In 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology'Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the primary epistemic norm of believing truths and not falsehoods. A theory of justification along these lines is then given, and its prospects of handling the evil demon objection to reliabilism are assessed.
History
Publication title
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume
69
Pagination
115-137
ISSN
0031-8205
Department/School
School of Humanities
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
Place of publication
Oxford
Rights statement
The definitive published version is available online at: http://interscience.wiley.com
Repository Status
Restricted
Socio-economic Objectives
Expanding knowledge in philosophy and religious studies