Conclusions: the future of conflict in the former USSR

It is rare that specific conclusions about a book's subject matter can be drawn from an edited collection of this type. Certainly, the contributors to this volume would not agree on a rank order of causes for the different conflicts that have occurred on the territory of the former USSR. Nor would we necessarily agree on which of the wars since 1991 are more significant than others, and we would not be able to articulate a common position on the most appropriate way to resolve conflict in the former Soviet space. Such is the nature of academic discourse. So too is it the nature of war itself, which can be prompted by myriad structural, political, economic, social, ideational and technological forces, sometimes in easily recognisable patterns, and sometimes not. Yet it is instructive that all the chapters in this book find common ground on one key area: the prospects for future conflict. Each contribution explicitly notes that the conditions that can give rise to conflict have not been ameliorated in the two decades since the collapse of the USSR. In fact, it can be argued that they have actually grown more acute in some cases. There are several reasons for this, each of which has been addressed in more detail in specific chapters. Perhaps the most significant has been the inability of former Soviet states - whether due to material weakness, failure to construct appropriate domestic and regional institutions, competing interests, polarised identities, or a mix of these - to address the root causes of regional conflict.