Promoting tax transparency to address international tax evasion is a central issue on the global policy agenda with G8 leaders recently declaring that ‘tax authorities across the world should automatically share information to fight the scourge of tax evasion’. This growing commitment to addressing international tax evasion has a long provenance. Recently, the little-known US Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), enacted in 2010, has played a key role in this effort/the international effort. The rapid evolution and diffusion of FATCA has the potential to make significant inroads into international tax evasion and has been lauded by proponents of improved offshore tax compliance. Yet FATCA is based on a ‘unilateral’ model, imposed by Washington on financial institutions operating in the US, which critics argue undermines its prospects of providing an effective basis for international tax cooperation and governance. This article provides an empirical account of the origins and evolution of FATCA, arguing that while FATCA is likely to increase the capacity of the US government to tax offshore holdings of its citizens, its ‘unilateral’ origins and design may limit reciprocity within the international tax regime. The article concludes with an assessment of the likely consequences of FATCA in terms of its impact on both international tax evasion and on global governance more broadly.
History
Publication title
Global Policy
Volume
5
Pagination
321-333
ISSN
1758-5880
Department/School
School of Social Sciences
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Place of publication
United Kingdom
Rights statement
Copyright 2014 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.