Is Laplacian determinism compatible with reasons-based freedom?

The topic of free will is perhaps the largest and richest debate in philosophy. With many notable philosophers having lent their hand to the discussion over the years, there is much that can be said of, and read into, this debate. It is, therefore, essential when engaging in any discussion of free will to make one's analysis well defined and sufficiently narrow in scope. For this reason, this thesis will tackle a specific question in relation to several of the main pillars of free will: compatibilism and determinism. Specifically, I will seek to answer whether Laplacian Determinism (a popular form of determinism) is compatible with reasonsbased freedom (a generalised compatibilist freedom that bases free will on the ability to act for reasons). Is every thesis of compatiblist freewill consistent with every thesis of determinism? I will argue, that at least in this case, the answer to that question is no.