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Factivity, consistency and knowability
One diagnosis of Fitch’s paradox of knowability is that it hinges on the factivity of knowledge: that which is known is true. Yet the apparent role of factivity (in the paradox of knowability) and non-factive analogues in related paradoxes of justified belief can be shown to depend on familiar consistency and positive introspection principles. Rejecting arguments that the paradox hangs on an implausible consistency principle, this paper argues instead that the Fitch phenomenon is generated both in epistemic logic and logics of justification by the interaction of analogues of the knowability principle and positive introspection theses that are characteristic of, even if not entailed by, epistemic internalism.
History
Publication title
SyntheseVolume
195Pagination
899-918ISSN
0039-7857Department/School
School of HumanitiesPublisher
Springer NetherlandsPlace of publication
NetherlandsRights statement
Copyright 2016 Springer Science+Business Media DordrechtRepository Status
- Restricted