One diagnosis of Fitch’s paradox of knowability is that it hinges on the factivity of knowledge: that which is known is true. Yet the apparent role of factivity (in the paradox of knowability) and non-factive analogues in related paradoxes of justified belief can be shown to depend on familiar consistency and positive introspection principles. Rejecting arguments that the paradox hangs on an implausible consistency principle, this paper argues instead that the Fitch phenomenon is generated both in epistemic logic and logics of justification by the interaction of analogues of the knowability principle and positive introspection theses that are characteristic of, even if not entailed by, epistemic internalism.
History
Publication title
Synthese
Volume
195
Pagination
899-918
ISSN
0039-7857
Department/School
School of Humanities
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Place of publication
Netherlands
Rights statement
Copyright 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Repository Status
Restricted
Socio-economic Objectives
Expanding knowledge in philosophy and religious studies