This article offers a feminist analysis of Rainer Forst’s position on same-sex marriage and tolerance. Moreover, it is an attempt to forge philosophical bridges between Forst and the work of Luce Irigaray. I am sympathetic to Forst’s argument that same-sex marriage is owed to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender men and women (LGBT) as a matter of right. However, I take issue with Forst’s characterisation of same-sex marriage as something to be tolerated by non-supporters. This is because tolerance does not require, let alone encourage, a perspectival change in the agent; and yet, there is no rational basis on which to oppose same-sex marriage. The maintenance of prejudicial attitudes is likely to contribute to the ongoing social discrimination that LGBT people face, even if legal equality is achieved for LGBT people.
History
Publication title
Parrhesia: a journal of critical philosophy
Volume
21
Pagination
113-124
ISSN
1834-3287
Department/School
School of Humanities
Publisher
Parrhesia
Place of publication
Australia
Rights statement
Copyright 2014 The Author Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/