The effect of na‚àövòve theories of intelligence on metacognitive monitoring accuracy

Research suggests that individuals who believe their intelligence has the capacity to incrementally grow may make less accurate judgements of learning (JOLs) than those who believe intelligence is a fixed entity. JOLs represent a prediction of future recall, and have implications for real world study behaviour. The present study aimed to determine whether delaying JOLs could improve JOL accuracy for incremental theorists. It was hypothesised that there would be an interaction effect of theory of intelligence (TOI) and time on metacognitive accuracy, and that overall metacognitive accuracy would be better for delayed than immediate JOLs. 56 participants (46 females, 10 males) completed a pairedassociate learning task, provided immediate and delayed JOLs and completed a cued-recall test and Dweck's (1999) TOI measure. There was no effect of TOI on either immediate or delayed JOLs (all p's > 0.1), negating the first hypothesis. The second hypothesis was supported, F(1, 54) = 124.02, p < .001, d = 1.25, replicating the delayed-JOL effect. These findings suggest that poor metacognition is not a concern for incremental theorists, and speak to the utility of learning techniques that use retrieval cues as a basis for study behaviour.