University of Tasmania
Browse
2015-03_Sibly.pdf (4.05 MB)

Turn-taking in finitely repeated symmetric games: experimental evidence

Download (4.05 MB)
report
posted on 2023-06-22, 04:20 authored by Hugh Sibly, John Tisdell, Shaun Evans
In this paper we investigate the emergence of turn taking in three finitely repeated games: (i) an allocation game, (ii) a low conflict dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE) game and (iii) a high conflict DSE game in an experimental setting. The experiments are run with and without cheap talk communication between participants. In order to develop experimental conjectures and interpret results we develop a theoretical analysis which incorporates the presence of three types of participant: (i) cooperative, (ii) competitive and (iii) self seeking. Based on our theoretical analysis we hypothesize that turn taking may be exhibited experimentally in all three of the games we study when some participants have cooperative preferences. We find experimentally that turn taking emerges in all treatments, and its incidence is qualitatively similar in the allocation and DSE games. While cheap talk increased the rate of cooperative behavior and eliminated competitive behaviour, it had at most a small effect on self seeking behavior. The degree of conflict also had a small effect on the prevalence of turn taking. We observed, using a repeated matching experiment for the high conflict DSE games, that a large majority of participants' behavior can be attributed to one of the three types.

History

Series

Discussion Paper Series 2015‐03

Pagination

39

Publisher

University of Tasmania

Rights statement

Copyright 2015 University of Tasmania

Notes

JEL Classification: C91

Repository Status

  • Open

Usage metrics

    Tasmanian School of Business and Economics

    Categories

    No categories selected

    Licence

    Exports

    RefWorks
    BibTeX
    Ref. manager
    Endnote
    DataCite
    NLM
    DC