Some argue that a Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika is committed to rejecting all epistemic instruments pramäṇa because they reject intrinsic natures svabhäva and intrinsic characteristics (svalakṣaṇa). This chapter takes a different perspective. arguing that Candrakīrti accepts both conventional and rationally warranted epistemic instruments and develops a cogent account of their respective roles in our cognitive lives. To be sure, any Mādhyamika rejects intrinsic nature. but Candrakīrti shows that epistemic instruments give us access to epistemic objects (prameya) precisely because they lack such nature and that each has its appropriate sphere of use simply because, relative to the standards appropriate to those spheres, each apprehends its respective object.
History
Publication title
Moonshadows: conventional truth in Buddhist philosophy
Editors
The Cowherds
Pagination
39-55
ISBN
978-0-19-975143-3
Department/School
School of Humanities
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Place of publication
New York
Extent
14
Rights statement
Copyright 2011 Oxford University Press, Inc.
Repository Status
Restricted
Socio-economic Objectives
Expanding knowledge in philosophy and religious studies