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Prāsaṅgika epistemology: A reply to Stag tsang's charge against Tsongkhapa's uses of Pramāṇa in Candrakīrti's philosophy
Stag tsang, amongst others, has argued that any use of mundane pramāṇa — authoritative cognition — is incompatible with the Prāsaṅgika system. His criticism of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka which insists on the uses of pramāṇa (tha snyad pa’i tshad ma) — authoritative cognition — within the Prāsaṅgika philosophical context is that it is contradictory and untenable. This paper is my defence of Tsongkhapa’s approach to pramāṇa in the Prāsaṅgika philosophy. By showing that Tsongkhapa consistently adopts a non-foundationalist approach in his interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika’s epistemology, and by showing that he emphatically denies any place for the foundationalist epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in the Prāsaṅgika system, I will argue that Tsongkhapa’s epistemology emerges from Stag tsang’s criticisms unscathed.
History
Publication title
Journal of Indian PhilosophyVolume
41Issue
5Pagination
535-561ISSN
1573-0395Department/School
School of HumanitiesPublisher
SpringerPlace of publication
DordrechtRights statement
Copyright 2013 Springer Science+Business Media DordrechtRepository Status
- Restricted