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Prāsaṅgika Epistemology in Context
Some argue that a Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika is committed to rejecting all epistemic instruments pramäṇa because they reject intrinsic natures svabhäva and intrinsic characteristics (svalakṣaṇa). This chapter takes a different perspective. arguing that Candrakīrti accepts both conventional and rationally warranted epistemic instruments and develops a cogent account of their respective roles in our cognitive lives. To be sure, any Mādhyamika rejects intrinsic nature. but Candrakīrti shows that epistemic instruments give us access to epistemic objects (prameya) precisely because they lack such nature and that each has its appropriate sphere of use simply because, relative to the standards appropriate to those spheres, each apprehends its respective object.
History
Publication title
Moonshadows: conventional truth in Buddhist philosophyEditors
The CowherdsPagination
39-55ISBN
978-0-19-975143-3Department/School
School of HumanitiesPublisher
Oxford University PressPlace of publication
New YorkExtent
14Rights statement
Copyright 2011 Oxford University Press, Inc.Repository Status
- Restricted