Reasons for rewilding : the ethical and ecological principles of a novel mode of environmental restoration

The primary aim of this thesis is to explore and strengthen the ethical, ontological, and empirical foundations of rewilding. Rewilding is a novel environmental practice distinguished by, among other features, the acknowledgement of autonomy and agency in non-human nature, an attitude of tolerance toward large, wild animals, and an emphasis on ecosystem function over community composition. I argue that rewilding is an effective, distinctive, coherent, and ethically defensible environmental practice, one best characterized as creative collaboration with wild beings. I demonstrate, through case studies, quantitative investigation, and philosophical discourse, that successful rewilding projects depend upon several factors, including a multidisciplinary approach, wide engagement with relevant stakeholders, close attentiveness to the local characteristics of ecosystems, and recognition of the moral significance of the animals with which rewilding is involved. I briefly defend rewilding against claims that the term ‚ÄövÑv=rewilding‚ÄövÑv¥ is vague, ambiguous and redundant in the face of existing terms from restoration ecology. In short, I argue that some ambiguity and vagueness is acceptable for scientific terms. Moreover, rewilding captures values and goals that are downplayed in mainstream restoration ecology. I draw on empirical evidence from rewilding projects in Europe, the Americas, and Australia to show that trophic rewilding in particular‚ÄövÑvÆthe introduction of a population of vertebrates to facilitate ecosystem restoration through feeding behaviours‚ÄövÑvÆcan prevent and mitigate biological invasions and promote the coexistence of newcomer species with long-time residents. In a broad review, I note some of the important conceptual and ethical foundations of rewilding, including a focus on ecosystem function rather than composition, reliance on animal agency, and an appeal to an ethic of coexistence. I use theory from invasion biology to highlight pathways by which rewilding might prevent or mitigate the impacts of an invasion, including increasing biotic resistance. I consider the risk that rewilding may enable a biological invasion or aggravate the impacts of an invasion, as has occurred with some introductions, and highlight lessons that rewilding science might take from invasion biology. In this context, I analyse and articulate the conditions required for such rewilding success, along with the risks of rewilding introductions. I explore the philosophical underpinnings of rewilding practice, arguing against some standard approaches in favour of an account based in a relational ontology and one that foregrounds a guiding principle of accommodating others, including nonhumans. I claim that the recent emphasis on autonomy in philosophical work on rewilding should be balanced by framing rewilding as creative collaboration with non-human others. I argue that the wildness at issue in rewilding is the capacity for beings, in particular living beings, to create arrangements that are functional and integrated, by means other than instrumental reason. This creativity is essentially collaborative. Rewilding, then, can be thought of as accommodating and finding agreement with the creative capacities of wild beings. Admitting the concept of collaboration allows us to distinguish between exploitative and fair rewilding. The approach emphasises the interconnected character of environmental practices, treating rewilding as a collaborative mode of environmental intervention that reflects and acknowledges such interconnection. One implication of taking this stance is that rewilding must account for the interests, roles, and relationships of animals themselves. To illustrate the practical application of the position developed herein, I then develop a specific, feasible rewilding proposal in Tasmania. Emus were extirpated from Tasmania in the mid‚ÄövÑv¨1800s. A reintroduction of wild emus to Tasmanian landscapes is a means of reinstating ecological functions, cultural roles, and local biodiversity. The moral dimensions of our engagement with wild animals are made clearer by thinking of them as collaborators. This is reflected in, and paralleled by, the contemporary situation of some African elephants. Elephants are a favourite thought experiment for rewilding advocates. Considering their situation carefully reveals that much more than their ecological function needs to be taken into account if we are to rewild with elephants. I argue that some elephants, and by extension some other animals, can be considered refugees. The argument rests on an assumption that the moral criteria for being a refugee are similar to the near-universally recognised legal criteria detailed in the UN Refugee Convention. I show that some elephants likely meet these moral criteria. Rewilding has yet to settle on a definitive form in Australia. I use the example of emus along with the other chapters to argue that with a multidisciplinary approach to the science, a close eye on local social-ecological conditions, support by Indigenous people and other stakeholders, and collaboration with the wild beings themselves in a spirit of accommodation, rewilding in Australia can live up to the optimistic expectations of its proponents.