SECURING TRANSNATIONAL OIL:
ENERGY TRANSIT STATES IN THE MALACCA STRAIT

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The research associated with this thesis abides by the international and Australian codes on human and animal experimentation, the guidelines by the Australian Government's Office of the Gene Technology Regulator and the rulings of the Safety, Ethics and Institutional Biosafety Committees of the University.

Allison Casey

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the roles of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia as 'energy transit states' for Middle Eastern oil flows, with specific reference to their efforts to ensure the Malacca Strait's safety, security and environmental protection. The Malacca Strait is one of the world's major chokepoints for oil shipped from the Arabian Peninsula to East Asia. While many scholars focus on the producers and consumers involved in this transnational energy supply chain, few have considered the third party countries that are located between them, or how they might contribute to supply chain security. And while a growing number of contributions seek to understand such 'energy transit states' for oil and gas pipelines in the South Caucasus and Black Sea regions, those in Southeast Asia are under-evaluated.

Appraisals of Singaporean, Indonesian and Malaysian foreign policies tend to assume that the three states have 'common interests' in upholding Strait security, and hence a sound basis for cooperation. Balance of Power expectations about alliance formation, and claims that Southeast Asian countries engage in consensus decision making practices and avoid interference in each others' affairs, often referred to as the 'ASEAN Way,' also support this view. It is certainly the case that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have engaged in a variety of efforts to protect the Malacca Strait, which accelerated in intensity following Admiral Thomas Fargo's (at the time Commander, United States Pacific Command) announcement in 2004 that a Regional Maritime Security Initiative would be established. Yet this was an initiative that Indonesia and Malaysia in particular saw as encroaching on their respective jurisdictions in the sea lane. More generally, assumptions about the likelihood of cooperation do not accord with less optimistic predictions that states will increasingly compete where strategic energy resources—such as oil—are involved.

This thesis therefore evaluates Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests and policy choices toward the Malacca Strait with respect to their energy transit state status. It does so in order to better understand whether claims about their common interests engendering cooperation in the sea lane actually hold, and offer a more cogent explanation of their interactions than arguments based on the Balance of Power or the ASEAN Way. To assess this, I develop a framework based on three types of energy transit states: the 'enmeshed energy transit state,' the 'fledgling

energy transit state' and the 'rising energy transit state.' I find that the three countries under review have markedly different stakes in Middle East-East Asia oil flows, and that this has shaped the scope of their agendas as well as the intensity of their security cooperation. In addition, I find that competition among the three has also been important, as each state seeks to capitalise on the supply chain for their own advantage. Thus, viewed through the lens of oil, a better account of the countries' interactions is one that recognises their converging and diverging interests. With Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia all expected to maintain, if not increase, their involvement in the transit oil supply chain, their motivations to both cooperate and compete in the Malacca Strait could be exacerbated in what is already a complicated maritime environment.

Keywords: Southeast Asia, oil, energy security, maritime security, Malacca Strait, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI	*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* Indonesia's Armed Forces
ADMM-Plus	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meetings Plus
ANF	Aids to Navigation Fund
AMF	ASEAN Maritime Forum
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASL	Archipelagic Sea Lanes
BAKORKAMLA / IMSCB	*Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut Republik Indonesia* / Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board
BP	British Petroleum
BP Migas	*Badan Pelaksana Kegiatan Usaha Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi* Executive Agency for Upstream Oil and Gas Activities
BPH Migas	*Badan Pengatur Hilir Minyak dan Gas Bumi* Regulating Agency for Downstream Oil and Gas
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CSI	Container Security Initiative
CTF	Combined Task Force
DWT	Deadweight Tonnes
EAS	East Asia Summit
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA	Energy Information Administration
EiS	Eyes in the Sky
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangements
GAM	*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* Free Aceh Movement
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IEA	International Energy Agency
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMO	International Maritime Organization

ISC	Information Sharing Centre
ISCP	Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrols
ISPS Code	International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 2004
Lemhannas RI	*Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional Republik Indonesia* Indonesian National Resilience Institute
LST	Landing Ship Tank
MAF	Malaysian Armed Forces
MARPOL	International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973/1978
MEH	Marine Electronic Highway
MIMA	Maritime Institute of Malaysia
MISC	Malaysia International Shipping Corporation
MMEA	Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency
MPA	Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore
MSC	Malacca Straits Council
MSP	Malacca Straits Patrols
MSTF	Maritime Security Task Force
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PACOM	United States Pacific Command
PCG	Singapore Police Coast Guard
POLAIR	Indonesian Marine Police
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
PSSA	Particularly Sensitive Sea Area
ReCAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia
RMAF	Royal Malaysian Air Force
RMN	Royal Malaysian Navy
RMSI	Regional Maritime Security Initiative
RSAF	Republic of Singapore Air Force
RSN	Republic of Singapore Navy
SOLAS	International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974
SUA	Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988
TEU	Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units
TNI	*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* Indonesian Armed Forces

TNI-AL	*Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Angkatan Laut* Indonesian Navy
TSS	Traffic Separation Scheme
TTEG	Tripartite Technical Experts Group
ULCC	Ultra Large Crude Carrier
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention for Law of the Sea 1982
VLCC	Very Large Crude Carrier

INTRODUCTION

The point is often made that East Asia's increasing reliance on African and Middle Eastern oil will have significant global impacts.[1] Yet this tends to overshadow another important consideration: the posture of littoral countries in Southeast Asia that sit adjacent to the Malacca Strait. With a growing number of maritime and continental transnational energy supply chains emerging throughout the international system, the need to understand such stakeholder dynamics will only increase in importance. This thesis explores how Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia interact toward securing the sea lane, in the context of their positions as third party states located along a transnational oil supply chain that stretches from the Arabian Peninsula to East Asia. It does so by analysing the three countries' interests and policy decisions through an energy transit state framework that is developed throughout the thesis. I argue that the countries' stakes in the transnational oil supply are powerful indicators for predicting the nature and scope of their policy choices, and better explain their interactions than Balance of Power-based notions of alliance formation, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) principle of consensus decision making and non-interference that is known as the 'ASEAN Way.' I demonstrate that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have different stakes in the transit oil supply, that they prioritise different strategic issues in the Strait on this basis, and that their stakes have prompted both their cooperative and competitive policy choices toward the sea lane. The study reveals an important interplay between each country's stake and its historical experiences, traditional security conceptions, foreign policy making practices and domestic factors. Furthermore, I show that the three countries uphold both converging and diverging interests in the Malacca Strait, rather than 'common' interests (as is often claimed).

[1] For instance, see R Dannreuther, 'China and Global Oil: Vulnerability and Opportunity,' *International Affairs* 87, no. 6 (2011); M Dorraj and J E English, 'China's Strategy for Energy Acquisition in the Middle East: Potential for Conflict and Cooperation with the United States,' *Asian Politics and Policy* 4, no. 2 (2012); T Feldhoff, 'Japan's Energy Future: Challenges and Opportunities in a Changing Geopolitical Environment,' *Geopolitics, History and International Relations* 3, no. 2 (2011); A M Jaffe and K B Medlock III, 'China and Northeast Asia,' in *Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy*, ed. J H Kalicki and D L Goldwyn (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); P Jain, 'Japan's Energy Security Policy in an Era of Emerging Competition in the Asia-Pacific,' in *Energy Security in Asia*, ed. M Wesley (London; New York: Routledge, 2007); H Lee and D A Shalmon, 'Searching for Oil: China's Initiatives in the Middle East,' *Environment* 49, no. 5 (2007); S A Yetiv and C Lu, 'China, Global Energy, and the Middle East,' *Middle East Journal* 61, no. 2 (2007).

Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have long held important positions as 'energy transit states' in relation to the transnational shipment of crude and refined oil through the Malacca Strait. That is, they are located between some of the world's largest oil producers in the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa, and major consumers such as China, Japan and South Korea. It is through the three littoral countries' waters that such oil shipments pass. Yet the Malacca Strait poses a range of strategic challenges related to its safety, security and environmental protection.[2] Non-state actors' unauthorised activities have long been present. The frequency of piracy incidents and armed robbery at sea[3] in Southeast Asia rose following the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, and has been particularly prevalent near Indonesia.[4] Concerns about terrorism in the sea lane were raised in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 World Trade Centre attacks (9/11), and high profile incidents such as the suspected al Qaeda bombings of the United States (US) warship *USS Cole* in the Gulf of Aden in 2000 and the *Limburg* oil tanker at Yemen in 2002. Such concerns became pronounced following regional attacks, including the suspected terrorist hijacking of the chemical tanker *Dewi Madrim* while it was passing through the Malacca Strait in 2003, and the Abu Sayyaf Group bombing of passenger ship *Superferry 14* in the Philippines in 2004.[5] Transnational organised crime such as arms proliferation, drug smuggling, illegal fishing and the unauthorised movement of people among countries in the region are rife in the Malacca Strait's waters as well.[6]

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[2] The stability of the Malacca Strait's maritime domain is usually conceptualised as three distinct issue areas of 'safety of navigation,' 'security' and 'environmental protection.' Unless specified in text, this thesis uses the terms 'security' and 'stability' to refer to all three issue areas in aggregation.

[3] 'Piracy' and 'armed robbery at sea' both generally refer to non-state actors' actual or attempted theft of merchant ships, their equipment or their cargo. The terms are usually distinguished by their legal definitions. The United Nations Convention for Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) refers to piracy as occurring on the high seas, whereas International Maritime Organization (IMO) refers to such activity within a country's jurisdiction. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB), which reports annually on ship attacks, designates the two terms with the same statistical classification. Commonwealth of Australia (Office of the Inspector of Transport Security), *International Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea Inquiry Report*, (2010), http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/oits/files/IPARS_SecurityInquiryReport.pdf, 6-7.

[4] C Z Raymond, 'Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A Problem Solved?' *Naval War College Review* 62, no. 3 (2009): 36.

[5] See Y-h Song, 'Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: Responses to the US Proposal,' in *Global Legal Challenges: Command of the Commons, Strategic Communications, and Natural Disasters*, ed. M D Carsten (Newport: Naval War College, 2007), 101-2.

[6] S Bateman, 'Confronting Maritime Crime in Southeast Asian Waters Reexamining "Piracy" in the Twenty-First Century,' in *Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies*, ed. B A Elleman, A Forbes, and D Rosenberg, *Naval War College Newport Papers* Vol. 35 (Newport: Naval War College, 2010), http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/Piracy-and-Maritime-Crime-NWC-

States that are proximate to the Malacca Strait as well as those located outside Southeast Asia are concerned about the waterway. Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's political elites routinely refer to the Strait in their security policy pronouncements.[7] China has a 'Malacca Dilemma' that stems from its dependence on energy resource imports.[8] The US's Energy Information Administration (EIA) refers to the sea lane as the "key chokepoint in Asia."[9] In 2010, alleged cables that entered the public domain through the Wikileaks website revealed that the US included the Malacca Strait in a world list of critical infrastructure.[10] And in 2012, India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reflected that the sea lane had long been a feature of New Delhi's strategic calculus.[11]

To this list can be added issues in navigational safety and environmental protection. The Malacca Strait's depth can vary due to shifting sand waves[12] and several hundred shipwrecks are spread throughout its waters.[13] Each year smoke haze spreads over the sea lane from forest burning activities in Sumatra to reach the Malay Peninsula and Singapore.[14] Accidents in the Strait can be fatal and cause pollution. One of the most serious occurred on 6 January 1975, when the Japanese tanker *Showa Maru* grounded near Indonesia's Buffalo Rock and spilled 884,000 gallons of oil.[15] On 18 August 2009, the Liberian-registered tanker *Formosa Product Brick* caught fire after it collided with the Isle of Man-registered coal carrier *Ostende Max* offshore

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2010.pdf, 137-45; S Bateman, J H Ho, and C Z Raymond, 'Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: An Agenda for Action,' *IDSS Commentaries* 41 (2006): 2.

[7] Deputy Minister Ahmad Maslan, cited in 'Selat Melaka Selamat Dari Ancaman Lanun,' *Utusan Online* 11 Sep 2012; T Y Lui, 'Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the 5th Cooperation Forum, Grand Copthorne Waterfront Hotel, Singapore,' 24 Sep 2012; Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of State Secretariat), 'Tanya Jawab Presiden RI Dengan Perwira Siswa Sesko TNI, Sesko Angkatan Dan Sespimmen Polri,' 29 Jun 2012 http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view &id=6512&Itemid=26.

[8] I Storey, 'China's "Malacca Dilemma,"' *Jamestown Foundation China Brief* 6, no. 8 (2006).

[9] United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'World Oil Transit Chokepoints,' 2012 http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf.

[10] B Kendall, 'Wikileaks: Site List Reveals US Sensitivities,' *BBC News*, 6 Dec 2010.

[11] Manmohan Singh, 'PM's Address to the Combined Commanders' Conference, New Delhi, India' (19 Oct 2012).

[12] R M Kamaruzaman, 'Navigational Safety in the Strait of Malacca,' *Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law* 2 (1998): 472.

[13] 'Fund Raised to Remove Ship Wrecks in the Straits,' *Star*, 11 Oct 2011.

[14] 'Haze Returns to Malaysia,' *Agence France-Presse* 16 Jun 2012; N Wong-Anan, 'Worst Haze from Indonesia in 4 Years Hits Neighbors Hard,' *Reuters*, 12 Oct 2006.

[15] M Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978), 65.

from Port Dickson, resulted in the deaths of nine crew members.[16] Such issues and events impose a burden upon the Strait's three littoral countries in managing its waters.

Questions therefore arise about the roles, interests and policy choices of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, with particular reference to how they have sought to protect the Malacca Strait and the oil supply that runs through it. As the sea lane's primary security providers, each nation has engaged in a complicated security architecture consisting of numerous mechanisms. Early efforts include the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG), established in 1977 to manage navigation and environment matters.[17] More recently, heightened security concerns in the aftermath of 9/11, the *USS Cole*, the *Limburg* and the rise in regional piracy rates have prompted a range of maritime initiatives to be established, many of which have focused on non-traditional challenges. These have included broad statements of recognition by regional multilateral organisations at Track I and Track II levels, US-led efforts such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) addition of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS). In response to Commander of the US Pacific Command Admiral Thomas Fargo's call to establish a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in March 2004—an initiative that was misrepresented in the media to imply that US Navy Seals would be permanently deployed to patrol the Malacca Strait—Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia established the trilateral naval patrols known as the MALSINDO Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols. Later, they formed its aerial surveillance counterpart, Eyes in the Sky (EiS). And yet while the three countries' efforts to protect the sea lane should certainly be applauded, it is difficult to determine whether there is any overarching rationale in how they have proceeded. Some aspects of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's approaches toward the Malacca Strait have

[16] Agence France-Presse, 'Nine Missing after Oil Tanker Collides with Bulk Carrier,' *Sydney Morning Herald* 20 Aug 2009; S Singh, 'Seven Bodies of Missing MT Formosa Crewmen Found,' *Star*, 22 Aug 2009.
[17] Cooperative Mechanism, 'Tripartite Technical Expert's Group (TTEG),' Malaysia (Marine Department), 2010 http://www.cooperativemechanism.org.my/index.php?option=com_content &view=article&id=16&Itemid=10.

been recognised in relevant literature.[18] But it is not clear if the three countries act in the same manner when their positions as energy transit states are taken into account.

Compounding this problem is Singapore's repeated statements that the three countries have cooperated in the Malacca Strait on the basis of their 'common interests.' This claim makes sense as far as the three countries have broadly stated their interests in maintaining regional stability.[19] But it is perplexing because Singapore has vocally advocated greater levels of collaboration to share the Strait's maritime security burden, whereas Indonesia and Malaysia have not. The danger here, then, lies in the miscalculations that could occur from assuming that geographically proximate countries necessarily uphold the same interests. It is thus important to explore whether Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia actually have 'common interests' in relation to their positions as energy transit states.

It is worth noting that ASEAN (of which the three littoral countries are founding members) has long claimed that its member states *do* uphold shared principles and approaches in their practice of consensus-based decision making and avoidance of interference in each others' affairs known as the 'ASEAN Way.' Similarly, Balance of Power predictions relating to alliance formation expect that states cooperate to secure against shared challenges. Despite the apparent suitability of the 'ASEAN Way' and Balance of Power notions to account for Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's approaches toward the Malacca Strait, they do not easily recognise that states' interests might not always be 'common,' or that they might engage in policy decisions that do not facilitate cooperation.

Indeed, while scholars have thoroughly studied the three countries' interactions in the sea lane, there has been little consideration of how the transnational oil trade might influence their interests and policy choices. It is common for contributors to note that the Malacca Strait is a shipping chokepoint. At least 70,000

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[18] Such as J Ho, 'The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,' *Asian Survey* 46 (2006); I Storey, 'Securing Southeast Asia's Sea Lanes: A Work in Progress,' *Asia Policy* 6 (2008).

[19] At the 19th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), for instance, ministers:

> [R]eaffirmed that the ARF should continue to serve as a platform for countries in the region to deal with challenges in the security environment while continuing to uphold the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes in the Asia-Pacific based on the principles of international law and use of multilateral mechanisms in finding common solutions to problems.

ASEAN Regional Forum, 'Chairman's Statement of the 19th ASEAN Regional Forum Phnom Penh, Cambodia,' 12 Jul 2012 http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library/ARF Chairman's Statements and Reports/The Nineteenth ASEAN Regional Forum, 2011-2012/FINAL 19th ARF Chairmans Statement, PhnomPenh, 12July2012.pdf.

vessels pass through it each year,[20] transporting one-third of the world's trade, half of its oil transportation and 70-90% of China's, Japan's and South Korea's oil requirements.[21] Other than statements of this nature, there has been little attempt in the literature to understand the ramifications of this energy trade in much more detail, or consider how supply chain dynamics in 'upstream' locations from the Malacca Strait toward the Arabian Peninsula, or 'downstream' toward the South China Sea and beyond might impact on this mid-point transit region.

More worrying is that the Malacca Strait's security is receiving less attention as a matter for inquiry. There are two main reasons for this. Unauthorised non-state actor activities in the sea lane—namely piracy and armed robbery at sea—have reportedly decreased since Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia established the MALSINDO Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols, the EiS and similar mechanisms. Additionally, other pressing maritime issues—such as the rise of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and heightened state tensions in the South China Sea—have come to dominate research agendas.[22] Together, these factors suggest that the Malacca Strait does not hold the same analytical significance as it did one decade ago.

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[20] In 2010, 74,136 vessel movements were reported to the Klang Vessel Traffic Service compared to 59,314 in 2001. Malaysia (Marine Department), 'Statistics of Ships Movement Reported to VTS Klang since 2001 until 2010,' http://www.marine.gov.my/jlm/pic/article/Stat Pergerakan kapal 2001-2010.pdf. Establishing a precise figure on shipping traffic in the Malacca Strait is fraught with complexity due to the variety of craft (e.g. passenger ferries, containerised cargo, 'ro-ro' ships, military vessels and oil tankers) that use its waters, the nature of their voyages (e.g. local fishing activities, feeder lines and international journeys) and multiple sources of data (e.g. littoral states' Vessel Traffic Service systems, individual ports' statistics and third parties' estimations). Estimations of the Strait's traffic having gradually grown from some 44,000 vessels annually during the 1980s to as many as 100,000 are not uncommon (G Naidu, 'The Straits of Malacca in the Malaysian Economy,' in *The Straits of Malacca: International Cooperation in Trade, Funding and Navigational Safety*, ed. B A Hamzah (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk, 1997), and T E Chua et al., 'The Malacca Straits,' *Marine Pollution Bulletin* 41, no. 6 (2000), cited in A T Law and Y S Hii, 'Status, Impacts and Mitigation of Hydrocarbon Pollution in the Malaysian Seas,' *Aquatic Ecosystem Health and Management* 9, no. 2 (2006): 147). On the whole, however, the data sources all acknowledge that the number of vessels in the Strait is increasing and that the transportation of crude and refined oil represents a sizable proportion of the traffic.

[21] Estimates of the exact quantities of crude and refined oil shipped through the Malacca Strait vary but 80% of East Asia's oil imports is the oft-cited approximation. Guy C. K. Leung notes the trade amounts to "70-80% of the oil from Africa and the Middle East towards China," and Ian Storey cites 90% of Japan's and 70-80% of China's oil imports. Similarly, for Suk Kyoon Kim, the Strait encounters "30% of world's trade, 50% of oil transportation, and 90% of the oil destined for Japan and Korea." S K Kim, 'Maritime Security Initiatives in East Asia: Assessment and the Way Forward,' *Ocean Development and International Law* 42, no. 3 (2011): 228; G Lees, 'China Seeks Burmese Route around the "Malacca Dilemma,"' *World Politics Review* (2007), and M Lanteigne, 'China's Maritime Security and the "Malacca Dilemma,"' *Asian Security* 4, no. 2 (2008), cited in G C K Leung, 'China's Energy Security: Perception and Reality,' *Energy Policy* 39, no. 3 (2011): 1333; Storey, 'Securing Southeast Asia's Sea Lanes,' 103.

[22] A rough indication of this research trend can be shown by conducting a full text search of publications listed in the Springer Link database (http://link.springer.com) for the strings 'Somalia

These developments do not take into account any issues related to global oil trading. The maritime domain remains the most practical, flexible and cost-efficient means to transport large quantities of crude and refined oil. The Middle East and North Africa is predicted to continue being the world's primary oil producing region to 2035,[23] with Saudi Arabia and Iraq to account for the largest supply increases out to 2030.[24] China continues to be a major contributor to the 45% growth increase in world oil needs that is anticipated to occur in the next two decades.[25] In addition to these supply and demand projections, all three of the Malacca Strait's littoral countries face important challenges in relation to the transit oil supply. Singapore has long positioned itself as a regional energy and maritime logistics hub, but the rise of other large capacity ports have the potential to detract from its regional leadership.[26] Indonesia has recently become a net oil importer despite being one of the larger oil reserve holders in Southeast Asia.[27] Malaysia, too, is set to cease being self-sufficient in oil,[28] and there are indications that it is expanding its ports' critical infrastructure to better capitalise on the transit supply too.[29] Thus, at a glance, the geostrategic importance of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's locations adjacent to the Malacca Strait, as it pertains to the shipment of oil between the Arabian Peninsula and East Asia, is increasing rather than decreasing.

AND Maritime AND Security,' 'Malacca AND Maritime AND Security,' and 'South China Sea' AND Maritime AND Security.' These searches respectively return 32, 22 and 28 publications for the 2003-2007 period, suggesting similar levels of attention in the scholarship. Yet for the 2008-2012 period, Somalia has commanded a much greater share, with 154 publications. This compares to 70 and 87 results for 'Malacca' and the 'South China Sea' throughout the same timeframe.

[23] F Birol, 'World Energy Outlook,' World Energy Council, 11 Nov 2011 http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/weo_2011__presentation.pdf, 27.

[24] British Petroleum, 'BP Energy Outlook 2030,' 2011 http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2010_downloads/2030_energy_outlook_booklet.pdf, 27.

[25] 'China's "Malacca Dilemma" Inspiring Quest for Energy Security, Says Kaplan,' Credit Suisse Asian Investment Conference Reporter, 21 Mar 2012 https://www.credit-suisse.com/conferences/aic/2012/en/reporter/day3/pacific_politics.jsp.

[26] For example see 'Singapore Faces its Challengers,' *Bunkerworld*, Sep 2007; A McKinnon, 'Hong Kong and Singapore Ports: Challenges, Opportunities and Global Competitiveness,' *Hong Kong Centre for Maritime and Transportation Law Working Paper Series* (2011); J L Tongzon, 'The Rise of Chinese Ports and its Impact on the Port of Singapore' (paper presented at the First Annual International Workshop on Port Economics and Policy in Singapore, 5-6 Dec 2011), 1-2.

[27] British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012,' http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2012.pdf, 6; Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources), 'OPEC Conference Agrees on Indonesia's Membership Suspension,' 10 Sep 2008 http://www.esdm.go.id/news-archives/opec/51-opec-en/1999-opec-conference-agrees-on-indonesias-membership-suspension.html.

[28] 'IEA Predicts Malaysia to Become Net Importer of Oil and Gas by 2017,' *Bernama*, 5 Jun 2012.

[29] For example, Iskandar Malaysia, 'Oil and Gas Lab's Vision,' http://www.iskandarmalaysia.com.my/pdf/cc-openday/oil-and-gas-eng.pdf.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Given the Malacca Strait's function in facilitating global seaborne oil supplies, that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia are the sea lane's primary security providers, and the complexity of their maritime security architecture, it is worthwhile considering how the three countries' stakes in Middle East-East Asia oil flows offers insight for understanding their interests and policy decisions in Strait security. Thus, the primary research question addressed by this thesis is:

> How are Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests and policy choices informed by their stakes in the transnational supply of oil between Middle Eastern producers and East Asian consumers, and does an approach that recognises energy transit states yield better understandings of their attempts to secure the Malacca Strait?

In answering this question, the thesis focuses on two knowledge gaps. One is theoretical and the other empirical. It first seeks to develop conceptual notions of third party 'energy transit states' that are geographically located along a transnational energy supply chain in between producer and consumer countries. To do so it builds on a nascent energy transit state literature that has been geographically bounded to address transit states for Russian oil and gas supplies sent by pipeline to Europe in the South Caucasus and Black Sea regions. An analysis of Southeast Asia offers a means to consolidate conceptual notions about the roles of energy transit states and at the same time expand the literature's limited empirical base. Having a more rigorous framework at hand will then have value for studying other energy transit states' roles throughout the international system.

Second, the thesis aims to resolve whether Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia really do have 'common interests' as energy transit states, and assess how they have cooperated in supply chain security matters in the Malacca Strait on this basis. Given also that strategic natural resources such as oil are regarded in the literature as prompting states' rivalry—as suggested in the title of Michael T. Klare's 2012 monograph, *The Race for What's Left: The Global Scramble for the World's Last Resources*—a key matter demanding attention is whether the littoral countries' transit state positions have engendered cooperation or competition. It is an easy claim that the three countries have seamlessly cooperated to protect the sea lane. But understanding their interests and policy choices as energy transit states sooner rather than later will be valuable at a time when the quantity of oil sent from the Middle East

to East Asia is set to increase, and other supply chain stakeholders are, in turn, likely to prioritise Strait security.

This thesis therefore sits at an important juncture in the literature that bridges energy security and maritime security discussions. It is through an understanding of Southeast Asia's energy transit states that their interactions to protect the supply chain in the sea lane can be explained. Without knowing the factors surrounding Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's transit state positions, it would be hard to determine whether their interests are the same, or to judge their policy choices. Likewise, theorising about energy transit states is of little use if there is no practical application for international politics in maritime Southeast Asia, or elsewhere.

An Energy Transit State Framework

This thesis develops a conceptual framework for explaining energy transit state policy choices, applies it to Southeast Asia as a new theatre of analysis, and considers its value against alternative explanations based on alliance formation and the ASEAN Way. The framework is based upon the notion that energy transit states have different stakes in transnational energy supply chains, and that this presents certain consequences for their strategic postures. Much like the terms 'great power,' 'middle power' and 'small power' can be used to designate countries' standings in the international system and make assumptions about their policy choices, I argue that there are three main types of energy transit state. Categorising countries as 'fledgling energy transit states,' 'rising energy transit states' and 'enmeshed energy transit states' can help reveal their interests and policy decisions toward an energy supply chain. An enmeshed energy transit state pursues an active role in the supply chain, which reflects its high stake in the transit supply. In contrast, fledgling energy transit states have little or no stake in the transit supply and consequently encounter little incentive to manage it. Lastly, the rising energy transit state type is conceptually positioned in between these two extremes.

In applying this framework to the Malacca Strait, it is necessary to determine the significance of the transnational oil supply for Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. This requires assessing the relationship between each country's commercial oil sector and the transnational energy supply chain, including whether its domestic oil reserves or the transit supply is more important. After the conclusion of the Second World

War, Southeast Asia was well-placed to capitalise on the shipment of oil to East Asia. With Japan set on a path of postwar reconstruction, and a new generation of large capacity tankers that made bulk oil transportation economically feasible, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia (as well as their regional neighbours) were ideally situated for the oil majors to build additional refinery capacity at a midpoint location in the supply chain. I argue in the thesis that this did not necessarily mean that the three countries had identical experiences. Singapore, for example, has become a major port and energy hub despite having no oil reserves of its own. In comparison, Indonesia's oil reserves are among Southeast Asia's largest. As such, I argue that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia respectively fit the 'enmeshed,' 'fledgling' and 'rising' energy transit state types.

The analysis also aims to use the findings of the initial energy transit state assessment to forecast the three countries' strategic interests and policy choices toward the Malacca Strait. This requires verifying the countries' postures based on their transit state positions. In particular, the discussion considers which issues in the Strait are prioritised over others on a country by country basis. In each case, the analysis examines how each state's interests reflects its stake in transit oil. I demonstrate that the transit oil stakes of each of the three countries' examined in this thesis has led them to accord maritime issues a different priority in their security agendas. Singapore's enmeshment has meant that it is sensitive to the potential for non-state actors to disrupt the transnational supply chain and, in turn, its livelihood. Indonesia's fledgling connection to the transiting shipments has meant that it is far less concerned about such challenges, and Malaysia's moderate transit oil stake is linked to its difficulty in making priorities out of its multiple security concerns.

The thesis then re-examines each country's transit oil stake to set out expected behavioural outcomes, and determines whether this occurred in reference to the cooperation and competition parameters identified earlier. I argue that Singapore's active involvement in maritime collaboration reflects its enmeshment in the Strait's transit oil shipments, that Indonesia's constrained contributions follow on from its nominal connection to the supplies, and that Malaysia's wide-ranging but not all-encompassing maritime efforts stems from its moderate energy stake. Further to this, the thesis makes the claim that an energy transit state's supply chain security interests are not necessarily bounded to its immediate territory, and that it will attempt to pursue its agenda regardless of geography it upstream and downstream locations. In

demonstrating this, the research considers whether there are any links between Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's policy choices in the Malacca Strait, and their approaches toward the maritime domain stretching from the Arabian Peninsula to East Asia, through which the transnational supply of oil is shipped.

Following this, a comparative analysis of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia considers the case study results in aggregate, which in turn develops an answer to the research question. I show that the three states' interests both converge and diverge, and that they cooperate as well as compete to realise their respective sea lane agendas. I argue that notions of alliance and the ASEAN Way cannot account for these findings, and that the energy transit state framework developed in this thesis offers a more sophisticated explanation.

RESEARCH METHOD

To analyse the strategic policy making of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia as it relates to their Strait security efforts, this thesis adopts an empirical inductive approach to three heuristic case studies. Its primary research consists of an evaluation of the littoral countries' policy pronouncements, as detailed in official government documents and news releases.[30] This is supplemented by a series of in-country interviews which were conducted in August and September 2009 with experts in fields related to maritime security and energy security.

The scope of the thesis is limited to the three cases of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, since they are the primary providers for the Malacca Strait's safety, security and environmental protection. Much like the existing scholarship on energy transit states that has focussed on the South Caucasus and Black Sea regions as mid-point countries involved in the supply of oil and gas from Russia to the European Union, these cases have been deliberately chosen in order to allow for comparison. Although Thailand has also formally participated in naval patrols in the northern stretches of the sea lane since 2008 in coordination with the trilateral patrols,[31] it has largely remained outside of Strait cooperative efforts and is not generally considered

[30] Sources include national news agencies *Antara* and *Bernama*, Singapore's *Straits Times*, Indonesia's *Jakarta Post* and *Jakarta Globe*, and Malaysia's *Star* and *New Straits Times.*
[31] 'Thailand Joins Malacca Straits Patrol,' *Asia One*, 18 Sep 2008.

as one of the Malacca Strait's littoral states.[32] Similarly, other stakeholders that have interests in the transnational energy supply chain—such as producers in the Middle East and Northern Africa, East Asian consumers including China, Japan and South Korea, as well as other users of the Strait like the US—have contributed through predominantly 'soft' means to maintain the Malacca Strait's stability. Moreover, they do not experience the movement of seaborne oil supplies on international journeys through their maritime territories on a firsthand basis.

Obviously this research encounters the same shortcomings as those faced by studies with similar methodological designs. Relying on senior decison makers' statements can be hazardous, as their authorship can be unclear and their release can be reactionary. Language biases can also affect the interpretation of policy statements. However, this thesis follows other studies' practices of identifying consistencies and changes of policy pronouncements in comparison to previous governments' statements, based on the assumption that a country's geostrategic interests tend to change slowly over time.[33]

Though there are ongoing disagreements within International Relations scholarship regarding the relative influence of agency over structure in strategic policy pronouncements, the assessment of geopolitical factors to explain states' preferences has long been established as an appropriate analytical tool.[34] As any model by its very nature requires a simplification of reality so that generalised

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[32] According to Chia Lin Sien, "[o]ne could include Thailand as one of the littoral states because it borders the Straits near its northern entrance, but Thailand is not strictly within the main body of the Straits." C L Sien, 'The Importance of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,' *Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law*, no. 2 (1998): 301.

[33] International Relations scholarship experienced debate during the 1950s about whether fixed national interests could be objectively identified or if they might undergo occasional modification. D E Nuechterlein, *America Recommitted: A Superpower Assesses its Role in a Turbulent World*, 2nd ed. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 12-3. In 1952 Hans Morgenthau referred to the Unietd States' (US) "unchanging interests that were pursued in different periods of history with different methods because the circumstances changed under which they had to be pursued." H J Morgenthau, 'What is the National Interest of the United States?' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 282 (1952): 4. In the contemporary international system, states' geographical circumstances tends to be fixed (aside from territorial conquest). A country's national interests, as they pertain to geography, can therefore be said to be static relative to other factors such as its politics and economy.

[34] The emergence of geopolitics as a field of study can be traced to the late 19th century, and its core ideas to the fourth century BC with Herodotus. G Herb, 'The Politics of Political Geography,' in *The Sage Handbook of Political Geography*, ed. K R Cox, M Low, and J Robinson (London: Sage Publications, 2008), 23. An example of causative research in international politics using geography as a variable is the Correlates of War project direct contiguity data set. It measures states' proximity and has been extensively used in studies of international conflict. D M Stinnett et al., 'The Correlates of War (COW) Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3.0,' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19, no. 2 (2002): 61-2.

observations can be made, the energy transit state framework developed in this thesis cannot account for all aspects of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's policy statements and interactions toward the Malacca Strait. Hence, while the states' transit stakes constitute the primary focus of this thesis, I also note the effects of non-oil factors as well. I do not endeavour to evaluate each mechanism that the littoral countries have ever put in place to manage the sea lane's stability. Rather, the thesis sets out to understand patterns in the three states' postures that have value for an expanding energy security scholarship, and offer new insight into their maritime security interactions.

THESIS STRUCTURE

The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter One critically assesses scholarship relevant to energy transit states, presents Southeast Asia as a new theatre of analysis in the context of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's 'common interests-cooperation' dilemma, and explains how detailed analyses of the three countries' approaches toward the Malacca Strait through the lens of transnational oil would likely generate new empirical and conceptual knowledge. In particular, it explores how conventional understandings of energy security are expanding to recognise a wide range of actors involved in supply chain security, how a nascent theme among such contributions recognises the roles of third party energy transit states, and notes the tendency for strategic energy resources to foster competitive policy choices in international politics. It shows how a study of Southeast Asia in relation to Middle East-East Asia oil flows offers a means to extend the geographical scope of energy transit state literature, and also providing some certainty about the unorganised explanations of transit states' interests and decision making. Alternative explanations based on the ASEAN Way and the Balance of Power are also outlined, of which I return to consider in the final analysis. The chapter's last section justifies the thesis's research design, including the utility of employing an empirically rich analysis that can underpin the building of a more robust energy transit state conceptual framework.

Chapters Two, Three and Four represent the case studies of the thesis. The aim of these chapters is to empirically validate the energy transit state framework and uncover evidence that can answer the research question. Each progresses according to a common four-part structure so as to highlight areas of congruity and incongruity,

while also facilitate a comparison and contrast process at a later stage of the thesis. The chapters begin with an analysis of how the case study country's foreign policy making and defence policy making is understood in contemporary scholarship. Here, the objective is to identify the specific value that an analysis of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's energy transit state positions would need to realise and how the new knowledge would fit into existing explanations of their strategic posturing.

Each case study then conducts the analysis of the country in question's position as an energy transit state, with the aim to identify which of the three energy transit state types it fits into. Two main issues are addressed here. The first is the transnational energy supply chain's importance to the country's strategic interests. The second is how this compares to the country's domestic oil sector activities. Determining the significance of 'transit oil' versus 'local oil' supplies and whether this has fluctuated throughout the country's statehood sets up the remainder of each chapter's discussion.

The third part of each case study chapter examines each country's strategic agenda in the Malacca Strait. Questions asked here include whether particular issues are prioritised over others, and whether each country's transit oil stake is relevant to its threat perception. Last, each chapter examines the case study country's policy choices as they pertain to maritime security in the Malacca Strait, whether there are discernible themes or traits in their policy choices, whether they cooperated or competed, and again whether their transit oil stakes are relevant to their decision making. Each country analysis demonstrates that energy transit states' interests and actions in supply chain security matters are influenced by the nature of their stakes, and that their own unique approaches to maritime security cooperation in the Malacca Strait has furthered their national interests, not just their Strait-specific objectives.

In particular, Chapter Two assesses Singapore's position as an energy transit state and asks what this has meant for its interests and policy decisions toward the Malacca Strait's security. It first argues that being a regional energy and maritime logistics hub has been a significant part of Singapore's attempts to offset its geostrategic vulnerability, and that the island state can be best understood to be an enmeshed energy transit state on this basis. It then demonstrates that Singapore's high level of involvement in Middle East-East Asia oil flows is related to why it flags piracy and maritime terrorism as sea lane priorities, and why its proactive efforts to

manage Strait security issues have so often sought to perpetuate its reputation as a leader in oil and maritime sectors, while also securing the oil supply upon which its longevity depends.

Chapter Three examines the significance of the transnational oil supply from an Indonesian standpoint. It argues that Indonesia can be best understood to be a fledgling energy transit state. This is because the Malacca Strait is only one of the archipelagic state's many sea lanes and it is a significant holder of oil resources in its own right. Indonesia's traditional Strait agenda, and its tendency for constrained contributions in sharing the security burden, are, in turn, presented in light of its nominal stake in the seaborne supply chain.

Chapter Four considers the case of Malaysia and demonstrates that on the basis that it shares some (but not all) characteristics of its two littoral neighbours' oil stakes, it matches the rising energy transit state type. Its moderate stake stems from the many infrastructure projects being developed on the Malay Peninsula that will put Malaysia in a position to become a future an oil hub like Singapore, as well as its offshore oil resources that are not quite as substantial as Indonesia's. Given this median level of involvement in transit oil, I argue, Malaysia encounters difficulty in managing competing strategic priorities in the Malacca Strait. While it strives to be a regional leader in energy and maritime sectors like Singapore, it also often encounters resource limitations when putting such aims into practice, in a similar way to Indonesia.

Chapter Five draws together the three case study findings and demonstrates that Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests in the Malacca Strait both converge and diverge, and that their positions as energy transit states have been associated with both cooperative and competitive policy choices. In doing so, it first reviews two alternative explanations for a 'common' approach to Strait security, and shows that neither Balance of Power notions of alliance formation nor the ASEAN Way are sufficient to account for the case study findings. It then shows why the energy transit state framework developed in this thesis offers a superior explanation. It considers in aggregate how the nature of different transit oil stakes is reflected in the countries' interests and policy choices toward the Malacca Strait. In particular, it explores why the states prioritise some issue areas over others, why their interests converge and diverge, and under what conditions their transit oil stakes translate into cooperation and competition. These findings are evaluated in light of existing energy

transit state scholarship and non-oil factors that contribute to understanding the three countries' energy transit state positions.

The thesis concludes that Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's different transit oil stakes have been the main reason why their efforts to protect the Malacca Strait have been so successful, though their historical experiences, conceptions of national security, foreign policy goals and domestic circumstances play important roles as well. In doing so, it reviews the main methods, questions and findings of the thesis, and identifies avenues for future research about other energy transit states for seaborne oil supplies. However, given the indications that the three littoral countries' stakes in Middle East-East Asia oil flows are increasing, it is likely that they will be motivated to engage in greater levels of competition in the future. The Malacca Strait's safety, security and environmental protection can therefore be expected to continue to feature in policymakers' and analysts' strategic concerns.

CHAPTER ONE

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S ENERGY TRANSIT STATES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

This chapter critically reviews major conceptual and empirical contributions pertaining to the transnational supply of crude and refined oil through the Malacca Strait from Middle Eastern producers to East Asian consumers. It considers two areas in the literature that are relevant to understanding the roles of Southeast Asia's energy transit states—Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia—in the supply chain's security. It first evaluates emerging notions of the 'energy transit state' as part of an evolution away from economic interpretations of energy security to incorporate strategic dimensions. It argues that these discussions are empirically constrained from only examining Eurasian pipeline transit states, and are conceptually weak for being unable to distinguish their interests and strategic posturing. These theoretical deficiencies can be addressed by incorporating conceptual work on the role of oil. Power politics in particular typifies states' relative positions in the international system, whereby oil is an indicator of state strength.

The chapter then turns to examine Southeast Asia as an ideal theatre of analysis to expand the geographic focus of energy transit state discussions. Here, the region's analytical appeal lies in the bulk crude and refined oil quantities that have been shipped from the Persian Gulf through the Malacca Strait since the conclusion of the Second World War, on a passage that is prone to myriad potential challenges *en route* to East Asian destinations. As the sea lane's littoral countries and primary security providers, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia thus have critical roles in protecting this transit supply. Yet their plethora of cooperative activities that aim to ensure the sea lane's safety, security and environmental protection stands at odds with expectations that they will inevitably compete over natural resources.[1] Furthermore, despite some claims otherwise from predominantly Singaporean policy makers, and predictions based on Balance of Power notions of alliance formation and the

[1] Notions that actors are driven by self-interest to access strategic natural resources have long been found in discussions about the 'tragedy of the commons,' or at an international level, the 'tragedy of the global commons.' More recently, scarcity of rare earth metals has become a prominent concern of analysts and policymakers. See E Brennan, 'The Next Oil? Rare Earth Metals,' *Diplomat* (2013); E A Clancy, 'The Tragedy of the Global Commons,' *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 5, no. 2 (1998).

Southeast Asian principle of consensus decision making known as the 'ASEAN Way,' there are indications that the three states do not interact on the basis of their 'common interests' in practice. This highlights the need to understand the dynamics underlying Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's Strait security interactions in the context of global oil trading. Such an endeavour would need to identify the three countries' interests in transit oil, consider whether these interests converge or diverge, and resolve the disparate expectations for their competitive and cooperative policy choices.

With this in mind, this chapter then presents a framework for understanding energy transit states. It offers a means to combine scholarship on strategic oil resources and maritime cooperation in the Malacca Strait, in a manner that accounts for Southeast Asian states' roles in securing transnational oil shipments. The framework's central tenet is that each state's stake in the transit energy supply shapes its strategic interests and policy choices in the Strait. By assessing Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's positions in relation to Middle East-East Asian oil flows, each can be characterised as one of three different types of transit state: a 'fledgling energy transit state'; a 'rising energy transit state'; or an 'enmeshed energy transit state.' Doing so presents a methodological platform upon which their interactions in the maritime domain can then be explored. This chapter concludes by detailing the case design, theory-building techniques and data gathering approaches that the rest of the thesis employs in order to apply the framework to the three countries.

THE REPRESENTATION OF NATURAL ENERGY RESOURCES

Reviews of the ways in which scholarship on energy security has been transformed typically begin with historical economic interpretations, and then broaden to encompass a more holistic range of factors. A crucial part of this expanding paradigm is the recognition that energy transit states have important roles for security of supply in the global energy trading system. And while understanding the roles of such stakeholders helps us identify generic strategic posturing traits, the contributions have not yet progressed to a point that energy transit states' interests and policy choices can be explained with sophistication. Furthermore, the overt empirical focus on states located astride natural gas and oil pipeline networks connecting Russia and Western Europe reinforces the need to question how other energy transit states—such as those

located in Southeast Asia—make policy choices. This is the primary knowledge gap that this thesis seeks to fill.

Hence, I examine the longstanding view within realist contributions that oil is a component of national power. Such notions offer a means to distinguish states and identify patterns in their strategic posturing. Subsequently, the implications for interests and policy choices that follow from international power distributions complement the theoretical shortcomings facing transit state understandings. The most common expectation, by far, is that states strive to access strategic natural resources. This leads to a prediction for competition, underscored in resource scarcity discussions as a field of inquiry that emerged as part of a post-Cold War expansion in security studies to incorporate environmental factors. And though such contributions do not completely recognise the transnational nature of energy supply chains, this characteristic is easily accommodated within the transit state literature. Together, notions of energy security, power politics and resource scarcity provide a conceptual base upon which the Strait's three littoral countries' interests and security policy choices can then be explored in more detail.

Energy Security and Transit States: From 'Economy of Supply' to 'Security of Supply'

From an early stage in the so-called 'great game' of energy security, 'consumer' states have had to manage their energy dependence on geographically distant 'producers' located outside their territorial jurisdiction, although calls are mounting to recognise third party states in this 'security of supply.' The need to ensure security of supply is regularly observed in the literature as emerging during the First World War in relation to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's and Admiral John Fisher's watershed conversion of the British Royal Navy's battleship propulsion methods from coal-powered, to full oil-powered boilers.[2] This move allowed Britain a relative advantage by extending the range of its naval power at a time when it faced a persistent arms-race with Germany. It also presented a new challenge to procure a continued supply of oil for the warships. This was a problematic undertaking given Britain's domestic abundance of coal relative to oil. In 1914, Churchill's nationalisation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now British Petroleum, or BP),

[2] See D Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 150-64; D Yergin, 'Ensuring Energy Security,' *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (2006): 69.

which at the time had stakes in newly-discovered Iranian oil reserves, was instrumental developing the Middle East region's first oil fields.[3]

Though Britain was neither the first—nor the last—leading power that encountered difficult decisions about accessing strategic natural resources, maintaining security of supply (or what is generally referred to as the 'traditional' energy security model), has become a common goal. Given ongoing processes of industrialisation and developing economies' continued 'rise' beyond the new millennium, which require abundant quantities of fossil fuels,[4] realising energy security has become an entrenched peacetime pursuit. But amid competing views on how best to deem energy supply chains 'secure,'[5] price repercussions have predominated ever since two unprecedented disruptions to Middle Eastern oil production occurred during the 1970s.[6] As the shocks occurred at a time when members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) accounted for a little more than half of the world's oil production,[7] it is unsurprising that market-based interpretations of security of supply persist.[8]

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[3] Ibid.

[4] The appeal of fossil fuels, especially oil, lies in their energy density, the low energy cost in their extraction, the ease with which they can be transported, and relative abundance compared with other energy resources. M S Vassiliou, *Historical Dictionary of the Petroleum Industry* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 18.

[5] Competing measurements such as 'availability,' 'accessibility,' 'reliability,' 'adequacy' and 'sufficiency' prohibit coherence among energy security definitions. One study that evaluated the definitions given in 91 peer-reviewed journal articles concluded that four indicators ('availability,' 'affordability,' 'energy and economic efficiency' and 'environmental stewardship') were common in the literature. B K Sovacool and M A Brown, 'Competing Dimensions of Energy Security: An International Perspective,' *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 35 (2010): 81.

[6] The first oil shock, which occurred against a backdrop of the Egypt-Israeli War beginning 1973, came about from Arab suppliers' decisions to cut oil production levels on 17 October in response to the United States' (US) backing of Israel in the Yom Kippur War. This caused the price of oil to increase from US$3 per barrel in 1973, to almost US$12 at the end of 1974. The second shock occurred amid the Iranian Revolution in 1979 when Tehran suspended petroleum exports to the US. The embargo was sufficient to cause crude oil prices to jump from US$24 per barrel in 1979 to US$34 in 1981. It prompted complex inflationary and deflationary pressures to consumers' domestic markets, challenged their macroeconomic policies, exacerbated their balance of payments deficits, forced adjustments to domestic and external energy demand and distorted labour, capital and exchange rates. This was enough to motivate developed states including the US, West Germany, France, and Japan to mitigate what they regarded an economic problem through energy consumption reduction and supplier and fuel diversification, especially in the direction of non-OPEC oil. S C Bhattacharyya, *Energy Economics: Concepts, Issues, Markets, and Governance* (London; New York: Springer, 2011), 333-4; D Gately, 'A Ten-Year Retrospective: OPEC and the World Oil Market,' *Journal of Economic Literature* 22, no. 3 (1984): 1100, 3; G J Ikenberry, 'The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks in the 1970s,' *International Organization* 40, no. 1 (1986): 107, 09, 10; I Skeet, *OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 100.

[7] In 1973 OPEC accounted for 51% of world oil production compared to 43% in 2011. See Oil Production - Barrels in British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012: Historical Data,' http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/

This producer-consumer centrism, however, overlooks the strategic roles of energy transit states in transnational supply chains. Scholarship on energy security has only recently begun to recognise a wider range of issues and actors. Daniel Yergin declared in 2006 that the traditional energy security model was outmoded and that broader factors, including the security of the entire energy supply chain and the dynamics of international relations, ought to be incorporated.[9] Florian Baumann identified energy security as a multidimensional concept that included states' internal policies, geopolitics and security policies, in addition to economic factors.[10] Athol Yates, in observing the diminished utility of market forces to assure reliable energy supplies, has called for resource diplomacy to be considered as a national security matter.[11] And still others have argued that there is a need to better recognise a wider range of supply chain stakeholders. According to Andrew Monaghan:

> [E]nergy security is not simply an "unreliable producer vs. vulnerable consumer" dialogue, as often portrayed, and more of a complex producer-consumer-transit state triangle.[12]

Similarly, Heiko Borchert and Karina Forster acknowledge all three of these stakeholder types when conceptualising European energy infrastructure security.[13]

Discussions of energy transit states, as one of the areas to have emerged from the conceptual expansion of energy security, have dealt with these issues on a preliminary basis. I define an energy transit state in this thesis as 'a third party state

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statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/spreadsheets/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2012.xlsx.

[8] For example, the World Economic Forum identifies "extreme energy price volatility" as a core resource security risk, of which is regularly pointed out in discussions endorsed by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) Energy Security Initiative. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Energy Working Group Secretariat), *Tenth Report on Implementation of the Energy Security Initiative*, (2008), http://www.ewg.apec.org/documents/EWG36_ESIImplementationPlan10th20081218.pdf, 28, 29; World Economic Forum, *Global Risks*, (2011), http://reports.weforum.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/mp/uploads/pages/files/global-risks-2011.pdf, 38.

[9] Yergin, 'Ensuring Energy Security,' 69.

[10] F Baumann, 'Energy Security as a Multidimensional Concept,' *CAP Policy Analysis*, no. 1 (2008), http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/784/pdf/CAP_Policy_Analysis_2008_01.pdf.

[11] A Yates, 'Energy Security as the Next National Security Priority' (paper presented at the Energy Security Symposium: Effects on Australia's Strategic Environment, Canberra, 11 Oct 2006).

[12] R Skinner, 'Energy Security and Producer-Consumer Dialogue: Avoiding a Maginot Mentality' (paper presented at the Government of Canada Energy Symposium, 28 Oct 2005), cited in A Monaghan, 'Russia-EU Relations: An Emerging Energy Security Dilemma,' *Pro et Contra* 10, no. 2-3 (2006): 4.

[13] H Borchert and K Forster, 'Energy Infrastructure Security: Time for a Networked Public-Private Governance Approach,' *Middle East Economic Survey* 50, no. 21 (2007): 32; H Borchert and K Forster, 'Homeland Security and the Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructures: A European Perspective,' in *Five Dimensions of Homeland and International Security*, ed. E Brimmer (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008), 138.

through whose sovereign territory passes the transportation of key strategic energy resources,' while keeping in mind the distinction of 'transit' or 'transnational' supply. This is in contrast to 'crossborder' trade between two states, which is commonplace and holds less analytical value.[14] This definition is based on provisions in Article 124 1 (b) of the United Nations Convention for Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) and Article 1 (c) of the Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked States 1965 (New York Convention), which refer to a country "with or without a sea-coast, situated between a land-locked State and the sea, through whose territory traffic in transit passes."[15] It is also derived from observations of current transit scenarios, such as Friedemann Müller's description of the Black Sea area as an "energy transit region" that is "located geographically on the route between an energy-rich region, the Caspian Sea area and one of the world's largest energy import markets, Europe."[16]

Existing discussions of energy transit states are empirically limited and conceptually weak. Contributions have thus far only sought to consider states located in the South Caucasus, Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions in their roles as east-west energy 'bridges' or 'corridors' for oil and gas sent by pipeline—such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Nabucco projects—between Russia and Western Europe. As a result, countries loosely identified as energy transit states have included Afghanistan,[17] Azerbaijan,[18] Belarus,[19] Bulgaria,[20] Georgia,[21] Latvia,[22] Moldova,[23]

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[14] The notion of a transit state has two major distinct meaning outside of an energy context: (i) the mass movement of humans, such as in the form of migration, asylum seeking or trafficking, and (ii) the transnational transportation of goods as provided in the United Nations Convention for Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) and the Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked States 1965 (New York Convention). The transnational-crossborder distinction is made in P Stevens, *Transit Troubles: Pipelines as a Source of Conflict* (London: Chatham House, 2009), 10.

[15] See United Nations, 'United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,' https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm.

[16] F Müller, 'Meeting Challenges Energetically: Networking Oil and Gas in the Black Sea Region,' *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 2, no. 2 (2002): 153.

[17] Ibid., 158.

[18] N Nassibli, 'Azerbaijan's Geopolitics and Oil Pipeline Issue,' *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 4, no. 4 (1999-2000).

[19] E Buchanan, 'Pipeline Politics: Russian Gas Diplomacy under Putin' (paper presented at the Australian Political Science Association Conference, University of Melbourne 27-29 Sep, 2010), 3; M Svedberg, 'Energy in Eurasia: The Dependency Game,' *Transition Studies Review* 14, no. 1 (2007); S Woehrel, *Russian Energy Policy toward Neighboring Countries*, (CRS Report for Congress, 2009), Available at the Federation of American Scientists web page, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34261.pdf, 13.

[20] J M Roberts, 'The Black Sea and European Energy Security,' *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 6, no. 2 (2006): 208; G M Winrow, 'Geopolitics and Energy Security in the Wider Black Sea Region,' *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 7, no. 2 (2007): 227.

[21] S J Malecek, *Pipeline Transit States: How Can the Legal Regime Meet Investor Objectives and Internal Development Needs? The Case of Georgia and Caspian Exports*, (University of Dundee, 2001); Nassibli, 'Azerbaijan's Geopolitics and Oil Pipeline Issue,' 103; Winrow, 'Geopolitics and

Poland,[24] Romania,[25] Turkey[26] and Ukraine.[27] These are undoubtedly important: Yergin's 2011 follow-up publication to the Pulitzer Prize-winning *The Prize* (entitled *The Quest*) devoted two full chapters to examining Caspian oil and its surrounds alone.[28] But a crucial indictor of theoretical rigor is an applicability to more than one set of circumstances. Given the preoccupation of energy transit state analyses with Eurasian pipeline networks, it is imperative to understand the physical movement of other energy resources in alternate delivery modes. In this respect, examining Southeast Asian states' positions astride Middle East-East Asian oil flows is an ideal means to supplement the lacking empirical evidence within this field.

The transit state literature is also curtailed by its theoretical disparity**,** for there are no systematic indications of energy transit states' positions, interests and policy choices, or how they might differ. While this most likely reflects existing studies' geographical arrangements (after all, there is a limit to the number of generalisations that can be drawn from a narrow Eurasian data set), it also raises questions over their applicability in other contexts. For example, some studies envisage certain scenarios facing transit states. Gareth Winrow evaluates Turkey as both a "pivotal state" and an "energy supplicant."[29] The first term refers to the "potential vulnerability" of states with "sensitive locations" and builds on what former United States (US) National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski referred to as "geopolitical pivots."[30] A case

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Energy Security in the Wider Black Sea Region,' 224; Woehrel, *Russian Energy Policy toward Neighboring Countries*, 11.

[22] Svedberg, 'Energy in Eurasia,' 201.

[23] Buchanan, 'Pipeline Politics: Russian Gas Diplomacy under Putin,' 3; Woehrel, *Russian Energy Policy toward Neighboring Countries*, 10.

[24] Svedberg, 'Energy in Eurasia,' 195, 7, 201.

[25] Roberts, 'The Black Sea and European Energy Security,' 208; Winrow, 'Geopolitics and Energy Security in the Wider Black Sea Region,' 227.

[26] M Bilgin, 'Turkey's Energy Strategy: What Difference Does it Make to Become an Energy Transit Corrdior, Hub or Center?' *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, no. 23 (2010): 114-5; Roberts, 'The Black Sea and European Energy Security,' 208; Svedberg, 'Energy in Eurasia,' 201; G M Winrow, 'Pivotal State or Energy Supplicant? Domestic Structure, External Actors, and Turkish Policy in the Caucasus,' *Middle East Journal* 57, no. 1 (2003); G M Winrow, 'Turkey as an Energy Transit State' (paper presented at the conference Black Sea: Energy and the Environment, Istanbul Bilgi University, Marine Law and Policy Research Center, 15 May 2003); G M Winrow, 'Turkey and the East-West Gas Transportation Corridor,' *Turkish Studies* 5, no. 2 (2004).

[27] Buchanan, 'Pipeline Politics: Russian Gas Diplomacy under Putin;' Svedberg, 'Energy in Eurasia;' Winrow, 'Geopolitics and Energy Security in the Wider Black Sea Region,' 224; Woehrel, *Russian Energy Policy toward Neighboring Countries*, 7.

[28] See chapters two and three entitled 'The Caspian Derby' and 'Across the Caspian,' in D Yergin, *The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).

[29] Winrow, 'Pivotal State or Energy Supplicant?'

[30] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primary and its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 40-1, 47, 149-50, cited in Winrow, 'Pivotal State or Energy Supplicant?' 77.

for viewing Turkey as pivotal, Winrow argues, stems from its location as an alternative energy corridor. Supplicants, in contrast, are far more dependent on energy imports. It is this transit energy reliance, and how weakly the state in question is positioned in the international system, that determines which state type applies.[31] Mert Bilgin's assessment of Turkey presents three potential state roles: as a *status quo* "transit corridor" whose receipt of pipeline transit fees overshadows its own requirements and is unable to re-export much of the incoming energy supplies; as an "energy hub" that is more vocal in setting the financial terms of transit and re-exports a moderate amount of transit resources; and as an investment-fuelled "energy centre" that bestows Ankara with greater political clout in its interactions with neighbouring states.[32] Like Winrow, Bilgin implicitly associates gradations in an energy transit state's involvement in a transnational energy supply chain with a commensurate level of geopolitical influence. Whether this holds for maritime Southeast Asia must therefore be kept in mind.

Other assessments frame state types based on the repercussions arising from the energy supply. For Rainer Leisen an energy transit state may be an energy exporter, whereby the transit supply chain facilitates its sales to competitors, or a consumer state, whose purchasing position is weakened by the transnational trade. Last, the energy supply may prompt competition within the country's domestic energy sector. The determining factor, Leisen argues, lies in the balance of the economic and political advantages relative to their costs—a claim that is not wholly unlike Winrow's contention concerning energy reliance.[33] Steven J. Malecek's evaluation of the legal regime surrounding Georgia's pipeline network role follows on from Leisen's view in that states regard their transit positions as either opportunities, and endeavour to capitalise on the energy distribution, or as threats, and regard the supply chain competitively.[34]

Paul Stevens takes this one step further in the 2009 Chatham House report, *Transit Troubles: Pipelines as a Source of Conflict*, with the claim that transit states exhibit 'good' or 'bad' behavioural patterns.[35] This work constitutes the most

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[31] Winrow, 'Pivotal State or Energy Supplicant?' 77-9.
[32] Bilgin, 'Turkey's Energy Strategy,' 114-5.
[33] R Liesen, 'Transit under the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty,' *Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law* 17, no. 3 (1999): 60-1.
[34] Malecek, *Pipeline Transit States:* 3.
[35] See the section entitled 'What Makes for "Good" and "Bad" Transit Countries?' in Stevens, *Transit Troubles*: 11.

conceptually in depth account of energy transit states in a field of scholarship dominated by descriptive case analyses. Though Stevens does not qualify 'goodness' or 'badness,' he identifies a series of transit state indicators based on historical pipeline experiences,[36] whereby policy choice varies depending on the transnational pipeline's security, the importance of foreign direct investment to the transit state, whether the transit state benefits from the pipeline, whether the transit state is dependent on offtake, whether the energy resources can be transported through alternative routes, and whether producer states and transit states compete in energy markets.[37] Several of these factors—such as a state's benefit, offtake and competition associated with the energy supply chain—are alluded to in the competing transit state paradigms. While they are certainly important in their own right, Stevens does not explain how variances among the six factors might translate into specific transit state policy outcomes. As a result, *Transit Troubles* reads like little more than a 'shopping list' at a time when a framework that can unpack energy transit states' strategic posturing is required.

The above contributions provide a basic but incomplete framework for understanding energy transit states. Transit states engage in complex production, transit and consumption activities. They can be distinguished by the nature of their involvement in transnational energy supply chains, which, depending on whether such conditions favour or hinder their strategic energy interests, tends to be associated with different levels of authority in the international system. How can these factors, and in what measure, apply to Southeast Asian energy transit states? Binary state typologies are not necessarily sufficient to recognise the nuances among Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's transit state positions. Price-based explanations are no longer adequate measures of security of supply. There is therefore a distinct need to bolster the theoretical underpinnings of energy transit state literature and expand its empirical application. As such, this discussion first considers how understandings of oil in International Relations can supplement its conceptual limitations, before examining Southeast Asia's security of supply role for Middle Eastern-East Asian oil flows.

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[36] Stevens' previous works adopt a similar focus and *Transit Troubles* incorporates their key ideas. See P Stevens, 'A History of Transit Pipelines in the Middle East: Lessons for the Future,' *Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy Seminar Paper* 23 (1996); P Stevens, 'Pipelines or Pipe Dreams? Lessons from the History of Arab Transit Pipelines,' *Middle East Journal* (2000): 224-41.
[37] Stevens, *Transit Troubles*: 11-3.

Strategic Energy Resources: A Component of National Power and Catalyst for Competition

In an increasingly globalised world where industrial and technological advancements will perpetuate reliance on non-renewable energy sources for the foreseeable future,[38] it is unsurprising that the international system is so often characterised in terms of what Michael T. Klare describes as "the new geopolitics of energy,"[39] in which, according to Yergin, oil is "the prize."[40] While it is tempting to identify energy security as an issue that has arisen only recently, as part of the so-called 'new agenda' in security studies that gained prominence after the Cold War, care must be taken not to ignore the fact that natural resources, including oil, have long been recognised for their strategic value. In International Relations, this value has primarily been associated with notions of power.

Despite being an 'essentially contested' term, understandings of power can be broadly grouped into two analytical streams: what David Baldwin has labelled the "'elements of national power' approach," whereby a state's strength is determined by its resources, and Dahlian 'relational' explanations of a state's ability to shape the preferences and actions of others.[41] Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye express the distinction in terms of "resource power" and "behavioral power."[42] As its name suggests, the former category is directly linked to contemporary explanations of how strategic resources shape states' standings in the international system. These can be traced as early as 1864 when English historian Henry Thomas Buckle wrote of four "physical agents"—climate, food, soil, and what Buckle termed the "General Aspect

[38] Though current global energy debates are dominated calls to increase consumption efficiency and decrease carbon emissions, fossil fuels, and in particular oil resources, are forecast to continue having a major part in the world energy mix during the coming decades, and any shift away from this *status quo* will be a gradual one. International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2010*, (Paris: International Energy Agency), http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weo2010.pdf, 5; United States of America (Energy Information Administration), *International Energy Outlook 2011*, (Washington: Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/pdf/0484(2011).pdf, 1.
[39] M T Klare, *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy*, 1st ed. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008).
[40] Yergin, *The Prize*.
[41] D A Baldwin, 'Power and International Relations,' in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. W Carlsnaes, T Risse, and B A Simmons (London; Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2013), 274; Robert Dahl, 'The Concept of Power,' *Behavioural Science* 2, no. 3 (1957), 202, cited in B C Schmidt, 'Realist Conceptions of Power,' in *Power in World Politics*, ed. F Berenskoetter and M J Williams (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 47-8.
[42] R Keohane and J S Nye, 'Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,' *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 5 (1998): 87.

of Nature"—influencing the human race.[43] In 1909, Halford Mackinder, commonly regarded as the founder of geopolitical thought, identified four "geographical conditions" affecting a country's position: its productivity, consisting of its fertility and mechanical power supply; its manpower, measured as the quantity and quality of its populace; its "degree and modes of human mobility"; and its social organisation, or cohesion in land utilisation.[44] Nicholas Spykman's work expanded on Mackinder's ideas and referred to similar geographic measures of state "size, location, topography, climate, population, arable land and minerals."[45]

While not the first to make such observations, Hans Morgenthau's discussion on national power, as presented in *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* is perhaps one of the most well known in International Relations. Like others' preceding claims, Morgenthau argued that a state's strength could be typified as a function of several factors including its geography, its natural resources such as food and raw materials, its industrial capacity, its military preparedness, its population size, its national character and morale, and the quality of its diplomacy and government.[46] Yet what distinguishes Morgenthau's elements of national power contribution is the claim that "certain raw materials have gained in importance over others."[47] For Morgenthau, it was natural *energy* resources (specifically oil but also uranium) that held unique power properties. Morgenthau explained:

> Since the First World War, oil as a source of energy has become more and more important for industry and war. Most mechanized weapons and vehicles are driven by oil, and consequently, countries that possess considerable deposits of oil have acquired an influence in international affairs which in some cases can be attributed primarily, if not exclusively, to that possession. […] The emergence of oil as an indispensable raw material has brought about a shift in the relative power of the politically leading nations. The United States and Soviet Union have become more powerful since they are self-sufficient in this respect, while Great Britain has grown considerably weaker, the British Isles being completely lacking in oil deposits.[48]

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[43] H T Buckle and J M Robertson, *Introduction to the History of Civilization in England* (London: Routledge, 1904), 22-3.
[44] S H Mackinder, 'Geographical Conditions Affecting the British Empire,' *Geographical Journal* 33, no. 4 (1909): 462-3.
[45] N J Spykman, 'Frontiers, Security, and International Organization,' *Geographical Review* 22, no. 3 (1942): 445. These factors are examined at length in N J Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1969).
[46] H J Morgenthau, *American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination* (London: Methuen, 1952), 175; H J Morgenthau, *The Impasse of American Foreign Policy*, Vol. 2, Politics in the Twentieth Century (Chicago University Press, 1962), 162; H J Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), Chapter Nine.
[47] Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*: 115.
[48] Ibid.

The above quote raises two pertinent points concerning the relationship between oil and national power. The first builds on the dictum implicit to 'resource power' explanations that possession of raw materials equates with national power, with respect to a state's ability to convert energy resources into other forms of strategic advantage (such as "industry and war" in Morgenthau's words). This has implications for a state's overall standing in the international system and in some cases, given the advent of technological developments and industrial advancements, can be more important than physical determinants. In 1946, for instance, Frederick L. Schuman claimed that *realpolitik* rationales were undergoing change and that powerful actors most likely had "personnel, plants, and productivity required for the conduct of industrialized total war."[49] For Quincy Wright in the 1955 monograph, *The Study of International Relations*, non-geographical indicators were preferable when explaining state power.[50] Howard G. Schaefer and Walter B. Wriston respectively asserted that manufacturing capabilities on one hand, and technology and information-based economies on the other, had bypassed the strategic value of natural resources.[51] The effect of this shift, for Paul Kennedy, is that states can realise an 'unnatural size' that is disproportionate to what their geographical endowments might otherwise suggest.[52] Indeed, in an extreme interpretation of the apparent redundancy of geographical factors, Richard Rosecrance noted the rise of the "virtual states" where economies' reliance on "capital, labor, and information are mobile and have risen to predominance, [and] no land fetish remains."[53] This debate over the worth of non-geographic power components raises some difficulties in Southeast Asia in particular: for example, how can Singapore's position be understood given its endemic natural resource scarcity as a tiny island state, keeping in mind that it is one of the region's most technologically advanced oil refiners and petrochemical manufacturers? It is, after all, an unavoidable reality that energy resources remain a primary input into industry, no matter how advanced the technology.

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[49] F L Schuman, 'Regionalism and Spheres of Influence,' in *Peace, Security and the United Nations*, ed. H J Morgenthau, *Harris Foundation Lectures* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), 88.
[50] Q Wright, *The Study of International Relations*, The Century Political Science Series (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), 348.
[51] H G Schaefer, *International Economic Trend Analysis* (Westport: Quorum Books, 1995), 75; W B Wriston, *The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming Our World* (New York: Scribner, 1992), 6; W B Wriston, 'Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy,' *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (1997): 177.
[52] P M Kennedy, 'On the "Natural Size" of Great Powers,' *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 135, no. 4 (1991): 486.
[53] R Rosecrance, 'The Rise of the Virtual State,' *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (1996): 46.

The second point draws on the effects of what Morgenthau referred to as "a shift in the relative power of the politically leading nations," as power politics has long sought to explain how power distributions affect states' policy choices. A plethora of attempts to typify states according to their power status can be discerned in International Relations. Martin Wight's seminal *Power Politics* is an important contribution distinguishing states' power disparities, using terms that include 'dominant power,' 'great power,' 'world power' and 'minor power.'[54] Others employ similar terms to designate power gradations, such as 'superpower' and 'hyperpower,' most often used in relation to the US,[55] 'middle power,'[56] 'secondary power,'[57] 'small power' and 'micro power.'[58] These labels have limited utility for understanding the repercussions of the Malacca Strait's transit oil for international politics. Great powers have by far attracted a majority of academic attention to the obscurity of weaker states. The overwhelming focus on Middle Eastern producers and China's mounting energy needs has meant that Southeast Asia remains on the periphery of global oil trading discussions. This is compounded by the lack of consensus on how competing power typologies might apply to states in the region. It is unclear, for example, whether the label 'regional power' or 'emerging regional power' best accounts for Indonesia,[59] and all three of the Malacca Strait's littoral states have been associated with middle power status since the Cold War's conclusion.[60]

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[54] M Wight, *Power Politics*, ed. H Bull and C Holbraad (New York; London: Continuum, 2002).
[55] E A Cohen, 'History and the Hyperpower,' *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 4 (2004); S P Huntington, 'The Lonely Superpower,' *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2 (1999): 35-49; E Kaufman, *The Superpowers and their Spheres of Influence: The United States and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1977).
[56] G d Glazebrook, 'The Middle Powers in the United Nations System,' *International Organization* 1, no. 2 (1947); C Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1984).
[57] L Neack, *The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 154.
[58] 'Power' is sometimes interchanged with 'state.' A Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); A Baker Fox, 'The Small States in the International System 1919-1969,' *International Journal* 24, no. 4 (1969); E Dommen and P Hein, *States, Microstates, and Islands* (London; Dover: Croom Helm, 1985); J A K Hey, *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); R Keohane, 'Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,' *International Organization* 23 (1969); R L Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); D Vital, *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967).
[59] For example, Robert A Pastor lists Indonesia as a regional power, but Andreas Berg suggests the state is far from realising this status. A Berg, 'Indonesia: A Long Road to Regional Power Status,' *RUSI Analysis* (2008); R A Pastor, *A Century's Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 2.
[60] J H Ping, *Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Asia Pacific* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); A T H Tan, 'Singapore's Defence: Capabilities, Trends, and Implications,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 21, no. 3 (1999): 451.

A range of behavioural assumptions concerning the effects of a state's power status can also be identified in the literature. The following traits should be read as illustrative rather than exhaustive. In a basic sense is the notion that more powerful states have a greater influence on the world stage. For structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz, the number of great powers (or 'poles') dictate the character of international politics, whether as a unipolar, bipolar or multipolar system.[61] At the opposite extreme, as Jeanne A. K. Hey has argued, small states are often overlooked for their diminished roles.[62] Power rankings can also influence whether states defensively 'balance' against or offensively 'bandwagon' with a more powerful state.[63] Another expectation in the literature is that states engage in unending struggles to accumulate power. For John Mearsheimer, this means that great powers are constantly "primed for offense" and the international system is characterised by their competition.[64] Given crude and refined petroleum's unique position as a national power indicator, these predictions can be read in an oil context as a pursuit to obtain strategic energy resources.

The assumption that states struggle to access natural resources has been explored in greater depth in resource scarcity discussions, which emerged as part of the post-Cold War expansion in security studies that debated whether—and how—existing conceptions could reflect broader types of danger to the state.[65] Such arguments are located within what Marc A. Levy and Carsten F. Rønnfeldt have termed 'three waves' or 'generations' of environmental security thought,[66] the last of which examines causal links between environmental change and violence.[67] Thomas

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[61] K N Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley Series in Political Science (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
[62] Hey, *Small States in World Politics*: 5.
[63] According to Mark R Brawley, economic power differences can prompt states to engage in behaviours including 'external balancing' through alliances, 'internal balancing' as arms races, 'bandwagoning,' 'buck-passing' and 'appeasement.' See M R Brawley, 'The Political Economy of Balance of Power Theory,' in *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, ed. T V Paul, J J Wirtz, and M Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 81-5.
[64] J J Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), 2-3.
[65] For example D A Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security,' *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 5; J T Mathews, 'Redefining Security,' *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (1989); T C Sorenson, 'Rethinking National Security,' *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 3 (1990).
[66] M A Levy, 'Time for a Third Wave of Environment and Security Scholarship?' *Environmental Change and Security Project: Report*, no. 1 (1995); C F Rønnfeldt, 'Three Generations of Environment and Security Research,' *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no. 4 (1997).
[67] Rønnfeldt, 'Three Generations of Environment and Security Research,' 476. See T F Homer-Dixon, 'Population, Environment, and Ingenuity,' *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 882 (1999): 208; R H Ullman, 'Redefining Security,' *International Security* 8, no. 1 (1983): 139-40; A H Westing, 'Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and Action,' in *Global Resources and International*

Homer-Dixon has argued that if conflict emerges as a function of scarce natural resources, it tends to do so as a diffuse, chronic and subnational tension among developing states—as opposed to outright war.[68] According to Homer-Dixon's logic, countries dependent on scarce and renewable resources are likely to lack aggressive capability.[69] However, in Southeast Asia, the transnational supply of crude and refined oil supplies through the Malacca Strait is not a matter of scarcity (or at least not yet). Middle Eastern states currently account for 48% of the world's proven oil reserves.[70] In addition, though Homer-Dixon and many others predict a looming world energy crisis associated with hydrocarbon exploitation,[71] environmental security scholarship has devoted attention to other natural resources that include farmed crops, fresh water, forestry and fisheries,[72] and not just fossil fuels, on the grounds that 60% of the world's inhabitants do not use them.[73] Still, given the 'special' qualities that are so often attributed to oil as an industry input, these contributions raise questions over whether expectations for competition are relevant to oil.

Judging from Klare's discussions about "resource wars,"[74] it would appear that these predictions are appropriate. A more extreme outcome than the internal conflict predictions that follow from resource scarcity, Klare stressed the potential challenges of "flash points" or world locations that he purports are likely to encounter

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Conflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and Action, ed. A H Westing (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 3-20.

[68] T F Homer-Dixon, 'Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,' *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 18-9; Homer-Dixon, 'Population, Environment, and Ingenuity,' 209.

[69] Homer-Dixon, 'Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict,' 19; T F Homer-Dixon, 'Scarcity and Conflict,' *Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy* 15, no. 1 (2000): 34.

[70] British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012' 6.

[71] 'Peak oil' enthusiasts continue to debate M. King Hubbert's 1956 prediction that US oil production would 'peak' during the early 1970s. See K Aleklett and C J Campbell, 'The Peak and Decline of World Oil and Gas Production,' *Minerals and Energy* 18, no. 1 (2003); R C Duncan and W Youngquist, 'Encircling the Peak of World Oil Production,' *Natural Resources Research* 8, no. 3 (1999): 5-6; D L Greene, J L Hopson, and J Li, 'Have We Run out of Oil Yet? Oil Peaking Analysis from an Optimist's Perspective,' *Energy Policy* 34, no. 5 (2006); T F Homer-Dixon, 'The Problem: A Chorus of Solutions,' *Foreign Policy* 160 (2007): 52; M K Hubbert, 'Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels' (paper presented at the Spring Meeting of the Southern District, Plaza Hotel, San Antonio, Texas, 7-9 Mar 1956).

[72] P H Gleick et al., *The World's Water 2002-2003: The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources* (Washington: Island Press, 2002); R Mandel, 'Transnational Resource Conflict: The Politics of Whaling,' *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 1 (1980); Ullman, 'Redefining Security,' 144.

[73] Homer-Dixon, 'Population, Environment, and Ingenuity,' 212.

[74] M T Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York: Metropolitan; Owl Books, 2002).

contained interstate struggles for hydrocarbon and other strategic natural resources.[75] Klare identified oil and gas flash points in the Caspian Sea, Middle East, Africa, South America, Northern Siberia and the Deep Atlantic, with potential conflict areas in the China Seas, the Indonesian archipelago and the Timor Sea.[76] This reveals only a nominal recognition for a Southeast Asian role in oil, as Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines are, for the most part, deemed flash points for gems, minerals, and timber.[77] These notions, as far as oil is concerned, were followed up in Klare's subsequent works, *Resource Wars: the New Landscape of Global Conflict, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: the New Geopolitics of Energy,* and *The Race for What's Left.* Unfortunately, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia receive only passing mention.[78] Since East Asia, particularly China, is becoming increasingly reliant on Middle Eastern crude and refined oil shipments, whether—and how—the assumptions for energy resource-based competition applies to the Malacca Strait's three littoral countries is a crucial knowledge gap that demands attention.

The above assessments are important for framing the relationship between strategic energy resources and states' positions, interests and policy choices. But they are constrained in addressing the 'transit' characteristics that are inherent to Middle East-East Asia oil flows and other transnational energy supply chains. As most discussions of energy resources from an 'elements of national power' standpoint follow on from predominantly realist interpretations of international politics, they do not easily accommodate issues that occur outside the state. Homer-Dixon, for instance, has charged that contemporary realism excludes transboundary factors that so frequently characterise natural resource exploitation,[79] and that result from the Westphalian system's dissection of large resource deposits into multiple states' territories. Yet environmental security studies and even notions of resource wars do not fare much better noting their tendency to recognise mostly crossborder scarcity

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[75] M T Klare, 'The New Geography of Conflict,' *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 3 (2001). Klare's notion of cartographic "fault lines" traces to the article, M T Klare, 'Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms,' *Current History* 95, no. 604 (1996): 353.
[76] Klare, 'The New Geography of Conflict,' 55.
[77] Ibid., 54.
[78] Klare, *Resource Wars*; Klare, *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet*; M T Klare, *The Race for What's Left: The Global Scramble for the World's Last Resources*, 1st ed. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012).
[79] T F Homer-Dixon, 'On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,' *International Security* 16, no. 2 (1991): 84-5.

problems. These contributions have little to offer in explaining physical distribution routes through third party transit states, which is the central concern of this thesis. As this chapter has shown, though, this shortcoming is addressed within energy security discussions.

It is therefore quite feasible to temper the theoretical indigence apparent within emerging energy transit state literature with the established assumptions of power as a determinant of state interests and policy choices, owing to the recognition of oil as a strategic energy resource in both fields of scholarship. Together, both areas of discussions envision energy transit states that differ (and even compete) on the basis of their access to, and interactions with, a transnational energy supply chain. Addressing the second major limitation facing existing energy transit state understandings—that is, its exclusive geographic focus—requires an appropriate strategy too. The impetus lies in exploring other energy transit state scenarios in a manner that considers predictions for competitive policy choices among potentially disparate state types.

SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE MALACCA STRAIT AND ITS ENERGY TRANSIT STATES

Southeast Asia is an ideal region to progress the prevailing conceptual and empirical knowledge constraints surrounding energy transit states' strategic roles in security of supply. The Malacca Strait's significance as an energy chokepoint is often pointed out.[80] But as the early Chinese recognised it as "a gullet [...] through which the foreigners' sea and land traffic in either direction must pass,"[81] such contemporary observations that the sea lane is a "gateway or gauntlet"[82] are not new. Yet they are nonetheless understandable. With respect to the vast quantities of crude and refined oil that are shipped through the Malacca Strait from predominantly Persian Gulf

[80] *Foreign Policy* magazine, the US Energy Information Administration and the International Energy Agency designate the Malacca Strait as a global choke point for oil in particular and maritime trade in general. 'The List: The Five Top Global Choke Points,' Foreign Policy, 2006 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/05/07/the_list_the_five_top_global_choke_points; International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2004*, (Paris: International Energy Agency), http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2008-1994/weo2004.pdf, 117-8; United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'World Oil Transit Chokepoints.'

[81] F Hirth and W W Rockhill (eds), *Chau Ju-Kua on the Chinese and Arab Trade*, (St Petersberg, 1914, reprinted Amsterdam, 1966), 60, cited in E Watkins, 'Facing the Terrorist Threat in the Malacca Strait,' *Terrorism Monitor* 2, no. 9 (2004): 8.

[82] D B Freeman, *The Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet?* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003).

producers to East Asian consumers,[83] Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia are positioned within a mid-point region of one of the world's largest transnational energy supply chains.

Southeast Asia's current importance for 'transit oil' is a product of a series of events dating back to the Second World War's conclusion. When Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956,[84] the resulting crisis contributed to major changes in world oil trading patterns. Nasser's action was significant because it followed a long period of Egyptian dissatisfaction with foreign administrators, and presented severe consequences for Britain's great power status. Egypt had been under Ottoman control since 1517, and occupied by the British from 1882 after the Egyptian Army was defeated at the Battle of Tel el Kebir. Just years earlier, in 1879, British and French pressure had influenced the replacement of the *Khedive* (Viceroy) Ismail Pasha with his son, Tewfik Pasha. Yet during the Franco-British 'Dual Control' administration that followed, Tewfik was not able to command authority over an increasingly discontented Egyptian Army, which, led by Urabi Pasha, sought to restore Egyptian control of Egypt. At the Battle of Tel el Kebir, British forces stormed the Army-fortified Alexandria.[85] However, after defeating the Urabists and restoring Tewfik's power, Britain's initial intentions to vacate Egypt were deferred in the name of maintaining order.[86]

Egyptian resentment towards the British grew. There are indications that Suez nationalisation had been considered within Egypt for some time,[87] but Nasser's ultimate decision came about as retaliation to British and US withdrawal from a funding agreement to build the Aswan High Dam.[88] The revocation of support was in turn an objection to Egypt's foreign relations, even though Nasser claimed neutrality when navigating East-West tensions. In September 1955, Egypt had negotiated an

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[83] This point is discussed in the Introduction, within the section entitled SOUTHEAST ASIA'S ENERGY TRANSIT STATES AND THEIR MARITIME POLICY CHOICES.
[84] See W W Aldrich, 'The Suez Crisis: A Footnote to History,' *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 3 (1967): 541-2.
[85] For a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the Battle of Tel el Kebir, see D F Featherstone, *Tel El-Kebir 1882: Wolseley's Conquest of Egypt* (Westport: Praeger, 2005).
[86] H Tollefson, *Policing Islam: The British Occupation of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Struggle over Control of the Police, 1882-1914* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), xi.
[87] L M James, 'When did Nasser Expect War? The Suez Nationalization and its Aftermath in Egypt,' *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath*, ed. S C Smith (Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 150-1.
[88] S C Tucker and P M Roberts, *The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History* (Santa Barbra: ABC-CLIO, 2008), 740.

arms agreement with Czechoslovakia.[89] In May 1956, it became the first Arab state to recognise the People's Republic of China as an independent state.[90] Control over the canal was also seen as a means to generate funds for the dam project without outside assistance.[91] The Suez's nationalisation was thus an important part of Egypt's independence struggle.[92]

The crisis was also important to the British Empire's loss of great power status, for it showed that London had no authority over Egypt.[93] The unimpeded supply of oil through the Canal was crucial to British military capability, especially as the Royal Navy's fleet had transitioned to oil-fired propulsion methods only decades earlier. Britain's strategy was also predicated on its ability to have a secure route to India.[94] Passage between London and Bombay via the Canal took 12 fewer days (or 7,242 fewer kilometres) compared with circumnavigating the African continent.[95] Even when India declared independence in 1947, two thirds of Britain's oil supply was still being shipped through the Canal.[96] Harold Macmillan (who later became the Prime Minister of Britain) reflected that the loss of Suez would drastically affect British interests:

> [W]e have got to win. For the stakes are very high—no less than the economic survival of Britain. For if we lose out in the M East, we lose the oil. If we lose the oil, we cannot live.[97]

The Canal's nationalisation also had some particular ramifications for global oil trading. Prompting doubts that shipping could continue through the artificial channel, Nasser's decision forced seaborne crude oil supplies to be rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope to reach major consumers in Europe. This, in effect, was a catalyst for the construction of a new generation of cost effective bulk oil tankers—now known as very large crude carriers (VLCCs)—that were far larger than existing 'Suezmax'

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[89] D Hopwood, *Egypt, Politics and Society, 1945-1990* (London; New York: Harper Collins Academic, 1991), 44-5; D B Kunz, *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 1; Tucker and Roberts, *The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 740.
[90] 'Egypt Recognises Communist China,' *Lewiston Daily Sun*, 12 May 1956, 42.
[91] Tucker and Roberts, *The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 740.
[92] D Varble, *The Suez Crisis* (New York: Rosen, 2009), 9.
[93] Kunz, *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis*, 1.
[94] S Morewood, 'Prelude to the Suez Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British Dominance over the Suez Canal, 1869-1956,' *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath*, ed. S C Smith (Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 15.
[95] J W Fiscus, *The Suez Crisis* (New York: Rosen, 2004), 5.
[96] Varble, *The Suez Crisis*, 9-12.
[97] M S Macmillan, Jan 1947, cited in P J Beck, 'Britain and the Suez Crisis: The Abadan Dimension,' *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath*, ed. S C Smith (Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 63.

capacities.[98] With longer journeys at sea becoming financially feasible as a consequence of this, producers could sell oil to new and remotely located customers.

Even if the Suez Crisis had not precisely affected shipping in this way, two important changes in the world's oil supply and demand that emerged in the postwar era would likely still have connected Middle Eastern producers with East Asian consumers. The first lies in the centralisation of major oil producers in the Middle Eastern region.[99] While commercial oil exploitation originated in North America and the Russian Empire,[100] production gradually has shifted toward the Persian Gulf over the course of the 20th century (and beyond) as its fields—and also those in the South Caucasus and Northern Africa—have been brought online. For instance, Saudi Arabia discovered large oilfields shortly before the Second World War but postponed developing them until after its conclusion.[101] The Abqaiq field, for example, was discovered in the 1930s. Along with the Qatif field, it was producing by 1946.[102] The world's largest oilfield, Ghawar, was discovered in 1948 and producing by 1951.[103] Production in the Safaniyah field commenced in 1957, and the 1960s saw the Aby Hadriyah, Abu Sa'fah, Berri, Fadhili, Khurais, Khursaniyah, and Manifah fields come online.[104] As shown in Figure 1, such developments have meant that Middle Eastern states increased their collective share of world oil production from 26% in 1965 to 33% in 2011.[105] Concurrently, the US's, Soviet Union's and Venezuela's share of

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[98] S M Ng, *Oil Discovery and Technical Change in Southeast Asia: The Oil System in Southeast Asia: A Preliminary Survey*, Field Report Series (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), 60-1. 'Suezmax' refers to the maximum size of ship that can safely pass through the Suez Canal. Similarly, 'Malaccamax' refers to the maximum vessel size that can physically traverse the Malacca Strait, which is slightly larger than Suezmax ships. As an illustration of their capacity differences, Suezmax ships can carry approximately 12,000 twenty-foot equivalent units of cargo (TEU), compared to 18,000 TEU attributed to the Malaccamax. D F Wood, *International Logistics*, 2nd ed. (New York; London: AMACOM, 2002), 105.

[99] M T Klare, 'Past its Peak,' *London Review of Books* 30, no. 16 (2008); M T Klare, 'Petroleum Anxiety and the Militarization of Energy Security,' in *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management*, ed. D Moran and J A Russell (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 44.

[100] For a comprehensive history on the emergence of contemporary oil trading, see V Alekperov, *Oil of Russia: Past, Present, and Future*, 1st ed. (Minneapolis: East View Press, 2011); Yergin, *The Prize*.

[101] M R Simmons, *Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy* (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), 31.

[102] International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2005*, (Paris: International Energy Agency), http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2008-1994/weo2005.pdf, 503, 8.

[103] Ibid., 510.

[104] Ibid., 508.

[105] 'Oil Production - Barrels' in British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012: Historical Data.' Klare estimates that producers in Africa, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea regions will increase their collective share of world oil production from 44% in 2004 to 57% in 2030. Klare, 'Petroleum Anxiety and the Militarization of Energy Security,' 44.

world oil production has declined from 55% in 1965 to 29% in 2011.[106] The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that this trend will continue to 2030.[107]

FIGURE 1: WORLD OIL PRODUCTION SHIFT: 1965-2011



Data taken from 'Oil Production - Barrels' in British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012: Historical Data.' British Petroleum defines the Middle East as the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. See British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012,' 44.

[106] 'Oil Production - Barrels' in British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012: Historical Data.' Klare similarly observes that the collective production of the US, Canada, Australia, Russia and the North Sea is projected to drop from 39% of world production in 1990 to as little as 24% by 2030. United States of America (Energy Information Administration), *International Energy Outlook 2007* (Washington: Energy Information Administration, 2007), cited in Klare, 'Petroleum Anxiety and the Militarization of Energy Security,' 44.

[107] According to the IEA's reference scenario, the Middle East (which it defines as Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) will account for 29 million of the world's 103 million barrels of oil produced daily in 2030, a greater proportion (28%) and quantity than it currently represents (26% in 2008). International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2009*, (Paris: International Energy Agency), http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2009/WEO2009.pdf, 84.

As Figure 2 shows, these supply-side changes have been paired with the emergence of major oil consumers in East Asia, as part of the region's rapid and sustained economic development following the war. The economic 'miracle' occurred from regional economies' adoption of export-centric industrialisation policies from the 1960s.[108] It has been referred to as "literally the fastest economic transformation in human history,"[109] whereby East Asia's economies grew between 4.6% and 6% each year.[110] This was far higher than the rates experienced in sub-Saharan Africa (0.2%), the Middle East (1.8%), Latin America (1.8%), South Asia (1.9%), or 'Western' states (2.4%),[111] or even the 1-1.5% of annual growth during the Industrial Revolution.[112]

[108] W A Dunaway, *Emerging Issues in the 21st Century World-System*, 2 vols, Vol. 2 (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 163.
[109] H-J Chang, *The East Asian Development Experience: The Miracle, the Crisis and the Future* (Penang; London; New York: Third World Network; Zed, 2006), 17.
[110] According to different estimates. Ibid; M K Connors, 'The Asian Economic Miracle and its Unmaking,' *The New Global Politics of the Asia Pacific*, ed. M K Connors, R Davison and J Dosch (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 110.
[111] These rates refer to a 1965-1990 timeframe. Connors, 'The Asian Economic Miracle and its Unmaking,' 110.
[112] Chang, *The East Asian Development Experience*, 17.

FIGURE 2: WORLD OIL CONSUMPTION SHIFT: 1965-2011



Data taken from 'Oil Consumption - Barrels' in British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012: Historical Data.' British Petroleum defines the Soviet Union as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. See British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012,' 44.

Japan's reconstruction under the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, is particularly noteworthy in relation to the growth in East Asia's oil needs. Postwar Japan faced constant energy crises. Its coal production was 36% of pre-war levels, compared with 66% for electricity and 0.004% for oil imports. Fearing remilitarisation, MacArthur closed all of Japan's Pacific Coast oil refineries in October 1945 and focused on rebuilding the coal industry instead.[113] Yet in July 1949, when the refineries were cleared to operate, Japan's petroleum

[113] L E Hein, *Fueling Growth: The Energy Revolution and Economic Policy in Postwar Japan*, Harvard East Asian Monographs (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1990), 64, 75.

engineers and technicians had since relocated to develop Southeast Asia's oil fields.[114] Oil gradually overtook coal as an industrial fuel source. The Japanese government sought to tie the future economy to oil and gas and in 1955 advocated petrochemicals.[115] Chemical manufacturers were early adopters, and the transition from coal to oil was influenced by the availability of modern oil-fired equipment.[116] The world oil price drop meant that by 1958, coal was the more expensive fuel.[117] But without local oil supplies, Japan soon turned to international markets for an energy solution.[118]

At the same time, Japan was one of the major shipbuilders in the postwar era, and was thus in an advantageous position to import bulk quantities of oil by sea. It held a 29% share of the world's megatanker building in 1957[119] and built the *Universe Apollo*, the world's first giant tanker (that was larger than 100,000 deadweight tonnes, or DWT) in 1959.[120] Throughout the 1960s it regularly launched the largest oil tankers in the world. In 1963, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries established a shipyard on Jurong Island, Singapore.[121] In 1966 tankers such as the *Idemitsu Maru* had exceeded 200,000 DWT capacities. By 1973, when the OPEC oil crises occurred, oil carriers such as the *Globtik Tokyo* had exceeded 500,000 DWT capacities.[122]

As a result of these events, global crude and refined oil demand is no longer limited to predominantly 'Western' developed states, which has been the *status quo* for much of the early history of commercial oil trading. Japan's renewed development certainly entrenched its position as a modern industrial power, but this has come at the cost of a dependence on imported oil. Almost all of Japan's energy resources (approximately 96%) are now imported.[123] Half of this (approximately 47%) is oil and

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[114] Ibid., 64, 74.
[115] Ibid., 300.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Ibid., 299.
[118] Ibid., 316.
[119] Koga, *Handbook of Shipbuilding Industry* 1995, 381-96, cited in H Kohama, *Industrial Development in Postwar Japan* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 138.
[120] S Motora, 'A Hundred Years of Shipbuilding in Japan,' *Journal of Marine Science and Technology* 2, no. 4 (1997): 202.
[121] Kohama, *Industrial Development in Postwar Japan*: 138.
[122] The *Globtik Tokyo* was built to be 483,000 DWT but later modified to become 540,000 DWT. Motora, 'A Hundred Years of Shipbuilding in Japan,' 202.
[123] Japan (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy), 'Energy in Japan 2010,' 2010 http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/energy-in-japan/english2010.pdf, 3.

most (almost 90%) is sourced from the Middle East.[124] Japan is one of the largest importers of Saudi crude in Asia, the primary destination for Qatari crude, the second-largest export destination of Iranian oil after China and receives the greatest proportion of the United Arab Emirates' oil exports.[125] This reliance is not expected to decrease in the aftermath of the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi disaster[126] which illustrated the potential dangers of nuclear power generation and the comparative safety of fossil fuels. China is just as dependent given expectations that it will surpass US economic production in the 2020-2050 period.[127] Having made the transition to become a net oil importer in 1993,[128] almost half of China's oil needs are obtained from the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman, Kuwait and Iraq together accounting for 45% of its total oil imports in 2010.[129] What President Hu Jintao referred to as China's 'Malacca Dilemma' in 2003 arises precisely from this reliance, as energy supply disruptions through strategic sea lanes such as the Malacca Strait could present severe consequences for Beijing's energy security. Together, the changes that have taken place in global oil trading in the Second World War's aftermath have bestowed a unique position for Southeast Asia as a midpoint region between major oil producers and consumers.

The Strategic Significance of Southeast Asian Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

Southeast Asia's location regarding the seaborne transportation of oil supplies to East Asia would be significant enough from a security policy planning perspective if the

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[124] International Energy Agency, *Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Japan*, (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008), http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Japan2008.pdf, 101; Japan (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy), 'Energy in Japan 2010,' 3.

[125] United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Iran,' Nov 2011 http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IR; United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Qatar,' 30 Jan 2013 http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=QA; United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Saudi Arabia,' 26 Feb 2013 http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=SA; United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: United Arab Emirates,' 3 Jan 2013 http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=TC.

[126] M Goswami and F Tan, 'Japan Power Sector Oil Demand May Triple as Nuclear Output Falls,' *Reuters*, 17 Jul 2011; H Tabuchi, 'Japan Quake is Causing Costly Shift to Fossil Fuels,' *New York Times* 19 Aug 2011.

[127] A Keidel, 'China's Economic Rise - Fact and Fiction,' *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Paper* 61 (Jul 2008): 5-6, cited in M Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2009), 40.

[128] E Thomson, 'ASEAN-China Energy Cooperation,' in *ASEAN-China Economic Relations*, ed. S-H Saw and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 227.

[129] R M Cutler, 'China Keeps up Oil Hunt,' *Asia Times*, 13 Jul 2011.

region was totally stable. But this is not always the case. The region's diverse range of latent traditional and non-traditional security challenges easily makes it the most critical transit segment of the transnational oil supply chain. It has long been recognised for being a potential theatre for clashing great power interests. China's pursuit of a blue water naval capability has included a major refurbishment of the *Liaoning*, the former Soviet *Varyarg* aircraft carrier, and presents implications for the US's regional presence.[130] With the Obama Administration's pronouncements about a "pivot" or "rebalance" to Asia,[131] the US in 2012 established "permanent and constant" access to northern Australian facilities.[132] China's and the Philippines' contest in the South China Sea dominate regional multilateral forums.[133] In maritime Southeast Asia, the tension lies in what Beijing views to be a containment strategy from "certain powers" impinging on its Strait use, and Washington's concern for the prospect of Chinese-controlled sea lanes.[134] Coupled with Japan's normalisation and India's 'rise' amid a China-India maritime-strategic rivalry arc in Asia,[135] questions abound regarding future power dynamics in the region.[136]

Non-state actors present Southeast Asia with more immediate problems. The region has a history of unauthorised trafficking in contraband goods including opium, currency, guns, pornography and even orang-utans.[137] To the Malacca Strait's immediate west the 'Golden Triangle' in the Andaman Sea is a hotspot for gun-running, drug trafficking and human smuggling. These activities are often entwined with armed robbery at sea.[138] Piracy and other unauthorised activities in the maritime

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[130] D Black, 'Big-Ticket Arms Race for Supremacy at Sea,' *National*, 9 Jan 2013; A Ramzy, 'Troubled Waters: Why China's Navy Makes Asia Nervous,' *Time*, 10 Aug 2011.
[131] See M E Manyin et al., *Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's 'Rebalancing' toward Asia*, (CRS Report for Congress, 2012), Available at the Federation of American Scientists web page, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf.
[132] J R Holmes, 'US Eyes Australia Base,' *Diplomat*, 12 Nov 2011.
[133] 'Obama Tour Caught up in Asian Territorial Debate,' *Associated Press*, 20 Nov 2012.
[134] Shi Hongtao, 'Energy Security Runs Up against the "Malacca Dilemma:" Will China, Japan and Korea Cooperate?' *China Youth Daily*, 15 Jun 2004, cited in Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy*: 86.
[135] G S Khurana, 'China-India Maritime Rivalry,' *Indian Defence Review* 23, no. 4 (2009).
[136] For example E Goh, 'Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,' *International Security* 32, no. 3 (2008): 113-57; J J Mearsheimer, 'The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia,' *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3, no. 4 (2010): 381-96.
[137] E Tagliacozzo, 'Smuggling in Southeast Asia: History and its Contemporary Vectors in an Unbounded Region,' *Critical Asian Studies* 34, no. 2 (2002): 194.
[138] M T Yasin, *Threats to Malaysia from the Western Maritime Frontier: Issues and Options* (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2006), 5-6.

domain[139] have troubled the region since before European arrival in the Indian Ocean Basin (circa 1450 AD),[140] and continue to present contemporary challenges. During the 1990s, and particularly in the aftermath of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, reported attacks peaked. And though cooperative security efforts reduced the number of reported attacks in the Strait from 75 in 2000 to only two in 2008 and 2009,[141] and 'political' piracy undertaken by the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM) dissipated following the signing of the Aceh Peace Agreement with Jakarta,[142] fears remain that the aftershocks from the Global Financial Crisis might prompt the re-emergence of such activities.[143]

As the US's second front in its Global War on Terror,[144] the Southeast Asian region has encountered extensive challenges associated with Islamic extremism following the devastating events of 11 September, 2001 (9/11). Many of these have been directed toward the maritime domain in light of two high profile shipping attacks: the warship *USS Cole*, which was damaged in 2000 in Yemen's Aden Harbour when a small craft rammed the ship's side and then exploded,[145] and the French VLCC *Limburg*, which was attacked by an explosive laden boat while anchored near the southern Yemeni port of Ash Shihr on 6 October 2002.[146] In Southeast Asia, perhaps one of the most devastating incidents was the 2004 attack on the *Superferry 14* passenger ship while in Manila Bay, where a television set containing explosives was planted on board on behalf of the Philippines' Abu Sayyaf Group. Its detonation and subsequent sinking resulted in 116 fatalities.[147] In addition,

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[139] For a discussion in defining corruption, piracy, sea robbery and maritime terrorism, see D R Dillon, 'Maritime Piracy: Defining the Problem,' *SAIS Review* 25, no. 1 (2005).
[140] R C Beckman, C Grundy-Warr, and V L Forbes, *Acts of Piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits*, Maritime Briefing (Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, Department of Geography, University of Durham, 1994), 1.
[141] International Chamber of Commerce (International Maritime Bureau), *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report: 1 January - 31 December 2001*, (Essex 2001), 5; International Chamber of Commerce (International Maritime Bureau), *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report: 1 January - 31 December 2009*, (Essex 2009), 5.
[142] 'Aceh Rebels Sign Peace Agreement,' *BBC News*, 15 Aug 2005; S Bateman, 'Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Indonesian Waters,' in *Indonesia Beyond the Water's Edge: Managing and Archipelagic State*, ed. R B Cribb and M Ford (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 118.
[143] M J Valencia and N Khalid, 'The Somalia Multilateral Anti-Piracy Approach: Caveats on Vigilantism,' *Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 8, no. 4 (2009).
[144] J Gershman, 'Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?' *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (2002).
[145] J J Carafano, 'Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea,' *Backgrounder* 2041 (2007): 2.
[146] 'France Says Tanker Was Attacked,' *BBC News*, 10 Oct 2002.
[147] J Hookway, 'A Dangerous New Alliance,' *Far Eastern Economic Review* 167, no. 18 (2004): 12.

multiple plans to target US warships while in the region have been uncovered[148] and in March 2010 the Republic of Singapore Navy was made aware by a foreign government agency of intentions of attacks on oil tankers passing through the Malacca Strait.[149]

Non-state actors have also sought to attack high profile political and infrastructure targets on land. Jemaah Islamiyah had planned assassinating four *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (DPR, Indonesia's Peoples Representative Council) members,[150] Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,[151] and also intended to crash a hijacked aeroplane into Singapore's Changi Airport.[152] The island state's Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) system, the embassies of Israel, the UK and the US, and the Australian and UK High Commissions, as well as US firms' offices have all been potential targets.[153] These plans are in addition to several bomb attacks carried out in Indonesia against Balinese night clubs in 2002 and 2005, Jakarta's Hotel Marriott in 2003 and again in 2009, together with the bombings of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel and the Australian Embassy in 2004.[154] In light of the numerous potential challenges of both conventional and non-conventional nature, it is understandable why former Australian Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Dibb described an 'arc of instability' that spanned from Indonesia to the Solomon Islands and Fiji.[155] Indeed, the Obama Administration has distinguished a comparable yet broader 'arc' that stretches from the Horn of

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[148] The perpetrators of the *USS Cole* incident had also planned to attack a US ship visiting Malaysia in 2000; senior al-Qaeda member Omar al-Faruq disclosed a plan to attack a US warship in Indonesia's port of Surabaya; Jemaah Islamiyah operatives reportedly intended to target US warship visiting Southeast Asia; al-Qaeda has been found to film Malaysian patrols in the Malacca Strait, which has been speculated as evidence of a planned attack on the waterway; and in 2008 Singaporean intelligence authorities disrupted an al-Qaeda scheme to attack a US ship in the Asia-Pacific. G G Ong, 'Pre-Empting Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,' *Viewpoints* 29 Nov (2002), http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Ong-Preempting Terrorism and Piracy, ISEAS.pdf, 2; C Z Raymond, 'The Threat of Maritime Terrorism in the Malacca Straits,' *Terrorism Monitor* 4, no. 3 (2006). For a detailed account see Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Home Affairs), 'The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,' 2003 http://www.mha.gov.sg/get_blob.aspx?file_id= 252_complete.pdf.

[149] N Chatterjee, 'Security Raised in Malacca Strait after Terror Warning,' *Reuters*, 4 Mar 2010.

[150] 'A Number of Pesantrens in Central Java Targets,' *Jakarta Suara Pembaruan*, 16 Jul 2003.

[151] S Fitzpatrick, 'Jakarta Foils Plot to Murder President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,' *Australian* 14 May 2010.

[152] Republic of Singapore (National Security Coordination Centre), *The Fight against Terror: Singapore's National Security Strategy* (Singapore: National Security Coordination Centre, 2004), 23.

[153] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Home Affairs), 'The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism' 13; Republic of Singapore (National Security Coordination Centre), *The Fight against Terror:* 23.

[154] B Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, (CRS Report for Congress, 2009), Available at the Federation of American Scientists web page, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf, 8, 14.

[155] P Dibb, 'Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads,' *Naval War College Review* 54, no. 1 (2001): 31.

Africa to western China,[156] thus encompassing the vast geography associated with Middle East-East Asian oil supply chain.

Granted, transnational oil supply chain insecurities do exist in regions 'upstream' toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf and 'downstream' beyond the South China Sea. But they are not nearly as diverse as those facing Southeast Asia, nor are the areas as readily distinguishable as discrete transit chokepoints. The waters off the Somali coast, stretching south toward the Seychelles and northeast toward the Arabian Sea have received renewed international attention in relation to an increased frequency in piracy attacks on shipping in the region, especially following the hijacking of the Ukrainian *Faina* in September 2008 while carrying 33 T-72 tanks and various munitions.[157] Having emerged as a function of failed state conditions in Somalia, it has been speculated that the 2011 'Arab Spring' uprisings could exacerbate these activities.[158] The South China Sea, too, is host to its own set of tensions associated with China's declared indisputable sovereignty over its first island chain, which overlaps with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members' claims to portions of the Spratly Islands.[159] Yet geographic bottlenecks are much less pronounced in the South China Sea (and beyond toward Japan) as they are in Southeast Asia. And though the waters surrounding the Arabian Peninsula are home to the chokepoints of Bab el Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz,[160] they are close to the naval reaches of Middle Eastern supplier states and patrolled by multinational naval coalitions including Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, CTF 151 and CTF 152.[161] Noting also that East Asia's oil supply chain is predominantly vulnerable to non-state actors' activities in its upstream stretches, and downstream by traditional boundary disagreements, Southeast Asia is therefore perhaps the most crucial region that demands attention, not only because it is a locus of a heterogeneous array of

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[156] P Escobar, 'US's 'Arc of Instability' Just Gets Bigger,' *Asia Times* 3 Sep 2009.
[157] A Cawthorne, 'US Navy Eyes Ukrainian Ship Seized by Somalis,' *Reuters*, 29 Sep 2008.
[158] 'Middle East Unrest Makes Perfect Fodder for More Piracy: Analysts,' *Economic Times*, 10 Oct 2011.
[159] For a comprehensive account of the dynamics in the South China Sea, see S Bateman and R Emmers, eds., *Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime* (London: Routledge, 2009).
[160] United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'World Oil Transit Chokepoints.'
[161] CTF 150 and CTF 151 address maritime terrorism and piracy respectively. CTF 152 patrols the Persian Gulf in association with member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). J Kraska, *Contemporary Maritime Piracy: International Law, Strategy, and Diplomacy at Sea* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), 93.

supply chain vulnerabilities, but also for the unavoidable physical constraints that its sea lanes present for international shipping routes.

The Malacca Strait as a Major Regional Conduit for Seaborne Oil Trade

The Malacca Strait is the most important sea lane in Southeast Asia for transiting oil shipments. The region's defining geographic characteristic is its fragmented territory. The Indonesian archipelago consists of five major islands (among over 17,000) stretching from eastern Malaysia to northern Australia. Only 6,000 of these are inhabited. Some 7,107 islands make up the Philippines. Even Malaysia is divided between its western peninsula and eastern states. Singapore, too, is an island state.

A great many waterways divide the region as a result of these dispersed landmasses, and the Malacca Strait and Singapore Strait route—often referred to together as the Malacca *Straits*—is the most conducive to bulk oil shipping. The former is moderately shallow and narrow and separates the east coast of Indonesia's island of Sumatra from the west coast of the Malaysian peninsula. The deep-water Singapore Strait lies at the peninsula's southeastern tip. At some 600 miles long, the two straits are at once one of the world's longest maritime passages used for international navigation as well as being the shortest sea route between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean in general, and the Persian Gulf and East Asia in particular.[162]

Other sea lanes in Southeast Asia are either longer or less easily navigable for crude carriers, as ships that often rank among the world's largest ocean going vessels. The Sunda Strait separates the islands of Java and Sunda, though it is not an appealing route for oil tankers. Aside from being a further distance compared to the Malacca Strait, it is shallower.[163] This means that only smaller ships can safety transit, usually at a higher operating cost. The Lombok Strait and the Makassar Strait—the former dividing East Bali and Western Lombok and connecting the West Flores Sea to the Indian Ocean, and the latter separating Borneo and Sulawesi and joining the Java Sea, Celebes Sea and South China Sea—easily allow the passage of larger vessels[164] but is a longer voyage and therefore more expensive. VLCCs travelling from Middle

[162] Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*: 52; United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'World Oil Transit Chokepoints.'
[163] Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*: 77-8.
[164] Ibid., 79-83.

Eastern states to East Asia save 1,000 nautical miles and three days' worth of sailing by using the Malacca Strait compared to the Lombok route.[165] It is consequently understandable why approximately 72% of tankers in the Indian Ocean use the Malacca Strait over other regional waterways,[166] and why one estimate in 2006 observed that as many as 26 oil carriers sail through the Singapore Strait each day destined for Asian ports.[167] Bearing in mind the excess of 70,000—and growing—ships traversing the sea lane each year and projections of East Asia's continued reliance on Middle Eastern oil, the Malacca Strait's significance within this energy supply chain will at least perpetuate, if not increase, in years to come.

Prospective Energy Transit States: Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia

Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, as the Malacca Strait's primary coastal countries, can all be classified as energy transit states, which I define as 'a third party state through whose territory passes strategic energy resources.' All are located alongside one of the world's major oil distribution patterns and noting the supply chain's emergence in the aftermath of the Second World War, have been for most of their contemporary existences as states. Singapore's path to independence from British administration began in 1963 with its inclusion into the Federation of Malaya, and culminated in its expulsion two years later. In contrast, Indonesia's statehood was declared in 1945, but not attained until 1949.

The relative proportions of transit oil that pass through Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's waters could be questioned at this point with an argument that the three countries do not encounter shipping traffic equally, and are therefore poor choices for analysis. Two qualifications must be recognised here. First, the sea lane's cartographs often depict a line of equidistance between the Malaysian Peninsula and Indonesia's island of Sumatra as representative of the two states' exclusive economic zones (EEZ). This practice can be deceiving: while Jakarta and

[165] H M Ibrahim, H A Husin, and D Sivaguru, 'The Straits of Malacca: Setting the Scene,' in *Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia's Perspective*, ed. H M Ibrahim and H A Husin (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008), 34-5; P B Marlow and B M Gardner, 'The Marine Electronic Highway in the Straits of Malacca and Singaporean Assessment of Costs and Key Benefits,' *Maritime Policy and Management* 33, no. 2 (2006): 188.
[166] B K Sondakh, 'National Sovereignty and Security in the Strait of Malacca,' in *Building a Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of Malacca*, ed. M N Basiron and A Dastan (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2004), 79.
[167] Ho, 'The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,' 560.

Kuala Lumpur have delimited the waterway's seabed, its water column is not yet wholly settled.[168] Second, Singapore's position at the very end of the Peninsula's landmass means that it shares a greater proximity to the Singapore Strait than the Malacca Strait. Without undertaking an intensive examination of shipping traffic patterns using publicly available data such as from STRAITREP (the Mandatory Ship Reporting System in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore) as submitted to the three countries' Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) authorities, there is no simple answer, other than perhaps noting that the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) used to manage the waterway's shipping has greater proximity to the Malaysian coastline and its deep-water route closely passes Sumatra. With respect to the tendency for both sea lanes to be referred to and discussed together as the Malacca *Straits*, and the regularity in which the three states are distinguished as on the littoral, these factors remain minor technicalities that do not jeopardise the countries' standings as appropriate cases for framing energy transit state conceptions.

Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia enjoy geostrategically crucial roles for the security of supply of oil that is shipped from the Middle East to East Asia. The need to understand their positions in this context is made all the more pressing given an abundance of discussions addressing the implications of the so-called 'Asian Century,'[169] and expectations that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia will become the "maritime heart of Asia."[170] As the waterway's primary security providers, their interactions (specifically, their maritime cooperation) demands attention.

UNDERSTANDING MARITIME SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN THE MALACCA STRAIT

Even a cursory glance at Southeast Asia's maritime security activities reveals that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia engage in a complex array of unilateral, bilateral, trilateral and multilateral efforts at multiple levels aimed at protecting the Malacca Strait's maritime domain. For example, all three states have since 9/11 sought to individually establish agencies that can coordinate their various departments responsible for the maritime domain, such as the Singapore's Maritime Security Task

[168] I M A Arsana, 'Urgent Use of Cartohypnosis in Border Dispute Settlement,' *Jakarta Post*, 26 Oct 2011.
[169] For example, H White, 'Power Shift: Rethinking Australia's Place in the Asian Century,' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 65, no. 1 (2011).
[170] R Kaplan, 'Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century-Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,' *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 2 (2009): 25.

Force (MSTF), the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), and the *Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut Republik Indonesia* (the Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board, or IMSCB, often referred to by its Indonesian acronym BAKORKAMLA). Bilateral naval exercises have been in operation for several decades, including the Indonesia-Malaysia Exercise *MALINDO JAYA* since 1973, the Indonesia-Singapore Exercise *ENGLEK* since 1974, and the Malaysia-Singapore Exercise *MALAPURA* since 1984.[171] Singapore and Indonesia have conducted naval patrols in the Singapore Strait and Philip Channel through the Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrols since 1992[172] and in 2005 implemented the real time sea surveillance and information sharing system, Project SURPIC.[173] The three countries formed the trilateral MALSINDO Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols in July 2004.[174] After being renamed to the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP), it became part of the Malacca Straits Patrols Network in April 2006 together with the aerial sea lane surveillance Eyes in the Sky (EiS), which was established with Thailand in 2005,[175] and the Intelligence Exchange Group, which went on to establish the MSP Information System.[176] The three states led the creation of the Cooperative Mechanism in 2007. With its origins in the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG), which formed in 1977, the Cooperative Mechanism has constituted a formal attempt to manage international burden sharing in providing for the Strait's safety of

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[171] A Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2001), 173; D F Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), 143-4.

[172] J Ho, 'Singapore's Perspectives on Maritime Security,' in *The Seas Divide: Geopolitics and Maritime Issues in Southeast Asia*, ed. J S Sidhu and K S Balakrishnan, *Institute of Ocean and Earth Sciences Monograph* (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Ocean and Earth Sciences, University of Malaya, 2008), 138; Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Singapore and Indonesia Participate in Indo-Sin Coordinated Patrols (ISCP) and Joint Socio-Civic Activities,' 9 Oct 2001 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2001/oct/09oct01_nr2.html.

[173] B C Cheong, 'Strengthening Surveillance Capability through Enhanced SURPIC,' Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence, Navy), 9 Dec 2009 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/navy/newsevents/Project_SURPIC_II.html.

[174] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Launch of Trilateral Coordinated Patrols - MALSINDO Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol,' 20 Jul 2004 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2004/jul/20jul04_nr.html. Thailand joined the MSP in 2008. See 'Thailand Joins Malacca Straits Patrol.'

[175] C Liss, *Oceans of Crime: Maritime Piracy and Transnational Security in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh*, IIAS/ISEAS Series on Maritime Issues and Piracy in Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 295; Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Launch of Eyes in the Sky (EiS) Initiative,' 13 Sep 2005 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2005/sep/13sep05_nr.html.

[176] I Storey, 'Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Two Cheers for Regional Cooperation,' in *Southeast Asian Affairs*, ed. D Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 41.

navigation and environmental protection, in accordance with Article 43 of UNCLOS.[177]

As evident in the above initiatives, many avenues of cooperation were established following the devastating events of 9/11. These were influenced in part by the US Department of Homeland Security's subsequent drive to develop a 'multilayer' approach to secure its inward bound seaborne logistics (in addition to its aviation sector), in terms of its focus on terrorism and away from national missile defence, theft, drug trafficking and illegal immigration.[178] Washington's major efforts have included the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Megaports Initiative, Operation Safe Commerce, the 24 Advance Manifest Rule, the Secure Freight Initiative and the SAFE Port Act 2006. This reinvigorated strategy has presented a number of implications for the Malacca Strait's maritime domain. Of particular note is the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), proposed by Commander of the US Pacific Command (PACOM) Admiral Thomas Fargo on 31 March 2004 when reporting to Congress on potential US maritime security cooperation avenues with Southeast Asian states. Admiral Fargo's suggestion that US Special Operations Forces' presence on patrol boats in the region might prove useful in the initiative implied that the RMSI would involve permanent military stationing in the Malacca Strait.[179] In response, Indonesia and Malaysia were critical that the initiative saw their own existing security provisions as inadequate, contravened their positions as the Strait's primary security providers, would compromise their sovereignty in the sea lane, and would inflame Islamic extremism.[180] In essence, the

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[177] Cooperative Mechanism, 'Background,' Malaysia (Marine Department), 2010 http://www.cooperativemechanism.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16&Itemid=10; Cooperative Mechanism, 'Objective,' Malaysia (Marine Department), 2010 http://www.cooperativemechanism.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=40&Itemid=45; Cooperative Mechanism, 'Tripartite Technical Expert's Group (TTEG).' Article 43 of UNCLOS, entitled, 'Navigational and safety aids and other improvements and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution,' provides that:

> User States and States bordering a strait should by agreement cooperate (a) in the establishment and maintenance in a strait of necessary navigational and safety aids or other improvements in aid of international navigation; and (b) for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships.

See United Nations, 'United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982.'

[178] A Erera et al., *Cost of Security for Sea Cargo Transport*, (Logistics Institute - National University of Singapore and Georgia Institute of Technology, 2003), http://www.tliap.nus.edu.sg/tliap/research_whitepapers/security_cost_report.pdf, 2; S E Flynn, 'America the Vulnerable,' *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 1 (2002).

[179] For a detailed discussion of the events see Storey, 'Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,' 40.

[180] Storey, 'Securing Southeast Asia's Sea Lanes,' 113-4.

US spurred the littoral states' renewed vigour in cooperating[181] and is thus reflected in the Strait burden sharing efforts currently in place.

A reading of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's maritime security efforts becomes all the more complex when considering their involvement through broader cooperative initiatives. All major multilateral bodies in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia Pacific have sought to address various challenges to the maritime domain. As a representative list, this has included the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) 2003 Counter-Terrorism Action Plan and Secure Trade in the Asia-Pacific Region Initiative,[182] and an anti-piracy agreement established as part of ASEAN's 2002 work program.[183] ASEAN's 2003 Bali Concord II declaration identified a need for greater member cooperation on transnational maritime issues, whereby the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) was later established as part of the Association's vision to realise an ASEAN Political-Security Community.[184] The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meetings Plus (ADMM-Plus) established an Experts Working Group on Maritime Security, which first met in 2011.[185] During the ASEAN Plus Three's 2001 anti-piracy summit in Brunei, then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi suggested the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and later the Information Sharing Centre (ISC), which were created in Singapore in 2006.[186] In 2003, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) released a Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and other Threats to Maritime Security,[187] and in January 2007 conducted its first ever *Maritime Security Shore* Exercise, which Singapore also

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[181] Ibid., 96.
[182] S Bateman, 'Regional Responses to Enhance Maritime Security in East Asia,' *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 18, no. 2 (2006): 35.
[183] J Ho, 'Southeast Asian SLOC Security,' in *Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and International Cooperation*, ed. S Wu and K Zou (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 171.
[184] See paragraphs A.1 and A.5 in Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II),' 2003 http://www.asean.org/news/item/declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii; and paragraph A.2.5 in Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015,' 2009 http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/asean/dl/ASEANblueprint.pdf.
[185] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM),' 2012 http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/category/asean-defence-ministers-meeting-admm.
[186] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Transport), 'Factsheet on the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia,' 2006 http://app.mot.gov.sg/DATA/0/docs/ReCAAP factsheet _Nov06_ [FINAL]as of 281106.pdf, 1.
[187] Bateman, 'Regional Responses to Enhance Maritime Security in East Asia,' 36; Ho, 'Singapore's Perspectives on Maritime Security,' 139.

hosted.[188] Maritime security continues to be at the forefront of ASEAN's agenda.[189] In addition, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) has taken steps to incorporate non-traditional issues in its Professional Forum.[190] East Asia Summit (EAS) discussions have also addressed issues in maritime security, yet have centred more in managing tensions in the South China Sea.[191]

Track II initiatives supplement this list. They include the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific's (CSCAP) 'Facilitating Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific' study group and subgroup 'Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits;'[192] the Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions' maritime security workshops;[193] as well as dialogue and confidence building mechanisms through the Western Pacific Naval Symposium.[194] International level agreements such as the amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS), namely the 2004 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), have required regional actors—including the littoral states—to take steps in ensuring their compliance. These are on top of other United Nations and International Maritime Organization (IMO) sponsored conventions relevant to maritime governance such as UNCLOS 1982 and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 (SUA).

These efforts paint an intricate picture of security cooperation in relation to the Malacca Strait, and are certainly evidence of habits of dialogue and interaction in regional security architecture. However, their sheer number, heterogeneous issue

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[188] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Information Paper: ASEAN and ARF Maritime Security Dialogue and Cooperation,' United Nations, 4 Oct 2007 http://www.un.org/depts/los/consultative_process/mar_sec_submissions/asean.pdf, 2.

[189] As evidenced in formal statements such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Joint Statement of the 3rd ASEAN-US Leaders' Meeting Bali, 18 November 2011,' http://www.asean.org/news/item/joint-statement-of-the-3rd-asean-us-leaders-meeting; People's Republic of China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Joint Statement of the 14th ASEAN-China Summit to Commemorate the 20th Anniversary of Dialogue Relations,' *Xinhua*, 2011 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/20/c_131257696.htm.

[190] Programme of the 4th FPDA Professional Forum, 2003, cited in C A Thayer, 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever,' *Security Challenges* 3, no. 1 (2007): 88.

[191] United States of America (White House, Office of the Press Secretary), 'Fact Sheet: East Asia Summit,' 19 Nov 2011 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/19/fact-sheet-east-asia-summit.

[192] Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 'Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits,' 2008 http://www.cscap.org/index.php?page=safety-and-security-in-the-malacca-and-singapore-straits.

[193] See Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nadi.

[194] Ho, 'The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,' 573.

focus and diversity in avenues of interaction are problematic, to the point where the three countries' strategic posturing is difficult to discern and assess. There could well be more to Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's energy transit state positions, for instance, than just being uniquely located along a supply chain. How, then, should the three littoral states' multitude of maritime security activities be understood?

A Question of 'Common Interests' and Cooperation

Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests and policy choices should be central to a study of their maritime interactions. After all, official policy pronouncements repeatedly state that the three countries cooperate in the Malacca Strait on the basis of their 'common interests.' This argument is attractive for its simplicity. Yet claiming that maritime security cooperation has followed as a result is precarious. Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's burden sharing activities in the Strait might not actually be identical. Moreover, they do not equally make statements about their interests in their respective strategic policies.

The first problem facing the 'common interests-cooperation' maxim in the Malacca Strait lies in the three countries' incomplete security participation. It is not a revelation that the Asia Pacific suffers from a vacuum in regional security architecture. No single institution, treaty or body comprehensively addresses maritime threats in a coordinated manner. As Jim Rolfe has explained:

> [M]ost of the region's 250 or so multilateral cooperative organizations have only a narrowly functional or geographical focus and, although they contribute to wealth, confidence and stability, they do not individually address a wide range of issues or cover the full region.[195]

The ARF and APEC involve both the US and China (where the ASEAN Plus Three only enjoys the participation of China, and the EAS only incorporated the US in 2011), but many initiatives lack the involvement of all three of the Malacca Strait's littoral countries. For example, Singapore is a signatory to the US's PSI and the CSI, Malaysia is not party to the SUA or the PSI and Indonesia has not committed to the SUA, PSI and the CSI. Singapore is the only littoral state involved in ReCAAP: even though Indonesia and Malaysia have made statements agreeing in principle with its overall thrust, they are not formally associated with it outside of a working

[195] J Rolfe, 'Regional Security for the Asia-Pacific: Ends and Means,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 30, no. 1 (2008).

relationship.[196] Given that the FPDA was created in the aftermath of the Malay-Indonesian *Konfrontasi* (Confrontation), Indonesia is not a party to the arrangement either.

The three states' security activities are also plagued by functional limitations. Naval patrol cooperation has been criticised as constituting little more than schedule sharing, for its infrequency, and for lacking the necessary resources to respond to incidents at sea.[197] The MSP is 'coordinated' and not 'joint,' meaning that each state guards its own sovereign waters rather than conducting a collective surveillance of the entire waterway under one command structure.[198] Indonesia's and Malaysia's reliance on principles of sovereignty limits the MSP's provisions to engage in 'hot pursuit' of suspect ships into another state's waters, only with prior permission and only for a five nautical mile limit.[199] EiS surveillances are similarly prohibited from approaching within three miles of any of the littoral states' coastlines,[200] have been criticised for being an under-resourced and tokenistic response to other state actors' pressures, and being, at best, a deterrent presence.[201] Some officials involved in the MSP have even stated that its activities are for "show" only.[202] Nor are the three states' maritime contributions necessarily equal. Indonesia is often singled out for being a "weak link" in Strait security efforts.[203] The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), which is attempting to become a third-generation armed force,[204] is Southeast Asia's most capable and best equipped. There is no clear answer as to whether waxing lyrical over Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's maritime security cooperation successes can

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[196] 18 countries (Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, Laos, Myanmar, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United Kingdom and Vietnam) are contracting parties to the ReCAAP Agreement. Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, 'About ReCAAP,' http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx.

[197] Liss, *Oceans of Crime*: 295; C Vavro, 'Piracy, Terrorism and the Balance of Power in the Malacca Strait,' *Canadian Naval Review* 4, no. 1 (2008): 14.

[198] S W Simon, 'Safety and Security in the Malacca Straits: The Limits of Collaboration,' *Asian Security* 7, no. 1 (2011): 35.

[199] Ibid.

[200] Vavro, 'Piracy, Terrorism and the Balance of Power in the Malacca Strait,' 14.

[201] Raymond, 'Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait,' 37-8.

[202] J F Bradford, 'The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,' *Naval War College Review* 58, no. 3 (2005): 69.

[203] J N Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism: Working Together and Alone in the Malacca Straits,' in *Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits*, ed. G G Ong-Webb (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 155; Raymond, 'Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait,' 36; Storey, 'Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,' 38.

[204] See Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'About the 3rd Generation SAF,' 2011 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/3g/home.html.

offset such "stumbling blocks."[205] It does illustrate, though, that their interactions, no matter how noble their intentions, are not necessarily seamless in their implementation.

The second obstacle lies in rhetorical arguments that stakeholders in the Malacca Strait have the same security interests. Non-littoral actors are perhaps the loudest proponents of the 'common interests-cooperation' argument, many of which are high profile US officials. This includes those associated with its navy, like PACOM Admiral Dennis Blair,[206] Admiral Patrick M. Walsh,[207] Rear Admiral Carlton "Bud" Jewett[208] and Captain J. Ashley Roach of the US Department of State.[209] For example, in 2009 the US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead explained his view that naval patrols conducted in the Malacca Strait constituted a response to a common threat.[210] For President of the US-Indonesian Society Alphonse F. La Porta, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, together with "donor countries" have a shared impetus to protect the Malacca Strait from piracy.[211] The 2002 US National Security Strategy identified a common interest with India in securing vital sea lanes in the Indian Ocean in terms of counter-terrorism and regional stability.[212] Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi also made a similar case regarding India and the Malacca Strait.[213] These officials are not alone in their views:

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[205] Raymond, 'Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait,' 35.

[206] According to Blair, all Asia-Pacific states have a common interest in addressing terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy and proliferation. D Blair, 'The Role of Armed Forces in Regional Security Cooperation,' *PacNet*, no. 34 (2000).

[207] In 2007 Walsh stated that shared interests in the maritime domain facilitate states' abilities to cooperate in securing against common challenges. United States of America (Committee on Foreign Relations), 'The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Treaty Doc. 103-39): Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session (S. HRG. 110-592),' 27 Sep and 4 Oct 2007 http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/lots.pdf, 24.

[208] For Jewett, states' common interests and cooperation in securing the maritime domain are essential in building successful maritime security initiatives. C B Jewett, (paper presented at the 37th Annual IFPA-Fletcher Conference, 26-27 Sep 2007), 94-5.

[209] J A Roach, 'Enhancing Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,' *Journal of International Affairs* 59, no. 1 (2005): 112.

[210] J Garamone, 'Roughead Urges More Naval Cooperation,' United States of America (Department of Navy), 7 Oct 2009 http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=48825.

[211] 'Indonesia Calls for Co-Op to Fight Piracy in Malacca Strait,' *Xinhua*, 21 Jun 2005.

[212] United States of America (White House Office), *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington: President of the United States of America, 2002), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf, 27.

[213] Y Kawaguchi, 'Towards a Brighter Future: Advancing Our Global Partnership. Address at the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry Delhi, India,' 8 Jan 2003.

numerous strategic policy analysts observe the interest-behaviour convergence in maritime Southeast Asia too.[214]

Of the Malacca Strait's three littoral countries, only Singaporean elites readily express the 'common interests-cooperation' formula as a rhetoric staple. For instance, in 2007, then-Minister for Manpower Ng Eng Heng stated that freedom of navigation, safety, security and environmental protection in the maritime domain were common interests requiring cooperation among states.[215] Such arguments often feature in the island state's policy pronouncements concerning bilateral security arrangements. This has occurred in relation to its annual Exercise *Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training* naval patrols with the US,[216] Singapore-Japanese views on the freedom and safety of Southeast Asian sea lanes[217] or ASEAN-centric regional architecture,[218] as well as defence relations with Vietnam.[219] Claims about the close alignment of interests are also regularly made in justifications of specific maritime forums and activities: Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean has praised the suitability of major multilateral platforms (Shangri-La Dialogue, ARF, ASEAN, EAS, ADMM-Plus,

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[214] A Bergin, 'Maritime Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities' (paper presented at the Fifth Japan-Australia Track 15 Dialogue, co-hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Tokyo, July 23-24, 2009), 10; R E Ratcliff, 'Building Partners' Capacity: The Thousand-Ship Navy,' *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 4 (2007): 47; D Rosenberg, 'Dire Straits: Competing Security Priorities in the South China Sea,' *Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* (2005); A T H Tan, 'Singapore's Cooperation with the Trilateral Security Dialogue Partners in the War against Global Terrorism,' *Defence Studies* 7, no. 2 (2007): 194; G Till, 'New Directions in Maritime Strategy? Implications for the US Navy,' *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 4 (2007): 36; G Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 279; D Zweig and B Jianhai, 'China's Global Hunt for Energy,' *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5 (2005): 37.

[215] E H Ng, 'Speech at the Opening Ceremony of International Maritime Defence Exhibition Asia,' 15 May 2007. Similarly, in 2005, Minister Teo stated that regional maritime security including the Malacca Strait, represented a concern for Asian countries. G Wan, 'Growing Consensus and Cooperation over Maritime Security,' *Cyberpioneer: Web Publication of the Singapore Armed Forces* (2005), http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/news/2005/jun/04jun05_news.html. RSN Chief of Staff Rear Admiral Tan Wee Beng explained the logic at the 5th Western Pacific Naval Symposium Maritime Security Information Exchange Seminar that:

> Maritime security threats such as piracy and maritime terrorism are of concern to many nations…we must work together to stay a step ahead always of these threats.

G Ong, 'Strengthening Maritime Security at 5th WMSIES,' 1 Sep 2010 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/navy/newsevents/1.html.

[216] A Wong, 'S'pore, US Kick off 10th Year of CARAT Exercises,' *Cyberpioneer: Web Publication of the Singapore Armed Forces* (2004), http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/news/2004/June/08jun04_news.html.

[217] Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited in Tan, 'Singapore's Cooperation with the Trilateral Security Dialogue Partners in the War against Global Terrorism,' 202.

[218] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 'Visit of Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mr Zainul Abidin Rasheed to Japan,' 2009 http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/agencies/mfa/press_release/P-20090224-1.html.

[219] C H Teo, 'Speech at the National Defence College of Vietnam,' 9 Sep 2009.

FPDA and ReCAAP) to pursue shared goals in sea lines of communication,[220] stressed the value of the Shangri-La Dialogue in establishing the EiS[221] and in 2011 singled out ASEAN Experts' Working Groups as constituting common interest-based avenues to cooperate on maritime security issues.[222] During the 64th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Singaporean delegate Gan Teng Kiat stressed that UNCLOS was an appropriate means for coastal states and user states to cooperate and pursue common interests in protecting the Singapore Strait and the Malacca Strait.[223] For Transport Minister Raymond Lim, when recounting the story of the Cooperative Mechanism's formation, the Malacca Strait's safety and security was important for both littoral states and other sea lane users that included international and industry organisations.[224]

In contrast, Indonesia and Malaysia do not utilise this argument beyond occasional and moderate statements recognising broad areas of shared importance. At best, perhaps, is the 2005 Australia-Indonesia Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership that noted the two states' maritime security goals, but addressed neither the archipelagic state's littoral neighbours nor strategic waterways in the region.[225] Indeed, Jakarta's 'common interest' rhetoric is most apparent in its formal policy declarations. The 2003 Defence White Paper advocated greater security interaction with Japan, Singapore and Malaysia in relation to transnational crime.[226] Its 2008 successor flagged counter-terrorism as an area for improved cohesion with other states.[227] The Department of Foreign Affairs also justified Indonesia's ARF participation based on common interests in both of these issue areas.[228] And while

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[220] C H Teo, 'Keynote Address at the 12th Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers,' 5 Aug 2010.
[221] C H Teo, 'Speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue,' 6 Jun 2010.
[222] C H Teo, 'Remarks at the Jakarta International Defense Dialogue,' 23 Mar 2011.
[223] United Nations Department of Public Information, 'General Assembly Adopts Two Wide-Ranging Resolutions Aimed at Strengthening World's Legal Regime for Oceans: Protecting Fisheries, Marine Ecosystems,' 4 Dec 2009 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/ga10899.doc.htm.
[224] R Lim, 'Welcome Address at the Opening Session of the Singapore Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection,' 4 Sep 2007.
[225] Commonwealth of Australia and Republic of Indonesia, 'Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia,' Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), 2005 http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/comprehensive_partnership_1105.html.
[226] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Defence), *Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21* (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan, 2003), 71.
[227] Republic of Indonesia (Department of Defence), *Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia* (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan, Republik Indonesia, 2008), 10.
[228] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 'Kerjasama Regional,' http://www.kemlu.go.id/Lists/RegionalCooperation/AllItems.aspx?l=en.

Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda and President Yudhoyono have respectively remarked on Indonesia's capability to manage its jurisdiction of the Malacca Strait in relation to security ties with India,[229] and the existence of an "equal partnership and common interest" with regard to its US bilateral relationship,[230] such statements are exceptions rather than the rule in Indonesia's strategic policy pronouncements on this issue.

Malaysia has been even less prone to such statements in general, let alone in relation to the Malacca Strait. From ASEAN's earliest days, Abdul Razak, while Deputy Prime Minister, was optimistic about the potential for the Association to realise regional security provisions "once we have become good friends with a common interest and destiny."[231] Najib Razak has entertained similar views concerning Malaysia-US trade and security cooperation.[232] Though Defence Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi has praised the value of security cooperation to tackle piracy,[233] Malaysian officials' common interest rhetoric addressing multi-actor maritime activities is rare relative to others' practices. One such instance of this occurred in 2005 when Najib Razak, as Deputy Prime Minister, stated that:

> To add to the complexity of the whole security equation [in the Malacca Strait], the many stakeholders that comprise littoral states, user states, maritime communities and NGOs may each have different level of interests, priorities, threat perceptions and expectations. Simply, it all boils down to issues relating to each state's national interests.[234]

Thus, all three of the Malacca Strait's coastal countries promote maritime security cooperation. But Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia do not all focus on 'common interest' justifications when doing so. With only a few scholarly contributions overtly

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[229] H Wirajuda and P Mukherjee, 'Transkripsi Keteranganan Pers Pada Acara 3rd India-Indonesia Joint Commission Meeting, Gedung Pancasila,' 18 Jun 2007.

[230] S B Yudhoyono, 'Indonesia and America: A 21st-Century Partnership,' speech delivered to US-Indonesia Society luncheon, Washington, DC, 14 Nov 2008, cited in J B Haseman and E Lachica, 'Getting Indonesia Right: Managing a Security Partnership with a Nonallied Country,' *Joint Force Quarterly* Q3, no. 54 (2009): 91.

[231] 'It's "Wait and See,"' *Straits Times*, 12 Aug 1967, 1.

[232] N Razak, 'Speech in Washington DC,' May 2002, cited in J Keith, 'US-Malaysia Security Relations and the East Asian Region: Speech Delivered in Kuala Lumpur,' 16 Apr 2008.

[233] Zahid Hamidi stated:

> Cooperation between nations is more important than the question of overlapping claims between countries, because if there is no control, they (the pirates) would feel that no one can enforce the law in that area.

Translated from the original Malaysian. 'Strategi Baru Atasi Ancaman Lanun,' *Berita Harian*, 30 Nov 2009.

[234] N Razak, 'Keynote Address for the Lima International Maritime Conference on 4 Dec 05,' *MIMA Bulletin* 12, no. 2 (2005): 2.

recognising variance in the three countries' interests and policy choices,[235] this raises questions over the accuracy of such arguments, and whether the countries' strategic agendas in the oil chokepoint actually align. A deeper understanding of interests and policy choices in the Malacca Strait is therefore needed.

The Balance of Power and the ASEAN Way as Alternative Explanations

Existing discussions within International Relations can account for some aspects of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's maritime security interactions, though they are generally oversimplified. Regional security complex theory, for instance, pigeonholes the countries as conflict-prone third world weak states within a Southeast Asian security complex that remains dominated by great powers, and has seemingly shifted toward a security regime in a greater Asian supercomplex.[236] Balance of Power notions of alliance formation and the ASEAN Way offer alternative explanations of Strait security activities, however, they also expect that cooperation occurs based on common interests.

Balance of Power contributions regard security cooperation in the form of alliances[237] and posit that states will either 'balance' or 'bandwagon.' Alliances, as a type of alignment,[238] are defined as formal—and usually military-centric—agreements that are typically concerned with the non-use of force.[239] States create alliances when the benefits of doing so exceed the costs, with the aim to realise an increased level of security for themselves.[240] Balance of Power theory predicts that this occurs when states seek to contain an untempered state-based power.[241] Stephen

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[235] N Khalid, 'To Serve and to Be Protected: A Comprehensive Perspective on Security in the Strait of Malacca' (paper presented at the Conference on the Security of Global Port Cities: Community, Environment and Maritime Policy, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, 30 Apr-2 May 2008), 11; M Leifer and D Nelson, 'Conflict of Interest in the Straits of Malacca,' *International Affairs* 49, no. 2 (1973); Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism;' Storey, 'Securing Southeast Asia's Sea Lanes.'

[236] B Buzan, 'The Southeast Asian Security Complex,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 10, no. 1 (1988); B Buzan, 'Security Architecture in Asia: The Interplay of Regional and Global Levels,' *Pacific Review* 16, no. 2 (2003); B Buzan and O Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 128, 73.

[237] G H Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 156.

[238] G H Snyder, 'Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,' in *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations*, ed. R L Rothstein (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), 85.

[239] Ibid., 84.

[240] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*: 43.

[241] C Layne, 'The War on Terrorism and the Balance of Power: The Paradoxes of American Hegemony,' in *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, ed. T V Paul, J J Wirtz, and M Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); R Little, *The Balance of Power in*

Walt—whose *Origins of Alliances* is credited as a founding work in the Balance of Threat subset—has argued that decisions to ally are made on the basis of threat perceptions rather than more powerful states,[242] where 'threat' is a product of "power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions."[243]

While these contributions raise questions over how Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's threat perceptions shape their security agendas and interactions, underlying these views is the notion that alliances are formed when their interests converge.[244] Morgenthau, for example, observed in *Politics among Nations* that "an alliance requires of necessity a community of interests for its foundation."[245] Similarly, Kalevi Jaakko Holsti has argued that "[c]ommon perceptions of threat and widespread attitudes of insecurity are probably the most frequent source of alliance strategies."[246] According to Richard Little, a state's decision to balance or bandwagon depends on its assessment of its competing interests with the stronger power on one hand and its common interests on the other.[247] The opposite logic stands as well, whereby Glenn H Snyder links common interests to cooperation, but views divergent interests as threatening alliances.[248] However, noting the multiplicity of cooperative maritime security provisions in which Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia are involved, and preliminary indications that their interests in the Malacca Strait are not necessarily identical, the logic of Balance of Power theories do not appear to account for the three countries' interests and policy choices in the sea lane.

Competing visions of a regional order also emphasise Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's security cooperation, especially in relation to ASEAN's attempts to present itself as a unified actor in the international system. At a minimum, this lies in promotions of an 'ASEAN Way' which refers to its members' practices of informal consensus decision making, non-interference and peaceful dispute settlement, as

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International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4.

[242] S M Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 5.

[243] Ibid., vi.

[244] Ibid., 263.

[245] Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*: 182.

[246] K J Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 2nd ed. (London: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 112.

[247] J Haacke, 'Michael Leifer and the Balance of Power,' *Pacific Review* 18, no. 1 (2005): 66; J Haacke, 'Michael Leifer, the Balance of Power and International Relations Theory,' in *Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael Leifer*, ed. M Leifer, R Emmers, and J C Y Liow, *Routledge Politics in Asia Series* (Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2006), 60.

[248] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*: 165.

codified in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.[249] At the most extreme are visions of a Deutschian security community whose members exhibit compatible norms and values, a nascent diplomatic and security culture and even identity.[250]

While it is not out of the ordinary for regional organisations to attempt to coalesce their members' identities and geopolitical orientations when addressing potential vulnerabilities, "with a presumed set of commonalities facilitating cooperation,"[251] ASEAN in particular has long weathered criticisms that doubt its cohesion. There is certainly a "contradiction between official consensus and actual practice" within ASEAN, whereby promotion of shared values does not equate to identical strategic policy outcomes, or what David Martin Jones and Michael L. R. Smith call its ability to "make process not progress."[252] According to Nicholas Rees, ASEAN's members' differences constitute a severe constraint on its ability to collectively manage security compared to the relative cultural homogeneity among European Union members.[253] Similarly, William Tow and Brendan Taylor note the divergence in Southeast Asian states' visions on the future direction of regional security architecture.[254]

Notions of the ASEAN Way certainly suggest that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia *should* at least have shared interests (if not norms and values) in relation to the Malacca Strait and engage in harmonious consensus-based decision making when providing for its security. But as with Balance of Power theories of alliance formation, an initial reading of the three littoral countries' maritime interactions based on the ASEAN Way does not reflect the fact that they do not equally make 'common interests-cooperation' claims in their policy rhetoric. Noting these two alternative

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[249] See Article 2 of Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, 24 February 1976,' http://www.asean.org/news/item/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976-3.
[250] See Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*; J Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects* (Richmond: Curzon, 2003).
[251] R Foot, 'Pacific Asia: The Development of Regional Dialogue,' in *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*, ed. L L E Fawcett and A Hurrell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 229; J Sperling, 'Regional or Global Security Cooperation? The Vertices of Conflict and Interstices of Cooperation,' in *Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century*, ed. E J Kirchner and J Sperling (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 264.
[252] D M Jones and M L R Smith, 'Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order,' *International Security* 32, no. 1 (2007): 174.
[253] N Rees, 'EU and ASEAN: Issues of Regional Security,' *International Politics* 47, no. 3-4 (2010): 408.
[254] W T Tow and B Taylor, 'What is Asian Security Architecture?' *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (2010): 107-8.

explanations' limited abilities to offer insight into Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interactions in the Malacca Strait, they can be set aside at this stage of the thesis. Though I return them in the final analysis, there is a more pressing need for a means to account for the three littoral countries' roles as energy transit states, and in particular their interests and policy choices toward the maritime domain.

AN ENERGY TRANSIT STATE FRAMEWORK AND CASE STUDY DESIGN

At this point it is clear that an original energy transit state framework would help determine whether Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have common interests in supply chain security in the Malacca Strait, and whether they cooperate when pursuing them. Such a framework would need to meet the following four requirements. It would primarily need a means of identifying a country as an energy transit state. There would be little use to studying a country's strategic posturing as an energy transit state without first demonstrating that it was 'a third party state through whose territory passes strategic energy resources.' This chapter has already shown that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia fit my definition of an energy transit state, on the basis that the Malacca Strait has long been used as the main maritime thoroughfare for Middle East oil shipments.[255] Next, as my review of the existing scholarship found that the chief classifier of energy transit states lies with the transnational energy supply chain passing through their territories, an energy transit state framework would also need to discern the three countries' relationships with Middle East-East Asia oil flows. Given the problematic notion of 'common interests' in the sea lane, the framework must accordingly be able to distinguish Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests in Strait security matters. This would then facilitate a comparative analysis of the three countries' interest convergence and divergence. Last, the framework should offer a means to assess the three countries' policy choices toward the Malacca Strait, which reflects the need to understand whether the littoral countries cooperate. However, noting that the tendency for states to compete over strategic natural resources is already well-documented within the

[255] For a conceptual discussion of my energy transit state definition, see the section in this chapter entitled *Energy Security and Transit States: From 'Economy of Supply' to 'Security of Supply'* The section entitled *Prospective Energy Transit States: Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia* demonstrates why Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia fit this definition.

literature, assessments of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's policy decision making should be as cognisant of competitive interactions as cooperative ones.

To fulfil these requirements, this thesis hypothesises that an energy transit state's 'stake' in a transnational energy supply chain can be used as a central mechanism to analyse its strategic interests and policy choices associated with security of supply. In regular usage, 'stake' refers to something of value or interest, or a share, that is often of a financial nature, and that is held in something, is at issue, or is in question.[256] Though the term is often used and rarely described within International Relations, R. T. Jangam likens it to power, interests and goals, and explains that:

> Stakes can be of different types—territorial, military, political, economic, racial, religious, cultural, or those relating to prestige and goodwill. At any given time, we will find that every nation has some or all of these stakes to achieve in relation to other nations.[257]

Noting these understandings then, 'stake' is defined for the purposes of this study as 'an energy transit state's value or share held in a transnational energy supply chain.' Similar to how it is defined in regular usage, financial characteristics are certainly relevant to this understanding. However, like Jangam's description, this thesis seeks assessments of stake that go beyond monetary considerations.

It is to be expected that different energy transit states will have different stakes in a transnational energy supply chain. This is reflected in Jangam's explanation that a country's stake is to be considered relative to those of others. In addition, the existing literature already recognises that energy transit states have diverse experiences in relation to a supply chain. It is therefore necessary to develop a means of measuring energy transit states' stakes in a transnational energy supply chain, and an ability to distinguish them from each other.

I argue that in order to make a judgement about a country's stake, two factors related to its supply chain involvement must be examined. The first is the relationship between the energy transit state's domestic energy sector and its national interests, which is based on the notion that natural resources are a component of national power. This evaluation requires a sense of the historical significance and role of the energy

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[256] Collins, 'English Dictionary Definition of Stake,' http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/stake; Oxford Dictionaries, 'Definition of Stake in English,' http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/stake--2.

[257] R T Jangam, *An Outline of International Politics* 2nd ed. (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1981), 2.

resources for the state in question. Here, those activities related to the same energy resource as the one traversing its territory are the primary concern. For instance, determining that a country's nuclear power production is important is unlikely to offer much analytical value when the supply chain being examined consists of piped natural gas. The second factor concerns the relationship between the state's domestic energy sector and the transnational energy supply chain, which is a recurring means of differentiation among competing transit state typologies. As alluded to within the literature on energy transit states, this can be observed in patterns of import consumption or production exports, in processing or refining, or a combination of such activities. Tracking a stake over time—as opposed to a momentary snapshot—would provide the most analytical value. Identifying a state's current and potential future policy trajectory would offer a means to avoid unexpected tensions in international politics, such as those encountered with the RMSI.

It is essential that both the nature of the relationship and its relative weight are considered together, so that an energy transit state's stake is wholly accounted for. Omitting one factor might reveal that a state is integrated in an energy supply chain, but will not differentiate whether this characteristic is significant to its overall interests. Failing to acknowledge the other is equally risky since it will only flag a country's domestic energy interests in isolation of its transit status. These distinctions are crucial. An incorrect understanding of a country's stake will skew interpretations of continuity and change in its policy pronouncements. As described in the following paragraphs, countries that have significant stakes in a transnational energy supply chain can be expected to have distinct interests and behave quite differently to those operating with greater autonomy from the supply chain.

Determining a way to identify different transit state types is the next task. Given that the relevant conceptual literature is currently at an early level of development, a simple classification system is appropriate. Figure 3 illustrates how three gradations of stake can be represented along a continuum with according energy transit state types. As this chapter's discussion has shown, classifying a state on the basis of its geostrategic attributes is a regular practice within energy transit state scholarship, geopolitics and power politics.

FIGURE 3: A CONTINUUM OF ENERGY TRANSIT STATE TYPES



Energy transit states can thus be distinguished at one extreme as 'fledgling energy transit states' that have 'low' stakes, whereby the transnational supply chain has little value, or significance to the country, little association with the distribution of energy resources through their territories, or is otherwise unrelated to its strategic standing. Conversely, 'enmeshed energy transit states' have 'high' stakes in the transit supply, whereby the transnational energy supply chain is very significant, holds great value or is otherwise an important to its strategic standing. 'Rising energy transit states,' in turn, represent a mid-point between the fledgling and enmeshed types. The framework does not provide stake thresholds for ascertaining discrete progressions from one type to another. Rather, it is intended to be a platform that identifies broad divergences among energy transit states, upon which general predictions concerning the nature of their supply chain interests and interactions can then be explored. A 'rising energy transit state's' stake can be expected to hold some significance to the country in question, but not to the high level of importance as enmeshed energy transit states, or to the relative unimportance of the fledgling energy transit state.

After making a judgement about which energy transit state type a country matches, its stake can then be used as a guide to predict its interests and policy choices. An enmeshed energy transit state, with a high stake in the movement of energy resources through its territory, can be expected to prioritise issues associated

with security of supply, including anything that has the potential to interrupt its continuation. If Singapore, Indonesia or Malaysia were found to be an enmeshed energy transit state, then they could be expected to demonstrate a great deal of interest in protecting the Malacca Strait. With a heightened awareness of supply chain challenges, enmeshed states would be likely to employ extensive measures to protect against them. In other words, if analysis reveals one of the Malacca Strait's littoral countries to have a high transit oil stake, then it would be anticipated to have an active role in Strait security activities.

Fledgling energy transit states can be expected to exhibit an alternate outlook and behavioural traits, as the transnational energy supply chain has little or no significance in their strategic calculus. If Singapore, Indonesia or Malaysia are assessed to match this state type, the analysis would seek to confirm that they do not regard issues in supply chain security as very important. Following on from this, it would then assess whether a low transit oil stake was associated with a disinclination to engage in Strait security activities. Here, the expectation is that a country with minor involvement in a transnational supply chain would have little incentive to participate.

Rising energy transit states are the most analytically challenging due to their juxtaposition in an intermediate 'grey area' between their enmeshed and fledgling counterparts. Their presence within the continuum is undoubtedly necessary. Much like the arguments that justify 'middle power' designations for their ability to mitigate stratified power distributions that result from using only 'great power' and 'small power' categories,[258] binary energy transit state typologies such as Stevens' are unlikely to fully explain the differences among Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. Only by demonstrating that a country is neither wholly integrated with, nor completely independent of, a transnational energy supply chain, can a rising state profile be inferred.

An examination of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's cooperation in the Malacca Strait must necessarily acknowledge the likelihood that they compete as well. Consequently, there are several dilemmas of cooperation and competition that face all three of the framework's energy transit state types. Whether an enmeshed

[258] Glazebrook, 'The Middle Powers in the United Nations System,' 307; E Jordaan, 'The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers,' *Politikon* 30, no. 1 (2003): 165.

energy transit stake's drive to secure its stake might manifest as competitive behaviour, for instance, as a means to maintain its position (as understandings of strategic energy resources predict), or cooperation with other supply chain stakeholders as a strategy to maximise its protection (which is the apparent rhetorical *status quo* for Southeast Asia's maritime security activities), is a core ambiguity demanding resolution. There will be a disparity between expectation and practice if any of the three littoral countries fit the fledgling state type (which is not expected to be interested in the supply chain due to its low stake), since that all of them *have* participated in a variety of sea lane initiatives. Given that rising energy transit states' interests conceptually sit between the enmeshed and fledgling types, it must be considered whether such state types share both, some, or neither of their counterparts' interests and policy choices. Resolving these dilemmas is therefore a secondary level task for the analysis.

In order to ascertain whether Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's security interests in the Malacca Strait are 'common,' it is worth noting how relevant terminology is understood within the literature. 'Common interests' are frequently mentioned in studies within states that are concerned with pluralism and governance,[259] and at a global level, in relation to diplomacy, international society and international regimes.[260] However, the specific characteristics that designate interests as being 'common' are rarely outlined. Noting the well-established theme in International Relations scholarship that no two countries ever uphold exactly the same interests,[261] it is more useful to identify interests that closely resemble each other rather than completely identical.[262] On this basis, this thesis uses 'convergence' and 'divergence' to refer to similar and dissimilar interests.

It is worthwhile considering the interplay between interests and policy choices here. In particular, Barry H. Steiner's work concerning interests and diplomacy

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[259] For example, T M Moe, *The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 150.

[260] See H Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1977), 13; A A Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,' *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982); B H Steiner, 'Diplomacy and International Theory,' *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 4 (2004).

[261] J Barnett, 'Environmental Security,' in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. A Collins (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 190; J J Mearsheimer, 'Israel's Nukes Harm US National Interests' (paper presented at the Israel's Nuclear Arsenal: Espionage, Opacity and Future, Washington DC, 7 Jul 2010).

[262] This is in accordance with how 'common interests' is described in N Zaslavskaia, 'The European Union and Russia,' in *The European Union and Global Governance: A Handbook*, ed. J-U Wunderlich, D J Bailey (London; New York: Routledge), 284.

indicates that it is more complex than Balance of Power predictions about cooperation. From examining Harold Saunders' and Thomas Schelling's contributions, Steiner concludes that the situational characteristics that facilitate convergent interests can just as easily draw states apart from each other.[263] And while he does recognise that convergent interests facilitate the likelihood of states cooperating,[264] he also notes that cooperation can be problematic. States can be unable to define their convergent interests,[265] their other goals and attitudes can interfere, or domestic constraints can impede negotiations.[266] Similarly, Steiner acknowledges how divergent interests are relevant to understanding adversaries and the possible escalation of war.[267] However, he also notes that divergent interests can, in some circumstances, facilitate interactions among states precisely because they hold different assessments of the value of something in question, whereby "[i]t may even be easier […] to reach a peaceful settlement if the parties do not see things the same way, but rather see things differently."[268]

Taking convergent and divergent interests into consideration along with cooperation and competition, and the multiple ways that interests and policy choices could interact, there are several potential answers to questions about how Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia approach maritime security in the Malacca Strait. The first possible answer is that the 'common interests-cooperation' claims are correct, and that convergent interests *do* prompt cooperation in the sea lane. Alternatively, it might be the case that the littoral countries have managed to cooperate despite having divergent interests. Another outcome is that interests converge but the three states compete. Fourth, competitive behaviour follows divergent interests.

A fifth possible outcome is that Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's various interests both converge and diverge, and that they are consequently motivated to engage in both cooperation and competition in the Malacca Strait. I argue that this is most likely to represent their interactions in the sea lane. If correct, such a finding

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[263] Steiner, 'Diplomacy and International Theory,' 506-7.
[264] Ibid., 504.
[265] Ibid., 505-6.
[266] B H Steiner, 'Diplomacy as Independent and Dependent Variable,' *International Negotiation* 6 (2001): 81-2.
[267] Ibid., 82.
[268] Fisher et al., *Coping with International Conflict* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1997), 47, cited in Steiner, 'Diplomacy and International Theory,' 502.

would need to identify how convergence and divergence occurs, as well as the circumstances driving cooperation and competition.

Despite this thesis's primary focus on the role of oil, it is not realistic to expect that it will account for every single policy decision that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have ever made toward the Malacca Strait. This is especially likely where fledgling and rising energy transit state types are concerned, which, having lower stakes in a transnational energy supply chain, are not necessarily motivated by oil-centric factors. Hence, should other factors emerge throughout the analysis that are relevant to understanding the three countries' priorities and policies, then the interplay of oil-centric factors and non-oil-centric factors must also be considered at a later stage in the thesis.

Research Design: Case Studies and Theory Building

Applying the framework to the particular problem of Southeast Asia necessitates a strategic policy analysis[269] that is designed around empirically-laden qualitative case studies. Since energy transit state scholarship is presently at an early stage of development, an examination of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia in their positions astride Middle East-East Asian oil flows not only expands such contributions' Eurasia-centric data sets, but offers a means to inductively generate conceptual generalisations on the nature of their strategic posturing. This study therefore adopts a multi-method approach to data analysis consisting of a focused literature review, case study techniques, documentary analysis and in-person interviews, which, in combination are appropriate to studies, such as this, that have exploratory objectives.[270]

Methodological contributions within the field of foreign policy analysis typically identify three techniques that can be used to evaluate a state's posturing,[271] all of which are employed in this research project. A state's official policy

[269] Though the field as an area of study is usually referred to as 'foreign policy analysis,' this thesis examines a broader span of strategic policy making that is not limited to foreign policy.
[270] D A Aaker, V Kumar and G S Day, *Marketing Research* (New York: Wiley, 1998), cited in D E McNabb, *Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*, 2nd ed. (Armonk: M E Sharp, 2009), 97.
[271] C F Hermann, 'Foreign Policy Behaviour: That Which is to be Explained,' in *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies*, ed. C F Hermann, M A East, and S A Salmore (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1978), 31.

pronouncements can be taken as a face value meaning.[272] This is perhaps the least analytically demanding and has some merit as far as comparing policy rhetoric across cases is concerned. However, this chapter has already shown how claims that the littoral states' common interests provide an impetus for maritime security cooperation in the Malacca Strait are not only advocated in distinctly different ways, but remain at odds with natural resource-based predictions for competition. This approach is therefore insufficient by itself. Second, a set of preconceived basic goals according to a chosen ideological standpoint can be deductively analysed.[273] As the framework represents a combination of existing understandings in International Relations and foreign policy analysis, it can thus be considered to represent a "midway between being hypotheses and generalizations."[274] On one hand it draws on theoretical assumptions within the fields of power politics and energy security, which provides a broad guideline for observing matters relevant to energy transit state policy choices. On the other hand, the framework has not yet been applied in its current form to a data set. Third, patterns of continuity and change in a state's external decision making can be inferred from empirical evidence.[275] While all three analytical techniques are relevant to this research, induction is the primary in-case method used due to its theory building properties.

Making inferences across case studies allows for the Popperesque 'logic of scientific discovery' and is a widely supported practice in the social sciences. Alexander George maintains that the value of heuristic methods lies in their ability to reveal "new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths."[276] What Arend Lijphart terms the 'hypothesis-generating case study' is used where theory does not yet exist.[277] According to Harry Eckstein's competing typology, the 'heuristic case study' that employ empirically grounded creative thinking—or a 'soft line' theory construction—allows intensive analysis without strong ties to a limited

[272] Ibid.
[273] Ibid.
[274] A phrase put forward in P McGowan and H B Shapiro, *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), 21.
[275] Hermann, 'Foreign Policy Behaviour: That Which is to be Explained,' 31.
[276] A L George and A Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 75.
[277] A Lijphart, 'Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,' *American Political Science Review* (1971): 692.

variable set.[278] This technique is appropriate for developing an answer to the central thesis research problem. Indeed, contemporary International Relations has continued to recognise the value of this case study technique.[279] For example, in 2007, Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman reviewed the 'conceptual innovation' pronounced within realist-associated research that addressed the effect of military power on strategic policy decision making and outcomes. The fact that Bennett and Elman flagged studies undertaken by Stephen Peter Rosen, Fareed Zarakia and Randall Schweller, all of which dealt with the effects of relative power changes[280] is instructive in relation to this research. Since oil, as a strategic energy resource, is an element of national power, the framework advanced in this thesis also draws on comparable presumptions. With Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia all positioned at a mid-point location in Middle East-East Asia oil supplies, there is ample opportunity to make inferences based on their transit oil stakes.

Induction is also suitable for studies such as this that require an identification of states' interests in a particular setting. This is precisely what Stephen Krasner prescribed in his hallmark 1978 publication, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy*,[281] and the technique continues to be used widely throughout International Relations scholarship in a post-Cold War setting. Samuel S. Kim, Ted Hopf and Dieter Senghaas employed empirical inference to respectively examine North Korea's and South Korea's interactions, to develop a constructivist theory of social identity and foreign policy choice and evaluate interdependencies throughout the international system.[282] Krasner's monograph also informs the design of this research because its attempt to understand US elite decision

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[278] H Eckstein, *Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 126, 44-5.

[279] A Bennett, 'Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages,' in *Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*, ed. D F Sprinz and Y Wolinsky-Nahmias (Ann Arbor, Michigan; Bristol: University of Michigan Press; University Presses Marketing, 2004), 22; S G Walker, 'Management and Resolution of International Conflict in a "Single" Case: American and North Vietnamese Exchanges During the Vietnam War,' in *Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations: Methodology in the Study of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution*, ed. Z Maoz (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), 282.

[280] A Bennett and C Elman, 'Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield,' *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 2 (2007): 178-80.

[281] S D Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), Chapter Two.

[282] T Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 23; S S Kim, *The Two Koreas and the Great Powers* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 38; D Senghaas, *On Perpetual Peace: A Timely Assessment* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 142.

making in a context of raw materials investments through a statist perspective is not unlike the knowledge gaps facing the energy transit state literature.

Granted, some disagreement surrounds the question of whether a state's 'national interest' ever really exists in a singular form. According to J. David Singer:

> "the national interest" is a smokescreen by which we all too often oversimplify the world, denigrate our rivals, enthrall our citizens, and justify acts of dubious morality and efficacy.[283]

For Richard Carlton Snyder, Henry W. Bruck and Burton M. Sapin—whose *Foreign Policy Decision Making* continues to be recognised as a foundational contribution in foreign policy analysis[284]—such charges can be allayed by contextualising the 'interest' under examination, with recognition that a plurality of national interests is more likely. This research's objective in unpacking the ambiguity in Southeast Asian energy transit states' 'common interests' claims must therefore remain firmly grounded in a supply chain security setting.

It is also important at this point to address the "objective-subjective dilemma"[285] that is so often levelled at foreign policy analysis, and to which this research design is not immune. It is possible that national interests cannot always be objectively defined. This criticism stems from the notion that there is an inherent subjectivity in the process of analysing empirical data.[286] Indeed, the very act of generalising foreign policies—that is, the researcher's elimination of what is deemed as irrelevant data in preference of seemingly more important evidence—runs the risk of imposing researcher-specific values, or even ideology, on what may otherwise be little more than a grouping of heterogeneous policy statements.[287] A danger exists that a researcher cannot be certain that policy preferences, whether elicited in official

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[283] J D Singer cited in D W Clinton, *The Two Faces of National Interest* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994), x.

[284] So much so that it was revised four decades later. See V M Hudson, 'Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Touchstone for International Relations Theory in the Twenty-First Century,' in *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*, ed. R C Snyder, et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1.

[285] R C Snyder, H W Bruck, and B Sapin, 'Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics,' in *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*, ed. R C Snyder, et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 75.

[286] Bernard Brodie for instance supports a subjective approach to examining interests. See Chapter Eight, especially page 364, of B Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973).

[287] As raised in, for example, L Buszynski, *Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 3; B White, 'Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches,' in *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*, ed. M Clarke and B White (Aldershot; Brookfield: Edward Elgar; Gower, 1989), 8-10; O R Young, 'The Perils of Odysseus on Constructing Theories in International Relations,' in *Theory and Policy in International Relations*, ed. R Tanter and R H Ullman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 188.

documents or in elite statements, are necessarily indicative of a state's 'true' preference.[288] Government officials are, after all, just as aware as analysts of prevailing foreign policy 'traditions' and can thus have the ability to—intentionally or unintentionally—perpetuate particular worldviews about their country's foreign policy. In an extreme circumstance, this could preclude the realisation of new strategic policy observations. With this in mind, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine with a sense of finality whether policy stances constitute a direct function of a state's national interests, or as a product of other factors, such as social norms.[289]

This dilemma is ongoing within foreign policy analyses and the obstacles mentioned above are not unique to this project. Rather, they face any attempt to interpret a state's strategic manoeuvring in the international system and have not prevented a number of foundational accounts of Singaporean, Indonesian and Malaysian foreign policy from being conducted.[290] Nor do they seriously undermine the knowledge enrichment that such studies can offer. Indeed, foreign policy analysis continues to thrive as a field of inquiry: according to Anders Wivel, the emergence of the journal *Foreign Policy Analysis* following the Cold War's conclusion attests to its value.[291]

Still, strategies are at hand that can mitigate the severity of such methodological problems. The key to striving towards objectivity, according to Snyder, Bruck and Sapin is that the observer acknowledge the subject's perspective as well as any additional information they may not be party to.[292] In *Defending the National Interest*, Krasner puts forward two provisions that must be met when making inferences. The evidence must relate to broad state aims or objectives, as opposed to,

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[288] C Freund and V Rittberger, 'Utilitarian-Liberal Foreign Policy Theory,' in *German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, ed. V Rittberger, *Issues in German Politics* (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 79.
[289] Ibid., 79-80.
[290] A Acharya, *Singapore's Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order* (New Jersey: World Scientific, 2008); Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN*; K S Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era, 1981-2003: Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2009); N Ganesan, 'Factors Affecting Singapore's Foreign Policy Towards Malaysia,' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 45, no. 2 (1991); M Leifer, *Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability* (London: Routledge, 2000); M C Ott, 'Foreign Policy Formulation in Malaysia,' *Asian Survey* 12, no. 3 (1972); F B Weinstein, 'The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia' (Thesis (PhD) - Cornell University, 1972); F B Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Soeharto*, 1st Equinox ed. (Jakarta: Equinox, 2007).
[291] A Wivel, 'Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: The Promise and Limitations of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis,' *Journal of International Relations and Development* 8, no. 4 (2005): 359.
[292] Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 'Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics,' 33.

for instance, a policy addressing a specific group within the state.[293] As this project's entire research focus concerns the ways in which energy transit states conduct themselves in the international system, this first criterion is easily fulfilled. Second, the preference must also continue over time.[294] Although the thesis problem is ultimately concerned with Southeast Asia's post-9/11 maritime security cooperation, the stake assessments do consider the three littoral countries' overall trajectories as energy transit states since the establishment of the Middle East-East Asia oil supply chain in the postwar era. Indeed, this time frame goes beyond the establishment of Singapore and Malaysia as states in 1963. Indonesia, having realised independence in 1949, offers a means to discern any differences that might arise from realising statehood first and energy transit state status second. A wealth of data subsequently exists upon which the three cases can be assessed.

Data Sources

The evidentiary bases of the cases that follow are drawn from a range of primary and secondary data sources. Each stake analysis cites statistics relevant to global seaborne oil trading from state-endorsed, not-for-profit and commercial sources such as the US Energy Information Administration's (EIA) country profiles, the IEA's *World Energy Outlook* series, BP's annual *Statistical Review of World Energy*, Business Monitor International's quarterly country-specific oil and gas sector reviews, as well as the three littoral states' official figures.[295] This in effect accentuates the scholarly attention devoted to the Middle East-East Asian energy supply chain within the vast literature on Southeast Asia's post-9/11 maritime security cooperation, and is supplemented with official policy pronouncements in forms spanning white papers, elite speeches, governmental reports, press releases, treaties and declarations.

High profile decision makers are cited throughout the cases for their detailed perspectives on strategic policy matters, and include those made by current (and former) heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs and defence. Other relevant officials include navy and other chiefs of armed forces, as well as those

[293] Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*: 35.
[294] Ibid.
[295] Where possible, local currencies are expressed in US dollars at a representative rate appropriate to the time that they were reported. The International Monetary Fund maintains a database of currency unit exchange rates to the US dollar dating from 1994. See International Monetary Fund, 'Exchange Rate Query Tool,' http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/ert/GUI/Pages/CountryDataBase.aspx.

associated with the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), the BAKORKAMLA and the MMEA. International and national news agencies regularly publish such officials' views on top of reporting on the three states' national affairs.

However, this thesis's reliance on policy statements for evidence presents some limitations that require acknowledgement. Full information about the authorship of official pronouncements is rarely available. It is expected that civil servants often prepare statements and speeches attributed to senior government figures, and this could potentially skew how the three case study analyses identify strategic interests. Not all statespeoples' views are necessarily accessible (or even articulated) in the public domain, especially if they do not align with government policy. These shortcomings can be alleviated, though they are not completely avoidable. To increase the likelihood of identifying policy consistencies and inconsistencies, I draw on a large amount of empirical data, incorporate elite decision makers' statements in different capacities (for example, S. Jayakumar has been appointed as Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Law, and Coordinating Minister for National Security, among other roles), and consider different incumbents' remarks for the same senior position (for example, Indonesia's Minister of Defence role has been undertaken, among others, by Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Juwono Sudarsono, as well as Sjafrie Syamsuddin as Deputy Minister of Defence).

A majority of policy statements examined within the thesis are in English, however *Bahasa Melayu* (Malaysian) is the national language of Singapore and Malaysia,[296] and *Bahasa Indonesia* (Indonesian) is the national language of Indonesia.[297] While Singapore also designates English as an official language, along with Mandarin and Tamil,[298] and English is used as an active second language in Malaysia,[299] this thesis's language bias risks misinterpretation of the three countries' strategic priorities—both on my own part as a non-native speaker of Indonesian or Malaysian, and on senior officials' parts, for whom English may not a primary

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[296] Malaysia, 'About Malaysia: Language,' http://www.malaysia.gov.my/en/about-malaysia?subCatId=3208956&type=2&categoryId=3208945; Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Singapore at a Glance,' 28 Jul 2011, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/army/microsites/paccpams/abt_spore/spore-glance.html.
[297] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of State Secretariat), 'The Geography of Indonesia,' 2010, http://www.indonesia.go.id/en/indonesia-glance/geography-indonesia.
[298] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Singapore at a Glance,' 28 Jul 2011, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/army/microsites/paccpams/abt_spore/spore-glance.html.
[299] Malaysia, 'About Malaysia.'

language. I have sought to address this, where possible, by consulting Indonesian, Malaysian and English sources, as it is not uncommon for news and government agencies within Southeast Asia to publish in more than one language. I also refer to sources that are only available in Indonesian or Malaysian. I take responsibility for my translations and the conclusions I draw from them.

The timing of the policy statements examined in this thesis also presents some difficulty. The increased international attention to the Malacca Strait following the peak in Southeast Asian piracy activities, 9/11, and the *USS Cole*, *Limburg*, and *Superferry 14* incidents, meant that there was an according proliferation of official statements made by Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's policy elites about regional maritime security. It is possible that such statements were more reactionary than representative of the littoral states' interests. As an attempt to mitigate this, I take a longer view of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's policy making and incorporate evidence about their maritime domains throughout their entire contemporary histories.

The official policy sources are also informed by a series of in-country interviews that were conducted during August and September 2009. The 18 interviewees, whose responses are deidentified throughout the case studies, were recruited from institutions in academia, government, industry, and non-government sectors. Though I sought to avoid purposive sampling by approaching potential interviewees from a broad scope of institutions, maintain a gender balance and recruit equally from the three case study countries, there was ultimately a bias of accessibility and time.

The target group was individuals who had country-specific expertise relevant to the thesis. I primarily sought those whose professional positions indicated a capacity to comment on regional maritime security and energy security matters. No formal pretesting was conducted to measure depth of knowledge, as it was anticipated that individuals who were not subject matter experts would self-select out of the study once informed about the research objectives. Such opting-out did occur in practice.

Nonetheless, the method of obtaining professionals' inputs is known to be particularly valuable for making generalisations and building theory,[300] and those interviewed provided crucial insight about the project. Semi-structured interviews

[300] K Goldstein, 'Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews,' *PS: Political Science and Politics* 35, no. 4 (2002): 669; McNabb, *Research Methods for Political Science*: 99.

were employed to draw on interviewees' expertise while maintaining a degree of uniformity among all discussions, in addition to avoiding the pitfalls of both the descriptive narratives and restricted responses that can follow from sole use of either open-ended or close-ended questions.[301] The above data sources are complemented where necessary with secondary observations from journal articles, conference proceedings and monographs obtained through archival research, and contextualised with recognition of strategic policy literature.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to fill some of the knowledge gaps surrounding states that act as conduits for energy by developing an original energy transit state framework. The rest of the thesis applies the framework to the cases of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. Its main value lies in its amalgamation of energy security and maritime security notions, which simultaneously allows for a renewed reading of Southeast Asia's international politics and a more robust explanation of third party state actors in transnational energy supply chains. The insight that the three empirically-charged country analyses offer to reveal represents a qualitative supplement to prevailing scholarship addressing regional maritime cooperation and the foreign policy and defence policy making of the Malacca Strait's littoral countries. In addition, it offers a means to discern any differences between land-based 'Eurasian' pipeline energy transit states and the Southeast Asian maritime 'variety.'

Understanding the roles of transit states in the context of transnational energy supplies benefits the numerous stakeholders involved in global oil trading at a time when the availability of hydrocarbon resources is expected to tighten in coming decades. That major contributors to the International Relations discipline continue to draw attention to the potential political, economic and security implications of China's continued reliance on Persian Gulf oil imports for the Asia Pacific attests to this inquiry's significance.[302] Where piracy plagues the Somali coast in waters 'upstream' from the Malacca Strait, and competing Spratly islands claims remain tense 'downstream' in the South China Sea, there is no better time to clarify the

[301] For an explanation of trade-offs between research 'reliability' and 'validity,' see M L Goel, *Political Science Research: A Methods Handbook*, 1st ed. (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1988), 38-9.
[302] Mearsheimer, 'The Gathering Storm,' 395-6; J S Nye, *The Future of Power*, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 64.

dynamics that underlie the geopolitics of oil in the wider Indian Ocean region, or what Robert Kaplan terms "Monsoon Asia."[303]

The proceeding chapters are devoted to applying the framework to the three case studies. In assessing whether they cooperate on the basis of common interests, the aim is to determine if Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia match any of the three energy transit state types that I present in this thesis (the 'enmeshed energy transit state,' the 'fledgling energy transit state' and the 'rising energy transit state'). Chapter Two examines the case of Singapore first due to its longstanding position as a regional hub for energy sectors and maritime logistics, and its vocal advocacy of 'common interest' arguments and approach to Strait security matters that do not always appear to be in unison with its neighbours. Chapter Three considers Indonesia's energy transit state position with respect to its strong adherence to principles of sovereignty and tendency to be flagged as the weakest of the three littoral countries. Chapter Four explores the case of Malaysia. Having spelled out the theoretical provisions developed in this chapter, the three cases should thus enable the development of an answer to the central research question and determine just how much oil factors account for the apparent differences in maritime security cooperation and competition in the Middle East-East Asia supply chain. Chapter Five considers this, and examines the value of an energy transit state framework in light of the case study findings over the more limited explanations based on the Balance of Power and the ASEAN Way.

[303] See R Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 2010).

CHAPTER TWO
SINGAPORE: AN ENMESHED ENERGY TRANSIT STATE

On 4 August, 1998, during an interview with the *Asian Wall Street Journal*, then-Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie famously dismissed Singapore as a 'little red dot.'[1] In doing so, he was alluding to the common practice for the small island state to be identified on maps with a circle that overlays its entire territory. In comparison to Indonesia's expansive archipelago, Habibie was correct. His words are now entrenched in Singaporean foreign policy vocabulary, to the point that Tommy Koh, the Ambassador-At-Large at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs used it in the title of his 2005 monograph on Singapore's international relations.[2] Being a 'little red dot' has long shaped Singapore's strategic posture. It is also interwoven with its experiences as an energy transit state.

As the first of three case studies, this chapter aims to identify Singapore's approach to maritime security in the Malacca Strait, by assessing its positition as an energy transit state for Middle East-East Asia oil flows. The energy transit state Framework, which I presented in Chapter One, requires two factors to be considered when determining a country's energy transit state type. After briefly reviewing Singapore's relationship to transit oil in the existing literature, this chapter assesses (i) the importance of oil to Singapore's strategic outlook, and (ii) the links between Singapore's oil sector and the transit oil supply. I conclude that Singapore has a high stake in the transnational oil shipments, and can thus be understood as an 'enmeshed energy transit state.' This is because Singapore's position as a regional energy and maritime logistics hub has been central to its vision of becoming a Global City. This, in turn, has been part of Singapore's ongoing survival strategy to offset its geographic vulnerability.

The remainder of the chapter explores Singapore's perspective in the 'common interests-cooperation' dilemma that this thesis aims to resolve. Specifically, it explores how 'enmeshment' has informed Singapore's interests and policy choices toward Strait security activities. The energy transit state framework predicts that Singapore's high stake in the transit oil supply would mean that it exhibits a

[1] H L Lee, 'Keynote Address at the NEtwork Conference,' 3 May 2003.
[2] T Koh and L L Chang, *The Little Red Dot: Reflections by Singapore's Diplomats* (Singapore; Hackensack: World Scientific; Institute of Policy Studies, 2005).

heightened awareness of potential supply chain challenges. It also anticipates that Singapore would employ comprehensive measures to secure the Malacca Strait. At the centre of evaluating whether these predictions hold is an attempt to unpack whether enmeshment facilitates cooperation or competition.

ASSESSING SINGAPORE'S POSITION AS AN ENERGY TRANSIT STATE

As detailed in Chapter One, the first step in determining which energy transit state type—'fledgling energy transit state,' 'rising energy transit state' or 'enmeshed energy transit state'—best reflects a country's position requires an assessment of its 'stake' in the transnational energy supply chain being examined. Doing so requires an evaluation of the role of the supply chain's energy sector in the state's strategic outlook, and the sector's connection to the transnational supply.

Singapore is a regional oil and maritime transportation hub. With the capacity to process 1.4 million barrels of oil each day, it is one of the world's major oil refining centres and the largest in Southeast Asia.[3] Despite facing regional competition from refiners in China, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan, Singapore has remained Asia's primary oil trading centre.[4] Indeed, the island state's ability to process large quantities of oil has facilitated its success in other related sectors.[5] Singapore commands 60% of the world's jack-up oil rigs and sets the Asia Pacific's oil products price.[6] It is the region's fourth-largest chemical exporter and, by value, the largest fuel exporter too.[7] In addition, it is a prime location for strategic petroleum storage, a leading regional petrochemical manufacturer and commercial oil exploration centre.[8]

Singapore's strong refining capability is also intertwined with its leadership in maritime logistics. It competes with Shanghai for the title of world's busiest port for

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[3] British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012' 16.
[4] E Ramasamy, 'Singapore's Role as a Key Oil Trading Centre in Asia,' in *Energy Perspectives on Singapore and the Region*, ed. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 31.
[5] Republic of Singapore (Economic Development Board), 'Energy,' http://www.edb.gov.sg/content/edb/en/industries/industries/energy.html.
[6] M Hong, 'Overview of Singapore's Energy Situation,' in *Energy Perspectives on Singapore and the Region*, ed. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 3-4.
[7] Table II.26: Exports of Fuels of Selected Economies, 1990-2010, and Table II.38: Leading Exporters and Importers of Chemicals, in World Trade Organization, 'International Trade Statistics,' 2011 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2011_e/its2011_e.pdf, 78, 91.
[8] Hong, 'Overview of Singapore's Energy Situation,' 3-4.

containerised cargo.[9] It has ranked third in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's Liner Shipping Connectivity Index since 2008.[10] Its registry of bulk carriers is one of the two largest in the world,[11] and it has been the world's biggest bunkering centre since 1987.[12] Singapore also has a sizeable tanker fleet. Almost two-thirds (64%) of its flagged commercial vessels are oil carriers.[13] By tonnage, they alone account for 8% of the world's oil tanker fleet and 2% of all registered vessels. With a combined 16,119,713 gross tonnage, they represent more than three and a half times the tanker fleet capacities of all other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) founding members put together.[14] These achievements are formidable. But why has Singapore realised so much growth in oil related sectors, and what has it meant for its strategic interests?

Contemporary Scholarship on Singapore's Transit State Status

Existing analyses of Singapore's foreign policy and defence policy making tend to focus on its small state status, and do not fully investigate what role, if any, oil has had in its attempts to manage its geography. Singapore's separation from the Federation of Malaysia in August 1965 came at a time when the notion of its independence was considered to be "a political, economic and geographic absurdity."[15] As a new and resource poor state, Singapore's territory equated to less than one percent of its neighbours'[16] (as a comparison, at 880 square kilometres, Fort

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[9] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Review of Maritime Transport 2011*, (New York: United Nations, 2011), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/rmt2011_en.pdf, 89.
[10] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 'Liner Shipping Connectivity Index 2004-2012,' 2012 http://www.unctadstat.unctad.org.
[11] Together with Hong Kong. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Review of Maritime Transport 2007* (New York: United Nations, 2007), xii.
[12] 'Singapore Hangs on to Position as World's Leading Bunker Port,' *Oil Daily*, 15 Oct 2008; T Doshi, *Houston of Asia: The Singapore Petroleum Industry* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 69.
[13] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Review of Maritime Transport 2007*: 33.
[14] Where Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines together represented 4,572,861 gross oil tonnage. Ibid., 125.
[15] K Y Lee in Colony of Singapore, *Legislative Assembly Debates*, Vol. 2, 5 Mar 1957, Col. 1471, cited in B Singh, *Singapore: Foreign Policy Imperatives of a Small State*, Occasional Paper (Singapore: Heinemann Asia for Centre for Advanced Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, 1988), 4.
[16] Estimations of Singapore's size vary due to its ongoing land reclamation activities, but are negligible compared to its neighbours' far larger territories. As at 2011, World Bank data places Singapore's land area at 700 kilometres, Malaysia's at 328,550 square kilometres, and Indonesia's at 1,811,570 square kilometres. World Bank, *Quick Query from World Development Indicators: Land Area (sq. km)*, http://data.worldbank.org. Official Singapore Government data states an island size of 715.8 square kilometres as at 2013 yet this does not present any major differences in the countries' relative sizes.

Hood, the United States' military base in Texas, occupies a far larger territory than Singapore in its entirety).[17] Fearing Malaysian domination, and having formed during Indonesia's *Konfrontasi*, ensuring Singapore's 'survival' was at the forefront of its leaders' concerns. President R. S. Nathan reflected in 2008:

> As with most other countries, geopolitical circumstances played a big role in the formulation of our foreign policy. The circumstances under which we gained independence underscored our inherent vulnerability. As a newly-independent small country located in a then politically volatile region, our foreign policy, made on the run, was directed at coping with this vulnerability.[18]

It is therefore understandable that academic accounts of Singapore's strategic position so often centre on its survival. Nor is it surprising that realist perspectives are dominant among such contributions,[19] given that survival is one of the 'three S's' (along with 'statism' and 'self-help') ascribed to that theory.[20] For instance, Michael Leifer's *Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability* argues that Singapore employs an exceptionalist foreign policy based on unique Balance of Power formulations that were born from its tumultuous transition to independence. According to his view, a culture of "siege and insecurity" that was upheld by early decision makers, persists in Singapore's strategic policy rhetoric.[21] Such formulations, for Leifer, have been expressed through Singapore's pursuit of the United States (US) alliance, its development of a deterrent military force, and in its support for multilateralism. By participating in regional groupings that have included the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Five

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Republic of Singapore (Department of Statistics), 'Latest Data,' 21 May 2013 http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/latest_data.html.

[17] Where Fort Hood is 340 square miles. United States of America (Fort Hood Public Affairs Office), 'Fact Sheet: Fort Hood Overview,' Fort Hood, http://pao.hood.army.mil/facts/FS 0703 - Fort Hood Overview.pdf.

[18] S R Nathan, 'Speech at the MFA Diplomatic Academy's Inaugural S Rajaratnam Lecture,' 10 Mar 2008.

[19] For example, L Buszynski, 'Singapore: A Foreign Policy of Survival,' *Asian Thought and Society* (1985); H C Chan, 'Singapore's Foreign Policy, 1965-1968,' *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 10, no. 1 (1969): 10; H C Chan, *Singapore: The Politics of Survival, 1965-1967* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971); M Leifer, 'The Conduct of Foreign Policy,' in *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, ed. K S Sandhu, P Wheatley, and T A Koh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); Leifer, *Singapore's Foreign Policy*; Singh, *Singapore*; B Singh, *The Vulnerability of Small States Revisited: A Study of Singapore's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1999); B Singh, *Politics and Governance in Singapore: An Introduction* (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2007); K Wilairat, *Singapore's Foreign Policy: The First Decade* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975).

[20] T Dunne and B C Schmidt, 'Realism,' in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. J Baylis, S Smith, and P Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 100-3.

[21] Leifer, *Singapore's Foreign Policy*: 4.

Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) and the Asia Europe Meeting, Singapore has been able to engage a diverse range of states in military and economic spheres of activity. For Leifer, these strategies are unlikely to change. The permanence of Singapore's geographic characteristics, he argues, continues to inform its strategic policy choices well beyond the Cold War's conclusion.[22]

Other perspectives are based on the premise that realism is no longer relevant for explaining Singapore's policy choices in the international system. Some place a greater emphasis on the island state's successful trading strategies.[23] Indeed, one of the primary strategies that the ruling People's Action Party employed shortly after independence was to continue industrialisation policies that had been established while Singapore was still part of Malaysia.[24] For first Foreign Minister Rajaratnam, Singapore's survival was best assured by its transformation into a 'Global City,' based on the logic that the creation of interdependent economic relationships would mitigate the island's physical weaknesses.[25] So significant has the Global City vision been that it continues to feature in Singapore's contemporary policy pronouncements.[26] In 2011, Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security Wong Kan Seng reiterated its importance to Singapore's longevity when speaking at the Singapore Perspectives Conference:

> For Singapore, becoming a global city is not merely an aspiration. It is a prerequisite for our survival. Being open is the only viable option for us if we wish to be self-reliant and continue to prosper. Closing our doors would only turn us into an island of no consequence, unable to provide for our people. We will become irrelevant to the world.[27]

In this sense, as Narayanan Ganesan put it, Singapore's foreign policy framework reflects an entwinement of realism and its complex economic interdependence.[28] For Amitav Acharya, who claims that ASEAN's value is underestimated, liberal

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[22] Ibid., 41, 161-2.
[23] For example, see 'Introduction,' in M H Toh and K Y Tan, *Competitiveness of the Singapore Economy: A Strategic Perspective* (Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific, 1998).
[24] J S T Quah, 'Controlled Democracy, Political Stability and PAP Predominance: Government in Singapore,' in *The Changing Shape of Government in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. J W Langford and K L Brownsey (Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1988), 131.
[25] See S Velayutham, *Responding to Globalization: Nation, Culture, and Identity in Singapore* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 92.
[26] For example, K Y Lee in Parliament 19 Apr 2005, and H L Lee at the official opening of the new Perakanan Museum 25 Apr 2008, cited in T H Tan, *Singapore Perspectives 2009: The Heart of the Matter* (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies: World Scientific Publishing, 2009), 77.
[27] K S Wong, 'Keynote Address at the Singapore Perspectives Conference, Raffles City Convention Centre, Singapore,' 17 Jan 2011.
[28] N Ganesan, *Realism and Interdependence in Singapore's Foreign Policy*, Politics in Asia Series (New York: Routledge, 2005), 10.

institutionalism and constructivism are preferable lenses. Instead, he posits that Singapore pursues peace through economic interactions, and despite conditions of international anarchy, it socialises collective norms, values and even identities with other actors.[29] Alan Chong, meanwhile, has gone as far to identify three post-Cold War explanations of Singapore's strategic policy to supplement the prevailing small state analyses: (i) as a weak state predicted to expand its soft power capabilities; (ii) within a regime, whereby Singapore seeks to bolster inter-state cohesion; and (iii) according to a "region-state idea," that positions "Singapore Inc." in a globalised market that transcends its sovereignty.[30]

In spite of this uncertainty as to whether 'small state' evaluations of Singapore remain useful, all recognise the economic dimension as a central part of the island state's survival strategy. Or, as Bilveer Singh has summarised, "what [Singapore] lacks in physical size, it makes up for with a wealth of leadership, moral authority and, of course, a very healthy bank account."[31] Economic power is by no means new to discussions of international politics.[32] Yet such 'big picture' analyses of Singapore's foreign policy making do not by their very nature devote specific attention to the role of oil in Singapore's survival and hub transformation. Oil in general receives only passing mention, let alone Middle Eastern shipments. At best are observations that the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil crisis was a turning point in Singapore's foreign policy trajectory[33] whereby its rhetoric became noticeably pro-Arab.[34] Prior to the crisis, Singh has argued, "the Arab world was secondary in Singapore's foreign policy considerations except for the flow of unlimited oil to the Republic."[35] Aside from such passing remarks, the relationship between Singapore's oil sector and its Global City vision has not been completely explored.

Certainly, oil is sufficiently important to Singapore that it has warranted two major academic publications and several articles. Most papers are quick to point out

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[29] Acharya, *Singapore's Foreign Policy*: 4, 9-10.
[30] A Chong, 'Analysing Singapore's Foreign Policy in the 1990s and Beyond: Limitations of the Small State Approach,' *Asian Journal of Political Science* 6, no. 1 (1998).
[31] Singh, *Politics and Governance in Singapore*: 15.
[32] See J S Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York; Oxford: Public Affairs; Oxford Publicity Partnership, 2004), 31.
[33] Leifer, *Singapore's Foreign Policy*: 65; Singh, *Singapore*: 26; Wilairat, *Singapore's Foreign Policy*: 50-1.
[34] Singh, *Singapore*: 26.
[35] Singh, *The Vulnerability of Small States Revisited*: 42.

Singapore's success in its commercial oil activities and the factors that underlie them. In 1989, Shankar Sharma put it simply:

> The oil industry in Singapore grew basically because of higher oil demand in the region, the country's strategic location, its well developed internal and external infrastructure, and the favourable government attitude towards foreign investors.[36]

Other than statements of this nature, few contributions locate the sector's development in relation to Singapore's overall strategic trajectory. Tilak Doshi acknowledged in his 1989 monograph *Houston of Asia: The Singapore Petroleum Industry* that becoming a regional oil centre has been part of Singapore's Global City industrialisation.[37] Numerous references to Singapore's strategic location astride Middle East-East Asian oil supplies, its deepwater port, skilled human resources and its Government's approach to open markets and manufacturing can be found in the 2006 edited publication *Energy Perspectives on Singapore and the Region*,[38] but there still remains a distinct need to relate such activities to the island state's strategic interests. This deficiency is apparent in other assessments of Singapore's oil activities too.[39] In contrast to evaluations of Singapore's strategic policy making, the wealth of information provided in these documents remains distant from overarching political and considerations. While Doshi devotes an entire chapter to Singapore's Global City development, he presents an overview of industrial progress that is not especially grounded in oil. By the same token, his proceeding descriptions of Singapore's oil activities are not married to notions of survival. This charge can also be levelled at *Energy Perspectives.*

Hence, while Singapore's foreign policy and its oil sector have each faced scrutiny in the literature, both suffer from the same limitation in that they are analysed in isolation of each other. Given that Singapore clearly has been successful in becoming an oil and maritime logistics trading hub, and its Global City visions of survival have had a role in this transformation, it is necessary to understand Singapore's oil activities in relation to its national objectives. The energy transit state

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[36] S Sharma, *Role of the Petroleum Industry in Singapore's Economy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 3.
[37] Doshi, *Houston of Asia*: 128; T Doshi, 'The Energy Economy of a City State, Singapore,' in *Energy Market and Policies in ASEAN*, ed. S Sharma and F Fesharaki (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 206.
[38] For example Hong, 'Overview of Singapore's Energy Situation,' 2-4.
[39] For example H A Yun and L K Jin, 'Evolution of the Petrochemical Industry in Singapore,' *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy* 14, no. 2 (2009).

framework developed in this thesis offers a means to recognise how the two are interlinked.

The Energy Transit State Framework and Singapore's Transit State Status

This section conducts a rereading of Singapore's activities in oil with reference to its strategic interests, and in the context of the transnational shipments that pass through the Malacca Strait. It finds that Singapore is an 'enmeshed energy transit state.' When determining an energy transit state type, the energy transit state framework, as set out in Chapter One, stipulates two factors (the significance of oil for Singapore's strategic interests, and the importance of the transit supply chain for its domestic oil sector) that require consideration. Since the discussion has already pointed out Singapore's resource scarcity—Singapore possesses no domestic reserves of its own[40]—the two factors are considered in unison below.

Oil has consistently been at the heart of Singapore's survival. As shown in Figure 4, its refinery capacity has significantly exceeded its own oil consumption requirements.

[40] United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Singapore - Overview / Data,' 12 Mar 2013 http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=SN.

FIGURE 4: SINGAPORE'S OIL REFINERY CAPACITY AND CONSUMPTION: 1965-2011



Data taken from 'Oil Refinery Capacities' and 'Oil Consumption - Barrels' in British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012: Historical Data.'

Singapore's earliest activities in oil sought to profit from other state actors' oil needs. Its historical prosperity as a trading port[41] extended to the bulk transportation of oil from the 1870s, when the US owned Standard Oil established a distribution centre on the island. When the Suez Canal was opened in 1892, Shell decided to build oil storage tanks on Bukom Island.[42] While still a British Straits Settlement, Singapore was the preferred headquarters for foreign investors exploring Indonesia's newly discovered oil reserves.[43] Its first refinery—which Shell also constructed on Bukom—

[41] See T Y Tan, 'Singapore's Story: A Port City in Search of Hinterlands,' in *Port Cities in Asia and Europe*, ed. A Graf and B H Chua (London; New York: Routledge, 2009).
[42] L-H Lye and C Youngho, 'Singapore: National Energy Security and Regional Cooperation,' in *Energy Security: Managing Risk in a Dynamic Legal and Regulatory Environment*, ed. B Barton, et al. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 396.
[43] K S Goh, 'Fourth Dr K T Li Lecture, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 13 Oct 1993, cited in Leifer, *Singapore's Foreign Policy*: 165.

was operating by 1961, still two years before joining the Federation, and four years before it left.[44]

By the time that Egyptian President Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal in 1956, Singapore was well positioned to ride on the tails of Japan's postwar reconstruction oil requirements. Its refining sector was already thriving at independence in 1965. Trade imports from Saudi Arabia grew from 1% early in the 1960s to 14% by the mid to late 1970s, most of which reflected Singapore's increased petroleum needs.[45] This double-digit growth did not pass unnoticed. In fact, it was a central influence upon Rajaratnam's Global City pronouncement.[46] Indeed, Rajaratnam pointed out the role of oil himself when he mentioned "giant tankers" while discussing the vision for development at the Singapore Press Club in 1972:

> [Singapore is t]ransforming itself into a new kind of city—the Global City. It is a new form of human organization and settlement that has, as the historian Arnold Toynbee says, no precedent in mankind's past history. People have become aware of this new type of city only recently. […] But the Global City, now in its infancy, is the child of modern technology. It is the city that electronic communications, supersonic planes, giant tankers and modern economic and industrial organisations have made inevitable. Whether the Global City would be a happier place than the megalopolis out of whose crumbling ruins it is emerging will depend on how wisely and boldly we shape its directions.[47]

Singapore continued to benefit at the expense of others' oil dependence. It was a refuelling base for US operations during the Vietnam War, a preferred location for oil exploration activities in the South China Sea, and from the 1970s an oil rig building depot.[48] Indeed, the oil crises of the 1970s that prompted developed states throughout the international system to diversify oil suppliers away from OPEC put Singapore in a good position to expand its refining activities to petrochemicals (and compete with other refiners that had emerged in the region), most of which are based on reclaimed

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[44] A map illustrating locations of major oil and port infrastructure in Singapore is given in Appendix A.
[45] Percentage Distribution of Annual Average Value of Quinquennial Imports and Exports by Major Countries 1960-1977. *Singapore Yearbook of Statistics*, various issues, cited in E C T Chew and E Lee, *A History of Singapore* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991), 200-1.
[46] K C Guan, 'Relating to the World: Images, Metaphors, and Analogies,' in *Singapore in the New Millennium: Challenges Facing the City-State*, ed. D Da Cunha (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 120.
[47] S Rajaratnam, 'Speech to the Singapore Press Club,' 6 Feb 1972, cited in Velayutham, *Responding to Globalization*: 83-4.
[48] B W Ang, *ASEAN Energy Demand: Trends and Structural Change* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 21; K Grice and D Drakakis-Smith, 'The Role of the State in Shaping Development: Two Decades of Growth in Singapore,' *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 10, no. 3 (1985): 353; R Le Blanc, *Singapore: The Socio-Economic Development of a City-State 1960-1980* (Maarheeze: Cranendonck Coaching, 2008), 19.

land that makes up Jurong Island.[49] By positioning itself as a major refiner midway between the Persian Gulf and East Asia, a feedstock producer for higher value added petrochemical applications, a liquid hydrocarbon break-bulk centre and a preferred bunkering destination, Singapore has essentially capitalised on the transnational supply of oil through the Malacca Strait to mitigate its geostrategic weaknesses. The whole-of-government 'Jurong Island Version 2.0' initiative that was unveiled in 2010 and (in part) aims to upgrade the petrochemical and energy sector over the period of ten years[50] indicates Singapore's continued interest in maintaining its competitive hub position.

Singapore therefore has a crucial—albeit complex—dependence on Middle Eastern oil. According to Singapore's Ministry of Trade and Industry in the 2007 *National Energy Policy Report*, 82% of the island state's crude oil originates from the region, with major suppliers including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.[51] As most of its refineries were built prior to the OPEC oil crises,[52] the majority are geared to operate on Middle Eastern oil. During the 1980s, 55% of its refineries' throughput was obtained from the region.[53] Other estimates as at 1995 and 2007 are as large as 84%[54] and 80%[55] respectively. Despite being referred to as a "cocktail refinery" that processes more than 20 different oil types, the Singapore Refining Company facility was estimated to source 90% of its oil inputs from Middle Eastern suppliers in 1995.[56] In general, this configuration means that different oil blends—that might vary in density ('heavy' versus 'light' oil) or in

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[49] Yun and Jin, 'Evolution of the Petrochemical Industry in Singapore,' 117-8.
[50] 'Factbox-Jurong Island, Singapore's Energy, Chemicals Hub,' *Reuters*, 10 Nov 2010.
[51] Saudi Arabia 32.8%, Kuwait, 18%, United Arab Emirates 10.5%, Qatar 13.5%, and 'Other Middle East' 7.1%. Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Trade and Industry), *Energy for Growth: National Energy Policy Report* (Singapore: Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2007), 15.
[52] O E Tong, 'The Singapore Oil Situation,' in *Energy Perspectives on Singapore and the Region*, ed. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 92. ExxonMobil's Jurong refinery was constructed in 1965, and its Pulau Ayer Chawan facility in 1971; Shell's Bukom refinery was built in 1961 and was upgraded in 2010 as part of the Shell Eastern Petrochemicals Complex along with the construction of Shell's largest investment in Singapore to date of a new ethylene cracker and mono-ethylene glycol facility. The Singapore Refining Company plant was completed in 1979. Business Monitor International, *Singapore Oil and Gas Report Q4 2012*, 31; Shell, 'Shell Completes its Largest Petrochemicals Project,' 5 Apr 2010 http://www.shell.com/chemicals/aboutshell/media-centre/media-releases/2010-media-releases/pr-shell-completes-largest-petrochemicals-project.html.
[53] On average from 1980-1987. Doshi, *Houston of Asia*: 95.
[54] T Abeysinghe and K-M Choy, *The Singapore Economy: An Econometric Perspective* (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), 59.
[55] Tong, 'The Singapore Oil Situation,' 92.
[56] A K Rhodes, 'Two of Singapore's Refiners Expand Despite Lack of Land,' *Oil and Gas Journal* 93, no. 33 (1995): 39-40.

sulphur content ('sweet' versus 'sour' types)—cannot be easily handled. And though the Singapore Government has sought to address this problem by diversifying its oil sources[57] whereby more than 40 countries are now estimated to be suppliers, most imports continue to be obtained from around the Arabian Peninsula.[58] Indeed, the Jurong Rock Caverns that are being constructed are expected to store predominantly Saudi and other Middle Eastern petroleum reserves as a means for producers to buffer supply chain disruptions.[59]

As such, the Malacca Strait's transit oil flow is integral to Singapore's economy. By value, oil represented one-third of Singapore's total imports and more than one-quarter of its exports in 2011.[60] Its manufacturing sector purchased 85% of the country's oil imports in 2000. Two-thirds of this in turn was specifically bought by the oil manufacturing subsector.[61] According to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in 2010, when speaking at the opening ceremony of Shell's new monoethylene glycol plant, the energy and chemical industry is worth US$48 billion, which roughly equates to one-third of Singapore's total manufacturing output.[62] And while consumer electronics, information technology products, pharmaceuticals and financial services are also important contributors to Singapore's economy, they still rely on electricity to operate: granted, the majority of Singapore's power is generated by gas imported from Malaysia and Indonesia,[63] but on average during the 2003-2010 period, approximately one-fifth was nonetheless derived from petroleum products.[64]

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[57] One of the six recommendations of the report was to diversify Singapore's energy supplies. Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Trade and Industry), *Energy for Growth*: 5.
[58] Interviewee 8841.
[59] As Tong has explained, "[i]f something happens in the Strait of Hormuz and they cannot send their crude out, they probably will depend on crude storage here [Singapore] to supply their outlets." D Bardsley, 'Journey to Cavernous Future for Oil,' *National*, 1 May 2011.
[60] Republic of Singapore (Department of Statistics), 'Table A6.2: Imports by Commodity at Current Prices,' 2010 http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/ess/essa62.pdf; Republic of Singapore (Department of Statistics), 'Table A6.3: Exports by Commodity at Current Prices,' 2010 http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/ess/essa63.pdf.
[61] Table 3: Import Matrix, 2000, in Republic of Singapore (Department of Statistics), *Information Paper on Economic Statistics: Singapore Input-Output Tables 2000*, (2006), http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/papers/economy/ip-e30.pdf, 9.
[62] H L Lee, 'Speech at the Opening of the Shell Eastern Petrochemical Complex at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel,' 4 May 2010.
[63] Four pipelines supply Singapore with gas from Malaysia and Indonesia, most of which (78.7% in 2010) is used for electricity generation and industrial purposes. Republic of Singapore (Energy Market Authority), 'Singapore Gas Industry,' 2010 http://www.ema.gov.sg/page/114/id:48; Republic of Singapore (Energy Market Authority), 'Energising Our Nation: Singapore Energy Statistics,' 2011 http://www.ema.gov.sg/media/files/publications/SES2011.pdf, 14.
[64] Republic of Singapore (Energy Market Authority), 'Energising Our Nation: Singapore Energy Statistics,' 14.

Singapore can be said to have a high stake in the transnational shipment of oil through the Malacca Strait, and is thus best represented by the enmeshed energy transit state type. Its high stake in East Asia-bound oil, reflected in commercial activities as an energy refining and maritime logistics hub, have always been crucial to its pursuit of survival. The overlap between Singapore's strategic interests and transit oil is therefore a substantial one. In 2011 Minister Wong summarised the energy-centric strategy as follows:

> Being open also helps us to overcome our physical constraints and small population. It helps us to create great things from the little things that we have. This is how, for example, despite having zero oil production, we became a global leader in oil trading, oil refining, oil rig building and so on.[65]

The significance of Middle Eastern oil to Singapore is evident, for example, in the fact that in 2010 the Government awarded Rob J. Routs (the former executive director of Royal Dutch Shell) with the Public Service Star (Distinguished Friends of Singapore) to acknowledge his influence in the company's decision to locate Shell's Eastern Petrochemical Complex in Singapore.[66] Beyond being important, though, it is not obvious how this involvement in transit oil is reflected in Singapore's strategic posture. With respect to the 'common interests-cooperation' line that Singaporean policy makers have so emphatically voiced in relation to maritime security issues in the Malacca Strait, it is now pertinent to question the consequences of its position as an enmeshed energy transit state. The remainder of this chapter addresses this. It begins by examining Singapore's security interests in the sea lane, and then evaluates its approach to supply chain security matters within the parameters of cooperation and competition.

SINGAPORE'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE MALACCA STRAIT

As previously noted in Chapter One, the energy transit state framework predicts that 'enmeshed' states are driven to secure the transnational energy supply upon which they are so involved. Due to its high stake in the supply chain, such a state is anticipated to be wary of all manner of potential disruptions to it, though it is not clear

[65] Wong, 'Keynote Address at the Singapore Perspectives Conference, Raffles City Convention Centre, Singapore.'
[66] Other recipients of the award the same year as Routs were employed in corporate supply chains and in Asia Pacific pharmaceutical chemical manufacturing sectors. J Cheam, '4 Business Leaders Get Awards,' *Straits Times*, 30 Mar 2010.

what issues, if any, might be prioritised. Having determined that Singapore matches the enmeshed energy transit state type, this section considers whether its stated security interests toward the Malacca Strait match this expectation.

There are broad indications that the prediction is accurate. Singapore's policy elites are well aware that their country is tied to the maritime domain to access oil. They routinely acknowledge the Malacca Strait's importance in facilitating world oil trade[67] and the island's strategic position astride the East-West sea trading route.[68] Singapore's International Advisory Panel on Energy, of which world energy authority Daniel Yergin is a member, has pointed out how the island state's import dependence bestows an inherent vulnerability to energy supply disruptions.[69] It is therefore not surprising that one interviewee interviewed for this thesis remarked "Singapore takes [maritime security issues] much more seriously than any other country."[70] Key officials, including Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Minister for Transport Yeow Cheow Tong, have stressed this.[71] The logic underlying this view is based on "the thinking in Singapore that any threat to maritime trade is an existential threat."[72]

Further, Singapore's strategic policy pronouncements identify a diverse range of potential challenges to the Malacca Strait's maritime domain. For instance, when speaking at the Conference on Law of the Sea in March 2005, Minister for Law and

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[67] For example, S K Choi, 'Opening Address at the Revolving Fund Handover Ceremony,' 26 Apr 2006; S Jayakumar, 'Speech at ITLOS Workshop on the Role of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,' 29 May 2007; Y Y Lam, 'Speech on Environmental Challenges for Shipping and Port Activities at the Sustainable Marine Transportation Conference, Raffles Town Club, Singapore,' 17 Jan 2011; R Lim, 'Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the 2nd Cooperation Forum, Grand Copthorne Waterfront Hotel, Singapore,' 14 Oct 2009; E H Ng, 'Speech at the 10th IISS Asia Security Summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue: Sixth Plenary Session: Building Strategic Confidence; Avoiding Worst-Case Outcomes, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore,' 5 Jun 2011; C H Teo, 'Speech at the Commissioning Ceremony of RSS Stalwart and RSS Supreme,' 16 Jan 2009; Teo, 'Keynote Address at the 12th Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers;' G Yeo, 'Speech at the Global Leadership Forum in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,' 6 Sep 2005; G Yeo, 'Speech at the OAV Liebesmahl Dinner in Hamburg,' 13 Mar 2007.

[68] T Koh, 'The Third Linnaeus Lecture: Biodiversity and Cities,' 22 Oct 2010; Republic of Singapore (Singapore Media Fusion), 'Come Collaborate with Singapore, Says Minister,' 13 Apr 2010 http://www.smf.sg/newsflash/13Apr2010/13apr2010_item2.html; G Yeo, 'Speech at the ISAS Conference: South Asia in the Global Community: Towards Greater Collaboration and Cooperation,' 8 Nov 2006.

[69] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Trade and Industry), 'Inaugural Meeting of the International Advisory Panel on Energy,' 2008 http://www.mti.gov.sg/NewsRoom/Documents/app.mti.gov.sg/data/article/16101/doc/MTI Press Release (31 Oct) Site.pdf, 1.

[70] Interviewee 2359.

[71] H L Lee, 'Speech to Lloyd's City Dinner, Merchant Taylors' Hall, London,' 7 Sep 2006; C T Yeo, 'Speech at the Opening of the International Maritime and Port Security Conference, Grand Copthorne Waterfront Hotel, Singapore,' 4 Aug 2004.

[72] Interviewee 2359. Similarly, Interviewee 1569 reflected that "Singapore places quite a high premium on security and on the security of shipping, particularly because of its high dependence on shipping for its maritime economy."

Deputy Prime Minister S. Jayakumar listed the prospect for terrorism to shift to the maritime domain, the use of the maritime trading sector to facilitate weapons proliferation and trafficking activities, as well as the environmental dangers of oil spills posed by single-hulled tankers.[73] Similarly, while at the 2010 International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia Security Summit (also known as the Shangri-La Dialogue), Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean referred to "real" threats related to sea lane security, freedom of navigation, maritime boundary disputes, terrorism and proliferation, all of which he maintained were central to the Asia Pacific's "strategic uncertainty."[74] Hence the way that Singapore has articulated its maritime security concerns centres upon statements such as these. Of the numerous possible threats facing shipping, officials have focused on non-state actors.

Singapore's concern for non-state actors' unauthorised activities at sea became prominent in its policy statements following the September 11, 2001 (9/11) World Trade Centre attacks. The 2000 Defence White Paper, *Defending Singapore in the 21st Century*, referred to non-state actors such as illegal immigrants, terrorists and hijackers as constituting only "low-intensity threats."[75] But by 2004, this had changed to the point that Singapore's National Security Coordination Centre under the Ministry of Defence developed a new National Security Strategy solely devoted to addressing transnational terrorism.[76] Lee Kuan Yew reflected on the state of international security shortly after 9/11, noting "I felt that something fundamental had changed."[77]

Since then, Teo and other key decision makers, including Senior Minister of State Balaji Sadasivan, Minister for Education and Second Minister for Defence Ng Eng Hen and Minister of State for Defence Koo Tsai Kee have claimed that piracy and terrorism constitute Singapore's two major maritime security problems.[78] At the

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[73] S Jayakumar, 'Keynote Address at the Conference on Law of the Sea Issues in the East and South China Seas, Xiamen,' 12 Mar 2005; S Jayakumar, 'UNCLOS: Two Decades On,' *Singapore Yearbook of International Law* 1, no. 8 (2005): 3.
[74] Teo, 'Speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue.'
[75] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), *Defending Singapore into the 21st Century* (Singapore 2000), 48-9.
[76] Republic of Singapore (National Security Coordination Centre), *The Fight against Terror*.
[77] K Y Lee, 'Speech at the Munich Economic Summit: The World after 9/11,' 7 Jun 2002.
[78] T K Koo, 'Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the 2nd International Maritime Security Conference,' 19 May 2011; E H Ng, 'Speech at the Opening of the 4th Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise and Diving Exercise,' 25 Mar 2011; B Sadasivan, 'Address at the Institute of South Asian

heart of this stance lays a conflation of the two challenges[79] whereby "[t]he main concern for Singapore is whether a piratical act could turn into a maritime terrorist attack."[80] In 2004, for Tony Tan Keng Yam, while Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for Security and Defence, the potential for a 'pirate-terror nexus' emerging represented "probably the greatest concern to maritime security."[81] This strategic priority, according to Minister Wong, was due to the difficulties for security officials to discern between the two actor types when responding to incidents at sea, and the similarities in how the two are managed.[82] Granted, while officials emphasise the two actors' convergence, the nexus is not unanimously upheld: Peter Ho, the Head of the Civil Service and Permanent Secretary in National Security, remarked in 2008 that "there has been no evidence to suggest that [piracy and armed robbery in the Malacca Strait was] motivated by terrorism."[83]

Though Singapore's sensitivity to shipping disruptions is not necessarily unique to oil trade,[84] its policymakers do single out the seaborne transportation of crude and refined oil supplies as a particular concern in relation to these non-traditional threats. Official statements about piracy (and other potential challenges) in the Malacca Strait are often mentioned in conjunction with the sea lane's transit oil shipments.[85] This tendency has continued as the frequency of piracy incidents has decreased in Southeast Asia, and increased off the Somali coast. In 2011, Minister of

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Studies Conference on Geopolitics of Energy in South Asia,' 14 Aug 2007; C H Teo, 'Speech at the 2010 Committee of Supply Debate,' 5 Mar 2010.

[79] 'Piracy and Maritime Terror in Southeast Asia: Dire Straits,' *International Institute for Strategic Studies Strategic Comments* 10, no. 6 (2004): 1.

[80] Interviewee 1569.

[81] T K Y Tan, 'Speech at the IDSS Maritime Security Conference, Marina Mandarin Hotel, Singapore,' 20 May 2004. Tony Tan became President of Singapore in September 2011.

[82] 'Piracy equals terrorism on troubled waters: Minister,' *Agence France Presse*, 21 Dec 2003, cited in R C Banlaoi, 'Maritime Security Outlook for Southeast Asia,' in *The Best of Times, the Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. J Ho and C Z Raymond (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies: World Scientific Publishing, 2005), 68.

[83] P Ho, 'Speech at the Lloyd's 360 Live Debate,' 21 Feb 2008.

[84] According to Interviewee 1569 the container shipping sector is also important:

> [T]he littoral states, especially Singapore, are concerned about the security of the shipping that plies through the Malacca and Singapore Straits as the Malacca and Singapore Straits are […] a conduit for trade through bulk carriers and containers, and many of these kinds of ships do call at local ports in Singapore and in Port Klang for example.

[85] For example Jayakumar, 'Keynote Address at the Conference on Law of the Sea Issues in the East and South China Seas, Xiamen;' Jayakumar, 'UNCLOS;' Ng, 'Speech at the Opening Ceremony of International Maritime Defence Exhibition Asia;' E H Ng, 'Speech at the Commissioning Ceremony of RSS Archer,' 2 Dec 2011; C H Teo, 'Speech at the RSN 40th Anniversary and Commissioning of RSS Formidable at Changi Naval Base,' 5 May 2007; Teo, 'Speech at the Commissioning Ceremony of RSS Stalwart and RSS Supreme.'

State for Defence and Education Lawrence Wong explained Singapore's vulnerability to oil disruptions 'upstream' from the Malacca Strait:

> While the Gulf of Aden is some 4,000 nautical miles from Singapore, it is a key waterway connecting Asia and Europe. It accounts for a significant portion of global trade, especially crude oil. Each year, some 30,000 vessels, many of which transit through our port, traverse these waters. By threatening the freedom of navigation and the safety of international shipping, piracy in the Gulf of Aden has direct implications for Singapore's security and our economic well-being. Therefore, it is in our interest to be in the Gulf of Aden and Singapore will continue to do our part by contributing to the international counter piracy effort in the Gulf.[86]

Similarly, Jayakumar observed the emergence of a post-9/11 relationship among oil, gas and maritime terrorism[87] with respect to the 2002 *Limburg* tanker attack that was orchestrated by suspected al Qaeda operatives while moored off Yemen's coast.[88] Singapore's wariness is particularly pronounced where its policy makers have entertained the possibility for 'floating bomb' attacks to be mounted against fuel-carrying vessels. Such scenarios envisage a tanker laden with crude oil, refined petroleum, liquid natural gas or another flammable chemical being detonated next to strategic infrastructure (such as Singapore's port facilities) or in key waterways (such as the Malacca Strait). The consequences of such an event, Teo has argued, would be "horrific" for the island state, the region and the world.[89]

Singapore is not alone in its concern about piracy and maritime terrorism. Both issues received widespread attention when the frequency of piracy incidents in Southeast Asia peaked during the late 1990s, and in the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks. Numerous analysts have explored the two actor types.[90] So too have states located throughout the broader Asia Pacific region. The ARF—whose 27

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[86] L Wong, 'Speech at the Overseas Service Medal Presentation Ceremony,' 14 Dec 2011.
[87] S Jayakumar, 'Keynote at the Singapore Conference on Freedom of Seas, Passage Rights and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,' 9 Jan 2008.
[88] See M Scheuer, S Ulph, and J C K Daly, *Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the Western Economy*, (Jamestown Foundation, 2006), http://www.jamestown.org/docs/Jamestown-SaudiOil.pdf, 38.
[89] Lee, 'Speech to Lloyd's City Dinner, Merchant Taylors' Hall, London;' C Z Raymond, 'Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Potential Scenarios,' *Terrorism Monitor* 4, no. 7 (2006); C H Teo, 'Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the International Maritime Defence Exhibition Asia,' 11 Nov 2003.
[90] For example R C Banlaoi, 'Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat,' *Naval War College Review* Autumn(2005); G Luft and A Korin, 'Terrorism Goes to Sea,' *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 6 (2004); G G Ong, ed. *Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits* (Singapore; Leiden, The Netherlands: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; International Institute for Asian Studies, 2006); A J Young and M J Valencia, 'Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no. 2 (2003).

members include the ASEAN 10 and dialogue partners, among others[91]—issued its own Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Security on 17 June 2003. Article 1 (a) observed that:

> Piracy and armed robbery against ships and the potential for terrorist attacks on vulnerable sea shipping threaten the growth of the Asia-Pacific region and disrupt the stability of global commerce, particularly as these have become tools of transnational organized crime.[92]

Singapore's stance nonetheless stands out. In the aftermath of 9/11, it has viewed piracy and terrorism as being far more dangerous relative to others' threat assessments. One interviewee remarked that "at least for the time being Singapore is not facing a major maritime security problem" and that that "terrorism is not a major problem for Singapore."[93] Another argued that "the predominant view is that there is no cause for concern."[94] Yet decision makers have continued to problematise piracy. In 2009, even despite his own admissions that the trilateral Malacca Straits Patrols and Eyes in the Sky aerial surveillance had lessened the frequency of incidents at sea,[95] Teo maintained that "piracy is of special concern" for Singapore given its position as a maritime state,[96] restated Indonesian Navy spokesperson Sagom Tamboem's concern that the Global Financial Crisis could prompt an increase in unauthorised activities in the Strait,[97] and remarked how "[i]n the medium term, terrorism, sectarianism and piracy could well worsen as a consequence of this crisis."[98] As mentioned previously, other Singaporean officials stress the growing piracy problem in the Gulf of Aden as well.[99]

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[91] As at 2012 ARF members included Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, United States, and Vietnam. ASEAN Regional Forum, 'About the ASEAN Regional Forum,' http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html.
[92] ASEAN Regional Forum, 'ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Security, 17 Jun 2003,' http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library/arf-chairmans-statements-and-reports/172.html.
[93] Interviewee 8841.
[94] Interviewee 1569.
[95] C H Teo, 'Speech at the Commissioning Ceremony of RSS Intrepid, RSS Steadfast and RSS Tenacious,' 5 Feb 2008.
[96] C H Teo, 'Speech at the 40th Command and Staff Course and 10th National Service Command and Staff Course Graduation Ceremony,' 30 Oct 2009.
[97] C H Teo, 'Speech at the 2009 Committee of Supply Debate,' 5 Mar 2009.
[98] C H Teo, 'Speech at the Special Forces Commanders Conference,' 19 Oct 2009.
[99] For example Koo, 'Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the 2nd International Maritime Security Conference;' Ng, 'Speech at the Opening of the 4th Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise and Diving Exercise;' J Teo, 'Welcome Address at the World Maritime Day Hamper Presentation Ceremony, PSA Building, Singapore,' 29 Sep 2011.

Maritime terrorism also routinely features in Singapore's contemporary strategic policy statements,[100] and is characterised as more dangerous than piracy. Seaborne terrorism has been referred to as the "most probable and dangerous"[101] threat that "cannot be ignored,"[102] cannot be escaped,[103] and the devastation of which "adds an entirely new dimension to the issue of maritime security."[104] Jayakumar, Teo and Koo have all stressed that terrorist activity is 'real,' 'ever-present and catastrophic,' 'non-theoretical' and 'non-hypothetical.'[105] One Major of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) even maintained, somewhat defensively, that maritime terrorism is no overblown threat.[106] This view contrasts with one interviewee's response when questioned about the nature of the terrorist threat in the Strait, that "of course you can't rule something like that out, but frankly it seems a little unlikely."[107]

This extends into the issue of transportation of oil at sea. As recently as 2011, floating bombs continue to feature in contingency planning scenarios for Singapore's National Maritime Security System,[108] and after the discovery of plans—speculated to have been developed by Jemaah Islamiyah—to attack an oil tanker in the Malacca Strait in March 2010.[109] In comparison, several analysts have voiced their doubts that such an attack would actually occur.[110] Hence, Singapore's sensitivity toward non-

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[100] For instance Koo, 'Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the 2nd International Maritime Security Conference;' Ng, 'Speech at the Commissioning Ceremony of RSS Archer;' Teo, 'Speech at the 2010 Committee of Supply Debate.'

[101] J Soon, 'eNforce: Transforming the Fleet for Unconventional Warfare,' *Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces* 30, no. 1 (2004).

[102] H L Lee, 'Speech to the US-ASEAN Business Council: Engaging a New Asia,' 12 Jul 2005; Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), *Defending Singapore into the 21st Century*: 48.

[103] Y C Tong cited in Republic of Singapore (National Security Coordination Centre), *The Fight against Terror:* 50.

[104] C H Teo, 'Keynote Address at the Opening of the 2nd Western Pacific MCMEX and DIVEX,' 26 Apr 2004.

[105] Jayakumar, 'Keynote Address at the Conference on Law of the Sea Issues in the East and South China Seas, Xiamen;' Jayakumar, 'UNCLOS,' 4; S Jayakumar, 'Speech at the National Security Dialogue with the Business Community, Orchard Hotel,' 21 May 2008; T K Koo, 'Speech at the Grassroots Leaders' Visit to the Navy Open House,' 29 May 2004; Teo, 'Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the International Maritime Defence Exhibition Asia;' Teo, 'Keynote Address at the Opening of the 2nd Western Pacific MCMEX and DIVEX;' C H Teo, 'Speech at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis, India,' Jan 2004.

[106] I L F Jau, 'Fireball on the Water: Rolling Back the Global Waves of Terror…from the Sea,' *Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces* 29, no. 4 (2003).

[107] Interviewee 2359.

[108] S Tan, 'Integrated Response,' *Cyberpioneer: Web Publication of the Singapore Armed Forces* (2011), http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/features/2011/dec11_fs.html.

[109] 'Singapore Raises Security Alert after Malacca Threat,' *Reuters*, 5 Mar 2010.

[110] For instance see S Bateman, 'Assessing the Threat of Maritime Terrorism: Issues for the Asia-Pacific Region,' *Security Challenges* 2, no. 3 (2006): 82; Richardson, 2004, 44-5, cited in S Bateman, J H Ho, and M Mathai, 'Shipping Patterns in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: An Assessment of the

state actor maritime threats is striking because it stands at odds with others' dismissals of them as remote possibilities. And while Singapore's officials acknowledge a variety of maritime challenges, which accords with the predicted effects of enmeshment, it is necessary to consider why piracy and maritime terrorism have received so much special attention.

Explaining Singapore's Interests: Allegiance, Economy, or History?

An easy explanation of Singapore's piracy and maritime terrorism focus lies in the island state's bilateral relationship with the US. In 1992 the two states agreed for US naval forces to use Singaporean facilities, and in 2001 for its aircraft carriers to dock next to Changi naval base.[111] As one of Southeast Asia's most supportive states of a US presence in the region,[112] it makes sense that Singapore's policy officials would reflect Washington's post 9/11 concerns as part of the Global War on Terror. Acharya has remarked on this point that "[t]o be sure, Singapore sees its strategic relations with the US in a broader context of its national security concerns, which includes perceived threats from its immediate neighbours."[113] It is also reasonable to expect that due to the increase in piracy incidents in Southeast Asia from the late 1990s and several high profile terrorist attacks staged throughout the region,[114] such security challenges would be reflected in Singapore's official statements.

However, the oil-survival overlap that is evident in Singapore's high transit oil stake is also instructive for understanding its maritime security interests. This is evident in two respects. The first relates to the adverse effects that Singapore would experience from seaborne trade disruptions. Teo was explicit in 2009 that navigational threats such as piracy and terrorism could be detrimental for Singapore's economy and the region's stability.[115] For Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Zainul Abidin Rasheed, any interference with energy shipments in chokepoints such as the

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Risks to Different Types of Vessel,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 29, no. 2 (2007): 320; P Lehr, 'Maritime Terrorism: Locations, Actors and Capabilities,' in *Lloyd's MIU Handbook of Maritime Security*, ed. R Herbert-Burns, S Bateman, and P Lehr (London: Lloyd's MIU, 2009), 57; Storey, 'Securing Southeast Asia's Sea Lanes,' 103.

[111] 'Singapore,' in *Asia Pacific Security Outlook*, ed. C E Morrison (Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 1999), 166, cited in Guan, 'Relating to the World,' 144.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Acharya, *Singapore's Foreign Policy*: 100.

[114] For an overview of terrorism in Southeast Asia, see Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*.

[115] Teo, 'Speech at the Commissioning Ceremony of RSS Stalwart and RSS Supreme.'

Malacca Strait "will have massive repercussions on the world economy."[116] The 2000 National Security Strategy went further, claiming that regional instability would hamper Singapore's hub position and "drive away investors."[117] Others have sought to put a price on the potential economic loss. Jayakumar has noted that a terrorist attack on shipping in the Singapore Strait could cost "tens of billions of dollars."[118] Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong estimated in 2007 that the island state's gross domestic product (GDP) growth would decrease as oil prices rise:

> What happens in the Middle East will affect Asia. What is less obvious is that the Middle East too has a strategic stake in Asia's stability and prosperity. […] If Asia catches a cold, it will also spread to the Middle East through reductions in oil revenue […Singapore has] no fuel subsidies. Yet it has been estimated that every US$10 increase in oil prices would shave 0.4 percentage points off our annual GDP growth.[119]

Mark Hong has cited similar figures, whereby a price rise from US$60 to US$100 per barrel would prompt a decrease of 0.6% in Singapore's growth rate.[120] While economic repercussions from trade disruptions do not necessarily apply solely to shipments of energy resources, the above evidence shows that oil can still be a factor. More importantly it is consistent with Singapore's stake in transit oil. As this chapter has revealed thus far, a core part of its Global City strategy relies on the economic benefits generated from its hub activities.

A second oil-centric rationale lies in Singapore's historical experience with terrorism, for the island state's earliest encounter, known as the *Laju* incident, involved both its refining sector and maritime domain. On 31 January 1974 members of the Japanese Red Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine sought to attack Shell's Bukom refinery. They intended to disrupt Singapore's outgoing oil supplies to the US military in South Vietnam, demonstrating solidarity with revolutionary forces in the process. Yet blunders in the plan's execution meant that only the facility's storage tanks caught fire, with the perpetrators attempting escape by hijacking the nearby *Laju* and holding its crew hostage offshore. In the

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[116] Z A Rasheed, 'Remarks at the Energy and Maritime Security Break-out Group, at the 3rd IISS Regional Security Summit, Manama, Bahrain,' 10 Dec 2006.
[117] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), *Defending Singapore into the 21st Century*: 6.
[118] Citing E Mitropoulos, Secretary General of the International Maritime Organisation. Jayakumar, 'Keynote Address at the Conference on Law of the Sea Issues in the East and South China Seas, Xiamen;' Jayakumar, 'UNCLOS,' 4.
[119] C T Goh, 'Speech at the Middle East and Asia Energy Summit, Marriot Hotel, Singapore,' 28 Nov 2007.
[120] Hong, 'Overview of Singapore's Energy Situation,' 6.

week that followed, and in a move that demonstrated how gravely policymakers regarded the incident, Singaporean officials exchanged places with the hostages to guarantee the hijackers' safe passage out of the country by aircraft to Kuwait.

The *Laju* incident was an isolated but significant event that occurred less than one decade after Singapore became independent. As a small island state that attempts to mitigate its geographical weakness through commercial activities in oil sectors, and in an international environment that is increasingly presented with non-state actor challenges, it is no wonder that piracy and terrorism is prominent in Singapore's worldview. These findings indicate that while enmeshed energy transit states *do* prioritise potential security challenges facing transit energy supplies (which the energy transit state framework set out to confirm), it is also quite possible for their security of supply concerns to concentrate on specific threats that emerge.

SINGAPORE'S APPROACH TO STRAIT SECURITY: COOPERATION OR COMPETITION?

The energy transit state framework advanced in this thesis posits that an 'enmeshed' state such as Singapore would act in a manner that ensures its continued access to the transnational energy supply chain, and that it would likely employ extensive strategies when doing so. This logic is straightforward. The previous section found that having a high stake in transit oil was generally associated with a heightened sensitivity to potential supply disruptions. It therefore follows that such a country would pursue any means it can to increase supply chain security. Military power is thus a chief consideration. The nature and scope of an enmeshed energy transit state's capabilities would be likely to focus on supply chain issues, as far as it is practicable. The underlying premise is that Singapore, given that its very survival is entwined with Middle East-East Asian oil shipments that pass through the Malacca Strait, would do its utmost to protect what is essentially its economic lifeline. Whether this drive manifests as cooperation or competition (or a combination of both) must be considered. One view might presume an enmeshed energy transit state to encourage security cooperation, since many states' combined efforts would realise a greater outcome than unilateral action. Alternately, an enmeshed energy transit state might choose to compete with others to maintain its high transit stake upon which it so depends. Whether and how these countervailing propositions feature in Singapore's

approach toward the Malacca Strait must therefore be considered throughout the following analysis.

A glance at Singapore's military capabilities quickly reveals that it has the most advanced armed forces in the Southeast Asian region. In particular, Singapore has developed formidable sea power despite its small physical size. Upon becoming independent in 1965, the Singapore Naval Volunteer Force consisted of only two wooden patrol boats, the *RSS Panglima* and *RSS Bedok*.[121] By the 1980s it had expanded to a "maritime guerrilla force."[122] It went on to mature beyond a so-called 'Cinderella service'[123] to realise what Sam Bateman described in 2010 as a "green water" naval capability.[124]

Considering the size of Singapore's defence budget, this is not surprising. As at 2012, it was the 21st largest in the world by value, and the 16th largest if measured proportionate to GDP.[125] With an expenditure that has averaged 4.4% of GDP since 1988, Singapore spends far more on defence than its neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia (2.3% and 0.8% during the same period respectively).[126] It was the only Southeast Asian state that did not decrease its defence budget in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis,[127] and in 1999 its outlay was more than four times Indonesia's. This spending pattern continues. Singapore's budget continues to be the highest of all ASEAN members, and its expenditure in 2012 represented more than twice that of Malaysia.[128]

The fact that Singapore has advanced naval capabilities and significant defence budget is consistent, on the whole, with the expectations of 'enmeshment.'

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[121] Republic of Singapore (Republic of Singapore Navy), *Onwards and Upwards: Celebrating 40 Years of the Navy*, (2007), http://www.mindef.gov.sg/dam/publications/eBooks/More_eBooks/Onwards&Upwards_2007.pdf, 14.
[122] R Karniol, 'Country Briefing: Singapore-Master Plan,' *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18 Feb 2004, cited in R Matthews and N Z Yan, 'Small Country 'Total Defence:' A Case Study of Singapore,' *Defence Studies* 7, no. 3 (2007): 384.
[123] T Huxley, *Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore*, Armed Forces of Asia Series (St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 2000), 184.
[124] W Minnick, '3 New Frigates Boost Singapore Navy's "Green-Water" Capabilities,' *Defense News* (2008).
[125] In 2012 Singapore's defence budget was US$9.7 billion, which represented 3.6% of its GDP. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'Military Expenditure Database,' http://milexdata.sipri.org.
[126] The average for Indonesia is approximate, noting that the Military Expenditure Database does not contain its budget information for the year 2000. Ibid.
[127] T Huxley, 'Defence Procurement in Southeast Asia' (paper presented at the 5th workshop of the Inter-Parliamentary Forum on Security Sector Governance in Southeast Asia, Phnom Penh, 12-13 Oct 2008), 2.
[128] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'Military Expenditure Database.'

This is usually attributed as part of a deterrence strategy to survive as a small state (also termed a "poisonous shrimp" policy)[129] "making Singapore sufficiently unpalatable for any aggressor to take a bite out of her"[130] rather than any particular response related to its oil interests. Singapore's military posturing has long been expressed in terms of Total Defence: a concept that was first articulated in 1984 as a means to "unite all sectors of society—government, business and the people—in the defence of the country."[131] Defined as a comprehensive and multifaceted means to ensure national survival, it consists of five 'pillars': Psychological Defence, Social Defence, Economic Defence, Civil Defence and Military Defence.[132] Deterrence, through Total Defence, together with diplomacy, is said to constitute the two central foundations of Singapore's defence policy.[133] Amid the Ministry of Defence's ongoing aims to realise a third generation SAF that relies on advanced technology as a force multiplier,[134] this whole of government approach can be seen in maritime initiatives such as the Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF) and the Special Operations Task Force. The MSTF oversees Singapore's maritime agencies such as the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), the Police Coast Guard (PCG), the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), Singapore Customs and the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority in order to "respond swiftly and effectively to potential maritime security threats."[135] The latter, an interoperable counter-terrorism agency announced in 2009, incorporates elite SAF groups like the Commandos and the Naval Diving Unit.[136]

It is not commonly pointed out that Singapore's stake in transit oil has actually had a role in its security capability development. In addition to engendering an acute

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[129] Matthews and Yan, 'Small Country "Total Defence,"' 380.
[130] E Yeo, 'Technological Capabilities of Our Defence Industries,' *Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces* 25, no. 2 (1999).
[131] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), *Defence of Singapore 1994-1995* (Singapore: Ministry of Defence, 1994), 5, cited in T Huxley, 'Singapore's Strategic Outlook and Defence Policy,' in *Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael Leifer*, ed. M Leifer, R Emmers, and J C Y Liow, *Routledge Politics in Asia Series* (Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2006), 142.
[132] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), *Defending Singapore into the 21st Century*: 12.
[133] Ibid., 74.
[134] See Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'About the 3rd Generation SAF.'
[135] J Ho, 'Anti-Piracy in Somalia: Models for Maritime Security Institutions,' *RSIS Commentaries* (2009); Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Fact Sheet: Maritime Security Task Force,' 23 Feb 2009 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2009/feb/23feb09_nr/23feb09_fs2.html.
[136] S Ramesh, 'SAF to Develop Integrated Task Force against Terrorist Threats,' *Channel News Asia*, 30 Jun 2009.

sensitivity to the danger that non-state actors can pose, the *Laju* incident has also, in fact, been instrumental in shaping the SAF's trajectory. Following attack, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew reflected on the severe repercussions that could have eventuated:

> These things are beyond our control. In a world so closely inter-dependent and inter-related, it is not possible to isolate ourselves from conflicts in which we are really spectators. […] If the Bukom raid had been successful, the considerable refining capacity would have been knocked out for several years, affecting not only Singapore, but also the countries in the wider region which got their supplies from Singapore. Then even if the oil embargo were lifted, and limitless supplies of crude oil were available, there would still be a shortage of oil in the region because there would have been a shortage of refining capacity.[137]

Lee's concern was not unfounded. Shell's production was halted for at least three months after an accidental fire at the very same facility in late September 2011.[138]

When speaking at the 2010 National Security Dialogue with the Business Community, Coordinating Minister for National Security Jayakumar recounted the story of a Somali pirate attack on a crude carrier that occurred in 2008, and a reported planned terrorist attack on oil tankers while traversing the Malacca Strait in March 2010 as reasons why "it is imperative that we [private and government stakeholders] all do our part" to secure supply chains and through a "Whole-of-Nation approach" "strengthen any weak links in our security strategy."[139] Jayakumar's view here echoes Lee's earlier words. Singapore's contemporary strategic priorities in the Strait might thus be considered as a hangover that developed from the early *Laju* experience.

Lee Kuan Yew reflected shortly after the attempted destruction of Shell's refinery in 1974 that Singapore had a clear duty "to take every precaution to prevent sabotage to property or industrial production, or danger to lives [and to…] minimise the reasons of any group to pick any quarrel with us."[140] According to Bilveer Singh, *Laju* influenced Singapore's decision to "invest in a well-oiled machinery to deal with international terrorism."[141] For intelligence analyst and diplomat Susan Sim:

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[137] A Josey, *Lee Kuan Yew*, 2 vols. (Singapore: Times Books International, 1980), 189.
[138] 'Shell Expects Bukom Refinery to Resume Full Production Soon,' *Channel News Asia*, 28 Dec 2011; 'Update 1-Shell Restarts Final Crude Unit at Singapore Refinery,' *Reuters*, 27 Oct 2011.
[139] S Jayakumar, 'Speech at the National Security Dialogue with the Business Community, Orchard Road Hotel Ballroom 1 and 2,' 27 Jul 2010.
[140] 'Our Duty as Big Oil Centre,' *Straits Times*, 6 Feb 1974.
[141] B Singh, *Skyjacking of SQ 117: Causes, Course and Consequences* (Singapore: Crescent Design Associates, 1991), 30. See also V Chew, *Laju Highjacking*, (Republic of Singapore (National Library of Singapore), 2009), http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_1372_2009-01-15.html.

> *Laju* […] showed us that you also need a well-integrated, robust crisis management system that not only has drawer plans for all sorts of scenarios, but is also well oiled by years of joint exercises.[142]

That S. R. Nathan (who went on to become President in 1999 but at the time held the post of Security and Intelligence Director within the Ministry of Defence)[143] was among the official *Laju* response contingent (and received a Meritorious Service Medal for his efforts),[144] illustrates the Singapore Government's value placed on protecting critical oil infrastructure and its overlap with national security interests. Nathan went on to be appointed Director of the Singapore National Oil Company for eight years following his Ministry directorship,[145] which further underlines this link.

It is therefore little wonder that Singapore has so many mechanisms in place to protect its critical energy infrastructure. Oil tankers are required to provide 24 hours' notice before arriving at Singapore.[146] The MPA has delineated restricted areas surrounding its oil and chemical industries and monitors ships carrying sensitive cargo such as oil, chemicals, liquid natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas. Regional sailing routes prevent vessels from passing close to sensitive port areas (such as Jurong Island's petrochemical hub and Changi naval base) and the MPA's express written permission is required for small vessels to enter its waters.[147] Since March 2005, through the Accompanying Sea Security Teams scheme, the RSN escorts tankers and other commercial ships carrying high value cargo.[148]

Singapore's transit oil interests also have ramifications for how it approaches security issues in the Malacca Strait. In relation to the cooperation-competition

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[142] Italics added. F Chan, 'Learning from the Experience - Past Incidents Have Honed Singapore's Crisis Management Skills,' *Straits Times*, 26 Mar 2011.
[143] O K Seng, '1974 - the Laju Incident,' 6, no. 1, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/history/birth_of_saf/v06n01_history.html.
[144] 'Two Get Awards at Ceremony,' *Straits Times*, 11 Jan 1975.
[145] A Chua, *S. R. Nathan*, (Republic of Singapore (National Library Singapore), 2004), http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_490_2004-12-23.html.
[146] Y Y Teo, 'Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 6 (2007): 542.
[147] Republic of Singapore (Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore), 'Prohibition on Movement of Vessels in Waters Surrounding: (a) Jurong Island; (b) Pulau Busing and Pulau Bukom; (c) Pulau Sebarok and Shell SBM; and (d) Sembawang Wharves and Approaches thereto,' *Port Marine Circular* no. 21 of 2006, 8 Dec 2005, cited in and in Ho, 'Singapore's Perspectives on Maritime Security,' 132; J Ho, 'Managing Port and Ship Security in Singapore,' in *Lloyd's MIU Handbook of Maritime Security*, ed. R Herbert-Burns, S Bateman, and P Lehr (London: Lloyd's MIU, 2009), 308. See also F Siew, 'Task Force to Strengthen Maritime Security,' *Cyberpioneer: Web Publication of the Singapore Armed Forces* (2004), http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/news/2004/March/02mar04_news2.print.html.
[148] 'Singapore Navy to Escort Merchant Ships to Stop Terrorism,' *Agence France-Presse*, 28 Feb 2005; Z Abuza, 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Keeping Al-Qaeda at Bay,' *Terrorism Monitor* 2, no. 9 (2004); Siew, 'Task Force to Strengthen Maritime Security.'

paradigm, three main patterns in Singapore's interactions with other states can be observed. First, Singapore plays an active leadership role that facilitates open and inclusive security cooperation. Second, it engages in multilateral avenues of collaboration despite voicing different preferences when doing so. Third, it competes with its neighbours when its commercial interests in oil are at stake. I investigate each of these in turn.

Active Leadership and Cooperation

The first and perhaps most easily identifiable trait associated with Singapore's high stake in Middle Eastern-East Asian oil flows lies in the island state's leadership approach to the maritime domain. Singapore is often singled out as being the most active of the Malacca Strait's three littoral states where maritime security matters are concerned.[149] Its numerous and varied mechanisms in place to ensure the stability of the sea lane in particular, and also international shipping in general, are reminiscent of a leadership strategy that positions Singapore as a safe business hub. This is evident, for example, in its adherence to a wide range of international conventions, agreements and initiatives related to securing the energy supply chain, its efforts to host major multilateral maritime security dialogues and exercises, and its contributions to maritime security 'upstream' and 'downstream' from the Malacca Strait toward the Persian Gulf and South China Sea.

Singapore is, on the whole, party to more International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions and instruments than Indonesia or Malaysia.[150] It has signed onto the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 (SUA), the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS) and its 2004 amendment, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.[151] It has joined all major US-led efforts that aim to protect seaborne trade. In March 2003 it became the first state in Asia to have ports compliant

[149] Ng, 'Speech at the Opening Ceremony of International Maritime Defence Exhibition Asia;' C Z Raymond, 'Maritime Security: The Singaporean Experience' (paper presented at the International Maritime Protection Symposium, Hawaii, Dec 2005), 14; Teo, 'Speech at the Commissioning Ceremony of RSS Stalwart and RSS Supreme;' Teo, 'Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,' 542.

[150] A full comparison of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's involvement in IMO conventions and instruments is provided in Appendix B.

[151] See C Z Raymond, 'The Challenge of Improving Maritime Security: An Assessment of the Implementation of the ISPS Code and Initial Responses as to its Effectiveness,' *IDSS Commentaries* 62 (2004).

with the Container Security Initiative (CSI).[152] Later that year, it joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which neither Indonesia nor Malaysia are party to.[153]

Though these indicate support for protecting international shipping in a general sense, they also have implications for seaborne oil trading. The ISPS Code, for instance, as the first international security standard for maritime infrastructure, applies to facilities involved with transporting crude and refined oil by sea just as much as containerised (and other) cargo. In a similar manner, Singapore's efforts through the PSI to coordinate the SAF with its diplomatic and intelligence agencies, its law enforcement, maritime and aviation authorities, as well as industry actors, are not only useful for preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction[154] but strengthen its overall capability to respond to incidents at sea. Singapore has also sought to reduce environmental vulnerabilities related to its oil sector and maritime logistics. It is phasing out the use of single hull oil tankers (which its bunkering firms regularly use) in accordance with the IMO's 2005 Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973/1978 (MARPOL).[155] Singapore was one of the first countries in the world to begin using ultra low sulphur fuels to meet MARPOL ship exhaust requirements and ISO 8217 marine fuel requirements.[156] Since 1992 it has developed several bunkering standards which have been adopted as international benchmarks.[157] The Singapore Standard SS 600: 2008 the Code of Practice for Bunkering (which revised SS CP 60: 2004 Bunkering by

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[152] United States of America (Customs and Border Protection), 'Singapore, the World's Busiest Seaport, Implements the Container Security Initiative and Begins to Target and Pre-Screen Cargo Destined for US,' 17 Mar 2003 http://www.cbp.gov/archived/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/cbp_press_releases/032003/03172003.xml.html.

[153] 'US, Allies Seek Right to Board Ships in WMD Search,' 34, *Arms Control Today* Jan-Feb 2004, at 37, cited in C H Allen, *Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law*, PSI Reports (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 48; United States of America (Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation), 'Proliferation Security Initiative Participants,' http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm.

[154] 'Singapore Rattles Sabre against WMD Proliferation,' *InSync: A Singapore Customs Newsletter* 7 (2010).

[155] C T Yeo, 'Opening Address at the 13th Singapore International Bunkering Conference, Singapore,' 23 Sep 2004.

[156] Republic of Singapore (Maritime Port Authority of Singapore), 'Fact Sheet on SS 524:2006: Singapore Standard for Quality Management for Bunker Supply Chain,' 2006 http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/pdf/060927b.pdf.

[157] 'Global Bunkering Standard Gathers Momentum,' *Bunkerworld*, Oct 2006; S Lor, 'Setting Standards,' *Straits Times*, 7 Dec 2011.

Bunker Tankers and SS CP 77: 1999 Bunker Surveying)[158] has been used to develop ISO 13739 Petroleum Products - Procedures for the Transfer of Bunker Fuel to Ships.[159] These activities contribute toward Singapore's overall strategic posture. For example, the Ministry of Finance, when detailing the 2011 budget, explained how involvement in multilateral avenues of interaction (including the IMO and PSI) helped "[reinforce] international recognition of Singapore as a useful partner, [and be] effective, constructive and principled."[160]

Indeed, Singapore's endeavours to act as a maritime security leader are also reflected in its self-styled status as a premiere destination for major regional forums and exercises. Singapore has hosted the Shangri-La Dialogue since its inception in 2001. It is similarly active within the ARF, often in areas related to the trade of oil by sea. Singapore hosted the ARF Expert Group Meeting on Transnational Crime in April 2000, the ARF Confidence Building Mechanism on Regional Cooperation on Maritime Security in March 2005, the ARF Seminar on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in March 2006 and the second ARF Confidence Building Mechanism Seminar on Energy Security in April 2008. In January 2007, the first ever ARF *Maritime Security Shore* Exercise was held in Singapore.[161] Prior to this, Singapore hosted the first multilateral submarine exercise *Pacific Reach* in 2000 in the South China Sea,[162] and in association with the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, the first Mine Counter Measure Exercise and Diving Exercise in June 2001.[163] Singapore was the only littoral country of the Malacca Strait to send observers to the PSI exercise *Team Samurai*, which was conducted in Japan in 2004.[164] It also convened exercise *Deep Sabre* in 2005, the PSI's first multilateral

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[158] Republic of Singapore (Maritime Port Authority of Singapore), 'New National Standard to Enhance Bunkering Practices,' 15 Oct 2008 http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/global_navigation/news_center/mpa_news/mpa_news_detail.page?filename=nr081015.xml.

[159] 'Quiet Revolution: Bunkerspot Talks to Douglas Raitt of Lloyd's Register's FOBAS About ISO 13739,' *Bunkerspot* 2010.

[160] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Finance), 'Singapore Budget: Expenditure Overview: Security and External Relations,' 2011 http://www.mof.gov.sg/budget_2011/expenditure_overview/mfa.html.

[161] See ASEAN Regional Forum, 'List of ARF Track I Activities,' http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library/arf-activities/list-of-arf-track-i-activities-by-inter-sessional-year.html.

[162] 'Multinational Sub Rescue Exercise Begins,' *Los Angeles Times*, 3 Oct 2000; Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Singapore Hosts Regional Submarine Rescue Exercise,' 18 Aug 2010 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2010/aug/18aug10_nr2.html.

[163] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), '1st WP MCMEX/ DIVEX 2001,' 2001 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/mcmex/2011/media/news/2001_gallery.html.

[164] Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 'The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise "Team Samurai 04" (Overview and Evaluation),' 28 Oct 2004 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/psi/overview0410.html.

naval exercise in the Southeast Asian region, and its successor, *Deep Sabre II*, in 2009.[165] Together with its participation in the PSI interdiction exercises *Sea Saber* in 2004, and *Leading Edge* in 2006 and 2010, all of which were conducted in the waters surrounding the Arabian Peninsula,[166] Singapore's maritime security activities can be seen to span not only its immediate region but the entire transnational energy supply chain.

Indeed, Singapore's initiatives in international cooperative maritime security activities are perhaps most pronounced in its decision to become involved 'upstream' from the Malacca Strait in the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151. Although CTF 151 formed in 2008 to counter piracy off the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden, the region (as mentioned previously in this chapter), is also important to Singapore's oil interests. Here, Singapore's contribution has included four task groups: the Landing Ship Tank (LST) *RSS Persistence*, 240 SAF personnel and two Super Puma helicopters in April 2009;[167] the LST *RSS Endurance*, 221 SAF personnel and two Super Puma helicopters in June 2010;[168] and the LST *RSS Endeavour*, 229 SAF personnel and two Super Puma helicopters in August 2011,[169] as well as the frigate *RSS Intrepid*, 145 personnel, and a Seahawk helicopter in 2012.[170] In addition, a Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) Fokker-50 maritime patrol aircraft detachment was deployed in April 2011.[171]

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[165] C H Teo, 'Opening Address at the Opening Ceremony of Exercise Deep Sabre II, Singapore,' 27 Oct 2009.

[166] J Lewis and P Maxon, 'The Proliferation Security Initiative,' in *Disarmament Forum: Maritime Security*, ed. K Vignard and J Linekar, trans. V Compagnion, Vol. 2 (2010), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/maritime-security-en-319.pdf, 37; Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Factsheet - Singapore's Participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative,' 11 Jan 2004 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2004/jan/11jan04_nr/11jan04_fs.html; United States of America (Department of State), 'United States Hosts Proliferation Security Initiative Interdiction Exercise,' 27 Oct 2006 http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/75274.htm.

[167] S Quek, 'SAF Task Group Sets off for Gulf of Aden,' *Cyberpioneer: Web Publication of the Singapore Armed Forces* (2009), http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/news/2009/April/09apr09_news.html.

[168] O H Tat, 'RSS Endurance Sets off for Gulf of Aden,' *Cyberpioneer: Web Publication of the Singapore Armed Forces* (2010), http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/news/2010/june/18jun10_news.html.

[169] S Tan, 'Keeping Pirates at Bay a Meaningful Task: Mr Wong,' *Cyberpioneer: Web Publication of the Singapore Armed Forces* (2011), http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/news/2011/nov/08nov11_news.html.

[170] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Fourth SAF Task Group Leaves for Gulf of Aden,' 4 Sep 2012 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2012/sep/04sep12_nr.html.

[171] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Fokker-50 Deployment to the GOA Overseas Service Medal Presentation,' 22 Aug 2011 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/air_force/news_events/news/2011/22Aug11.html.

This participation is remarkable when considering Singapore's position as a small state. As a comparison, Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand sent officers to act in a liaison capacity.[172] In September 2010, Thailand deployed two vessels in association with CTF 151, the *HTMS Pattani* and the *HTMS Similan,* along with 351 personnel.[173] Malaysia and Indonesia have independently deployed forces to the Gulf region, along with Russia, China, Japan and India.[174] Other CTF 151 contributors have included Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Jordan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the UK and the US.[175] It is also striking that Singapore commanded CTF 151 for three three-month periods beginning January 2010, March 2011 and March 2013,[176] a role that few naval forces have played. The US Fifth Fleet, the Turkish Navy, the Republic of Korea Navy, the Pakistan Navy, the Royal Danish Navy and the Royal New Zealand Navy have all held operational control of the coalition force.[177] To date, Thailand is the only other Southeast Asian country to have commanded CTF 151 (from late March 2012).[178]

Singaporean officials have been quick to point out the SAF's CTF 151 successes. Minister Teo emphasised in 2010 that during the RSN's watch no

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[172] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Singapore Completes Second Command of Multinational Counter-Piracy Task Force,' 30 Jun 2011 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2011/jun/30jun11_nr2.html.

[173] United States of America (Combined Maritime Forces Public Affairs), 'Thailand Joins CMF Counter-Piracy Mission,' 28 Sep 2010 http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2010/CMF055.html.

[174] 'Malaysia Deploys Navy to Somalia,' *BBC News*, 5 Sep 2008; J Hitipeuw, 'As Indonesian Elite Force Approaches Somalia,' *Kompas*, 21 May 2011; United States of America (Combined Maritime Forces Public Affairs), 'Republic of Korea Turns over Command of CTF-151 to Turkey,' 1 Sep 2010 http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2010/CMF052.html. Indonesia's and Malaysia's deployments to the Gulf are discussed in the section entitled *Cooperation in and Beyond the Malacca Strait: 'Upstream' and 'Downstream' Policy Choices* in Chapter Five.

[175] United States of America (Combined Maritime Forces Public Affairs), 'Republic of Korea Turns over Command of CTF-151 to Turkey.'

[176] 'Singapore Takes over Command of Multinational Counter-Piracy Task Force,' *Bernama*, 31 Mar 2011; Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Singapore Completes Command of Multinational Counter-Piracy Task Force,' 21 Apr 2010 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2010/apr/21apr10_nr2.html; Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Singapore Takes over Command of Multinational Counter-Piracy Task Force for Third Time,' 7 Mar 2013 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2013/mar/07mar13_nr.html.

[177] 'Turkey to Command Somalia Anti-Piracy Force: US,' *Agence France-Presse*, 24 Apr 2009; 'PN Hands over Command of CTF-151,' *Associated Press of Pakistan*, 31 Mar 2011; L G Luke, 'New Zealand Takes Command of Anti-Piracy Task Force,' *Future Directions International* (2011), http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-ocean/29-indian-ocean-swa/112-new-zealand-takes-command-of-anti-piracy-task-force.html; Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Singapore Completes Command of Multinational Counter-Piracy Task Force;' United States of America (Combined Maritime Forces Public Affairs), 'Royal Thai Navy Assumes Command of Combined Task Force 151,' 3 Apr 2012 http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2012/CMF006.html.

[178] United States of America (Combined Maritime Forces Public Affairs), 'Royal Thai Navy Assumes Command of Combined Task Force 151.'

successful pirate attacks occurred in the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor in the Gulf of Aden, and stated that there were 26% fewer attacks in the Gulf region overall, compared to the previous year when Singapore was not commanding the coalition.[179] The deployments have also been used to demonstrate Singapore's capabilities in a Malacca Strait setting. In March 2009, at the first ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security held at the Indonesian port-city of Surabaya, Singaporean delegates stressed the RSN's CTF 151 experience when discussing its contributions in the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP).[180] Consequently, Singapore's involvement in the coalition's activities does not just represent a means to demonstrate the SAF's prowess at sea in areas 'upstream' toward the Arabian Peninsula. It has also had implications for its approach toward Strait security cooperation.

Singapore's readiness to help secure the transnational energy supply chain far beyond its immediate region is evident beyond CTF 151. On 27 October 2003 the SAF deployed the *RSS Endurance* together with C-130 transport aircraft and 192 military personnel to Iraq as part of reconstruction activities during the US-led Global War on Terror.[181] This task group was the first of many sent as part of Operation Blue Orchid, in which 998 SAF personnel served for five years until 20 December 2008.[182] Although its objectives centred on reconstruction efforts,[183] the operation was associated with Singapore's oil interests. One of the SAF's primary activities was protecting Iraq's critical oil infrastructure. The RSN trained in oil platform defence exercises prior to deployment.[184] Task groups engaged in maritime operations that included securing the Al Basra Oil Terminal and pipelines.[185] According to the *RSS Endurance's* Major Clarance Tan of the Naval Diving Unit (Singapore's equivalent of the US's Navy Seals), patrols consisted of inspecting

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[179] C H Teo, 'Speech at the Overseas Service Medal Presentation Ceremony,' 17 May 2010.
[180] ASEAN Regional Forum, *Co-Chairs' Summary Report: The First ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security, Surabaya, Indonesia, 5-6 March 2009*, (2009), http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library/ARF Chairman's Statements and Reports/ The Sixteenth ASEAN Regional Forum, 2008-2009/Co-Chairs Summary Report of the 1st ARF ISM-MS.pdf, 3.
[181] 'Singapore to Send 192 Military Personnel to Iraq,' *Agence France-Presse*, 27 Oct 2003; T H Woon, *Partnering to Rebuild: Operation Blue Orchid: The Singapore Armed Forces Experience in Iraq*, ed. S Leong and E Tan (Singapore: Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 2010), 8.
[182] Woon, *Partnering to Rebuild*: 11.
[183] Ibid., 8.
[184] Ibid., 17.
[185] F Chew, 'Reflections on Operation Blue Orchid (Sea),' *Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces* 34, no. 2 (2008); Woon, *Partnering to Rebuild*: 24, 6.

merchant vessels for "suspicious personnel, terrorist organisations, people who try to smuggle oil or Iraqi national artefacts, and for weapons of mass destruction of any associated material."[186] Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Sukhvinder Singh Chopra explained, "[w]e board and inspect ships to verify that they are not contravening United Nations Security Council regulations, for example, in the area of oil smuggling and carriage of unauthorised weapons."[187] These activities were not unwarranted. On 24 April 2004, in an incident that was alleged to be one of several targeting Iraqi infrastructure, two suspected al Qaeda vessels detonated in the Al Basra Oil Terminal's proximity while speeding toward the facility.[188]

Singapore's support for the Global War on Terror was often justified on the basis of its small state status and consequent need for favourable great power relations,[189] though its policy elites have at times publicly stated that its participation was not solely driven by the security relationship with Washington. At an official media briefing in 2004, then-Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for Security and Defence Tony Tan explained:

> [W]e are doing this in our world support of a US-led coalition in the war on terror, not because—not just because we are good friends with the US, although that's a very important message, but because we regard this as being in the interest of Singapore.[190]

While Tan did not elaborate on whether Singapore's oil interests in particular were involved, Minister Teo said as much in Parliament shortly after the *RSS Endurance* left the island state's shores:

> It is important that Singapore does our part within our means to help the international community see through the reconstruction of Iraq. This will help the Iraqi people to rebuild their lives, facilitate Iraq's reintegration into the global community, and provide the foundation for a better future for the Iraqi people. It is in our interest that this effort succeeds. Without a stable Iraq, there can be no stability in the Gulf region. Security and stability in the Gulf region has significant implications for issues that are critical to Singapore, such as the supply of oil and the spread of terrorism. We may be geographically distant from Iraq, but how the situation turns out there has a direct bearing on some of our most vital interests.[191]

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[186] 'Divers Prepared to Face Danger,' *Straits Times* 1 Jan 2004; Woon, *Partnering to Rebuild*: 36.
[187] D Boey, 'Singapore Forces Patrol Iraqi Coastline,' *Straits Times*, 29 Dec 2003.
[188] 'Iraq Resumes Petroleum Exports after Bombs,' *Associated Press*, 26 Apr 2004.
[189] For example see N B Yian, 'Survival Politics,' *Today* 14 Apr 2003.
[190] United States of America (Embassy of the United States of America in Singapore), 'Transcript: US, Singapore Reaffirm their Fight against Terrorism: Rumsfeld, Tan Conduct Joint Press Briefing,' 21 Apr 2004 http://singapore.usembassy.gov/042104.html.
[191] C H Teo, 'Response to Parliament on the Sending of Troops to Iraq by Minister for Defence, Singapore,' 10 Nov 2003.

Teo's words again underline the link between Singapore's interests in oil and terrorism as central factors in Singapore's contemporary threat perceptions pertaining to the Malacca Strait. Indeed, when reflecting on the deployment of the *RSS Resolution* in 2005—which also provided logistical support and secured areas surrounding oil facilities, including the Al Basra Oil Terminal, throughout the Gulf region—the Minister remarked that the task group's contribution was critical because "[w]hat happens in this part of the world has an impact on Singapore's security and also our economic stability."[192]

Although Singapore does not currently rely on Iraq for trade in general or oil in particular in any great amount,[193] this does not mean that Iraqi oil is of no commercial value. Even before Operation Blue Orchid's first deployment, Lee Yi Shyan, the chief executive officer of International Enterprise Singapore (a state-run agency responsible for facilitating Singapore's international trading interests), pointed out that in the context of its oil resources, "Iraq is certainly not a country to be overlooked."[194] The Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore and Minister for Trade and Industry, Lim Hng Kiang, has observed how disruptions in Iraq "have added to supply woes."[195] Such comments are compounded by the fact that Singaporean firms have been pursuing commercial opportunities related to Iraq's oil assets. Logistics specialist Windmill International, for example, sent representatives to Iraq in 2003 in the context of redeveloping port and oil infrastructure, such as those located at Khor al-Amaya and Umm Qasr.[196] In 2011 the Singapore branch of Leighton Offshore signed onto a US$518 million agreement with Iraq's South Oil Company to construct a floating oil terminal near the Al Basra Oil Terminal, as part of the Crude Oil Export Facility Reconstruction Project. According to reports, the terminal will consist of a single point mooring buoy that can load 900,000 barrels of oil onto tankers each day and a 75 kilometre pipeline connecting the installation to oil

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[192] 'Defence Minister Visits Troops in Persian Gulf,' *Singapore: A monthly update from the Singapore Embassy*, Feb 2005, 4.

[193] Neither Singapore's 2012 *Yearbook of Statistics* nor the 2007 *National Energy Policy Report* identify Iraq as a trading partner—either in general or for oil in particular. In addition to outlining major Middle Eastern suppliers (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar), the National Energy Policy Report states that 7.1% of Singapore's oil imports are derived from 'Other Middle Eastern' sources, but does not disclose specific states. See Table 13.2 'Total Trade by Region/Country' in Republic of Singapore (Department of Statistics), 'Yearbook of Statistics Singapore,' Singapore: Department of Statistics Singapore, 2012; Chart 1.5: Singapore's Crude Oil Imports (2006), in Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Trade and Industry), *Energy for Growth*: 15.

[194] Y S Lee, 'Speech at the Seminar on Iraq,' 15 Jul 2003.

[195] H K Lim, 'Speech at the Global Financial Market Summit,' 19 Jul 2008.

[196] 'Iraq Hitting Export Targets, Seeks Firms to Rebuild Ports,' *Oil Daily*, 4 Dec 2003.

storage facilities in the Faw Peninsula.[197] And as Iraq ranked as the world's 8th largest producer of petroleum liquids in 2012, whereby more than half of its crude exports (51%) are sent to refineries in Asia,[198] Singapore's involvement with Iraqi oil—and its need to ensure its security—might be expected to expand in coming years.

Singapore's endeavours to peacefully resolve territorial disagreements 'downstream' from the Malacca Strait in the South China Sea are another instance of its maritime leadership aspirations. They are striking because Singapore is not a claimant to the Spratly Islands. When Chinese naval vessel *Haixun 31* berthed in the port of Singapore while visiting in July 2011, the event received regional media attention at a time of heightened tensions among China's, Vietnam's and the Philippines' hydrocarbon exploration activities within the disputed waters. In a press release addressing the situation, the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs downplayed the visit's significance, encouraged Beijing to explain its intentions over the Spratlys, and progress the ASEAN-supported 2010 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, on the grounds that it was in Singapore's interests to maintain freedom of navigation in such international shipping passages.[199]

Singapore's attempts to be a leader when securing the maritime domain serve several purposes. In general, its active participation in multilateral activities promotes itself as a 'good international citizen' and strengthens its security relationship with the US. Given its potential geopolitical vulnerabilities, a preoccupation with maintaining prestige and favourable relations with more powerful actors should not come as a surprise, since doing so is regularly attributed to small states.[200] Singapore's contributions also have implications for its transit state interests. Its high achievement reinforces its position as an attractive and safe business destination for maritime logistics, upon which the long distance bulk transportation of oil relies. One analyst has described it thus:

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[197] 'Leighton Awarded US$518 Million Iraq Crude Oil Project,' *Leighton Holdings Press Release*, 14 Oct 2011; 'Update 1-Iraq Awards $518 Mln Oil Expansion Deal to Leighton,' *Reuters*, 4 Oct 2011; S Salaheddin, 'Iraq's Oil Expansion Plans Face Major Challenges,' *Associated Press*, 14 Jan 2011.
[198] United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,' 2 Apr 2013 http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IZ.
[199] Republic of Singapore (Embassy of the Republic of Singapore in Cambodia), 'Comments on Visit of Chinese Maritime Surveillance Vessel Haixun 31 to Singapore,' 2011 http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/phnom_penh/press_statements_speeches/embassy_news_press_releases/2011/201106/press_201106_5.html.
[200] Stephen Walt for example argues that small states are more likely to bandwagon than balance with great powers, so as to reduce the likelihood of facing an attack from them. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*: 29-31.

> To make sure the world knows about what it is doing, Singapore publicised widely what it does. By taking such an approach, Singapore not only ensure [sic] that it can carry out trade as usual, the country also send [sic] a strong signal to businesses that it will respond quickly and positively towards any measures that may affect businesses.[201]

Similarly, Peter Ho explained why a proactive approach to maritime security is integral to Singapore's commercial interests:

> For Singapore, perception is as important as reality. Both affect decisions by our stakeholders and our investors. Because Singapore is perceived to be a safe and secure country, because we are seen to be pro-business, transparent and well-governed, investors are prepared to look at Singapore. But that is only the first step. If the reality cannot measure up to the perception, then they will walk. So it is our business, as government, to ensure that perception and reality converge.[202]

Singapore's leadership in maritime affairs is not unlike an advertising strategy, within which its portrayal as a secure commercial centre is perpetuated. In turn, this contributes toward its survival interests. Prestige is therefore strongly linked to enmeshment. In the case of Singapore, its prestige is relevant to both its military capabilities (in terms of its reputation for being secure) and its industrial activity (in terms of its perceived commercial strength).

Singapore's emphasis on sharing the security burden through multiple actors is instructive here. At face value Singapore's active endeavours to reduce the vulnerability of a maritime region stretching the entire transnational energy supply chain from the Arabian Peninsula to Japan can be regarded as the island state doing its best to address what it views as potentially existential threats. But its high profile involvement also means that maritime issues remain at the forefront of regional (and in some cases, international) security agendas. Singapore maximises the number of states exposed to maritime security issues by promoting multilateral avenues of interactions—whether in the form of conventions, training exercises or deployments. Indeed, approaching numerous countries individually is impractical since it is beyond the human resource capabilities of Singapore alone.[203] An overall greater level of security can be realised throughout the transnational energy supply chain, and this is

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[201] S B Shah, *Securing Maritime Trade: Post-September 11 Maritime Security Initiatives and their Implications on Malaysia*, MIMA Issue Paper (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2004), 17.
[202] Ho, 'Speech at the Lloyd's 360 Live Debate.'
[203] Leifer, for example, noted how the small size of the island state's official cohort constrains its diplomatic activity. Leifer, *Singapore's Foreign Policy*: 3.

more than Singapore could ever hope to achieve by itself. As such, spreading the security burden among many countries allows Singapore an opportunity to deploy forces upstream to protect its oil interests, as well as making its task of self-appointed maritime leader much easier. This indicates that it is quite possible for an enmeshed energy transit state to be driven toward cooperation in relation to supply chain security matters. Doing so, at least as far as the above contributions are concerned, facilitates the protection of transit oil shipments, which, through reputation management, contributes in turn to national survival goals.

Competition amid Cooperation

Despite employing an open and inclusive approach to maritime issues as part of an overarching maritime leadership strategy, this has not meant that Singapore merely cooperates for the sake of doing so, or that its stated preferences necessarily converge with those of its neighbours. Chapter One explained that Singapore has been the most vocal of the Malacca Strait's littoral countries in claiming that maritime security interactions have been driven by 'common' interests. Closer inspection has shown that such claims are not always accurate in practice. While Singapore's need to maintain its position as a secure energy and logistics hub has underpinned its proactive worldview on how to manage issues at sea, it has also supported policies that run counter to Indonesia's and Malaysia's preferences. Four examples of this are examined below. None of them are new, by way of content, to discussions of Southeast Asia's maritime security in the literature. All of them, if viewed through the prism of Singapore's transit oil priorities, reveal a habit of action directed toward the Malacca Strait that is interlaced with occasional discord rather than seamless cooperation.

The Malacca Strait's Legal Status: An early example in which Singapore's interests diverged with its neighbours can be found during the development of a legal regime to manage navigation in the Malacca Strait, at the beginnings of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. One area of contention lay in coastal states' desires to establish territorial boundaries that exceeded their prevailing (and accepted) three mile claim. This had implications for the passage of vessels through sea lanes that were wider than six miles (such as the Malacca Strait), since it

threatened to nullify some waters designated as high seas.[204] On the one hand, the so-called 'user states,' or 'maritime states,' such as the US and Japan—as well as others in East Asia—sought to protect merchant ships' and warships' unrestricted international journeys. On the other hand, coastal countries, including Indonesia and Malaysia, wanted to enshrine their sovereign control over the waters surrounding their coastlines.[205] Given that the users were among the world's most industrialised and import-dependent, their concern was that the freedom of shipping might be constrained or even rerouted (and thus made more expensive). Likewise, coastal states suspected unwarranted use of what they saw as their maritime territories.

What makes Singapore's stance so noteworthy is that it initially aligned more closely with users rather than its neighbours. On 16 November 1971 the three littoral countries released the Joint Statement of the Governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, within which detailed a series of statements "with a view to adopting a common position on matters relating to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore."[206] While all three states declared their consensus on the waterway's safety of navigation, they differed on its legal status. Indonesia and Malaysia concurred that the straits were not an international route but upheld the right of innocent passage:

> [T]he Governments of the Republic of Indonesia and of Malaysia agreed that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are not international straits while fully recognising their use for international shipping in accordance with the principle of innocent passage. The Government of Singapore takes note of the position of the Republic of Indonesia and of Malaysia on this point.[207]

Although consensus was later reached for managing vessels on international voyages (following the seventh and eighth negotiation rounds of the United Nations Convention for Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS III),[208] the fact that the island state simply noted its neighbours' views in the Joint Statement is more than just a technicality. In the context of Singapore's rapidly growing oil sector, the UNCLOS III provisions for Strait navigation had the potential to 'make or break' the island state's survival as a trading hub. UNCLOS III, the outcome of the ten year conference,

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[204] E J Frank, 'UNCLOS III and the Straits Passage Issue: The Martime Powers' Perspective on Transit Passage,' *Journal of International and Comparative Law* 3 (1981): 245.
[205] Sien, 'The Importance of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,' 301, 3, 13.
[206] Article 1. Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*: 204; Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism,' 148.
[207] Article V. Ibid.
[208] Y L Lee, *Southeast Asia: Essays in Political Geography* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1982), 41.

includes several articles that apply to the passage of an oil tanker through the Malacca Strait: not only for transit passage (Section II), but also Part III (Straits Used for International Navigation), the right of innocent passage (Section III) and passage through the waters of archipelagic states (Part IV).[209]

If a compromise between user and coastal countries had not been reached, and the UNCLOS negotiations had established a navigation regime that was much more favourable to global merchant shipping through sea lanes, Singapore's commercial oil activities may well have developed differently. Had coastal countries been able to prevent the Malacca Strait's use for international shipping, Singapore would have never prospered as a mid-point stopover destination for long haul liner routes or as a refiner in general, since it would have had no access to Middle Eastern-East Asian oil flows. After all, any vessel approaching the island state by sea must first pass through Indonesian and Malaysian waters. It is therefore understandable why following the Joint Statement, in 1972, Rajaratnam again declared support "for the unimpeded passage of all ships of all nations through the straits."[210] A Singaporean state unable to offset its vulnerable geography through open market trading would be doomed to isolation. Granted, Singapore's stance in the Joint Statement may have just been a formal observation of its neighbours' countervailing preferences, but it also had implications for its access to maritime logistics (and hence its trajectory toward enmeshment as an energy transit state) as well.

Under Keel Clearance Negotiations in the Malacca Strait: Similar pressures were at play in Singapore's dispute with Indonesia and Malaysia during negotiations to establish an under keel clearance in the Malacca Strait during the 1970s. The disagreement arose because Singapore's request for a clearance of 2.6 metres varied significantly with Indonesia's preference for 4.6 metres.[211] The latter figure would have placed a much more restrictive upper limit on the size of vessels that could safely traverse the waterway. J. N. Mak has noted that this contention was intertwined with the safety of navigation of oil tankers and had severe implications for

[209] A comprehensive explanation of UNCLOS applicability to the passage of an oil tanker through the Malacca Strait is given in S Bateman, 'The Regime of Straits Transit Passage in the Asia Pacific: Political and Strategic Issues,' in *Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea*, ed. D Rothwell and S Bateman, *Publications on Ocean Development* (The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 103-5.
[210] Parliamentary Debates, Singapore, 17 Mar 1972, cited in Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*: 34, cited in Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism,' 148.
[211] Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*: 68, cited in Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism,' 149.

Singapore's competitiveness as a hub port. The dangers associated with passage through the Malacca Strait's shallow and narrow geography was compounded by the precarious single hull, screw and rudder tanker design in use at the time[212] (whereas modern tankers are usually constructed with double hulls, twin screws, skegs and rudders for built-in redundancy in their manoeuvrability).[213] Indonesia and Malaysia insisted that fully laden vessels of 200,000 deadweight tonnes (DWT) were the largest permissible ship size, since their 20 metre draught meant that only three metres would separate their hull from the sea floor.[214] This view came at a time of tanker accidents that resulted in widespread oil pollution, such as occurred with the *Showa Maru,* which spilled 4,500 tonnes of oil into the Singapore Strait after becoming grounded in January 1975,[215] or the *Diego Silang* in 1976.[216] As a natural deep-water port favourably located adjacent to major international liner routes, it made sense that Singapore would seek to establish as small a clearance as possible. Doing so would facilitate the passage of larger (and more cost effective) bulk cargo shipments. And even though Singapore is just as vulnerable to oil spills as Indonesia and Malaysia, the island state's under keel clearance preferences suggests that maximising its interaction with global seaborne trading was the more important issue.

Just as the negotiations underpinning navigation in the Malacca Strait posed potentially negative repercussions for Singapore's ability to become a leading oil hub state, so too did the discussions in setting an under keel clearance. Singapore's facilities had been built to handle 300,000 DWT Japanese tankers.[217] A prohibitively large clearance would have prompted such very large crude carriers (VLCC) to bypass Singapore and travel along alternative sea routes such as the Lombok Strait and the Makassar Strait. Tankers would have to load 15,000 fewer tons of oil just to meet one extra meter in keel clearance,[218] which equates to 5% of a 300,000 DWT tanker's total cargo. Indeed, a difference as small as 50 centimetres—barely the diameter of a standard oil drum, which was once the primary means of transporting

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[212] Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism,' 146.
[213] See J Parunova, I Senjanovića, and C G Soaresb, 'Hull-Girder Reliability of New Generation Oil Tankers,' *Marine Structures* 20, no. 1-2 (2007).
[214] K L Koh, *Straits in International Navigation: Contemporary Issues,* Oceana Publications, New York 1982, 77, cited in Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism,' 149.
[215] See P Tangsubkul, *ASEAN and the Law of the Sea* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), 26.
[216] Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism,' 150.
[217] Ibid., 149.
[218] Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia:* 71, cited in Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism,' 150.

bulk quantities of crude and refined product—can be a deciding factor on whether an oil carrier is able to traverse the Malacca Strait (and therefore facilitate Singapore's cost competitiveness).[219] This is an important consideration when the number of crew members required to sail 'supertanker' vessels is not significantly larger than what is needed for smaller craft.[220] One report, for example, has estimated the average VLCC crew size to be between 24 and 26 people, a figure that is not unlike those of the Suezmax (22-24), Aframax (21-24) or Panamax (20-24).[221] Since these and other overhead costs can be spread more widely on larger vessels, Singapore's market appeal as an oil hub is dependent on their passage.

Singapore and Indonesia later offered three metre and four metre clearances respectively in their negotiations, and eventually settled on 3.5 metres.[222] This was subsequently acknowledged in 1977 as part of the Traffic Separation Scheme.[223] Yet it is still little wonder that Singapore claimed Indonesia's and Malaysia's preferences for a deeper clearance was a collusive attempt to reduce its commercial appeal.[224] Even many years later, Jayakumar put forward the same argument while speaking at an international conference on the Malacca Strait and Singapore Strait in 1996. The foreign minister stressed an IMO working group's findings that there was "no need […] to increase the minimum under keel clearance for vessels plying the two Straits,"[225] based on his view that safety of navigation throughout the waters remained sufficient.

The Regional Maritime Security Initiative: Singapore's need to ensure its continued access to transnational oil supplies has also taken the form of disputes on security matters, such as the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). As Chapter One outlined, Indonesia and Malaysia viewed Commander of the US Pacific Command (PACOM) Admiral Thomas Fargo's proposal for US involvement in patrolling the Malacca Strait as a deliberate attempt to permanently station military personnel in the waterway. Singapore did not initially share this view, and was

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[219] Lee, *Southeast Asia*: 73-4.
[220] Ibid., 83.
[221] Deloitte, *Challenge to the Industry: Securing Skilled Crews in Today's Marketplace*, (2011), http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_GR/gr/press/gr-pressreleases-en/45db808288cdd210VgnVCM1000001a56f00aRCRD.htm, 4.
[222] Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism,' 150.
[223] Joint Statement on Safety of Navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, 24 Feb 1977, in Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*: 205.
[224] Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia:* 67, cited in Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism,' 149.
[225] S Jayakumar, 'Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Meeting the Challenges Ahead,' *Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law*, no. 2 (1998): 430.

supportive of Fargo's initiative instead. Shortly after the RMSI announcement, Minister Teo publicly responded that all of the sea lane's stakeholders ought to be responsible for its stability: not only countries located adjacent to its coastline but those external to its region too.[226] Claiming the existing Strait security provisions that were in place were insufficient, the Minister argued that "it is an intensive and complex task to safeguard regional waters against maritime terrorism," and that "[n]o single state has the resources to deal effectively with this threat."[227] Statements of this nature have since become a hallmark of Singapore's strategic rhetoric concerning the Malacca Strait.[228] More importantly, they are often mentioned together with proclamations about the prevalence of a shared Southeast Asian interest in the sea lane.[229]

As with many of its other maritime security efforts, Singapore's RMSI support can be—and has been—attributed to its military ties with the US and within the context of its support for the Global War on Terror.[230] Other explanations in the literature can be found in its overall heightened threat perception of non-state actors at sea in the years proceeding 9/11 and its dependence on economic trade.[231] But direct US military protection of the Malacca Strait would have spread the security burden too, a trait that this chapter has already identified as characteristic of Singapore's open and inclusive maritime approach to ensuring the stability of the maritime domain, which in turn stems from its enmeshment. For a small state that had specifically built Changi Naval base with US military vessels in mind,[232] there was clear appeal for Singapore to support the RMSI. Should the initiative have eventuated, Singapore would have likely found itself with many more warships to provide bunkering services to—which again would have reinforced its energy hub position. That said, Singaporean officials' justifications for supporting the RMSI were not specific to the US. Teo emphasised a need to incorporate as many states' security contributions as

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[226] Teo, 'Keynote Address at the Opening of the 2nd Western Pacific MCMEX and DIVEX.'
[227] Ibid.
[228] For example, D Chia, 'Navies and Maritime Security - a Republic of Singapore Navy Perspective,' in *Freedom of Seas, Passage Rights and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention*, ed. M H Nordquist, T B Koh, and J N Moore (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 608.
[229] For example Jau, 'Fireball on the Water;' C H Teo, 'Opening Address at the Global Air Power Conference,' 18 Feb 2008; C H Teo, 'Speech at the Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College,' 30 Jan 2008.
[230] A T H Tan, 'Singapore: Recent Developments in Terrorism and Japan's Role,' *Asia-Pacific Review* 12, no. 2 (2005): 83-4.
[231] Storey, 'Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,' 40.
[232] A T H Tan, 'The Emergence of Naval Power in the Straits of Malacca,' *Defence Studies* 12, no. 1 (2012): 128.

possible, regardless of their locations within or external to Southeast Asia.[233] According to Second Minister for Foreign Affairs Lee Yock Suan:

> Singapore's approach has always been to work with as many countries as possible to promote the safety and security of all our sea lines of communication, including the Straits of Malacca. Such efforts have intensified in the current security climate, extending beyond piracy to counter-terrorism measures.[234]

A similar argument was developed by an unidentified official in Singapore's Defence ministry, who stated that all states with interests in the sea lane, regardless of their location, ought to contribute toward its security.[235] Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Zainul Abidin Rasheed was perhaps the most candid about relating Singapore's inclusive approach to maritime security to its oil interests. In 2006, when explaining how stakeholders positioned throughout the entire transnational oil supply chain were encouraged to take part in Strait security activities, Rasheed stated:

> We therefore welcome the Gulf countries to play a role in maritime security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, based on the open and inclusive frameworks of cooperation that we have established among the littoral states and extra-regional stakeholders. The main East Asian importers of oil from the Middle East, e.g. China, Japan, and the ROK, are already stakeholders in ensuring the security of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.[236]

Opposition from Indonesia and Malaysia meant that the RMSI never eventuated, even though the initiative offered a means to facilitate greater cohesion among coastal and user countries in protecting the sea lane: a scenario which Singapore's policy officials have a stated interest in realising. And while Singapore went on to participate with Indonesia and Malaysia in the trilateral Strait patrols that were established in response to the RMSI, its policy officials continued to endorse the initiative. Ambassador to the US Chan Heng Chee publicly reiterated Singapore's support for the RMSI some 10 months after MALSINDO Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols had been created.[237] This reveals consistency in Singapore's approach to managing the security of Middle East-East Asian oil flows, and indicates that the island state has been able to cooperate with Indonesia and Malaysia in spite of its divergent preferences.

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[233] Teo cited in 'Maritime Security in the Malacca Straits,' *Straits Times*, 26 Apr 2004.
[234] Y S Lee, 'Remarks in Parliament on Piracy in the Malacca Straits,' 11 Mar 2004.
[235] P Goodenough, 'US Plan to Secure Key Shipping Lane Upsets SE Asia,' *CNS News*, 6 Apr 2004.
[236] Rasheed, 'Remarks at the Energy and Maritime Security Break-out Group, at the 3rd IISS Regional Security Summit, Manama, Bahrain.'
[237] H C Chan, 'Remarks at the Proliferation Security Initiative Second Anniversary Event at the Department of State,' 31 May 2005.

The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia: Singapore's hosting of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) illustrates how the island state's maritime leadership aims have resulted in regional cooperation, albeit to the exclusion of Indonesia and Malaysia. ReCAAP was originally suggested by Japanese President Junichiro Koizumi in 2001 in the Brunei-hosted ASEAN Plus Three meeting. With an aim "to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia" through activities such as information exchange and capacity building among relevant stakeholders,[238] 16 states signed the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) agreement in 2004, and it was ratified and launched in Singapore in 2006.[239]

Indonesia and Malaysia expressed reservations about ReCAAP and the ISC. The two states signed but did not ratify the agreement, and have arranged only operational relationships with the initiative.[240] One reason for this can be found in threat perception differences. According to one interviewee:

> The official response is there may not be a need to join ISC because the piracy rates aren't that high in the first place, and because of this, there is no reason to secure a formal mechanism to address an issue that both Malaysia and Indonesia do not consider serious.[241]

If this is the case, then it further underscores the need to evaluate Indonesia's and Malaysia's security priorities toward the Malacca Strait, which is undertaken in subsequent chapters of this thesis. Another explanation lies in the decision to locate ReCAAP in Singapore. In fact, Indonesia had wanted to host ReCAAP in Batam,[242] and in Malaysia's view, it indirectly competed with the International Maritime Bureau

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[238] Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, 'About ReCAAP.'
[239] See J Ho, 'Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia: The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC),' *Marine Policy* 33, no. 2 (2009): 432.
[240] G Christoffersen, 'Japan and the East Asian Maritime Security Order: Prospects for Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation,' *Asian Perspective* 33, no. 3 (2009): 127. This point is also observed in Ho, 'Singapore's Perspectives on Maritime Security,' 139; Ho, 'Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia,' 433.
[241] Interviewee 1569.
[242] R Arsyad, 'Cooperation to Safeguard Shipping through the Malacca Strait,' in *Asian Energy Security: Regional Cooperation in the Malacca Strait*, ed. A Forbes (Canberra: Sea Power Centre-Australia, Department of Defence, 2008), http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/PIAMA23.pdf, 177.

and Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur.[243] As the above interviewee continued:

> I think the main reason that both parties are not members is because of competition. Initially, when the idea was floated in Japan, both Malaysia and Indonesia wanted to host the ISC, but eventually it was decided that Singapore is the host through a secret balloting process. Because of this, the two countries were not very satisfied with the outcome, so I guess it's a sign of protest to continue not to participate in ReCAAP.[244]

Again, the ReCAAP experience shows that Singapore will prioritise opportunities to be a leader in maritime security over potential disagreement with its neighbours. It has not only facilitated Singapore's ability to present itself as a capable actor and secure business destination. Engaging regional actors also offers a means to realise a greater level of sea lane security than might otherwise be achieved through its unilateral action. This does not mean that from Singapore's perspective, US involvement will necessarily take precedence over the littoral countries. An alleged leaked official cable from Singapore's US Embassy in 2007 revealed Singaporean officials' expectations that the location issue would continue to preclude Indonesia's and Malaysia's interactions with ReCAAP ISC, but also their request that the US delay its accession to the centre in the hope that the existing working ties would influence their eventual formal inclusion.[245]

Though the examples examined here illustrate that, on the whole, favourable relations have prevailed among the Malacca Strait's three littoral countries, Singapore's active leadership in respect to Middle East-East Asia oil flows has not always equated to seamless cooperation with its neighbours. From examining four instances of how Singapore's preferences toward the Malacca Strait have been at odds with Indonesia's and Malaysia's—the development of a legal regime in the Malacca Strait, the establishment of an under keel clearance, the RMSI proposal and the creation of ReCAAP—some observations can now be made about how the island state's need to manage its enmeshed energy transit position manifests as competition amid cooperation in ensuring the stability of the maritime domain. Singapore's active and inclusive approach to Strait security helps portray itself as a maritime leader and

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[243] Bateman, 'Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Indonesian Waters,' 119; Bergin, 'Maritime Cooperation,' 6.
[244] Interviewee 1569.
[245] United States of America (Embassy of the United States of America in Singapore), *Cable 07SINGAPORE249, Singapore Hosts First-Ever ARF Exercise*, (2007), http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/02/07SINGAPORE249.html.

also spreads the security burden among many actors. Doing so essentially maximises the protection of Singapore's transit oil interests, minimises its individual outlay, and concurrently perpetuates its reputation as a safe and secure business destination in the oil sector. While this point has already been made in an earlier section of this chapter, the fact that cooperation in maritime security issues proceeded despite stakeholders' divergent interests is different to Singapore's 'common interests-cooperation' claims. At the same time, Singapore's contentions regarding navigational matters were driven by economic considerations, in terms of ensuring the passage of large vessels (such as oil tankers) through the Strait to reach its shores. The fact that economic considerations could foster discontent on Singapore's part is a finding that requires more examination. It is to this theme of commercial rivalry among the littoral countries that I now turn.

The Economic Drivers of Rivalry

Singapore's competition with Indonesia and Malaysia on commercial matters related to its transit oil stake constitutes the third pattern in its maritime activities. That is, Singapore's need to maintain its leading hub position has also manifested as attempts to prevent the diversion of seaborne traffic away from its shores. Having enjoyed the status of being the region's sole hub port up until the 1990s,[246] Singapore has since been preoccupied with mounting competition from other regional ports such as Hong Kong, Kaohsiung, Busan, Shanghai and Shenzhen.[247] This concern has also been directed toward Malaysia, and somewhat in relation to Indonesia, on issues spanning port development, land reclamation and traffic diversion.

Malaysian officials, including Minister for Transport Ong Tee Keat, have been explicit that port upgrading activities—such as at Pasir Gudang located to the southeast of the Malaysian Peninsula in Johor, the Port of Tanjung Pelepas at the southwest of Johor, and Port Klang on the Malacca Strait's northern coast—are intended to compete with Singapore.[248] With Port Klang and the Port of Tanjung

[246] Syafi'i and K Kuroda, 'Container Port Competition: A Southeast Asia Case Study' (paper presented at the Ninth Conference of Hong Kong Society for Transportation Studies, 2004), 4.
[247] See Republic of Singapore (Maritime Port Authority of Singapore), 'Singapore Voted Best Seaport in Asia,' 27 Apr 2011 http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/global_navigation/news_center/mpa_news/mpa_news_detail.page?filename=nr110427.xml.
[248] 'Port of Tanjung Pelepas Poised to Compete with Singapore Port,' *Bernama*, 3 Nov 2009; F K Chang, 'In Defence of Singapore,' *Orbis* 47, no. 1 (2003): 111; N Ganesan, *Bilateral Tensions in*

Pelepas offering tariffs priced at two-thirds of Singapore's, they are becoming viable alternative transhipment locations.[249] Though not solely limited to oil trade, Malaysia's redevelopments compete with Singapore's refining and bunkering services, upon which it has depended.[250] According to Abdul Rashid Mohamad Isa Al-Qadiry (the executive chairman of the Asia Petroleum Hub, a facility slated for construction on Malaysia's reclaimed island of Tanjung Bin), doing so is a means to lessen dependence on "foreign oil companies that imported petroleum products via Singapore instead of directly into Malaysia"[251] and has potential to remove between 6-7 million metric tonnes from the island's bunker sector.[252] By avoiding double handling costs, as Johor's Chief Minister Abdul Ghani Othman has remarked, Malaysia's petroleum products will become more competitive.[253] Since maritime traffic traversing the Malacca Strait must first pass by Malaysia's major maritime and oil facilities before reaching Singapore, the possibility that its neighbour could pressure the island state "just as Shenzhen did to Hong Kong"[254] is not a prospect that Singapore's policymakers have overlooked.

Singapore's sensitivity to this competition was evident in 2001 when several of its major shipping clients, including Maersk Sealand and Evergreen Marine, moved their operations to the Port of Tanjung Pelepas,[255] the former of which lost Singapore business from handling some 1.8 million cargo containers during the 2000-2001 financial year alone.[256] On the day that the company's contract expired, Singapore allegedly "[…] screwed up [Maersk Sealand's] entire global network," by undertaking repairs to its terminal, causing incoming ships to queue in the waters surrounding

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Post-Cold War ASEAN, Vol. 9, Pacific Strategic Papers (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), 42.

[249] 'Malaysia: Port Expansion Will Challenge Singapore,' *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service*, 30 Jun 2008; A Gee, 'Port of Singapore Faces New Rival,' *BBC News*, 14 May 2002; S L Lam and W Y Yap, 'Competition among Major Ports in Southeast Asia,' *RSIS Commentaries* 94 (2008); Syafi'i and Kuroda, 'Container Port Competition.'

[250] 'Malaysia Begins Building New Oil Terminal Along Malacca Strait,' *Kyodo News*, 5 Jul 2007; 'Singapore Faces its Challengers.'

[251] 'KIC to Make M'sia Self-Reliant in Petroleum Products Storage,' *Bernama*, 11 Feb 2009.

[252] 'Singapore Faces its Challengers,' 1.

[253] 'Building of APH to Save Govt between RM150-RM200 Million in Oil Subsidy,' *Bernama*, 12 Jun 2008.

[254] L K Yew when reflecting on the Iskandar Development Region. 'Malaysia Begins Building New Oil Terminal Along Malacca Strait.'

[255] Y Ahmad, 'Singapore Losing out to its More Enterprising Neighbor,' *Business Times*, 23 Jan 2003, 20.

[256] Syafi'i and Kuroda, 'Container Port Competition,' 5.

Sentosa Island.[257] Since then Singapore has had to coax back customers through corporate and personal tax concessions, wage restraints and corporate governance incentives.[258] In 2002 the MPA allocated US$64 million over five years to establish a Maritime Cluster Fund that would strengthen its commercial interests.[259] Singapore's Green Marine Strategy has seen some success in influencing Dubai firm Drydocks World to move operations from Indonesia to Jurong.[260]

Competition is also evident in Singapore's land reclamation efforts, which since independence have grown the island's size of 580 square kilometres to some 715.8 square kilometres.[261] Malaysia has alleged that such activities constitute a deliberate strategy to narrow the Johor Strait[262]—the waterway separating the Malaysian Peninsula from Singapore—and therefore interfere with its plans to become an international shipping centre.[263] The reclamation project has caused the Johor Strait to become shallower and has exacerbated its current, which increases the difficulty for vessels to enter the Port of Tanjung Pelepas.[264] Singapore's opposition to a Malaysian proposal to replace the ageing causeway connecting the two states with a high-arched bridge and swing bridge that would allow the passage of ships to ports in its Iskandar Development Region is indicative of a similar logic.[265]

In addition, Singapore has adversely reacted to various proposals to circumvent the Malacca Strait. While discussions to construct infrastructure through Thailand's Isthmus of Kra, for instance, have existed for centuries,[266] Singaporean policy makers have been vehemently opposed to contemporary suggestions for

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[257] According to a company executive. Ahmad, 'Singapore Losing out to its More Enterprising Neighbor,' 20.
[258] Ibid.
[259] Republic of Singapore (Maritime Port Authority of Singapore), *MPA to Set up an $80 Million Maritime Cluster Fund*, (2002), http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/global_navigation/news_center/mpa_news/mpa_news_detail.page?filename=020513.xml.
[260] United Arab Emirates (Drydocks World), 'High-Level Singapore Delegation Visits Drydocks World Shipyard in Dubai United Arab Emirates,' *Drydocks World*, 27 Sep 2011 http://www.drydocks.gov.ae/en/news/high.level.sg.delegation.aspx.
[261] Republic of Singapore (Department of Statistics), 'Latest Data;' L Lim, 'Bigger Singapore from Sea and Swamp,' *Straits Times* 30 Mar 2002, cited in M Sparke et al., 'Triangulating the Borderless World: Geographies of Power in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle,' *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 29, no. 4 (2004): 494.
[262] S Goh, 'Singapore Reclamation Does Not Narrow Johor Shipping Lanes,' *Financial Times*, 22 Apr 2002, 14.
[263] J Burton, 'Malaysia Puts the Screw on Singapore over Water,' *Financial Times* 7 Mar 2002, 12.
[264] Z I Ismail, 'Attitude over Reclamation Job an Admission of Guilt,' *Business Times*, 19 Mar 2002, 36; D Taib, 'S'pore Wants Time to Study New Proposal on Water,' *Business Times* 12 Mar 2002, 2.
[265] Burton, 'Malaysia Puts the Screw on Singapore over Water,' 12.
[266] Dating as early as Thai King Narai the Great. Lehman Brothers Global Equity Research, 'Global Oil Chokepoints,' 18 Jan 2008, 12.

building a trans-isthmus bridge, canal or hydrocarbon pipeline.[267] Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was perhaps the most explicit on this matter in 2005, when alluding to a potential revenue loss from Isthmus construction projects, and claimed the matter was so important that it required the Port of Singapore Authority to monitor the situation "and make sure nobody moves its cheese away."[268] This is compounded by the fact that the Port of Singapore Authority won a tender to operate Pakistan's Chinese-built port of Gwadar, far upstream of the Malacca Strait. Though tasked with managing the port's containerised cargo, the Port of Singapore Authority has been in receipt of tax incentives that span its provision of bunkering services too.[269] Furthermore, so serious was Malaysia's proposed trans-peninsula pipeline project regarded that in 2007 Singapore halved corporate income tax requirements for oil companies as a means to retain business.[270]

Singapore's competitive tendency in its bilateral relationship with Malaysia is all too often dismissed as what President R. S. Nathan described as "occasional stresses and strains, which are inevitable between close neighbours with such intertwined histories."[271] As one policy analyst has noted, during the Mahathir Government (1981-2003) Singapore was expected to act like an *adik* (Malay for 'younger sibling') rather than an *abang* ('older brother or sister').[272] This means that when Singapore has been outspoken it is not always viewed kindly by its neighbours. Yet such "sibling rivalry"[273] explanations relying on arguments of shared experiences do not account for the relative absence of port competition with Indonesia. After all, both Singapore and Indonesia were administrated by European powers, experienced Japanese imperialism during the Pacific War and share cultural and linguistic heritage.

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[267] 'Thai Plans May Cause Congested Strait,' *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service*, 31 Dec 2003.
[268] H L Lee, 'Speech in Parliament: Singapore is Opportunity, Singapore,' 19 Jan 2005.
[269] S Fazl-e-Haide, 'Singapore Takes over Pakistani Port,' *Asia Times*, 8 Feb 2007; M Richardson, 'Full Steam Ahead for Naval Might,' *Straits Times*, 15 Jan 2009.
[270] J Marron, 'Akan Datang: Singapore to Fight to Keep Oil Hub Status,' *Platts' The Barrel*, 20 Aug 2009 http://blogs.platts.com/2009/08/20/akan_datang_sin.
[271] S R Nathan, 'Speech at the State Banquet Hosted by their Majesties the Yang-di-Pertuan Agong Tuanku Syed Sirajuddin and the Raja Permaisuri Agong Tuanky Fauziah at the Istana Negara,' Kuala Lumpur, 11 Apr 2005, transcript available in S-H Saw and K Kesavapany, *Singapore-Malaysia Relations under Abdullah Badawi* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 67.
[272] Ibid., 17.
[273] Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, *Roundtable on Singapore-Malaysia Relations: Mending Fences and Making Good Neighbours*, Trends in Southeast Asia Series (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 3.

Even though Singapore's negotiations to establish an under keel clearance in the Malacca Strait had the effect of preventing larger vessels' diversion away from the island state, Singapore does not appear to view Indonesian ports as particular rivals when transit oil is taken into account. Jakarta's Port of Tanjung Priok is not directly on the way to Singapore for international shipping traversing the Malacca Strait. In 2008, the American Association of Port Authorities ranked Tanjung Priok as 96th largest in the world for containerised cargo and bunkering sector services. Singapore topped the listing. Ong Eng Tong was not overly concerned about the fact that Kuwait and other Middle Eastern producers had begun to sell oil directly to Indonesia and not through Singapore.[274] And while Indonesia would stand to benefit if shipping was diverted away from the Malacca Strait through other sea lanes such as the Lombok-Makassar route—since this would mean that tanker traffic would pass by its own major ports (in Padang, Cilacap and Makassar) and oil refining facilities (in Cilacap and Balikpapan)—Singapore's officials have not raised such a scenario. When the issue of traffic diversion emerged after Lloyd's of London placed the Malacca Strait on its war risk zone list in 2005 to reflect the increase in piracy incidents, Peter Ho questioned the evidence behind it.[275] With respect to Singapore's stance on the Strait's under keel clearance, this suggests that it has been more worried about ensuring large tankers arrive at its own facilities than Indonesia's minor potential to coax them away.

It is evident from the above discussion that two drivers underlie Singapore's interactions toward the maritime domain. At times, Singapore's need to maintain its position as a leading hub port manifest as commercial rivalry with other supply chain stakeholders, especially where there was potential for its transit oil interests to be adversely affected. On other occasions, when Strait security issues were concerned, Singapore has gone to great lengths to promote cooperation: not only with its immediate neighbours, Indonesia and Malaysia, but with other 'user' states too. The effect of doing so is that a wide range of actors have been at hand to contribute to maritime security, and in turn protect Singapore's shipping interests. These economic and security motivations are by no means reflected in Singapore's policy stances in a

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[274] Ong remarked that:

> Singapore is still an important break-bulk centre, where traders bring in oil products by very large crude carriers, or big tankers which can carry up to 80,000 barrels, with the cargo broken down into smaller parcels for transhipment to smaller regional ports.

H L Lee, 'Singapore: Oil Trading Hub Faces Competition,' *Bunkerworld*, 6 Apr 2006.

[275] Ho, 'Speech at the Lloyd's 360 Live Debate.'

straightforward manner. As the examples of negotiating the Malacca Strait's legal status, its under keel clearance, and the RMSI and ReCAAP revealed, competition is often intertwined with cooperation. These findings are in accordance with the energy transit state framework's expectations that enmeshed states engage in a diverse range of strategies to ensure their continued access to their transnational energy supply chain interests. It also goes some way in resolving the ambiguity of how a 'high' supply chain stake can affect such enmeshed countries' posturing.

CONCLUSION

Singapore provides a useful case study for understanding how pervasive links between a state's strategic interests and a transnational energy supply chain can impact upon its worldview and policy choices. From before its independence until well past the events of 9/11, Singapore has become one of the largest energy centres and hub ports for maritime logistics in the Asia Pacific region: both of which are interwoven with its access to Middle Eastern oil flows destined for East Asia. For Singapore, its oil and related sectors represent much more than simply revenue generators, and have long offered a means to mitigate the geostrategic vulnerabilities that arise from being a small state and manage 'survival.'

Having assessed Singapore according to the expectations of an 'enmeshed energy transit state' type and found that this best accounts for Singapore's extensive involvement with oil shipments that traverse the Malacca Strait, this chapter went on to consider the implications for the island state's security interests and policy choices toward the Strait, within the context of the 'common interests-cooperation' paradigm that was presented at the outset of the thesis. Being 'enmeshed' has influenced how Singapore views the safety and security of the Malacca Strait. Its policy makers' identification of diverse potential vulnerabilities in the sea lane was consistent with the prediction that it would be sensitive to supply chain disruptions. But Singapore's specific concern for non-state actors' activities at sea, such as terrorism and piracy, was not originally forseen. Closer inspection revealed that the *Laju* experience left a mark on how Singapore prioritises security challenges and its armed forces' capability development. Indeed, its attention to the likelihood of 'floating bomb' tanker attacks to occur (a scenario that other actors have not attributed the same danger) suggests that Singapore's oil-centric threat awareness has persisted over time.

This said, the baseline assumption that an enmeshed state would be actively driven to protect its access to the transnational energy supply chain holds in Singapore's case. Its approach toward maritime security has been one of proaction along the entire shipping route between the producers located around the Arabian Peninsula and East Asian consumers, and not just within the Malacca Strait's waters. Singapore's numerous efforts to present itself as a maritime leader also resolved uncertainties over whether enmeshed states cooperate or compete, and found that economic and security factors can be powerful drivers of behaviour.

Viewing Singapore through the lens of oil thus allows a new narrative concerning its strategic posture to be fleshed out. This builds upon, and goes beyond, the prevailing explanations of small state behaviour, many of which in Singapore's case focus on its bilateral relationship with the US. Oil has had no small role in realising Rajaratnam's goal to develop Singapore into a 'Global City.' As a 'little red dot,' ensuring the security of transit oil shipments is a priority that Singapore cannot afford to ignore. Having completed the first part of a three part puzzle that aims to unpack claims that 'common interests' have driven security cooperation in the Malacca Strait, it is now necessary to evaluate Indonesia's and Malaysia's positions as energy transit states. Chapter Three and Chapter Four undertake this analysis.

CHAPTER THREE
INDONESIA: A FLEDGLING ENERGY TRANSIT STATE

When Indonesia's Shipping Law 2008 came into full effect in May 2011, vessels operated by foreign crews or holding overseas registrations were no longer permitted to service its local logistics sector.[1] This was a form of economic nationalism that strengthened Indonesia's control over its maritime domain and bolstered its merchant shipping sector. Yet it was also a national security mechanism disguised by economic justifications, since it ultimately restricted foreign flagged ships' access to the archipelago's waters.[2] The new cabotage principle is significant to Indonesia's energy transit state position. An exemption for transporting oil within its waters later had to be established, on the basis that Indonesian companies do not always have specialised equipment.[3] High profile figures, including Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, the Energy Ministry's Director General of Oil and Gas, Chairman of Indonesian oil and gas regulator *Badan Pelaksana Kegiatan Usaha Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi* (Executive Agency for Upstream Oil and Gas Activities, or BP Migas), and Minister of Transportation Freddy Numberi pointed out how the principle would adversely affect Indonesia's offshore oil activities.[4] A revised regulation that allowed foreign flagged vessels to operate in Indonesia addressed this shortcoming in 2011,

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[1] According to Chapter 5, section 2, paragraph 2, article 8:

(1) Domestic sea freight is conducted by national sea transport companies using Indonesian-flagged vessels and manned by the ship crew of Indonesian nationality.
(2) Foreign ships are prohibited from transporting passengers and/or goods between islands or ports in Indonesian waters.

Translated from the original Indonesian. See Republic of Indonesia, 'Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 17 Tahun 2008 Tentang Pelayaran,' http://www.bpkp.go.id/uu/filedownload/2/33/135.bpkp.

[2] H Dick, 'The 2008 Shipping Law: Deregulation or Re-Regulation?' *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 44, no. 3 (2008): 399.

[3] See Alfian, 'Oil Report: Q+A-Indonesia Exempts Oil and Gas Vessels from Cabotage Rule,' *Reuters*, 11 Apr 2011.

[4] B Djanuarto and Y Rusmana, 'Indonesia Waives Cabotage Rule for Oil, Gas Exploration Vessels,' *Bloomberg*, 4 Apr 2012; Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources), 'Cabotage Principle Could Not be Implemented in Oil and Gas Upstream,' 11 Mar 2011 http://www.esdm.go.id/news-archives/oil-and-gas/47-oilandgas/4252-cabotage-principle-could-not-be-implemented-in-oil-and-gas-upstream.html; *Reuters*, 'DPR Urged to Postpone New Cabotage Rule,' *Jakarta Globe*, 2 Mar 2011; Tularji and A Supriad, 'INSA: Cabotage Jangan Dikorbankan,' *Bisnis Indonesia* 4 Nov 2010.

provided that they were involved in specific activities such as offshore oil and gas surveying, drilling, construction and support activities.[5]

The dominance of a national security agenda at sea and special provisions for managing oil are thus central to understanding Indonesia's position as an energy transit state. As this thesis's second case study examining whether Middle East-East Asia oil flows influence state interests and policy choices, this chapter evaluates Indonesia's strategic policy making according to the energy transit state framework. It finds that Jakarta's oil interests have been focused on its domestic production for so long that the Malacca Strait's transit supplies hold little importance in comparison. On this basis Indonesia matches the 'fledgling energy transit state' type that was presented in Chapter One.

The central objective of this chapter is to determine what repercussions, if any, arise from the fact that Indonesia's strategic interests seem unrelated to transit oil. It does this within the context the problematic assumption that 'common interests' prompts cooperation. It begins by assessing Indonesia against framework expectations that it will have marginal concern for the Malacca Strait's security. It then evaluates Indonesia's approach toward the sea lane in relation to the framework's second prediction, that it has no transit oil-based incentive to contribute toward security of supply activities. At the heart of this discussion is an attempt to identify what factors, if not transit oil, motivate Indonesia to participate at all. To develop an answer, it is first necessary to understand what transit oil means for Indonesia.

Assessing Indonesia's Position as an Energy Transit State

Indonesia's experience in the oil sector has, in essence, been characterised by a period of intensive production followed by a long-term gradual decline. Despite having one of the largest oil reserves of all Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries,[6] Indonesia was a net exporter of oil until 2004.[7] With a refinery capacity

[5] Djanuarto and Rusmana, 'Indonesia Waives Cabotage Rule for Oil, Gas Exploration Vessels;' R R Kusuma, 'Govt Exempts Oil, Gas Vessels from Cabotage Law,' *Jakarta Globe*, 10 Apr 2011.
[6] According to the Energy Information Administration, Indonesia's reserve is 4.03 billion barrels and Malaysia is 4.00 billion barrels. United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'International Energy Statistics: Crude Oil Proved Reserves (Billion Barrels),' http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6. See also British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012' 6; International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2009*, 548.
[7] International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2009*, 539.

that is comparable to Singapore's,[8] it produces more oil than any other member state of the Association.[9] The fact that it has been the only country located in Asia to be part of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) underlines just how sizeable its oil resources are at an international level. Despite being richly endowed with hydrocarbons, Indonesia's commercial oil activities have not, at least in recent decades, enjoyed much success. It was the largest of all Asia Pacific producers until being overtaken by China after 1974.[10] Its oil sector was developed through the oversight of national oil company Pertamina (albeit with some disquiet since it was rife with corrupt business practices). As shown in Figure 5, Indonesia's oil output has fluctuated from an all-time peak during the late 1970s. Since 1991, production has fallen from an excess of 1.6 million barrels daily to less than one million (942,000) barrels as at 2011.[11] This decline of more than 600,000 barrels daily is by no means trivial. It equates to 2,450 Olympic-sized swimming pools[12] and is more than Australia's average daily oil output.[13] And although Indonesia's current production level might still seem to be a large quantity, it is nonetheless small compared to its earlier levels.[14]

[8] As at 2013 Indonesia's oil refining capacity stood at 1.0 million barrels daily compared to Singapore's 1.4 million barrels daily. United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Indonesia - Overview / Data,' 9 Jan 2013 http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=ID; United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Singapore - Overview / Data.' See also British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012' 16.
[9] British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012' 8; International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2009*, 588.
[10] 'Oil Production - Barrels,' in British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012: Historical Data.'
[11] Ibid.
[12] 'Just How Much is 60,000 Barrels of Oil a Day?' *NBC News*, 24 Jun 2010.
[13] Australia's oil production in 2011 was 484,000 barrels daily. British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012' 6.
[14] Ibid.

FIGURE 5: INDONESIA'S OIL PRODUCTION: 1965-2011



Data taken from 'Oil Production - Barrels,' in British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012: Historical Data.'

With a production decline so severe, it is not surprising that Indonesia became a net oil importer in 2004. In 2008, Jakarta suspended its OPEC membership after being unable to meet the cartel's production quota.[15] Since then it has foundered in securing foreign investment in major oil sector projects and is not a major actor in global oil trading.

Concurrently, Indonesia has been an energy transit state for most of its contemporary existence. Its independence attained Dutch recognition in 1949, several years before East Asia's postwar economic growth prompted bulk oil supplies to be delivered from the Persian Gulf. It is therefore important to consider whether Indonesia's diminished output is related to the transnational shipment of crude and refined oil through the Malacca Strait. In turn, has being an energy transit state affected Indonesia's strategic decision making? A preliminary overview of these

[15] E Djumena, 'Indonesia Resmi Keluar Dari OPEC,' *Kompas*, 10 Sep 2008.

issues can be gleaned from existing contributions about Indonesia's foreign policy posture in the international system.

Contemporary Scholarship on Indonesia's Transit State Status

Oil is usually neglected in discussions about Indonesia's foreign policy. At best are passing observations in the literature that natural resources, sometimes specified as oil, are one of the archipelagic state's many foreign policy determinants. For instance, Dewi Fortuna Anwar has pointed out Indonesia's size, large population, natural resources and culture as primary drivers.[16] Anthony L. Smith has been more specific, noting Indonesia's population and geographic size, the historical influence of the Srivijaya and Majapahit empires,[17] its advocacy of non-alignment, its budding economy and its wealth of oil and gas resources located around Sumatra and to Kalimantan's east.[18] For Leo Suryadinata, oil is Indonesia's most important income stream and has fostered the gradual liberalisation of its economy.[19] Its natural resources also underpin its decision makers' views that Indonesia will inevitably become a chief power at a global level.[20] And while Suryadinata is not alone in identifying Indonesian aims to become a principal regional (or even global) actor,[21] his view of Jakarta's foreign policy has emphasised elite perceptions over tangible factors.[22] Other than statements of this nature, little academic attention has been devoted to considering how Indonesia's oil interests might fit within the broader context of its strategic interests. As found in the Singapore case, publications about Indonesia's oil do exist, though they tend to be historical or economic in nature.[23] It is

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[16] Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN*: 19.

[17] The Srivijaya Empire lasted from 8th-14th centuries and was based around (but spread beyond) Sumatra. The Majapahit Empire endured from 1293-1520 and centred in Java and is thought to have spread to Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, Bali and areas of Borneo. A L Smith, 'Indonesia: Transforming the Leviathan,' in *Government and Politics in Southeast Asia*, ed. N J Funston (Singapore; London: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; Zed, 2001), 74. See also A L Smith, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State?' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 3 (2000): 500.

[18] Smith, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid,' 500.

[19] L Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 9-10.

[20] Ibid., 7.

[21] For example, Smith, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid,' 500.

[22] Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto*: 5.

[23] For example A Hunter, 'The Indonesian Oil Industry,' in *The Economy of Indonesia: Selected Readings*, ed. B Glassburner (Jakarta: Equinox, 2007); P Lewis, *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007);

therefore not wholly clear how important oil resources are for Indonesia's external relations.

Existing strategic policy assessments provide a clear precedent to justify filling this gap in the literature, for most publications are based around a certain feature of the archipelagic state's international affairs. Anwar and others have assessed Indonesia's external conduct within the context of ASEAN.[24] The role of Islam has been a popular research area,[25] as has Sukarno's neutrality or non-alignment.[26] Daniel Novotny explored Indonesia's elite perceptions toward the United States (US) and China in a 2010 monograph that built on Anwar's earlier consideration of whether Indonesia's foreign relations were "going West or East."[27] As commonly occurs with other states' foreign policy analyses, several studies focus on particular Indonesian governments,[28] its bilateral relations (such as with Malaysia, Singapore, the US, China, Japan and Australia),[29] or combination of the two.[30]

T N Machmud, *The Indonesian Production Sharing Contract: An Investor's Perspective* (The Hague; Cambridge: Kluwer Law International, 2000).

[24] D F Anwar, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy and ASEAN Solidarity,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 Dec 1987; Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN*; D F Anwar, 'ASEAN and Indonesia: Some Reflections,' *Asian Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 1 (1997); A L Smith, 'Indonesia's Role in ASEAN: The End of Leadership?' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 21, no. 2 (1999).

[25] D F Anwar, 'Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia,' *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* 3, no. 3 (2011); A A B Perwita, *Indonesia and the Muslim World: Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2007); R Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy* (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

[26] F P Bunnell, 'Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965 President Sukarno Moves from Non-Alignment to Confrontation,' *Indonesia*, no. 2 (1966); R Kumar, *Non-Alignment Policy of Indonesia* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1997).

[27] D F Anwar, 'Indonesia's Foreign Relations: Going West or East?' originally published in *Van Zorge Report on Indonesia* 4, no. 2 Jun 2002, reprinted in D F Anwar, *Indonesia at Large: Collected Writings on ASEAN, Foreign Policy, Security and Democratisation* (Jakarta: The Habibie Center, 2005), 85; D Novotny, *Torn Between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010).

[28] K He, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy after Soeharto: International Pressure, Democratization, and Policy Change,' *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 8, no. 1 (2008): 68; Smith, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid;' H Soesastro, A L Smith, and M L Han, eds., *Governance in Indonesia: Challenges Facing the Megawati Presidency* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto*.

[29] D F Anwar, 'Indonesia's Relations with China and Japan: Images, Perception and Realities,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 12, no. 3 (1990); I N Bakti, 'Bilateral Relations between Indonesia and the Philippines: Stable and Fully Cooperative,' in *International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism*, ed. N Ganesan and R Amer (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010); N Hamilton-Hart, 'Indonesia-Singapore Relations,' in *International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism*, ed. N Ganesan and R Amer (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010); T Kivimäki, *US-Indonesian Hegemonic Bargaining: Strength of Weakness* (Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, 2003); T L C Liang, 'Explaining Indonesia's Relations with Singapore During the New Order Period: The Case of Regime Maintenance and Foreign Policy,' *IDSS Working Papers* 10 (2001); J C Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008); B Singh, *Defense Relations between Australia and Indonesia in the Post-Cold War Era* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002); H Soesastro and

It is true that most discussions of Indonesian interactions in the international system make some mention of these factors in varying detail. An example here is Michael Leifer's 1983 publication, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*.[31] But conducting a focused inquiry into the relationship between oil and Indonesian strategy is not inconsistent with existing studies. Given that oil has been nominally recognised within the scholarship as one of Indonesia's important natural resources (and in turn as a component of its foreign policy making) and the common practice of viewing its foreign policy through the lens of a particular issue, examining the strategic consequences of transit oil for Indonesia will both develop and fit within the existing analyses.

This does not mean that existing explanations of Indonesia's foreign relations ought to be discarded. While there is some debate about the existence of 'traditions' in Indonesia's foreign policy making—whereby its own policy leaders have questioned whether it has one at all[32]—such views obscure rather than clarify attempts to understand continuity and change. Three enduring themes are evident within the literature: the *bebas aktif* (free and active) principle, the relationship between Indonesia's domestic and international politics, and patterns of policy inconsistency. Although none relate to oil at face value due to their broad strategic focus, it is worthwhile to address them here. If oil has had a role in how Indonesia conducts itself in the international system, then it would be likely to fall within their scope.

Bebas aktif is a fundamental characteristic of Indonesia's foreign policy doctrine, and means that the archipelagic state is independent in how it interacts within the international system.[33] The term emerged from the Indonesian revolution

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T McDonald, *Indonesia-Australia Relations: Diverse Cultures, Converging Interests* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995); R Sukma, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship* (London; New York: Routledge, 1999); R Sukma, 'Indonesia-China Relations: The Politics of Re-Engagement,' *Asian Survey* 49, no. 4 (2009); B Vaughn, *Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and US Interests*, (CRS Report for Congress, 2011), Available at the Federation of American Scientists web page, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32394.pdf; M L Weiss, 'Malaysia-Indonesia Bilateral Relations: Sibling Rivals in a Fraught Family,' in *International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism*, ed. N Ganesan and R Amer (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010).

[30] I Storey, 'Indonesia's China Policy in the New Order and Beyond: Problems and Prospects,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 1 (2000).

[31] M Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London; Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1983).

[32] Novotny, *Torn Between America and China*: 4.

[33] D F Anwar, 'Changes and Continuity in Indonesia's Regional Outlook,' in *China, India, Japan, and the Security of Southeast Asia* ed. C Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 211; Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*: 111; Novotny, *Torn Between America and China*: 350; Smith, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid,' 500; F B Weinstein, *The Meaning of Nonalignment: Indonesia's "Independent and Active" Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: International Relations

against Dutch administrators in 1945 and is attributed to a speech that Mohammad Hatta delivered while Foreign Minister in 1948.[34] Hatta's view of an independent Indonesia was a country that could *mendayung antara dua karang* or "row between two reefs."[35] The allusion was that as a newly autonomous state during the Cold War, Indonesia ought to manage its own affairs rather than constraining itself through alliances with either Soviet Union or US blocs.[36] As Hatta explained:

> The Government is of the opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia is should not be a passive party in the arena of international politics which does not make us the object of an international conflict but that it should be an active agent entitled to determine its own standpoint with the right to fight for its own goal—the goal of a fully independent Indonesia.[37]

Contemporary discussions continue to point out the long-term importance of a *bebas aktif* foreign policy, although it is also generally accepted that its articulation has been adapted to different circumstances over time.[38] Franklin B. Weinstein has argued that Indonesia suffers from a "dilemma of dependence" in relation to its pursuit of an independent foreign policy, while at the same time being a weak state that is reliant on other countries (usually 'Western' and more developed ones) for economic assistance.[39] Sukarno, for example, intended to make Indonesia a world leader, whereas Suharto sought to maximise its receipt of aid.[40] Rizal Sukma tracked five meanings of the principle from 1950 to 1976 based on Weinstein's previous work: in its original form to prevent a newly independent Indonesia from signing onto potentially restrictive agreements with Cold War powers; during the mid-1950s as a balancing mechanism between the two blocs; to manage economic relations with other states; to bolster Indonesian leadership against neoimperialism during the 1960s; and in a form that combined all previous interpretations during President Suharto's

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of East Asia Project, Cornell University, 1974), 4; Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence*: 161.

[34] Weinstein, *The Meaning of Nonalignment*: 6. For a detailed explanation of how *bebas aktif* emerged see R Sukma, 'The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View,' *Asian Survey* 35, no. 3 (1995).

[35] Anwar, 'Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia,' 39.

[36] T Abdullah, *Indonesia Towards Democracy*, History of Inflation-Building Series (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 309; Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN*: 18.

[37] Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*: 20.

[38] For example Anwar, 'Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia,' 38; Smith, 'Indonesia's Role in ASEAN: The End of Leadership?' 239; M Suryodiningrat, 'Time for Fourth Generation 'Bebas Aktif' to Rise,' *Jakarta Post*, 22 Dec 2011; Weinstein, *The Meaning of Nonalignment*: 5; Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence*: 161.

[39] See Chapter One of Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence*.

[40] Weinstein, *The Meaning of Nonalignment*: 9, 14; Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence*: 354-5.

New Order.[41] In 2002, Anwar made a similar reflection about the continuance of *bebas aktif* with the following analogy:

> Indonesia's foreign policy in the past has been likened to a flirtatious and pretty young girl, willing to court and be courted by many suitors, but unwilling to be tied down to anyone of them. Indonesia is no longer so young or so pretty. But as a more experienced woman of the world, she still likes to keep her options open.[42]

Are enduring notions of Indonesia's independent foreign policy and its equally longstanding oil activities interrelated? From having briefly surveyed the gradual decline of its commercial oil sector at the start of this chapter, a rudimentary parallel between the two can be made. *Bebas aktif* has fluctuated over time in terms of the dynamics of independence and dependence. So too have Indonesia's oil activities experienced periods of great output and reduced production. If such a relationship exists, then it is worthwhile considering what it looks like.

The second major theme, which is that Indonesia's internal issues are often manifested in its external posturing, indicates that there probably is a link. It is not a revelation that countries experience some interplay between their domestic and international political spheres. Elite decision makers in representative forms of government often operate in dual capacities as both national representatives as well as being locally accountable to their constituents. Indonesia is no exception,[43] and the internal-external foreign policy relationship has often been pointed out.[44] For Anwar it has meant that major changes in Indonesian Government are accorded new directions in the tone of foreign policy pronouncements.[45] As an example, decision making during President Sukarno's 'Guided Democracy' was at times an arena where competing party politics were played out, whereas the 'New Order' Government sought to ensure Indonesia's stability and economic development through

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[41] Chapter Five of Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence*, cited in R Sukma, 'Indonesia's Bebas-Aktif Foreign Policy and the 'Security Agreement' with Australia,' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 51, no. 2 (1997): 233.
[42] Anwar, *Indonesia at Large*: 92.
[43] Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto*: 5.
[44] D F Anwar, 'Indonesian Foreign Policy: Losing its Focus in 2000,' originally published in *Van Zorge Report on Indonesia* (Van Zorge Heffernan and Associates, Jakarta 2000) 2, no. 21, reprinted in Anwar, *Indonesia at Large*: 76; Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN*: 7-8; Anwar, 'Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia,' 38; Sukma, 'Indonesia's Bebas-Aktif Foreign Policy and the 'Security Agreement' with Australia,' 237; Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*: 140; F B Weinstein, *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation: An Inquiry into the Functions of Indonesian Foreign Policy* (Equinox Publishing, 2009), 10, 99.
[45] Anwar, *Indonesia at Large*: 76.

relationships with other states.[46] The overlap has also meant that Indonesia's security assessments tend to centre on internal challenges.[47] Furthermore, Novotny's study reveals that decision making elite have continued to uphold a domestic focus in how they view national security.[48]

The third theme follows on from Weinstein's dilemma of dependence in that there is an element of contradiction in Indonesia's posturing in the international system. A lack of resources has meant that Indonesia is not always able to realise what has been referred to as ambitious foreign policy aspirations. At the heart of Weinstein's dilemma is a struggle between policy pronouncements for Indonesian independence that are frequently unable to be realised in practice:

> Indonesian leaders give expression to the conflicting pressures that lead them to depend on outsiders while fearing dependence, and speak of an active policy that makes Indonesia a leader of nations while Indonesia itself finds its capacity to act as an independent nation in jeopardy.[49]

For Leifer, the archipelagic state's geography bestows a tension between territorial vulnerability on one hand and a sense of regional entitlement that arises from its size on the other.[50] According to Anwar, Indonesia has at times approached ASEAN to further its own aims in regional primacy[51] and at others maintained a low profile within the Association.[52] As an energy transit state, this raises question about whether oil enables or constrains Indonesia's policy choices in general and toward the Malacca Strait in particular. Leifer, for example, pointed out a maritime goal-capability gap in relation to Indonesia's archipelagic principle.[53]

Do the same conditions exist in its position relative to transit oil? It is likely that oil has had some implications for Indonesia's strategic decision making. After all, it is generally accepted that its domestic issues often play out in some form in its external behaviour—and Indonesia's commercial experience in oil certainly appears to have been fixated on exploiting its own resources. But Indonesia's geography and

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[46] Sukma, 'Indonesia's Bebas-Aktif Foreign Policy and the 'Security Agreement' with Australia,' 237-8.
[47] D F Anwar, 'Indonesian Domestic Priorities Define National Security,' originally published in M Alagappa (ed) *Asian Security Practice, Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1998), reprinted in Anwar, *Indonesia at Large*: 138; Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN:* 19; Anwar, 'Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia,' 38.
[48] Novotny, *Torn Between America and China*: 346.
[49] Weinstein, *The Meaning of Nonalignment*: 5.
[50] Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*: 173-4.
[51] Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN*: 7-8.
[52] Ibid., 289.
[53] Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*: 176.

location means that it is also unavoidably an energy transit state. At this stage of the analysis one can merely speculate as to whether its own oil resources or the transit oil supply chain play out in its worldview in general, or its Strait security activities in particular. A closer inspection of Indonesia's oil interests should resolve this.

The Energy Transit State Framework and Indonesia's Transit State Status

This section assesses Indonesia's position as an energy transit state in relation to the transnational supply of crude and refined oil through the Malacca Strait from producers located around the Arabian Peninsula to East Asian consumers. In accordance with the expectations of the energy transit state framework set forth in Chapter One, it begins with an examination of what transit oil has meant for Indonesia over time. From this it goes on to determine the strategic role of oil for the Indonesian government. It finds that Indonesia is a 'fledgling energy transit state' due to its low stake in the transnational energy supply chain.

Transit Oil: Transit oil has rarely been of much concern to Indonesia. In the postwar era, the Malacca Strait's prominence was not suddenly raised in Jakarta's strategic agenda just because a new trans-Southeast Asia oil supply chain was emerging. As one of the oldest producers in the world,[54] oil reserves throughout the archipelago had already been developed into production under the Dutch colonial administration. Dutch interests in crude emerged during the late 1800s when A. J. Zylker, a tobacco planter, began exploring deposits in Northern Sumatra.[55] The Royal Dutch Company later took over and in 1907 merged with English Shell Transport to become the Royal Dutch Shell Group.[56] By 1925, its operator *Bataffsche Petroleum Maatschappij* (Batavian Oil Company) controlled 95% of extracted oil output in the Netherlands East Indies.[57] At the time it ranked among the world's largest non-US oil producers.[58]

In addition to having already been invested in exploiting its own crude for more than five decades, Indonesia's oil infrastructure had been badly damaged as part of an allied resistance to imperial Japanese expansion during the Pacific War. Being

[54] Hunter, 'The Indonesian Oil Industry,' 255.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.; Shell Indonesia, 'History of Shell in Indonesia,' http://www.shell.co.id/en/aboutshell/who-we-are/history/country.html.
[57] Hunter, 'The Indonesian Oil Industry,' 256.
[58] P M Reed, 'Standard Oil in Indonesia, 1898-1928,' *Business History Review* 32, no. 3 (1958): 311.

resource poor and struggling under a US-imposed oil embargo, Japan saw an attraction in controlling the Dutch East Indies' oil assets.[59] Many facilities were located around the Palembang area in Sumatra, which at the time represented over half of the Dutch East Indies' reserves.[60] During the Battle of Palembang (13-15 February 1942), the Shell-owned BPM refinery was set alight amid Allied and Japanese fighting.[61] Dutch forces set the *Nederlandsche Koloniale Petroleum Maatschappij* (Dutch Colonial Petroleum Company) refinery on fire, which destroyed 80% of the facility.[62] In the Riau Archipelago, storage terminals were sabotaged at Bintan Island's Tanjung Uban.[63] To the Kalimantan's east, south and southeast, oil wells and other facilities at Tarakan Island, Banjarmasin and Balikpapan were deliberately damaged.[64]

This meant that by the time that East Asia's economic growth started driving bulk oil deliveries from the Middle East and through Southeast Asia's waters, Indonesia had been an autonomous state for several years. Having obtained the Netherlands' formal recognition of its 1945 declaration of independence in 1949, Jakarta immediately faced the task of repairing the damaged facilities.[65] As a newly formed country, exploiting oil was an excellent means to generate a steady source of income. This was no easy endeavour. The foreign commercial interests that had spent so long investing in developing the archipelago's oil resources did not favourably regard the prospect of changing to a state-operated system. Jakarta took steps to nationalise Dutch assets in 1957, including those in the oil sector, and thus circumvent resistance. By December that year Indonesian military personnel were posted at key facilities, the national oil company Permina (which later became Pertamina) had been established and Army Colonel Dr Ibnu Sutowo was placed at its head.[66] As such, capitalising on what became a major transnational oil supply chain linking Middle

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[59] B Dunford et al., *Pacific Neighbors: The Islands of Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia*, 2nd ed. (Honolulu, Hawaii: Bess Press, 2006), 47.
[60] P S Dull, *A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 64.
[61] G E Salecker, *Blossoming Silk against the Rising Sun: US and Japanese Paratroopers at War in the Pacific in World War II* (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole, 2010), 43.
[62] Ibid., 45-6.
[63] C S Popple, *Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) in World War II* (New York: Standard Oil Company, 1952), 260.
[64] Dull, *A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945*: 61, 62; K J Pelzer, 'Japan's Drive against the Netherlands East Indies,' *Far Eastern Survey* 11, no. 3 (1942): 38.
[65] See Hunter, 'The Indonesian Oil Industry,' 257-8.
[66] M C Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 317.

Eastern producers with East Asian consumers would have made little sense for an Indonesia that was already committed building up its local assets.

This does not mean that Middle Eastern oil has never been a consideration for Indonesia. Infrastructure projects designed to process transit supplies have been occasionally announced, yet they struggle to come to fruition. During the early 1970s there were plans to construct refining and storage facilities on Sumatra's southern point that would process Middle Eastern oil resources, as well as up to four refineries only a short distance across the Singapore Strait on Batam Island that would have had 100,000 barrels per day capacities.[67] Here, Pertamina's aim was to establish Batam Island as a competitor hub to Singapore.[68] However, this was abandoned a few years later when Pertamina experienced major financial difficulties.[69] In 1999, the United Arab Emirates' Emarat General Petroleum Corporation was reportedly considering building a bunkering port at Sabang, Aceh, which would function as a transit point for Middle Eastern crude oil.[70] The fact that there has been no public update about this facility following its initial announcement suggests that it did not progress much further.

Indonesia does not currently rely on significant quantities of Middle Eastern oil. Although Saudi Arabia has long been Indonesia's second-largest oil supplier after Singapore, imports from the former have barely fluctuated in quantity throughout the past two decades compared to the latter. Indonesia imported 4.5 million tonnes of Saudi crude and refined petroleum in 1992 compared to 5.4 million tonnes in 2011, with an average of 4.8 million tonnes annually during this period. In contrast, imports from Singapore more than quadrupled from 3.7 million tonnes to 15.4 million tonnes over the same period, and averaged 8.5 million tonnes. Saudi imports have thus been in steady decline proportionate to Indonesia's overall energy mix: having decreased from 38% of Indonesia's total crude and refined oil imports in 1992 to 12% in 2011. Even if a broad span of producers from the Middle East and Africa were taken into consideration to include Kuwait, Iraq and Iran, and even Nigeria, Algeria and Sudan (since a direct sea route from these states to Indonesia must still cross the Indian

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[67] L Howell and M Morrow, *Asia, Oil Politics, and the Energy Crisis: The Haves and the Have-Nots* (New York: IDOC/North America, 1974), 77.
[68] Lee, *Southeast Asia*: 96.
[69] D Forbes, 'Spatial Aspects of Third World Multinational Corporations' Direct Investment in Indonesia,' in *Multinationals and the Restructuring of the World Economy*, ed. M Taylor and N J Thrift, *The Geography of Multinationals* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 138.
[70] 'Indonesia: UAE's State Oil Company Wants to Invest in Sabang,' *Antara*, 15 Dec 1999.

Ocean), their combined supplies have averaged less than one-third (27%) of Indonesia's total imports since 1992.[71]

What is striking is that Indonesia has until recently sold a much greater quantity of crude oil to East Asia than all the product it received from the Middle East. Japan has been the primary recipient. Together with South Korea, China and Taiwan, the region has received some 58% of Indonesia's crude oil and refined petroleum exports between 1992 and 2011. This equates to an average of 31.3 million tonnes each year: more than triple what Indonesia buys from Middle Eastern and African states put together. Indonesia's oil production can thus be thought of having been supplementary to the transnational energy supply chain. But given Indonesia's struggles to maintain production in recent years, this arrangement is not necessarily static. Its exports to East Asia have declined from as much as 51.5 million tonnes in 1996 to just 13.5 million tonnes in 2011.[72]

Other indications of the negligible importance of the Malacca Strait's transit oil to Indonesia are evident in its infrastructure and maritime logistics.[73] While some of Indonesia's largest reserves are located throughout Sumatra, the island that makes up the Malacca Strait's southern coastline, its refineries' outputs are small. Sumatra's reserves are mostly arranged around three major basins in the island's northern, central and southern areas and include fields such as Arun, Duri and Musi.[74]

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[71] Includes gas. Calculations based on data from Table 7.3.14 in the 1996, 2000, 2003 and 2005-6 editions of the *Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia* and its equivalent, Table 14.3.12, in the 2009, 2011 and 2012 editions. Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 1996* (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 1996); Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2000* (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2000); Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2003* (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2003); Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2005-2006* (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2005-2006); Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2009* (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2009); Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2011* (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2011); Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2012* (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2012).

[72] Calculations based on data from Table 7.2.7 and Table 7.2.8 in the 1996, 2000 and 2005-6 editions of the *Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia* and their equivalents, Table 14.2.5 and Table 14.2.6 in the 2011 and 2012 editions. Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 1996*; Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2000*; Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2005-2006*; Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2011*; Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2012*.

[73] A map illustrating locations of major oil and port infrastructure in Indonesia is given in Appendix C.

[74] For detailed information regarding Sumatra's oil resources see J Clure, 'Fuel Resources: Oil and Gas,' in *Sumatra: Geology, Resources and Tectonic Evolution*, ed. A J Barber, J Milsom, and M J Crow (London: The Geological Society, 2005).

Sumatra's larger refineries are located at Pangkalan-Brandan in North Sumatra, Dumai in Riau, and at Plaju in South Sumatra, yet these only respectively produce 5,000 barrels, 170,000 barrels and 134,000 barrels daily.[75] These are small quantities when compared to the Cilacap refinery (348,000 barrels) located on the southern coast of Central Java, Balikpapan's facility (260,000 barrels),[76] or when considering that Indonesia's production in 2011 totalled slightly less than one million barrels per day.[77] In turn, even these larger establishments are dwarfed by the ExxonMobil plant in Jurong, Singapore, which produces 605,000 barrels daily—and is one of the largest refineries in the world.[78] Sumatra's oil infrastructure is not therefore sizeable in either an Indonesian or international context. A portion of Indonesia's domestic reserves is located in the general proximity of the Malacca Strait's transit supply route, but they are overshadowed by other oil interests distributed throughout the rest of the archipelago.

The expansion of Indonesia's oil ports match this spread. In contrast to Singapore, which profits considerably as a regional logistics hub for oil, containerised cargo and other commodities, none of Indonesia's major ports are located near the waterway.[79] Its largest, Jakarta's Tanjung Priok, is far from Sumatra. Facilities at Balikpapan, Surabaya's Tanjung Perak and Makassar in Sulawesi are situated much further to the east. And while Sumatra's largest port at Belawan is located at the Malacca Strait's northern entrance, it mostly exports palm oil, cocoa, coffee, rubber and plywood.[80] Instead, oil is usually shipped out of specialised facilities.[81] Of the numerous minor ports along Sumatra's northern coastline that opens onto the Malacca Strait, few handle oil. Those that do are of low capacities.[82] For example, Belawan's Citra jetty handles mineral oils, though not in great quantities.[83] Tanjung Uban's oil

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[75] Business Monitor International, *Indonesia Oil and Gas Report Q3 2012*, 70.
[76] Ibid.
[77] 'Oil Production - Barrels,' in British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012: Historical Data.'
[78] In 2010 the Jurong refinery ranked fifth-largest in the world by capacity. W R True and L Koottungal, 'Global Capacity Growth Slows, but Asian Refineries Bustle,' *Oil and Gas Journal* 108, no. 24 (2010).
[79] Interviewee 2359 stated that "there are no major ports along the coast of Sumatra. Well, there's Medan, it's not a huge port but nothing like Singapore or Port Klang or anything like that."
[80] See the web page entitled 'Statistik: Komoditi' at PT Pelabuhan Indonesia I (Persero), 'Cabang Pelabuhan Belawan: Komoditi,' http://belawan.inaport1.co.id/komoditi.htm. Accessed 24 Oct 2008 and on file with the author. See also PT Pelabuhan Indonesia I (Persero), *Annual Report: Take a Risk...* (2010), http://beta.inaport1.co.id/wp-content/uploads/annualreport2010_1.pdf, 40, 44.
[81] World Bank, 'Transport in Indonesia: Overview,' http://go.worldbank.org/PF2AFG64V0.
[82] See *Lloyd's List Ports of the World*, Vol. 1 (London: Informa, 2010), 614, 20, 45.
[83] Ibid.

jetty accommodates vessels up to 210 metres long but would be unable to receive Malaccamax ships (like Singapore can) that often exceed 400 metres.[84] Even the port of Dumai, which has 12 tanker terminals, most of which are owned by Pertamina and Caltex (six and four terminals respectively), would have difficulties servicing larger vessels. This is mostly due to the fact that vessels with drafts larger than 21 metres—such as very large crude carriers (VLCCs) and ultra large crude carriers (ULCCs)—are unable to pass through the Malacca Straits.[85] In comparison, VLCCs and ULCCs approach 200,000-300,000 deadweight tonnes (DWT) and over 300,000 DWT respectively,[86] and Caltex's crude oil wharves receive ships of up to 150,000 DWT. Pertamina's largest terminal accommodates only 100,000 DWT vessels, with the rest limited to smaller capacity tankers of up to 5,000 and 35,000 DWT.[87]

It is possible that Indonesia's transition to become a net oil importer in 2004 will eventually be followed by a greater intake of oil sourced from Middle Eastern suppliers, and there is some evidence that this is occurring. Pertamina's processing Director, Rukmi Hadihartini, has stated that the national oil company is looking for Middle Eastern producers to supply Indonesia for the next 20 years, as well as invest in new complexes.[88] In March 2013, one supplier was found. Deputy Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources, Susilo Siswoutomo, announced that Iraq had agreed to provide Indonesia with 'unlimited' amounts of crude oil for as long as 50 years.[89] Elsewhere, Saudi Aramco has signed on to be the Cilacap facility's major oil supplier.[90] Its subsidiary in Asia is exploring the feasibility of establishing a refinery in Tuban, East Java.[91] The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation has signed a memorandum of understanding to assess a prospective refinery construction project in Balongan,

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[84] Ibid.
[85] A 1976 estimate reported that 23% of vessels passing through the Malacca Strait had draft of greater than 19.7 metres. Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*: 55. The *Tateyama* VLCC, built by Nippon Oil Corporation for example is 333 metres long, 60 metres wide, 29.6 metres deep, has a draft of 20.84 metres and is described as being the maximum size to pass through the Malacca Strait. 'Nippon Oil Corp. Places Tateyama VLCC in Service,' *Oil and Gas Journal* 100, no. 45 (2002): 3.
[86] M Stopford, *Maritime Economics*, 2nd ed. (Oxon: Routledge 2005), 207, cited in Bateman, Ho, and Mathai, 'Shipping Patterns in the Malacca and Singapore Straits,' 317.
[87] See *Lloyd's List Ports of the World*, 1: 614, 20, 45.
[88] Alfian, 'Pertamina Plans Fuel Self-Sufficiency,' *Jakarta Post*, 12 Jun 2009.
[89] T S Siahaan, 'Iraq Willing to Supply an 'Unlimited' Quantity of Crude Oil to Indonesia,' *Jakarta Globe*, 19 Mar 2013.
[90] International Energy Agency and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Energy Policy Review of Indonesia*, (Paris: International Energy Agency; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008), www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Indonesia2008.pdf, 127.
[91] 'Aramco, Pertamina Mull Refining, Petrochem Project,' *Reuters*, 18 Feb 2012.

Central Java.[92] A new facility in Banten, West Java was planned with investment from Iran's Oil Refining Industries Development Company, although Tehran later withdrew its support.[93] In 2009, Indonesia's SETDCO Group revealed plans to construct a 300,000 barrels per day capacity facility on Batam that would refine Middle Eastern crudes.[94]

Refinery upgrades are also expected to have substantial supply chain stakeholder involvement—and not just from producers. In 2009 Pertamina signed an agreement with United Arab Emirates firm Star Petro Energy and Japan's Itochu Corporation to develop the Balikpapan refinery.[95] South Korea's SK Corp has also expressed interest in extending the Dumai plant.[96] These projects are expected to come online in the next few years. According to Pertamina, they aim to phase out Indonesia's oil imports in coming decades.[97]

In the meantime, Indonesia's oil shortfalls are being filled from within Southeast Asia. Singapore has continued to be Indonesia's largest oil supplier. Imports from Malaysia drastically increased from 1.7 million tonnes (4.6% of Indonesia's total oil imports) in 2005 to 6.4 million tonnes (18.5%) only two years later. Imports have since continued at this higher quantity[98] and still show that Indonesian oil needs are being satisfied from its immediate region, and not from more distant suppliers located beyond the Indian Ocean.

Oil and Indonesia's Strategic Interests: A long producing history, with geographically spread oil assets, and external trading patterns that are not centred on Persian Gulf countries, paints a picture of an Indonesia that is (for now) much more interested in its domestic oil sector than the Malacca Strait's transit oil. This does not mean that oil is unimportant to Jakarta. Indonesia is certainly not the only country that has sought to exploit its own oil reserves. But as often occurs with rentier states

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[92] 'Govt Urges Kuwait to Build Balongan Crude Oil Refinery,' *Antara*, 7 Mar 2012.
[93] R D Fadilla, 'Oil Refinery Investors to Receive Incentives,' *Jakarta Post*, 5 May 2012.
[94] 'Indonesia's SETDCO Plans 300,000 BPD Refinery in Batam,' *Reuters*, 28 Apr 2009.
[95] M V Liem and J Latul, 'Pertamina to Diversify Refinery in $1.7bn Deal,' *Jakarta Globe*, 2 Mar 2009; E Watkins, 'Pertamina Renews Plan to Upgrade Balikpapan Refinery,' *Oil and Gas Journal* (2009).
[96] I Krismantari, 'South Korea's SK Sees a Lot of Potential in Indonesia,' *Jakarta Post*, 12 Dec 2006.
[97] R Sasistiya, 'Pertamina to Cease Imports of Petroleum in 2017 after Refinery Projects are Completed,' *Jakarta Globe*, 14 Jul 2009.
[98] Indonesia's crude oil and refined petroleum imports from Malaysia amounted to 5.5 million tonnes in 2008, 4.9 million tonnes in 2009, 6.6 million tonnes in 2010 and 5.2 million tonnes in 2011. Table 14.3.12 in Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2009*; Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), *Statistik Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2012*.

endowed with large hydrocarbon deposits, the revenue generated from oil has been central to furthering Indonesia's elite political interests, and not always in a manner favourable to its constituents. This is evident foremost in the conduct of Pertamina, national declining production and the hazards of maintaining fuel subsidies. These factors indicate how oil is at times a political and financial burden to Indonesia.

After Permina merged with Pertamin to become Pertamina in 1968, the company (and sole overseer of Indonesia's oil and gas resources) embarked on what became Indonesia's most severe case of maladministration in its history. Despite being established on paper to benefit the Indonesian people,[99] Pertamina's activities under Sutowo's leadership were rife with corruption. It has been described as "a virtual fiefdom controlled by a former military general" and President Suharto's biggest revenue generator.[100] Financial records were exempt from public scrutiny. Tendering practices were exclusive to favoured parties. Revenue was used to further elite officials' personal positions and support President Suharto's military regime,[101] with only a fraction reaching government coffers.

Despite its suspect business activities, Pertamina grew to become a giant oil conglomerate that had its own oil drilling equipment, fleet, retail outlets and refineries.[102] It had the power to 'make or break' projects. In 1973, Pertamina completed the construction of Jakarta's Veteran's Building in nine months, a project which had struggled for the previous nine years. Pertamina's money was the likely factor as to why it succeeded. Sutowo himself even justified the dubious practices, exclaiming, "[w]hat is the complaint? My management is getting results. If I am corrupt, and can get results like this, then Indonesia needs corruption."[103]

From 1970 the suspect practices were targeted as part of the Presidential-sponsored Commission of Four review into corruption, but few substantive outcomes. Pertamina's business practices became publicly apparent in 1975 when the company

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[99] Howell and Morrow, *Asia, Oil Politics, and the Energy Crisis*: 76.

[100] *Jakarta Post* 1999 and Y Chua 1999 cited in N Korte, 'The Nexus between Economic Rents and the Persistence and Change of Neopatrimonialism: Evidence from Indonesia' (paper presented at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies Neopatrimonialism in Various World Regions Workshop, Hamburg, Germany, 23 Aug 2010).

[101] F S S E Seda, 'Petroleum Paradox: The Politics of Oil and Gas,' in *The Politics and Economics of Indonesia's Natural Resources*, ed. B P Resosudarmo (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 180.

[102] C McPherson and S MacSearraigh, 'Corruption in the Petroleum Sector,' in *The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level*, ed. J E Campos and S Pradhan (Washington: World Bank, 2007), 202.

[103] I Sutowo, speech at *Cinta I* dedication, 23 Oct 1970, Pertamina Public Relations Brochure, Jakarta, cited in Howell and Morrow, *Asia, Oil Politics, and the Energy Crisis*: 78.

faced bankruptcy after being trapped in a vicious cycle of taking out short-term international loans that perpetuated its burgeoning debt. At this stage, Pertamina's debt equated 30% of Indonesia's gross domestic product (GDP).[104] The Indonesian Government took over its defaulting loans and tightened state agencies' abilities to take out loans in order to preserve its credit rating.[105] It was only in the *reformasi* (reformation) period after Suharto was no longer in power that the full magnitude of the financial problems were uncovered.[106] One investigation conducted in 2003 found that Suharto and his associates shared US$1.7 billion of Pertamina's finances.[107] Another account estimates that Pertamina lost US$4.69 billion between April 1996 and March 1998 due to unauthorised activities including embezzlement and illegal commissions.[108] The 2001 *Oil and Gas Law* (Law 22/2001) restructured Pertamina and reallocated its policy, licensing, and regulatory responsibilities to agencies such as BP Migas and *Badan Pengatur Hilir Minyak dan Gas Bumi* (Regulating Agency for Downstream Oil and Gas, or BPH Migas).[109]

Indonesia's oil sector has not been problem free even after decentralisation. Indonesia suspended its cartel membership in 2008 after years of struggling to meet its OPEC oil quotas. Technical issues, low investments rates, ageing oil fields and deteriorating infrastructure have continued to trouble its oil output. The Duri field's production, which began in 1958, is reportedly now in decline.[110] The Minas field (discovered in 1944 and operational since the 1950s) was once the largest producing fields in Southeast Asia but its continued viability as an international benchmark for

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[104] P McCawley, 'Some Consequences of the Pertamina Crisis in Indonesia,' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 33, no. 1 (1978), cited in Seda, 'Petroleum Paradox,' 181.
[105] C O Khong, *The Politics of Oil in Indonesia: Foreign Company-Host Government Relations*, LSE Monographs in International Studies (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 169-70; E Salim, 'Trends in the Indonesian Economy,' in *Trends in Indonesia II: Proceedings and Background Paper*, ed. L Suryadinata and S Siddique (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), 104.
[106] M Kobonbaev 2006, B Glassburner 1976, J A C Mackie 1970, 'Indonesia: Perils of Pertamina' 2003, Oxford Analytica 2000, K Muljadi 2002 and V Hari 2004, cited in McPherson and MacSearraigh, 'Corruption in the Petroleum Sector,' 202.
[107] Ibid.
[108] *Jakarta Post* 1999 and Y Chua 1999 cited in Korte, 'The Nexus between Economic Rents and the Persistence and Change of Neopatrimonialism.'
[109] International Energy Agency and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Energy Policy Review of Indonesia*, 38, 43.
[110] A N Lasman and M D Isnaeni, 'The EOR System in Duri: Comparison between Conventional and Non-Conventional Systems,' in *High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor Technology Development* (Johannesburg: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/te_988_prn.pdf, 387; United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Indonesia,' 9 Jan 2013 http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ID.

heavy crude oils is now uncertain.[111] That the output of Indonesian wells decreases by between 10% and 15% each year[112] is no small matter, for the national budget loses US$322 million in revenue for every fewer 100,000 barrels of oil produced.[113] Oil revenue contributed to as much as 70% of Indonesia's annual budget during the 1960s and 1970s, yet only one-quarter in 2005.[114] So serious was the revenue loss that in 2009 Jakarta began selling off its crude oil stocks to offset its decreased oil output.[115] Malfunctions in production facilities have been costly too. A gas pipeline leak near Duri in October 2010 meant that Chevron Pacific lost 200,000 barrels worth of refining capacity across one thousand wells while it was repaired.[116] Though Chevron denied that the leak affected production, Jakarta claimed it was a major reason underlying its inability to realise production goals.[117] In addition, BP Migas' existence was found to be unconstitutional during a review of Law 22/2001. On 13 November 2012, the Constitutional Court of Indonesia declared that it would be immediately dissolved.[118]

The following high profile dispute underlines just how important the Indonesian government values control over its oil resources. In 2001 ExxonMobil discovered the Cepu oil field using 3D seismic equipment in a block that Pertamina had previously given up.[119] Cepu is so large—containing an estimated 600 million barrels—that it was predicted to boost Indonesia's production by 20% and restore the country's net oil exporter status.[120] Claiming that the field necessitated government oversight,

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[111] See M Demongeot, 'Indonesia Oil Marker under Scrutiny as Minas Shrinks,' *Reuters*, 21 Jul 2008.
[112] 'Indonesia Unlikely to Meet Crude Output Targets in 2009 and 2010,' *Oil and Gas News*, 3 Jan 2010.
[113] According to Anggito Abimanyu, the Finance Ministry's head of fiscal policy. E Watkins, 'Producers Forecast Decline in Oil, Natural Gas Production from Indonesia Operations,' *Oil and Gas Journal* 106, no. 35 (2008): 47.
[114] F Tumiwa, 'Speech at the RSIS Regional Workshop on Energy and Non-Traditional Security, Grand Copthorne Waterfront Hotel, Singapore,' 28 Aug 2008.
[115] M Ali, 'Update 2-Indonesia to Release 7 Mln Bbls Crude Stocks in Nov,' *Reuters*, 6 Oct 2010.
[116] 'Sumatra Pipeline Leak Hits Indonesian Oil Output,' *Jakarta Globe*, 2 Oct 2010.
[117] R R Kusuma and Reuters, 'Indonesian Government Says Oil Target out of Reach Due to CPI Stoppage,' *Jakarta Globe*, 3 Nov 2010; I M Sentana and D Sudrajat, 'Chevron Indonesia: Pipeline Leak Not Affecting Crude Output in Riau,' *Dow Jones Newswires*, 28 Oct 2010.
[118] For a discussion of this decision, see Latham and Watkins, 'The Dissolution of BPMIGAS — Impact and Consequences,' *Client Alert*, no. 1435 (2012).
[119] E Davies and M Urquhard, 'RPT-Factbox-Exxon Mobil's Huge Cepu Oil Field in Indonesia,' *Reuters*, 29 Jul 2009; D I Hertzmark, *Pertamina Indonesia's State-Owned Oil Company*, The James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University (2007), 39.
[120] B Guerin, 'Indonesia Opens a Gusher,' *Asia Times*, 17 May 2006.

Hence, Pertamina embarked on a "naked asset grab"[121] which after protracted disagreement culminated with ExxonMobil's signing onto a 30 year production sharing contract.[122] Pertamina's stranglehold on the Indonesian oil sector may have been dealt with but Jakarta maintains a watchful eye on production. In 2012, for instance, BP Migas demanded that ExxonMobil increase Cepu's oil output from 20,000 barrels daily to 25,000 barrels daily so as to reach national goals.[123]

Production has also diminished from a central government perspective following the secession of hydrocarbon rich provinces. Jakarta's relinquishment of administering Aceh in 2005 and Timor-Leste's independence in 2002 halted its receipt of their oil revenue. These are not trifling amounts. Timor-Leste's Petroleum Fund (which was established to manage the income generated by exploiting the Timor Sea's hydrocarbon resources) had accrued US$4.75 billion as at March 2009.[124] At the end of March 2013, it totalled US$13 billion.[125] Aceh's oil production had contributed to as much as 20% of Indonesia's annual budget.[126] This is lost revenue for Jakarta ever since signing the Peace Agreement with the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM) in 2005. According to Clause 1.3.4 of the Agreement, Aceh retains 70% of the revenues generated from current and future hydrocarbons produced in the territory.

Despite the announcement of major multinational oil projects in Indonesia, many have missed development deadlines.[127] A complicated regulatory environment and poor infrastructure has meant that Indonesia faces difficulty in securing investment.[128] While Jakarta has sought to stimulate the oil sector by lowering tariffs for importing equipment,[129] improving exploration regulations,[130] and establishing tax

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[121] W Arnold, 'Indonesia Takes a Tortuous Path to Oil,' *New York Times*, 19 Feb 2004; W Arnold, 'Indonesian Leader Acts to Break Exxon Deal Impasse,' *New York Times*, 19 Aug 2005; Hertzmark, *Pertamina Indonesia's State-Owned Oil Company*: 39.
[122] 'Pertamina, ExxonMobil Reach Cepu Deal,' *Jakarta Post*, 14 Mar 2006.
[123] R R Kusuma, 'BPMigas Orders Exxon Mobil to Raise Output,' *Jakarta Globe*, 4 Jan 2012.
[124] T Rasmussen, *Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste: Selected Issues*, (International Monetary Fund, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09220.pdf, 5.
[125] Central Bank of Timor Leste, 'Quarterly Report: 31 Mar ,' no. 31 (2013), http://www.bancocentral.tl/Download/Publications/Quarterly_Report31_en.pdf.
[126] Project Ploughshares, *Armed Conflict* 2000, cited in F Berrigan, *Indonesia at the Crossroads: US Weapons Sales and Military Training*, (Arms Trade Resource Center, World Policy Institute, 2001), http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/indo101001.htm.
[127] For an outline of proposed refining capacity expansions see Business Monitor International, *Indonesia Oil and Gas Report Q3 2012*, 71.
[128] See United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Indonesia.'
[129] 'Indonesia to Give Incentives to Oil, Gas Sector,' *Xinhua*, 18 Dec 2007.

incentives for exploration[131] and refining,[132] calls continue to be made for an improved business environment.[133]

Government spending on fuel subsidies has compounded declines in oil revenue. Indonesia is the fifth-largest oil consumer in the Asia Pacific following China, Japan, India and South Korea,[134] where 63% of its national energy consumption is estimated to be oil.[135] In 2008 the International Energy Agency (IEA) ranked Indonesia as the seventh-largest energy subsidiser in the world and the fourth-largest in terms of oil price offsets only.[136] A rising Indonesian middle class that consumes greater quantities of fuel has meant that the policy has become increasingly costly over time. Mineral fuel subsidies exhausted one-fifth of the state budget in 1965.[137] In 2005 world oil prices spiked to reach US$60 per barrel and Jakarta's expenditure grew from US$8 billion to US$14 billion. As Indonesian policy analyst Jusuf Wanandi put it, this meant that one-quarter of the national budget was spent on oil subsidies that year.[138] When oil barrel prices jumped to as much as US$140 in 2008 it cost the Indonesian Government an additional US$33 billion in payments.[139] Even shortly after President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono took steps to eliminate subsidies in 2005, the government outlay still equalled 10% of its tax revenue.[140] And in June 2013, when petrol prices were approved to be raised by 44%, subsidies were still expected to cost 13% of government revenue and not improve the budget

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[130] 'Oil Exploration: New Incentives,' *East Asian Executive Reports* 14, no. 11 (1992); 'Indonesia Offers Incentives for Investors in Energy Fields,' *Antara*, 10 Oct 2012.
[131] 'Govt Gives Incentives to Oil Exploration Companies,' *Antara*, 5 May 2010.
[132] See 'Update 1-Indonesia Offers Tax Incentives for Oil/Energy,' *Reuters*, 14 Oct 2008.
[133] 'Govt Should Focus on Oil, Gas in Encouraging Investment: Observer,' *Antara*, 18 May 2005; 'Editorial: Bolstering Oil Investment,' *Jakarta Post*, 7 May 2009; 'Aramco Wants More Incentives from Asia,' *Oil and Gas News*, 21 Sep 2010; 'Taiwan State-Run Oil Firm Mulls Investment in Indonesia,' *Asia Pulse*, 13 Oct 2010; M Ali and E Davies, 'Indonesia Urges Pertamina to Build New Refineries,' *Reuters*, 12 Feb 2009; A S Azwar, 'Govt to Rebuff Incentive Proposal for Oil Refineries,' *Jakarta Post*, 20 May 2013.
[134] British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012' 9.
[135] E Prasetyono, 'Energy Security: An Indonesian Perspective,' in *Energy Security: Visions from Asia and Europe*, ed. A Marquina (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 216.
[136] International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2008*, (Paris: International Energy Agency), http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2008-1994/weo2008.pdf, 62.
[137] A Budiman and H Soesastro, 'Pendahuluan,' in *Pemikiran dan Permasalahan Ekonomi di Indonesia dalam Setengah Abad Terakhir: Ekonomi Terpimpin (1959-1966)* ed. H B Soesastro (Jakarta: Penerbit Kanisius, 2005), 15-9, cited in C Beaton and L Lonton, *Lessons Learned from Indonesia's Attempts to Reform Fossil-Fuel Subsidies* (Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2010), 2.
[138] J Wanandi, *Global, Regional and National: Strategic Issues and Linkages* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 454.
[139] S B Yudhoyono, 'Sambutan Pada Acara Silaturrahim Dengan Tokoh Masyarakat Provinsi Kepulauan Bangka Belitung Sungai Liat,' 1 Aug 2008.
[140] United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Indonesia.'

defecit.[141] Though calls for further reductions continue to be made,[142] it remains a contentious policy: not only for the economic costs mentioned above, but for its political ramifications too.

Radical changes to Indonesia's energy sector have often been associated with a change in government. When President Sukarno lost power in 1965 it was against a backdrop of economic crisis, where inflation was as high as 500%[143] and 'Western' countries had stopped purchasing Indonesian oil due to concerns about the prevalence of communist ideology.[144] The end of the Suharto Presidency in 1998 developed partly as a hangover from oil price hikes triggered during the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis.[145] Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund's emergency aid required Suharto to scale down commodity subsidies.[146] The resultant price hikes of kerosene (by 25%), diesel (60%) and petrol (71%) saw mass riots throughout the archipelago including in Yogyakarta, Bandung and Medan.[147] Indeed, protests usually ensue whenever higher oil prices are announced.[148] In 2003 President Megawati Sukarnoputri cancelled a proposed fuel price hike in the face of public demonstrations.[149] In late March 2012, Jakarta's House of Representatives was defaced with graffiti[150] and other protests were held throughout the archipelago in Ambon, Medan, and Surabaya prior to a Parliamentary vote that would decrease the price offset.[151] In this respect, it is understandable why Wanandi referred to Yudhoyono's steps to remove subsidies in 2005 as "a brave act."[152] In this sense, then, oil has been a political liability to the central government.

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[141] 'Unprimping the Pump: Sound Economics but Lousy Politics,' *Economist*, 22 Jun 2013.
[142] S K Zainuddin, 'Indonesia's Fuel Subsidy Must Be Cut, Top Economists Say,' *Jakarta Globe*, 3 Apr 2012.
[143] D Kingsbury, *South-East Asia: A Political Profile* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2005), 357, cited in S Pallone, 'Indonesia's Oil Crisis: How Indonesia Became a Net Oil Importer,' *Journal of International Policy Solution* 10 (2009), http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/025/9207.pdf, 2.
[144] B Smith, *Hard Times in the Land of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2007), cited in Pallone, 'Indonesia's Oil Crisis,' 2.
[145] 'Indonesia Clashes over Fuel Hike,' *BBC News*, 1 Oct 2005.
[146] Hertzmark, *Pertamina Indonesia's State-Owned Oil Company*: 18.
[147] Beaton and Lonton, *Lessons Learned from Indonesia's Attempts to Reform Fossil-Fuel Subsidies*: 4.
[148] Wanandi, *Global, Regional and National*: 454.
[149] Global market pressure nonetheless prompted price increases later that year. 'Editorial: The Fiscal and Trust Deficit,' *Jakarta Post*, 4 Apr 2012.
[150] Zainuddin, 'Indonesia's Fuel Subsidy Must Be Cut, Top Economists Say.'
[151] 'Indonesians Protest against Fuel Price Hike,' *Agence France-Presse*, 28 Mar 2012; 'Indonesians Protest Fuel Price Rise before Parliament Vote,' *Reuters*, 27 Mar 2012; D Leonard, 'Polda Maluku Siagakan 1.000 Personil Amankan Demonstrasi,' *Antara*, 29 Mar 2012.
[152] Wanandi, *Global, Regional and National*: 454.

Indonesia can therefore be described as being a 'fledgling energy transit state' on the basis that its oil interests are vested in its own energy resources rather than the Middle East-East Asia transnational energy supply chain. Indonesia's rich history in exploiting its oil reserves—which has experienced periods of great success and an ongoing gradual downturn—has often encountered political, economic and social repercussions, many of which have been associated with its elite decision makers. And though it is not clear whether Indonesia's oil sector will someday recover, or if the archipelagic state will become more dependent on Middle Eastern oil, the country will continue to possess substantial oil reserves regardless of how well they are extracted.

Some observations can now be made about how oil might be related to Indonesia's strategic policy making. First, given the importance that Indonesia attaches to its domestic oil sector and that its internal issues are often reflected in its external conduct, it is not a stretch to expect that its oil interests, even if not grounded in transit oil shipments, would have some implications for its policy choices at an international level. Second, Indonesia's transformation from a net oil exporter to a net oil importer is not unlike Weinstein's dilemma of dependence. On the one hand Indonesia has long held the prestigious title of being the largest oil producer in its immediate region. On the other hand its declining production has necessitated a greater reliance on external fuel sources. The independence-dependence dichotomy that has been central to Indonesia's approach to international politics is thus reflected in its oil sector too. Third, Pertamina's corrupt conduct has meant that intentions to exploit hydrocarbons for the benefit of the Indonesian people have fallen short. This, too, is reminiscent of Indonesia's difficulties in realising what are sometimes ambitious policy objectives. With these factors in mind, Indonesia's oil sector certainly appears to be an important (if not overlooked) component of its strategic outlook.

INDONESIA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE MALACCA STRAIT

Having established that Indonesia has a low stake in the transit oil supply, its approach to protecting the Malacca Strait can now be examined. Chapter One identified two main expectations about fledgling energy transit states in relation to the thesis's 'common interests-cooperation' puzzle. This section examines the first of

these, namely, that such states exhibit little concern about security issues facing the transnational energy supply chain. In other words, since Middle East-East Asia oil flows through the Strait have had at best marginal relevance to Indonesia, the energy transit state framework predicts it would not regard potential threats in its waters as major problems. The following discussion evaluates whether this expectation holds.

The fact that Indonesia has not made arguments (like its neighbours Singapore and Malaysia) that Southeast Asian states have a 'common interest' in protecting the sea lane would suggest that the framework's prediction is correct. Yet judging from Indonesia's policy pronouncements, it is well aware of security challenges at sea. For instance, Indonesia's strategic documents routinely acknowledge the maritime domain's importance. The Defence 2003 White Paper states that "sea security is vital to Indonesia."[153] According to its 2008 successor, maritime security is one of the most prominent regional security issues receiving attention in the 21st century.[154]

Indonesia is an archipelagic state, so these statements should not come as a surprise. A closer look at its strategic policy pronouncements reveals that certain issues in the Strait are prioritised over others. The two Indonesian White Papers observe a number of security challenges at sea, though they tend to favour ones linked to border security. The 2003 White Paper lists non-traditional threats including ship hijacking, piracy and terrorism, but much more attention is devoted to what it refers to as 'sovereignty threats' such as illegal fishing, immigrants, resource exploitation, treasure taking and arms smuggling.[155] The Malacca Strait too, while identified, is not considered in a security context. Instead, it is seen in relation to Indonesia's unresolved territorial borders with Malaysia and Thailand.[156] This is consistent with how one interviewee described Indonesia's interests in maritime security, stating that "from Indonesia's point of view the most important maritime threat is smuggling and

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[153] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Defence), *Defending the Country Entering in the 21st Century*, (Jakarta: Indonesia (Ministry of Defence), 2003), Available through the National Defence University Military Education Research Library Network, http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Indonesia WhitePaper.pdf, 30; Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Defence), *Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21*: 42.
[154] Republic of Indonesia (Department of Defence), *Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia*: 16.
[155] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Defence), *Defending the Country Entering in the 21st Century*, 30-1; Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Defence), *Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21*: 43.
[156] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Defence), *Defending the Country Entering in the 21st Century*, 24-5; Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Defence), *Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21*: 34-6.

illegal fishing, to which they lose billions of dollars a year."[157] It was also what Chief of the *Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut Republik Indonesia*, or Indonesia Maritime Security Coordinating Board (BAKORKAMLA, or IMSCB) Laksdya Didik Heru Purnomo mentioned in 2010 when asked about the major threats facing Indonesia's maritime security. He cited marine resource management and illegal activities such as theft and license misuse, and not the piracy or terrorism threats so emphasised by neighbouring littoral states.[158] And although the 2003 Defence White Paper does make reference to maritime terrorism—a threat that Singapore so often stresses—it is only in passing.[159] Given the importance of Islam in Indonesia, whereby 87% of the population identify as Muslim,[160] and the increase of extra-regional states linking Islam to terrorist activity in the aftermath of 9/11, it is understandable that Jakarta would be wary of supporting counter-terrorism policies.

The 2008 Defence White Paper also acknowledges several non-traditional security threats relevant to the maritime domain. Again, though piracy is recognised, there is an underlying sense of its relationship to the policing of contraband goods:

> The types of seaborne and airborne security threats receiving priority attention in the administration of national defence include hijacking or piracy, arms smuggling, ammunition and explosives or other materials that could endanger national safety, illegal fishing, property theft at sea, as well as environmental pollution.[161]

While the Malacca Strait was dealt with much more extensively in the 2008 document than its 2003 predecessor, the nature of the discussion remains limited as far as consideration of non-traditional challenges are concerned. Granted, the opening paragraphs that discuss the sea lane detail trilateral naval patrols, yet the document returns to territorial issues to conclude that border security management has become

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[157] Interviewee 2359.

[158] Republic of Indonesia (Embassy of Indonesia in Australia), 'Transkrip Program Radio Kookaburra: Kerja Sama Keamanan Perbatasan,' Oct 2010 http://www.indonesia.embassy.gov.au/jaktindonesian/RS101052.html.

[159] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Defence), *Defending the Country Entering in the 21st Century*, 57; Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Defence), *Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21*: 43.

[160] According to Indonesia's 2010 population census, 87% of the resident population aged 15 and over identifies as Muslim. This compares to 15% of Singapore's population. See Table 07.9 in Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), 'Population of Indonesia: Result of Indonesia Population Census,' 2010, http://www.bps.go.id/hasil_publikasi/pddk_ind_sp2010/index3.php?pub=Penduduk Indonesia Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010 (Result of Indonesia Population Census 2010); Republic of Singapore (Department of Statistics), 'Census of Population 2010: Statistical Release 1 on Demographic Characteristics, Education, Language and Religion,' 12 Jan 2011, http://www.singstat.gov.sg/news/news/press12012011.pdf.

[161] Translated from the original in Indonesian. See Republic of Indonesia (Department of Defence), *Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia*: 31.

one of Indonesia's national defence interests, especially with neighbouring countries.[162]

Indonesia's apparent focus away from unconventional maritime security issues is also evident in its tendency to downplay such potential vulnerabilities at sea. Where Chapter Two discussed Singapore's near overstatement of strategic weaknesses in the sea lane—and especially piracy and maritime terrorism—Indonesia has been much more muted. One interviewee commented that Indonesia does not view the threats of piracy and maritime terrorism to the same degree as Singapore.[163] This is illustrated in the Indonesian policy elites' ongoing dissatisfaction with piracy reporting methods, especially when they were voiced while the frequency of incidents was quite high (according to the Kuala Lumpur-based International Maritime Bureau, or IMB).[164] In response to piracy data that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) released in 2003, Minister for Transport Tjuk Sukardiman protested that the figures were inflated because of a definitional disagreement of what constituted an act of piracy.[165] This objection is also evident in the 2003 Defence White Paper, which disputed the IMB's number of reported piracy incidents. Where the IMB claimed that 91 of the 213 incidents reported during 2001 in Asia and the Indian Ocean occurred within Indonesian territory, the White Paper listed only 61 cases. It did, though, acknowledge that discrepancies aside, the figures warranted greater attention to security challenges at sea.[166]

Other examples underline the White Paper's contention. In 2004 Navy Chief Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh argued that IMB figures were "exaggerations,"[167] and that only four piracy incidents occurred in Indonesian territory that year—not the IMB's figure that exceeded 100.[168] Furthermore, Sondakh also remarked that "[there] is a grand strategy to paint a bad picture over our waters, as if the Indonesian navy is

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[162] Ibid., 143.
[163] Interviewee 1569.
[164] The frequency of piracy incidents in Southeast Asia peaked after the Asian Financial Crisis. In 1993, there were 10 reported attempted and actual attacks in Indonesia and 5 in the Malacca Strait. In 2003, 121 were reported in Indonesia, with 28 in the Malacca Strait. Attempted and actual attacks in the sea lane peaked in 2000, with 75 incidents reported. International Chamber of Commerce (International Maritime Bureau), *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report: 1 January - 31 December 2001*, 5; International Chamber of Commerce (International Maritime Bureau), *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report: 1 January - 31 December 2006*, (Essex 2006), 5.
[165] 'Indonesia Disputes IMO Report,' *Business Times*, 14 Jul 2003.
[166] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Defence), *Defending the Country Entering in the 21st Century*, 22; Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Defence), *Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21*: 32.
[167] A Sukarsono, 'Indonesia Being Tested over Malacca Strait-Report,' *Reuters*, 19 Jul 2004.
[168] Watkins, 'Facing the Terrorist Threat in the Malacca Strait.'

not strong and the crimes at sea are increasing."[169] This stance was later echoed by BAKORKAMLA Chief Executive Vice-Admiral Djoko Sumaryono in 2006 when commenting that the IMB's data forces Indonesia into a corner when addressing Strait security issues.[170] In 2007, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda publicly rejected IMB descriptions of the Malacca Strait as a "dark area" for crime and suggested international shipping companies fostered such views.[171] Admiral Slamet Soebijanto raised this sentiment again when he claimed that newly released IMB figures were a ploy by "foreign interests" that sought to secure the sea lane. Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono also contested its 42 reported incidents in the Malacca Strait, and argued that government statistics noted just two incidents instead.[172] Director General of Maritime Transportation Harijogi questioned the IMB's data gathering and definition of piracy, and stated that its figures would discredit Indonesia.[173] In 2010 the executive director of the Indonesia-based think tank Global Future Institute went as far to call the IMB a "British stooge" which "encouraged Singapore and Malaysia to exaggerate various acts of piracy committed by terrorists [sic] groups from Aceh in the Malacca Strait."[174]

Indonesian policy makers do not appear to have quite made such extreme statements. They have, however, suggested that the Global Financial Crisis could prompt an increase in unauthorised activities such as piracy in the Strait[175] and have continued to suspect the integrity of external actors' data. During field research for this thesis the author found anecdotally that Indonesian interviewees viewed data relevant to the archipelagic country's maritime sector which had originated from non-Indonesian sources as misleading. The rationale offered was that Indonesia's own lack of statistics was incentive for others to create their own—usually inaccurate—information.

Piracy is not the only challenge facing the Malacca Strait that Indonesia's policy makers have sought to downplay. Though Singapore has devoted extensive efforts to

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[169] Sukarsono, 'Indonesia Being Tested over Malacca Strait-Report.'
[170] 'BAKORKAMLA: IMB Kerap Pojokkan Indonesia Soal Keamanan di Selat Melaka,' *Antara*, 29 Dec 2006.
[171] 'RI Foreign Minister Denies Malacca Strait is "Dark Area,"' *Antara*, 11 May 2007.
[172] M N Yusoff, 'Indonesia Refutes IMB Data on Piracy in Melaka Strait,' *Bernama*, 10 May 2007.
[173] 'Pemerintah Minta Klarifikasi Data Pembajakan Kapal,' *Kompas*, 16 Jul 2007.
[174] Hendrajit, 'Singapore, Malaysia and Britain Exaggerate Acts of Piracy in Malacca Strait,' Global Future Institute, 6 Apr 2010 http://www.theglobal-review.com/content_detail.php?lang=en&id=1609 &type=8.
[175] 'Indonesian Navy Says Credit Crunch Will Lead to Rise in Piracy,' *Agence France-Presse*, 25 Nov 2008.

address the potential threat from maritime terrorism, it does not appear to have garnered much interest from Indonesia.[176] According to Ansyaad Mbai, the Head of the Antiterrorism Coordinating Desk of the Minister for Political, Legal and Security Coordination, maritime terrorism awareness is still dominated by developed countries such as Japan, Britain and Singapore, whereas Indonesia is inclined to be defensive about the matter.[177] As with the issue of piracy, there have been calls within Indonesia for cautious interpretations of maritime terrorism threats. For instance, where Singaporean officials have taken pains to emphasise the danger of 'floating bomb' attacks on oil and other bulk mineral fuel tankers, Admiral Sondakh remarked that their fears were unfounded:

> Of course ordinary people will think that a suicide bombing attack on a tanker might occur. But in my opinion as Chief of Naval Staff, intercepting a tanker is not easy—let alone when only using a boat that is being knocked about by the waves and wind. It would almost be impossible to carry out a suicide bomb attack on a moving tanker. If we're talking about hijacking a tanker, this could occur. But taking a bomb on board a tanker that could be 16 metres high is no easy matter. Moreover, two tonnes of TNT would be needed to blow up a tanker. What's shown on films is just nonsense.[178]

The two states' different views were also evident when Singapore released information in March 2010 that an attack on oil tankers in the Malacca Strait was imminent. Though Indonesia ultimately pledged to increase security activities in the sea lane,[179] and conducted joint military-police counter-terrorism exercises in the area,[180] several of its high profile policy figures sought to distance themselves from the news. Deputy Defence Minister Sjafrie Syamsuddin initially refused to comment on the warning.[181] Rear Admiral Agus Suhartono remarked that "[a]nyone considering this should think again, hundreds of times, before acting."[182] First Admiral S. M.

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[176] Abuza, 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia;' J D Pena, 'Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing Regional and Extra-Regional Concerns,' *Stanford Journal of International Relations* 10, no. 2 (2009): 5.
[177] 'Indonesia Cenderung Defensif Hadapi Ancaman Terorisme Maritim,' *Antara*, 6 Dec 2006.
[178] Translated from the original Indonesian. See 'Laksamana TNI Bernard Kent Sondakh: "Angkatan Laut Bukan Centeng,"' *Tempo*, 19 Jul 2004.
[179] Chatterjee, 'Security Raised in Malacca Strait after Terror Warning.'
[180] A William, 'TNI Siap Hadapi Terorisme di Selat Malaka,' *Tempo*, 13 Mar 2010.
[181] 'Singapore Navy Steps up Patrols after Warning of Terrorist Threat,' *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 5 Mar 2010.
[182] 'Terrorism a Real Risk in Malacca,' *People's Daily*, 13 Jun 2007.

Dorojatun was reported as stating that "[i]t was just information. It wasn't certain,"[183] and that "there was no need to panic over the news." [184]

A rare acknowledgement occurred in 2004 (and shortly after the Malacca Strait Coordinated Patrols had been announced) when Admiral Sondakh remarked that terrorism was one of eight categories of transnational crime occurring at sea.[185] Even in this instance, Sondakh discounted the threat later that year, stating that the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Angkatan Laut* (TNI-AL, or Indonesian Navy) had found no evidence of terrorist activity in the Malacca Strait.[186] Admiral Soebijanto provided a more even-handed view in 2007, arguing that while the likelihood of maritime terrorism is small for Indonesia, its waters are so large that the threat must be monitored regardless.[187]

If Singapore overstates the threats of piracy and maritime terrorism then Indonesia understates them. What makes Jakarta's stance striking is its seeming reluctance to recognise the two types of activity, even at a time when piracy incidents were at peak frequencies from the late 1990s and beyond 2000, or amid increased worldwide concerns for terrorism following the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks. And although Indonesia has recognised some of the problems that non-state actors can pose in the sea lane, its assessments tend to focus on border and territorial issues, or are framed as domestic crime. On the whole, then, the prediction about a fledgling energy transit state's interests in securing transit oil supplies can be said to hold in the case of Indonesia. Security issues in the Malacca Strait do not rate highly in its strategic priorities. Since this chapter has already shown why transit oil does not feature in the scope of Indonesia's interests, it is necessary to consider what factors, if not the supply chain, underlie its relaxed appraisal of the piracy and maritime terrorism threats.

Explaining Indonesia's Interests: Sovereignty, National Unity and Political Sensitivity

Three factors, which are not directly linked to oil, shed light on why Indonesia's security interests in the Malacca Strait have not been particularly focused on piracy or maritime terrorism. Indonesia's desire to control its maritime domain, often expressed

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[183] 'Singapore Navy Steps up Patrols after Warning of Terrorist Threat.'
[184] 'Naval Base on Malacca Strait Terror Alert,' *Antara*, 6 Mar 2010.
[185] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Defence), 'Keamanan Jadi Prasyarat Pengelolaan Laut Yang Optimal,' 6 Aug 2004 http://www.dephan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=article$sid=5846.
[186] 'No Terrorist Activity in Indonesian Waters So Far, Says Navy Chief,' *Antara*, 11 Dec 2004.
[187] 'Pemberantasan Terorisme Maritim Terkendala Terbatasanya Alat Tempur,' *Antara*, 10 May 2007.

in a manner that reflects sensitivity about its sovereignty, is the first factor. As its various Defence White Papers over time suggest, many of the challenges that Indonesia identifies at sea—such as illegal fishing, unauthorised immigration and smuggling—relate to border issues. As a country that has as many as 16 distinct entry points that are vulnerable to smuggling,[188] it is not surprising that Sarwono Kusumaatmadja (who was once the Minister of Maritime Exploration) has argued that Indonesia puts great effort into protecting its sea border from such activity.[189] Director General of Monitoring and Control at the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Aji Sularso has claimed that illegal fishing threatened "Indonesia's economic and territorial sovereignty,"[190] and the matter has been so pervasive that in 2005 the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries suspended foreign flagged ships' fishing licences.[191]

Indonesia's sensitivity to perceived incursions into the Malacca Strait's waters was put in the spotlight following 29 June 2004 when the trilateral coordinated patrols of the waterway (involving Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore) were announced. The patrols' establishment, which Indonesia championed,[192] came as a response to a US statement some months earlier calling for the creation of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). Indonesia's rejection of the RMSI was paired with numerous assertions that the Malacca Strait was under Indonesian sovereign control.[193] This included reiterations in official statements upholding the three littoral states' sovereignty of the sea lane, including: the Batam Joint Ministerial Statement on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore adopted on 2 August 2005 (Batam

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[188] A T Kurniawan, '16 Entry Points across Indonesia Prone to Smuggling,' *Tempo*, 14 Nov 2011.
[189] E Azly, 'Indonesia, Philippines to Step up Border Security,' *Antara*, 8 Sep 2009.
[190] E Maulia, 'Govt to Shoot Fish Poachers,' *Jakarta Post*, 6 May 2008.
[191] This was later modified so that foreign companies that had investments in Indonesia were exempt. E Bolongaita et al., *Enhancing Government Effectiveness in Indonesia: A Study of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries*, (United States Agency for International Development, 2009), http://indonesia.usaid.gov/documents/document/Document/410/EGE__Indonesia_MMAF_ Assessment, 25.
[192] 'Indonesia Proposes Joint Force to Patrol Malacca Straits,' ABC Radio Australia, 17 Jun 2004 http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2004-06-17/indonesia-proposes-joint-force-to-patrol-malacca-straits/659908; 'Singapore Welcomes Indonesian Proposal for Joint Malacca Strait Patrols,' *Agence France-Presse*, 19 Jun 2004; I Storey, 'Calming the Waters in Maritime Southeast Asia,' *Asia Pacific Bulletin* 29 (2009): 1.
[193] For example, 'Indonesia, Malaysia Reject US Patrols in Malacca,' *Agence France-Presse*, 8 May 2004; 'KSAL Tolak Penempatan Pasukan Asing di Selat Malaka,' *Antara*, 10 Apr 2004; 'US Told Indonesia and Malaysia to Stay out of Straits,' *Bernama*, 8 May 2004; D Sumaryono, 'Kerawanan di Selat Malaka,' *Kompas*, 2 Jul 2004; 'US Intention to Help Maintain Security in Malacca Strait Economically Motivated,' *Antara*, 17 Apr 2004, cited in Watkins, 'Facing the Terrorist Threat in the Malacca Strait;' D E Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy*, 2nd ed. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010).

Statement); the Kuala Lumpur Statement of Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore of 20 September 2006 (Kuala Lumpur Statement); and the Singapore Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore of 6 September 2007 (Singapore Statement). Statements linking the issue to sovereignty have become a regular feature in Indonesian discussions about the Malacca Strait. State Secretary Hatta Radjasa's following comment is representative of this:

> The Malacca Strait comes under the territorial sovereignty of Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. Countries outside them are mere users of the strait so they have no right to be involved in safeguarding it by deploying their forces there.[194]

The RMSI chain of events is useful to illustrate Indonesia's insistence that the Malacca Strait is partly within its jurisdiction, but the country has had associated border concerns with the sea lane much earlier than 2004. Indonesia has historically regarded its surrounding waters as protection against external threats.[195] In this geostrategic context the Malacca Strait represents a direct route for foreign naval vessels to Indonesia's internal waters.[196] Indonesia's campaign of Confrontation (*Konfrontasi*) against the formation of a Malaysian state included patrolling the Malacca Strait.[197] Indeed, declarations about Jakarta's legal right to the waterway are evident as early as 1971 in the Joint Statement of the Governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore on 16 November, whereby Article 4 (v) stated that the Malacca Straits were not international straits.[198]

Indonesia's decision to close the Lombok Strait and Sunda Strait in 1988 was also influenced by an intention to demonstrate its sovereign control over its maritime domain. The announcement made by *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia,* Indonesia's Armed Forces (ABRI) early in September 1988 that the two waterways were to be temporarily closed while live firing exercises[199] were conducted sparked a

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[194] 'RI Rejects Any Effort to Internationalize Malacca Strait,' *Antara*, 29 Aug 2007.
[195] D F Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara and Hankamrata*, Australia-Asia Papers (Nathan, Queensland: Griffith University, Faculty of Asian and International Studies, Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, 1996), 4.
[196] Lee, *Southeast Asia*: 95.
[197] J Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy: The First Fifty Years: Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 87.
[198] See Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*: 204.
[199] M J Valencia, 'International Conflict over Marine Resources in South-East Asia: Trends in Politicization and Militarization,' in *Conflict over natural resources in South-east Asia and the Pacific*,

flurry of discussion on the possible motivations for the decision. For the Defence Minister Leonardus Benjamin Moerdani the closure was warranted on grounds of Indonesia's regional security. According to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas it was a necessary measure to prevent hazards to passing ships.[200] Though it was usual for Jakarta to organise naval manoeuvres late in the year, these official justifications were regarded with scepticism. One analyst went as far to suggest that this signalled retaliation against falling OPEC oil prices on which the Indonesian budget depended, and deliberate meddling in Japan's oil shipments from Gulf countries, given that it was a beneficiary of cheap oil and its trading on spot markets was perceived to be exacerbating the price drop.[201] If so, then there is an element of competition in how fledgling energy transit states can view transnational energy supply chains in relation to their own commercial activities. A more widely accepted interpretation of the closure is that it was an assertion of Indonesian sovereignty over sea lanes,[202] for it came at a time when the third round of negotiations for the United Nations Convention for Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) had finalised just six years earlier. During the UNCLOS negotiations Indonesia had championed the inclusion of an archipelagic concept, and while it was eventually integrated into the Convention (Part IV), user countries saw it as impeding merchant and war ships' navigational freedom.[203] Indonesia's emphasis on 'traditional' issues at sea is therefore not limited to the Malacca Strait. There is thus a degree of consistency in how Indonesia approaches its entire maritime domain.

This is discernible in a more recent context. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono remarked in 2010 that Indonesia's geography was particularly vulnerable because it shared borders with seven other states.[204] During a period of heightened tensions with Malaysia over contested waters in Ambalat, Navy Chief Tedjo Edhy

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ed. T G Lim and M J Valencia (Japan; Singapore: United Nations University Press; Oxford University Press, 1990), http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80a04e/80A04E0a.htm.

[200] A Z U Purba, 'Lain Lombok, Lain Pula Malaka,' *Tempo*, 5 Nov 1988, 27.

[201] See P Hastings, 'Why Did Indonesia Close Shipping Lanes?' *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 Oct 1988.

[202] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29 Feb 1996, cited in J Guoxing, *SLOC Security in the Asia Pacific*, (Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, 2000), http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Ji Guoxing-SLOC Security in the Asia Pacific.htm. For a criticism of Hastings' OPEC (and other) explanations, see B Lowry, 'Why Indonesia Closed the Straits in September 1988,' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 16, no. 3 (1993).

[203] J R Coquia, 'Development of the Archipelagic Doctrine as a Recognized Principle of International Law,' *Philippine Law Journal* 58 (1983): 13, 34; K Kriangsak, *The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary Delimitation in South-East Asia* (Singapore; New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 152-3.

[204] 'Presiden Perintahkan Pembahasan Batas Maritim Dengan Malaysia,' *Antara*, 22 Aug 2010.

Purdijatno justified invigorated naval activities around Indonesia's furthest islands on the basis of "possible infiltration by ships from Malaysia," whereby "Navy personnel are ready to intercept in case a foreign ship is infiltrating."[205] When interviewed shortly after becoming the new Chief Commander of the armed forces in September 2010, Admiral Suhartono indicated his concern for Indonesia's territorial integrity when explaining that one of his first objectives would be to "secure the key points" of Indonesia's borders.[206] Together, these statements show that Indonesia's view of the Malacca Strait in conventional terms is a longstanding one.

A related explanation for Indonesia's tendency to overlook vulnerabilities in the Malacca Strait is Jakarta's overarching concerns for national unity, embodied in the strategic doctrine of *wawasan nusantara* (archipelagic outlook). Originating from *nusantara* (archipelagic concept), *wawasan nusantara* has featured in Indonesia's statements about national objectives since its independence in 1949. This was at a time when Indonesia faced several domestic challenges to its statehood such as from Darul Islam (an extremist separatist movement that sought to create an Islamic Indonesian state and precursor to what is now Jemaah Islamiyah) and domestic revolts in the Moluccas, South Sulawesi, West Sumatra and Kalimantan. The latter was partly due to a dominance of Javanese personnel in the Sukarno Government coupled with a lack of attention to other ethnic groups' wellbeing.[207] National unity was therefore an issue for the new government in Jakarta. It sought to manage the matter by promoting political cohesion and national identity from one end of the archipelago to the other—often expressed as 'from Sabang to Merauke.'[208]

These concerns for national unity are evident in Indonesia's national motto, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (meaning "unity in diversity"), and the idea of *nusantara*. The *nusantara* concept was outlined by Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawijaja on 13 December 1957 (now known as the Djuanda Declaration). This was significant because it defined Indonesian territory in new terms—that of archipelagic baselines—

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[205] 'Indonesian Navy Intensifying Security of Outermost Islands,' *Antara*, 21 Aug 2009.
[206] I Hayati et al., 'We Must First Secure the Key Points,' Asia Views, 21 Dec 2010 http://www.asiaviews.org/features/5-features/9737-featuresalias71.
[207] See P Dibb and P Prince, 'Indonesia's Grim Outlook,' *Orbis* 45, no. 4 (2001); M Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change*, Politics in Asia Series (London; New York: Routledge, 1994), 101.
[208] This phrase refers to two cities on the outermost east and western sides of Indonesian territory, located in Aceh and West Papua respectively. It featured heavily in nationalistic government policy documents especially during the Sukarno era and as David Webster describes it, is "a geographical assertion of Indonesian national space." D Webster, 'From Sabang to Merauke: Nationalist Secession Movements in Indonesia,' *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 48, no. 1 (2007): 85.

and meant that upon becoming Act Number 4 of 1960, Indonesia's baseline expanded from three nautical miles to 12 nautical miles. This was an act that the UK, the US, New Zealand, Japan, the Netherlands, France and Australia contested but China and the Soviet Union accepted.[209] Given the domestic unrest facing Indonesia at the time, the Djuanda Declaration aimed to foster national political identity and cohesion.[210] This developed into the notion of *wawasan nusantara* over the ensuing years. Announced under the Sukarno Presidency in 1966 and promoted under Suharto from 1973, *wawasan nusantara* became Indonesia's political ideology of the sea.[211] *wawasan nusantara* envisages a unified Indonesia over land (*darat*) and sea (*laut*) where the two are regarded as one entity, as illustrated by the Indonesian term *tanah-air,* meaning homeland,[212] or a "place of land and water," where islands and seas represent "a single undivided unit."[213] In this context Indonesia's waters function as unifiers of land and state. These characteristics are expressed in the sayings, *laut adalah perekat kepulauan Indonesia* (meaning "the sea is the glue of the Indonesian archipelago") and *laut adalah jembatan yang menghubungkan pulau dan penduduk yang menempatinya di seluruh Indonesia* (or "the sea is a bridge connecting all the islands and people of Indonesia").[214] This concept continues to be reflected in contemporary strategic policy pronouncements. Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa underlined the relevance of Indonesia's archipelagic unity to its border and sovereignty concerns in August 2011:

> Thus for example, to ensure the unity of Indonesia's national territory, through diplomatic efforts international recognition has been obtained for the

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[209] D P O'Connell, 'Mid Ocean Archipelagos in International Law,' *British Yearbook of International Law* 45 (1971): 39, and Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia:* 22, cited in B Kwiatkowska and E R Argoes, 'Archipelagic Waters: An Assessment of National Legislation,' in *Law of the Sea at the Crossroads: The Continuing Search for a Universally Accepted Régime: Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Symposium of the Kiel Institute of International Law, July 10 to 14, 1990,* ed. R Wolfrum, U E Heinz, and D A Bizzarro (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1991), 132.

[210] M Kusumaatmadja, *Hukum Laut Internasional* 1986, cited in Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto*: 12; M Kusumaatmadja, 'The Concept of the Indonesian Archipelago,' *Indonesian Quarterly* 10, no. 4 (1982): 13, cited in R Haller-Trost, C H Schofield, and P R Hocknell, *The Territorial Dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan in the Celebes Sea: A Study in International Law* (Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, 1995), 16.

[211] For a detailed discussion of *wawasan nusantara* see D P Djalal, 'Geopolitical Concepts and Maritime Territorial Behaviour in Indonesian Foreign Policy' (Masters thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1990), 83. For contemporary discussion see D S Adhuri, 'Does the Sea Divide or Unite Indonesians? Ethnicity and Regionalism from a Maritime Perspective,' in *Conference of National Integration and Regionalism in Indonesia and Malaysia: Past and Present* Canberra, Australia 25-8 Nov 2002.

[212] Literally 'land-water.' Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto*: 13.

[213] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*: 10.

[214] See Adhuri, 'Does the Sea Divide or Unite Indonesians?' 4.

> conception of *wawasan nusantara* which unifies thousands of islands that became part of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. These days, efforts to ensure territorial integrity and respect for state sovereignty continue through border diplomacy.[215]

While Indonesia's political stability and governance has been substantially improving since the fall of Suharto,[216] it continues to face a mixture of competing challenges throughout its islands rather than those specific to one location such as the Malacca Strait. Many areas experience forms of domestic radicalism.[217] There are fears that the conflict between Christian and Muslim populations in the Molucca Islands, which erupted in 1999 but deescalated in 2002, might return.[218] Managing secessionism has also been challenging. Aceh intensified efforts to realise greater autonomy from Jakarta after East Timor was permitted to conduct a referendum for independence in 1999.[219] There are ongoing calls for West Papua's independence.[220] This has been compounded by regular large-scale natural disasters: such as the Boxing Day tsunami in December 2004; the Sidoarjo mudslides that were triggered by poor mining practices in the aftermath of the Yogyakarta earthquake on 27 May, 2006;[221] the Mentawi Islands tsunami in West Sumatra and the eruption of Mount Merapi in Central Java in October 2010; and flooding in Waisor, West Papua.[222] To this can be

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[215] Translated from the original Indonesian. See M Natalegawa, 'Sambutan Menlu Pada Acara Syukuran / Buka Bersama Dalam Rangka HUT ke-66 Kemlu, Ruang Nusantara,' 19 Aug 2011.

[216] According to World Bank Group's Worldwide Governance Indicators project, Indonesia's performance against the 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism' indicator (which "[r]eflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism") has improved from a lowest ever recorded score of -2.13 in 2003 to its highest score of -0.82 in 2011 (where -2.5 is 'weak' and 2.5 is 'strong,' and reporting was established in 1996). See World Bank, 'The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project,' http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.

[217] A C Alwasilah, 'Preaching Not Enough to Stop Radicalism,' *Jakarta Post*, 28 Sep 2011. For a detailed account of domestic conflict in Indonesia see J Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia* (Cambridge; Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2004); C Wilson, *Internal Conflict in Indonesia: Causes, Symptoms and Sustainable Resolution*, (Department of the Parliamentary Library Australia, 2001), http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/rp/2001-02/02rp01.pdf.

[218] A P Simamora, 'New Civil War Haunts Ambon,' *Jakarta Post* 13 Sep 2011.

[219] S Lekic, 'East Timor's Independence Inspires Aceh Separatists,' *Associated Press* 1999.

[220] M Bachelard, 'Five Jailed over West Papua Independence Push,' *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 Mar 2012.

[221] N Sawolo et al., 'The LUSI Mud Volcano Triggering Controversy: Was it Caused by Drilling?' *Marine and Petroleum Geology* 26 (2009).

[222] See O Rondonuwu and S Creagh, 'Indonesia Probes Illegal Logging Role in Papua Floods,' *Reuters*, 11 Oct 2010; Yansen, 'Indonesia and the Great Challenge of Natural Disasters,' *Jakarta Post*, 2 Nov 2010.

added the monumental challenge of addressing developing Indonesia, where 12% of the population lives below the national poverty line.[223]

Indeed, Indonesia's densely habited areas are situated far away from the chokepoint. According to the 2010 Census, more than half (57%) of the Indonesian population lives on the island of Java. The next largest island in terms of population is Sumatra, which delimits the Malacca Strait's southern coast, constituting 21% of the national total.[224] Though half (49%) of the island's total population (more than 24 million people) together reside in the provinces of Aceh, North Sumatra, Riau and the Riau Islands—all of which border the Malacca Strait—more people can be found living in West Java, Central Java, or East Java alone.[225] Even Sumatra's most populated provinces, North Sumatra and West Sumatra, are still dwarfed by Java. The former's province's population of 13 million people compares to West Java's 43 million residents.[226] The latter province, located on Sumatra's southern coast, opens onto the Indian Ocean and away from the Malacca Strait.

These demographic characteristics are unlikely to change in a short-term period. With *wawasan nusantara* in mind, Indonesia's geostrategic interests span a far greater territorial region than the Malacca Strait, which is essentially just one of the archipelago's many waterways. Given its position adjacent to Sumatra—only one of Indonesia's five major islands—and within a political entity encompassing more than 17,000 islands, the Malacca Strait is not necessarily the most important area in Indonesia's archipelago. One could go as far to argue that the Malacca Strait is peripheral to Indonesia's overarching geopolitical interests due to its physical distance from Java, where the political and administrative hub of the state is located. As one analyst put it, the waterway does not cut through Indonesia's 'heart.'[227]

A third factor explaining Indonesia's threat perception of the Malacca Strait is associated with the political challenges it faces in addressing terrorism and piracy. Many high profile leaders, such as Barack Obama, David Cameron and Kevin Rudd have praised Indonesia's efforts to address terrorist activity.[228] As the world's largest

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[223] World Bank, 'World Indicators: Indonesia,' http://data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia.
[224] Republic of Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics), 'Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010: Data Agregat Per Provinsi,' 2010 http://www.bps.go.id/65tahun/SP2010_agregat_data_perProvinsi.pdf, 8.
[225] Totalling 43 million, 32 million and 37 million people respectively. Ibid.
[226] Ibid.
[227] Lee, *Southeast Asia*: 82.
[228] 'Australian PM Praises Indonesian Counter-Terror Forces,' *Xinhua*, 18 Sep 2009; 'Barack Obama Asia Trip: US President Reaches out to Muslims in Indonesia,' *Telegraph*, 10 Nov 2010; 'Cameron Praises Indonesia as Model of Democracy and Islam,' *Agence France-Presse*, 12 Apr 2012.

Muslim-majority country, it has been a balancing act for Jakarta to implement initiatives. When President Megawati Sukarnoputri flew to Washington shortly after 9/11 to condemn the attacks, her initial condolences to President Bush were poorly received at home. Islamic militant groups such as Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders Front sought international media coverage by holding anti-American rallies in Jakarta, intimidating US tourists in Solo, and by burning US flags and George Bush effigies.[229] Though these activities were an extreme response not necessarily representative of the views held by Indonesia's populace, Jakarta's support for the US was not helped by Vice-President Hamzah Haz's remark that "hopefully this tragedy will cleanse the sins of the United States," a statement that Haz had to revise when later endorsing Indonesian cooperation with Washington.[230]

There was also a degree of public suspicion that the US was creating a scapegoat out of Islam in the aftermath of 9/11. Hasyim Muzadi, the head of Natlatul Ulama, one of Indonesia's leading Islamic organisations, questioned the evidence put forward against Osama bin Laden.[231] Wirajuda reported that the Indonesian Cabinet had laughed at other countries' suggestions that Islamic fundamentalism could threaten Indonesia.[232] In another instance President Yudhoyono demanded proof of Jemaah Islamiyah's existence before he was willing to take steps to ban it.[233] Vice-President Jusuf Kalla put forward a similar view during an interview with Adnkronos International, stating that Jemaah Islamiyah could not be outlawed because it did not exist as an organisation.[234] This scepticism is also held by the broader population. Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group has reported that fewer than half of Indonesia's constituents believed that Jemaah Islamiyah existed.[235]

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[229] J Gee, 'Islam and the Middle East in the Far East: Nervousness over Afghanistan,' *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 20, no. 9 (2001): 49; K Y Lee, 'Current Events,' *Forbes* 169, no. 8 (2002): 3; S Mydans, 'Anti-American Protests Increase, and Sponsors Plan More,' *New York Times*, 10 Oct 2001.

[230] A L Smith, *What the Recent Terror Attacks Mean for Indonesia*, Trends in Southeast Asia Series (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 8.

[231] H Retnowati, 'Interview - Indonesian Muslim Chief Warns US of Backlash,' *Reuters*, 27 Sep 2001, cited in A L Smith, 'Epilogue: The Bali Bombing and Responses to International Terrorism,' in *Governance in Indonesia: Challenges Facing the Megawati Presidency*, ed. H Soesastro, et al. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 309.

[232] M Steyn, 'They Want to Kill us All,' *Spectator* 19 Oct 2002, cited in Smith, 'Epilogue,' 314.

[233] S W Simon, 'US-Southeast Asia Relations: Elections, Unrest, and ASEAN Controversies,' *Comparative Connections* 6, no. 4 (2005): 66.

[234] Adnkronos International, 'Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah Does Not Exist, Says Vice-President,' 30 Apr 2008 http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.2121227936.

[235] P Symonds, 'The Political Origins of Jemaah Islamiyah: Behind the Bali Bombings,' Global Research: Centre for Research on Globalization, 12 Nov 2003 http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-political-origins-of-jemaah-islamiyah/1030.

Sentiments such as these have constrained Indonesia's ability to address the threat of terrorism, to the point that Megawati changed her initial US support to openly criticise the war in Afghanistan as part of the Global War on Terror.[236] It was not until the Bali Bombings of 2002 that more concrete steps were taken to address Islamic fundamentalism, and even then only after significant influence from other state actors.[237]

Indonesia faces a similar conflicting position in relation to addressing piracy in the Malacca Strait, since this type of activity is reported as originating from the Sumatran side of the sea lane.[238] One interviewee reiterated this perspective. While acknowledging that there was not necessarily any evidence that Indonesia was the source of piracy, they commented that the Malacca Strait is "very safe provided that you stay on Malaysia's side and don't go near to the Indonesian side."[239] Another commented that ships are not encouraged to drop anchor for long periods in Sumatra "because it's just asking for trouble." Problematic areas included the Southern Sumatran coast near Bengkulu, Padang, and Panjang, as well as further away from the Malacca Strait in Northern and Northeastern Kalimantan, Tarakan and Samarinda.[240]

Of course, any country could have geographic areas that are more vulnerable than others in which it might not be prudent for a shipping vessel to drop its anchor. But Indonesia was regularly reported as being a piracy hotspot during the peak level of incidents in Southeast Asia after 2000.[241] Such activity tends to be opportunistic and more characteristic of petty theft and armed robbery as opposed to organised crime.[242] This is sometimes attributed to the severe repercussions that Indonesians faced during the Asian Financial Crisis[243]—whereby the country's nominal exchange rate decreased by 75%[244] and its currency was valued from IDR2,400 per US dollar in

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[236] 'Indonesia: Megawati Seeks to Disarm Extremists,' *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service*, 15 Oct 2001.
[237] For instance, 'Australia Seeks Action over Bali,' *BBC News*, 5 Oct 2002; M Wilkinson and M Moore, 'Taking the War against Terror to Indonesia,' *Age*, 26 Oct 2002.
[238] J N Mak, 'Pirates, Renegades, and Fishermen: The Politics of "Sustainable" Piracy in the Strait of Malacca,' in *Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism*, ed. P Lehr (New York: Routledge, 2007), 200.
[239] Interviewee 8681.
[240] Interviewee 6769.
[241] 'Indonesia "Piracy Hotspot,"' *BBC News*, 1 Nov 2000; 'Sea Piracy Hits Record High,' *CNN*, 28 Jan 2004.
[242] Interviewees 8681 and 6769.
[243] For example C Z Raymond, 'Piracy in Southeast Asia: New Trends, Issues and Responses,' *IDSS Working Papers* 89 (2005): 10.
[244] A Berg, 'The Asian Crisis: Causes, Policy Responses, Outcomes,' *International Monetary Fund Working Paper*, WP/99/138, Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1999, cited in J S Djiwandono,

June 1997 to IDR16,000 in January 1998.[245] Hence, engaging in piracy, even on an opportunistic basis, is economically appealing and difficult for governments to manage.[246] Indeed, the problem has also been compounded by problems of corruption within the Indonesian bureaucracy, with respect to reports of officials responsible for policing the coast of Sumatra assisting in its perpetration.[247] And while official efforts to eradicate *Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme* (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism, the post-Suharto anti-corruption movement) are ongoing, Sumatran piracy has re-emerged in relation to incidents in the South China Sea.[248]

The Malacca Strait is therefore less significant to Indonesia in strategic terms than for its neighbours.[249] But Jakarta's apparent disinterest in addressing matters of terrorism and piracy can be explained by several factors unrelated to oil: its domestic sensitivities, the tendency for challenges in the Malacca Strait to originate from Indonesia and the numerous other strategic issues affecting the archipelago that compete for its policy makers' attention. As such, the energy transit state framework's predictions about Indonesia's strategic interests based on its position as a fledgling energy transit state held in this case. Transit oil has only a little—if any—relevance to how Indonesia views security issues in the sea lane. More conventional issues related to ensuring Indonesia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity throughout the archipelago have stood out instead as prominent themes in its strategic agenda.

'Ten Years after the Asian Crisis: An Indonesian Insider's View,' in *Ten Years After: Revisiting the Asian Financial Crisis*, ed. B Muchhala (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2007), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Asia_TenYearsAfter_rpt.pdf, 47.

[245] I J Azis, E Thorbecke, and W Thorbecke, 'The Socio-Economic Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on Indonesia,' in *Ekonomi Indonesia di Era Politik Baru: 80 Tahun Mohamad Sadli*, ed. M Ikhsan, et al. (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2002), np.

[246] R C Banlaoi, 'Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: Current Situation, Countermeasures, Achievements and Recurring Challenges' (paper presented at the conference Global Challenge, Regional Responses: Forging a Common Approach to Maritime Piracy, 18-19 Apr 2011 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 2011), 2.

[247] For example, according to a 2004 World Markets Research Centre report. See 'WMRC Report Blames Indonesian Corruption for Rise in Piracy in South-East Asian Waters,' *Financial Times*, 14 Feb 2004.

[248] E Frécon, *Chez les Pirates d'Indonésie* (Paris: Fayard, 2011).

[249] B Bingley, 'Security Interests of the Influencing States: The Complexity of Malacca Straits,' *Indonesian Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (2004): 362. Two respondents also raised this point. Interviewee 7281 stated that "I think the Indonesian argument is that [Indonesia does not] benefit as much from the straits." Interviewee 2359 commented that the Malacca Strait is not a priority for Indonesia as ships are usually destined for ports in Singapore or Malaysia, and because Indonesia's economic payoff from shipping in the Strait is far less than its neighbours.

INDONESIA'S APPROACH TO STRAIT SECURITY: COOPERATION OR COMPETITION?

It is now appropriate to turn to Indonesia's role in relation to the second component of this thesis's 'common interests-cooperation' puzzle. That is, it is necessary to examine the consequences of Indonesia's low stake in Middle East-East Asia oil flows for its approach to Strait security, and consider how other non-oil factors are relevant to its policy choices. 'Fledgling energy transit states' like Indonesia can be generally assumed to have minimal participation in securing a transnational energy supply chain. No state would actively seek to expend resources addressing an issue it regarded as unimportant, unless the prospective gains from doing so outweighed the costs. Yet viewed solely within the scope of transit oil, Indonesia faces little incentive to secure the Malacca Strait's waters, since Middle East-East Asia shipments do not directly factor in its strategic calculus.

A general indication that this expectation holds is evident in how the TNI-AL is resourced. It is widely acknowledged that Indonesia's naval budget is limited.[250] Indonesia's overall military expenditure has historically represented less than 1% of its GDP. During the last decade (2003-2012) Indonesia's spending averaged 0.8% of its GDP (compared to 4% and 2% in Singapore and Malaysia respectively).
In constant prices its Defence budget equates to slightly more than half (52%) of Singapore's over the same time period:[251] a difference that is all the more striking when comparing Indonesia's expansive geography to its island neighbour. The TNI-AL usually receives only a fraction of the funds. Even in 2005 when the Defence budget was expanded under Sudarsono's ministership to some US$2.4 billion, the TNI-AL received US$354 million (15% of the expenditure), compared to the US$996 million (41%) allocated to the Army.[252] With this in mind it is easy to understand that the TNI-AL has been described as "traditionally the least important of the country's military services."[253]

Although more recent Defence budgets under President Yudhoyono have substantially expanded, it is not clear whether government intentions to spend 1.5% of

[250] See C Liss, 'The Privatisation of Maritime Security-Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?' *Asia Research Centre Working Paper* 141 (2007): 7; A T H Tan, 'Force Modernisation Trends in Southeast Asia,' *IDSS Working Papers* 59 (2004): 15-7.
[251] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'Military Expenditure Database.'
[252] Y Chrisnandi and L C Sebastian, 'Defence Budgeting in Indonesia: Some Policy Options,' *RSIS Commentaries* 126 (2007): 1.
[253] H Manseck, 'TNI-AL: Navy of the Republic of Indonesia,' *Naval Forces* 25, no. 2 (2004): 95.

GDP by 2015[254] will be realised. The 2011 Defence budget, worth US$7.01 billion, grew 28% from the previous year's US$5.45 billion.[255] Its successor was slated to be US$7.9 billion.[256] Much of this is expected to be equipment procurement as part of a military modernisation strategy. The TNI-AL announced a green water navy plan in 2005 that envisaged a 274 ship strong force by 2024—leading one analyst to remark that it could prompt Indonesia's "largest naval shopping spree in 40 years."[257] Jakarta has so far purchased three South Korean *Chang Bogo* class submarines, one of which is to be built with state-owned shipbuilder PT PAL in Surabaya using technology transfer mechanisms.[258] Other prospective acquisitions are reported to include fast patrol boats, a rigid inflatable boat, a guided missile destroyer, anti-submarine warfare helicopters, a hydro-oceanography vessel, support vessels and a replacement for the tall ship *KRI Dewaruci*.[259]

Yet when Indonesian naval budget increases such as this are put forward they are rarely grounded in arguments about the Malacca Strait. Yudhoyono has stressed that the renewed focus on military acquisitions are simply part of Indonesia's natural modernisation and not reflective of a regional arms race.[260] In previous occasions decision makers have emphasised topical political issues. When President Wahid proposed to upgrade TNI-AL forces in 2004 it was on the basis of addressing domestic conflict in Aceh, the Moluccas and West Papua.[261] In 2005, at a time when trilateral maritime patrols in the Malacca Strait were well underway, Sudarsono sought to justify a larger navy and air force budget on a "need to increase our striking power" in general and better protect the Ambalat region amid fears of Malaysian encroachment in particular—and not in relation to the sea lane.[262] Not only does this suggest that having a well-resourced TNI-AL was more important for addressing these issues than the Malacca Strait, but given that vast deposits of oil lie under Ambalat's seabed, it raises the prospect that Indonesia's oil interests might factor in its maritime activities elsewhere in the archipelago.

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[254] T Moss, 'Indonesia Military Powers Up,' *Diplomat*, 18 Jan 2012.
[255] N I Santosa, 'No Arms Race in Soaring Regional Defense Budget: SBY,' *Jakarta Post*, 22 Mar 2012.
[256] Moss, 'Indonesia Military Powers Up.'
[257] R A Supriyanto, 'Naval Modernisation: A Sea Change for Indonesia?' *Nation*, 30 Jan 2012.
[258] See J Hitipeuw, 'Indonesia Buying Submarines from S Korea on Technology Transfer Terms,' *Kompas*, 5 Jan 2012.
[259] N I Santosa and N Afrida, 'RI Ready to Modernize its Weaponry,' *Jakarta Post*, 16 Jan 2012.
[260] Santosa, 'No Arms Race in Soaring Regional Defense Budget.'
[261] Manseck, 'TNI-AL: Navy of the Republic of Indonesia,' 95.
[262] 'Defence Ministry Seeks Additional Budget for Navy, Air Force,' *Antara*, 23 Mar 2005.

Being poorly funded has meant that the TNI-AL has limited maritime power.[263] Indonesia's naval capabilities have long been regarded as weak and are routinely referred to as "ageing," 'lacking in technology' and being in "appalling condition"[264]—what has been described as an "open secret among the region's defence community."[265] Indonesia's complex maritime command network, spread across nine agencies, is not known for sharing intelligence or resources.[266] According to one interviewee, Indonesia "doesn't have a navy that's capable of patrolling the country's vast maritime domain."[267] Or, as Sheldon Simon put it, "Jakarta's anaemic maritime budget means that Indonesia lacks sufficient ships to patrol the waters around its 17,000 islands."[268]

Indonesian policy makers are well aware of this limitation. Admiral Sondakh has referred to Indonesia's vessels as only suited to fishing expeditions, and has remarked that few warships were functioning.[269] Sudarsono lamented at the 2007 Shangri-La Dialogue that "[what] we lack in Indonesia is effective capacity to deploy resources, equipment, ships."[270] Analysts have also observed that as little as one-third of the navy fleet is operational at any particular moment.[271] One writer for the *New York Times* even creatively likened the TNI-AL's capacity to protect the Indonesian archipelago as analogous to "having fewer than 100 police cars responsible for patrolling the entire area from Seattle to New York, or Lisbon to Moscow."[272] With estimates of required vessels to adequately patrol the archipelago numbering in the

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[263] R Hartfiel and B Job, 'Raising the Risk of War: Defence Spending Trends and Competitive Arms Processes in East Asia,' *Working Paper* no. 44, (Vancouver: Institute of International Relations, the University of British Columbia, 2005), 16-7, cited in R Sukma, 'Indonesia's Security Outlook, Defence Policy and Regional Cooperation,' in *Asia Pacific Countries' Security Outlook and its implications for the Defense Sector*, *Joint Research Series* (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2010), http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series5/pdf/5-1.pdf, 11.
[264] See 'Chilly Response to US Plan to Deploy Forces in the Strait of Malacca,' Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 24 May 2004 http://www.iags.org/n0524042.htm; 'Piracy and Maritime Terror in Southeast Asia;' Abuza, 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia;' R Snoddon, 'Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: Naval Responses to Existing and Emerging Threats to the Global Seaborne Economy,' in *Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism*, ed. P Lehr (New York: Routledge, 2007), 234.
[265] G G Ong, 'A Little Diplomacy Can Help Calm Troubled Waters,' *Straits Times*, 8 Mar 2005.
[266] Simon, 'Safety and Security in the Malacca Straits,' 30.
[267] Interviewee 2359.
[268] Simon, 'Safety and Security in the Malacca Straits,' 30.
[269] Ong, 'A Little Diplomacy Can Help Calm Troubled Waters.'
[270] 'Indonesia Wants Help to Secure Waterway,' *Daily Times*, 4 Jun 2007.
[271] 'Chilly Response to US Plan to Deploy Forces in the Strait of Malacca;' Luft and Korin, 'Terrorism Goes to Sea;' S Narayan, 'Economic Impact of Terrorism on the Southeast Asian Region,' *ISAS Insights*, no. 8 (2005): 7; L C Sebastian, *Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 195; I Storey, '"Triborder Sea" is SE Asian Danger Zone,' *Asia Times*, 18 Oct 2007.
[272] S A Weiss, 'Indonesia's Security Burden,' *New York Times*, 3 Sep 2009.

hundreds,[273] Indonesia's ability to manage vulnerabilities throughout the entire archipelago, let alone in a particular sea lane, is uncertain. And while Indonesia has been seeking to establish a Sea and Coast Guard (*Kesatuan Penjaga Laut dan Pantai*, or KPLP) as part of Law 17/2008 on Shipping, of which would address a variety of issues including safety, security, pollution, traffic at sea and search and rescue,[274] doing so has been stalled by extensive regulatory requirements.[275]

Indonesia's small naval budget and limited sea power broadly matches what a fledgling energy transit state's maritime capability is predicted to look like. Since the discussion has so far only examined TNI-AL resourcing as a whole, it would be premature to conclude that having a marginal stake in transit oil equates to weak national maritime power. However, closer examination reveals that Indonesia's Strait security activities have also been constrained by resource limitations. Indonesia has been referred to as the "weak link" in the Malacca Straits Patrols,[276] and has been described as having a passive role in the Strait aerial patrols Eye in the Sky, as a majority of aircraft being flown in the initiative are those owned by its two neighbours.[277] According to one interviewee:

> [The] real thing about Eyes in the Sky [...] is that the Indonesians don't contribute much, they couldn't contribute much because they don't have the ships and the capability, so it is like putting one, two players on one aircraft, and the other party just gaining. [...] So there's a lot of low confidence in that Eyes in the Sky. So eventually it becomes, 'Eye in the Sky I do it' for Malaysia and Singapore.[278]

They continued that being poorly resourced was central to a lack of interest in Strait security measures:

> [Indonesia is] not very interested about RMSI or anything of security measures. There are reasons for this. Strategic reasons. They don't have good ships. They don't have good air capability. [...] So obviously they can't cover Sumatra and the Straits of Malacca. In terms of capability, they have very few ships.[279]

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[273] The TNI-AL estimated that 262 additional ships were needed to properly patrol Indonesia's waters in 2007. *Antara*, 18 Sep, 2007, cited in Storey, '"Triborder Sea" is SE Asian Danger Zone.' Other analysts cite requirements of between 180 and 380 ships. H W Y Wijayanta, Y Syahrul, and A Mawardi, 'TNI Anniversary: At Sea We're Poor,' *Tempo*, 13 Oct 2003.
[274] D Sumaryono, 'The Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board,' in *Indonesia Beyond the Water's Edge: Managing and Archipelagic State*, ed. R B Cribb and M Ford (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 144.
[275] 'Uncertainty Still Clouds Formation of Coast Guard,' *Jakarta Post*, 4 Feb 2013, 14.
[276] Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism,' 155.
[277] Interviewee 7281.
[278] Interviewee 4633.
[279] Ibid.

Another expressed their "dread to think what would happen" if Indonesia had to respond to an emergency at sea.[280]

Indonesia's approach to securing the Malacca Strait might therefore be considered as 'constrained contributions.' Indonesia clearly has been involved in efforts to ensure the security of the Strait, yet its activities are 'constrained' in that they reflect the weaknesses that its maritime agencies face at a national level. While this matched my framework's expectation that its Strait security activities would reflect its low stake in the supply chain, the fact that Indonesia has participated *at all* when it has no transit oil-related impetus to do was flagged in Chapter One for scrutiny. There is therefore a need to understand what being a 'constrained contributor' has meant for Indonesia, whether its efforts at sea are relevant to its energy transit state position and how it relates to the broader dynamics of competition and cooperation that this thesis aims to unpack.

The remainder of this chapter addresses these issues by examining three main consequences of Indonesia's constrained security contributions in the Malacca Strait. First, Indonesia has been able to pursue its stated security concerns in the sea lane, especially where they relate to its sovereignty. Second, it has facilitated Indonesia's receipt of assistance from other Strait stakeholders. The third implication relates to the prospect for shipping to be redirected away from the Malacca Strait through Indonesia's other major sea lanes. Taken together, these suggest that it has been in Indonesia's interests to adopt a minimal role in sharing the Strait's security burden.

Asserting Sovereignty

A principal implication of Indonesia's constrained contributions is that reflects the country's stated security interests, and with an intensity commensurate with the priority it accords the Malacca Strait. Armed forces commander Admiral Agus Suhartono, for instance, has defended charges against Indonesia's maritime capabilities in the sea lane on these grounds, remarking that:

> If our minimal force is regarded as inadequate to cover all border areas, I can justify it. We have priorities. The border areas in western Sumatra can be said to be problem-free. There are occasional patrols there, not continuous operations.[281]

[280] Interviewee 7973 made this point in relation to both Indonesian and Malaysian capabilities.
[281] Hayati et al., 'We Must First Secure the Key Points.'

In particular, Indonesia's activities have reflected its desire to uphold principles of sovereignty in the waterway. Having rejected Admiral Fargo's RMSI proposal on the grounds that the deployment of US forces to protect the Malacca Strait would compromise Indonesia's sovereignty in the sea lane, the impetus was for Indonesia to contribute to security activities itself—even if conducted without the adequate resources. For one official, a weak Indonesian contribution was preferable to US military assistance, and remarked that "we may need a thousand ships, but not the Americans […] these are our straits."[282] Other elite decision makers stressed the need for Indonesia to increase the Malacca Strait's security as a means to prevent other states' armed forces involvement. Admiral Sondakh has warned, "if we can't show the ability to guard the Straits of Malacca, the international forces may get in."[283] Western Fleet Command Chief Rear Admiral Tedjo Edhi Purdijanto reiterated this view in 2005,[284] and in 2007, Radjasa was quoted as stating:

> Indonesia will reject any effort to make the Malacca Strait problem an international issue because internationalization would open an opportunity for foreign forces' involvement in securing the busiest waterway in the Asia Pacific.[285]

These statements suggest that the use of sovereignty arguments to justify Indonesian decision making have not solely been directed toward the US. Indonesia adopted similar reasoning when dismissing offers from India and Japan to provide naval patrols in the Strait,[286] as well as when justifying its rejection of private companies' presence in providing armed escort services through the Malacca Strait.[287] Indonesia has taken issue over perceived sovereignty infringements in circumstances unrelated to the Malacca Strait. Policy officials—including Chairman of the DPR Commission in charge of Foreign Affairs and Defence Theo L. Sambuaga, and Suripto, a member of the Welfare Justice Party faction—have used these arguments to refuse Indonesian

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[282] 'Terror Malacca Straits,' *Associated Press*, 2 Jun 2004, cited in Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism,' 153.
[283] A Sukarsono, 'Indonesia Being Tested over Malacca Straits - Report,' *Reuters*, 19 Jul 2004, cited in M J Valencia, 'The Politics of Anti-Piracy and Anti-Terrorism Responses,' in *Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits*, ed. G G Ong-Webb (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 93.
[284] F Febiana, 'Security in the Malacca Straits to Prevent Foreign Forces,' *Tempo Interactive*, 9 Sep 2005.
[285] 'RI Rejects Any Effort to Internationalize Malacca Strait.'
[286] 'Indonesia Rejects Japan Coast Guard Patrols in Malacca Strait,' *Kyodo News Service*, 18 Mar 2005; R Sinha, 'Jakarta Says no to Indian Patrol in Malacca Straits,' *Indian Express*, 13 Jul 2005.
[287] W Soeriaatmadja, 'Indonesia Rules out Private Armed Escorts in Malacca Strait,' *Bloomberg* 2 May 2005.

participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), one of the US's post-9/11 efforts to address trafficking in weapons of mass destruction.[288] For Foreign Ministry spokesman Desra Percaya, Indonesia's reservations about the PSI were based on the possibility that US naval ships would be allowed to interdict merchant vessels in Indonesian waters.[289] Similarly, Sambuaga and Suripto remarked that the PSI could violate UNCLOS[290]—and by that logic weaken Indonesia's legal standing in relation to law of the sea. For a country that adopts an archipelagic-wide view of maintaining national unity, a constrained contribution in the Malacca Strait can thus be viewed as an appropriate response to pursue its stated interests.

Indonesia's particular concern about potential incursions into its territory is also evident in how it has approached maritime patrols. Foremost is the fact that it advocated coordinated and not joint trilateral patrols in the Malacca Strait, whereby each state conducts its own activities in its own territory and under its own command.[291] This contrasts contrast with joint patrols, which are conducted under a centralised command structure. As indicated in its name, the Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrols (ISCP), which was established in 1992 in the Singapore Strait and the Philip Channel, are also conducted on a coordinated (and not joint) basis.[292]

So too can Indonesia's sensitivity be seen in how it has responded to illegal fishing activities. Its maritime patrols tend to be upgraded in response to incidents involving other states' merchant fishing vessels deemed to be in Indonesian waters (rather than locals operating without permits). This has not just occurred with Malaysian ships in the Malacca Strait. Indonesian patrols have been reported as increasing in regularity in response to detaining Chinese, Thai, Philippine and Vietnamese fishermen too.[293] In 2010, Indonesia installed radar facilities in the Malacca Strait and its other waterways on the grounds of being better able to prevent

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[288] 'PKS to Oppose Any Govt Intention to Join US-Proposed PSI,' *Antara*, 12 Jun 2006; 'RI to Become US Puppet if it Joins PSI: Observer,' *Antara*, 13 Jun 2006.
[289] 'Parliament Supports Govt Refusal to Join Proliferation Security Initiative,' *Antara*, 20 Mar 2006; 'RI Declines to Join Proliferation Security Initiative,' *Antara*, 17 Mar 2006.
[290] 'Parliament Supports Govt Refusal to Join Proliferation Security Initiative;' 'PKS to Oppose Any Govt Intention to Join US-Proposed PSI.'
[291] Storey, 'Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,' 41.
[292] G Chaikin, 'Piracy in Asia: International Cooperation and Japan's Role,' in *Piracy in Southeast Asia Status, Issues, and Responses*, ed. D Johnson and M J Valencia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 140; Japan International Cooperation Agency, cited in T Susumu, 'Suppression of Modern Piracy and the Role of the Navy,' *NIDS Security Reports*, no. 4 (2003), http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2002_2.pdf, 54.
[293] 'Indonesia to Coordinate Patrols with Vietnam to Tackle Illegal Fishing,' *Tempo*, 18 May 2011; 'Ministry Deploys More Patrol Boats in Malacca Strait,' *Jakarta Post*, 14 Feb 2012; Azly, 'Indonesia, Philippines to Step up Border Security.'

unauthorised fishing from non-Indonesian vessels.[294] And while the chair of ASEAN in 2011, Indonesia hosted an illegal fishing forum in with the Association's members, which, according to Minister for Maritime and Fisheries Fadel Muhammad, was established "so that fishing ships from neighboring countries stop stealing our fishes [sic]."[295] Protecting Indonesian fish stocks is certainly an important driver of these activities, but they are nonetheless underpinned by a desire to minimise the presence of non-Indonesian vessels in its waters.

An incident mentioned earlier in this chapter whereby Indonesia stepped up its Malacca Strait surveillance in March 2010 in response to reports of an impending terrorist oil tanker attack is a notable exception to fishing-centric patrol upgrades. Tamboen announced that Indonesia would step up its patrols by deploying more skilled personnel to the area.[296] Defence Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro claimed that "[o]il tankers can pass, but we will increase our readiness."[297] This could be considered as reflecting Indonesia's apparent growing reliance on Middle Eastern oil supplies, as it occurred after Indonesia suspended its OPEC membership.

A secondary implication, and one that is related to reputational factors follows on from Indonesia's sovereignty assertions in the Strait. J. N. Mak has described how both Indonesia and Malaysia sought to 'keep up appearances:'

> […] Malaysia and Indonesia felt compelled to, at least, be seen to step up security in the Malacca Straits. Once again, it was the sense of 'incomplete sovereignty' in the Malacca Straits and the fear that their maritime sovereignty could be further eroded that made Malaysia and Indonesia respond to the Singapore call for stepping up security in the Malacca Straits.[298]

Indonesia's constrained contributions can also be understood as an attempt to counter the perception that other international stakeholders have sought to discredit its maritime capabilities. Indeed, numerous policy officials have mentioned that Indonesia's security activities were linked to their esteem of the 'international community.' The TNI-AL's Deputy Chief of Staff Vice-Admiral W. R. Argawa remarked in 2005 that "[t]he involvement of foreign troops will make us look weak. We don't want that."[299] General Endriartono Sutarto claimed that Indonesia's

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[294] 'Foreign Poachers Still Operating in Waters off N Sumatra,' *Antara*, 29 Jun 2010.
[295] 'Indonesia to Host ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Illegal Fishing,' *Xinhua*, 13 Jul 2011.
[296] 'Security Tightened over Terrorism Threat at Malacca Strait,' *Agence France-Presse*, 4 Mar 2010.
[297] Chatterjee, 'Security Raised in Malacca Strait after Terror Warning.'
[298] Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism,' 153.
[299] 'Indonesia Launches "Operation Octopus" in Malacca Strait,' Singapore Institute of International Affairs 15 Jul 2005 http://www.siiaonline.org/page/insightsDetails/id/2688/ArticleCategoryId/7.

involvement in aerial surveillance through the Eyes in the Sky initiative was "to show the international community that we are serious about securing the Malacca Strait."[300] For Indonesia's Western Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Purdijatno, the patrols would demonstrate "to the international world that no foreign power will be allowed to infiltrate the Malacca Strait."[301] Statements to this effect have continued to be voiced. In 2011, Yusgiantoro stressed that trilateral Strait patrols were hoped to benefit the Strait's extra regional stakeholders and enhance the Strait's good security image in the international community's eyes.[302] Elite decision makers have also sought to draw on Indonesia's expertise in numerous other scenarios. Natalegawa, for instance, recounted Indonesia's success in trilateral cooperative activities at the United Arab Emirates' 2011 piracy conference.[303]

Noting that Indonesia has long viewed itself as a dominant actor in Southeast Asia, such statements should be considered in the context of its regional leadership aspirations. While Indonesia tends to be criticised as a weak maritime actor, its approach has been entirely proportionate to its maritime capabilities and resources. The most fundamental function that Indonesia's constrained contributions in securing the Malacca Strait performs is that it fulfils (or at least takes steps to fulfil) its stated security interests.

Facilitating Assistance

A second consequence of Indonesia's constrained contribution follows on from the first. Being adamant that the Malacca Strait's three littoral countries were alone responsible for providing security in the sea lane, Indonesia has welcomed non-military forms of assistance from stakeholders instead—such as equipment donations, training, exercises and information sharing.[304] This stance was important enough that it dominated the attention devoted to maritime security in the 2008 Defence White Paper:

> The Malacca Strait's strategic position has prompted countries' desires for direct roles in securing it. For Indonesia, directly securing the Malacca Straits is Malaysia's, Singapore's and Indonesia's sovereign rights. However,

[300] 'Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore Agree to Boost Security in Malacca Strait,' *New York Times*, 2 Aug 2005.
[301] 'Japan, Indonesia to Discuss Security Aid for Malacca Strait,' *Antara*, 25 Sep 2005.
[302] 'Tiga Negara Patroli di Selat Malaka,' *Dunia Pos*, 14 Nov 2011.
[303] M Natalegawa, 'Statement at the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs - DP World Public-Private Counter Piracy Conference,' 18 Apr 2011.
[304] Storey, 'Calming the Waters in Maritime Southeast Asia,' 2.

> Indonesia recognises the interests of other users and their indirect security participation in the form of capacity building such as education, training and information.[305]

Indonesia's support for non-military contributions here reflects previous trilateral articulations such as the 2005 Batam Statement, the 2006 Kuala Lumpur Statement and the 2007 Singapore Statement. Article 13 of the 2005 Batam Statement, for example, states:

> Bearing in mind the responsibility and burden of littoral States and the interests of user States in maintaining the safety of navigation, environmental protection and maritime security, the Ministers welcomed the assistance of the user States, relevant international agencies, and the shipping community in the areas of capacity building, training and technology transfer, and other forms of assistance in accordance with UNCLOS 1982. In this regard they also welcomed closer collaboration between littoral States and the international community.[306]

In this context, Indonesia has benefited from a variety of assistance packages. Some have focused on equipment donations. China provided computer equipment to the BAKORKAMLA after announcing in 2007 that it would cooperate with Indonesia on issues related to Strait security.[307] Many other contributions have consisted of entire vessels. Japan paid for Indonesia's buoy tender *KN Pari* in the 1970s[308] and donated another, the *KN Jadayat*, in 2003.[309] In 2005, it provided two ships to manage waste disasters worth US$50 million.[310] The US reportedly offered to donate landing ship tanks (LST), dinghies and small boats the same year.[311]

Patrol boat donations have been particularly forthcoming. In 2007 Japan supplied Indonesia with three brand new high speed patrol boats for use in the Malacca Strait—the *Hayabusa*, *Anis Madu* and *Taka*—which were worth an estimated

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[305] Translated from the original in Indonesian. Republic of Indonesia (Department of Defence), *Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia*: 17.
[306] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 'The Batam Joint Statement of the 4th Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,' 2 Aug 2005 http://160.96.2.210/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/if/2005/200508/infocus_20050802_02.html.
[307] C A Thayer, 'China and Southeast Asia: A Shifting Zone of Interaction,' in *The Borderlands of Southeast Asia: Geopolitics, Terrorism, and Globalization*, ed. J Clad, S M McDonald, and B Vaughn (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2011), http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/books/borderlands-southeast-asia.pdf, 251.
[308] 'Keeping the Straits Safe,' *Motorship* 83, no. 987 (2002).
[309] 'Boost for Navigational Safety in the Malacca Straits,' *Today*, 10 Oct 2003.
[310] 'Japan, Indonesia to Discuss Security Aid for Malacca Strait.'
[311] 'US to Donate Old Ships to Indonesia,' *Associated Press*, 12 Jul 2005.

US$16.8 million.[312] The US donated 15 vessels the following year,[313] and the Australian Federal Police provided three craft in 2011 so that Indonesia could better address people smuggling.[314] According to Indonesia's 2011 *Daftar Rencana Prioritas Pinjaman Luar Negeri* (List of Planned Priority External Loans), South Korea's Economic Development Cooperation Fund agreed to loan US$35 million so that the National Police could procure and maintain fast patrol boats.[315] In 2012, the Singapore Police Coast Guard (PCG) gave five patrol boats to the Indonesian Marine Police (POLAIR).[316]

Stakeholders have facilitated training packages as well. The Japanese Coast Guard has conducted training activities with all three littoral countries, albeit with a particular emphasis on bettering Indonesia's capabilities.[317] China has asked TNI-AL officials to complete in-country training.[318] Some have addressed specific issues. In October 2008, the US Coast Guard organised a course to help Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia manage hazardous and noxious substances in the Strait—a matter that China and Australia have sought to have an input in as well.[319] Other forms of training assistance have been components of broader projects or activities. The multiple bilateral and multilateral naval exercises that Indonesia regularly participates in can be viewed as forms of training. As evident in Indonesia's *Daftar Rencana*

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[312] The assistance followed a pirate attack on the Japanese tugboat *Idaten* in March 2005 whereby three fishermen were kidnapped, two of whom were Japanese nationals. 'Japan Asks for Help to Resolve Piracy Crisis in Malacca Straits,' *Jiji Press English News Service*, 15 Mar 2005; 'Japan to Supply Indonesia with Patrol Boats to Combat Pirates,' *Jiji Press English News Service*, 16 Mar 2005; Mak, 'Pirates, Renegades, and Fishermen: The Politics of "Sustainable" Piracy in the Strait of Malacca,' 199.

[313] See S W Simon, 'US-Southeast Asian Relations: Better Military Relations and Human Rights Concerns,' *Comparative Connections*, Jul 2007, and S W Simon, 'The New ASEAN Charter Bedeviled by Burma's Impunity,' 59, and *Riau Bulletin* no. 2, 31 Jan 2008, cited in S W Simon, 'The New Security Environment - Implications for American Security in the Asia Pacific Region' (paper presented at the 2011 Pacific Symposium: Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University, Washington DC, 4-5 Apr 2011), 19.

[314] 'Strategic Marine and AFP to Deliver High-Speed Patrol Boats to Indonesian Waters,' Strategic Marine, 12 Dec 2011 http://www.strategicmarine.com/news-and-media/2011/january/strategic-marine-and-afp-to-deliver-high-speed--patrol-boats-to-indonesian-waters-.aspx.

[315] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of National Development Planning), *List of Planned Priority External Loans: DRPPLN, 2011* (Jakarta: Ministry of National Development Planning, 2011), 83.

[316] 'Police Present 5 Coastal Patrol Craft to Indonesia,' *Asia One*, 9 Feb 2012.

[317] Y Sato, 'Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation' Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2007 http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Maritime security cooperation Japan-SE Asia Sato.pdf, 2, 5-6.

[318] Thayer, 'China and Southeast Asia,' 251.

[319] H Djalal, 'The Development of Cooperation on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore' (paper presented at the International Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 24 Nov 2008), 9.

Prioritas Pinjaman Luar Negeri publications, training is also a standard component of developing new maritime capabilities.

Many such projects are directed at enhancing Indonesia's ability to address safety issues in the Strait. According to the 2011 *Daftar Rencana Prioritas Pinjaman Luar Negeri*, the Economic Development Cooperation Fund agreed to provide a US$78 million loan for Indonesia to implement a national project to improve and develop its aids to navigation.[320] In previous years the Japan International Cooperation Agency had agreed to a US$17.7 million grant that would enhance Vessel Traffic Services in the Malacca and Singapore straits.[321] Denmark and Norway signed on to US$18 million and US$14 million loans too: the former to assist a national ship reporting system; and the latter to develop Vessel Traffic Services in the Malacca Strait's northern stretches.[322] China agreed to grant US$1.9 million to replace navigation aids that were damaged following the Boxing Day Tsunami that struck Aceh severely in 2004,[323] though there have been suggestions that Beijing's policymakers were later discouraged by the cost of doing so.[324] The European Union and China each agreed to grant the BAKORKAMLA some US$5 million to respectively develop an integrated security and safety system in the Strait and establish a national maritime surveillance satellite system.[325] In 2006, the US offered to develop Indonesia an early warning monitor system and provide situational data intelligence in the Malacca Strait.[326]

Assistance has varied in terms of whether Indonesia or all three littoral countries were the recipients, and whether packages targeted the Malacca Strait's waters or Indonesia's national maritime capability. Indonesia has perhaps received the most attention, not only because it has been the more vocal state in advocating capacity building, but it has the longest coastline compared to its neighbours, and the least resources at hand to protect it. These forms of assistance have also furthered

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[320] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of National Development Planning), *DRPPLN, 2011*: 59.
[321] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of National Development Planning), *List of Planned Priority External Loans and Grants: DRPPHLN, 2011* (Jakarta: Ministry of National Development Planning, 2011), 127-8.
[322] Ibid., 155, 7; Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of National Development Planning), *List of Planned Priority External Loans: DRPPLN, 2012* (Jakarta: Ministry of National Development Planning, 2012), 69.
[323] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of National Development Planning), *DRPPHLN, 2011*: 159.
[324] I Storey, 'China and Indonesia: Military-Security Ties Fail to Gain Momentum,' *Jamestown Foundation China Brief* 9, no. 4 (2009).
[325] Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of National Development Planning), *DRPPHLN, 2011*: 3-6.
[326] Xinhua, 'US Offers Early Warning System to Secure Malacca Strait,' *People's Daily*, 23 Apr 2006.

Indonesia's interests and capabilities throughout its entire archipelago. Yoichiro Sato has observed that there are sometimes secondary uses for contributions other than their originally intended purposes.[327] A closer inspection of this reveals that it is possible Indonesia's receipt of non-military assistance relevant to securing the Malacca Strait have archipelagic-wide implications. National level systems, such as the ones described above, strengthen Indonesia's capabilities with respect to its entire maritime domain. Assisted training packages and equipment procurement do this too.

Training: The numerous training activities that stakeholders have funded to better Indonesia's maritime capabilities have utility in other geographic areas, not just in the Malacca Strait. Rarely are personnel permanently stationed in one position for the duration of their careers, and it would not be an impossible scenario for such skills to be used in routine circumstances outside of the sea lane. An extreme example of this occurring lies with *Kopassus* (Indonesian Special Forces) participation in the US's International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, a training initiative for non-US armed forces. Congress banned Indonesia's IMET involvement from 1993-1995 after the Santa Cruz massacre of 12 November 1991, when *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI, or Indonesian Armed Forces) personnel killed an estimated 271 East Timorese civilians using US supplied M-16 rifles.[328] The Leahy Law's prohibition of US military assistance to states that have suspected human rights violations was later invoked when TNI forces embarked on a campaign of killing and destruction in response to East Timor's declaration of independence on 30 August 1999. Yet restrictions have been relaxed since the events of 9/11 and the announcement of Southeast Asia as the 'second front' on the global war on terrorism. The George W. Bush Administration took steps to reinstate IMET and other forms of assistance in 2005.[329] Obama too has sought to continue *Kopassus* IMET involvement on the proviso that only younger personnel are eligible to participate, based on the need to exclude higher ranking officers suspected for committing gross human rights violations throughout their careers.[330]

Indeed, numerous *Kopassus* members have gone on to hold powerful political and military positions. Leonardus Benjamin Moerdani became Commander in Chief

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[327] Sato, 'Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation' 5.
[328] J T Stoel, 'Codes of Conduct on Arms Transfers-the Movement toward a Multilateral Approach,' *Law and Policy in International Business* 31, no. 4 (1999): 1307.
[329] Vaughn, *Indonesia:* 2.
[330] C Fromm, 'US Seeks to Resume Indonesian Training,' *Asia Times*, 6 Mar 2010.

of ABRI, during which time he had a prominent role in suppressing the 1984 Tanjung Priok massacre,[331] and was later Defence Minister under Suharto.[332] Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, who was involved in suppressing the 30 September 1965 coup attempt while Commander of *Kopassus*, admitted to the mass killing of Javanese villagers that had alleged communist sympathies, and was later Ambassador to South Korea and a member of Indonesian Parliament.[333] Agum Gumelar participated in counterinsurgency activities in Aceh and has held important positions including Commander of *Kopassus*, Minister for Transportation and Governor of National Defence Institute (*Lemhannas*).[334] Prabowo Subianto has been linked to TNI violence against the East Timorese during the early 1990s and was in command of a military suppression of student protests at Trisakti University in May 1998.[335] In 2011, he declared an intention to run for President in 2014.[336] Training assistance provided to Indonesia in a Malacca Strait context is by no means controversial like the IMET example. Yet it is a clear example of how personnel can undergo training programs funded by other states and later move on to work elsewhere in other capacities.

Equipment Procurement: Two high profile instances illustrate how Indonesia has previously used donated equipment to further its own national objectives. One pertains to the use of Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft. One of the first acts of the US's resumed military aid program to Indonesia was to service and repair a number of its ageing C-130s, which Jakarta had struggled to maintain and acquire spare parts for during the arms embargo. This came following the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. The assistance package included the deployment of two technicians to Aceh with spare parts to repair five C-130s and members of Alaska's 517th Airlift Squadron. However, this bypassed the Congress-imposed ban so that the C-130s could be used in disaster recovery activities.[337] Yet the aircraft is widely suitable to

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[331] A L Freedman, *Political Participation and Ethnic Minorities: Chinese Overseas in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the United States* (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 106.
[332] S Eklöf, *Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia: The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and the Decline of the New Order (1986-98)* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2003), 113.
[333] Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto*: 73-4.
[334] Eklöf, *Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia*: 230; A Rabasa and J B Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1599, 45; G Robinson, 'Rawan is as Rawan Does: The Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh,' *Indonesia* (1998): 152.
[335] R B Cribb and A Kahin, *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia*, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 353-4.
[336] J Hitipeuw, 'Prabowo Runs for President,' *Kompas*, 22 Nov 2011.
[337] B Guerin, 'Myth and Reality: Indonesia's C-130 Hercules,' *Asia Times* (2005).

undertake a "limitless" range of combat, reconnaissance and assistance missions.[338] Since the embargo was lifted, Indonesian C-130 aircraft have continued to be used in various capacities throughout the entire Indonesian archipelago, from sending aid to victims of Sumatran floods in December 2006 and fighting annual forest fires, to earthquake responses in Yogyakarta in 2006, Sumatra in September 2009 and Aceh in April 2010.[339] These incidents are of an internal nature and reflect some of the competing strategic issues that Indonesia's policy makers often face.

Another example of Indonesia's pragmatism in relation to other states' military funding is in reference to the UK's sale of BAE Hawk combat aeroplanes to Jakarta. Indonesia had purchased British aircraft since the 1970s, and while there had been some British disquiet about Indonesia's occupation of East Timor since 1975, it was not until the mid-1990s that British concerns over the use of its military hardware to suppress insurgencies became much more pronounced. British aid to Indonesia had risen by 111% during the 10 year period ending in 1993, at a time where Indonesia was the fourth-largest UK arms purchaser. This increase facilitated Jakarta's purchases of British military hardware.[340] In 1993, BAE announced its intent to supply 24 Hawk combat aircraft (14 '100' series models and 10 '200' series models, plus an intended later purchase of 16 models),[341] a contract that was paired with Indonesian reassurances that the equipment would not be used against the East Timorese.[342] Despite this promise, reports later emerged that the aircraft were being used in military operations: not only in East Timor during its transition to independence in 1999, but also in a military offensive in Aceh to suppress the GAM.[343] In 2003, the TNI's Commander-in-Chief, General Endriartono Sutarto justified the aircrafts' use in Aceh based on the armed forces' limited resources,

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[338] Ibid.

[339] 'Panglima TNI Ditunggu di Australia,' *Antara*, 16 Apr 2007; 'Penggantian Dua Pesawat Tempur TNI AU Ditunda,' *Antara*, 19 Feb 2009; 'TNI-AU Siapkan Dua Pesawat Pemotretan Udara,' *Antara*, 7 Apr 2010; Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of State Secretariat), 'Menuju Indonesia Bebas ASAP,' 25 Mar 2008 http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1660&Itemid=192; Republic of Indonesia (National Agency for Disaster Management), 'Laporan Harian PUSDALOPS,' 5 Oct 2009 http://www.bnpb.go.id/uploads/pubs/306.pdf, 4.

[340] M Phythian, 'Battling for Britain: British Arms Sales in the Thatcher Years,' *Crime, Law and Social Change* 26, no. 3 (1997): 290-1.

[341] A Acharya, *An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control*, Vol. 8, Pacific Strategic Papers (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 66; Phythian, 'Battling for Britain,' 293.

[342] Phythian, 'Battling for Britain,' 294.

[343] J Aglionby, 'Indonesia Uses UK Hawks in Aceh Offensive,' *Guardian*, 20 May 2003; R Dilley, 'The "Trainer" Jet the UK Loves to Hawk,' *BBC News*, 29 May 2002; B Wheeler, 'How Big is the UK Arms Trade?' *BBC News*, 9 Sep 2003.

stating that "[i]n order to cover the whole region and complete the job, I am going to use what I have. […] After all, I have paid already."[344] General Syafrie Suamsuddin similarly remarked, "[f]or us, we have already paid, so there is no problem. […] We use fighters to defend our sovereignty and against a sovereign target."[345]

The two examples illustrate how Indonesia has previously used foreign-sourced military hardware to pursue interests different to their originally designated purposes. There is therefore a prospect that stakeholder supplied equipment in the Malacca Strait would be used toward in other circumstances where needed. Aids to navigation, for example, might be physically located in the Strait but can free up Indonesia's resources to better manage navigation (or other strategic priorities) in its other waterways. Ocean going vessels can be easily transferred to different locations throughout the archipelago as needed.

Here, Japan's donation of the three high speed patrol craft in 2007 presents a noteworthy case. With bulletproof glass and armour protection, the vessels were technically designated as military equipment and thus clashed with Japan's overseas developmental assistance principles that prohibited arms exports. The Japanese Cabinet side stepped this regulation by waiving the arms restriction on the provision that the boats would only be used to tackle piracy and terrorism and could not be given to another country without prior approval.[346] It also meant that the vessels were assigned to POLAIR and not the TNI-AL, a prospect that Indonesian officials did not necessarily agree with. One rumour was that Indonesia refused to complete the signing ceremony to hand over the vessels on the grounds of its failure to agree with the conditions, although it signed the document the following day.[347] Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Soebijanto even sought to transfer them to the TNI-AL on the grounds that they had a better legal footing to uphold Indonesia's interests.[348] Ultimately, the boats were given to POLAIR and stationed at Riau's Tanjung Batu, at Belawan and at Medan.[349] Despite these indications that the vessels could perhaps have had broader uses, they have apparently been used for their mandated requirements. The ships were

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[344] J Aglionby, 'Military Chief Defends Use of British Jets,' *Guardian*, 22 May 2003.
[345] 'British-Made Jets "Used in Attack on Indonesia Villages,"' *Times*, 26 May 2003.
[346] 'Indonesia Cleared to Receive Patrol Boats,' *Japan Times*, 14 Jun 2006.
[347] GlobalSecurity.org, 'PG Hayabusa Class,' http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/hayabusa.htm.
[348] 'Sembilan Radar Rampung Dipasang di Selat Malaka Akhir 2007,' *Antara*, 9 Oct 2007.
[349] 'Tokyo Giving Jakarta Three New Patrol Boats,' *Straits Times*, 21 Jul 2005; 'Japan Gives Indonesian National Police Three Patrol Boats,' *Jakarta Post*, 1 Dec 2007.

used to respond when Petronas' tanker *Bunga Kelana 3* and the St Vincents and the Grenadines-registered carrier *Waily* collided in the Malacca Strait on 25 May 2010.[350] The *Anis Madu* was deployed to apprehend Malaysian smugglers approaching Dumai.[351] However, Indonesia has not hesitated in previous circumstances to employ whatever equipment is available to pursue its goals if needed.

Jakarta receives various forms of aid and assistance in order to bolster its maritime capabilities, some of which are specifically targeted to the country, plus some that have been part of trilateral burden sharing activities. Many others also have value for Indonesia's ability to address other strategic issues throughout the entire archipelago. This is not to say that this necessarily applies to every form of assistance, but as the weakest and largest of the three littoral countries Indonesia has the most incentive to do so. Indonesia's constrained contributions in securing the Malacca Strait are therefore useful as far as its receipt of external assistance is concerned, and especially since the sea lane is not particularly prominent in its strategic calculus. And while it might be easy to point out that the other two littoral countries also receive a variety of assistance from Strait stakeholders, Singapore can hardly apply such contributions in other geographic areas given that it is a small island state. Whether the same applies for Malaysia will be considered in the next chapter's case study analysis.

Traffic Diversions

Indonesia's constrained contributions indirectly present consequences for its stake in the transnational energy supply chain. If weakly patrolled—even only as far as Indonesia's waters are concerned—a vulnerable Malacca Strait could be conducive for merchant shipping to travel through other Southeast Asian sea lanes. In 2005 when the Joint War Committee of Lloyd's Market Association of London responded to the growing number of piracy incidents in the Malacca Strait and designated the area—including proximate Indonesian ports—as in danger of "war, strike, terrorism and

[350] R Ali, 'KP Anis Madu 649 Lakukan Sar Tabrakan MV Bunga Kelana,' Polisi Air, 2010 http://www.polair.or.id/index.php/component/content/article/1-berita-terbaru/385-kp-anis-madu-649-lakukan-sar-tabrakan-mv-bunga-kelana-3; A F Othman, S U Ariff, and L Gomez, 'Ship Crash Causes Oil Spill off Johor,' *New Straits Times*, 26 May 2009.
[351] J Primus, 'Polisi Tangkap Kapal Penyelundup,' *Kompas*, 9 Jun 2009.

related perils,"[352] there were large resultant insurance premium price hikes. Vessels carrying bulk quantities of crude oil faced the highest increase of all ship types. Nazery Khalid explained:

> The Lloyd's London underwriting market was reported to be quoting additional premiums, calculated as a percentage of the value of a ship's hull and machinery, of 0.05% for base war risk cover and 0.01% for each transit of the Straits. This translates into around US$12,500 for the base war-risk premium for a small 1,100 TEU[353] container feeder vessel and US$2,500 for each passage through the Straits. In the case of a VLCC (very large crude carrier or 'supertanker'), this would rise to about US$63,000 for the base premium and US$12,600 for each transit.[354]

Although merchant shipping did not re-route away from the Strait in this instance,[355] there are mixed opinions about whether this could occur in response to future price increases. One Intertanko representative stated shortly after the Strait's new classification that "premiums would have to rise incredibly to make economic sense of re-routing."[356] President of Asia Pacific Energy Consulting Al Troner expressed a different view and argued that a large incident such as piracy in the waterway could influence the shipment of crude oil through the Sunda and Banda straits.[357]
If maritime traffic routes in Southeast Asia were diverted away from the Malacca Strait, and not necessarily just due to weak security provisions, Indonesia would be in a favourable position to capitalise on it.

Because of its low stake in transnational oil supplies in the Malacca Strait, Indonesia would be the least affected of the three littoral states in the event that shipping ceased to pass through the sea lane. This scenario was discussed as early as 1982 by Lee Yong Leng and remains relevant.[358] According to Lee, any kind of decrease in the value of the Malacca Strait as a conduit for world trade would realise long-term gains for Indonesia, as it would be likely to be paired with a rise in traffic

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[352] N Khalid, 'Security in the Straits of Malacca,' *Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* (2006).
[353] Twenty-foot equivalent units.
[354] 'Additional War Risk Premium Imposed,' *Star*, 5 Sep 2005, cited in Khalid, 'Security in the Straits of Malacca.'
[355] A Forbes, 'Should We Worry About Piracy?' in *Australia's Response to Piracy: A Legal Perspective*, ed. A Forbes, *Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs* (Canberra: Sea Power Centre-Australia, Department of Defence, 2010), 5.
[356] M Whitfield, 'Shippers Urge Reversal of Malacca Strait 'War Risk' Rating,' *ICIS News*, 5 Aug 2008.
[357] J Saul, 'Malacca Threat Raises Cost Stakes for Shippers,' *Reuters*, 4 Mar 2010.
[358] Lee, *Southeast Asia*: 85. See also F Chew, 'Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Regional Interests,' *Geddes Papers* (2005): 77.

through the archipelagic state's other north-south sea lanes.[359] Indonesia's three archipelagic sea lanes (ASL) as adopted by the IMO in 1998 include ASL I, consisting of the Sunda Strait, the West Java Sea and the Karimata Strait, which then forks towards the Singapore Strait the South China Sea to the northwest and northeast respectively; ASL II, which refers to the Lombok Strait, the Java Sea, the Makassar Strait and the Celebes Sea; and ASL III, which links the Indian Ocean, the Timor Sea and the Pacific Ocean.[360] Of these alternate sailing routes, Indonesia would gain the most from an increase in maritime traffic through ASL II.

The Lombok-Makassar route is the more likely diversion for shipping traffic, given its present use by carriers too large to use the Malacca Strait. Ships passing through ASL II would be required to add 1,000 nautical miles in distance and three days' sailing time to vessels originating from the Middle East. It would also mean that seaborne trade would bypass Singapore in favour of Indonesia's larger ports such as Padang, Cilacap and Makassar, and not the converse[361] (which is the current *status quo*). On a long-term time frame, this traffic increase would benefit Indonesia, for it would pass two of its largest refineries—Cilacap on the southern coast of Central Java, and Balikpapan on the east coast of Kalimantan. As Cilacap currently processes some quantities of Gulf oil[362] its configuration could be exploited. Since the route would pass Sulawesi's major port of Makassar, Indonesia would have an opportunity to develop existing port and oil infrastructure. Provided that its domestic oil production challenges could be overcome, Jakarta would be in a position to compete with Middle Eastern oil suppliers, which would face higher operating costs from having to sail greater distances on this alternate route.

An increase in shipping traffic through the Sunda Strait would realise only some increase in intraregional shipping traffic in the vicinity of Jakarta's port of Tanjung Priok. Michael Leifer noted in 1978 that the Sunda Strait encounters only some oil tankers sailing from Southwestern Sumatra, and much less often those originating from the Persian Gulf destined for passage through the Makassar Strait.[363]

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[359] Lee, *Southeast Asia*: 85.
[360] See A J Halliwell, 'How 'One of Those Days' Developed: Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes and the Charting Issues' (paper presented at the IHO/IAG Advisory Board on the Law of the Sea: Addressing Difficult Issues in UNCLOS, Monaco, 2003), 2.
[361] *First Five Year Development Plan 1969-1974*, 177, cited in Lee, *Southeast Asia*: 96.
[362] One report estimated in 2008 that up to 75% of Cilacap's oil input was of Asian and Middle Eastern origin. International Energy Agency and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Energy Policy Review of Indonesia*, 127.
[363] Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*: 76-7.

As the Sunda Strait's less frequent use is due to geographical factors that make it prohibitive to larger craft, it is unlikely that this shipping pattern has significantly changed since then, at least as far as the bulk transportation of oil is concerned. The Sunda Strait is far shallower than the Malacca Strait. Vessels in excess of 100,000 DWT do not pass through,[364] meaning that those of Malaccamax sizes are unable to use it. Even if passage were somehow possible such ships still could not enter the port of Tanjung Priok: its entrance, which is 11-12 metres deep at low water,[365] is too shallow for such carriers. Since most crude oil carriers weigh more than 100,000 DWT and Malaccamax tankers have drafts as much as 20.2 metres,[366] an immediate traffic diversion through the Sunda Strait is unlikely in the case of an impassable Malacca Strait. Over a longer time period, regional feeder routes would be adjusted to use the Sunda Strait. This would mean a greater amount of traffic in smaller vessels to Indonesia's regional ports, but still not those of Malaccamax capacity. Even so, given projections for Malacca Strait traffic to continue increasing, many vessels would still be unable to pass through the Sunda Strait.

Indonesia would be unlikely to realise much benefit from an increase in crude carrier traffic through the ASL III, the Ombai-Wetar passage, as there are no substantially sized ports or oil terminals nearby. Although Timor-Leste lies adjacent to the route (as it constitutes a portion of the Wetar Strait's southern coastline), the country's infrastructure is predominantly located on the south of Timor island facing the oil-rich Timor Sea. Noting also that Timor-Leste has been formally independent from Indonesia since 2002, Jakarta has little to gain by way of increased revenue from a diversion in this direction. This is not necessarily a problem since the route remains an indirect, time consuming and costlier means to reach East Asian oil consumers from the Middle East.

Indonesia's decision makers have not made explicit references to such scenarios, though there are some indicators that it would like to exploit alternate sea lanes for economic gain. According to a major policy report entitled *Masterplan Percepatan dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia* (Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development) that the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs released in 2011, one of Indonesia's

[364] Ho, 'The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,' 561.
[365] *Lloyd's List Ports of the World*, 1: 622.
[366] Bateman, Ho, and Mathai, 'Shipping Patterns in the Malacca and Singapore Straits,' 317.

national economic priorities is to exploit its sea lanes for growth with an emphasis on its eastern area. Doing so, the report claims, will improve Indonesia's maritime competitiveness, strengthen national security and enhance its economic sovereignty.[367] These are all issues Indonesia has elsewhere stressed as relevant to its archipelagic-wide strategic priorities. And while Indonesia's oil interests are for the time being grounded in managing its domestic fuel reliance as a net importer, the possibility remains that in more fortuitous times it will be better placed to supplement East Asia (or at least more than it does now). The fact that Indonesia is undertaking an ambitious strategy to upgrade its refining capacities and construct new processing facilities—many of which have Middle Eastern and East Asian investment partners—attests to this.

It is quite possible for a fledgling energy transit state to share the security burden of the transnational energy supply chain, even if it has no apparent transit oil interest in doing so. Indonesia's constrained contributions are consistent with my framework's predictions that it has no transit oil-based incentive to participate in Strait security activities. Its various avenues of cooperation has been proportionate to the priority Indonesia accords the Malacca Strait and has been a means to strengthen its maritime capabilities. After all, the main driver for Indonesia's post 9/11 Strait security participation was unrelated to its oil interests. Yet the analysis also revealed the potential for Indonesia to compete as far as exploiting its alternate sea lanes is concerned. As this would have favourable implications for Indonesia's other major refineries, it raises the prospect that fledgling energy transit states can still be motivated by their oil interests, even if they are not directly related to the transit supply's immediate circumstances. Indonesia's approach to Strait security can therefore be described as exhibiting elements of both cooperation and competition, most of which have taken steps to realise non-oil objectives.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has extended the baseline understandings of energy transit states' supply chain interests and policy choices. The Singapore case study confirmed a positive

[367] Republic of Indonesia (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs), 'Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development 2011-2025,' 2011 http://www.depkeu.go.id/ind/others/bakohumas/bakohumaskemenko/PDFCompleteToPrint(24Mei).pdf, 33.

correlation between a country's high transit oil stake and its motivation to adopt an active approach toward securing the transnational energy supply chain in the Malacca Strait. Examining Indonesia's position adjacent to Middle East-East Asia seaborne oil flows has allowed an alternate set of circumstances—namely, the consequences of having a low transit oil stake—to be incorporated into these findings.

Indonesia's oil interests have rarely been associated with the Malacca Strait's transit oil supplies. They have instead been fixed on exploiting its domestic hydrocarbon resources that are spread throughout the archipelago—long before Indonesia attained independence or the transnational energy supply chain emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. Despite being designated as a fledgling energy transit state on this basis, this has not meant that oil is unimportant. Indonesia's oil sector has had a fundamental role in national economic development and has served a variety of stakeholders' political interests. This chapter's task was to ascertain whether assumptions about Indonesia's interests and policy choices that were based on its low transit oil stake could explain its approach to securing the Malacca Strait.

Although Indonesia identifies a range of potential security challenges in the waterway, it has not ascribed to threat assessments that prioritise piracy and maritime terrorism like its more enmeshed neighbour Singapore. Rather, Indonesia has devoted attention to more conventional issues associated with its sovereignty at sea and the integrity of its maritime borders. This has reflected an overarching security doctrine emphasising national unity as opposed to a unique Strait-centric stance. It is thus consistent with the energy transit state framework's prediction that a fledgling energy transit state would attribute a low strategic priority to its transnational energy supply chain.

The fact that Indonesia had participated *at all* in ensuring the security of the Malacca Strait when it had no transit oil-based incentive to do so sat uneasily with the energy transit state framework and warranted closer investigation. The chapter found that Indonesia's constrained contributions in sharing the Strait security burden has not only reflected the resourcing challenges its maritime agencies face throughout the entire archipelago, but were proportionate to its stated security priorities. It also found that Indonesia is sometimes motivated to secure the Strait by its desire to be seen as a capable actor in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's efforts have also produced two secondary consequences. Being a constrained contributor has meant that Indonesia is more likely

receive assistance from other stakeholders interested in a secure Malacca Strait, which can benefit its national maritime capabilities. It is also raises the prospect that Indonesia's other major sea lanes would become preferred routes for transnational oil and in doing so benefit its other geographically spread oil infrastructure. In other words, it is in Indonesia's interests, including its oil interests, to be a weak player in security activities addressing the waterway.

As an historical oil supplier to East Asian consumers (and thus a supplementer to the shipments traversing the Malacca Strait), Indonesia is not immune from the competitive dynamics of transit oil, even though the transnational energy supply chain is not prominent in its strategic agenda. It is not yet certain whether or how Indonesia's transition to become a net oil importer is changing. A greater level of Middle Eastern involvement in Indonesia's oil sector can be expected at least throughout the next decade or two, as this is the estimated period before with local infrastructure initiatives to restore the country's oil exporter status are scheduled to come into effect. If this occurs, then it will be important to monitor whether Indonesia's approach to Strait security changes.

Despite having cooperated through a variety of mechanisms with the Malacca Strait's two other littoral countries (and other stakeholders) to protect the sea lane, Indonesia has been motivated by a particular set of geostrategic interests—and ones that at this stage of the analysis can be said to diverge from the survival-centric goals underpinning Singapore's active leadership. Having ascertained the near polar differences between the two countries' oil interests, only Malaysia's energy transit state position—and how it fits relative to its littoral neighbours—now remains to be examined. Chapter Four takes this as its core purpose.

CHAPTER FOUR
MALAYSIA: A RISING ENERGY TRANSIT STATE

In April 2004, in response to a statement by Singapore's Minister of Defence Teo Chee Hean that securing against terrorism in maritime Southeast Asia was a challenge that no single state could address alone, Malaysia's Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar claimed that such concerns in the Malacca Strait should be addressed with Malaysia and Indonesia.[1] As his words came shortly after the abortive United States' (US) Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) proposal, Hamid Albar's statement was more than just a passing remark. In one respect it illustrates Malaysia's longstanding view that protecting the Strait is a responsibility for the three littoral countries—Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia—and a stance that Indonesia has ardently reiterated. It also indicates that Kuala Lumpur's interests in the sea lane have not always perfectly converged with Singapore's.

As the third and final case study on Southeast Asian energy transit states presented here, this chapter examines whether Middle East-East Asia oil shipments influence Malaysia's interests and policy choices. Like the previous two cases that explored Singapore's and Indonesia's positions, it is based on the proposition that the nature of Malaysia's oil interests—and specifically, their relation to the transit supplies—are a primary indicator of the country's security preferences directed toward the Malacca Strait. For Malaysia, the answer is not straightforward. Most of its domestic reserves are located offshore to the Malaysian Peninsula's north and northeast, whereas its major critical energy infrastructures are positioned alongside the Malacca Strait's coastline. On the basis of this—being neither 'enmeshed' nor 'independent' of transit oil like its two neighbours—this chapter argues that Malaysia has a moderate stake in the Malacca Strait's transit oil. It therefore matches the energy transit state framework's 'rising energy transit state' type.

The dual nature of Malaysia's transit oil interests creates difficulties for understanding its maritime security decision making. Do Malaysia's policy elites prioritise security challenges related to piracy and maritime terrorism like Singapore,

[1] P Vijian, 'M'sia Continues to Bolster Maritime Security,' *Financial Times* 27 Apr 2004, cited in Y-h Song, 'RMSI and Enhancing Security in the Straits of Malacca,' in *Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and International Cooperation*, ed. S Wu and K Zou (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 115.

or have they adhered to principles of sovereignty in the Strait like Indonesia? Has Malaysia's commercial oil interests in the waterway encouraged an 'active leadership' approach to security activities, as occurred with Singapore, or do non-oil factors motivate 'constrained contributions' like Indonesia? Alternatively, is Malaysia's approach to Strait security somehow a combination of the enmeshed and fledgling extremes, or does it exhibit entirely different traits altogether? Answers to these questions can be developed through an analysis of Malaysia's energy transit state position. Doing so offers a means to uncover additional links between transit oil and states' posturing, and in particular ones that the previous two cases may have overlooked due to their contrasting positions according to the energy transit state framework.

Assessing Malaysia's Position as an Energy Transit State

Malaysia's national oil company Petronas (*Petroliam Nasional Berhad*) is a central actor in the country's energy sector. It has engaged in a diverse range of activities spreading beyond 'core businesses' such as exploration, extraction, refining and petrochemical manufacturing. The iconic Petronas Twin Tower skyscrapers that dominate Kuala Lumpur's city skyline, once the tallest in the world, reflect the company's commercial success since it was created under the 1974 Petroleum Development Act. In 1998, its efforts extended into maritime trading when it acquired the Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (MISC) Berhad (Malaysia's largest shipping company, which owns and operates the world's largest fleet of liquid natural gas bulk carriers),[2] of which it currently holds a majority (63%) share.[3] When it incorporated the MISC's Maritime Academy of Malaysia into the company group,[4] it added to an existing educational portfolio that included the wholly owned subsidiary

[2] Oxford Business Group, *The Report: Malaysia* (Oxford Business Group, 2010), 138.
[3] MISC Berhad, *Annual Report: Weathering the Storm, Rising above Challenges*, (2011), http://www.misc.com.my/misc/pdf/publications_pdf_nn6la5.pdf, 12, 96. In January 2013, Petronas announced it was seeking a full takeover of the MISC. Petronas, 'Notice on Conditional Take-over Offer on MISC Berhad,' 2013 http://www.petronas.com.my/media-relations/media-releases/Pages/article/Notice-on-Conditional-Take-Over-Offer-on-MISC-Berhad-.aspx.
[4] Petronas, 'ALAM,' http://www.petronas.com.my/community-education/education/education-training-institutions/Pages/education-training-institutions/alam.aspx.

the Petronas University of Technology.[5] In addition, Petronas conducts numerous community projects as part of an ongoing corporate social responsibility program.[6]

While this depicts a company that has employed a multifaceted approach to facilitating Malaysian development, it has also engaged in controversial financial bailouts when acting on Government instructions. Being legally accountable to the Prime Minister,[7] such practices were prolific during Mahathir bin Mohamed's tenure. Petronas paid RM2.3 billion in 1984 to rescue Bank Bumiputra after its loans to a Hong Kong firm defaulted, purchased a Boeing 747 aircraft for Malaysia Airlines in 1985, and in 1989 spent RM982 million rescuing Bank Bumiputra a second time when property prices declined.[8] The MISC acquisition faced scandal too, for it led to Petronas' purchase of the financially troubled Konsortium Perkapalan, which was owned by Mahathir's son.[9] In 1999, Petronas invested in Mahathir's "pet project," the national (and failing) automobile manufacturer Proton, only to relinquish its stake after thirteen months.[10] Petronas also underwrote the costs associated with Putrajaya, the planned administrative capital adjacent to Kuala Lumpur.[11] And when an opposition party—the Islamic Party of Malaysia—won the Terengganu seat in the 1999 federal election, Mahathir reacted by declaring that Petronas' revenues from the Kertih refinery located in Terengganu were to bypass state coffers and be sent to Kuala Lumpur instead[12]—an issue that has since been an ongoing source of tension.[13]

A glance at Petronas' business profile illustrates its prominent role within Malaysia's economy and political system. Any analysis of Malaysia's relationship with the transnational shipment of crude and refined oil through the Malacca Strait

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[5] Petronas established the University of Technology following Government request in 1997. Universiti Teknologi Petronas, 'About the University,' http://www.utp.edu.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=1901.

[6] Petronas, 'Community and Education,' http://www.petronas.com.my/community-education/Pages/default.aspx.

[7] Article 3 (2) states that "[Petronas] shall be subject to the control and direction of the Prime Minister who may from time to time issue such direction as he may deem fit." Malaysia (Attorney General's Chambers of Malaysia), 'Laws of Malaysia: Act 144: Petroleum Development Act 1974: Incorporating All Amendments up to 1 January 2006,' 2006 http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol. 3/Act 144.pdf, 6.

[8] L Lopez, 2003, cited in L Lopez, 'Petronas: Reconciling Tensions between Company and State,' in *Oil and Governance: State-Owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply*, ed. D R Hults, M C Thurber, and D G Victor (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 827; Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy*: 221.

[9] Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy*: 220-1.

[10] Lopez, 'Petronas,' 828.

[11] Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy*: 221.

[12] Lopez 2003, cited in Lopez, 'Petronas,' 828-9.

[13] C Chooi, 'PKR Wants Putrajaya-Terengganu Oil Royalty Settlement Revealed,' *Malaysian Insider*, 24 Apr 2012.

from Middle Eastern producers to East Asian consumers would therefore have to take this into consideration.

Contemporary Scholarship on Malaysia's Transit State Status

Discussions falling within the broad scope of International Relations scholarship do not provide much guidance about the strategic implications of Malaysia's oil interests. While Petronas is acknowledged within numerous studies devoted to assessing the country's economic development, these are rarely more than token recognitions of the national oil company's historical significance and its politically sensitive activities under Mahathir's Prime Ministership.[14] This is not to say that such contributions are not without value. Rather, Malaysia's oil resources and Petronas tend to be dealt with using either only economic parameters or as examples of government hydrocarbon management.

More in-depth analyses of Malaysia's oil sector do exist, though the majority are in need of updating to reflect contemporary politics. Bruce Gale's informative political history of Petronas concludes that the national oil company's activities have long been intertwined with government interests. But this was published in 1981 and has had no post-Cold War equivalent to succeed it.[15] Wan Leong Fee's 'Malaysian Energy Policy: An Economic Assessment,' as its name suggests, develops a detailed overview of Malaysia's energy mix, and Petronas' position within it. Its value lies in identifying major governmental agencies responsible for developing or upholding Malaysian energy policy, though it was published in 1991.[16] This two-decade long void has partially been filled by Leslie Lopez's 2011 examination of Petronas. For Lopez, while the state-national oil company relationship has been strained at times, and its expansion to realise a more global trading position will necessitate a continued

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[14] For example *Globalization and National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia*, ed. J M Nelson, J Meerman, and E Abdul Rahman (Singapore; Bangi: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; Institute of Malaysian and International Studies, 2008); C Barlow, *Modern Malaysia in the Global Economy: Political and Social Change into the 21st Century* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001); C O Fong, *The Malaysian Economic Challenge in the 1990s: Transformation for Growth* (Singapore: Longman Singapore, 1989), 120; E T Gomez and K S Jomo, *Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage, and Profits*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge; Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999); K S Jomo, *Malaysian Eclipse: Economic Crisis and Recovery* (London; New York: Zed, 2001); M B Musa, *Malaysia in the Era of Globalization* (San Jose: Writer's Club Press, 2002); T Williamson, 'Incorporating a Malaysian Nation,' *Cultural Anthropology* 17, no. 3 (2002).

[15] B Gale, 'Petronas: Malaysia's National Oil Corporation,' *Asian Survey* 21, no. 11 (1981).

[16] W L Fee, 'Malaysian Energy Policy: An Economic Assessment,' in *Energy Market and Policies in ASEAN*, ed. S Sharma and F Fesharaki (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 103.

adeptness at risk mitigation, Petronas' commercial success has led it to be upheld as an exemplar for national oil companies throughout the international system.[17]

Evident among these contributions is an overt focus on Malaysia's hydrocarbon exploitation and one that scarcely considers whether non-domestic resources—such as transit oil—factor in Malaysia's strategic decision making. This omission is perhaps understandable given Petronas' pervasive and successful commercial activities. Alternatively, it might be the case that non-Malaysian oil has played only a marginal role. Closer examination of the Malacca Strait's transit oil from a Malaysian perspective thus not only offers a means to resolve this. It can also help shed light on Petronas' role in broader terms than purely economic ones.

Such a study can be framed against prevailing understandings of Malaysia's foreign policy and defence policy making. Abdul Razak Baginda has described Malaysia's external conduct as being guided by a desire to realise global peace and justice.[18] While admirable for its optimism, this view is so broad that it does not have much direct application for exploring Malaysia's approach to transit oil. And although there is a "particular knowledge tradition" of Malaysia's international relations in academia,[19] contributions provide only bare guidelines for how an energy transit state analysis might fit within existing work.

These guidelines can be grouped into two main areas. First, the diversity among studies addressing Malaysia's strategic conduct in the international system precludes any overarching theme from being drawn out and applied to the country's involvement in Strait security activities. Marvin C. Ott's early study of Kuala Lumpur's foreign policy decision making identified an elite consensus on economic development, a 'Westernised' outlook, a rejection of communism and support for international organisations.[20] Tang Siew Mun has observed multilateralism, regionalism, Islamic solidarity and non-alignment as core traits.[21] Johan

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[17] Lopez, 'Petronas,' 810-1.
[18] A R Baginda, 'Introduction,' in *Malaysia's Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change*, ed. A R Baginda (Shah Alam: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2007), ix.
[19] For a detailed analysis of Malaysia's international scholarship in higher education, see K Balakrishnan, 'International Relations in Malaysia: Theories, History, Memory, Perception, and Context,' *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 9, no. 1 (2009).
[20] Ott, 'Foreign Policy Formulation in Malaysia.' For an extended list of early works on the emergence of Malaysian foreign policy, see J Saravanamuttu, 'ASEAN in Malaysian Foreign Policy Discourse and Practice, 1967-1997,' *Asian Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 1 (1997): 35. See also Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy*: 9.
[21] S M Tang, 'Malaysia and Northeast Asia,' in *Malaysia's Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change*, ed. A R Baginda (Shah Alam: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2007), 92.

Saravanamuttu's constructivist assessment of Malaysian 'middlepowermanship' similarly concludes that four traditions spanning neutralism, regionalism, globalisation and Islam have emerged in the first five decades of its foreign policy making.[22] These themes are reflected in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' own description of a Malaysian foreign policy that consists of peaceful, independent and principled interactions, active multilateralism through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of Islamic Conference. Accordingly, Malaysia supports conflict resolution, economic partnership and international law.[23] Though there are broad consistencies among these varying accounts, together they provide a jumbled background for assessing Malaysia's transit state position. Are the traits equally relevant, or are some more important than others? In a review of Malaysia's external security conceptions, K. S. Nathan notes that ASEAN is the priority, then Islamic states, followed by Malaysia's non-aligned commitments, Commonwealth countries and all other states.[24]

The second issue facing understandings of Malaysia's international politics is the disproportionate and longstanding emphasis attributed to decision makers' personality traits compared to structural factors—such as an energy transit state's geography—in the construction of its foreign policy and defence policy. Ott observed this in 1971[25] and has argued that Malaysia's pronouncements about its strategic direction "is an elite dominated process:"[26]

> Since independence (1957) the formulation of Malaysian foreign policy has been the virtual prerogative of a small stable elite comprising four or five men. Largely impervious to domestic political pressure, the values and perceptions of this group exercised an often decisive impact upon policy. The result was a decision-making process characterized by informal conversations and personal, as opposed to institutional, relationships.[27]

Others have continued to flag this. For Saravanamuttu:

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[22] Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy*: 4, 16.
[23] Malaysia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 'Malaysia's Foreign Policy,' http://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/foreign_policy.
[24] K B Teik, *Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995, cited in K S Nathan, 'Malaysian Foreign Policy: Evolution of Strategic Interests in a Changing Domestic, Regional and Global Context,' in *Malaysia's Defence and Security since 1957*, ed. A R Baginda (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Strategic Research Centre, 2009), 70.
[25] M C Ott, 'The Sources and Content of Malaysian Foreign Policy toward Indonesia and the Philippines: 1957-1965' (PhD thesis, John Hopkins University, 1971).
[26] Ott, 'Foreign Policy Formulation in Malaysia,' 239.
[27] Ibid., 225.

> Malaysian foreign policy has been persistently marked by objectives premised on 'national needs,' or in the conventional language of foreign policy discourse, 'national interests,' as mediated through the prism of its 'elite ideology.'[28]

Saravanamuttu's analysis of Malaysia's foreign policy concludes that constructivism served as the best way to understand Malaya's transition to become Malaysia. Ideas and identity bolstered its approach to regionalism and has manifested itself in various forms of middle power posturing.[29]

It is no wonder that there is a proliferation of studies devoted to the processes of Malaysian elites' decision making. According to Saravanamuttu in 1997, each premiership exhibits "its own distinctive style, economic and political predilections."[30] While all Prime Ministers have been targeted,[31] a majority centre on Mahathir, which is understandable given his 22-year tenure as head of government.[32] These typically characterise Mahathir as a charismatic iconoclast and "leader of the Third World" whose promotion of nationalism and economic reform often manifested as 'anti-western' visions to help engender a Malaysian-influenced regional order. Many of his policies echoed those of his predecessors, though his controversial 'Buy

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[28] Saravanamuttu, 'ASEAN in Malaysian Foreign Policy Discourse and Practice, 1967-1997,' 35.

[29] Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy*: 346. This monograph has been positively appraised for its insight into the construction of Malaysian foreign policy. Geoffrey C. Gunn has reflected, for example, that Saravanamuttu's "critical constructivist approach to foreign policy outputs in general begs emulation by scholars working on Malaysia's ASEAN neighbours." B T C Guan, 'Malaysia's Foreign Policy: The First Fifty Years: Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism,' *Kajian Malaysia* 29, no. 1 (2011): 122; G C Gunn, 'Malaysia's Foreign Policy: The First Fifty Years: Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism,' *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 41, no. 4 (2011): 680; R Sathiah, 'A Study on Malaysia's Foreign Policy,' *Star*, 12 Dec 2010.

[30] Saravanamuttu, 'ASEAN in Malaysian Foreign Policy Discourse and Practice, 1967-1997,' 48.

[31] The following titles are a representative though not exhaustive list: A Abdullah, *Tengku Abdul Rahman Dan Dasar Luar Malaysia, 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1987); A T Al-Attas and T C Ng, *Abdullah Ahmad Badawi: Revivalist of an Intellectual Tradition* (Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2005); W Chamil, *Abdullah Ahmad Badawi: Perjalanan Politik PM ke-5* (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan, 2004); K Md Khalid, 'Malaysia's Foreign Policy under Najib,' *Asian Survey* 51, no. 3 (2011); J V Morais, *Hussein Onn: A Tryst with Destiny* (Singapore: Times Books International, 1981); Ott, 'Foreign Policy Formulation in Malaysia;' P A Samad, *Tun Abdul Razak: A Phenomenon in Malaysian Politics: A Political Biography* (Kuala Lumpur: Affluent Master, 1998). Self-penned reflections include N Razak, *Globalising Malaysia: Towards Building a Developed Nation* (Selangor: Malaysia Publishing House, 2006). Mahathir has written numerous monographs such as M Mahathir, *The Malay Dilemma* (Singapore: D. Moore for Asia Pacific Press, 1970); M Mahathir, *A Doctor in the House: The Memoirs of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad* (Petaling Jaya: Malaysia Publishing House, 2011).

[32] For example B T Khoo, *Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad* (Kuala Lumpur; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); R S Milne and D K Mauzy, *Malaysian Politics under Mahathir*, (London; New York: Routledge, 1999); Chapter Three of S Nair, *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy* (London; New York: Routledge, 1997); B Wain, *Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times*, 2nd ed., Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific Series (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

British Last' and 'Look East' policies of the early 1980s, advocacy for an East Asia Economic Grouping, and recognition of distinct 'Asian values' in the 1990s are usually attributed as part of a 'Mahathiri legacy.'[33]

These contributions, while valuable, are inadequate for understanding Malaysia's stake in transit oil. This is because they imply that its geography is only marginally relevant to how strategic policy is developed. And while Nathan has reflected that Malaysia's geography is nominally related to policy pronouncements, it tends to be dismissed as simply one of many other factors:

> Malaysia's conception of, and approach to global security is directly influenced by historical, ideological, domestic, structural, and geographical factors in its immediate as well as distant geo-strategic environment.[34]

Ultimately, Nathan concludes that Malaysian foreign policy is a process of how agency factors (including the role of elite decision makers) manage structural constraints (such as geography).[35] This focus on decision makers has not helped understandings about Malaysia's geostrategy. Noting the preliminary indications of Petronas' substantive political and economic clout and Malaysia's position as an energy transit state, analysing the country's involvement in Middle Eastern oil flows destined for East Asia is a useful undertaking. The energy transit state framework articulated in this thesis offers a means to do this, and the findings can then be used as a basis to unpack Malaysia's interests and policy choices in protecting the Malacca Strait.

The Energy Transit State Framework and Malaysia's Transit State Status

This section assesses Malaysia's position as an energy transit state in relation to the transnational shipment of oil from the Middle East to East Asia. Resolving which of the three energy transit state types—'fledgling,' 'rising' or 'enmeshed'—best reflects its circumstances depends on Malaysia's stake in the transiting oil supply.

In accordance with the energy transit state framework's requirements that were set

[33] K He, *Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic Interdependence and China's Rise* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 139-40; G P Lopez, 'Mahathir's Regional Legacy,' East Asia Forum, 17 Jun 2010 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/17/mahathirs-regional-legacy. See also I Stewart, *The Mahathir Legacy: A Nation Divided, a Region at Risk* (Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2003).
[34] Nathan, 'Malaysian Foreign Policy,' 60.
[35] Ibid., 92.

forth in Chapter One, doing so requires an understanding of what the supply chain has meant for Malaysia and its oil sector's overall strategic importance.

When oil producers located on the Arabian Peninsula began to expand their consumer bases to include Japan following the Second World War's conclusion, Malaysia was on the verge of becoming an independent state and its domestic oil exploration and production activities were in their infancy. The Federation of Malaya was officially established on 31 August 1957, which closely followed Egyptian President Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal the previous year. Consequently, Malaysia did not face the same opportunity as Singapore to capitalise on the emerging transnational energy supply chain when it became independent almost one decade later in 1965. And although Malaysia's early oil exploration experiences trace to the late 19th century like Indonesia, Kuala Lumpur's postwar oil interests were not yet committed to exploiting local reserves like its archipelagic neighbour. Hydrocarbon resources were discovered in Borneo during the 1870s, with Shell and Exxon being early producers in the area.[36] However, the prevailing opinion that the Malaysian landmass contained marginal oil resources, low international oil prices and a lack of technology all meant that Malaysia's oil activities stagnated beyond the first half of the 20th century.[37] Malaysia's major commodities consisted of tin, rubber and palm oil at independence,[38] after which its commercial oil production activities intensified.[39] At 1960, Shell had built (and was operating) a refinery in Port Dickson, as was Esso three years later.[40] At the time when the Middle East-East Asia transnational oil supply chain was emerging, Kuala Lumpur was not as fixated on its domestic oil sector as Indonesia was. Nor did it face pressure to mitigate resource scarcity and national survival issues through hydrocarbon industries like Singapore.

These factors suggest that Malaysia's transit oil interests were very much in a 'middle' position relative to its two neighbours. This has continued to feature in Malaysia's energy sector. Malaysia is not an especially prominent actor in global energy trading and shares neither Singapore's blanket reliance upon, nor Indonesia's relative independence from, the transnational supply of oil shipped through the

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[36] Lopez, 'Petronas,' 811.
[37] Ibid; Gale, 'Petronas,' 1131.
[38] M Ariff and G P Lopez, 'Malaysia,' in *The Political Economy of Trade Reform in Emerging Markets: Crisis or Opportunity?* ed. P Draper, P Alves, and R Sally (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009), 119.
[39] Gale, 'Petronas,' 1131; Lopez, 'Petronas,' 811.
[40] Business Monitor International, *Malaysia Oil and Gas Report Q3 2013*, 43.

Malacca Strait. Indeed, Malaysia's domestic oil activities exhibit qualities of both its littoral neighbours. This characteristic becomes evident when profiling its oil activities.

Oil and Malaysia's Strategic Interests: Malaysia is endowed with a small and prosperous oil sector whereby crude and refined petroleum accounts for half of its primary energy supply.[41] Its proven oil reserves are estimated at 5.9 billion barrels,[42] a far greater amount than what its resource-poor neighbour, Singapore, can lay claim to. This quantity is not substantial at an international level. Representing only 0.4% of the world's total oil reserves, it is comparable to those of Indonesia, Vietnam and Australia.[43] In fact, its reserves are so unremarkable that if all countries in the international system are ranked by the size of their oil reserves, Malaysia is almost the precise mathematical median.[44] That Malaysia is a medium-sized actor in oil is underlined by the fact that its 539,000 barrels per day of refinery capacity is dwarfed by both Singapore (1.4 million barrels) and Indonesia (1.0 million barrels).[45] Its average daily oil consumption between 2002 and 2011 of 561,000 barrels represents only 2.3% of the Asia Pacific's total, compared to Singapore's and Indonesia's respective consumption patterns that stand at 3.6% and 5.3%.[46] Malaysia's oil production—that is, the extraction of resources from the earth—is also moderate relative to its neighbours. As Figure 6 shows, Malaysia's production has not significantly fluctuated during the 1990-2011 period. Its stable output has represented

[41] According to the *Eighth* and *Ninth Malaysia Plan*, crude and refined oils accounted for 54% of Malaysia's primary energy supply in 1995, although this has gradually declined to 45% by 2010. See Table 11-3: Primary Commercial Energy Supply by Source, 1995-2005, in 'Chapter Eleven: Energy,' Malaysia (Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department), *Eighth Malaysia Plan 2001-2005*, (2001), http://www.epu.gov.my/en/eighth-malaysia-plan-2001-2005, 308; Table 19-3: Primary Commercial Energy Supply by Source, 2000-2010, in 'Chapter Nineteen: Sustainable Energy Development,' Malaysia (Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department), *Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010*, (2006), http://www.epu.gov.my/en/ninth-malaysia-plan-2006-2010, 395.

[42] British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012' 6.

[43] Where the three countries' oil reserves totalled 4.0 billion barrels (0.2%), 4.4 billion barrels (0.3%) and 3.9 billion barrels (0.2%) respectively at 2011's conclusion. Ibid.

[44] British Petroleum (BP) statistical data on world oil reserves traces to 1980. In 2010 the mathematical median equalled 5.5 billion barrels and Malaysia's reserves were estimated to be 5.9 billion barrels. In 2000 the median equalled 4.6 billion barrels and Malaysia's reserves 4.5 billion barrels. In 1990 Malaysia's oil reserves were estimated to be 3.6 billion barrels compared with a median of 3.3 billion barrels. However, in 1980 Malaysia's oil reserves were estimated at 1.8 billion barrels compared to a world median of 2.6 billion barrels. Data for these calculations were obtained from British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012: Historical Data.'

[45] United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Indonesia - Overview / Data;' United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Malaysia - Overview / Data,' 30 May 2013 http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=MY; United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Singapore - Overview / Data.'

[46] British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012' 9.

8.9% of the Asia Pacific's oil production for this period, whereas Indonesia's share is 17.4%.[47] Again, this is far more than Singapore, which has no domestic oil reserves and consequently no local oil production.

FIGURE 6: MALAYSIA'S OIL PRODUCTION: 1965-2011



Data taken from 'Oil Production - Barrels,' in British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012: Historical Data.'

The economic significance of oil to Malaysia can also be thought of as being in between Singapore and Indonesia, and can be illustrated using a measure devised by Michael Lewin Ross. For Ross, a country's 'oil reliance' is stated as the proportion of its fuel-based exports (by value) to its gross domestic product (GDP).[48] This calculation places Malaysia's oil reliance at 7%, which again falls between Singapore (36%) and Indonesia (1%).[49] And even though primary sector activities historically

[47] 'Oil Production - Barrels,' in British Petroleum, 'Statistical Review of World Energy 2012: Historical Data.'
[48] M L Ross, 'Does Oil Hinder Democracy?' *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (2001): 326.
[49] Using 2010 data in constant dollars. World Bank data profiles put Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's GDP at US$213 billion, US$708 billion and US$247 billion respectively in the year 2010.

dominated the Malaysian economy (in 1957 they represented half of its GDP), secondary industries have acquired a more substantial role since 1985.[50] Malaysia's oil exports are only one of several large sectoral revenue generators. The crude petroleum and refined products that Malaysia exported in 2012, while valued at some US$26 billion, only counted towards 11% of the total value of its exports that year. In comparison, one-third of Malaysia's exports were electrical and electronic products. Furthermore, Malaysia's palm oil product and integrated electronic circuit exports are each worth as much as its oil exports.[51]

While Malaysia's position in oil trading can be broadly profiled as occupying a midpoint between its neighbours, it should not be assumed that oil has no strategic significance for Kuala Lumpur. Like Singapore and Indonesia, Malaysia's oil sector was originally grounded in national strategy considerations, and this was evident with Petronas' establishment in 1974. Petronas was created as a means to exploit domestic oil and gas resources for the Malaysian public's benefit. This came as part of Prime Minister Abdul Razak's New Economic Policy, which sought to support *bumiputra* (ethnic Malay) constituents through economic reforms.[52] As discussed at this chapter's outset, Petronas has since been upheld as having a special role in furthering Malaysia's energy sector. Finance Minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah reflected in 2010 that doing so has also had broader strategic implications:

> The entire oil and gas wealth of Malaysia is vested in Petronas…it was not formed to privatize our oil and gas reserves but to safeguard our national sovereignty over them…it is charged with ensuring our energy security.[53]

The three countries' oil exports were valued at US$76 billion, US$10 billion and US$17 billion respectively. See Malaysia (Department of Statistics), *Yearbook of Statistics Malaysia 2011*, (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2012), http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/download_Buku_Tahunan/files/BKKP/2011/Buku_Tahunan_Perangkaan_Malaysia_2011[Laporan_Lengkap].pdf, 97; Republic of Indonesia (Ministry of Trade), 'Export Growth HS 6 Digits,' http://www.kemendag.go.id/en/economic-profile/indonesia-export-import/export-growth-hs-6-digits; Table 13.1, External Trade by Type, in Republic of Singapore (Department of Statistics), 'Yearbook of Statistics Singapore;' World Bank, 'World Indicators: GDP (Current US$),' http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.

[50] Malaysia (Ministry of Finance), cited in S K Hasan and I Yussof, 'Economic Development in Malaysia since Independence,' in *Malaysia's Economy: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Y Ishak (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Strategic Research Centre, 2009), 12.

[51] In 2012 palm oil and palm-based products, and electronic circuits represented US$24 billion each. Table 10: Exports of Major and Selected Commodities, Malaysia (Department of Statistics), 'Monthly External Trade Statistics,' 2011 http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/download_External/files/ExternalTrade/2011/DIS/PENERBITAN_DISEMBER_FULL_2011.pdf, 23-5.

[52] Gale, 'Petronas,' 1129-30.

[53] C Wright, 'Portents in Petroleum,' *Euromoney* (2010): 206.

Despite being initially modelled on Indonesia's national energy company, Pertamina, Petronas did not encounter the same pressure for economic performance. Where Pertamina's experience has been one of an ongoing struggle to export hydrocarbon resources to satisfy Jakarta's revenue needs (as detailed in Chapter Three), Kuala Lumpur already held a favourable balance of payments position due to its existing tin, rubber, palm oil and timber industries.[54] So successful has Petronas been that the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated that 40% of Malaysia's revenues for 2010 were made up of the company's dividends and taxes.[55] Hence, it is clear why Petronas has been referred to as the Malaysian Government's "unofficial banker."[56] Indeed, Petronas is the only Southeast Asian company to consistently rank highly on *Fortune* magazine's Global 500 (Forbes' annual listing of the world's largest companies), and its revenue was so great that it was placed in the world's top 100 biggest firms for 2008 (95th largest), 2009 (80th) and 2011 (86th). In comparison, no Indonesian firm has ever made the Global 500, and though Singapore's Flextronics International and Wilmar International often receive mention, they have not been serious competitors: in 2011 the two companies ranked 334th and 317th respectively.[57]

At this stage of the analysis, Petronas' commercial success might prompt the conclusion that Malaysia has little interest in the Malacca Strait's transit oil. Yet doing so would overlook an important characteristic of the national oil company's economic activity. Much of its revenue (58% according to the International Energy Agency, or IEA)[58] is actually derived from its international operations—which span upstream and downstream gas and oil activities in as many as 58 countries[59]—rather from within Malaysia. As at January 2011, Petronas has access to 8.6 billion barrels in crude oil equivalent and condensate global reserves: some 2.7 billion barrels of oil equivalent on top of Malaysia's reserves.[60] And although Petronas' major oil interests are diversified among Malaysian refineries, it also has an 80% stake in Engen

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[54] Gale, 'Petronas,' 1139.
[55] United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Malaysia,' 30 May 2013 http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=MY.
[56] Wright, 'Portents in Petroleum,' 200.
[57] Global 500 rankings available at CNN Money, 'Global 500,' http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/index.html.
[58] International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2009*, 608.
[59] Petronas, 'Annual Report,' 2011 http://www.petronas.com.my/investor-relations/Documents/annual-report/AnnualReport_FinancialStatement_2011.pdf, 3.
[60] If potentially recoverable contingent reserves are not included, then Petronas' access to global crude oil and condensate totals 4.7 billion barrels of oil equivalent, of which 3.6 billion barrels are located within Malaysia. Ibid., 39-42.

Petroleum's refinery in Durban, South Africa.[61] In other words, Petronas's financial achievements are not wholly based on exploiting Malaysian hydrocarbons. Rather, a substantial portion is intertwined with activities that stem from its position as a multinational conglomerate.

Conducting an overview of Malaysia's oil sector has revealed that oil is important but not vital to Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia's moderate oil output is overshadowed by its neighbours' and the financial success that Petronas has experienced is not wholly attributable to its domestic business activities. By the same token this analysis does not rule out the prospect for transit oil to factor in Malaysia's strategic agenda. At this stage of the analysis Malaysia's oil circumstances appears to match the 'rising energy transit state' type, for it seemingly fits the gulf between the 'fledgling' and 'enmeshed' ends of the spectrum. Determining whether these preliminary indications accurately account for Malaysia's energy transit state position requires a more detailed examination of the relationship between its oil sector and the Malacca Strait's transnational oil shipments—in other words, the second factor stipulated by the energy transit state framework.

Transit Oil and Malaysia: Malaysia's transit oil interests are affected by a discrepancy between the locations of its oil reserves and the infrastructure geared to handle it. Malaysia's oil fields are located far from the Malacca Strait. Six hydrocarbon basins—the Malay, Penyu, Sarawak, Sabah, Sulu and Tarakan basins—lie within (or partly within) Malaysia's territorial boundaries.[62] Though the Indonesia-Malaysia maritime border in the Strait bisects very small portions of the North Sumatra and Central Sumatra basins,[63] Malaysia extracts no oil or gas in the waterway.[64] Its producing fields are instead situated offshore near the Gulf of Thailand's continental shelf and near the South China Sea in the Malay, Sabah and Sarawak basins.[65] The largest, the Malay Basin, lies northeast of the Malaysian

[61] Ibid., 8.
[62] Fee, 'Malaysian Energy Policy,' 104.
[63] N Ramli, 'The History of Offshore Hydrocarbon Exploration in Malaysia,' *Energy* 10, no. 3-4 (Mar-Apr 1995), cited in Fee, 'Malaysian Energy Policy,' 105.
[64] T K Hooi, 'Natural Resources Exploitation and Utilisation,' in *Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia's Perspective*, ed. H M Ibrahim and H A Husin (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008), 82.
[65] United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Malaysia.'

Peninsula and south of the Mekong Delta. The Sarawak and Sabah basins, as their namesakes suggest, are located off Borneo's coast.[66]

Only some of Malaysia's oil facilities mirror this geographical spread.[67] East Malaysia's main oil ports and terminals are located alongside the South China Sea including at Bintulu, Lutong, Labuan, Sepangar Bay and Kuching, as well as the offshore floating production, storage and offloading unit *FPSO Kikeh*.[68] Shell operates a middle distillate synthesis plant at Bintulu[69] and a 45,000 barrel per day capacity refinery at Lutong which it sought to sell in the late 1990s.[70] Major infrastructure can also be found on the Peninsula's South China Sea coast. Petronas' small refinery at Kertih processes 49,000 barrels daily, which represents less than 10% of Malaysia's national oil refinery capacity.[71] A nearby tanker facility handles locally produced oil through two large terminals. The floating storage and offloading tankers such as the *FSO Puteri Dulang* and *FSO Cendor* provide offshore discharge points for oil extracted from beneath the seabed. Support facilities and services for the offshore activities are available at Kemaman.[72]

Most of Malaysia's major oil infrastructure is instead situated on the Malacca Strait side of the Peninsula. Oil refineries are positioned at Malacca and Port Dickson. In addition to the Kertih facility, Petronas operates two plants at Sungai Udang in the state of Malacca. With capacities of 100,000 and 129,000 barrels daily, they together constitute Malaysia's largest oil refinery complex. Shell's Port Dickson facility has a capacity of 109,000 barrels per day.[73] San Miguel's refinery (which is also located in Port Dickson, and, until August 2011, was owned by Esso)[74] can produce 86,000

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[66] The Penyu Basin is also located next to the Malay Basin, but is much smaller (5,000 square kilometres compared with 12,000 square kilometres). Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Berhad, 'Report on Malaysia Oil and Gas Exploration and Production,' 2011 http://www.bpmb.com.my/GUI/pdf/annual_report/2011/20.pdf; Fee, 'Malaysian Energy Policy,' 104; United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Malaysia.'
[67] A map illustrating locations of major oil and port infrastructure in Malaysia is given in Appendix D.
[68] *Lloyd's List Ports of the World*, Vol. 2 (London: Informa, 2010), 840-54.
[69] Shell Malaysia, 'About Shell MDS,' http://www.shell.com.my/home/content/mys/products_services/solutions_for_businesses/smds/about_smds.
[70] 'Shell Looking to Cut Costs, Sell Malaysia Refinery,' *Oil and Gas Journal* (1999).
[71] Business Monitor International, *Malaysia Oil and Gas Report Q3 2013*, 43.
[72] *Lloyd's List Ports of the World*, 2: 840-2.
[73] Business Monitor International, *Malaysia Oil and Gas Report Q3 2013*, 43.
[74] C Yap and B Porter, 'Esso Malaysia Falls by Record as San Miguel Buys at Discount,' *Bloomberg*, 18 Aug 2011.

barrels of oil every day.[75] Privately owned oil terminals are also spread adjacent to the Strait at Malacca, Port Dickson, Port Klang, Langkawi Island, Johor and Penang.[76]

While these refineries are generally aimed at ensuring petroleum independence for Malaysia,[77] their distance from the oil fields indicates that the facilities do not necessarily process domestic oil resources alone. After all, they sit adjacent to the Malacca Strait, one of the world's critical oil chokepoints. According to one estimate, Malaysia's refinery dependence on Middle Eastern oil was 74% in 1978 and following input diversification, reduced to 21% by 1987.[78] Petronas' two refineries at Malacca—PSR-1 and PSR-2—are each configured to process distinct oil blends, but both use different amounts on Middle Eastern crudes. Completed in 1994, the PSR-1 hydroskimming facility was constructed to refine locally sourced condensates and low sulphur crude oils from Terengganu and Sarawak,[79] though there have been deliberations to 'sour up' its configuration by using high sulphur content oil from the Middle East.[80] The PSR-2 refinery—commissioned in 1994 and completed in 1998[81]—was designed to process both 'sweet' and 'sour' crude imports for export purposes,[82] and is capable of handling a large proportion of Middle Eastern blends. According to PSR-2's second-largest stakeholder ConocoPhillips, much of the refinery's input consists of Middle Eastern oils[83] but its share of the output is directed toward other company owned downstream operations in the region, such as retail fuel sale in Thailand.[84] In 1999 at least 63% of PSR-2's 'crude slate' was reported to consist of Arabian Heavy, Iranian Heavy, Iranian Light, and Iraq's Basrah Light and

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[75] Business Monitor International, *Malaysia Oil and Gas Report Q3 2013*, 43.
[76] Owners include Petronas, Shell and Caltex. See Malaysia (Maritime Institute of Malaysia), 'Minor Ports and Jetties,' http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/web-links/malaysian-ports/minor-ports-and-jetties.
[77] Malaysia (Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department), *Sixth Malaysia Plan 1990-1995*, (1991), http://www.epu.gov.my/en/sixth-malaysia-plan-1990-19951, 313.
[78] Malaysia (Ministry of Energy, Telecommunications and Posts), *National Energy Balances Malaysia 1978-88* (Kuala Lumpur, Dec 1989,), cited in Fee, 'Malaysian Energy Policy,' 98-9.
[79] T Chang, 'JV Starts up Grassroots Refinery in Malaysia,' *Oil and Gas Journal* 97, no. 12 (1999): 49; M R Sarmidi et al., 'Overview Petrochemical Based Industries in Malaysia,' *ASEAN Journal of Chemical Engineering* 1, no. 1 (2001): 8-9; C Tan, 'Petronas Designs Sudan Refinery, Sees Decision Next Year,' *Oil Daily*, 7 Nov 2006.
[80] Tan, 'Petronas Designs Sudan Refinery, Sees Decision Next Year.'
[81] Business Monitor International, *Malaysia Oil and Gas Report Q3 2013*, 43; Chang, 'JV Starts up Grassroots Refinery in Malaysia,' 50-1.
[82] Malaysia (Economic Planning Unit, *Sixth Malaysia Plan 1990-1995*, 313; Sarmidi et al., 'Overview Petrochemical Based Industries in Malaysia,' 8-9.
[83] ConocoPhillips, 'Refining and Marketing,' 2011 http://www.conocophillips.com/EN/about/company_reports/fact_book/Documents/RM_International.pdf, 80.
[84] Sarmidi et al., 'Overview Petrochemical Based Industries in Malaysia,' 8-9.

Fao Blend, and as at 2009, Sudan's Dar Blend.[85] Or, put differently, Petronas' 2011 annual report details its refinery throughput in terms of Malaysian and non-Malaysian crude oil feedstock. Though it does not specify country sources, non-Malaysian crude has not since 2007 represented more than 24% of the aggregate input for all of Petronas' Malaysian refineries.[86]

Shell's Port Dickson plant also handles a variety of oils that range from Malaysia, the broader Asian region, as well as Middle Eastern and African crudes.[87] Shell has historically processed 29-31% of heavy Middle Eastern oil in Malaysia,[88] which probably reflects the addition of a long range catalytic cracking unit to the site in 1999.[89] Yet in 2007 Shell Refining Company reported that 17% of oils processed in Malaysia were sourced from the Middle East.[90] In 2009 this was stated to be only 6%,[91] and 8% in 2010.[92] With as much as 90% of its output being consumed locally,[93] there is only little indication of this facility's integration with transregional oil movements.

It is less clear whether San Miguel's Port Dickson refinery is flexible. The plant, which Esso established in 1963, is configured to refine 'light' and 'sweet' crudes (such as Malaysian Tapis and Saudi Aramco blends),[94] with its primary output

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[85] I Bramono et al., 'Gobal Downturn Will Narrow 2009-10 Margins, Utilizations for Asia-Pacific,' *Oil and Gas Journal* 107, no. 21 (2009): 51; Chang, 'JV Starts up Grassroots Refinery in Malaysia,' 51.

[86] The proportion of non-Malaysian oil inputs into Petronas' refineries was 22% in 2007, 19% in 2008, 17% in 2009, 18% in 2010 and 24% in 2011. Petronas, 'Annual Report,' 53.

[87] 'MISC Signs Contract of Affreightment with Shell Refining,' *Business Times*, 4 Jul 1996; 'Shell Refinery Co (FOM) Bhd,' *Business Times*, 13 Jul 1996; 'Shell Refining Company (Federation of Malaya) Berhad - Financial and Strategic Analysis Review,' *M2 Presswire*, 8 Apr 2009.

[88] Shell Refining Company (Federation of Malaya) Berhad, 'Annual Report 2007: High Reliability, People Excellence,' 2007 http://www-static.shell.com/content/dam/shell/static/src/downloads/annual-reports/2007/ar-2007.pdf, 33.

[89] Shell Refining Company (Federation of Malaya) Berhad, 'Company Background,' http://www.shell.com/src/about-src/company-background.html.

[90] Shell Refining Company (Federation of Malaya) Berhad, 'Annual Report 2007,' 33.

[91] Shell Refining Company (Federation of Malaya) Berhad, 'Annual Report 2009: Surpassing Limits,' 2009 http://s05.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell/static/src/downloads/annual-reports/2009/annual-report-2009.pdf, 46.

[92] Shell Refining Company (Federation of Malaya) Berhad, 'Investor Briefing Quarter 4 2010,' 2010 http://s04.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell/static/src/downloads/about-shell/our-performance/ibm-q410-investorpresentation.pdf, 9.

[93] 'Shell Refinery in Malaysia Hit by Fire - Report,' *Reuters*, 26 Dec 2007; N Khalid, 'Maritime Trade and Development,' in *Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia's Perspective*, ed. H M Ibrahim and H A Husin (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008), 110.

[94] Petron, 'Preliminary Offering Circular: Capital Securities,'(2013), http://www.petron.com/pdfs/disclosures/2013/Petron - Preliminary Offering Circular (Capital Securities) - ATTACHMENT (012213).pdf, 20.

of liquefied petroleum gas serving its service station network in Malaysia.[95] However, both Esso and San Miguel have stated intentions to diversify the refinery's oil inputs.[96] It could thus be expected to become more geared to non-Malaysian oil sources in the future, although there are no firm indications that this has happened just yet. Still, since at least one of the Malacca refineries processes quantities of Middle Eastern crudes, Malaysia can be considered to have some stake in transit oil supplies in the Malacca Strait.

This said, only some of Malaysia's oil imports are derived from Middle Eastern producers. Nor have Malaysia's oil exports been especially directed toward East Asia. In 1987, Malaysia imported an estimated 70% of its crude petroleum from Middle Eastern producers—Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—and the majority of Malaysian crude was exported to Japan (25%), South Korea (19%), Singapore (17%), Thailand (15%) and the Philippines (8%).[97] In 2010, Petronas figures reveal a similar distribution whereby almost half (49%) of Malaysia's crude imports were sourced from Gulf countries—namely Saudi Arabia (22%), the United Arab Emirates (13%), Iran (5%), Libya (5%) and Kuwait (4%). Some 60% of its exports went to Australia, Thailand and India. In comparison, only 14% was exported to China and South Korea that year.[98]

While these major commercial oil activities indicate a degree of transit oil involvement, Malaysia has a stated policy goal to become an oil and gas hub.[99] There are several projects under development that are located alongside the Malacca Strait, all of which capitalise on Malaysia's strategic geography to facilitate the movement of Middle Eastern oil. The Sungai Limau Hydrocarbon Hub has envisaged the construction of two oil refineries in Kedah, one of which Malaysia's Merapoh Resources is developing in Yan. These will become the country's largest refineries

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[95] Esso Malaysia Berhad, *Annual Report and Accounts*, (2006), http://www.exxonmobil.com/Malaysia-English/PA/Files/Esso_Malaysia_Berhad_2006_Annual_Report.pdf, 2; Oxford Business Group, *The Report: Malaysia*: 148; S Singh, 'Fire Breaks out at Esso Refinery,' *Star*, 16 Sep 2011.

[96] Esso Malaysia Berhad, *Annual Report and Accounts*, 2; San Miguel Corporation, 'SMC Buys Exxon Mobil's Downstream Oil Business in Malaysia,' 17 Aug 2011 http://www.sanmiguel.com.ph/2011/08/smc-buys-exxon-mobil's-downstream-oil-business-in-malaysia.

[97] Petronas, *Nada Petronas*, various issues, cited in Fee, 'Malaysian Energy Policy,' 90-1.

[98] Malaysia (Department of Statistics), *Petroleum and Natural Gas Statistics*, (Putrajaya: Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2011), http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/download_Mining/files/Petroleum/petroleum_gas_asli2011.pdf, 14-5.

[99] As stated in ministers' speeches such as the Deputy Minister and Prime Minister. D S C Lim, 'Speech at the Opening Ceremony of Production Optimisation Week Asia, the Westin, Kuala Lumpur,' 27 Jul 2011; Malaysia (Office of the Prime Minister), 'ETP in Overdrive with 19 Developments Worth RM67 Billion Major Investments in Oil, Gas and Energy, Business Services, Healthcare,' 11 Jan 2011 http://www.pmo.gov.my/?menu=news&page=1729&news_id=5819&news_cat=4.

when they commence operations in 2014. With investment from Hong Kong and the China National Petroleum Corporation, this refinery is envisaged to be an entry point for Middle Eastern crudes. Its 350,000 daily barrel capacity is intended to process Saudi Aramco's Arab Light and Arab Heavy blends, with Iran a potential secondary supplier.[100] Its output is also destined for Asia, and China has signed a 20-year contract to purchase more than half (200,000 barrels daily) of its products.[101] Qatar-backed Gulf Petroleum announced plans in 2008 to establish a facility of 100,000-150,000 daily barrel refining capacity, of which is expected to process oil from its Persian Gulf assets and export up to 60% of its output.[102] Malaysia's Pristine Oil has announced the construction of the country's first crude oil storage depot with the intention to refuel vessels transiting the Malacca Strait with East Asian destinations,[103] and British company Lenstar (which is involved in the storage facility through a joint venture with Middle Eastern interests) has also began to evaluate the possibility of constructing a refinery in the states of Malacca or Perak so as to service the region.[104]

Several projects relevant to the energy sector are underway in the Iskandar Development Region in Southern Johor. In 2005 Kuala Lumpur announced the Asia Petroleum Hub, a comprehensive petroleum facility on reclaimed island Tanjung Bin.[105] In 2011, Petronas announced its intention to build a 300,000 barrel capacity Refinery and Petrochemicals Integrated Development complex at Pengerang, Johor, to be operational by 2015. The complex is also expected to refine Middle Eastern crude and its strategic location at the southern mouth of the Singapore Strait to facilitate

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[100] 'Chinese to Fund Malaysia Refinery,' *Oil Daily*, 16 Jul 2009; 'Spotlight Now on Downstream Growth,' *Hydrocarbon Asia* (2010); Business Monitor International, *Malaysia Oil and Gas Report Q3 2012*, 28-9; K Yunus, 'Refinery May be Linked to Yan-Songkhla Pipeline,' *New Straits Times*, 28 Jul 2009.

[101] 'Merapoh to Build Rm36bil Oil Refinery in Kedah,' *Star*, 16 Jul 2009, 28-9; C Kok, 'Making Sense of Merapoh's Oil Refinery Project in Yan,' *Star*, 18 Jul 2009. In 2013 the Sungai Limau Hydrocarbon Hub project was reported as having stalled. 'Zipy Project Will Resume if BN Wins Kedah: Mukriz,' *New Straits Times*, 13 Apr 2013.

[102] 'Gulf Petroleum Eyes $5bln Malaysia Refinery Project,' *Reuters*, 17 Mar 2008; 'Qatar Firm to Build Oil Refinery in Malaysia,' *Xinhua*, 18 Feb 2008; 'Spotlight Now on Downstream Growth,' 20; C Sagaran, 'Qatar Firm to Build Oil Refinery in Manjong,' *New Straits Times*, 18 Feb 2008.

[103] A Lai, 'Storage Terminal in Pulau Besar to Boost Industry,' *Star*, 7 Nov 2008.

[104] 'Verwater Bina Terminal Minyak Rm1.25b di Malaysia,' *Utusan Online*, 16 Jun 2009; T C H Goh, 'Lenstar Keen on US$8 Billion Refinery and Complex in Malaysia,' *Edge Financial Daily* 13 Jul 2009; L Y-Sing, 'Lenstar Eyes $8 Bln Malaysian Oil Facilities - Report,' *Reuters*, 13 Jul 2009.

[105] 'Asia Petroleum Hub to Develop World's Largest Petroleum Hub,' *Bernama*, 27 Mar 2007; 'Singapore Faces its Challengers,' 1; K S Li, 'KIC to Develop Reclaimed Island in Tanjung Bin,' *Business Times*, 23 Sep 2005.

Middle East-East Asia oil movement.[106] And in 2012 Prime Minister Najib Razak announced the possibility for a discarded Taiwanese petrochemical plant to be added to the project, and of which could develop Pengerang into one of the region's major energy hubs.[107]

Malaysia is likely to develop a greater stake in transit oil as these projects come online. Along with existing refineries' gradual trends to process Middle Eastern 'sour' crude oils, it means that Malaysia will have a greater ability to "import beer and export champagne,"[108] especially given the prospect that Malaysia is predicted to become a net oil importer by 2015 at the latest.[109] For now, Malaysia should be described as a rising energy transit state. It is neither as integrated nor as independent from the transnational oil supply chain as its two neighbours, even though its Strait-side energy infrastructure build up offers to raise its transit oil stake to approach greater enmeshment. As one interviewee reflected, where Singapore depends on the sea lane as a critical lifeline, this is only partly true for Malaysia.[110] And while Malaysia has not shared Indonesia's membership experience in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Petronas' commercial success has resulted in a much more globally spread portfolio compared to Pertamina's relative stagnation. Having identified Malaysia to be a rising energy transit state, its approach to managing security issues in the Malacca Strait—first in terms of its interests and then in terms of its policy choices—can now be assessed.

MALAYSIA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE MALACCA STRAIT

Predicting Malaysia's security interests in the Malacca Strait based on its rising energy transit state position is no straightforward task. This is because rising energy transit states' interests and policy choices are potentially the most diverse of the three types considered in this thesis. On the one hand, since Malaysia's Strait-side

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[106] R Ahmad, 'Petronas Plans $20bn Refining, Petchem Complex,' *Reuters*, 13 May 2011; A F Othman, 'Pengerang - a Petroleum Hub in the Making,' *Business Times*, 15 Jul 2011.
[107] 'PM: Pengerang to be Major Oil and Gas Hub in Asia Pacific (Update),' *Star*, 13 May 2012.
[108] A K Rhodes, 'Demand, Deregulation May Attract More Refiners to Asia,' *Oil and Gas Journal* 93, no. 19 (1995): 41.
[109] According to varying estimates in 'Malaysia's Net Oil Import Status Delayed - Petronas,' *Reuters*, 5 Jun 2005; 'Malaysia Likely to be Net Oil Importer by Next Year,' *Bernama*, 27 May 2010; 'Malaysia Sets Tax Breaks for Crude,' *Oil and Gas News*, 6 Dec 2010; N J Watson, 'Assailed at Home, Petronas Looks Abroad,' *Petroleum Economist*, 1 Aug 2008; K Yunus, 'Malaysia Region's Sole Net Oil Exporter by 2014,' *New Straits Times*, 8 Jun 2010.
[110] Interviewee 2359.

infrastructure is reminiscent of Singapore's position as a regional oil and maritime logistics hub, it could be expected to share its small neighbour's sensitivity to non-state actors' unauthorised activities at sea. Chapter Two found that Singapore emphasised the threat of piracy and maritime terrorism in the Malacca Strait because it saw them as challenges to its Global City survival strategy. This was linked to Singapore's ability to refine Gulf crude oil. As Malaysia is not yet as invested in the transit supply as Singapore, it is unlikely to uphold quite the same oil-centric concerns.

In contrast, like Indonesia, Malaysia's domestic oil production has long been driven by its major oil reserves that are located far from the Malacca Strait. On this basis, Kuala Lumpur might be expected to be unconcerned about potential security challenges in the waterway. Indeed, Chapter Three found that Indonesia has downplayed threats of piracy and maritime terrorism due to a wide range of competing priorities throughout its entire archipelago, many of which are unrelated to oil. Instead, Jakarta is more concerned about upholding principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Strait. Malaysia's domestic oil activities are not quite as withdrawn from the transnational supply chain as Indonesia's. For this reason, non-oil factors may not drive Malaysia's priorities in the sea lanes to quite the same extent. With these two countervailing possibilities in mind, this section aims to identify Malaysia's security interests in the Malacca Strait and then determine whether and how they marry up to its transit oil stake.

Kuala Lumpur's key decision makers and official policy documents recognise the Malacca Strait's strategic importance.[111] When speaking at the 3rd Asia Economic Summit in Kuala Lumpur on 28 July 2005, Razak noted the waterway's significance for transit oil:

> The Strait of Malacca remains one of the most strategic nerve centres of international trade [whereby…] 50 per cent of the world's oil and gas passes through the straits each year.[112]

[111] M Mahathir, 'Majlis Pelancaran Rasmi Sistem Kawalan Laut,' 1 Jun 2000; Malaysia (Ministry of Defence), 'Malaysia's National Defence Policy,' http://www.mod.gov.my/images/ndp.pdf, 3; Malaysia (Ministry of Defence), *Dasar Pertahanan Malaysia*, (Kuala Lumpur: Kementarian Pertahanan Malaysia, 2010), http://www.mod.gov.my/images/dpn-terbuka.pdf, 19; N Razak, 'US-Malaysia Defense Cooperation: A Solid Success Story, Heritage Foundation,' 3 May 2002; A Zahid Hamidi, 'Keynote Address in Conjunction with the Launching of Books on Terrorism, UiTM Hotel, Shah Alam,' 27 Jul 2009.
[112] Razak, *Globalising Malaysia*: 57.

However, the Ministry of Defence's website and 2010 *Dasar Pertahanan Negara* (National Defence Policy) do little more than state that the waterway constitutes one of the country's strategic interests in its immediate area. This is along with its land, sea and air spaces in general, and its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the Singapore Strait and lines of communication between its eastern and western landmasses in particular.[113]

Policymakers tend to provide greater detail when identifying specific threats. In 2005, Razak described threats in the Malacca Strait as a complex and wide range of issues that includes minor incidents of theft at port facilities, smuggling, sea robbery, pollution, illegal immigration and, potentially, maritime terrorism.[114] According to Malaysia's Chief of the Navy in 2006, "illegal immigration, maritime pollution, illegal fishing and safety of navigation"[115] were important issues. Similarly, Northern Region Commander of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), First Admiral Zulkifli bin Abu Bakar identified "terrorism, piracy, sea robbery, smuggling, human and narcotics trafficking" as threats.[116] The MMEA's *Strategic Plan 2040*, released in December 2011, stipulates robbery at sea, illegal immigrants, unauthorised foreign fishing vessels, smuggling and pollution. It notes that these issues are problematic for Malaysia's whole maritime domain, including the Malacca Strait.[117] Alternatively, as Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin summarised while speaking at a Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) conference in 2009, "Malaysia wants the Straits of Malacca to be safe, secure and be developed in a sustainable manner."[118]

It is therefore not clear which of these issue types decision makers regard as priorities. According to one interviewee, navigational safety matters are central to

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[113] Malaysia (Ministry of Defence), 'National Defence Policy,' http://www.mod.gov.my/component/content/article/100.html?lang=en; Malaysia (Ministry of Defence), *Dasar Pertahanan Malaysia*.
[114] Razak, 'Keynote Address for the Lima International Maritime Conference on 4 Dec 05.'
[115] M A b M Nor, 'Managing Security of the Straits of Malacca: The Royal Malaysian Navy's Perspective,' in *Building a Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of Malacca: Proceedings of the MIMA International Conference on the Straits of Malacca, 11-13 October, 2004 Kuala Lumpur*, ed. M N Basiron and A Dastan (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2006), 71.
[116] Z b A Bakar, 'Enhancing Maritime Security - Law Enforcement in Malaysia' (paper presented at the Strengthening Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific Conference, 24th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 7-9 Jun 2010), 5.
[117] Malaysia (Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency), *Pelan Perancangan Strategik Maritim Malaysia 2040* (Kuala Lumpur: Agensi Penguatkuasaan Maritim Malaysia, 2011), 32-6.
[118] M Yassin, 'Keynote Address at the Opening Ceremony of the 6th MIMA Conference on the Straits of Malacca: Charting the Future,' 23 Jun 2009.

Malaysia's Strait strategic agenda.[119] Yet Najib Razak's policy statements have not been consistent on the matter. In 2008 he declared that safety was "paramount" in the Strait compared to its security and marine environment.[120] This stance stands at odds with his previous claim (in 2006) that the Malacca Strait's security constituted "the highest priority" before moving on to address safety of navigation.[121] On other occasions, Razak has highlighted the need to ensure the Malacca Strait's environmental integrity,[122] a matter that government officials have also pointed out for some time. Pollution in the sea lane has been frequently raised as early as 1976 within both the lower *Dewan Raykat* and upper *Dewan Negara* houses of Malaysia's Parliament.[123]

This ambiguity in priorities is consistent with the expectations of a rising energy transit state, insofar as Malaysia's stated interests toward the Strait share some characteristics of Singapore's and Indonesia's. Its non-traditional threat focus is broadly like Singapore's. Razak has reflected how 'softer' issues related to non-state actors have been prominent in Malaysia's post-Cold War security concerns.[124] Yassin has also explained:

> Some maritime powers perceive the Straits in 'hard security' terms […]. Our perception of the Straits is somewhat different. We regard the Straits of

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[119] Interviewee 7281.
[120] N Razak, 'Launching of the Centre for the Straits of Malacca,' 21 Oct 2008.
[121] N Razak, 'Keynote Address at the Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety Security and Environmental Protection, Istana Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,' 18 Sep 2006.
[122] Ibid.; N Razak, 'The Security of the Straits of Malacca and its Implications to the South East Asia Regional Security, Seoul, South Korea,' 13 Mar 2007.
[123] Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Penyata Rasmi Parlimen Dewan Rakyat Parlimen Keempat Penggal Kedua Jilid II Bil 37,' 26 Oct 1976 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-26101976.pdf, 4110; Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Penyata Rasmi Parlimen Dewan Rakyat Parlimen Kelima Penggal Ketiga Jilid III Bil 47,' 13 Nov 1981 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-13111981.pdf, 5866-9; Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Penyata Rasmi Parlimen Dewan Rakyat Parlimen Keenam Jilid I Bil 29,' 22 Nov 1982 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-22111982.pdf, 3648-50; Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Penyata Rasmi Parlimen Dewan Negara Parlimen Kelapan Penggal Pertama,' 1 Mar 1991 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DN-01031991.pdf, 84-5; Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Penyata Rasmi Parlimen Dewan Rakyat Parlimen Kelapan Penggal Kedua Jilid III Bil 63,' 21 Dec 1992 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-21121992.pdf, 12747, 72-3; Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Penyata Rasmi Parlimen Dewan Rakyat Parlimen Kelapan Penggal Keempat Jilid IV Bil 25,' 13 Jul 1994 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-13071994.pdf, 7, 9; Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Kandungan Parlimen Kesebelas Penggal Kedua, Bil 23,' 20 Jun 2005 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-20062005.pdf, 25-47; Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Dewan Rakyat Aturan Urusan Mesyuarat Bil 77,' 16 Nov 2006 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/opindex/pdf/AUMDR16112006.pdf, 4; Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Dewan Rakyat Parlimen Kesebelas Penggal Keempat Mesyuarat Ketiga Bil 52,' 22 Oct 2007 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-22102007.pdf, 29; Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Dewan Rakyat Parlimen Kedua Belas Penggal Ketiga Mesyuarat Kedua Bil 27,' 9 Jun 2010 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-09062010.pdf, 1-2.
[124] N Razak, 'Malaysian Defence Modernisation to Proceed,' *Military Technology* 28, no. 4 (2004): 9.

> Malacca primarily in soft security terms - as our "front yard," as a source of fish resource, and as ecological tourism assets. We also view it as a key economic facilitator for both Malaysia as well as for the international community […].[125]

At the same time, Malaysia's view of the Malacca Strait is also similar to Indonesia's, in that it has been vocal about preserving its sovereign rights and border integrity in the waterway. According to Razak:

> Let me reiterate Malaysia's position that any form of preventive measures and operational arrangements to secure the safety of the Malacca Straits must not impinge on the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the littoral states.[126]

Policy convergence between Indonesia and Malaysia on the Malacca Strait's legal status has taken place since the 1960s.[127] It is apparent in the 1971 Joint Statement on the Malacca Strait, within which the two concurred that the Malacca Straits were not international straits.[128] While Malaysia's and Indonesia's interests diverged slightly when negotiating what became the United Nations Convention for Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), as Malaysia's fear of transit passage provisions stood at odds with Indonesia's support for the archipelagic principle,[129] both states have agreed to resolve their territorial borders both in the Straits and elsewhere in accordance with Convention.[130] Malaysia has since gone on to reiterate its sovereignty concerns in the context of UNCLOS transit passage.[131]

Another ambiguity concerning Malaysia's view of the Strait is that decision makers have not clearly articulated their views on the threat of maritime terrorism—to

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[125] Yassin, 'Keynote Address at the Opening Ceremony of the 6th MIMA Conference on the Straits of Malacca.' See also N Khalid, 'With a Little Help from My Friends: Maritime Capacity-Building Measures in the Straits of Malacca,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 31, no. 3 (2009).
[126] N Razak, 'Remarks at the 2005 Shangri-La Dialogue Fifth Plenary Session: Enhancing Maritime Security Cooperation, Shangri-La Hotel Singapore,' 5 Jun 2005.
[127] Djalal, 'The Development of Cooperation on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,' 1.
[128] See Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*: 204.
[129] P Polomka, *Ocean Politics in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1978), 46.
[130] Such as during Indonesia's and Malaysia's Annual Consultations. See Malaysia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 'International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore): Opening Speech by the Agent of Malaysia, 13 November 2007,' 2007 http://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/speeches-delivered-overseas-2007/-/asset_publisher/X9Nx/content/opening-speech-by-the-agent-of-malaysia?redirect=/web/guest/speeches-delivered-overseas-2007; Malaysia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 'Joint Statement between Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia at the 9th Annual Consultation between Prime Minister Dato' Sri Mohd Najib Bin Tun Abdul Razak and President Dr H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Putrajaya,' 18 Dec 2012 https://www.kln.gov.my/archive/content.php?t=3&articleId=2588590; Polomka, *Ocean Politics in Southeast Asia:* 46.
[131] Razak, 'Keynote Address at the Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore;' Razak, 'Launching of the Centre for the Straits of Malacca.'

the point where they have at times put forward countervailing assessments of it. Like Indonesian officials, Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar claimed in 2004 that the likelihood of maritime terrorism occurring in the Malacca Strait was "blown out of proportion."[132] In 2005, Razak argued that "we need to emphasize strongly that the Straits of Malacca has not had a single terrorist attack" and that only piracy and minor stealing from ships had occurred instead.[133] Elsewhere, he has referred to the threat of 'floating bomb' attacks—a challenge that Singapore has so vocally flagged—as being negligible.[134] Similarly, policy elites such as Razak, Yassin and Hamid Albar have dismissed the chances of a piracy-terrorism nexus emerging in the Strait.[135] It may be the case that Malayisa, like Indonesia, has had to navigate domestic sensivities when addressing counter-terrorism policies, for these statements came at a time when Islam was frequently identified in relation to the US-led Global War on Terror.

However, these perspectives contrast with those of other Malaysian officials. For Inspector General Musa Hassan in 2007, maritime terrorism was "real and plausible" and could lead to adverse economic repercussions throughout the international system.[136] It is not novel for a country's policy elites to uphold diverse threat assessments, but it is worth pointing out that Razak has at other occasions distinguished maritime terrorism as a significant problem. During a speech delivered at the Asia Pacific Intelligence Chief Conference in 2007, Razak gave a very different overview of the dangers that maritime terrorism can present. In this instance he argued that unlike piracy, maritime terrorism can "destruct and demolish carriers, oil tankers, shipping lines, sea lanes and ports." He continued that:

> [M]aritime terrorists, unlike ordinary pirates, are in a position to cause enormous environmental damage and destruction. This is due to the fact that the very nature of their potential targets[—]such as oil tankers or huge ships that carry nuclear waste—could cause pollution of a scale that is difficult to imagine. It can thus be safely concluded that maritime terrorism is a real potential danger in need of serious consideration.[137]

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[132] 'Indonesia, Malaysia Downplay Malacca Strait Threats,' *Reuters*, 7 May 2004.
[133] Razak, 'Keynote Address for the Lima International Maritime Conference on 4 Dec 05.'
[134] 'US$14b Oil Pipeline across Northern Malaysia,' *Star*, 17 Apr 2007.
[135] 'Indonesia, Malaysia Downplay Malacca Strait Threats;' 'Malaysia Says it Has Not Found Link between Terrorists and Regional Piracy,' *Associated Press*, 5 Jun 2005; 'US$14b Oil Pipeline across Northern Malaysia;' Razak, *Globalising Malaysia*: 195-6; Yassin, 'Keynote Address at the Opening Ceremony of the 6th MIMA Conference on the Straits of Malacca.'
[136] M Ved, 'Outsiders Not Needed to Patrol Malacca Strait: Malaysia,' *Indo-Asian News Service*, 14 Jun 2007.
[137] N Razak, 'Speech at the Asia Pacific Intelligence Chief Conference, Prince Hotel, Kuala Lumpur,' 6 Sep 2007.

Razak's words here were in stark contrast to his previous assessments. At best, his prominence in official pronouncements about the Strait gives weight to the existing explanations, addressed earlier in this chapter, that Malaysian strategic policy making is an elite dominated process. While it is possible this could be dismissed as carelessness on the part of his speechwriters, Razak has acknowledged in his published speech collection *Globalising Malaysia: Towards Building a Developed Nation* that responsibility for his speeches' content remains his own.[138] Another explanation might be that Malaysia's threat perceptions toward the Malacca Strait have changed over time. If so, it does not make sense that Singapore would declare maritime terrorism to be a problem in the Strait shortly after the 9/11 attacks, but Razak has described it as a threat years later, not sooner. This suggests that Malaysia's mounting reliance on Middle Eastern oil is being reflected in policy makers' security perceptions. In that case, they might become more attuned to perceived sensitivities in years to come.

What needs considering, then, are the factors underpinning Malaysia's view of the Malacca Strait. The following questions can be drawn from the discussion thus far. Why have issues related to safety of navigation, the environment and sovereignty been so prominent in Malaysian views of the Malacca Strait? Moreover, why do Malaysia's strategic policy announcements about its maritime domain encompass so many different issues? Finally, why has Malaysia seldom considered maritime terrorism to be problematic in the Strait, and yet has identified a wide range of non-state actors' unauthorised activities at sea? Chapter Two found that Singapore's security interests were associated with its maritime logistics and oil hub activities, whereas Chapter Three found that Indonesia's interests followed on from non-oil matters. In answering these questions, the relative importance of oil and non-oil factors underpinning Malaysia's strategic rationale in the waterway should be acknowledged.

Explaining Malaysia's Interests as a Pollution Issue

There are five main (and interrelated) answers to the above questions. Oil is relevant to some but not all of them. The first is based on Malaysia's demographic spread and the challenges arising from its population's reliance on the Malacca Strait's marine

[138] Razak, *Globalising Malaysia*: vi.

resources. Malaysia's largest population centres have always been located on its western landmass. For example, in 1980, 8.8 million people (or 67% of Malaysia's 13 million inhabitants) resided in provinces that bordered the sea lane. In 2010, this amounted to some 18 million people (65%) of a 28 million-strong total.[139]

The concentration of Malaysia's population alongside the Malacca Strait has meant that its marine environment holds a high level of importance. The waterway is used by 70% of the fishermen residing in the Peninsula and provides at least half of Malaysia's fish landings.[140] The diverse range of seagrass, mangroves, coral reefs and peat swamps located alongside the coastline are important for marine ecosystems, and—in turn—the human populations that exploit them.[141] Given that the tourism industry contributes towards 10% of Malaysia's GDP and its growing maritime tourism sector,[142] the areas surrounding the islands of Langkawi and Pangkor on the Peninsula's west coast are important leisure destinations.[143]

As such, anything that could affect the Malacca Strait's marine resources could have direct consequences for Malaysia's population too. As far as international shipping's use of the sea lane is concerned, incidents involving oil and petrochemical spills are especially problematic. Oil slicks make water inhospitable to marine life by interfering with sunlight and constraining the flow of oxygen from the atmosphere. According to an article co-authored by retired Captain of the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) Mat Taib Yasin, the Malacca Strait experiences the greatest environmental threats from oil spills and safety of life at sea matters compared to Malaysia's other maritime areas.[144]

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[139] In 1980, 8,791,518 people of Malaysia's total population of 13,136,109 resided in the Malay Peninsula's coastal provinces of Perlis (144,782 people), Kedah (1,077,815), Pulau Pinang (900,772), Perak (1,743,655), Selangor (1,426,250), Kuala Lumpur (919,610), Negeri Sembilan (551,442), Melaka (446,769) and Johor (1,580,423). In 2010, 17,953,401 people of Malaysia's total population of 27,565,821 were living in Perlis (227,025 people), Kedah (1,890,098), Pulau Pinang (1,520,143), Perak (2,258,428), Selangor (5,411,324), Kuala Lumpur (1,627,172), Negeri Sembilan (997,071), Melaka (788,706) and Johor (3,233,434). Data available in Malaysia (Department of Statistics), 'Population and Housing Census of Malaysia: Preliminary Count Report,' 2010 http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/download_Population/files/BPD/Laporan_Kiraan_Permulaan2010.pdf, 25.

[140] Ibrahim, Husin, and Sivaguru, 'The Straits of Malacca,' 35; Table 4.1: Landings of Marine Fish by State and Fishing Gear Group, in Malaysia (Department of Fisheries), 'List of Annual Fisheries Statistics,' 2008 http://www.dof.gov.my/html/themes/moa_dof/documents/pendaratan_ikan_laut.pdf.

[141] See Hooi, 'Natural Resources Exploitation and Utilisation.'

[142] Business Monitor International, *Malaysia Tourism Report Q1 2011*, 13; S Hashim, 'Marine Tourism the Next Big Attraction in Malaysia,' *Bernama*, 18 Jun 2005.

[143] Ibrahim, Husin, and Sivaguru, 'The Straits of Malacca,' 35.

[144] M T Yasin and A H Herriman, 'Force Structure Planning for the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency' (paper presented at the Lima Maritime Conference: Smart Partnership in Managing Future Maritime Security Challenges, Langkawi, Malaysia, 29 Sep 2003), 31-2.

For example, the chemical carrier *Choon Hong III* caught fire at Shell's Port Klang terminal in June 1992, which then spread to three nearby storage tankers. This incident caused 13 fatalities. When the ship sank, 400 tonnes of xylene, an aromatic hydrocarbon, was emptied into the Klang River and endangered local residents.[145] In 1997, the grounded Chinese carrier *An Tai* spilled 235 tons of Kuwaiti crude into the Malacca Strait, which spread 250 kilometres along the Peninsula's coast, damaged Malaysia's diminishing mangroves, and incapacitated its nearby aquaculture industry for two months.[146] The 600 tonnes of phenol and 18 tonnes diesel that the Indonesian tanker *Endah Lestari* spilled next to Johor in June 2001 killed thousands of cockles and fish.[147] In 2010, when Petronas' tanker *Bunga Kelana 3* collided with the *Waily* while travelling from Bintulu to its Malacca refinery,[148] the resultant 2,000 tonnes of light crude oil that dispersed next to Johor cost fishermen some US$460,000 in the eight days that followed.[149] Given these incidents, it makes sense why in 1993 Environment Minister Law Hieng Ding claimed Malaysia 'could expect a disaster' after the supertanker *Maersk Navigator* collided with the *Sanko Honour* near the Malacca Strait and began spilling oil.[150]

Oil is thus important to Malaysia as a pollutant in the Malacca Strait. But Malaysia has also been sensitive to the carriage of radioactive material in its proximity. For instance, it sought to prevent Japan's shipment of plutonium through the Malacca Strait on the *Akatsuki Maru* in 1992. Though Singapore and Indonesia also opposed the use of the Straits for carrying nuclear material at the time, Malaysia was explicit that the ships' passage constituted a security threat.[151] A similar position

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[145] J Doyle, *Riding the Dragon: Royal Dutch Shell and the Fossil Fire* (Boston: Environmental Health Fund, 2002), 78-80; A J Hamid, 'Tanker Explosion Leaves 13 Dead or Missing,' *Reuters*, 21 Jun 1992. See also 'Explosions and Fires: 1992-2002,' 1, addendum to *Riding the Dragon.*

[146] M P Zakaria et al., 'Oil Pollution in the Straits of Malacca, Malaysia: Application of Molecular Markers for Source Identification,' *Environmental Science and Technology* 34, no. 7 (2000): 1189.

[147] 'Indonesian Tanker Capsizes, Spills Toxic Chemical,' *Agence France-Presse*, 14 Jun 2001.

[148] Othman, Ariff, and Gomez, 'Ship Crash Causes Oil Spill off Johor.'

[149] 'Naikkan Caj Kapal Dagang - Azalina,' *Utusan Online*, 2 Jun 2010.

[150] 'Maersk Navigator Supertanker Still Spilling Crude off Sumatra,' *Oil and Gas Journal*, 2 Feb 1993, 17; M Richardson, 'Potential Disaster as Tanker Burns in Malacca Strait,' *New York Times*, 22 Jan 1993.

[151] *Reuters*, 15 Jul 1997, Eager and Stewart 1992, *AFP* 10 Nov 1992, *UPI Business and Financial Wire* 24 Sep 1992, cited in GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional Programme for the Prevention and Management of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas, 'Marine Pollution Management in the Malacca/Singapore Straits: Lessons Learned,' 1998 http://beta.pemsea.org/sites/default/files/mppeas-info-1999-195.pdf, 85; M Vatikiotis et al., 'Stormy Passage: Japan's Plutonium Shipment Scares ASEAN,' *Far Eastern Economic Review* 155, no. 40 (1992): 12.

was put forward in 1997, when the *Pacific Teal* was asked to refrain from transporting spent nuclear fuel from Japan through Malaysian waters to France for reprocessing.[152]

The Malay Peninsula as a Locus of Non-Traditional Maritime Challenges

Malaysia's apparent difficulties in prioritising strategic challenges in the Malacca Strait can be partially explained by the Malay Peninsula's historical experiences as a locus of unauthorised non-state actor activity. These issues are in addition to the environmental degradation caused by navigational incidents. They are also strategically important because of the Peninsula's large population centres situated adjacent to the waterway. As described in Chapter One, piracy and armed robbery in Southeast Asian waters predated European arrival. Malaysia has for decades faced a 'Golden Triangle' of transnational organised crime centring on the Andaman Sea, where groups smuggling narcotics, arms and consumer goods at times use the Malacca Strait to facilitate their operations.[153]

While the Southeast Asian region has broadly encountered the same types of challenges, Malaysia has more often borne the brunt of such issues, as opposed to being a source of them. Malaysia is a primary destination for human trafficking. One report estimated that 76% of trafficked Indonesians became prostitutes or maids in Malaysia.[154] Thai nationals are also involved trafficking activities, which occur along the two states' land border and adjacent coastlines.[155] Illegal fishing in Malaysian waters involve vessels from neighbouring states such as Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines as well as Malaysian nationals that do not hold correct licences.[156]

Illegal immigration has also long been a matter of concern. Malaysia was a major destination for people fleeing the Vietnam War, many of whom reached the

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[152] 'Malaysia Bans Ship Carrying Nuclear Waste to Japan,' *Reuters*, 15 Jan 1997; GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional Programme for the Prevention and Management of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas, 'Marine Pollution Management in the Malacca/Singapore Straits: Lessons Learned,' 85.

[153] S Permal, 'Trafficking in the Strait of Malacca,' *Maritime Studies*, no. 156 (2007): 8; Yasin, *Threats to Malaysia from the Western Maritime Frontier*: 38.

[154] R H Nik and S Permal, 'Security Threats in the Strait of Malacca,' in *Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia's Perspective*, ed. H M Ibrahim and H A Husin (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008), 192.

[155] See A Dupont, *East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 163.

[156] Malaysia (Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency), *Pelan Perancangan Strategik Maritim Malaysia 2040*: 33; Yasin and Herriman, 'Force Structure Planning for the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency,' 31-2.

Peninsula's shores on makeshift rafts. The arrival of some 1.5 million 'boat people' following the fall of Saigon dominated Malaysia's policy rhetoric in April 1975.[157] Unauthorised arrivals from Indonesia to the Peninsula via the Malacca Strait's south[158]—which has been described as the world's largest flow of people after the US-Mexico border—has also been a regular source of discontent in the contemporary Malaysia-Indonesia relationship.[159] The repatriation of Indonesian nationals, and perceptions that immigrants detract from Malaysians' social and economic wellbeing and conduct criminal activities, have all been exacerbating factors.[160] At times, the issue has been caught up with Aceh's desires for succession, of which has been a sensitive political matter for Indonesia.[161]

These issues have not had much to do with Malaysia's transit oil interests. A very tenuous link can be made in relation to illegal immigrants' contributions to a transient and poorly regulated workforce, of which had a large role in constructing the Petronas Twin Towers.[162] Another can be found in the 10 August 2003 attack on the Malaysian-flagged oil tanker *Penrider* by suspected *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement, or GAM) members, while it was carrying 1,000 tonnes of fuel oil from Singapore to Penang.[163] Piracy and armed robbery at sea has more often involved transit oil. For example, the Malaysia-registered *Petro Ranger* was hijacked

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[157] M Leifer, *Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia* (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), 63; Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy*: 167-8. Mahathir often reflected on the 'boat people' challenge, and it is a matter that Razak continues to deal with, such as through Australia's 'Malaysia Solution' for processing refugees. 'Malaysia Strives to Deny Human Traffickers a Transit Point,' *Bernama*, 3 Mar 2011; M Mahathir, 'Speech at the Official Opening of the Fifth Conference of Red Cross/Red Crescent Leaders of ASEAN, Dewan Bandaraya, Kuala Lumpur,' 7 May 1983; M Mahathir, 'Official Dinner Hosted in His Honour by His Excellency Dr Wilfried Martens Prime Minister of Belgium, Brussels, Belgium,' 22 Sep 1988; M Mahathir, 'Speech at the 43th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,' 4 Oct 1988; M Mahathir, 'Speech at the Official Luncheon Hosted in His Honour by His Excellency Dr Helmut Kohl Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, Germany,' 19 Sep 1988; M Mahathir, 'Official Opening of the Eighth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, Kuching, Sarawak,' 16 Feb 1990; M Mahathir, 'Speech at the Official Dinner Hosted by H E Mr Vo Van Kiet, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Cultural Palace, Hanoi, Vietnam,' 19 Apr 1992.

[158] Malaysia (Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency), *Pelan Perancangan Strategik Maritim Malaysia 2040*: 33.

[159] For example see 'Malaysian Immigration Detains 121 Indonesians,' *Antara*, 14 Jan 2013.

[160] J C Liow, 'Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no. 1 (2003): 45, 48.

[161] Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations*: 150.

[162] T Bunnell, *Malaysia, Modernity and the Multimedia Super Corridor: A Critical Geography of Intelligent Landscapes* (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon 2004), cited in A M Nah and T Bunnell, 'Ripples of Hope: Acehnese Refugees in Post-Tsunami Malaysia,' *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 26, no. 2 (2005): 252.

[163] International Chamber of Commerce (International Maritime Bureau), 'New Brand of Piracy Threatens Oil Tankers in Malacca Straits,' 2 Sep 2003 http://www.iccwbo.org/id3779/index.html.

in 1998 near the Malacca Strait's southern entrance while carrying jet fuel and diesel from Singapore to Vietnam, only to be discovered and then seized by Chinese police 10 days later. Repainted as the Honduran-flagged *Wilby*, it was attempting to smuggle oil.[164] Other vessels relevant to Malaysian oil interests have been targeted amid the growing piracy activity off Africa's eastern coast. In August 2008 Somali pirates hijacked two MISC owned oil tankers, the *Bunga Melati 2* and *Bunga Melati 5*.[165] In February 2011 the Italian-registered oil tanker *Savina Caylyn* was boarded far past the Malacca Strait's northern entrance while travelling through the Indian Ocean from Sudan to Pasir Gudang in Johor.[166] While such incidents often receive extensive media coverage, it must be kept in mind that oil tankers are rarely singled out as a target. According to the International Maritime Bureau's (IMB) data (as shown in Table 1), only 14% of all global piracy and armed robbery attacks in 2011 involved crude oil tankers. This compares with 23% involving bulk carriers, 23% involving chemical and product tankers, and 14% involving container ships.[167]

[164] 'China Rules out Oil Tanker Hijacking,' *Reuters*, 9 Nov 1998; Z Huanxin, 'Authorities Report Ship Engaged in Smuggling,' *China Daily*, 5 Nov 1998; Raymond, 'Piracy in Southeast Asia: New Trends, Issues and Responses,' 7.
[165] 'Bunga Melati 5 ke Djibouti,' *Bernama*, 29 Sep 2008.
[166] European Naval Force Somalia, 'Piracy - MV Savina Caylyn Hijacked,' Baltic and International Maritime Council, 8 Feb 2011 https://www.bimco.org/News/2011/02/08_Savina_Caylin_hijacked.aspx.
[167] International Chamber of Commerce (International Maritime Bureau), *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report: 1 January - 31 December 2011*, (Essex 2011), 13.

TABLE 1: GLOBAL PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY INCIDENTS IN 2011

Vessel Type	*No. Incidents*	*% World Total*
Bulk carrier	100	23
Chemical and product tanker	100	23
Container	62	14
Crude oil tanker	61	14
General cargo	35	8
Tug	32	7
Fishing vessel	11	3
Vehicle carrier	7	2
LPG tanker	6	1
Other	25	6
World Total	*439*	

Data taken from International Chamber of Commerce (International Maritime Bureau), Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report: 1 January - 31 December 2011, (Essex 2011), 13.

Terrorism as a Land Threat

Following on from this is the nature of terrorism, which for Malaysia has historically been a land-based rather than maritime challenge. Malaysia has been no stranger to non-state actors' politically motivated violence. The Malayan Emergency began in 1948 after the Malaysian Communist Party, led by Chin Peng, attempted to overturn the British administered Government. The next 12 years saw the British Army and Malay national police forces undertaking a drawn out campaign in the Peninsula's jungle terrain against Chin's Malayan People's Anti-British Army (later renamed to the Malayan Races Liberation Army), many of whom were of Chinese descent, and known as 'communist terrorists.'[168] The 13 May 1969 Incident saw racial riots between Chinese and Malay citizens erupt in Kuala Lumpur after the ruling UMNO lost its government majority in Parliament to Chinese opposition parties.[169]

[168] K G Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 828-31; I Pfennigwerth, *Tiger Territory: The Untold Story of the Royal Australian Navy in Southeast Asia from 1948 to 1971*, 1st ed. (Dural: Rosenberg Publishing, 2008), 38-42.
[169] See Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations*: 115.

As a Muslim majority country, Islam has long been represented in Malaysia's political processes.[170] However, 'deviant' activities in the name of Islam have at times been problematic. The Ministry of Home Affairs identified 12 militant groups in 1967 that had goals related to the Government's overthrowal.[171] The 1979 Iranian revolution prompted a revival of orthodox *dakwah* Islam and bolstered domestic support to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia.[172] By 1984, Malaysia's White Paper was listing the Islamic Revolution Cooperative Movement, Jamaat Tabligh and the Sabilullah Fighting Group as organisations of concern.[173] On 19 November 1985, police stormed Memali village, Kedah, in response to Ibrahim Mahmood's teachings. This event, now known as the Memali Incident, resulted in the deaths of 14 civilians and four police officers.[174] The group Darul Arqam was banned in 1994, and its leader Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad was imprisoned for one decade under the Internal Security Act's provisions. During the Sauk Incident in July 2000, members of the al Ma'unah group looted a military base for weapons and ammunition. In the same year, members of the *Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia* (Malaysian Mujahedeen Group) undertook a bank robbing spree and Philippine-based Abu Sayaff Group kidnapped 24 tourists from Sipadan Island and Pandanan Island.[175]

When the 9/11 World Trade Centre attacks occurred in 2001, then, Malaysia had already been dealing with Islamic fundamentalism for some time. Kuala Lumpur encountered increased international attention from Islamic fundamentalists, especially when supporters linked to al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah were found to be supporting their activities from within Malaysia. Noordin Top and Azahari Husain, two of the perpetrators associated with the series of terrorist bombing attacks in

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[170] For an historic overview of political Islam in Malaysia, see A Ufen, 'Mobilising Political Islam: Indonesia and Malaysia Compared,' *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 47, no. 3 (2009): 308-33.

[171] '12 Kumpulan Militan Mahu Guling Kerajaan,' *Utusan Malaysia* 26 Sep 2003, cited in A F A Hamid, 'Islam and Violence in Malaysia,' *IDSS Working Papers* 123 (2007): 2.

[172] B K Cheah, *Malaysia: The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 212; C Muzaffar, 'Islamic Resurgence and the Question of Development in Malaysia,' in *Reflections on Development in Southeast Asia*, ed. T G Lim (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), 9.

[173] R Harun, 'Dealing with Terrorism in the Muslim World: Some Preliminary Observations' (paper presented at the International Conference on Youth and Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, 27 Feb 2009), 6.

[174] Cheah, *Malaysia*: 212; E Noor, 'Al-Ma'unah and KMM in Malaysia,' in *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia*, ed. A T H Tan (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007), 168-9.

[175] On 23 April 2000, 21 people, most of whom were foreign nationals, were kidnapped from Sipadan Island in Sabah. Later, on 10 September that year, three Malaysian nationals were kidnapped from Pandanan Island. A L Filler, 'The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society,' *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 4 (2002): 162; Noor, 'Al-Ma'unah and KMM in Malaysia,' 167.

Indonesia—Bali in 2002 and 2005, the Jakarta's Marriott Hotel in 2003 and again at the Ritz Carlton Hotel in 2009, and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004—were Malaysian nationals. With the Southeast Asian region being designated as the second front in the global war on terror, Malaysian policy makers required a carefully constructed response that was mindful of domestic religious and political views. Both Mahathir and Abdullah Badawi have denounced terrorism as "un-Islamic,"[176] while the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party went as far to call for a *jihad* against the US.[177]

So while Malaysia has established a range of counter-terrorism measures—both predating and following 9/11—radical Islam has largely been a land-based issue rather than one directed toward the maritime domain. This goes some way to explaining why Malaysia's policymakers have flagged a host of non-state actor threats in the Malacca Strait, but maritime terrorism has not been a prominent one.[178] Furthermore, the terrorist threat for Malaysia has not any relationship to its oil interests either.

Terminological Ambiguity

Policy makers' use of terminology also contributes to apparent ambiguities about Malaysia's Strait interests. Piracy is often viewed under the umbrella term of 'maritime crime.' The International Maritime Organization (IMO) follows the definition provided in the UNCLOS, article 101, whereby piracy refers to:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
    (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
    (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

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[176] O Bakar, 'The Impact of the American War on Terror in Malaysian Islam,' *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 16, no. 2 (2005): 112, cited in D G Cox, J Falconer, and B Stackhouse, *Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy in Asia and Africa* (Boston; London: Northeastern University Press of New England, 2009), 101.

[177] Ufen, 'Mobilising Political Islam: Indonesia and Malaysia Compared,' 323.

[178] Razak said as much in 2005 while Deputy Prime Minister:

> In addressing maritime security in the Straits of Malacca, the threat from smuggling, illegal migration, piracy and other related maritime criminal acts are more real than perceived potential terrorism.

Razak, 'Keynote Address for the Lima International Maritime Conference on 4 Dec 05.'

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).[179]

The Malaysia-based IMB, which is a prominent contributor to the country's maritime security narrative, follows this stance. But Malaysia's decision makers do not all uphold this view. One official described piracy as "only a nuisance," and that corruption at Indonesian ports was the more pressing issue.[180] The Malaysian view of piracy is instead much broader, whereby it is regarded as a criminal act.[181] Najib Razak has argued that the definition overlooks other forms of unauthorised activities at sea and advocated a notion that better recognises discrete types of threats.[182] Others have focused on the UNCLOS 'high seas' clause. According to the National Security Council maritime security policy undersecretary, Abd Rahim Hussin, 'armed robbery at sea' is a preferable descriptor rather than 'piracy:'

> Piracy happens on the high seas. In the Straits of Malacca, it (piracy) happens in territorial waters. So technically, it is not piracy but robbery at sea. That will be charged under the Penal Code.[183]

Interpreting such activities as maritime crime means that Malaysia is in an easier position to prosecute individuals. The Marine Police represent Malaysia's primary agency responsible for managing maritime crime. In comparison, the RMN's role is supplementary.[184] Offenders can be charged under the Penal Code (Act 574) or section 127A of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act 593),[185] which were previously considered to be adequate provisions.[186] But in 2010 media reports stated that new legislation was being tabled in the *Dewan Rakyat* which would reflect the high seas factor in local law.[187] While we should be wary of reading too much into the change, it came in the aftermath of the two MISC tanker hijackings off Africa's eastern coast. These events dominated Malaysia's anti-piracy concerns at the time.

The ambiguity over the notion of security threats in the Strait might also be partly 'lost in translation' due to the *Bahasa Melayu* (Malaysian) use of the word

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[179] United Nations, 'United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982.'
[180] Dillon, 'Maritime Piracy,' 157.
[181] S Permal, 'Malaysia's and Indonesia's Security Concerns and Priorities in the Straits of Malacca: Similarities and Differences' (paper presented at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2006), 9.
[182] 'New Definition Sought for Acts of Piracy, Isolated from Terrorism,' *Utusan Online*, 8 Oct 2004, cited in Dillon, 'Maritime Piracy,' 155.
[183] M Zulfakar and T E Hock, 'National Anti-Piracy Law in the Pipeline,' *Star*, 20 May 2009.
[184] Susumu, 'Suppression of Modern Piracy and the Role of the Navy,' 52.
[185] I L Mokhtar and M Mahmood, 'New Law Soon to Fight Pirates,' *New Straits Times*, 24 Mar 2011.
[186] Zulfakar and Hock, 'National Anti-Piracy Law in the Pipeline.'
[187] Mokhtar and Mahmood, 'New Law Soon to Fight Pirates.'

keselamatan to mean both 'security' and 'safety.'[188] The former is employed when referring to the United Nations Security Council (*Majlis Keselamatan Pertubuhan Bangsa-Banga Bersatu*), or Malaysia's Internal Security Act 1960 (*Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri*).[189] The latter is seen in the Malay phrase for the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS, or *Konvensyen Antarabangsa bagi Keselamatan Nyawa di Laut*).[190] This overlap is less prevalent in *Bahasa Indonesia* (Indonesian), where *keselamatan* is usually used to refer to 'safety' and *keamanan* for 'security' (the Indonesian phrase for the Security Council is *Dewan Keamanan Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa*).[191] In contrast, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004 (Act 633), available in Malay and English, uses *keamanan, kesejahteraan* and *keselamatan* to respectively refer to 'peace,' 'safety' and 'security.'[192] Although the English terms all refer to the stability of the maritime environment in a general sense, they have particular meanings as well: 'safety,' for instance, specifically relates to ships' navigation at sea.[193] It is therefore not clear whether Malaysia's 2006 Annual Defence Report referred to safety issues, security issues or both when recounting the successes of the Eyes in the Sky (EiS):

> *Ianya berjaya menyakinkan masyarakat antarbangsa dengan keupayaan negara di dalam menjaga keselamatan perairan di Selat Melaka.*
> Eyes in the Sky managed to convince the international community of the [littoral] states' abilities to maintain the safety/security of the Malacca Strait's waters.[194]

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[188] A E Coope, *A Malay-English Dictionary* (Kuala Lumpur: Macmillan, 1976), 249.
[189] See Malaysia, 'Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu (PBB),' Portal Pusat Maklumat Rakyat, http://pmr.penerangan.gov.my/index.php/penafian/1229-pertubuhan; Malaysia (Attorney General's Chambers of Malaysia), 'Laws of Malaysia: Akta 82: Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri 1960: Mengandungi Segala Pindaan Hingga 1 Januari 2006,' 2006 http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/ Vol. 2/Akta 82.pdf.
[190] See Malaysia (Marine Department), 'Guidelines for Damage Control Plans,' 2000 http://www.marine.gov.my/jlm/pic/article/service/notice/mgn/2000/nmpm302000.pdf.
[191] 'Dewan Keamanan PBB Gelar Sidang Darurat Nuklir Korea Utara,' *Antara*, 12 Feb 2013.
[192] See Part II, 3 (2) of Malaysia (Attorney General's Chambers of Malaysia), 'Laws of Malaysia: Act 633: Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004: Incorporating All Amendments up to 1 January 2006,' 2006 http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol. 13/Act 633.pdf; Malaysia (Attorney General's Chambers of Malaysia), 'Undang-Undang Malaysia: Akta 633: Akta Agensi Penguatkuasaan Maritim Malaysia 2004,' 2006 http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol. 13/Akta 633.pdf.
[193] As Interviewee 2359 remarked, "for me safety and security are two different things, and there are various mechanisms that have been set up to improve safety in the straits […] but security, that's a different issue."
[194] Malaysia (Ministry of Defence), *Laporan Tahunan* (Kuala Lumpur: Kementarian Pertahanan Malaysia, 2006), 131.

While there is a consequent potential for obfuscation in the intended meaning of Malaysia's maritime policy pronouncements, it goes some way to explain the tendency for broad interpretations of security.

Sovereignty, Border Integrity and the Pursuit of Oil

The analysis thus far has revealed that Malaysia's strategic interests in the Malacca Strait are only partly related to transit oil factors. Its adherence to principles of sovereignty in the sea lane is also not directly linked to Middle East-East Asia oil flows. However, Malaysia has used its support for sovereignty principles to advance its interests in oil throughout its entire territory instead. Chapter Three found that Jakarta's incentive to maintain national unity (*wawasan nusantara*) was reflected in its efforts to secure its entire archipelago's maritime domain as opposed to the Malacca Strait in particular. A similar parallel can be drawn with Malaysia. The Federation of Malaya's political incorporation of Sarawak and British North Borneo (now Sabah) in 1963 (to become the Federation of Malaysia) as part of a British exit from colonial Asia was revolutionary for the Federation's geopolitical outlook. Malaysia became a maritime state once the South China Sea separated its east from its west.[195] This transformation meant there was a new need to secure lines of communication between the Peninsula and Borneo. It also meant that Malaysian maritime priorities were drawn away from the Peninsula and subsequently, the Malacca Strait. However, Kuala Lumpur has not adhered to an overarching national doctrine. Notions of 'Total Defence' have long featured in Malaysia's strategic rhetoric but they are much less entrenched in its policymaking than Singapore's concept which bears the same title.[196]

A more crucial difference lies instead in the role that oil played in east Malaysia's incorporation. The Federation's expansion is often explained as driven

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[195] C K Wah, 'Reflections on the Shaping of Strategic Cultures in Southeast Asia,' in *Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security*, ed. D Da Cunha (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 9.

[196] Interviewee 4633 stated that:

> If you read on Singapore's defence policy [Total Defence is] very clearly elaborated. What is Total Defence? It means everything, you know, every level, everything we use to defend […] and we are small. If you ask me if Malaysia believes in Total Defence, the answer is yes, very seriously. […] Now the term being used in Malaysia is called *Hanruh*. So it's a short-term word, Malaysian word for Total Defence. Basically it means every level of society, military and other agencies, an overall concept of defending the nation. But is Malaysia great with that? I would be very honest that it's still building up. But Singapore is great with that concept.

partly by prevailing UMNO party desires to ensure *ketuanan Melayu* (Malay supremacy) which had been established in article 153 of the 1957 Constitution.[197] In this sense the Borneo states' inclusion offered a means to 'balance' Malay constituents' racial profile with Singaporean residents who were mostly Chinese and Indian,[198] which Abdul Rahman, who was Prime Minister at the time, designated *bumiputra* and *non-bumiputra* (indigenous and non-indigenous) strata within Malay society.[199] Yet there was also an underlying economic interest in accessing Borneo's offshore hydrocarbon resources. Rahman reasoned that:

> Their people [in North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak] are within our group. They have the same characteristics as we, the same way of living and the same currency. It would be a matter well worth considering if they approached us. It would be good financially. They have oil.[200]

Indeed, the Sultanate of Brunei's eventual decision to remain independent of the Federation was grounded in its disagreement with west Malaya's intentions to control its oil reserves and generated revenue.[201] Just prior to the start of a round of negotiations on Brunei's potential inclusion in the Federation, Shell's local subsidiary announced the discovery of substantial offshore hydrocarbon deposits, to which the Malayan response was that any profits from its exploitation would be collected by the federal government and not retained by Brunei, the state.[202] North Borneo was similarly disgruntled with oil revenue sharing arrangements to the point that its first Governor Mustapha Harun considered declaring the state's independence in the 1970s on this basis.[203] Contestation over oil revenue allocations between the eastern states and Kuala Lumpur continue to be voiced.[204]

The oil factor is not just relevant to understanding Kuala Lumpur's sovereignty emphasis in the Malacca Strait. Malaysia has contested its maritime

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[197] Cheah, *Malaysia*: 237.
[198] G M T Kahin, 'Malaysia and Indonesia,' *Pacific Affairs* 37, no. 3 (1964): 256-8, cited in P Sodhy, 'Malaysian-American Relations During Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia, 1963-66,' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 19, no. 1 (1988): 114.
[199] Cheah, *Malaysia*: 237.
[200] *Sunday Times*, 16 Feb 1958 cited in M N Sopiee, 'The Advocacy of Malaysia-before 1961,' *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 4 (1973): 729.
[201] H F Armstrong, 'The Troubled Birth of Malaysia,' *Foreign Affairs* (1963): 683-4; Sodhy, 'Malaysian-American Relations During Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia, 1963-66,' 112.
[202] Higham to Wallace and J Martin, minute 28 Jun 1963, CO 1030/1469, no. 370, and MacKintosh to Sandys, tel. 182, 25 Jun 1963, CO 1030/1469, no. 360, cited in A J Stockwell, 'Britain and Brunei, 1945-1963: Imperial Retreat and Royal Ascendancy,' *Modern Asian Studies* 38, no. 4 (2004): 811-2.
[203] B Ross-Larson, *Politics of Federalism: Syed Kechik in East Malaysia* (Singapore: Bruce Ross-Larson, 1976): 146-8, 157-8, cited in A R Kahin, 'Crisis on the Periphery: The Rift between Kuala Lumpur and Sabah,' *Pacific Affairs* 65, no. 1 (1992): 39.
[204] See 'Sabah, Sarawak May Lose Oil, Gas Forever,' *Free Malaysia Today*, 17 Jun 2011.

boundary delimitation with all six of its neighbouring states (Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines), each of which have been driven in some form by its pursuits to control offshore oil resources. Malaysia's maritime boundary delimitations are generally based on its controversial Continental Shelf Act 1966 (which was established on a reading of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea at odds with its conventional interpretations) and 'Map Showing the Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Boundaries.'[205] The latter outlines Malaysia's maritime claims. Since its publication in 1979, it has been poorly received by other countries.

Malaysia's dispute with Indonesia over the sovereignty of Sipadan and Ligitan islands emerged in 1969 during an early period in both states' exploration of hydrocarbon reserves off Borneo's eastern coast.[206] A particular area of disagreement concerned jurisdiction over the adjacent oil rich Ambalat Block. Less than three years after the 2002 International Court of Justice ruling that both islands belonged to Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur awarded energy giant Shell oil exploration rights near the islands.[207] Despite accepting the outcome, Jakarta's dissatisfaction has endured to the point that RMN and *Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Angkatan Laut* (TNI-AL, or Indonesian Navy) vessels have faced tense encounters in the area, and on one occasion were involved in a minor collision.[208]

Malaysia's contest with Singapore for sovereignty of Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks and South Ledge also stemmed from its oil interests. Part of Kuala Lumpur's case presented to the International Court of Justice's arbitration was that it had signed a petroleum agreement with the Continental Oil Company (now ConocoPhillips) in 1968. Within this agreement, Kuala Lumpur pointed out, it had delimited a claim to title concession area encompassing the waters surrounding Pedra Branca.[209]

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[205] See M J Valencia, J M Van Dyke, and N A Ludwig, *Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea*, Publications on Ocean Development (Boston: Martins Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), 36.
[206] D A Colson, 'Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia),' *American Journal of International Law* 97, no. 2 (2003): 399.
[207] 'Ambalat Case to be Settled by Indonesia and M'sia, Petronas Says,' *Antara*, 3 Mar 2005.
[208] 'Indonesian Lawmakers Protest Alleged Territorial Violations by Malaysia,' *Today*, 23 Oct 2008, 12; T Siboro and M S Saraswati, 'RI, KL Warships Collide in Ambalat,' *Jakarta Post*, 4 Oct 2005; Weiss, 'Malaysia-Indonesia Bilateral Relations,' 175.
[209] Critics later disputed this claim because none of the island groups were mentioned in the 1968 agreement. See International Court of Justice, 'Verbatim Record: Public Sitting Held on Tuesday 20 Nov 2007, at 10am, at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President, Presiding in the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore),' CR 2007/29, 2007 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14199.pdf, 28. Malaysia's case can be accessed at International Court of Justice, 'Verbatim Record: Public Sitting

The discovery of offshore hydrocarbon reserves in the North Malay Basin in the Gulf of Thailand and in the South China Sea, necessitated Malaysia's establishment of exploitation arrangements with Thailand and Vietnam. A Thai-Malay Joint Development Area was created through a 1979 Memorandum of Understanding and 1990 agreement.[210] Though Vietnamese (then South Vietnam) and Malaysian maritime boundary claims in the Gulf were declared in 1971 and 1979 respectively, a memorandum of understanding providing for hydrocarbon exploitation was not finalised until 1992.[211]

Malaysia sought to limit Brunei's EEZ on the grounds that the Peninsula's continental shelf expanded into the South China Sea and therefore justified its greater maritime claim. This was associated with the two states' sovereignty dispute over two offshore oil and gas blocks, and this was eventually resolved through a Commercial Arrangement Area in 2009. While Malaysia lost jurisdiction of the blocks to its neighbour, the Area provided for bilateral sharing of revenue that resulted from hydrocarbon exploitation activities.[212] Prime Minister Badawi's reflection on this outcome was that "in so far as the oil and gas resources are concerned, the [Commercial Arrangement Area] agreement is not a loss for Malaysia."[213]

Last, Malaysia's pursuit of oil through bilateral maritime boundary delimitations is compounded by its claims to parts of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, which overlap those of Vietnam, Brunei, and the Philippines. Not only do Malaysia's existing offshore hydrocarbons lie within China's declared first island chain, which claims the island grouping as far south as Borneo, but Kuala Lumpur has the potential to realise sovereignty over some of the hydrocarbon resources in the area. Though oil reserve estimates diverge wildly (estimates in the South China Sea range from 28 billion barrels according to a US Geological Survey undertaken in 1993-1994, to Chinese reports of up to 213 billion barrels, with the Spratlys

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Held on Friday 16 Nov 2007, at 10am, at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President, Presiding in the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore),' CR 2007/27, 2007 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14193.pdf.

[210] See Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority, 'Petroleum About the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority (MTJA),' 2011 http://www.mtja.org/aboutus.php.

[211] J I Charney et al., *International Maritime Boundaries*, Vol. 3 (Dordrecht, Boston Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), 2341; N H Thao, 'Joint Development in the Gulf of Thailand,' *IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin* (1999): 81.

[212] 'Malaysia, Brunei to Develop Offshore Oil Blocks - Malaysia,' *Reuters*, 22 Sep 2010; S Suparmaniam, 'Oil, Gas Deal Allows for Sharing of Revenue,' *New Straits Times*, 5 Apr 2010.

[213] R Severino, *Where in the World is the Philippines? Debating Its National Territory* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 82.

anticipated to contain quantities of between 2.1 billion and 105 billion barrels of oil),[214] even conservative approximations represent far greater quantities than Malaysia's existing proven reserves of 5.9 billion barrels. In any case, the area is certainly valuable enough that China has allegedly disrupted Vietnamese and Filipino oil exploration vessels and attempted to construct an oil rig in the area.[215] In 2012 it was involved in stand-offs with the Philippines and established Sansha, a military garrison, on one of the islands.[216] And even though Malaysia claims jurisdiction over only a southernmost few of the 170-odd islands, reefs and banks that make up the Spratly grouping[217]—including Swallow Reef, Ardasier Reef and Mariveles Reef (*Terumbu Layang Layang*, *Terumbu Ubi*, and *Terumbu Mantani*)[218]—it has potential to benefit from revenue sharing arrangements (as it has in its other maritime border contestations discussed above) should they ever be realised.[219]

There are consequently good reasons why Malaysia's policy elites seem to have difficulty in prioritising strategic issues in the Malacca Strait. The Malay Peninsula encounters a diverse range of challenges that can affect the waterway's safety, security and environmental protection. These findings reflect elements of the two countervailing tensions of 'enmeshment' and 'independence' evident in Malaysia's position as a rising energy transit state. Like Singapore, transit oil is a factor in some aspects of Malaysia's strategic agenda in the Strait. It tended to be prominent in issues related to the pollution of its marine environment, and to a lesser

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[214] B D Cole and National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies, *'Oil for the Lamps of China': Beijing's 21st-Century Search for Energy* (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2003), 21. However, in 2013, the EIA indicated that reserves in the area may not contain large quantities of hydrocarbons. 'South China Sea Contested Areas Poorly Endowed, EIA Says,' *Oil and Gas Journal* (2013).

[215] M Auslin, 'Turbulent Waters in the South China Sea,' *Wall Street Journal* 14 Jun 2011.

[216] 'Philippine Leader Says he Won't Yield in Territorial Dispute with China, Will Bolster Military,' *Associated Press*, 23 Jul 2012; J Gomez, 'China Names Garrison Commanders at Newest City in South China Sea, Pressing Claims over Waters,' *Associated Press*, 27 Jul 2012.

[217] D J Dzurek, *The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who's On First?* Maritime Briefing, Vol. 2 (Durham: University of Durham, 1996), 1-3, cited in J C Baker, 'Conflict Potential of the South China Sea Disputes,' in *Asian Security Handbook 2000*, ed. W M Carpenter and D G Wiencek (Armonk; London: M E Sharpe, 2000), 106.

[218] Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy*: 277. Vietnam has occupied Amboyna Cay (*Pulak Kecil Amboyna*) which Malaysia claims as its sovereign territory. T-c Lu, *China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands* (London; New York: Routledge, 1989), 153. Malaysia published a map in 1988 which included on it a number of islands in the group as part of Malaysian territory. The Malay name for Swallow Reef, *Terumbu Layang Layang*, was later changed to mean Swallow Island or *Pulau Layang Layang*. See D J Hancox and V Prescott, 'A Geographical Description of the Spratly Islands and an Account of Hydrographic Surveys Amongst Those Islands,' *IBRU Maritime Briefing* 1, no. 6 (1995): 43.

[219] China did, in fact, formally ask Malaysia in August 1992 to establish a joint agreement on the development of oil and gas resources in the disputed area. C Jie, 'China's Spratly Policy: With Special Reference to the Philippines and Malaysia,' *Asian Survey* 34, no. 10 (1994): 899.

degree, piracy and armed robbery at sea. In contrast to Singapore, Malaysia's view of terrorism has had little to do with transit oil factors or the Malacca Strait. Malaysia's and Indonesia's circumstances are similar as far as they have to manage geographically spread land masses that are separated by bodies of water. This means that the Malacca Strait is not necessarily the overarching strategic interest it is for Singapore. However, accessing local oil reserves beneath the seabed are significant to Malaysia's assertion of its sovereign rights.

This has also revealed how issues of safety, security and environmental protection can be blurred in relation to the transportation of oil by sea. The attack mounted on the *Limburg* in 2002 is important to note in this context. At the time, the vessel was being chartered by Petronas to carry Iranian and Yemeni oil to its Malacca refinery, while the MISC awaited the construction of an oil carrier in Japan.[220] When alleged al Qaeda operatives attacked the French very large crude carrier (VLCC) on 6 October using an explosive laden boat while it was anchored near the southern Yemeni port of Ash Shihr at Mukalla (a security issue), 12,000 tonnes of crude Arabian heavy oil spilled into the Gulf of Aden (affecting the environmental integrity of the surrounding waters). The resulting detonation killed one crew member and injured 12 others, and the event triggered shipping insurance premium hikes throughout the international system (affecting and safety of life at sea and reflecting safety of navigation concerns).[221] Not only did the *Limburg* incident result in environmental degradation, loss of life at sea, as well as briefly prompting security concerns about terrorists targeting Malaysian oil interests in the *Dewan Rakyat* in its aftermath,[222] but it compromised Malaysia's economic interests in oil too.

These observations go some way to explain why Malaysia has not been very vocal about identifying converging interests with other Strait stakeholders. With the exception of a few rare instances, Malaysia does not, on the whole, share Singapore's concern about terrorism or its potential nexus with piracy, especially in the Malacca Strait. Its concern for maritime crime is much broader than its neighbours' rhetoric. For a country that is located at a mid-point in the transnational supply of oil between

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[220] 'MISC Akan Miliki Kapal Terbesar di Malaysia,' *Utusan Online*, 1 May 2002.
[221] Carafano, 'Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea,' 2-3; Centre of Documentation, Research and Experimentation on Accidental Water Pollution, 'Limburg,' Apr 2006 http://www.cedre.fr/en/spill/limburg/limburg.php.
[222] K Y Chow, in Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Penyata Rasmi Parlimen Dewan Rakyat Parlimen Kesepuluh Penggal Keempat Mesuarat Ketiga,' 22 Oct 2002 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-22102002.pdf, 70.

the Arabian Peninsula and East Asia, that has both a partial reliance on transit oil shipments and exploiting its own domestic reserves, Malaysia's interests in the Malacca Strait are very much in line with what we might expect of a rising energy transit state.

MALAYSIA'S APPROACH TO STRAIT SECURITY: COOPERATION OR COMPETITION?

The analysis thus far has identified Malaysia's transit oil stake and found that its stated security interests in the Malacca Strait share characteristics of Singapore's non-traditional security focus and Indonesia's adherence to principles of sovereignty. Yet the broad scope of Malaysia's strategic agenda is troublesome when attempting to distinguish clear patterns in its policy choices. Rising energy transit states are conceptually positioned within an intermediate 'grey area.' A study of Malaysia's decision making in the context of its moderate transit oil stake would need to question if it shares any of its neighbours' policy traits, or exhibits entirely unique qualities. The findings of this thesis' three cases would then be in good stead for detailed examination in the final analysis.

An overview of Malaysia's military spending, maritime capability and scope of efforts to ensure the Malacca Strait's safety, security and environmental protection indicate at face value that the moderate behavioural qualities expected of a rising energy transit state do in fact hold. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's historical data on world military expenditure underscores this. On average, from 1988 to 2012, Malaysia's annual defence budget has exceeded Indonesia's (US$3.3 billion compared to US$3.1 billion) but has equated to less than half of Singapore's (US$6.9 billion). In 2008, Malaysia spent as much as the Philippines and Vietnam put together (US$5.1 billion compared with a combined US$5.0 billion), roughly half of Taiwan's expenditure (US$9.7 billion), and mere fractions of South Korea's (18%), Japan's (9%) and China's (5%) defence outlays.[223] That said, it has not been uncommon for Malaysia to exceed its defence budgets in recent years.[224]

Ke Xu's description of the Malacca Strait's three littoral countries' maritime capabilities that "Indonesia is the lowest, Singapore is the highest, and Malaysia

[223] In constant 2011 US dollars. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'Military Expenditure Database.'
[224] Jane's Information Group, 'Malaysia: Defence Budget Overview,' *Sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia*, 19 Feb 2013.

comes somewhere in between"[225] precisely reflects what was assumed to follow from Malaysia's rising energy transit state position. The RMN has historically been regarded as one of the weaker or so-called 'Cinderella' services within the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF).[226] It is a small service in terms of troops, and represented 1,000 of the MAF's 18,000 personnel in 1962.[227] In 2011, the RMN accounted for 14,000 (13%) of the MAF's 109,000 personnel, compared with 15,000 (14%) in the air force and 80,000 (73%) in the land force.[228] In addition, the RMN's fleet is small. With frigates as the largest operational warships, Malaysia does not have a full maritime task force.[229] Major naval acquisitions from Britain, Germany, Italy and France have posed interoperability challenges. Their maintenance and spare parts have also been costly.[230] And while its naval capabilities have developed after extended deployments since 2008 around the Arabian Peninsula,[231] these observations paint a picture of a limited Malaysian naval power.

In the Malacca Strait, Malaysia has undertaken a wide range of activities to ensure safety, security and environmental protection. Its electronic monitoring mechanisms include the Sea Surveillance System and Automatic Identification System. The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System sends navigational data to vessels in the waterway, and Vessel Traffic Service control centres manage large ships' movements on a 24 hour basis through the Mandatory Ship Reporting System. The Differential Global Navigation Satellite System assists in determining vessels' positions.[232] Malaysia has addressed navigational and environmental issues in the Strait with Singapore and Indonesia through the early initiatives like the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG) and the Cooperative Mechanism that grew from

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[225] K Xu, 'Myth and Reality: The Rise and Fall of Contemporary Maritime Piracy in the South China Sea,' in *Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and International Cooperation*, ed. S Wu and K Zou (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 91.
[226] C Jeshurun, 'Malaysia: The Delayed Birth of a Strategic Culture,' in *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. K Booth and R B Trood (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), 227.
[227] M Alagappa, 'Malaysia: From the Commonwealth Umbrella to Self-Reliance,' in *Defence Spending in Southeast Asia*, ed. K W Chin, *Issues in Southeast Asian Security* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 175-7.
[228] *Military Balance 2011*, cited in Business Monitor International, *Malaysia Defence and Security Report Q3 2012*, 54.
[229] Jane's Information Group, 'Malaysia: Navy,' *Sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia*, 27 Feb 2013.
[230] Jane's Information Group, 'Malaysia: Procurement,' *Sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia*, 27 Feb 2013.
[231] Jane's Information Group, 'Malaysia: Navy.'
[232] See A A b Abdullah and R Suppiah, 'Safety of Navigation and Institutional Framework in the Straits of Malacca,' in *Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia's Perspective*, ed. H M Ibrahim and H A Husin (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008).

it.[233] The first phase of the Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) system, which aims to manage the Strait's navigational and pollution matters through an integrated technology platform among land-based and sea-based users, was completed in 2012.[234] It is also involved in security initiatives such as the MALSINDO Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols, and was proactive in establishing its aerial component Eyes in the Sky (EiS). Naval exercises with Singapore (through Exercise *MALAPURA*), Australia (Exercise *MASTEX*), the US (Exercise *Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training*) and regional states (Exercise *Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism*) are at times conducted in the Malacca Strait's waters.[235] And while Malaysia is not generally pointed out as being a leader in maritime security, like Singapore often is, it has not been criticised for being a 'weak link' like Indonesia either.

Malaysia's maritime power thus fits with the broad assumptions of a rising energy transit state that follow from having a moderate transit oil stake. That is, the scope of its capabilities are in accordance with its diverse security interests and appear to mirror Malaysia's overall priorities in to the Malacca Strait. A more detailed consideration of Malaysia's approach toward the Malacca Strait is therefore warranted, and one that can determine (i) whether Malaysia exhibits cooperative or competitive policy choices, (ii) whether Malaysia's policy choices exhibit traits of Singapore's 'active leadership' or Indonesia's 'constrained contributions,' and (iii) whether its policy choices are driven by oil or non-oil factors.

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[233] R Beckman, 'The Establishment of a Cooperative Mechanism in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore under Article 43 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,' in *The Future of Ocean Regime-Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M Johnston*, ed. A E Chircop, T L McDorman, and S Rolston (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 233, 49.

[234] Fadli, 'IMO Hands over Shipping Control Center in Batam,' *Jakarta Post*, 7 Aug 2012, 5; International Maritime Organization, 'Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) Demonstration Project in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,' http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/MarineElectronicHighway.aspx.

[235] Exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training in 1997 and 2012 for instance included activities conducted at the Lumut naval base on the Strait's coast. 'Malaysia and United States Start "CARAT'97" War Games,' *Bernama*, 9 Jul 1997; E Baxter, 'Malaysia, Singapore Boardings Wrap up Anti-Terrorism Exercise,' United States of America (Department of the Navy), 2007 http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=31314; Commonwealth of Australia (Royal Australian Navy), 'Australia and Malaysia Join Forces,' 26 Aug 2009 http://117.55.225.121/Australia_And_Malaysia_Join_Forces; Malaysia (KD Duyong), 'EX CARAT 2012,' 2012 http://www.navy.mil.my/duyong/index.php/anugerah/ohsas/18-pos-12/62-ex-carat-2012; Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Singapore and Malaysian Navies Conduct Bilateral Maritime Exercise,' 25 Feb 2013 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2013/feb/25feb13_nr.html.

Interagency Cohesion

One of the major initiatives that Singapore put in place to protect its maritime domain was the Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF), which seeks to bolster its agencies' coordination when responding to issues at sea. It has sought to build a comprehensive maritime situational awareness program; improve its armed forces' abilities to jointly respond to incidents at sea, and increase the coordination among the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, the Singapore Police and Coast Guard (PCG) and Customs.[236]

The MMEA can be considered to fulfil a broad span of similar functions, although it was formally established some years earlier in 2005. Prior to its creation there were 14 ministries, four maritime councils, two maritime committees and 24 other government agencies that were responsible for protecting Malaysia's maritime zone.[237] For example, eight separate bodies managed Malaysia's search and rescue and maritime law enforcement activities, including the RMN, Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF), the Marine Police (now Marine Operations Force), the Marine Department, the Royal Customs and Excise Department, the Department of Fisheries, the Department of Environment and the Immigration Department.[238] A study commenced in 1997 by the RMN's Special Forces *Pasukan Khas Laut* (established in 1983 and renamed to *Kapal Diraja Panglima Hitam* in 2009)[239] Commander Sutarji bin Kasmin concluded in 2002 that Malaysia's maritime agencies were inefficiently arranged.[240] In April 1999 the deficiencies in Malaysia's maritime policing capabilities were raised in Cabinet.[241] The recommended course of action was to transfer authority for law enforcement activities at sea to a new agency.[242]

The MMEA was created as a civilian coast guard body to address this fragmented authority and coordinate the various organisations.[243] Like the MSTF, which emerged as part the development of a third generation SAF, the MMEA's

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[236] See the the section entitled SINGAPORE'S APPROACH TO STRAIT SECURITY: COOPERATION OR COMPETITION? in Chapter Two.
[237] H S b Kasmin, 'Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies and Auxiliary Security Agencies of Malaysia,' in *Malaysia's Defence and Security since 1957*, ed. A R Baginda (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Strategic Research Centre, 2009), 195.
[238] D Mahadzir, 'Policing the Waves: Malaysia's Coastguard Seeks Wider Range,' *Jane's Navy International* (2012): 26.
[239] 'RMN Celebrates Diamond Jubilee,' *Bernama*, 26 Apr 2009.
[240] Kasmin, 'Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies,' 201.
[241] Ibid., 203.
[242] Mahadzir, 'Policing the Waves,' 26.
[243] Ho, 'The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,' 566.

creation came during a time of Malaysian defence modernisation as outlined in documents such as the *Versatile Malaysian Armed Forces of the 21st Century*.[244] But where the development of Singapore's armed forces capabilities were partly motivated by the *Laju* experience (during which members of the Japanese Red Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine attacked Singapore's Shell oil refinery), the MMEA's establishment stemmed from ongoing and predominantly non-oil related concerns.

As stated in Section 3 (2) of the MMEA Act 2004, the Agency's overarching objectives are reflective of Malaysia's diverse strategic interests in the Malacca Strait:

> The Agency shall, subject to this Act, be employed in the Malaysian Maritime Zone for the maintenance of law and order, the preservation of the peace, safety and security, the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension and prosecution of offenders and the collection of security intelligence.[245]

Though the above functions do not explicitly identify responsibilities related to oil, the MMEA's website also indicates that the Agency's remit encompasses "[c]ontrol and prevention of maritime pollution in the seas."[246] As this chapter has shown that maritime pollution is central to Malaysia's oil interests in the Strait, the MMEA can be considered as having some role in protecting the country's transit stake.

This said, Malaysia has long positioned security forces in the Malacca Strait. Coastal mine sweepers and inshore mine sweepers were allocated to patrol the sea lane as early as 1958.[247] The *Pasukan Khas Laut* has been one of the primary agencies responsible for protecting Malaysia's EEZ.[248] Its activities have included protecting Malaysia's offshore oil rigs and tankers, conducting anti-terrorist training exercises on MISC owned ships in the Malacca Strait, assisting RMN operations in 2003 to prevent fleeing Acehnese from entering Malaysia, and rescuing the two MISC tankers

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[244] R A Bitzinger, 'A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 32, no. 1 (2010): 54.
[245] Malaysia (Attorney General's Chambers of Malaysia), 'Laws of Malaysia: Act 633: Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004: Incorporating All Amendments up to 1 January 2006,' 7.
[246] Malaysia (Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency), 'Functions,' https://www.mmea.gov.my/eng/index.php/en/about-us/functions.
[247] A F Basrib (ed), *Membelah Ombal: Sejarah TLDM 1934-1989* (Kuala Lumpur: RMN, 1991), 119-20, cited in Kasmin, 'The Malaysian Armed Forces after 50 Years of Independence,' 170-1.
[248] S Ahmad, *Kerjaya Sebagai Tentera Laut Diraja Malaysia* (Selangor: PTS Professional Publishing, 2006), 60; K Conboy, *South-East Asian Special Forces*, Vol. 32, Elite Series (London: Osprey, 1991), 26.

that Somali pirates hijacked off the east coast of Africa in 2008.[249] Consequently, while the MMEA's form might be new, its functions are not.

The aspiration for maritime security operational excellence that was evident in Singapore's approach to securing the Malacca Strait is also reflected in the MMEA's activities, especially in relation to its role in diminishing the threat of non-state actors at sea. Razak has praised the Agency's track record in making arrests.[250] MIMA has noted the MMEA's achievement.[251] In a press statement in 2012, the MMEA estimated that the 516 foreign fishing vessel arrests and the 4,644 it pursued from 2006-2012 saved Malaysia almost US$1 billion in marine resources from being unlawfully taken during this period.[252] Such positive appraisals are not limited to from within Malaysia either. John Bradford, for example, has argued that activities on the Malaysian side of the Malacca Strait have been effective in addressing piracy threats.[253] Adam J. Young has pointed out the MMEA's potential to be an exemplar for other states' maritime agencies.[254]

Despite this success, the MMEA's activities have been constrained by resource limitations: a similar set of circumstances, perhaps, to the challenges facing Indonesia's maritime capability. Many of these are related to the Agency's reliance on donated equipment from the RMN, RMP, Customs, Fisheries, Marine and Immigration departments.[255] One estimate states that 85% of its vessels were acquired from other organisations.[256] As at 2009, of the 73 ships at the MMEA's command, all except two were outdated and small in size. Its 15 *Sipadan* class (and former RMN)

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[249] 'RMN Launches Ops to Prevent Acehnese from Entering Malaysia,' *Bernama*, 23 May 2003; '9th Ops Fajar of Bunga Mas 5 Begins,' *Bernama*, 28 Feb 2011; M Z Zainuddin, (Chief of Defence Forces Malaysia) *Asian Defence Journal*, Oct 2004, 14-21, cited in Kasmin, 'The Malaysian Armed Forces after 50 Years of Independence,' 158; Z A bin Zin in Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Penyata Rasmi Parlimen Dewan Negara Parlimen Kesebelas Penggal Kedua Mesyuarat Pertama Bil 3,' 5 May 2005 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DN-05052005.pdf, 10.

[250] N Razak, 'Speech at the Korea National Defense Univeristy: The Security of the Straits of Malacca and its Implications to the South East Asian Regional Security,' 13 Mar 2007, cited in J F Bradford, 'Shifting the Tides against Piracy in Southeast Asian Waters,' *Asian Survey* 48, no. 3 (2008): 481.

[251] Malaysia (Maritime Institute of Malaysia), 'Towards Becoming a World-Class Maritime Enforcement Agency,' 5 Jul 2012 http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/towards-becoming-a-world-class-maritime-enforcement-agency.

[252] Malaysia (Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency), 'Press Statement,' 18 Jan 2012 http://www.jpm.gov.my/userfiles/file/maklumbalas APMM.pdf.

[253] Bradford, 'Shifting the Tides against Piracy in Southeast Asian Waters,' 480.

[254] A J Young, *Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: History, Causes and Remedies* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 121.

[255] Jane's Information Group, 'Malaysia: Security and Foreign Forces,' *Sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia*, 16 Oct 2012.

[256] Mahadzir, 'Policing the Waves,' 28.

patrol boats have been in service for almost five decades.[257] More modern materiel procurements have been made recent years, including two Canadian amphibious Bombardier 415MP aircraft in 2008, 20 patrol craft from Turkey as well as several Eurocopter Dauphin AS365 N3 helicopters. Australia donated six fast patrol craft in 2010 to bolster Malaysia's capability in responding to non-state actor threats.[258] In 2011, the Government signed contracts to acquire 18 fast interceptor craft.[259]

The MMEA also faced difficulties in filling its 4,035 newly created positions and cohesion challenges among its military and civilian personnel. As at 2010, 2,420 of these had been filled,[260] although Admiral Mohamed Amdan has claimed that a staff size of 9,000 personnel is desired. Senior MMEA posts are dominated by former RMN officials, and its Director Generals have only ever been held by military three-star officials.[261] The MMEA's air wing is chronically short of pilots and infrastructure,[262] and there have also been turf wars with other maritime agencies.[263] The MMEA's functions might be best summarised using the words of one interviewee, who reflected that although Malaysia is working at 95% it does not have perfect coordination.[264] Certainly Malaysia has sought to develop a coherent interagency maritime security capability in the Malacca Strait, and in a manner not unlike Singapore. Yet its resource constraints have so far inhibited its full realisation, much like the challenges facing Indonesia.

Upstream and Downstream Supply Chain Security

Like Singapore, Malaysia also endeavours to protect shipping in waters upstream and downstream from the Malacca Strait. For example, Singapore actively protects merchant shipping from Somali piracy through CTF 151. Doing so promotes itself as a capable maritime security provider and secures its oil interests at the same time. Malaysia also contributes to anti-piracy patrols in the region. However, its

[257] Kasmin, 'Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies,' 210; Mahadzir, 'Policing the Waves,' 28.
[258] Jane's Information Group, 'Malaysia: Security and Foreign Forces.'
[259] Mahadzir, 'Policing the Waves,' 30.
[260] Kasmin, 'Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies,' 206.
[261] Mahadzir, 'Policing the Waves,' 27.
[262] Ibid., 30-1.
[263] Kasmin, 'Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies,' 206, 11-2. The RMP, for instance, feared being downgraded following the MMEA's creation and took steps to obstruct its establishment. Mahadzir, 'Policing the Waves,' 27. According to Interviewee 4633, there were concerns that the MMEA's growth would come at the expense of other maritime agencies such as the marine police.
[264] Interviewee 4633.

motivations have been slightly different and its deployments have not been undertaken through the multinational naval coalition.

Malaysia announced *Operasi Fajar* (Operation Dawn) in 2008 after Somali pirates boarded two MISC-owned oil tankers off Africa's eastern coast. The *Bunga Melati 2* was hijacked on 19 August while carrying palm oil from Dumai, Indonesia to Rotterdam. The *Bunga Melati 5* was targeted ten days later off the coast of Yemen while shipping petrochemicals from the Saudi port of Yanbu to Singapore.[265] Malaysia's initial deployment consisted of two warships and a patrol craft, but over time has included five RMN vessels (*KD Lekiu*, *KD Sri Inderapura*, *KD Mahawangsa*, *KD Sri Indera Sakti* and *KD Hang Tuah*).[266] It also involved special forces from *Pasukan Khas Laut*, the RMAF's special forces *Pasukan Khas Udara*, an army commando team (*Grup Gerak Khas*) and MISC employees through the RMN Volunteer Reserve Force, the *Pasukan Simpanan Sukarela Tentera Laut Di Raja Malaysia* (PSSTLDM).[267]

Malaysia is not the only country that has sought to counter Somali piracy outside of CTF 151. China, Russia, India and Iran have each conducted activities in the region too.[268] Yet its deployments have been explicitly directed at securing its own shipping interests upstream from the Malacca Strait. In some cases these have focused on its oil interests. One of Kuala Lumpur's first responses to the two hijackings was to establish a task group to track Malaysian tankers when attacked in the Gulf region.[269] In January 2011, its maritime forces helped rescue the MISC-chartered and petrochemical carrying *Bunga Laurel* when boarded off the coast of Oman on its way to Singapore.[270]

In other cases, Malaysia's contributions here were aimed at non-oil related purposes. The *Bunga Melati 2*, for instance, was not carrying petroleum products.

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[265] 'Assistance and Cooperation Sought from Yemen and Somalia on Hijacked Tankers,' *Bernama*, 2 Sep 2008; 'Pirate Attacks, Drug Mules, ATM Heists and Murders Mark 2008,' *Bernama*, 26 Dec 2008; B Laurance, 'Insurers Face Huge Claims as Piracy Spreads in Aden,' *McClatchy - Tribune Business News* 10 Apr 2009.
[266] 'A Great Test of Our Navy's Ability,' *New Straits Times*, 23 Jan 2011; MISC Berhad, 'Modification of Bunga Mas Lima into a Navy Auxiliary Vessel,' 1 Jun 2009 http://www.misc.com.my/pressroom_pressrelease_release.php?id=46.
[267] 'Two RMN Ships Return from Gulf of Aden,' *Bernama*, 15 Oct 2008; '9th Ops Fajar of Bunga Mas 5 Begins.'
[268] 'Piracy off Horn of Africa Expected to Rise as Monsoon Season Ends,' *Gulf News*, 14 Sep 2009; J C Bussert, 'China's Fleet Joins the World's Navies off Somalia,' *Signal* 65, no. 2 (2010).
[269] 'Assistance and Cooperation Sought from Yemen and Somalia on Hijacked Tankers.'
[270] K A Kammed et al., 'Brief: Malaysia Tanker and Crew Saved from Pirate Attack in Gulf,' *McClatchy - Tribune Business News*, 22 Jan 2011.

During an eight month period concluding in October 2010, the RMN auxiliary vessel *Bunga Mas 5* escorted some 109 Malaysian ships through piracy-prone waters[271] and it is unlikely that all of these were oil carriers—although it is perhaps worthwhile to reiterate that Petronas is the MISC's primary shareholder. In 2009, Foreign Minister Anifah bin Aman claimed that Malaysia's activities were for others' benefit, stating that:

> […] we feel that it is very, very important, and we place this high priority in order to solve the piracy in the Gulf of Aden, because it affects—it does affect the economy of the region and maybe the whole world.[272]

In addition, Malaysian forces responded to attacks on the Chinese *Zenhua 4* on 17 December 2008 and Indian flagged oil tanker *Abdul Kalam Azad* on 1 January 2009. This was more a result of circumstance as the *KD Sri Indera Sakti* was proximate to both vessels at the time.[273] With this in mind, RMN Chief Admiral Abdul Aziz Jaafar's praise that "throughout [*Operasi Fajar*] not one commercial vessel owned by the MISC or [Malaysia] was hijacked by armed pirates"[274] underlines a distinct priority allocated to protecting Malaysian shipping interests, with reputational factors coming perhaps a close second.

These activities have not been immune from resource difficulties. Due to their age, few RMN ships were reportedly capable of long periods of deployment at sea without needing to refuel,[275] leading one analyst to describe Malaysia's Gulf maritime commitment as 'episodic.'[276] According to Admiral Jaafar, operating costs were central in the decision to return MAF forces home in 2009.[277] In fact, much of the anti-piracy operations were dependent on financial assistance from the Petronas-controlled MISC. The MISC reportedly paid US$4-4.7 million in ransom to secure the two *Bunga Melati* vessels' release.[278] In addition, its container ship, the *Bunga Mas 5*, was converted to a support vessel that the RMN could use in the operation. This added a helicopter deck, communication systems, medical equipment, weapons

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[271] 'Bunga Mas Lima Returns after Gulf of Aden Escort Duties,' *Bernama*, 23 Oct 2010.
[272] United States of America (Embassy of the United States of America in the Republic of Korea), 'Remarks with Malaysian Foreign Minister Y. B. Datuk Anifah bin Haji Aman after their Meeting,' 14 May 2009 http://seoul.usembassy.gov/p_nk_051409.html.
[273] 'RMN Saves Ship Boarded by Pirates,' *New Straits Times*, 19 Dec 2008; 'Malaysian Helicopter Saves Indian Vessel from Somali Pirates,' *Reuters*, 1 Jan 2009.
[274] N Norazman, 'Royal Malaysian Navy Continues to Shine,' *Bernama*, 26 Apr 2011.
[275] 'Malaysia - Budgetary Difficulties Remain,' *Defence Review Asia*, 26 May 2010.
[276] J Stevenson, 'Somali Pirates at Sea,' *Forbes*, 19 Nov 2008.
[277] 'Navy Puts Focus on Security in Straits of Malacca,' *New Straits Times*, 7 Jan 2007.
[278] 'Malaysia's MISC to Continue to Use Horn of Africa,' *Reuters*, 30 Sep 2008; R Cheah, 'Rm6.9mil Ransom Paid for Release of Second Ship,' *Star*, 20 Sep 2008.

facilities and small vessel launchers, and the *Bunga Mas 5* continues to be an official part of the RMN's auxiliary fleet.[279] Furthermore, in 2011, when Kuala Lumpur announced its decision to strengthen the Malaysian security presence in the Gulf and add another auxiliary vessel, it was revealed that the MISC would cover the costs of doing so.[280] RMN Chief Admiral Aziz disclosed that the Malaysian Government did not pay for the asset's use. Under the arrangement, the RMN supplied personnel, equipment, helicopters and weaponry, and the MISC met the overheads such as fuel and spare parts.[281]

Based on its position as a rising energy transit state, one would anticipate Malaysia to exhibit characteristics of Singapore's leadership approach to managing security issues related to the Malacca Strait. The analysis found that although Malaysia has sought to bolster its ability to manage issues at sea through the MMEA, and has contributed to security activities both in the Malacca Strait and in waters toward the Arabian Peninsula like its island state neighbour, its resource limitations have often precluded its aspirations. Another important difference was that Malaysia's upstream contributions were very much targeted to its own shipping interests, whereas Singapore was more driven to share the entire regional security burden (and to be seen doing so). Securing incoming oil supplies was relevant to both countries' policy decisions, though they were not as prominent in Malaysia's rhetoric. Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar's claim in 2004 that Malaysia's efforts to secure its share of the Malacca Strait "differed only in style" to Singapore[282] is an appropriate observation in this respect.

Asserting Sovereignty

Indonesia has rejected a variety of cooperative security initiatives that could have resulted in non-littoral countries' military presences in the Malacca Strait. While this preference has often been motivated by its sensitivity to perceived infringements of its sovereignty in the waterway, reputational factors were sometimes at stake too. Here, one of Indonesia's notable policy decicions was its rejection of the RMSI on the

[279] S Saunders, *Jane's Fighting Ships, 2011-2012* (Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group, 2011), 504.
[280] Zahid Hamidi explained, "[w]e can add another ship, as long as the MISC agrees to bear its operating costs." 'Ministry May Deploy Another Ship to Gulf,' *Bernama*, 23 Jan 2011.
[281] H E Yaacob, 'Operasi di Teluk Aden Dipertingkat,' *Berita Harian*, 22 Apr 2011.
[282] 'Malaysia Will Cooperate on Malacca Straits Security: FM,' *Agence France-Presse*, 8 Jun 2004.

grounds of sovereignty concerns.[283] Razak also discounted the RMSI after it was announced, claiming that it could not proceed without Malaysian consent, that it was a matter of sovereignty,[284] and that the littoral states together held responsibility to ensure security of the Malacca Strait.[285] Later, when speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June, Razak explained that foreign troops' presence in the Malacca Strait would be counterproductive for addressing radicalism. He argued:

> What we should avoid is the presence of foreign forces in Southeast Asia, not because we distrust those from outside the region, but because a foreign military presence will set us back in our ideological battle against extremism and militancy.[286]

Other high profile decision makers including Hamid Albar and Chief of the Armed Forces General Mohamed Zahidi Zainuddin raised their opposition too.[287] When speaking at the *Dewan Negara*, the upper house of Malaysian Parliament, MP Salahuddin Ayub remarked that the RMSI proposal affected both Indonesian and Malaysian sovereignty in the Malacca Strait and reflected US hegemonic ambitions in Southeast Asia.[288] Statements of this nature have since become prolific in Malaysian rhetoric on the sea lane, not only on Razak's part,[289] but by other high profile decision makers like Abdullah Badawi[290] and Muhyiddin Yassin.[291]

The US is not the only state to be rebuffed in such a manner. Malaysian responses to Japanese, Indian and Chinese offers of naval patrol contributions in the Malacca Strait have ranged from ambiguity (at best), to outright dismissal.[292] Officials

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[283] Interviewee 4633 remarked that "the RMSI was a pain for Malaysia and Indonesia."
[284] J Kent, 'Malaysia Rejects US Sea Patrols,' *BBC News*, 4 Apr 2004.
[285] Z A Rahman, 'Najib: No Need for US to Patrol Straits,' *Star*, 5 Apr 2004.
[286] 'Malaysia Rejects Use of Foreign Troops in Region,' *Reuters*, 7 Jun 2004.
[287] 'Three-Nation Coordinated Patrols in Melaka Strait,' *Utusan Online*, 21 Jul 2004; 'US Told Indonesia and Malaysia to Stay out of Straits;' Watkins, 'Facing the Terrorist Threat in the Malacca Strait.'
[288] Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Penyata Rasmi Parlimen Dewan Rakyat Parlimen Kesebelas Penggal Pertama Mesuarat Kedua Bil 18,' 5 Jul 2004 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-05072004.pdf, 75.
[289] 'Security Costs in Malacca, Singapore Straits Estimated at US$300mm,' *Star*, 13 Mar 2007; M Baker, 'Malaysia Rebuffs US Seaforce Plan,' *Age*, 6 Apr 2005; W H Hamid, 'Use Straits but Help Pay for Security,' *New Straits Times*, 14 Mar 2007; Razak, 'Keynote Address at the Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore;' J Ritikos, 'Najib: Straits Users Must Play Role,' *Star*, 14 Mar 2007.
[290] 'Malaysia Not to Allow Foreign Forces to Patrol Malacca Straits: PM,' *People's Daily*, 21 Jul 2005; 'PM: Malaysia against Foreign Forces Patrolling Strait,' *Star*, 3 Dec 2007.
[291] Yassin, 'Keynote Address at the Opening Ceremony of the 6th MIMA Conference on the Straits of Malacca.'
[292] 'Indian Navy Awaits Regional Nod for Patrolling Malacca Straits,' *Hindustan Times*, 7 Jun 2007; 'China Offers Help on Strait of Malacca Security,' *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, 19 Nov 2009; Portsworld Malaysia: National Maritime Portal, 'Malaysia Rejects Joint Anti-Piracy Patrols with Japan,' *Shipping Monitor*, http://www.portsworld.com/publications/shipmonitor/sm05.htm.

have also discounted suggestions for privately-hired security escorts to protect merchant vessels in the waterway on the grounds that a minor sovereignty infringement could escalate into a major one if force was used at sea.[293] Malaysia's Director of Internal Security, Othman Talib, even went as far to warn Singaporean escorts that they would be detained if found operating in Malaysian waters, adding that the RMP could provide those services instead.[294]

Indonesia has also not been exempt from Malaysia's sovereignty sensitivities in the Malacca Strait. Incursions into each other's sections of the waterway regularly flare up in the bilateral relationship. An early example occurred in 1953 when the Indonesian patrol boat *Djuanda* seized a Malaysian fishing vessel that sailed near the coastline of Bengkalis while British forces escorted it (along with some 300 others) through the Strait. In response, a RMN ship entered Indonesian waters to free it.[295] More recently, in 2010, a passing RMP ship fired on an Indonesian patrol that was boarding a Malaysian fishing vessel for allegedly trespassing into its Riau waters (despite the fishermen's protests that their on board global positioning system placed their boat squarely in Malaysian territory). Claiming that their ship was sailing unauthorised in Malaysian waters, the RMP towed the patrol craft back to the Malaysian Peninsula and arrested the Indonesian officials.[296]

Malaysia's policy elites have opposed suggestions to establish an Australian counter-terrorism force in Southeast Asia on similar grounds. When Prime Minister John Howard proposed pre-emptive strikes on terrorists to be launched from Malaysian territory in 2002, Mahathir responded that doing so would constitute an act of war,[297] and Hamid Albar argued that Howard "should not be touching on the question of sovereignty."[298] When Howard suggested the initiative again in 2004, Deputy Defence Minister Zainal Abidin Zin declared that it would not be permitted

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[293] A C Sjaastad, 'Southeast Asian SLOCs and Security Options,' in *Maritime Security in Southeast Asia*, ed. C G Kwa and J K Skogan (London: Routledge, 2007), 8.
[294] 'Malaysia Warns Armed Boats Escorting Merchant Ships against Encroachment,' *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, 27 Apr 2005.
[295] G Poulgrain, *The Genesis of Konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, 1945-1965* (Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing, 1998), 66.
[296] 'Malaysian Police Arrests Indonesian Maritime Officers, Deny Shooting,' *Jakarta Globe*, 15 Aug 2010; I L Mokhtar, N Ilyas, and R See, 'Jakarta Has Situation under Control,' *New Straits Times*, 25 Aug 2010; H D Tampubolon, 'I Am Displeased by Malaysia: Fishery Minister,' *Jakarta Post*, 16 Aug 2010.
[297] 'M'sia May Rethink Cooperation with Australia - PM,' *Bernama*, 4 Dec 2002.
[298] 'ASEAN to Discuss Howard's Stance on Pre-Emptive Strikes,' *Star*, 7 Dec 2002.

for the same reason.[299] These statements further show that Malaysia's suspicion for other countries' military activities within its territory is consistently upheld toward its land and maritime domains. Malaysia's reaction to the RMSI was therefore not unique or limited to the Malacca Strait. As the case study of Indonesia found, this was just one of many instances where Malaysia has upheld its adherence to principles of sovereignty.

Reputational Factors

Malaysia is also sensitive to claims about its ability to protect the Malacca Strait. For example, in addition to viewing the RMSI as a sovereignty challenge, Malaysia saw the initiative as an insinuation that it did not possess adequate maritime security capabilities.[300] RMP Superintendent Shahbudin bin Abdul Wahab claimed that the US was trying "to picture Malaysia's security forces as incapable to guarantee safety for ships passing through the straits."[301] Later, in 2007, Razak argued that 'user' states' ongoing concerns suggested their lack of confidence in the littoral countries to protect merchant shipping.[302]

Decision makers have thus sought to demonstrate Malaysia's maritime capabilities in the Strait, and in doing so have indicated concerns about extra regional actors' military involvement. Similar to statements made by Indonesian policy elites, Najib Razak explained that if Malaysia had not acted to increase security cooperation, "[w]e might (have been) pressured by the international community to let them bring their own patrols into the straits."[303] It is therefore understandable why Razak stressed that Malaysia's involvement in the Malacca Straits Patrol Network demonstrated to other states its 'seriousness' about protecting the sea lane.[304] As discussed in the previous case studies, both Singapore and Indonesia have put forward this justification as well.

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[299] 'Malaysia Attacks Australia Anti-Terror Plan,' *New Zealand Herald*, 20 Dec 2004.
[300] Storey, 'Securing Southeast Asia's Sea Lanes,' 114.
[301] S B A Wahab, 'Contemporary Issues on Terrorism: Royal Malaysia Police Perspective,' *Journal of the Royal Malaysia Police Senior Officers' College* 2 (2004): 45-6.
[302] Razak, 'The Security of the Straits of Malacca and its Implications to the South East Asia Regional Security, Seoul, South Korea.'
[303] 'Najib Seeks Jakarta Cooperation in Fighting Piracy,' *Straits Times*, 3 Apr 2005, cited in Storey, 'Securing Southeast Asia's Sea Lanes,' 116.
[304] 'Air Patrols for Malacca Strait,' *BBC News*, 13 Sep 2005.

The reputational factors underpinning Malaysia's maritime security cooperation do not stop here. It has sought to advocate its successful contributions in a variety of forums. In spite of the financial reliance on the MISC for its operations, elite military figures have publicly applauded the Gulf antipiracy activities: Admiral Jafaar claimed the efforts "upheld the MAF, especially the RMN, to a higher level in the international maritime arena, showing that it is on par with other countries;"[305] Vice-Admiral Ahmad Kamarulzaman Ahmad Badaruddin praised the RMN's "excellent performance;"[306] Chief of the Armed Forces Abdul Aziz Zainal commented that RMN involvement "should be appreciated," adding that piracy levels had fallen following international cooperation in the Gulf;[307] and Chief of the RMAF General Azizan Ariffin stressed that "Malaysia was the only Asian country that had sent its assets (rescue team) to tackle the [*Bunga Melati*] situation," which he viewed as dedication in protecting national interests.[308] Self-promotional statements such as these resemble the leadership traits that Singapore has exhibited in its attempts to be seen as a capable maritime security provider.

Like Singapore, Malaysia's policy elites have promoted Strait security cooperation as a desirable model to be used in other locations. This has occurred in both 'upstream' and 'downstream' waters from the Malacca Strait. The *Strategic Plan 2040* identifies a strategic goal for the MMEA to serve as a benchmark for other maritime agencies abroad.[309] In 2008, Hamid Albar argued to the United Nations that a navigation fund (reminiscent of Malaysia's support for a fund in the Malacca Strait)[310] lane could help secure waters surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.[311] At a 2010 Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions conference in Hanoi, Malaysia put forward a proposal for a security mechanism in the South China Sea that was based on the Malacca Strait's coordinated patrols—although it was not successful.[312]

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[305] Norazman, 'Royal Malaysian Navy Continues to Shine.'
[306] 'Bunga Mas Lima Returns after Gulf of Aden Escort Duties.'
[307] 'RMN Ship in Gulf of Aden to End Duty End of the Month,' *Bernama*, 26 Feb 2009.
[308] '21 RMAF Personnel Involved in 'Ops Fajar,' Return Home,' *Bernama*, 20 Oct 2008.
[309] See article 213 (e) in Malaysia (Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency), *Pelan Perancangan Strategik Maritim Malaysia 2040*: 18.
[310] Malaysia's support for funding mechanisms in the Malacca Strait is discussed later in this chapter, in the section entitled *Financial Burden Sharing Mechanisms*.
[311] 'Malaysia Floats a Security Fund for Safer Gulf of Aden,' *Press Trust of India*, 18 Nov 2008.
[312] J M Tupas, 'ASEAN Hit for Being "Soft" on Security Issues,' *Inquirer Global Nation*, 18 Jul 2011.

At times, such efforts have involved approaching high profile US figures. In 2008, Foreign Minister Yatin telephoned Condoleezza Rice to further Malaysia's proposal for an international naval peacekeeping force addressing Somali piracy, which had previously been raised at the United Nations Security Council and the 2008 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Peru.[313] Aman raised the applicability of Malaysia's Strait security capabilities for Gulf of Aden antipiracy activities to Hillary Clinton as a means "to share our experiences."[314] On another occasion in 2011, Kuala Lumpur invited Singapore to cooperate in Malaysian-led anti-piracy activities in the Gulf.[315] This offer came at a time that Singapore had already completed several deployments with, and commands of, CTF 151, and might be regarded as a subtle striving on Malaysia's part for leadership in maritime security over its neighbour. In the least, these efforts reinforce arguments that Malaysian foreign policy making is inherently an elite dominated process.

Malaysia's self-promotion here has also seen favourable outcomes in the international arena. In November 2009, Malaysia's policy elites took pains to emphasise its maritime security capabilities when it was re-elected to the IMO Council for the third time, at which point it received an IMO Exceptional Service Rendered to Shipping and Mankind award for its Gulf contributions.[316] According to Deputy Transport Minister Abdul Rahim Bakri, the Council bid resubmission was evidence of Malaysia's commitment to the Malacca Straits.[317] Following the election, elite figures—including Malaysia's Transport Minister Ong, his department's under-secretary for the maritime division Abdullah Yusuff Basiron and the Malaysian High Commission's maritime attaché Malik Saripulazan—stated that the victory reflected the international community's esteem in Malaysia's maritime capabilities. Specifically, these included its efforts to ensure the maritime domain's safety, security and environmental protection, secure the Gulf region and the Malacca Strait, address terrorism and piracy and contribute to the Cooperative Mechanism and Aids to Navigation Fund.[318]

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[313] 'APEC Sets 18 Months to Overcome Global Crisis,' *Star*, 25 Nov 2008.
[314] 'Decision on M'sians in Guantanamo Bay to be Known Soon,' *Antara*, 18 May 2009; United States of America (Embassy of the United States of America in the Republic of Korea), 'Remarks with Malaysian Foreign Minister Y. B. Datuk Anifah bin Haji Aman after their Meeting.'
[315] 'M'sia Invites S'pore to Jointly Monitor Gulf of Aden,' *Bernama*, 14 Mar 2011.
[316] 'RMN Receives Excellence Award in London,' *Bernama*, 25 Nov 2009.
[317] 'Malaysia Seeks Re-Election to IMO Council,' *Hellenic Shipping News*, 8 Oct 2009.
[318] 'Malaysia Hailed as One of Council's Renowned Member,' *Star*, 27 Nov 2009; O T Keat, 'Malaysia Successfully Elected to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Council Share,' 30 Nov 2009

Of course, countries often seek to promote themselves to different parties and for different purposes. Malaysia's prestige as a capable maritime actor is relevant to the entire transnational supply of oil from the Middle East to East Asia, and not just in a Malacca Strait context. It has motivated Malaysia to step up its security cooperation in the sea lane for reasons related to upholding its territorial integrity, but being seen as a competent maritime actor has been intricately linked to the weight of Malaysia's voice in various international capacities. These are factors that have been prominent in Singapore's and Indonesia's respective approaches to the sea lane as well.

Burden Sharing and Capacity Building

In a parallel to Indonesia's preferences, Malaysia's police elite have encouraged capacity building assistance from other stakeholders through means such as technology transfer, training and intelligence sharing.[319] In May 2005, in the months following the RMSI announcement, Razak declared his support for US contributions.[320] Later, at a China-Malaysia summit in December that year, Badawi advocated Chinese contributions to strengthen Strait security too.[321] Like Indonesia, such help had to be respectful of Malaysia's sovereignty. Yassin's statement below is indicative of policy rhetoric on the matter:

> As a littoral state, Malaysia is committed to acquiring best available technologies and practices to manage the straits while maintaining and exercising its sovereignty in accordance with international law.[322]

Such contributions have been forthcoming. But in comparison to Indonesia, which has received a broad range of packages that have bolstered its maritime capabilities throughout its entire archipelago, Malaysia has derived benefit in addressing maritime crime and navigational safety. This is evident in the nature of (i) non-littoral countries' equipment and training contributions, which is examined in this section, and (ii) Malaysia's efforts to establish 'user pays' mechanisms for protecting the

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http://confucianalumni.com; C T Wo, 'Malaysia Re-Elected into IMO Council,' *Star*, 28 Nov 2009; C T Wo, 'Most Developing Countries Trust Malaysia's Maritime Role, Says Tee Keat,' *Star*, 29 Nov 2009; C T Wo, 'Rough, but We Glided On,' *Star*, 29 Nov 2009.

[319] 'Aerial Watch Keeps Piracy at Bay in Straits of Malacca,' *Star*, 24 Jun 2009; Storey, 'China's "Malacca Dilemma."'

[320] 'Malaysia and US Renew Defence Pact, Discuss Malacca Strait Security,' *Channel News Asia*, 9 May 2005.

[321] R Sutter, 'Emphasizing the Positive; Continued Wariness,' *Comparative Connections* 7, no. 4 (2006): 4.

[322] 'Aerial Watch Keeps Piracy at Bay in Straits of Malacca.'

Strait, which is considered in the next. In most instances, these have had direct implications for Malaysia's oil and non-oil interests in the Malacca Strait.

Japan has perhaps been the most active in providing capacity building assistance. In 1976 it donated the buoy tender vessel *Pedoman* to Malaysia through the Malacca Straits Council (MSC).[323] This ship offered Malaysia the capability to undertake surveying, fire-fighting, maintenance and oil containment activities, as well as manage navigational aids.[324] In 2002, Japan contributed a replacement vessel of the same name.[325] In 2006 it donated the craft *KM Marlin*, which has been used for training and patrol activities.[326] Later, in 2009, a Japanese grant allowed the MMEA to purchase three electro-optronic laser cameras and two sets of radio direction finders worth approximately US$4.9 million.[327] These have wide applications for addressing maritime crime, managing traffic and conducting search and rescue operations.[328] In the same year, Japan helped Malaysia's Customs Department procure ten speed boats and 14 thermal imagers valued at US$7.4 million.[329] In 2011, under a US$3.4 million assistance project, the RMP's Marine Operation Force acquired 40 sets of night vision goggles, 40 binocular range finders, 60 portable digital radios and four rigid hull inflatable boats. These too were to be used to conduct surveillance and prevent crime activities at sea.[330]

The Japanese International Cooperation Agency organises a variety of training initiatives. A Japanese Coast Guard officer is deployed on a long-term arrangement to assist in training MMEA personnel. A Maritime Guard and Rescue Project facilitated technology transfers in maritime law enforcement and has conducted several seminars in recent years. During a 2009 workshop, for instance, three Agency officials trained 28 MMEA personnel in procedural conduct for advanced boarding inspections, criminal investigations and arrests, as well as practical activities using MMEA ships.

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[323] 'Malacca Straits Buoy Tender Replaced,' *Japan Times*, 12 Jun 2002.
[324] K Saishoji, 'Japan's Contribution to Safe Navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,' *Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law* 2 (1998): 512.
[325] 'Malacca Straits Buoy Tender Replaced.'
[326] 'MMEA Foils Hijack of Two Fishing Boats, Nabs Two Pirates,' *Bernama*, 8 Aug 2011; Malaysia (Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency), 'MMEA Assets,' http://mmea.gov.my/eng/index.php/en/other-language/78-public.
[327] Japan (Embassy of Japan in Malaysia), 'Handover of Equipment for Maritime Security Enhancement,' 21 Mar 2011 http://www.my.emb-japan.go.jp/English/ODA/grant aid maritime/21032011.htm.
[328] 'Maritime Agency to Improve Surveillance,' *Bernama*, 20 Mar 2009.
[329] Japan (Embassy of Japan in Malaysia), 'Handover of Equipment for Maritime Security Enhancement.'
[330] Ibid.

In addition, the Agency deployed patrol craft to Southeast Asia 21 times between November 2000 and 2009. In 2000 and 2007 they held drills with Malaysian marine police forces.[331]

Australia has also contributed to building Malaysia's maritime security capabilities, albeit mainly in relation to countering drug and arms smuggling. In October 2010, it donated six patrol vessels, three mobile explosive and narcotics trace detectors, six video borescopes, six night vision devices, 24 search equipment kits and ten laptops and analyst notebook licences.[332] In March 2011 it announced equipment donations valued at US$141,000 that included additional trace detectors and a training package for their operation. Later, in July, the MMEA and the Australian Border Protection Command signed a memorandum of understanding on civil maritime law enforcement.[333] Despite the anti-narcotic focus that has been a prominent component of Australia's maritime interests, these contributions have had broad application in Malaysia's maritime crime prevention activities. For Admiral Amdan at least, the 2010 assistance package would strengthen Malaysia's ability to conduct operations at sea.[334]

For its part, the US has provided a variety of security assistance initiatives to Malaysia through the Office of Defence Cooperation. This said, they have not especially been directed toward Strait security. Some 50 Malaysian officials are trained through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program every year. Participants have included Malaysia's Chief of Defence Force, Chief of Air Force and Chief of Navy.[335] On the direction of then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, the US established the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism training and research centre in Kuala Lumpur.[336] With a focus on counter-terrorism in

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[331] Japan (Embassy of Japan in Malaysia), 'Maritime Law Enforcement Seminar －Japan Coast Guard Contributed toward Competence of Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency,' 22 Jan 2009 http://www.my.emb-japan.go.jp/English/ODA/maritime_seminar.html.
[332] B O'Connor, 'Australia and Malaysia to Combat Transational Crime,' Australian Labor Party, 15 Mar 2011 http://global.alp.staging.communityengine.com/federal-government/news/australia-and-malaysia-to-combat-transational-crim.
[333] B O'Connor, 'Strengthening Ties with Malaysia to Improve Maritime Security,' Australian Labor Party, 12 Jul 2011 http://global.alp.staging.communityengine.com/federal-government/news/strengthening-ties-with-malaysia-to-improve-mariti.
[334] 'APMM Terima Peralatan Bernilai Rm4.8 Juta Dari Australia,' *Bernama*, 29 Oct 2010.
[335] United States of America (Department of State), 'Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations,' 2007 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60641.pdf, 363; United States of America (Embassy of the United States of America in Malaysia), 'Office of Defense Cooperation,' http://malaysia.usembassy.gov/odc.html.
[336] Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy*: 37-8.

general (rather than maritime terrorism in particular), its workshops have involved trainers from Australia, Britain, Canada, Croatia, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea and the US.[337] Other US capacity building efforts to Malaysia have been through the Excess Defense Articles mechanism, the Antiterrorism Assistance program and the Non-Proliferation Anti-Terrorism Demining and Related Programs. Export Control and Related Border Security funding are used to strengthen enforcement, maritime security and industry relationship capabilities.[338] The Foreign Military Sales Training Program, Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program and Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies courses can be added to this list.[339] Again, like Australia's donations, these contributions reflect the US's own interests (in other words, counter-terrorism in a post 9/11 international system). As found with the case of Indonesia, these efforts are more likely to benefit Malaysian military personnel in general rather than marine officials in particular.

Financial Burden Sharing Mechanisms

Malaysia's attempts to obtain financial assistance from non-littoral state actors follow on from its capacity building advocacy. Many of these have objectives related to the Malacca Strait's safety and environment. Like Indonesia, Malaysia has often sought monetary contributions as a means to offset resource and capability limitations. In 1972 Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (who later became Finance Minister under Mahathir) suggested the creation of a toll in the Strait that Malaysia and Indonesia could oversee together.[340] B. A. Hamzah, formerly the Director General of MIMA, has often argued for a funding mechanism for the waterway.[341] The rationale, according to the Deputy Director of Malaysia's Marine Department, Captain Ahmad Othman, was that Malaysia has:

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[337] United States of America (Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism), 'Country Reports on Terrorism 2004,' Apr 2005 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45313.pdf, 38.
[338] United States of America (Department of State), 'Congressional Budget Justification' 363-4.
[339] United States of America (Embassy of the United States of America in Malaysia), 'Office of Defense Cooperation.'
[340] Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism,' 149.
[341] B A Hamzah, 'Managing Marine Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Personal Observations,' *Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law* 2 (1998); B A Hamzah, 'Funding of Services in the Straits of Malacca: Voluntary Contribution or Cost Recovery,' *Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law* 3 (1999); B A Hamzah and M N Basiron, *The Straits of Malacca: Some Funding Proposals* (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 1997).

> already put up the capital costs of putting the best navigation system in the straits, the least the users must do is pay for the maintenance and running of the system.[342]

Othman's words reveal that much of the concern relates to the notion that there are 'free riders' using the waterway without bearing any of the costs from doing so.[343] Razak explained this in 2007:

> It is regrettable to note that the international users have thus far not matched their usage of the Straits with contribution to the costs of maintaining its safety and security. […] Malaysia finds it difficult to accept that while the international users consider the Straits as an international sea lane which they have the right to use, however, the efforts of maintaining and securing the waterway have always been regarded the responsibility of the littoral states. The high expectations from the international users and the increased in volume of traffic have indeed imposed considerable demand and financial burden on the littoral states.[344]

Responses to 'user pays' initiatives have varied. Some stakeholders, such as Japan and Intertanko have been supportive. Others, including the Federation of ASEAN Shipowners Association, have not.[345] Such suspicions are often based on fears that a legal precedent could emerge, which would then present adverse consequences in other global shipping lanes.[346]

Two main multilateral funding mechanisms are in place to manage stakeholder's monetary contributions for protecting the Malacca Strait. In 1981 the MSC established the Revolving Fund to respond to large oil spills.[347] The Cooperative Mechanism, created in 2007, also organises stakeholder contributions for managing the Malacca Strait's navigational safety through the Aids to Navigation Fund (ANF).

Each of the littoral countries examined in this thesis have been involved in the two funds. The fact that Malaysia's Environment Department is the Revolving Fund's national representative agency further reflects its priority allocated to protecting the Strait's marine resources. In comparison, Singapore and Indonesia have respectively

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[342] D Urquhart, 'KL Calls for Levy on Users of Singapore, Malacca Straits,' *Business Times*, 28 Oct 2008.
[343] G Christoffersen, 'Chinese and ASEAN Responses to the US Regional Maritime Security Initiative,' in *China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security*, ed. G Wu and H Lansdowne (Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2007), 139.
[344] Razak, 'The Security of the Straits of Malacca and its Implications to the South East Asia Regional Security, Seoul, South Korea.'
[345] Urquhart, 'KL Calls for Levy on Users of Singapore, Malacca Straits.'
[346] V Sakhuja, 'Malacca: Who's to Pay for Smooth Sailing?' *Asia Times*, 16 May 2007; Urquhart, 'KL Calls for Levy on Users of Singapore, Malacca Straits.'
[347] M Cleary and K C Goh, *Environment and Development in the Straits of Malacca* (London: Routledge, 2000), 186.

designated the MPA and Directorate General of Sea Transportation.[348] Malaysia was the ANF's first host for the first three years of its existence. With agreements on the parts of South Korea, United Arab Emirates, the Middle East Navigation Aids Services and the Nippon Foundation to contribute, Transport Minister Ong argued that it would allow Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia to be proactive in the Strait "and not only rely on foreign countries."[349]

A glance at the funds' usage indicates that Indonesia gained the most. As at 2006, Malaysia had only ever drawn from the Revolving Fund once. Its US$580,000 withdrawal in 1992 was to clean up the *Nagasaki Spirit's* oil spill in the Strait's north after it collided with the container ship *Ocean Blessing.* While Singapore has never made a withdrawal, Indonesia has done so on two occasions. The first, amounting to US$660,000, was also in response to the *Nagasaki Spirit.* The second, of US$500,260, was to clean the Riau Archipelago's waters in 2000. In October that year, the *Natuna Sea* ran aground at Batu Berhanti in the Singapore Strait while carrying Nile Blend crude oil from the Middle East to China.[350]

Financial contributions to maintain navigational aids in the Malacca Strait reveal a similar distribution of assistance among the three countries. Of the 51 navigational aids installed in the Malacca Strait as at 2005, 28 were in Indonesian waters, 18 were in Malaysian waters and Singapore had five. Of these, 30 were paid for by the MSC. Most (23) of these were Indonesia's, none were Singapore's and only seven were Malaysia's.[351] Similarly, one of the ANF's first activities was to conduct an assessment survey of the Strait's aids to navigation. Here, Malaysia estimated its survey would cost US$442,500, whereas Indonesia quoted almost twice the amount (US$908,500). Singapore did not request any funds.[352]

This spread of financial resources makes sense since Indonesia has the longest coastline and maritime domain of the three littoral states. Yet the link between 'user

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[348] Republic of Singapore (Maritime Port Authority of Singapore), 'Fact Sheet on the Revolving Fund,' 26 Apr 2006 http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/pdf/060426c.pdf.
[349] 'Give More to Fund, Shipping Firms and Countries Told,' *Star*, 28 May 2008.
[350] Republic of Singapore (Maritime Port Authority of Singapore), 'Fact Sheet on the Revolving Fund;' M H E Siang, 'Natuna Sea Incident: Singapore's Experience' (paper presented at the Oil Spill Symposium - Petroleum Association of Japan, Tokyo, Japan, 1-2 Mar 2001), 2.
[351] Malacca Strait Council, 'Towards Enhancing the Navigational Safety and Preserving the Marine Environment in the Straits,' 2005 http://www.nmc.com.sg/MSC.pdf, 4.
[352] The two figures included each country's unilateral surveys as well as joint surveys conducted with the MSC. Co-operative Mechanism in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, 'Assessment Survey of AIDS to Navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,' ANF 1/5/1, 2008 http://inflexpoint.com/meetings/aids-to-navigation-fund/category/1-1st-aton-committee-meeting?download=11:anf-1-5-1-asessment-survey-of-aton-in-the-soms, 3.

pays' funding mechanisms and the Strait's marine environment has been more loudly voiced by Malaysia. This is evident in relation to designation of the Malacca Strait as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA), which the IMO defines as a unique location requiring protection from maritime activities.[353] Given that Malaysia has the greatest population spread alongside the Strait's coastline and has substantive reliance on the waterway's marine resources, it is the most eligible of the three countries to request such a classification. Acquiring PSSA designation would require Malaysia to demonstrate that the Malacca Strait (i) has an ecological, sociocultural and economic, or scientific and educational importance; that (ii) is vulnerable to destruction from shipping; and (iii) could be protected through IMO intervention.[354] If successful, a PSSA designated Strait would give Malaysia grounds to mandate associated protective measures such as compulsory escorts, provided that IMO legal provisions were shown to be inadequate. While littoral states are prohibited from levying compulsory charges on a unilateral basis, PSSA classification could enable them to do so. Fees could be extended to patrol services too. This could then be made a legal requirement under articles 42 and 311 of UNCLOS.[355] In 2012, Mohamed Hazmi bin Mohamed Rusli recommended that an imposition of traffic limits in the Strait would be the appropriate course of action.[356]

There are indications that Malaysia is actively considering these issues. At the 2009 East Asian Series Congress, RMN Captain Rakish Suppiah argued that a PSSA classification of the Malacca Strait would enable the coastal countries to protect their ecosystems and recommended a feasibility study to consider the consequences of doing so.[357] MIMA officials have flagged the practicality of designating the Malaysian waters, including the Strait, as a PSSA.[358] However, if this were to

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[353] International Maritime Organization, 'Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas,' 2011 http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/PSSAs/Pages/Default.aspx.

[354] J Roberts, T Workman, M Tsamenyi and L Johnson, 'The Western European PSSA: A "Politically Sensitive Sea Area,"' *Marine Policy* 29, (2005): 432, cited in J Roberts, A Chircop, and S Prior, 'Area-Based Management on the High Seas: Possible Application of the Imo's Particularly Sensitive Sea Area Concept,' *International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law* 25, no. 4 (2010): 504.

[355] N Ünlü, 'Straits of Malacca,' *International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law* 21, no. 4 (2006): 549.

[356] M H B M Rusli, 'Protecting Vital Sea Lines of Communication: A Study of the Proposed Designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area,' *Ocean and Coastal Management* 57 (2012): 92.

[357] R Suppiah, 'Designating the Straits of Malacca as a PSSA' (paper presented at the EAS Congress, Manila, 23-27 Nov 2009), 1.

[358] S M Ali, 'Pressure on Shipping Sector to Clean up Act,' *Star* 2011; M N Basiron, 'Designating a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area: Specifics, Processes and Issues,'(2009), http://www.mima.gov.my/

eventuate, Malaysia's elite decision makers would face a difficult choice. Malaysia's apparent growing reliance on the Malacca Strait for Middle Eastern oil can be expected to clash with its interest in protecting the waterway's marine environment. This in turn would prompt a need for more oil pollution preventative measures to manage growing international shipping traffic.

Traffic Diversions and Economic Rivalry

Malaysia intends to become an energy hub, whereby its expansion and upgrading of facilities at Pasir Gudang, the Port of Tanjung Pelepas and Port Klang has prompted mounting rivalry with Singapore.[359] Some of its projects, such as the Asia Petroleum Hub that was announced for construction on the island of Tanjung Bin, have been explicitly described as an attempt to coax customers away from Singapore. In addition, both Singapore and Indonesia have sought to ensure merchant shipping arrives at their ports. For Singapore, this means that maritime traffic should continue to pass through the Malacca Strait to reach the island state. In contrast Indonesia would benefit from traffic diversions that avoided the Malacca Strait but still passed through its other major sea lanes.

Three main traffic scenarios can be envisaged for Malaysia based on these factors. The first is a *status quo* scenario whereby the Malacca Strait continues to be the primary route for Middle East-East Asia oil shipments. With its major oil ports and related infrastructure all situated alongside the sea lane's coastline, Malaysia has a strategic and commercial advantage from the fact that merchant shipping must first pass its facilities before Singapore or Indonesia. The numerous projects in place to capitalise on the transnational oil supply chain and the subtle rivalry with Singapore to be the region's premiere oil and gas hub indicates that Malaysia is well aware of these circumstances. Should Malaysia be unsuccessful, and merchant shipping increases in the Strait while passing its facilities by, then it would face a higher risk of damage to its marine environment without any of the commercial benefit.

The second scenario relates to factors that could divert traffic away from the Malacca Strait in upstream locations. The longstanding (albeit as yet unrealised) plans

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mima/wp-content/themes/twentyeleven/cms/uploads/presentation/53.Designating_a_Particularly_Sensitive_Sea_Area_MNB_SOM_09.ppt, 26.

[359] This point is discussed from Singapore's perspective in Chapter Two, within the section entitled *The Economic Drivers of Rivalry*.

to construct a canal through Thailand's Isthmus of Kra could eventually see bulk oil carriers taking this shorter route instead. Malaysian policy makers acknowledge that a Kra Canal have would consequences for Malaysia's economy, environment and shipping.[360] In 2002, MP for Jeli, Mohamed Apandi Mohamad exclaimed:

> Imagine what will happen to the Port of Tanjung Pelepas, Port Klang, West Port, South Port and all ports, those ports, including the ones in Kuantan, what will happen? We have to think, for any products and goods being exported from Europe to go to East Asia and the United States, they would through the Kra Canal first.[361]

Aside from this, a Kra Canal diversion has not been prominent in Malaysia's policy statements—probably because the various efforts to undertake the project have so far been unsuccessful or abandoned. Still, the refinery projects slated for construction on the Malay Peninsula's Strait-side coastline in Kedah at Yan and Bukit Kayu Hitam would be Canal competitors. Malaysia would be placed in an advantageous position over Thailand, but should visions for a trans-peninsular pipeline ever eventuate (one project that would have seen Yan to be connected with Bachok in Kelantan was halted in 2007),[362] then it would be to the detriment of Singapore and Indonesia as well.

The last scenario is the prospect that future traffic routes might increase through Indonesia's alternate sea lanes. If a majority of transit oil supplies were to circumvent the Strait of Malacca in favour of the Sunda Strait, then Malaysia would have a small opportunity to develop facilities located in its eastern states. This said, most facilities in Sarawak and Sabah are currently geared to exploit offshore oil and gas resources.[363] While a Sabah Oil and Gas Terminal is being planned for construction at Kimanis, and is to be completed by 2013,[364] the north-east direction of Malaysia's Borneo coastline would require ships to detour at a cost if they were to use any maritime logistics facilities or energy infrastructure there. In any case, as described in the Indonesian case study, the Sunda Strait's depth is not suited for

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[360] The matter has been regularly raised in the *Dewan Negara*. Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Malaysia Dewan Rakyat: Order Paper,' 10 Aug 1972 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/opindex/pdf/OPDR10081972.pdf, 3; Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Malaysia Dewan Rakyat: Order Paper,' 22 Jul 1985 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/opindex/pdf/OPDR22071985.pdf, 1; Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Malaysia Dewan Rakyat: Order Paper,' 2 Nov 1999 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/opindex/pdf/ORDER-PAPER-DR-02-11-1999.pdf, 2.
[361] Translated from the original Malaysian. Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Penyata Rasmi Parlimen Dewan Rakyat Parlimen Kesepuluh Penggal Keempat Mesuarat Ketiga,' 16 Oct 2002 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-16102002.pdf, 68.
[362] Kok, 'Making Sense of Merapoh's Oil Refinery Project in Yan.'
[363] See Business Monitor International, *Malaysia Oil and Gas Report Q3 2013*, 41-2.
[364] 'Kimanis to be New Oil Town with Sabah Oil and Gas Terminal,' *Bernama*, 7 May 2010.

VLCC passage. If the Lombok-Makassar route was favoured, then Malaysia would be unlikely to realise any commercial benefit in the short to medium term. Though Sabah's eastern coast would be proximate to such vessel movement, there are no major oil and gas facilities nearby that could capitalise on it.[365] However, there would be one advantage, for the environmental costs generated by such traffic would be shifted away from one of Malaysia's most densely populated areas near the Malacca Strait to one of its least populated regions.[366]

Malaysia's challenge is to decide whether the commercial gain that could be realised from greater interaction with transit oil shipments is more important than the environmental costs that doing so would realise. Razak has, after all, proclaimed a desire to impose a ceiling limit on the number of vessels permitted to traverse through the waterway, so as to ensure navigational safety. In his view, there is a tipping point whereby traffic growth will become risky, excessively dangerous and costly.[367] Whether this view will prevail remains to be seen. Indeed, the numerous projects being developed along the Malay Peninsula's southwestern coastline suggests that the commercial payoff is more important for the time being.

CONCLUSION

There is no clear pattern in how cooperation and competition has played out for Malaysia in terms of its efforts to secure the Malacca Strait. However, the following observations can be made. As a rising energy transit state, Malaysia was predicted to exhibit behavioural characteristics that were similar to Singapore's and Indonesia's. Broadly, the analysis found that this expectation held. Malaysia engages a diverse range of measures to ensure that the Malacca Strait remains safe, secure and environmentally protected. While the majority of these have required multilateral cooperation, Malaysia's deployments to address Somali piracy were very much a sole undertaking. With its mounting infrastructure development in oil and maritime logistics sectors, there is a distinct tendency for Malaysia to compete when its transit oil interests are involved. This trait is much like the 'active leadership' that Singapore

[365] A gas import terminal at Lahad Datu is anticipated to become operational in 2015. Business Monitor International, *Malaysia Oil and Gas Report Q3 2013*, 47, 42-9.
[366] The 3,120,040 residents of Sabah represent 11% of Malaysia's 27,565,821 national total. Malaysia (Department of Statistics), 'Population and Housing Census of Malaysia: Preliminary Count Report,' iv.
[367] T E Hock, 'Malaysia Seeks to Limit Maritime Traffic in Straits of Malacca,' *Star*, 22 Oct 2008.

undertakes. At the same time Malaysia's enthusiasm for stakeholder assistance was, like Indonesia, intertwined with maintaining its sovereignty in the Strait—though it has perhaps had a greater focus on bolstering the MMEA's capability to respond to maritime crime. And unlike Singapore and Indonesia, a balance of both oil factors and non-oil factors underpin Malaysia's approach toward the Malacca Strait.

This chapter's examination of Malaysia as an energy transit state has also raised additional information about how a country's relationship with a transnational energy supply chain influences its strategic interests. Due to its many projects in oil and maritime logistics dotting the Peninsula's coastline, and its domestic resource exploitation activities, it makes sense that Kuala Lumpur has adopted a wide interpretation of strategic challenges in the Malacca Strait, among which it also has had trouble selecting priorities. Here, its interests converge with, but are not identical to, its neighbours.' Malaysia's view of maritime crime was much broader than Singapore's focus on piracy and maritime terrorism, and has been more strongly emphasised than Indonesia's regard of the same issues. And while all three states have noted that pollution in the Strait can be hazardous, Malayisa has been particularly vocal about it. At times, the states are also motivated by diverging rationales. Malaysia's sovereignty interests, which have had significant relevance for its oil interests, was one such example. But as far as ascertaining whether the three littoral countries share a 'common interest' in securing the Malacca Strait, Malaysia's strategic agenda encounters the most overlap with those of Singapore and Indonesia. The following chapter addresses this convergence in order to answer this thesis's research question in greater detail.

CHAPTER FIVE

STAKES, INTERESTS AND POLICY CHOICES: ENERGY TRANSIT STATES AND SECURITY IN THE MALACCA STRAIT

The preceding three chapters examined how Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's involvement with Middle East-East Asia oil flows affects their interests and policy choices associated with the Malacca Strait. As a regional maritime logistics and energy hub that fits the 'enmeshed energy transit state' type, Singapore actively seeks to protect itself against piracy and maritime terrorism, which it views as existential threats. In comparison, Indonesia matches the 'fledgling energy transit state' type and does not face an incentive like its neighbour to prioritise security cooperation in the waterway. Instead, it aims to preserve sovereignty throughout its entire maritime domain, and not just in the Malacca Strait. Last, Malaysia is a 'rising energy transit state' on the basis that it possesses its own domestic oil production sector like Indonesia, and also several infrastructure projects geared to process Middle Eastern oil, like Singapore. With its interests spread so broadly, Malaysia encounters difficulties in prioritising the Strait's safety, security and environmental protection.

This chapter undertakes a more systematic analysis of these findings. It resolves whether the three energy transit states have cooperated to secure the Malacca Strait based on their 'common interests.' It begins by returning to the two alternative explanations identified at the outset of this thesis that are relevant to understanding interactions in the sea lane, and reviews them in light of the case study findings. It shows that neither Balance of Power notions of alliance formation, nor 'ASEAN Way' visions of non-interference and consensus-based cooperation provide adequate accounts of the littoral states' interests and policy choices in the waterway.

The discussion then turns to the energy transit state framework developed in this thesis. First, Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests in the Malacca Strait are addressed in the context of their transit state positions. Here, I show that a state's 'stake' in a transnational energy supply chain does not dictate what particular threat or security challenge will be deemed as more important than another. Rather, it identifies countries that are likely to prioritise security of supply matters (that is, enmeshed energy transit states) and those that are not (namely, fledgling energy transit states). The conditions for interest convergence and divergence are then

examined. I argue that transit states' interests are likely to converge when they have similar stake characteristics. Likewise, different stakes prompt interest divergence.

Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's policy choices toward the Strait are then compared. I show that the nature of each country's transit oil stake has shaped the character, intensity and form of its interactions. Since the three countries' positions as energy transit states are distinct, their policy choices differ accordingly as well. Consequently, while the three countries have certainly cooperated to protect the Malacca Strait's maritime domain (which, as some have claimed has followed from their interests), this is not fully representative of their interactions. Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia also compete, particularly when their economic interests related to oil are concerned. Yet in some instances, such as where the three countries' prestige is involved, there is only a subtle distinction between collaboration and rivalry.

Last, I consider how non-oil factors have contributed to the three littoral states' interests and policy choices in the maritime domain. This thesis has drawn on the nature of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's transit oil stakes as primary indicators of their Strait security activities. However, the three case studies cannot be fully understood without acknowledging their historical experiences, conceptions of security and geopolitics, traditions in foreign policy making and domestic circumstances.

By evaluating the three littoral countries' policy choices in the context of Middle East-East Asia oil flows, it becomes clear that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia pursue distinct agendas in the Malacca Strait, and do not always cooperate when doing so. Thus, rather than having 'common interests,' as is often purported, Strait security activities follow from both their converging and diverging interests instead. Hence, it is through a combination of cooperative and competitive policy choices—exhibited along the transnational energy supply chain's entire geography beyond the Malacca Strait, including the Arabian Sea and the South China Sea—that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia pursue their respective Strait interests. The energy transit state framework has had a crucial role in identifying these findings. In order to comprehensively understand how different transit oil stakes affect interests and policy choices, they now demand comparative assessment.

INTERESTS AND POLICY CHOICES: A REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Prior to analysing the evidence generated from the energy transit state framework, it is worthwhile reexamining the two main alternative explanations for Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests and policy choices in the Malacca Strait. After all, the notion that 'common interests' form the basis of the three countries' cooperation in the sea lane has been a consistent feature of the policy language used by Singapore and states located outside of Southeast Asia such as the United States (US) and Japan.[1] As I observed at the outset of this thesis, Balance of Power arguments about alliance formation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nation's (ASEAN) support for the 'ASEAN Way' appear to support such claims.[2] Both have also long been recognised in discussions of Southeast Asian politics.[3] Despite this, neither one can adequately explain the three countries' approaches toward the sea lane, chiefly because they cannot account for the diversity of their interests and policy choices in the maritime domain.

The Balance of Power

A central tenet of Balance of Power theories is that states form alliances when they uphold the same interests in balancing with, or bandwagaining against, another state actor. This idea is relevant to understanding maritime Southeast Asia. Andrew Tan, for instance, observes that Balance of Power dynamics are among several factors driving naval modernisation in the region. Along with the mounting significance of sea lanes, states are increasingly faced with the challenge of protecting large maritime jurisdictions, guarding against non-state actor threats, and mitigating perceived tensions with extra-regional actors.[4] Yet if the Balance of Power could specifically account for Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests and policy choices in

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[1] See the discussion in Chapter One, within the section entitled *A Question of 'Common Interests' and Cooperation*.
[2] See the discussion in Chapter One, within the section entitled UNDERSTANDING MARITIME SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN THE Malacca Strait.
[3] For example see M C Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005); S Chawla, M Gurtov, and A-G Marsot, *Southeast Asia under the New Balance of Power* (New York: Praeger, 1974); A Collins, *Building a People-Oriented Security Community the ASEAN Way*, Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series (New York: Routledge, 2013); P Darby, 'Stability Mechanisms in South-East Asia: II. Balance of Power and Neutralisation,' *International Affairs* 49, no. 2 (1973); R Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF* (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).
[4] Tan, 'The Emergence of Naval Power in the Straits of Malacca,' 107.

the Malacca Strait, and the three countries had interacted on the basis of common interests, then they should be expected to have entered into alliances to protect it.

There are two main problems with this. The first is the fact that the referent objects of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's collaboration in the Malacca Strait are not always states. The case studies show that their interests focus on a variety of matters spanning navigational safety, safety of life at sea, pollution, tourism, marine resources, goods and people smuggling, piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as maritime terrorism. Granted, Indonesia has a particular stated priority in upholding its sovereignty at sea. Given that its sensitivity to perceived infringements into its maritime jurisdiction has often been directed toward other states, this lends support to a Balance of Power argument. Yet Indonesia still acknowledges the existence of non-state actor issues, such as unauthorised fishing, as well. Similarly, though piracy and maritime terrorism are prominent in its concerns, Singapore *is* concerned with traditional matters in regard to its preoccupation with survival. Indonesia's and Malaysia's longstanding suspicions of other actors' military presences in the waterway is also convincing. But since Singapore initially declared its support for US involvement through the proposed Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), this has not been a matter of consensus for the littoral countries. So while there is some evidence to indicate that a form of Southeast Asian balancing has occurred, it must also be kept in mind that Indonesia's and Malaysia's sensitivities have also been directed to many states throughout the Asia-Pacific (including China, Japan, India and Thailand) in response to their offers of military assistance. This stance, which has been upheld by multiple regional powers, contrasts with how Southeast Asia is usually discussed: as a region affected by great power relations (whether Cold War US-Soviet Union rivalry,[5] or US hegemony in the Asia Pacific), in the midst of a 'rising' China.[6]

Expectations about alliances are therefore too narrow to account for the littoral states' interests in the Malacca Strait. However, some analysts have sought to use Balance of Power notions to understand non-traditional challenges. Yet these, too, are inadequate. Christopher Layne argues that terrorist groups such as al Qaeda *do* behave

[5] A Lau, 'Introduction,' in *Southeast Asia and the Cold War*, ed. A Lau (Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2012), 8.
[6] R Sutter, 'China's Rise, Southeast Asia, and the United States: is a China-Centred Order Marginalizing the United States?' in *China, the United States, and Southeast Asia: Contending Perspectives on Politics, Security, and Economics*, ed. S W Simon and E Goh, *Asian Security Studies* (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 95.

in ways reminiscent of balancing, but observes that a rigorous (and in his view, correct) Balance of Power perspective discounts any equivalence with state power because they have insufficient capabilities.[7] Anthony Vinci notes how armed groups often form alliances with both state and non-state actors "based on their security interest."[8] Yet this view designates non-state actors as participants in collective security, rather than being a threat driving collaboration, the latter of which characterises their activities in the Malacca Strait. It does not help shed light on the littoral countries' interests either, and can be dismissed as well.

A second difficulty with using notions of alliance and the Balance of Power to explain Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's approach toward the Malacca Strait is that alliances are the exception, and not the rule, when it comes to the security architecture in place to protect the waterway. Indeed, alliance theory has been criticised for being unable to distinguish different types of security cooperation.[9] While the three countries participate in many forms of alignment in Southeast Asia, hardly any of them take the shape of formal alliances. An even smaller number of these address maritime issues, and fewer still are directly relevant to the waterway. Most alliances in the Asia-Pacific region centre on the US. Its main formal allies include Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand,[10] where security relationships are respectively framed by the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Treaty in 1951, the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, the US-Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty of 1951, the US-Republic of Korea Mutual Security Agreement of 1954 and the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila Pact) signed in 1954. But none of these arrangements are specifically concerned with the Malacca Strait. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean Peninsula, Chinese reunification, South China Sea territorial disputes, challenges to trade and prosperity, and violent extremism have dominated US security relationship agendas instead.[11]

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[7] Layne, 'The War on Terrorism and the Balance of Power,' 106-7.
[8] A Vinci, *Armed Groups and the Balance of Power: The International Relations of Terrorists, Warlords and Insurgents*, LSE International Studies (New York: Routledge, 2009), 60.
[9] J S Duffield, C Michota, and S A Miller, 'Alliances,' in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. P D Williams (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 293.
[10] X Dormandy, *Prepared for Future Threats? US Defence Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific Region* (London: Chatham House, 2012), 3.
[11] Ibid., viii.

Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia are not formally allied with the US, but the US-Singapore security relationship has been described as being based on "mutual security interests."[12] US warships are permanently stationed at Singapore's Changi Naval Base,[13] but this is overseen by military access agreements,[14] rather than an explicit treaty. Further, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia are not involved in many other formal alliances in the region. Perhaps the most notable is the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). But given that it formed during Sukarno's Confrontation, Indonesia is not party to the agreement.[15]

Even if the narrow scope of alliances is overlooked, and that the non-traditional characteristics of the three countries' interests and interactions in the Malacca Strait can be accommodated, a final obstacle still prevents Balance of Power theories from having utility for this study. The fact remains that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have all engaged in a variety of forms of interaction, *in spite of* having distinct interests. There is therefore justification in looking to explanations, like the energy transit state framework, that can readily recognise why the three states collaborate to pursue their individual strategic agendas. Before doing so, the second alternative expectation for converging interests, namely the ASEAN Way, must first be reviewed.

The ASEAN Way

As explained in Chapter One, the ASEAN Way is usually defined around consensus-based dialogue and the principle of non-interference in members' affairs. If it could correctly explain Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests, then the three countries, as some of the Association's founding members, would be expected to uphold these practices in relation to their maritime security activities.

Evidence exists to indicate that ASEAN-based avenues of interaction strive to develop a collective Southeast Asian stance on maritime matters in the region. Several declarations point out the importance of maintaining a common view about maritime

[12] E Chanlett-Avery, *Singapore: Background and US Relations*, (CRS Report for Congress, 2010), Available at the Federation of American Scientists web page, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20490.pdf, 5.
[13] Dormandy, *Prepared for Future Threats?*: 8.
[14] Chanlett-Avery, *Singapore:* 5.
[15] See R Emmers, 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements and Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,' *Asian Security* 8, no. 3 (2012): 271.

matters,[16] though the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) is one of the most prominent. The AMF was established as part of the Association's aspirations to create an ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), in turn part of the ASEAN Community, by the year 2020.[17] In 2003, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II described signatories' intentions to:

> nurture common values, such as habit of consultation to discuss political issues and the willingness to share information on matters of common concern, such as environmental degradation [and] maritime security cooperation […].[18]

Similarly, the APSC (then the ASEAN Security Community) recognised that "maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and therefore shall be addressed regionally in [a] holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner."[19] The AMF seeks to further this objective.[20] The three main AMF events held to date—from 28-29 July 2010 in Surabaya, Indonesia, from 17-19 August 2011 in Pattaya, Thailand, and from 3-4 October 2012 in Manila, Philippines—have all stated intentions to address "cross-cutting" issues facing the maritime domain, including safety, security, connectivity, search and rescue.[21] In addition, the first forum sought

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[16] For example, at the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum, held at Hanoi in 2010, participants "stressed the need to build common perceptions on threats and challenges in maritime security." Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Chairman's Statement, 17th ASEAN Regional Forum 23 July 2010, Ha Noi, Viet Nam,' 2010 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/conference/arf/state1007.pdf, 6.

[17] The ASEAN Community is to comprise of an ASEAN Political-Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. See Vientiane Action Programme 2004-2010, in Association of Southeast Asian Nations, *ASEAN Documents Series 2004*, http://www.asean.org/archive/ADS-2004.pdf, 20-50; Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,' http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-charter/asean-charter; Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Declaration of ASEAN Concord II;' Paragraph A.2.5 in Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015.'

[18] Paragraph 4 of Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Declaration of ASEAN Concord II.'

[19] See section A, paragraph 5 of the Declaration. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Joint Statement of the 3rd ASEAN-US Leaders' Meeting Bali, 18 November 2011.'

[20] According to the ASEAN Community Blueprint, the AMF aims to "[a]pply a comprehensive approach that focuses on safety of navigation and security concern in the region that are of common concerns to the ASEAN Community" Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015' 11. Elsewhere the AMF has been described as aiming "to promote and develop common understanding and cooperation among ASEAN Member States on trans-boundary maritime issues." Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Joint Communiqué of the 43rd ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting - Enhanced Efforts Towards the ASEAN Community: From Vision to Action" Ha Noi, 19-20 July 2010,' 2010 http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/item/joint-communique-of-the-43rd-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting-enhanced-efforts-towards-the-asean-community-from-vision-to-action-ha-noi-19-20-july-2010-3.

[21] '1st ASEAN Maritime Forum Convened,' *US Fed News Service*, 31 Jul 2010; 'The 2nd ASEAN Maritime Forum,' Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2011 http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/the-2nd-asean-maritime-forum; Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Chairman's Statement, 3rd ASEAN Maritime Forum,' 9 Oct 2012 http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/chairman-s-statement-3rd-asean-maritime-forum.

to refine a draft concept paper,[22] whereby the AMF objectives identified within it included:

(b) fostering maritime cooperation through constructive dialogues and consultations on maritime issues of common interest and concern; [and]
(c) promoting and developing common understandings and views among ASEAN Member Countries (AMCs) on regional and global maritime issues.[23]

It also encouraged information exchange on common matters in safety, security and environmental protection, and a common understanding and position of members on "emerging international issues related to maritime cooperation."[24] In addition, the Chairman's statement at the third AMF identified maritime security and cooperation as components of the ASEAN Community's three pillars.[25]

ASEAN can therefore be said to have taken steps to facilitate members' converging interests in the maritime domain. These goals contrast with practice. At the first Tokyo Seminar, entitled 'Common Security Challenges: Future Cooperation among Defense Authorities in the Region,' which Japan's Ministry of Defence hosted in 2009, participants were reported as "seem[ing] to hold an ambiguous view in relation to a possibility of a major maritime terrorist threat," whereby ASEAN's notion of non-interference was speculated to be the cause.[26] More importantly, ASEAN's policy objectives do not correspond to this thesis's research findings thus far. My case studies showed that Singapore and Indonesia hold diverging views about the dangers posed by maritime terrorism and piracy in relation to the Malacca Strait. Malaysia encounters difficulty in identifying whether safety of navigation, security or environmental protection is more important. Indonesia's and Malaysia's suspicion of extra-regional actors' military involvement in Strait security solutions also indicates that notions of non-interference are very much alive in maritime Southeast Asia. This said, the ASEAN Way has been criticised for upholding principles of sovereignty to

[22] '1st ASEAN Maritime Forum Convened.'
[23] Paragraph 7 (b) and (c) of Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ASEAN Maritime Forum,' 2007 www.dmcr.go.th/fag/index/ข้อมูลในเว็บไซต์/รายงานด้านทะเลและชายฝั่ง/ประชุม/ASEAN MARITIME/ประกอบ 3.2.5 ASEAN maritime - concept paper.doc, 2.
[24] See Paragraph 8 (a) and (i) of Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ASEAN Maritime Forum,' 2-3.
[25] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Chairman's Statement, 3rd ASEAN Maritime Forum.'
[26] A Raj, 'Japan's Initiatives in Security Cooperation in the Straits of Malacca on Maritime Security and in Southeast Asia: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism,' *Japan Institute for International Affairs Fellow Report* (2009): 34.

the point that it undermines collaboration.[27] As one analyst described such circumstances, cooperation under the conditions of non-interference simply constitutes collective acts of self-interest.[28] On this basis then, notions of 'common interests' in the Malacca Strait are incompatible with ASEAN's policy goals.

As noted in Chapter One, ASEAN also faces extensive challenges in fostering regional cohesion.[29] Its visions of a shared stance on maritime matters are not exempt from such problems either. ASEAN mechanisms did not, for instance, resolve Indonesia's and Malaysia's Ambalat border disagreement.[30] Muhammad Hikam, a representative of Malaysia's National Awakening Party, declared during a tense period of the dispute that ASEAN should have been involved.[31] In 2009, President Yudhoyono expressed hope that the Association could solve the quarrel,[32] but then later doubt that this would actually happen.[33] Some Indonesian legislators saw ASEAN as being so unable to act that they called for it to be disbanded.[34]

The South China Sea has also been an ongoing point of disagreement within the Association. Then-US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton asked ASEAN to "speak with one voice" and "clearly outline its position" in 2012, at a time when the Philippines and China were engaged in a protracted military standoff in the Scarborough Shoal.[35] This did not happen. In July, the dispute precluded a joint communique from being released for the first time in 45 years at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh.[36] Cambodia later argued, like China, that such matters ought not to be addressed through multilateral mechanisms such as ASEAN or the East Asia Summit.[37] Philippine President Benigno Aquino claimed that "there was no consensus"[38] on the matter, and Foreign Secretary Albert de Rosario similarly

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[27] D K Emmerson, 'Southeast Asian-Pacific Frameworks: What Do They Frame and What Work Do They Do?' (paper presented at the 47th Strategy for Peace Conference, Warrenton, 19-21 Oct 2006), 4.
[28] F Situmorang, 'The Need for Cooperation in the Malacca Strait,' *Jakarta Post*, 19 Jul 2012, 7.
[29] See the discussion in Chapter One, within the section entitled *The Balance of Power and the ASEAN Way as Alternative Explanations.*
[30] M Adamrah, 'RI, Malaysia to Avoid Force in Ambalat Row,' *Jakarta Post*, 23 Jun 2010.
[31] 'ASEAN Should Help RI, M'sia Resolve Ambalat Dispute, Says Legislator,' *Antara*, 23 Mar 2005.
[32] Gunanto and S Tobing, 'Indonesia-Malaysia Resumes Ambalat Negotiations,' *Tempo*, 24 Apr 2009.
[33] S Fitzpatrick, 'Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Steps Ups Threat in Malaysia Sea Dispute,' *Australian*, 4 Jun 2009.
[34] Y R Kassim, 'ASEAN Cohesion: Making Sense of Indonesian Reactions to Bilateral Disputes,' *IDSS Commentaries* (2005).
[35] J E Esplanada, 'Ph Hits China Duplicity in West Philippine Sea,' *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 13 Jul 2012.
[36] R Tofani, 'Lines of Division Grow in ASEAN,' *Asia Times*, 4 Dec 2012.
[37] L Murdoch, 'Asian Nations Feud over South China Sea,' *Sydney Morning Herald*, 20 Nov 2012.
[38] M Ortigas, 'The End of the "ASEAN Way,"' *Al Jazeera*, 22 Nov 2012.

exclaimed, "[a] consensus is 100 percent. How can it be consensus when two of us are saying we're not with it?"[39]

It is important to note, however, that Indonesia undertook significant remedial effort in the meeting's aftermath. Natalegawa rejected notions that ASEAN could not reach consensus,[40] and undertook intensive shuttle diplomacy to obtain members' agreements to the statement, Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea, which Cambodia's Hor Namhong then released.[41] In September, Indonesia distributed a draft of the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea to ASEAN's foreign ministers.[42] Indonesia's efforts here were rightly praised,[43] though divisions among the Association's members have persisted at subsequent meetings.[44]

A final example illustrating ASEAN members' diverse maritime interests can be found in the extension of the AMF. Following US calls to include extra-regional actors in the forum, an inaugural Expanded AMF was held after the third AMF meeting on 5 October 2012.[45] Like the previous events, it sought to address shared maritime challenges.[46] But as large multilateral organisations often find, the membership growth has made consensus difficult to achieve. The Chairman's statement for the third AMF hinted at this when it stressed the need to maintain "ASEAN centrality" in its activities.[47] Similarly, when China pledged some US$474 million in 2012 to establish an AMF Fund,[48] it was criticised for "buying ASEAN hospitality."[49] These factors further show that ASEAN's claims to progress common maritime interests are not matched by practice.

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[39] Murdoch, 'Asian Nations Feud over South China Sea.'
[40] 'ASEAN Near Consensus on Sea Row: Indonesia,' *Agence France-Presse*, 18 Jul 2013.
[41] Council on Foreign Relations, 'ASEAN's Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea,' 20 Jul 2012 http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/aseans-six-point-principles-south-china-sea/p28915; R J Heydarian, 'Brunei in the South China Sea Hot Seat,' *Asia Times*, 22 Dec 2012; R Severino, 'Indonesia Seeks Active Role in Sea Disputes,' *Global Times*, 20 Sep 2012.
[42] Y Ririhena, 'RI Circulates Draft Code of Conduct on South China Sea,' *Jakarta Post*, 29 Sep 2013.
[43] For instance, see B B T Saragih, 'RI Finds Common ASEAN Ground in Sea Dispute,' *Jakarta Post*, 23 Jul 2012.
[44] See S Chen, 'Malaysia Splits With ASEAN Claimants on China Sea Threat,' *Bloomberg*, 29 Aug 2013.
[45] P Lee-Brago, 'US Wants Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum Institutionalized,' *Philippine Star*, 7 Oct 2012.
[46] The Chairman's Statement encouraged a "dialogue involving EAS participating countries to utilize opportunities and address common challenges on maritime issues building upon the existing ASEAN Maritime Forum." See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'Chairman's Statement, 1st Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum Manila,' 2012 http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/1st-expanded-asean-maritime-forum-manila.
[47] Ibid.
[48] 'China Unveils 3-Billion-Yuan Maritime Fund for ASEAN,' *Sina English*, 8 Oct 2012.
[49] M Yu, 'Inside China: Buying ASEAN Hospitality,' *Washington Times*, 10 Oct 2012.

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S ENERGY TRANSIT STATES AND THEIR INTERESTS IN THE MALACCA STRAIT: CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE?

Neither Balance of Power notions of alliances nor the ASEAN Way provide satisfactory explanations for Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's respective strategic outlooks in relation to the Malacca Strait, chiefly because they do not acknowledge the diverse characteristics of those interests. Conversely, the energy transit state framework presented in this thesis offers a more sophisticated explanation. Rather than conflating the three countries' differences as 'common interests,' the framework recognises them to be sometimes divergent. This section examines how Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's positions as transit states for Middle East-East Asian oil flows affects their maritime interests, and considers how these interests converge and diverge. The case study data indicates that transit states tend to adopt similar stances on issues when their energy interests are involved. Equally, such countries' interests vary when they have different stakes in a transnational energy supply chain. These findings support my hypothesised relationship between energy transit states' stakes and their interests.

Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia each face unique circumstances that follow from two points of departure: the timing of their independence and establishment of an oil industry relative to the emergence of the seaborne Middle East-East Asia oil supply chain; and the way in which their domestic oil reserves are exploited relative to the transit oil supply. Singapore's extensive involvement in Middle Eastern oil exports stems from the close timing between its immediate need (at independence in 1965) to ensure national survival, and the commercial attraction of Southeast Asia as a refining destination in the postwar era. An absence of local production is also significant in why Singapore became a regional oil refining and maritime logistics hub. Consequently, Singapore fits the enmeshed energy transit state type.

For its part, Indonesian autonomy came about prior to 1956, and it had already taken steps to manage its existing oil assets by the time that East Asian demand started driving the bulk transportation of oil through Southeast Asia. Owing to the previous Dutch administration's efforts, it was already invested in its own production sector. With many oil facilities damaged by Japanese expansion during the Pacific War, there was little point for Indonesia to become substantially involved in the emerging transnational energy supply chain. Indonesia thus matches the fledgling

energy transit state type, for it is too invested in managing domestic production to be overly concerned about transit oil shipments.

In comparison, Malaysia's independence from British authority in 1957, like Singapore's, coincided with the emergence of bulk oil quantities being regularly shipped through the Malacca Strait. Shell's Peninsula refinery, too, was established shortly afterwards. In contrast to Singapore, Kuala Lumpur did not experience the same immediate geostrategic imperative to survive. And much like Indonesia, it also possessed a ready supply of oil reserves that could be exploited. Hence, Malaysia's circumstances are similar to Singapore's and Indonesia's, for it is both a refiner of Middle Eastern oil and producer in its own right. And while an economic imperative can be identified in regard to how Malaysia approaches the transit supply chain, its own production has so far precluded it from becoming an oil hub like Singapore. Malaysia was designated as a rising energy transit state on the basis of its moderate stake.

Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia can therefore be generically identified as energy transit states, though any closer level of scrutiny reveals they have quite distinct stakes in Middle East-East Asia oil flows. Their interests can also be described in this manner through both broad and detailed analysis. At various stages of their contemporary histories, each of the three countries have made policy pronouncements that recognise safety of navigation, traditional and non-traditional security matters, and environmental issues.[50] In isolation, this general finding could prompt the conclusion that the three littoral states do indeed have 'common interests' in the Malacca Strait.

A closer reading of the three countries' interests reveals that 'stake' does not translate into blanket assessments of potential challenges facing the transnational energy supply chain. On the basis of Singapore's high level of interaction with (and reliance upon) Middle Eastern oil supplies, it would be easy to anticipate that it treats all issues in the Malacca Strait equally. Yet this is not the case. Its policy makers have been far more preoccupied with maritime terrorism and piracy, even when there was evidence that the actual threat of attacks occurring was low. Likewise, Indonesia is not ignorant of circumstances in the sea lane just because it has a low stake in transit

[50] For example, see United Nations General Assembly, 'A/60/529 - Identical Letters Dated 28 October 2005 from the Permanent Representatives of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly,' 1 Nov 2005 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/60/529.

oil, but rather faces an imperative to protect its large maritime jurisdiction stretching throughout the archipelago.

Though the issue of protecting the Malacca Strait's maritime domain received international attention when the trilateral coordinated naval patrols were established in July 2004, the three littoral states continue to flag their respective concerns. In January 2013, Tony Tan noted the importance of remaining "ever vigilant" against non-traditional challenges like piracy, and stressed the importance of the Singapore Armed Forces in "keep[ing] Singapore secure in an uncertain world."[51] The Indonesian Navy proposed to create a Central Region Fleet to complement its existing Eastern Region Fleet and Western Region Fleet, and establish the Kohanla (*Komando Pertahanan Laut*, or Sea Defence Command) as a new overarching command. This shows that the Malacca Strait continues to have a minimal role in Indonesia's maritime interests. If realised, the reform will see the new fleet and the Kohanla stationed at Surabaya, in turn shifting the Eastern Region Fleet headquarters eastwards from Surabaya and away from the sea lane, to Sorong, in West Papua.[52] Additionally, and in accordance with Indonesia's emphasis on having an archipelagic outlook, the Kohanla was partly justified as a means to manage strategic outer islands that demarcate the country's boundary baselines.[53] And in February, Malaysia's Deputy Director-General Operations, Rear Admiral Ahmad Puzi Abdul Kahar noted how the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) had been so successful that its patrols had follow-on benefits, not only for reducing the frequency of piracy and armed robbery at sea incidents, but also assisting in the fishing and tourism industries as well.[54] This too reflects the broad spectrum of issues prominent in Malaysia's Malacca Strait agenda. Clearly there are notable similarities and differences in Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's sea lane priorities. It is therefore imperative to examine their interests' convergence and divergence in more detail as it pertains to their respective transit state types.

[51] T K Y Tan, 'Speech at the 87/12 Officer Cadet Course Commissioning Parade at SAFTI Military Institute, Singapore,' 12 Jan 2013.
[52] 'Navy Hopes Navy's Third Fleet to be Operational in 2014,' *Antara*, 23 Jan 2013.
[53] 'Pembentukan Armada Kawasan Tengah Selesai 2014,' *Antara*, 25 Jan 2013.
[54] 'MMEA, World's Youngest Maritime Enforcement Agency, Recognised,' *Bernama*, 8 Feb 2013.

Diverging Interests and Energy Transit State Status

Nowhere are divergent interests more noticeable than Singapore's and Indonesia's views about maritime terrorism, piracy and armed robbery at sea. For Singapore, maritime threats emanating from non-state actors are directly linked to its survival as a small state, as well as its Global City policy that seeks to ensure it. Singapore's current sensitivity stemmed from its *Laju* experience in January 1974, whereby members of the Japanese Red Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine attempted to compromise its oil refining activities. Its continued attention to piracy in both the Malacca Strait and off the coast of Somalia is proof of this. Indonesia takes the opposite stance. Its officials actively downplay the piracy threat, notions of a 'pirate-terror nexus,' and 'floating bomb' scenarios that envision oil and gas tankers being detonated in the sea lane. Here, the chief difference underlying the two countries' perspectives is that Indonesia does not see its oil interests threatened by such non-state actor activities, as they are not located in the Malacca Strait.

It is worthwhile noting Malaysia's stance here. Malaysia has also experienced a major non-state actor threat to its transit oil interests but did not respond like Singapore did to *Laju.* In October 2002, when the *Limburg* very large crude carrier (VLCC, which was under charter by Malaysia's national oil company Petronas) was rammed by suspected al Qaeda operatives while in the Gulf of Aden, the attack did not prompt any obvious response by Kuala Lumpur. Aside from receiving mention in Parliament,[55] Malaysian decision makers have had little to say on the record about the *Limburg*—although one member of the RMP, speaking anonymously (and in contrast to other countries' interpretations of the event),[56] claimed that Malaysian Government officials doubted that terrorist activity was the cause.[57] Furthermore, policy elites did not appear to make any immediate decisions to boost Malaysia's maritime capabilities, as Singapore had done after January 1974. In fact, as found in the Malaysia case study, Malaysian officials actually downplayed notions of pirate-

[55] Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Kandungan: Dewan Negara 20 Nov,' 2002 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/opindex/pdf/AUMDN201102.pdf, 2; Malaysia (Parliament of Malaysia), 'Penyata Rasmi Parlimen Dewan Rakyat Parlimen Kesepuluh Penggal Keempat Mesuarat Ketiga' 70.

[56] For instance, Yemen, France and the US have attributed the incident as a terrorist attack. 'Yemen Says Tanker Blast Was Terrorism,' *BBC News*, 16 Oct 2002; S Rotella and E Schrader, 'Tanker Blast Likely a Terror Attack, French Say,' *LA Times*, 11 Oct 2002; United States of America (Department of State), 'Chapter Eight: Foreign Terrorist Organizations,' http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65479.pdf, 217.

[57] A Al-Haj, 'French to Probe Yemen Tanker Fire,' *Associated Press*, 7 Oct 2002.

terrorist collaboration in the Malacca Strait in the years following the *Limburg* incident. And even though the attack did not directly affect Singapore's oil interests, Singapore's elite refer to it more frequently than their Malaysian counterparts.[58] This shows that at the time, Malaysia's oil interests in the Malacca Strait were not substantial enough to warrant any overt concern—or at least not in the public domain.

The above observations should not be taken to mean that Indonesia is unconcerned about non-state actor challenges to its energy assets elsewhere in its archipelago. Jakarta certainly has been prepared to respond with force to protect its oil facilities if deemed necessary. For example, as part of the 1958 anti-communist rebellion in Central Sumatra against the Sukarno-led government, affiliates of the *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (the Indonesian Republic's Revolutionary Government) attempted to cut off Jakarta's foreign exchange from oil majors (including Caltex, Stanvac and Shell) by occupying oil fields in the areas surrounding Pekanbaru, Sumatra.[59] Sukarno's initial reaction was to ask the movement to exclude oil companies from the conflict.[60] Yet when the PRRI sought to obtain US military assistance by appealing to its interest in preventing the spread of communism throughout the region, Jakarta rejected Washington's suggestion that marines could help protect American oil installations,[61] deployed *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI, or Indonesian Armed Forces) members to secure Caltex facilities and prevent unilateral US action[62] and threatened to bomb its storage tanks.[63]

While Indonesia's oil infrastructure has been targeted by non-state actors in other locations, the Malacca Strait has rarely been one of them. Riau has encountered fuel smuggling activities involving Singaporean buyers, but the reported stolen shipments of 3,000 and 6,000 tonne quantities are miniscule compared to the

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[58] As a representation of the exhaustive mention of the *Limburg* incident see S Jayakumar, 'Speech for National Security and Minister for Law, at the 5th National Security Seminar,' *Asia One*, 12 Sep 2007; Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Home Affairs), 'Reply to Question in Parliament on Maritime Terrorist Threats,' 20 Jan 2003 http://www.mha.gov.sg/news_details.aspx?nid=OTI0-/r9a3iqQy5o=; Yeo, 'Speech at the Opening of the International Maritime and Port Security Conference, Grand Copthorne Waterfront Hotel, Singapore.'

[59] D F Doeppers, 'An Incident in the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion of 1958,' *Indonesia* 14 (1972): 189.

[60] H Cleveland, G J Mangone, and J C Adams, *The Overseas Americans* (New York: Arno Press, 1980), 107.

[61] D S Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957-1959* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2009), 56-7.

[62] Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200*: 319. See also Doeppers, 'An Incident in the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion of 1958,' 189.

[63] D Brichoux and D J Gerner, *The US and the 1958 Rebellion in Indonesia*, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 2002), 6.

minimum 200,000 tonnes of oil that VLCCs can carry.[64] In its endeavours for greater autonomy from Jakarta, the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM) targeted some offshore infrastructure to generate revenue. In 2002, its members attacked a supply ship on charter for ExxonMobil[65] and its Arun gas terminal.[66] On 10 August 2003, alleged GAM members attacked the Malaysian flagged oil tanker *Penrider* offshore from Port Klang while it was carrying 1,000 tonnes of fuel oil from Singapore to Penang.[67] In 2005, alleged GAM members staged a hostage-ransom style boarding on the methane-carrying *Tri Samudra*.[68] Such attacks were partly used as GAM financing strategies,[69] and also to express dissatisfaction with what the group viewed as disproportionate profit sharing arrangements of Aceh's resources.[70] And even though Aceh's secessionist aspirations were resolved in a 2005 peace agreement, the fact that Jakarta deployed TNI personnel to control the area's hydrocarbon resources—whose aggravated violence toward the local population led to thousands of civilian casualties[71]—suggests that if Indonesian oil interests were ever substantially compromised, the country's policy elites would not dismiss military force as an option in addressing it. Indeed, shortly after the 2002 Bali bombing tragedy that targeted foreign nationals,[72] Jakarta took steps to strengthen its oil infrastructure security after receiving US advice that additional attacks could be

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[64] B Guerin, 'Subsidy Cut to Fuel the Fire in Indonesia,' *Asia Times*, 28 Sep 2005; J-H Kim, 'Korea: Market Adjustment in Declining Industries, Government Assistance in Troubled Industries,' in *Pacific Basin Industries in Distress: Structural Adjustment and Trade Policy in the Nine Industrialized Economies*, ed. H T Patrick and L Meissner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 389.
[65] C Liss, 'The Maritime Dimension of Energy Security,' in *The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security*, ed. B K Sovacool (Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2011), 120.
[66] E Blanche, 'Tanker Terror: The Shipping Lanes of the Gulf, Which Constitute a Vital Economic Lifeline to the Region's Oil Exporters, Could Become the Next Battleground in the War against Terrorism,' *Middle East* (2002).
[67] International Chamber of Commerce (International Maritime Bureau), 'New Brand of Piracy Threatens Oil Tankers in Malacca Straits.'
[68] 'Pirates Storm Indonesian Tanker,' *BBC News*, 14 Mar 2005.
[69] S E Amirell, 'Political Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: A Comparison between the Straits of Malacca and the Southern Philippines,' in *Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits*, ed. G G Ong-Webb (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006); D Marley, *Modern Piracy: A Reference Handbook* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 55; Young, *Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia*: 73.
[70] F Lamoureux, *Indonesia: A Global Studies Handbook* (ABC-CLIO, 2003), 70.
[71] M A Miller, *Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia: Jakarta's Security and Autonomy Polices in Aceh* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 4.
[72] Imam Samudra, key orchestrator of the Bali Bombings stated in a monograph entitled *Aku Melawan Teroris* that the primary targets of the attack was the US and its allies. A Acharya, 'The Bali Bombings: Impact on Indonesia and Southeast Asia,' *Centre for Eurasian Policy Occasional Research Paper Series II* 2, no. 2 (2005): 2.

forthcoming.[73] Similarly, in May 2003, in an attempt to control GAM activities, Indonesian authorities banned foreign vessels' passage through the territorial waters off Aceh's coast—with the exception of ExxonMobil vessels operating in the area.[74]

It is therefore quite possible for energy transit states to prioritise threats to their oil interests, but, depending on their transit oil stakes, those interests will not necessarily be directed toward the transnational energy supply chain. In the case of the three littoral countries under analysis here, Singapore has a historical imperative to address non-state actors in the Malacca Strait, whereas Indonesia and Malaysia do not. Thus, if the three countries' interests in a different regional sea lane were to be examined, they could be expected to uphold a different balance of strategic priorities based on their oil stakes. In fact, this scenario is evident eastwards from the island of Borneo in the Makassar Strait. Chapter Three highlighted the Makassar Strait's importance to Indonesia, whereby ships travelling from the Indian Ocean through the Lombok Strait and Makassar Strait route would pass by its large refineries at Cilacap and Balikpapan, and the port at Makassar.[75] Here, Indonesia has greater oil interests in the region than the Malacca Strait, especially since ultra large crude carriers (ULCC) on international journeys use the route on the way to East Asia.

Indonesia is quite prepared to respond to what it sees as threats to its oil infrastructure in this area. It is evident from the official reaction to demonstrations staged in 2001, where 150 police officers were reportedly deployed to protect US energy giant Unocal's infrastructure in Makassar after it had begun conducting offshore oil exploration activities.[76] It can be seen more recently in how government officials reacted to students who protested rising fuel prices in March 2012. Reports indicate that all mayors and regents in the South Sulawesi region met to discuss the outcry, and eight TNI battalions (some 5,600-8,000 soldiers) were put on alert regarding security threats. According to TNI Major General Muhammad Nizam, the precaution was a priority.[77]

Indonesia's stance contrasts with Singapore's interests in the Makassar Strait, which are not grounded in oil. In April 2012, Singapore's Senior Minister of State

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[73] 'Bush Links Blast to Al-Qaida,' *St Petersburg Times*, 15 Oct 2002; J Aglionby and E MacAskill, 'Bush Puts World on Alert for New Wave of Al-Qaida Attacks,' *Guardian* 15 Oct 2002.
[74] E Watkins, 'ExxonMobil Exempted from Indonesian Foreign Ship Decree,' *Oil and Gas Journal* (2003).
[75] See the discussion in Chapter Three, within the section entitled *Traffic Diversions.*
[76] 'Protests Hit Makassar Strait,' *Upstream*, 11 Sep 2001.
[77] Wahyudi and S Umar, 'Pangdam Siagakan 8 Batalyon TNI,' *Seputar Indonesia*, 22 Mar 2012.

Masagos Zulkifli visited South Sulawesi, along with business representatives of International Enterprise Singapore who had specialisations in waste management, port operations and construction.[78] Aiming to progress bilateral trade relations,[79] the discussions reportedly covered a wide variety of issues including urban management and planning, infrastructure development,[80] fish trading, golf and tourism.[81] Despite the prominence of oil in the area—Chevron established a US$6 billion project in the Makassar Strait in 2008 which is expected to yield 3% of Indonesia's future oil production[82]—there is no indication that oil was on the meetings' agendas. Granted, Indonesia and Singapore do conduct military exercises together in region. The 19th Exercise *CAMAR INDOPURA*, for example, was held in Balikpapan from 22-24 November 2011 and consisted of maritime aerial surveillance activities in the sea lane.[83] Still, the prevalence of such types of activities remain outweighed by the attention Singapore devotes to the Malacca Strait.

Malaysia's priorities in the Makassar Strait further underline the relationship between stakes and interests. Chapter Four examined Malaysia's and Indonesia's contest for jurisdiction over the oil rich Ambalat region, including Sipadan Island and Ligitan Island.[84] Additional commercial oil interests on Malaysia's part can be observed in this area. In May 2000, Pertamina reportedly intended to offer Petronas exploration rights in the Makassar Strait.[85] Then-Prime Minister Mahathir's interest in doing so was clear, when he remarked that "[i]f Indonesia accepts us, we would like to go there."[86] In 2009, ExxonMobil sold Petronas Carigali (Petronas' exploration subsidiary[87]) two 20% stakes in the Mandar Block in the Southern Makassar basin

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[78] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 'Press Statement: Visit of Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs Masagos Zulkifli to Makassar and Jakarta 25-28 April 2012,' 26 Apr 2012 http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/jakarta/press_statements_speeches/2012/201204/press_20120427_02.html.
[79] 'Masagos Zulkifli to Make Official Visit to Indonesia,' *Channel News Asia*, 24 Apr 2012.
[80] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 'Press Statement: Visit of Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs Masagos Zulkifli to Makassar and Jakarta 25-28 April 2012.'
[81] W D Endah, 'Pelabuhan Makassar: Diusulkan Jadi Basis Distribusi Singapura,' *Bisnis Indonesia*, 26 Apr 2012.
[82] R R Kusuma, 'Oil Supplies Run Deep,' *Jakarta Globe*, 6 Mar 2012.
[83] 'EX Camar Indopura,' *Republic of Singapore Air Force News* 120 (2012): 23.
[84] See the discussion in Chapter Four, within the section entitled *Sovereignty, Border Integrity and the Pursuit of Oil.*
[85] 'Indonesia's Pertamina Offers Oil Deal to Malaysia's Petronas,' *Kyodo News*, 29 May 2000; M El, 'Pertamina, Petronas Consider Oil Project Partnership,' *Oil and Gas Journal* (2000).
[86] 'Indonesia's Pertamina Offers Oil Deal to Malaysia's Petronas.'
[87] Petronas, 'Out Business: Exploration and Production,' http://www.petronas.com.my/our-business/exploration-production/Pages/default.aspx.

and the Surumana Block in north Makassar.[88] That Malaysian energy interests are focused in Indonesia's eastern region is also suggested in Petronas' withdrawal from joint exploration activities (with Pertamina and ExxonMobil) in Indonesia's Natuna Sea gas project in February 2012, which it had only joined in December 2010.[89] Suggesting that the project was not a priority for Petronas,[90] Thailand's PTT Exploration and Production took its place in September.[91]

Based on these oil interests, the energy transit state framework anticipates that Malaysia would regard threats to the Makassar Strait's maritime domain as important but not all-encompassing concerns. Its policy makers rarely note the safety, security or environmental protection of the Makassar Strait, as they do in the Malacca Strait. Najib Razak and Mahathir have, on occasion, acknowledged the waterway as an alternative route to the Malacca Strait for international shipping.[92] This is understandable given that the Makassar Strait is predominantly located within Indonesian jurisdiction. Yet some officials do recognise a variety of non-state actor threats around the north-eastern area of Sabah, situated at the waterway's northern approaches. According to Captain Mohamad Onn Khalil, the MMEA's Chief of Enforcement over Maritime District 17, Malaysia's eastern waters are inherently exposed to 'evil elements' of criminal threats such as robbery at sea, smuggling and illegal immigrants.[93] For Isa Munir, the Commander of the RMP's Marine Operations Force (*Pasukan Gerakan Marin*), the cities of Kudat, Sandakan and Tawau are focal points for the unauthorised immigrant entry. Munir noted that the RMP's General Operations Force (*Pasukan Gerakan Am*), the Malaysian Immigration Department and the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) all collaborate to address this activity, along with maritime crime and smuggling.[94] Armed robbery at sea has also been a problem for fishermen around Sabah's east coast near Semporna.[95] Similarly, in 2010, First

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[88] 'ExxonMobil Signs PSC for Indonesia's Mandar Block,' *Oil and Gas Journal* (2007); Alfian, 'Exxon Sells Stakes in Two Deepwater Blocks to Petronas,' *Jakarta Post*, 1 Oct 2009.
[89] 'Malaysia's Petronas Resigns from Big Indonesia's East Natuna,' *Star*, 27 Feb 2012; M Ali, 'Malaysia's Petronas Withdraws from Indonesian Gas Project,' *Oil Daily*, 29 Feb 2012.
[90] F Hidranto, 'East Natuna and Booming Shale Gas Guarantee of Long-Term Gas Supply is Needed,' *Bisnis Indonesia*, 24 Oct 2012.
[91] 'PTTEP Replaces Petronas to Explore East Natuna Block,' *Indonesia Today*, 20 Oct 2010.
[92] Mahathir, 'Majlis Pelancaran Rasmi Sistem Kawalan Laut;' Razak, 'Keynote Address at the Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.'
[93] 'APMM Tumpu Perairan Timur Sabah,' *Berita Harian*, 18 Feb 2011.
[94] 'PGM Kesan Laluan Tikus Pati di Seluruh Negara,' *Utusan Online*, 28 Jan 2011.
[95] N Mansor, 'Penduduk Semporna Kini Merdeka Daripada Ancaman "Mundu,"' *mStar*, 21 Aug 2009.

Admiral Anuwi Hassan, as Commander of Naval Region 2, commented on the nature of challenges to the area's maritime domain, stating that:

> [t]he threat exists at all times between activities involving terrorists, smugglers and illegal immigrants. This requires the Navy's personnel and ships to be constantly prepared to face all threats.[96]

Hassan further stated that the South China Sea, Celebes Sea and Sulu Sea all required constant security, and stressed the importance of the waters off the coasts of Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan, especially where other countries' borders and oil rigs were located.[97] With naval bases at Sandakan, Lahad Datu, Semporna and Tawau, the region is of strategic significance to Malaysia. Indeed, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) has installed several radar facilities to monitor the Celebes Sea and Sulu Sea, which sit at the north of the Lombok-Makassar route. Defence Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi argued that the equipment would help monitor the movement of merchant vessels in general, but also neighbouring countries' ships too. According to Zahid Hamidi, the MAF would take immediate action to prevent transgressions from occurring.[98] In addition, the MMEA has built a new base near Sandakan[99] and as part of proposals in the *Eleventh Malaysia Plan 2016-2020*, is installing new radar facilities in the area.[100] These statements and activities also tally with Malaysia's oil interests near the Lombok-Makassar route, and lends further support to an argument that links offshore oil interests and maritime priorities. After all, in 2012, the MMEA requested government approval to establish an air patrol base at Kuching, on Sarawak's west coast, in order to conduct surveillance activities over oil and gas rigs in the South China Sea.[101]

Converging Interests and Energy Transit State Status

The convergence of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests in the Malacca Strait has occurred following similar logic to the factors that have underpinned their

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[96] Translated from the original Malaysian. 'Kapal TLDM Sentiasa Siap Siaga Lakukan Rondaan,' *New Sabah Times*, 18 Feb 2010.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Mansor, 'Penduduk Semporna Kini Merdeka Daripada Ancaman "Mundu."'
[99] 'MMEA to Move into New RM48mil Base after Completion Next Year,' *Star*, 7 Oct 2011.
[100] 'Making Sabah Less Vulnerable to Security Threats from the Sea,' *New Straits Times*, 15 Mar 2012; 'MMEA to Complete Surveillance System within 11MP,' *Borneo Post*, 15 Mar 2012; Mansor, 'Penduduk Semporna Kini Merdeka Daripada Ancaman "Mundu."'
[101] J Lanson, 'Kawalan Perairan Diperketat,' *Borneo Post*, 21 Sep 2012.

divergence. A prominent area where their interests converge has been Indonesia's and Malaysia's adherence to principles of sovereignty in the sea lane, especially on the issue of sensitivity to perceived intrusions into their respective maritime jurisdictions. With the majority of the waterway being within Indonesian and Malaysian jurisdiction—a line of equidistance separates the states—this is not in itself unexpected. As energy transit states, it is important to note that neither Indonesia's nor Malaysia's sovereignty interests in the Malacca Strait have much to do with their oil stakes. Put differently, they can each be said to have upheld comparable views about an issue that represented a similar level of importance for their oil sectors—namely, very little. Granted, the Malaysian case study revealed that Kuala Lumpur has disputed maritime borders with all of its neighbours in a way that would see it gain access to offshore hydrocarbon resources.[102] Yet the Ambalat Block off the eastern coast of Borneo has been the centre of contention with Indonesia, and not the Malacca Strait.

However, it would be mistaken to refer to this as proof positive of 'common' interests. Indonesia and Malaysia do not care for each other's jurisdiction as much as they care about their own. This is evident in the two states' regular quarrels about trespassing into each other's waters in the Strait, several examples of which are examined in Chapter Four. This includes the standoff in 2010 when RMP officials arrested their Indonesian maritime enforcement counterparts for being in Malaysian waters, while the Indonesians in turn were apprehending Malaysian fishermen for allegedly straying into Indonesian waters.[103] Thus, while it is accurate to state that the two countries' interests converge in the sense that they both uphold principles of sovereignty in the Strait, their interests are far from identical.

In contrast to Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore has not made many statements indicating its concern about extra-regional actors' involvement in Strait security activities. Rather, it has welcomed many states' military participation in securing the Malacca Strait, which offer a means to better protect its enmeshed transit state position. Furthermore, Singapore's policy pronouncements addressing maritime security cooperation persistently recognise the Strait's transit oil, as mentioned on multiple occasions by Teo and other officials including Lee Hsien Loong, Tony Tan,

[102] See the discussion in Chapter Four, within the section entitled *Sovereignty, Border Integrity and the Pursuit of Oil*.
[103] See the discussion in Chapter Four, within the section entitled *Asserting Sovereignty*.

Balaji Sadasivan, Wong Kan Seng, and then-Senior Parliamentary Secretary for Defence and the Environment and Water Resources Koo Tsai Kee.[104] This view has also been voiced by SAF commissioned officers including Lieutenant Colonel Chow Ngee Ken and Majors Serene Chua Pui Hong, Gary Ow and Desmond Low.[105]

There is also some evidence to suggest that Singapore's policy choices in respect to its maritime jurisdiction has more to do with ensuring international shipping patterns are to its advantage than it has to do with keeping other states' military presences out of the sea lane. One example lies in Indonesia's periodic lamentation about (and even banning of) Singapore's sand purchases, which it alleges is illegally mined from the Riau and Bangka-Belitung provinces. In what Indonesia's former intelligence chief Hendropriyono called a "cartographic zero-sum game," its concern lies in fears that Nipah Island—one of the two countries' boundary demarcation points—may become submerged and allow Singapore to claim a larger maritime jurisdiction.[106] Another example can be seen shortly after the International Court of Justice's final decision in July 2008 about Singapore's and Malaysia's sovereignty dispute over Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (whereby the former feature was awarded to Singapore and the latter two to Malaysia).[107] Singapore's Senior Minister of State Balaji Sadasivan stated that in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention for Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), Singapore's territorial sea would now extend up to 12 nautical miles from Pedra Branca, and that

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[104] Tony Tan cited in 'Asia Security Conference Meets in Singapore to Address Terrorism and Other Defence Issues,' *Singapore: A monthly update from the Singapore Embassy*, Jul 2003; T K Koo, 'Speech at SAF-NCC Familiarisation Visit to Changi Naval Training Base,' 17 Nov 2005; H L Lee, 'Speech at the 11th International Conference on 'the Future of Asia,' Tokyo, Japan,' 25 May 2005; Lee, 'Speech to the US-ASEAN Business Council: Engaging a New Asia;' B Sadasivan, 'Keynote Address at the Meritus Mandarin Singapore,' 14 Aug 2007; C H Teo, 'Speech at ASEAN Regional Forum Confidence Building Measure,' 2 Mar 2005; C H Teo, 'Remarks on "Setting National Security Priorities" at the 5th Shangri-La Dialogue, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore,' 4 Jun 2006; C H Teo, 'Speech at the 8th IDSS Asia-Pacific Programme: Cooperating for Peace and Security,' 7 Aug 2006; C H Teo, 'Security Cooperation in Asia: Managing Alliances and Partnerships,' *Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces* 33, no. 2 (2007); Teo, 'Speech at the Commissioning Ceremony of RSS Stalwart and RSS Supreme;' K S Wong, 'Speech at the Launching Ceremony for RSS Stalwart at St Marine,' 9 Dec 2005.

[105] S C P Hong, 'Maritime Security: Possibilities for Terrorism and Challenges for Improvement,' *Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces* 32, no. 2 (2006); C N Ken, 'Strengthening Our Capability through Enhanced SURPIC,' *Navy News: A Publication of the Republic of Singapore Navy* 6 (2009): 3; D Low, 'Global Maritime Partnership and the Prospects for Malacca Straits Security,' *Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces* 34, no. 2 (2008); G Ow, 'Information Sharing: A Singapore Perspective,' *Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces (Supplement)* (2011): 11.

[106] B Guerin, 'The Shifting Sands of Time - and Singapore,' *Asia Times* (2003); R L Parry, 'Stop Taking Our Islands, Says Jakarta,' *Age*, 19 Mar 2007.

[107] See the discussion in Chapter Four, within the section entitled *Sovereignty, Border Integrity and the Pursuit of Oil.*

the feature could be used to set an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) estimated to be "half the size of a football field" around it.[108] This was enough to make Malaysia's Foreign Minister Rais warn its neighbour that it was "stirring a hornet's nest" and retort that Singapore could not unilaterally change shipping lanes as it saw fit.[109] But since the island group is on the South China Sea side of Singapore and extends past the east of the Malay Peninsula, even on the slim chance that Singapore was even able to establish this claim and have it recognised, it would do little more than inconvenience shipping routes destined for Malaysia or exiting the Johor Strait.

Based on these findings, Indonesia and Malaysia should be expected to put forward similar views on other matters if their oil interests *were* both at stake. This has in fact occurred. An example can be seen in in how the two countries responded to fuel and food price hikes that affected low- and middle-income countries in 2008.[110] When speaking at the Developing Eight summit in July 2008, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi claimed in unison that rising oil prices were "grave threats."[111] In their official addresses to the summit participants, both leaders flagged the problems that oil price hikes posed for the cost of food.[112] Malaysia's Foreign Minister Rais Yatim later raised the matter to the UN General Assembly in September that year, stating that "[e]nergy and food are truly needs of humanity" and that "sky-rocketing prices of fuel and food have caused us distress and widespread hardship."[113] Similarly, Indonesian Minister of Agriculture Anton Apriyantono, speaking at a United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) regional policy dialogue in December, noted that in response to the oil price increases (which saw the cost of fuel exceed US$150 per barrel and US$1,000 per tonne for rice), Indonesia's consumer price index rose an

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[108] Agence France-Presse, 'Malaysia Warns Singapore over Disputed Island,' *Asia One*, 18 Aug 2008; Z A Wahab, 'Singapore to Claim Territorial Sea, EEZ around Batu Puteh,' *Bernama*, 22 Jul 2008.
[109] 'Do Not Test Us, Rais Cautions Singapore,' *Bernama*, 26 Jul 2008; 'KL's Warning on Pedra Branca,' *Straits Times*, 18 Aug 2008 and 'Don't Stir a Hornet's Next, KL Warns S'pore,' *Straits Times*, 27 Jul 2008, cited in Storey, 'Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,' 53.
[110] See International Monetary Fund, 'Price Surge Driving Some Countries Close to Tipping Point—IMF,' 1 Jul 2008 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/NEW070108A.htm.
[111] Associated Press, 'Malaysia, Indonesia Say Food, Oil Crises are 'Grave Threats' to World Economy,' *Jakarta Post*, 8 Jul 2008.
[112] Developing 8 Summit, *Sixth D-8 Summit: Meeting Global Challenges through Innovative Cooperation*, (Kuala Lumpur2008), http://www.developing8.org/image/Booklet/summit2008.pdf, 92, 97.
[113] R Yatim, 'Statement at the General Debate of the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York,' 27 Sep 2008.

estimated 10-14%.[114] In 2011, Effendi Siradjuddin, the Chairman of the Association for Indonesian Oil and Gas Companies, went as far to state that the crisis was related to Middle Eastern oil. On the topic of the Arab Spring uprisings that began in late 2010, Siradjuddin argued that:

> Seen from (a) domestic energy production and consumption aspect, the political turmoil in the Middle East has a potential to make our energy condition become more critical, and therefore it must be seriously anticipated.[115]

In comparison, Singapore's response to the food-fuel crisis was more reserved. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reflected that "it's quite understandable why people are agitated all over the world and demonstrating, rioting, protesting, blaming their governments." He added, "[f]ortunately in Singapore we have plenty of rice. So you don't see riots."[116] Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam also appeared to be resigned on the matter. When speaking at the annual general meeting of Singapore's Association of Banks in June 2008, one heading listed on Shanmugaratnam's presentation's transcript suggested simply "letting the oil prices pass through." Elsewhere he noted Singapore's inability to protect itself from fluctuations on food and fuel markets.[117]

Energy Transit States and their Interests: Empirical and Conceptual Implications

These findings challenge claims that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have 'common interests' in the Malacca Strait, and they strengthen the notion that energy transit status plays a key role in shaping choices. More broadly, they reinforce existing ideas about transit states as distinct actors in energy supply chains. Certainly, countries throughout the international system are regularly being identified as energy transit states.[118] This practice can be expected to continue, and such states' statuses will also disappear as global energy trading patterns evolve.

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[114] A Apriyantono, 'Indonesia Response to Food-Fuel and Financial Crisis: With a Perspective of the Second Green Union' (paper presented at the UNESCAP-Indonesia Regional Policy Dialogue, Bali, Indonesia, 9-10 Dec 2008), 1.
[115] 'Conflicts a Threat to Indonesia's Energy,' *UPI*, 28 Mar 2011.
[116] H L Lee, 'Speech at the NUS-UCC National Day Rally,' 17 Aug 2008.
[117] T Shanmugaratnam, 'Speech at the Association of the Banks in Singapore Annual General Meeting, Shangrila Hotel, Singapore,' 27 Jun 2008.
[118] B Shaffer, 'Introduction,' in *Beyond the Resource Curse*, ed. B Shaffer and T Ziyadov (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 6.

The findings also support the observations made at the outset of this thesis that energy transit states and their interests are not necessarily alike. Chapter One reviewed existing efforts to distinguish energy transit states from each other, using terms such as "energy supplicants" and "pivotal states."[119] The differentiation of energy transit states using a basic indicator—that is, their stake in a transnational energy supply chain—has shown that the categories of 'enmeshed energy transit state,' 'fledgling energy transit state' and 'rising energy transit state' have practical value as analytical categories. Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia do have unique experiences in exploiting hydrocarbon resources, and the energy transit state framework accounts for them.

The notion of a country's 'stake' is thus instructive for understanding its interests, though the linkage is not always straightforward. It is not enough to state that enmeshed states will always rank non-state actor threats at the top of their supply chain priorities. Nor is it accurate to claim that a state will necessarily focus on sovereignty issues if the transit supply is not a priority. My research instead shows that enmeshed countries are driven to protect the supply chain, whereas fledgling states do not encounter this incentive. Although Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's oil interests can be linked to a spread of issues within and beyond the Malacca Strait, they have not all been affected at the same time or in the same ways. Thus, it is more accurate to describe the three countries' interests as both converging and diverging.

There is also utility in being able to identify Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests in relation to their stakeholder positions within Middle East-East Asia oil flows. Continuing to assume that they are identically positioned is hazardous. Erroneous judgements about states' energy interests can—and do—present significant consequences. For example, Joseph Nye has noted how Russia's President Vladimir Putin underestimated Ukraine's influence as an energy transit state for its gas exports in 2006. By cutting off supplies to Ukraine after it refused to accept a gas rate hike, Nye argues, Putin "damaged Russia's reputation as a reliable supplier of natural gas."[120] The same risk of misunderstandings is just as relevant to energy transit states in the Asia Pacific region. After all, the RMSI proposal did not adequately recognise Indonesia's and Malaysia's long held suspicion of other states' presences in the

[119] Winrow, 'Pivotal State or Energy Supplicant?'
[120] J S Nye, 'Russia Plays at Resource Politics to Boost Prestige,' *Taipei Times*, 25 Jan 2006.

waterway. President Habibie's dismissal of Singapore as a 'little red dot' was not helpful when Indonesia had to request assistance from its neighbour (and others) only a few months later during the Asian Financial Crisis.[121] Indeed, figures such as Dick Cheney and Hugh White predict that miscalculation is a likely catalyst for future maritime conflict in the Asia Pacific.[122] The Malacca Strait's transit oil has also been identified as a location where clashes could occur.[123] For some analysts, the probability for misunderstandings lies with the US and China, in the context of the latter's 'Malacca Dilemma.'[124] Being able to clarify how Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia view the shipment of oil between Middle Eastern producers and East Asian consumers therefore goes some way in avoiding such an outcome.

It is worrying that discussions about Southeast Asia's energy transit states scarcely recognise the potential for their interests to diverge. Singapore continues to make statements about sharing interests at sea with other states in the region. In late September 2012, for instance, a Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) news announcement noted 'common interests' in relation to the Cooperative Mechanism.[125] In January 2013, during a visit by South Korea's Director General Maritime Safety Policy Bureau at the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, the Chief Executive of the MPA claimed that the two countries had 'common interests' in the maritime domain as well.[126] As indicated in Chapter Two, Singapore's stance facilitates burden sharing in the maritime domain and promotes itself as a proactive maritime leader, which in turn reinforces its position as a

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[121] R Klingler-Vidra, 'The Pragmatic 'Little Red Dot': Singapore's US Hedge against China,' *IDEAS Reports - Special Reports* SR015 (2012), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/47506, 67; A M Murphy, 'Indonesia and the World,' in *Indonesia: The Great Transition*, ed. J Bresnan (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 262.

[122] D Bagchee, 'Risk of Miscalculation in South China Sea: Ex-US Official,' *CNBC*, 2 Sep 2011; H White, 'Caught in a Bind That Threatens an Asian War Nobody Wants,' *Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 Dec 2012.

[123] 'Echoes of Dreamland,' *Economist*, 5 Nov 2011.

[124] J Frewen, 'Harmonious Ocean? Chinese Aircraft Carriers and the Australian-US Alliance,' *Joint Force Quarterly* 59, no. 4 (2010); Mearsheimer, 'The Gathering Storm,' 382, 95; M G Salameh, 'China's Global Oil Diplomacy: Benign or Hostile?' *International Association for Energy Economics Policy Brief*, no. 1 (2010): 24.

[125] Republic of Singapore (Maritime Port Authority of Singapore), 'Singapore Hosts the 5th Cooperation Forum,' 25 Sep 2012 http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/global_navigation/news_center/mpa_news/mpa_news_detail.page?filename=nr120924.xml.

[126] Republic of Singapore (Maritime Port Authority of Singapore), 'Press Release: Senior Maritime Official from the Republic of Korea Visits Singapore under the Distinguished Visitors Programme,' 24 Jan 2013 http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/agencies/mpa/press_release/P-20130124-1.html.

desirable place for conducting business activities in energy and maritime logistics sectors.

Malaysia and Indonesia rarely make 'common interest' arguments. Given that the case studies show how the two countries are less involved in transnational oil shipments compared to Singapore, it makes sense that they would correspondingly be less inclined to make such statements. This said, Nazeri Khalid, of the Maritime Institute of Malaysia, has offered a balanced view of the littoral countries' interests:

> The stakeholders of the Strait, whose common and clashing interests intersect in the sealane, must work hand in hand to overcome the security threats in the Strait for their mutual interest and benefit.[127]

Here, this thesis's findings of convergence and divergence is synonymous with Khalid's description of "common and clashing interests."

Indonesia, for its part, remains practically silent on the issue. However, in January 2013, at the at the 6th anniversary of the IMSCB's formation, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Air Chief Marshal Djoko Suyanto acknowledged the "maritime appeal against global interests" of Indonesian waters.[128] As such, even though the Strait is not prominent for Indonesia's oil interests, its officials are not oblivious to the fact that its waterways are important to others.

Outside of Southeast Asia, high profile figures continue to make policy pronouncements about transit states' 'common interests,' including Andris Piebalgs (formerly the Commissioner for Energy at the European Commission), Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev and the President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov.[129] An exception can be found in Dimo Böhme's 2011 study of energy relations between the European Union and Russia, which recognises the existence of divergent and convergent interests. According to Böhme, commercial European relations with Russia have precluded the development of a European Union

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[127] Khalid, 'To Serve and Be Protected,' 11.

[128] Republic of Indonesia (National Coordinating Agency for Surveys and Mapping), 'Remarks of Minister of Coordinating for Politics, Legal and Security on 6th IMSCB Anniversary,' 9 Dec 2012 http://bakorkamla.go.id/en/index.php/arsip/index-berita/berita-internal/1320-remarks-of-minister-of-coordinating-for-politics-legal-and-security-on-6th-imscb-anniversary.

[129] 'Presidents of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Discussed Cooperation Questions in Energy Sphere,' *Kazakhstan Today*, 14 Dec 2009; A Piebalgs, 'Why Energy Security Matters in Europe and Eurasia,' *per Concordiam* 1, no. 1 (2012): 9.

energy policy.[130] Böhme's and Khalid's arguments are therefore encouraging that transit state interests are not all being taken for granted. For now, since 'common interest' claims still persist, there is reason to ensure that energy transit states' circumstances—and their policy choices—can be accurately represented.

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S ENERGY TRANSIT STATES AND THEIR POLICY CHOICES TOWARD THE MALACCA STRAIT: COOPERATION OR COMPETITION?

Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's policy choices are clearly linked to the nature of their transit oil stakes. A broad association is evident, for instance, in the three countries' maritime capabilities. Singapore is the most advanced naval power in Southeast Asia and has the highest transit oil stake of the Malacca Strait's littoral states. In contrast, Indonesia is the least invested in the supply chain and the most weakly positioned of the three to address issues in the sea lane. In turn, Malaysia's moderate yet growing transit oil stake, its military spending and maritime capabilities share many of its neighbours' characteristics. Its efforts toward operational excellence in the Malacca Strait's maritime domain recall Singapore's aspirations for leadership in maritime security. But, like Indonesia, Malaysia's resource constraints at times preclude its ability to realise this objective.

These observations provide a useful backdrop against which case findings about cooperation and competition can be presented. It is easy to point out similarities in Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's collaboration. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and at a time when the frequency of piracy incidents in Southeast Asia was high, all three countries unilaterally put mechanisms in place to better coordinate their maritime agencies. Singapore established the Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF), Malaysia the MMEA and Indonesia the IMSCB. All have long signed onto a range of 'hard' forms of security cooperation, such as the Indo-Sin Coordinated Patrols between Singapore and Indonesia, Singapore's and Malaysia's joint Exercise *MALAPURA* and Malaysia's and Indonesia's MALINDO patrols. And where the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) has incorporated all three littoral countries (and later Thailand), their cooperation has extended into the EiS aerial surveillance program as well. The sea lane's safety of navigation and its environmental protection have been

[130] D Böhme, *EU-Russia Energy Relations: What Chance for Solutions? A Focus on the Natural Gas Sector* (Potsdam: Universitätsverlag Potsdam, 2011), 216.

managed through efforts such as the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG), the Cooperative Mechanism and the STRAITREP mandatory ship reporting system. Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have contributed to various multilateral maritime security activities that have a broader Asia Pacific focus, including the FPDA's Bersama Shield, the Proliferation Security Initiative's (PSI) Exercise *Deep Sabre* and *Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training* exercises with the US Pacific Command (PACOM). In addition, the littoral countries have collaborated with other supply chain stakeholders to protect the Malacca Strait's maritime domain, most notably with Japan through the Nippon Foundation. Despite the sensation that surrounded the RMSI, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia interact with the US on maritime matters as well.

Cooperation can therefore be said to occur on matters related to the safety, security and environmental protection of the sea lane, and this has been the main focus of scholarly analyses. Yet this does not wholly explain all characteristics of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interactions. The three countries also compete in the form of commercial rivalry. Additionally, each country has exhibited initiative through different mechanisms, as evident in Indonesia's proposal to establish the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols, Malaysia's advocacy of the EiS, and Singapore's hosting of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and the Information Sharing Centre (ISC). The cases also revealed Singapore's proactive leadership and Indonesia's constrained contributions in the sea lane. And there are other indications that the three countries' collaboration is not always seamless. Singapore adopts stances that Indonesia and Malaysia do not always agree with, as was evident in the negotiations to establish the Malacca Strait's legal status, under keel clearance and the ReCAAP ISC. Indonesia's and Malaysia's sensitivities to infringements of their sovereignty at sea often obstructs attempts to involve other states and private escorts in security burden-sharing activities.

This competition, which is underrepresented in the literature, constitutes this section's primary analytical focus. It examines how Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests have influenced their competitive attempts to secure the Malacca Strait. Two observations are worth noting here. The first lies in the geographic focus of energy transit state policy choices. Although the Malacca Strait is the obvious locus of the three countries' maritime activities, their efforts often extend to locations

beyond the sea lane itself. The second is that the three states' policy choices does not always fit neatly into categories of cooperation and competition. Their efforts to leverage success in the Malacca Strait is a case in point that is examined below. This discussion sheds light on some of the conceptual ambiguities in how energy transit state policy choices has been dealt with in the literature, and supports a case for managing transregional (if not global) solutions to energy supply chain security.

Cooperation in and Beyond the Malacca Strait: 'Upstream' and 'Downstream' Policy Choices

Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's efforts to protect their interests has meant that their security activities sometimes play out in 'upstream' and 'downstream' locations beyond the Malacca Strait. That is, they all seek to safeguard the waters off the Somali coastline and throughout the South China Sea. However, in both of these regions, Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's policy choices reflect the nature of their transit oil stakes. In other words, their cooperation follows from pursuing their respective strategic agendas.

Singapore often participates in security activities upstream from the Malacca Strait, many of which are associated with its energy hub position. Here, its most prominent contributions concern its deployments to, and multiple commands of, the multinational CTF 151 counter piracy operations. These have served as excellent opportunities for Singapore to demonstrate its maritime capabilities and obtain valuable deployment experience, all at a time when its policy makers have stressed the importance of Singapore as a safe destination for hydrocarbons. Since the waters surrounding Somalia's coastline are adjacent to the world's major oil producers, its efforts have also had the effect of maximising other countries' security involvement in the Middle East-East Asia oil supply chain. This is similar to Singapore's posture in the Malacca Strait itself, where it has advocated extra-regional state actors' military assistance in conducting security activities. What makes the Gulf contributions stand out is that Singapore had been unable to realise such stakeholder cooperation in Southeast Asia due to Indonesia's and Malaysia's reservations. As an enmeshed energy transit state that has repeatedly voiced concern about non-state actors' abilities to affect merchant shipping in the Malacca Strait, Singapore's CTF 151 contributions can be read as an attempt to protect its oil interests upstream.

Like Singapore, Malaysian government officials describe the country's Gulf deployments as a way to test the RMN's capabilities.[131] But whereas Singapore's contributions form part of a large international counter piracy coalition that seeks to "protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations,"[132] Malaysia's operations have been primarily aimed at protecting Malaysian-flagged ships, and were initiated in response to the hijacking of its nationally (MISC) owned *Bunga Melati* vessels. Here, Malaysia's narrower scope relative to Singapore is reflective of its moderate transit oil stake. This said, the fact that the MISC put up much of the RMN's overheads signals that any leadership aspirations Malaysia has to secure its expanding stake in Middle East-East Asian oil flows has not been matched by government funding. Hence, Malaysia's transit oil stake has not yet become important enough to warrant as wholehearted an approach as its island state neighbour.

Indonesia's decision to become involved in upstream counter piracy activities was mostly driven by reputational factors. In fact, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially prohibited the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Angkatan Laut* (TNI-AL, or Indonesian Navy) from conducting counter piracy activities off the coast of Somalia in 2008. According to TNI Vice Marshall Sagom Tamboen, the Gulf region was far from Indonesian waters and the Ministry was unwilling to engage in negotiations with the perpetrators.[133] Two frigates (the *KRI-AHP 355* and *KRI-YOS 353*) were eventually deployed on 23 March 2011,[134] and under similar circumstances to what Malaysia had previously faced: in response to the hijacking of a nationally flagged vessel. The *Sinar Kudus* was carrying nickel northeast of the island of Socotra while sailing to Rotterdam when it was boarded on 16 March 2011, and its attackers demanded a ransom for its release. Yet Indonesia's deployment was much smaller than the RMN's, and the decision to respond came at a time of domestic pressure to rescue the Indonesian nationals that made up the majority of the *Sinar Kudus'* crew—and not by any obvious rationale associated with seaborne oil logistics. In response,

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[131] 'A Great Test of Our Navy's Ability.'
[132] United States of America (Combined Maritime Forces Public Affairs), 'Combined Task Force (CTF) 151,' http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/151/index.html.
[133] R Fadillah, 'Pembebasan WNI di Somalia Tolak Kirim Kapal Perang, TNI AL Pasrahkan Pada Deplu,' *Detik News*, 22 Dec 2008.
[134] M A Baharudin, 'Somali Piracy: RI Says Enough is Enough,' *Strategic Review* 1, no. 1 (2011): 85, 89.

students held protests outside the Somali Embassy in Jakarta,[135] and prominent figures such as Theo L. Sambuaga, Yohanes Sulaiman of the Indonesian National Defence University and others denounced the Government's inaction.[136] Chief Security Minister Djoko Suyanto later retorted that:

> Many people have said the government is not taking any action, the government is weak and so on while the fact is that from the beginning it had already considered military action as an option.[137]

Part of the delay was due to the TNI-AL's limited maritime capability. After leaving Tanjung Priok, the two frigates' restricted storage capacities meant that they had to stop at Colombo to restock.[138] TNI Major General M. Alfan Baharudin reflected on the operation that Indonesia was "[s]hort on ocean-going combat ships and modern weapons systems but long on heroism, determination and adaptability [...]."[139] Thus, for a fledgling energy transit state with little interest in protecting transit oil shipments, it makes sense that Indonesia's apparent greater concern was its reputation in its domestic political sphere.

The three states' Strait interests are also reflected in their security activities downstream from the Malacca Strait, though the distinctions among them are not as marked. As shown in Chapter Two, Singapore has sought to ensure navigational freedom in the South China Sea (where East Asia-bound vessels pass) and smooth over its neighbours' quarrels associated with the Spratly Islands. This indicates a distinct readiness on Singapore's part to be proactive on matters where its transnational supply chain interests are concerned, especially since it is one of the few states that does not claim jurisdiction over maritime features in the area. For an enmeshed energy transit state, downstream supply issues can be just as important as those located nearby. In 2012, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong personally linked the matter of national survival to ongoing disagreements in the South China Sea, adding that if it affected ASEAN, it would damage Singapore's security and influence.[140]

Yet Indonesia has also sought to address the South China Sea issue, and in a manner that simultaneously bolsters its position as a regional power and protects its

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[135] 'Students Rally in Front of Somali Embassy,' *Jakarta Post*, 13 Apr 2011.
[136] A F Arimbi, 'Govt Action Urged to Free RI Hostages in Somalia,' *Antara*, 11 Apr 2011; R Atriandi, 'Free MV Sinar Kudus, Show Indonesia's Fury,' *Jakarta Post*, 13 Apr 2011; Y Sulaiman, 'Hostage Crisis Shows Indonesia Unprepared for Emergency,' *Jakarta Globe* 19 Apr 2011.
[137] 'RI Govt Already Sent Military Troops to Somalia,' *Antara*, 15 Apr 2011.
[138] Baharudin, 'Somali Piracy,' 89.
[139] Ibid., 86.
[140] P S Huei, 'S'pore Wants Peaceful Resolution,' *Straits Times: Asia Report*, 12 Sep 2012.

own oil and gas resources. As noted earlier in this chapter, Indonesia was instrumental in salvaging the failed ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2012.[141] However, its contributions have spanned a much longer timeframe. In 1990, Indonesia established the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea. This Track II level initiative, which Canada has funded, and Indonesian subject matter expert Hasjim Djalal conducted, has allowed regional government officials to attend outside of their professional capacity and discuss low level and non-politically charged maritime issues.[142] These workshops have been praised as "one of Jakarta's most important unilateral security initiatives"[143] and considered for recommendation for a Nobel Peace Prize.[144]

More recently, Natalegawa has stressed that Indonesia holds a unique position that allows it to arbitrate states' disagreements over the South China Sea, on the basis that it is a non-claimant country to the Spratly Islands that aims to take a leadership role beyond its ASEAN chairmanship in 2011.[145] Indeed, Natalegawa and Yudhoyono both flagged their aspirations for Indonesia to make a significant contribution towards the issue before it took on the chair role.[146] And although Natalegawa has emphasised that such goals aim to avoid regional conflict and tension,[147] there has been some speculation about Indonesia's motivations. In one respect, Indonesia's efforts can be simply viewed part of a *bebas aktif* foreign policy. One analyst has pointed out, for instance, that by depicting itself as a primary actor in Southeast Asian affairs,

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[141] See the section entitled *The ASEAN Way*

[142] Council on Foreign Relations, 'A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia,' 20 Sep 2010, http://www.cfr.org/indonesia/conversation-marty-natalegawa-minister-foreign-affairs-republic-indonesia/p22984; E A Laksmana, 'Jakarta Eyes South China Sea,' *Diplomat*, 23 Feb 2011; D Scott, 'Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea,' *Asian Survey* 52, no. 6 (2012): 1024; M Vatikiotis, 'South China Sea Disputes: Diplomacy Key to Calming Troubled Waters,' *cogitASIA*, 18 Sep 2012 http://cogitasia.com/south-china-sea-disputes-diplomacy-key-to-calming-troubled-waters.

[143] A Shephard, 'Oil on Troubled Waters: Indonesian Sponsorship of the South China Sea Workshops,' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 18, no. 1 (1995): 1.

[144] T Næss, 'Epistemic Communities and Environmental Co-operation in the South China Sea,' http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Naess.pdf; H Djalal, 'South China Sea: Contribution of 2nd Track Diplomacy / Workshop Process to Progressive Development of Regional Peace and Cooperation,' 16-7 Oct 2011.

[145] D Washburn, 'Natalegawa: Indonesia Wants to "Facilitate Conversation" on Tense South China Sea,' *Asia Society*, 19 Sep 2013, http://asiasociety.org/new-york/natalegawa-indonesia-wants-facilitate-conversation-tense-south-china-sea; Council on Foreign Relations, 'A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa.'

[146] Council on Foreign Relations, 'A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa'; Laksmana, 'Jakarta Eyes South China Sea.'

[147] Council on Foreign Relations, 'A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa.'

Indonesia will be better able to influence ASEAN in the future.[148] Others have reflected that Indonesia's initiatives should be interpreted as a means to address China's 'nine-dash line' claim in the South China Sea, which overlaps its waters in the Natuna Sea. Given that the area is crucial for Indonesia's natural resources, fishing and commerce, it has an imperative to ensure that it does not lose jurisdiction.[149]

It is no surprise, then, that Indonesian decision makers stressed a need to bolster security around the Natuna Sea during the recent heightened tensions. Indonesia established bilateral coordinated naval patrols with China in the South China Sea, of which Defence Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro justified using the same reason that decision makers refer to in the Malacca Strait—to prevent illegal fishing.[150] This, too, is consistent with Indonesia's fledgling energy transit state status, as transit oil does not significantly factor into its policy decisions in the region. An official statement released in 2012 on behalf of TNI Commander Admiral Agus Suhartono argued that Indonesian national interests to the Natuna Islands' north need protecting through strengthened defence and military operations.[151] In another, the Governor of Indonesia's National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas RI, or *Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional Republik Indonesia*), Budi Susilo Soepandji, echoed Natalegawa and noted that the South China Sea dispute could threaten regional stability. Among other threats, he suggested it could lead to spillover into its EEZ, threaten Indonesia's offshore gas revenue in the Natuna Sea, affect its economy and regional trading relationships, and prompt insurance cost hikes, as well as lead to shipping diversions to the Makassar Strait (though he did not elaborate on whether this would be favourable or detrimental to Indonesian interests).[152] In his view, the likelihood of spillover necessitated an Indonesian force posture that can operate in the Natuna Sea

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[148] K Chongkittavorn, 'South China Sea: ASEAN's Exit Strategies,' *Nation*, 20 Jul 2012; L Hunt, 'Indonesia Capitalizes on ASEAN Divisions,' *Diplomat*, 25 Jul 2012.
[149] Laksmana, 'Jakarta Eyes South China Sea'; R Severino, 'ASEAN and the South China Sea,' *Security Challenges* 6, no, 2 (2010): 37.
[150] M Adamrah, 'Indonesia, China Plan Coordinated Sea Patrols,' *Jakarta Post*, 23 May 2011.
[151] R Jordan, 'TNI: Konflik Laut Cina Selatan Rawan Potensi Ancaman,' *Detik News*, 27 Aug 2012.
[152] The full transcript of Soepandji's address to the Founding Fathers House is available on his personal blog website, though excerpts are reported on the Lemhannas RI website. See Republic of Indonesia (National Defence Institute), 'Laut Cina Selatan Sebagai Flash Point di Kawasan Asia Pasifik,' Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional Republik Indonesia, 8 Feb 2012 http://www.lemhannas.go.id/portal/in/berita/178-umum/1690-laut-cina-selatan-sebagai-flash-point-di-kawasan-asia-pasifik.html; B S Soepandji, 'Pengaruh Keamanan Regional Bagi Keamanan Nasional Indonesia (Kasus Sengketa Laut Cina Selatan),' 23 May 2012 http://budisusilosoepandji.wordpress.com/2012/05/23/pengaruh-keamanan-regional-bagi-keamanan-nasional-indonesia-kasus-sengketa-laut-cina-selatan.

and surrounding areas and secure offshore oil rigs.[153] Thus, Soepandji concluded, regional security in the South China Sea is linked to Indonesia's national security.[154]

For a fledgling energy transit state, the above statements underline how Indonesia's domestic production trumps Middle East-East Asia oil flows in importance. It also shows that states seek to secure their oil interests regardless of whether they are tied to transnational or domestic supplies. As an enmeshed energy transit state, Singapore's response was to promote cooperative security solutions in the South China Sea. Indonesia has clearly made a substantial contribution as well, though such a free and active approach must be recognised with consideration of its protection of (non-transit oil) assets.

There is less evidence to make firm judgements about Malaysia's approach to the downstream dispute in the South China Sea. When speaking at the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue, Najib Razak supported plans to develop the 2002 ASEAN-based Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea into a Code of Conduct.[155] Other than this, Malaysia's policy makers have been quiet on the topic of the area's maritime security. This is not inconsistent with Malaysian decision makers' struggles to prioritise one type of challenge over another in the Strait. It is also likely due to Malaysia's status as a claimant to portions of the Spratly Islands. Outside of broad reiterations about maintaining safety of navigation, peace and stability in the South China Sea and its Malacca Strait approaches, all of which are in alignment with its stated interests in the sea lane, Malaysia's policy officials have had little else to say on downstream security matters. Instead, they tend to focus on negotiating Malaysia's competing claims to the area.[156]

Beyond the Malacca Strait: Cooperation and Competition

An exception to Malaysia's preoccupation with the Spratly Islands is its attempt to leverage its activities in the Malacca Strait. In 2011, Malaysia's Defence Minister Zahid Hamidi implied that the Malacca Strait's trilateral naval patrols were appropriate for addressing the South China Sea's traditional maritime security

[153] Soepandji, 'Pengaruh Keamanan Regional Bagi Keamanan Nasional Indonesia.'
[154] Ibid.
[155] N Razak, 'Keynote Address at the 10th IISS Asia Security Summit,' 3 Jun 2011.
[156] 'Malaysia Will Clear Disputes through Talks,' *Star*, 15 May 2009; N C Yean and J M Rafiee, '"Qinzhou Industrial Park an Iconic Malaysia-China Project," Says Najib,' *Bernama*, 21 Oct 2011.

hotspots.[157] This is not the only time that Malaysia has advanced its sea lane contributions as being transferable to other situations. Chapter Four found how Malaysia's promotion of its success in securing waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Malacca Strait was relevant to its re-election to the International Maritime Organization Council in 2009.

These activities exhibit characteristics of both collaboration and rivalry. Despite drawing on the trilateral maritime security cooperation experience, they are acts of reputation management and thus forms of power politics. For Martin Wight, prestige is simply "influence derived from power."[158] When states require others' recognition of their power, Wight notes, prestige is a form of upholding honour and interests.[159] In this respect, then, Malaysia's efforts to leverage Strait security activities in other circumstances does not represent only cooperation, or solely competition.

Zahid Hamidi's contemporaries in Singapore have also promoted maritime cooperation to other supply chain stakeholders. Minister Teo Chee Hean, for example, has put great emphasis on the trilateral naval patrols' achievements at high profile events including the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in 2005[160] and the Center for Strategic and International Studies Statesman's Forum in Washington in 2008.[161] Others have advocated ReCAAP and the ISC,[162] recounted its role in the development of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (its full title: Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden),[163] and encouraged Yemen's interest in establishing its own ISC.[164] In 2010, Singapore hosted a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) delegation—led by the Commander of the Royal Bahrain Naval Force and including senior naval

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[157] 'Comprehensive Efforts Needed to Ensure Regional Maritime Security,' *Bernama*, 5 Jun 2011.
[158] Wight, *Power Politics*: 97.
[159] Here, Wight refers to Harold Nicholson's argument that asserting honour is "power based on reputation," and asserting interests is "reputation based on power." H Nicholson, *The Meaning of Prestige* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937) 9, cited in Wight, *Power Politics*, 99.
[160] C H Teo, 'Keynote Address at the Opening of the 9th Western Pacific Naval Symposium,' 18 Nov 2004.
[161] C H Teo, 'Speech in Washington DC,' 15 Jan 2008.
[162] Ng, 'Speech at the Opening Ceremony of International Maritime Defence Exhibition Asia;' C R Tan, 'Welcoming All with Open Arms - the RSN and IMDEX 2011,' *Navy News: A Publication of the Republic of Singapore Navy* 3 (2011): 14.
[163] R Lim, 'General Statement at the 26th Regular Session of the Assembly of the International Maritime Organization,' 23 Nov 2009.
[164] Teo, 'Speech at the Commissioning Ceremony of RSS Stalwart and RSS Supreme.'

officials from Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates—to visit the Changi Command and Control Centre.[165]

Singapore has therefore been able to facilitate the development of closer upstream exchanges in oil and maritime logistics. In December 2008 it became the first state to ever sign a free trade agreement with the GCC. According to Lee Kuan Yew, this allowed Singapore "reliable access to supplies of oil and gas."[166] Using the theme 'common interests and common challenges'—a maxim strikingly similar to what Singapore advocates in the Malacca Strait—the island state initiated what became the first Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED) in 2005. Among other issues, AMED has explored the matter of cooperation against piracy and maritime security.[167] Tommy Koh, a leading proponent of the island state's maritime interests in particular, and its international relations more generally (and who represented Singapore during the UNCLOS III negotiations and in dealings with Malaysia to resolve the Pedra Branca disagreement), was its chair. Choo Chiau Beng, the Chairman of the Singapore Petroleum Company, moderated AMED's panel addressing global energy security.[168] AMED's 2008 successor encouraged members' collaboration to address issues including energy security, climate change, terrorism, maritime security, disease and religious conflict.[169] And though ASEAN members participate in AMED too, Singapore's role in the event has been prominent.

Despite its cautionary approach to deploying armed forces upstream, Indonesia has been forthright in UN discussions about countering the threat of Somali piracy. Like Singapore's and Malaysia's leveraging activities, its policy choices have served the same interests it upholds in the Malacca Strait. According to Rama Anom

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[165] Republic of Singapore (Ministry of Defence), 'Gulf Cooperation Council Delegation Visits Changi C2 Centre,' 2010 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2010/jun/15jun10_news.html.

[166] 'GCC-Singapore FTA Plan Backed,' *Gulf Daily*, 18 Jul 2007; Republic of Singapore (Singapore FTA Network), 'GCC-Singapore (GSFTA) Media Info-Kit,' 2008 http://www.fta.gov.sg/press_home_detail.asp?id=111&txt_rdate=0&txt_ftalist=0; Republic of Singapore (Singapore FTA Network), 'Overview of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GSFTA),' 2012 http://www.fta.gov.sg/fta_gsfta.asp?hl=32.

[167] Asia-Middle East Dialogue, 'Chairman's Report: The Third Asia-Middle East Dialogue Ministerial Meeting (AMED III): "Strengthening Cooperation Towards Common Prosperity," Bangkok,' 14-16 Dec 2010 http://app.amed.gov.sg/data/internet/amed/pdf/Chairmans_Report_3rd_AMED_Ministerial_Meeting.pdf, 3.

[168] Asia-Middle East Dialogue, 'Discussion Panel 3: Global Energy Security,' 2005 http://app.amed.gov.sg/internet/amed/read_content.asp?View,218,; T Koh, 'Transcript of Media Briefing of the Inaugural Asia-Middle East Dialogue, Singapore,' 2005 http://app.amed.gov.sg/internet/amed/read_content.asp?View,177,.

[169] G Yeo, 'Speech at the Second Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED II) at Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt,' 5 Apr 2008.

Kurniawan of Polkam (the Indonesian Foreign Ministry's Directorate for Political, Security and Territorial Treaties), international counter piracy provisions such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 were welcome, as long as Somalia's sovereignty was respected in accordance with UNCLOS.[170] This in itself was consistent with Indonesia's Malacca Strait preferences. Yet when it came to vote for Resolution 1838 (to provide for the use of force against Somali piracy), Foreign Minister Natalegawa stipulated that Indonesia's support applied only to Somalia and could not be used to establish customary international law elsewhere.[171] The same reasons were put forward when Indonesia rejected a US proposal to the Security Council to pursue Somali pirates onshore, on the basis of its loose wording. Arief Havas Oegroseno, the Foreign Ministry's Director General for Legal and International Treaties stated his fear that this could be applied to "other jurisdictions."[172] Though such concerns can also be justified on the greater danger of Somali piracy compared to Southeast Asian incidents,[173] it nonetheless reflects Jakarta's suspicion of other states' naval involvement in the Malacca Strait.

Competition in and Beyond the Malacca Strait: Traffic Diversions and Port Rivalry

The case studies revealed that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia compete in relation to the transnational shipment of oil through Southeast Asia. It was noted at the outset of this thesis that countries tend to compete to access strategic natural resources. For example, Michael T. Klare argues that 'flashpoints' and even 'resource wars' can develop, whereas Thomas Homer-Dixon has explored the relationship between natural resource scarcity and conflict. In relation to energy transit state scholarship, the prospect for competition is evident in the full title of Paul Stevens' 2009 Chatham House report, *Transit Troubles: Pipelines as a Source of Conflict.* Here, the problem with applying expectations for Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia to compete, on the basis that they are stakeholders of a major transnational energy supply chain, is that it contrasts with the prevailing explanations that the three countries cooperate in the

[170] R A Kurniawan, 'Piracy an Extension of Somalia's Lawless Land,' *Jakarta Post*, 17 Dec 2008.
[171] M Natalegawa, 'Statement/Explanation of Vote after the Vote Adoption of Security Council Resolution 1838 on Somalia (Piracy),' 2008 http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/NewStatements/ps100708.htm.
[172] T Hotland, 'RI Rejects US Anti-Piracy Proposal,' *Jakarta Post* 17 Dec 2008.
[173] Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Tedjo Edhi Purdijatno made this comparison in 2008. 'Selat Malaka Belum Segawat Perairan Somalia,' *Antara*, 5 Dec 2008.

Malacca Strait instead. Indeed, the three countries are just as driven to compete to advance their oil interests, as they are to collaborate and protect them. Similar to the ways in which they cooperate, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia all exhibit characteristics of rivalry that reflect their Strait interests. This has principally occurred in situations where there were prospects for the transit oil trade route to be diverted.

Singapore's need to be a leading regional energy and maritime logistics hub has produced deep sensitivities about anything that might prevent the arrival of bulk oil carriers to its shores. Its concern is mainly directed toward Malaysia's ports of Johor, the Port of Tanjung Pelepas and Port Klang, which have been undergoing facility upgrades. This is not the case for Indonesian ports and oil terminals, which tend to be lower capacity, distantly located, and have been linked to corrupt business practices.[174] Yet one interviewee remarked, this view may change once a "more favourable" political situation in Indonesia emerges.[175] Singapore's enmeshment also means that it is suspicious of projects that might lead to the circumvention of international merchant shipping away from the sea lane, such as the periodic proposals to transport oil through the Isthmus of Kra by pipeline or canal. As a small island state situated at the Malacca Strait's southern entrance, major changes to international shipping routes could be detrimental to Singapore's hub position.

This is also somewhat true for Malaysia, whereby policy makers have not been especially vocal on the matter. Since there are several oil infrastructure projects being built in the Malay Peninsula's north, next to the Malacca Strait's northern entrance, a rerouting through the Kra Isthmus would see more bulk oil carriers pass near their general area—and through co-location could even be to Malaysia's strategic advantage. Malaysia is also much more affected by the environmental consequences that can follow from merchant shipping activity plying the Malacca Strait's waters, such as accidents and oil spill pollution. It therefore makes sense that Malaysia should try to capitalise on the transnational energy supply chain, as it appears to be doing, if it has to bear the environmental consequences regardless.

Though Indonesia may not have been a focus of its two neighbours' port competition, this does not mean Jakarta has never aspired to rival Singapore's and Malaysia's commercial oil activities. As discussed in Chapter Three, Indonesia has a

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[174] 'Ditunggu Gebrakan KPK di Pelabuhan: Permainan Tarif Makin Menggila,' *Suara Pembaruan* 10 Oct 2011.
[175] Interviewee 2379.

strong production history through Pertamina. Its current refinery facilities could capitalise on an alternative transnational energy supply chain that passed through the Lombok Strait and Makassar Strait, and there is some evidence to indicate that its decision makers are aware of this. Not only is the Malacca Strait *not* a strategic priority as far as Indonesia's oil interests are concerned, but being the least capable of the three littoral countries to share the Strait security burden could indirectly contribute to redirections. It would take a major security event in the Strait or substantial change in regional energy trading patterns to warrant large-scale traffic diversion away from the waterway. If it did, Indonesia's alternate sea lanes would put it at an advantage.

A good example of Indonesian competition on this issue occurred in 2009, when Vice President Jusuf Kalla and the Chairman of Indonesia's Investment Coordinating Board Muhammad Lufti appealed to the Netherlands' Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende to relocate Shell Singapore's operations to Batam. They argued that doing so would allow Shell to exploit the Natuna Sea's hydrocarbon resources and help Indonesia's natural resources become more competitive.[176] Whether projects such as these will be realised remains to be seen. Given the disruption to Shell's Bukom production in 2011 that resulted from one of the worst fire accidents in Singapore's history,[177] such proposals might become more appealing to investors. So far, Indonesia's major oil infrastructure projects appear to be developing as part of an aim to ensure national self-sufficiency in oil production.[178]

Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's competitive tendencies share an important similarity with their cooperation: the fact that their rivalry has not been geographically constrained to the Malacca Strait. Although it has been a primary area for the three states' competition to play out, there are also strong links to how they have dealt with upstream locations as well. The efforts of Petronas to buy shares in North African oil assets essentially makes sure that upstream supplies continues to arrive at the Malay Peninsula's port infrastructure. Likewise, in 2010, Pertamina tried to obtain a 46% takeover share of Indonesian firm Medco Energy, which controlled

[176] A Suharmoko, 'RI Offers Shell to Build Refinery in Batam,' *Jakarta Post*, 9 Feb 2009.
[177] Y Chan, 'Pulau Bukom Fire Expected to Cause Significant Supply Disruption,' *Channel News Asia*, 29 Sep 2011; A Koh and Y K Pin, 'Shell in Customer Talks after Fire Shuts its Biggest Refinery,' *Bloomberg Business Week*, 1 Oct 2011.
[178] Alfian, 'Pertamina Plans Fuel Self-Sufficiency.'

blocks in Oman, Libya, Yemen and until 2011, in Tunisia too.[179] In 2011, Pertamina put in a bid to acquire part of ExxonMobil's oil block in Angola. As it exceeded the value of what China's Sinopec offered,[180] it was evidently of a high importance.

Singapore has not tried to extend its commercial influence over upstream resources in quite the same manner, apart from an attempt by the Port Authority of Singapore to develop Pakistan's port at Gwadar. While its 40-year tender involved operating multipurpose and container (and not oil) terminals,[181] China has taken over the Port of Singapore Authority's contract and it is now anticipated that it will convert the port into an oil centre for its own energy needs.[182] There is no evidence in the public domain that suggests that there was ever any plan on Singapore's part to operate or expand Gwadar's oil infrastructure. Given the port's proximity to the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula, China's desire to bolster its oil facilities, and the long-term nature of the Port of Singapore Authority's initial tender, it is not a logical jump to expect that it could have been an eventual outcome. Indeed, on the day of the official contract signing ceremony, Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari remarked that the takeover would assist China's oil security of supply.[183] Alternatively, it might be the case that Singapore sees its energy hub future in facilitating Chinese access to oil. In 2009, PetroChina acquired a 45.51% share of the Singapore Petroleum Company, which raised its overall stake in the company to 100%.[184] And in 2011, Sinopec announced the construction of a new lubricant plant in Singapore. With a scheduled completion in 2012, General Manager of Sinopec Lubricant Company Song Yunchang has claimed that Singapore is set to become Sinopec's "gateway to the rest of the world."[185]

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[179] 'Pertamina to Make $3.5 Billion Bid in Africa: WSJ,' *Jakarta Globe*, 10 May 2011; N Afrida, 'Pertamina Takeover Plan Confirmed,' *Jakarta Post* 8 Oct 2010; R R Kusuma, 'Local Energy Giant Medco Sells Rights to Tunisia Oil and Gas Blocks for $58m,' *Jakarta Globe*, 30 Oct 2011; MedcoEnergi, 'International Operation,' http://www.medcoenergi.com/page.asp?id=210042.
[180] A Tudor, 'Exxon in Talks on Angola Sale,' *Wall Street Journal*, 10 May 2011.
[181] L K Chin, 'PSA Signs 40-Year Deal to Operate Gwadar Port in Western Pakistan,' *Channel News Asia*, 7 Feb 2007.
[182] S Fazl-e-Haider, 'China Set to Run Gwadar Port as Singapore Quits,' *Asia Times* 5 Sep 2012.
[183] 'Pakistan Hands over Gwadar Port Operation to China,' *Nation*, 18 Feb 2013.
[184] PetroChina, 'Announcement: Third Quarterly Report of 2009,' 2009 http://www.petrochina.com.cn/Resource/pdf/xwygg/Third Quarterly Report of 2009.pdf, 11; PetroChina, 'Petrochina Acquires Keppel's Entire Stake in Singapore Petroleum Company,' 25 May 2009 http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/press/newsreleases/PetroChinaAcquiresKeppelsEntire_StakeinSingaporePetroleumCompany_.htm.
[185] 'Sinopec Breaks Ground on First Lubricant Plant Outside China,' *Xinhua* 28 Jul 2011.

Energy Transit States and their Policy Choices: Empirical and Conceptual Implications

The fact that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia both cooperate and compete, as a direct result of their stakes in oil, raises some important implications for how their interactions in the Malacca Strait are understood. More generally, it also offers new knowledge about energy transit states' policy choices and the relationship between policy decision making and stakes in transnational energy supply chains. The evidence sheds light on the role of oil in relation to prevailing understandings of (or 'traditions' in) the three case study countries' strategic policy making. In the case of Singapore, Rajaratnam's Global City vision is more firmly linked to its position as a regional maritime logistics and energy hub. For Indonesia, my research identifies the political and economic importance of domestic oil production over transit supplies, and the relevance of *wawasan nusantara*, its archipelagic vision, to its position as an energy transit state. My analysis of Malaysia's energy geopolitics is a structural balance to the agency-centrism in accounts of its policy elites' strategic decision making.

In relation to how the three countries approach the Malacca Strait, this research contradicts explanations that allocate disproportionate attention to Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's cooperation. Or, put differently, it supports the limited number of existing analyses that note differences among the three countries' priorities and policy choices in the waterway.[186] Certainly, the three countries cooperate when in pursuit of their respective interests. Yet they compete as well, and as this chapter has shown, the distinction between the two is sometimes blurred.

The findings also go some way to clarify the three countries' involvement in security architecture. In Chapter One, I noted that the many avenues of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's collaboration in the sea lane, coupled with their participation in regional multilateral fora, combines to make a complicated picture of their interactions. Because of this, it was difficult to identify the logic of the three states' policy decisions. But using an energy transit state framework to match the countries' stakes in Middle East-East Asia oil flows with their efforts to protect their interests in the sea lane, helps to resolve this ambiguity.

[186] Khalid, 'To Serve and Be Protected;' Leifer and Nelson, 'Conflict of Interest in the Straits of Malacca;' Mak, 'Unilateralism and Regionalism;' Storey, 'Securing Southeast Asia's Sea Lanes.'

The discovery that Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's patterns of cooperation and competition are played out far beyond the Malacca Strait's immediate vicinity requires attention here as well. This 'extended geography' is not often recognised in scholarship about the three countries' interactions, other than statements about the large quantities of Middle Eastern oil that are shipped through the waterway. Analyses about counteracting Somali piracy predominantly refer to Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's success in the Malacca Strait,[187] other than the occasional note that Singapore contributed to CTF 151.[188] Likewise, contemporary analyses about the South China Sea have been preoccupied addressing disputes involving China, the US, the Philippines and Vietnam. However, given Leszek Buszynski's observation in 2012 that the presence of energy resources in the South China Sea has been an obstacle to resolving states' disagreements,[189] a focus on how oil motivates Southeast Asia is a step toward addressing this.

This lack of analysis in the scholarly literature is partly due to timing. Attention to Strait security issues peaked in the aftermath of 9/11, when piracy rates were high, trilateral coordinated patrols were established and Lloyd's of London designated the sea lane as a war risk zone. In comparison, Somali piracy became a focus of international attention following high profile events such as the hijacking of the Ukrainian *Faina*, while transporting military equipment, in September 2008.[190] While the South China Sea has been an ongoing point of contention for states in the Asia Pacific, it has seen a period of renewed tensions since 2011.[191] Future assessments of international affairs relevant to maritime and energy issues in both upstream and downstream locations from the Malacca Strait will therefore need to be mindful of recognising multiple stakeholder roles.

Noting that energy transit state literature has so far made weak attempts to conceptualise behavioural patterns, Paul Stevens' discussions of 'good' and 'bad' energy transit states stands out for being one of the few contributions considering how

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[187] S I Baniela and J V Ríos, 'Piracy in Somalia: A Challenge to the International Community,' *Journal of Navigation* 1, no. 1 (2012): 698; J Kraska and B Wilson, 'Somali Piracy: A Nasty Problem, a Web of Responses,' *Current History* 108, no. 718 (2009): 229.
[188] B van Ginkel and L Landman, 'In Search of a Sustainable and Coherent Strategy Assessing the Kaleidoscope of Counter-Piracy Activities in Somalia,' *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 10, no. 4 (2012): 736.
[189] L Buszynski, 'The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US-China Strategic Rivalry,' *Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2012): 141.
[190] Cawthorne, 'US Navy Eyes Ukrainian Ship Seized by Somalis.'
[191] See Auslin, 'Turbulent Waters in the South China Sea.'

different circumstances affect an energy transit state's policy choices. Stevens' work observed six factors distinguishing energy transit states: the supply chain's security; the importance of foreign direct investment; the transit state's benefit from, and dependence on the supply chain; the existence of alternative supply routes; and whether producer states and transit states compete.[192]

Yet Stevens has offered little guidance on how these were linked to policy outcomes. Judging from the evidence that has emerged from the three case studies, Stevens' observations are certainly relevant to understanding Middle East-East Asia oil flows, for all of these factors emerged in the case studies. Some of Stevens' factors are represented under my notion of 'stake' (investment, benefit and dependence) whereas others are recognised as relevant to policy outcomes (stakeholder competition, nature of security in the supply chain, and the existence of alternative supply routes). Hence, the research presented in this thesis progresses in the spirit of Stevens' contribution, albeit with a simplified framework. This study identifies one all-encompassing transit oil factor (a country's stake in a transnational energy supply chain), rather than Stevens' six.

Indeed, like Stevens' work, this study addresses two traits attributable to energy transit states ('cooperation' and 'competition' compared with 'goodness' and 'badness'). Here, an important difference is that this study does not acknowledge the moral value inherent in notions of 'good' and 'bad' behaviour, and is therefore a more reliable way of analysing energy transit states. International Relations scholarship has long grappled with how to address morals in foreign policy. In discussions centring on realism, they are often recognised but relegated as subordinate to material power. E. H. Carr was sceptical as to whether 'goodness' could ever be objectively identified when evaluating the primacy of politics over ethics. According to Carr, renouncing self-interests for a higher political end "rests on some kind of intuition of what is right and cannot be demonstrated by rational argument."[193] Hans Morgenthau argued in *Politics among Nations* that while the contextual circumstances of policy decisions should be acknowledged, universal morals do not apply in foreign policy. In his view, states' individual moral aims should not be recognised due to the problem of

[192] See the section entitled *Energy Security and Transit States: From 'Economy of Supply' to 'Security of Supply'* in Chapter One.
[193] E H Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave, 2001), 42.

subjective bias.[194] Kenneth Waltz's theory of international politics treats states as like units,[195] and for John Mearsheimer, realism does not recognise the idea of 'good' and 'bad' states, and instead assumes they are "billiard balls of varying size."[196] On this basis then, and given that the energy transit state framework presented in this thesis draws on power centric notions of strategic energy resources, there is a case to downplay the apparent subjectivity in Stevens' descriptors.

In Southeast Asia too, assuming the Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia all share identical views of 'good' and 'bad' behaviour is fraught with challenges. It is not helpful to describe Indonesia's policy of *bebas aktif*, Singapore's active leadership, or Malaysia's support for sovereignty at sea as simply being either 'good' or 'bad.' This thesis has already shown how the ASEAN Way and visions of a regional identity are not helpful for understanding the three case studies. To extend the point, claims that 'Asian values' emerged as a counter to 'Western' perspectives of international politics has faced similar criticisms. Norms and values are not necessarily held equally throughout the region, or even within states. For Benedict Anderson, the appropriation of western political concepts in Indonesia tend to be grounded in traditional Javanese values.[197] Indeed, Javanese culture alone contains a plethora of values related to etiquette and moral conduct.[198] Another study that explored critical thinking values within Indonesia revealed significant differences among Javanese, Minangkabau and Batak Toba cultural groups.[199] Such variations are not exclusive to Indonesia. The homogenous notion of Asian values and Confucian economics in Singapore has served to exclude the country's Malay minorities.[200] In Malaysia, government policy that provides special rights to ethnic Malay and indigenous *bumiputera* citizens has been a matter of discontent for Chinese and Indian

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[194] Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*: 10-1.
[195] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*: 93.
[196] J J Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions,' *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 48.
[197] B Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Cornell University Press, 1990), 148.
[198] One study on power traditions in Javanese culture note traditions of power where high noble characters are linked to the traits of *duwur* (high), *luhur* (noble), *unggul* (victorious) and *alus* (refined), compared with *ngisor* (low), *asor* (humble), *(k)asor* (defeated) and *kasar* (rough). M Soemarsaid, 'The Concept of Power in Javanese Tradition,' *Indonesia Circle: School of Oriental and African Studies Newsletter* 2, no. 5 (1974): 16.
[199] J S Chandra, 'Notions of Critical Thinking in Javanese, Batak Toba and Minangkabau Culture,' in *Ongoing Themes in Psychology and Culture*, ed. B N Setiadi, et al. (Melbourne, Florida: International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology, 2004).
[200] See T Chong, 'Asian Values and Confucian Ethics: Malay Singaporeans' Dilemma,' *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 32, no. 3 (2002).

inhabitants.[201] In addition, Indonesia's and Malaysia's disagreements about the cultural ownership of traditional batik, dance and music has long been a thorn in bilateral relations, rather than being treated as a shared heritage.[202]

The case study findings also go some way toward addressing conceptual ambiguities inherent in the three energy transit state types.[203] It was not clear at the outset of the thesis whether enmeshed energy transit states' high stakes in the transnational energy supply chain would drive them to cooperate or compete with other supply chain stakeholders. As far as Singapore is concerned, its drive to ensure it remains a preferred regional hub in maritime logistics and energy sectors has manifest as an active leadership approach whereby both cooperation and competition further this aim. This said, cooperation has been more prevalent in Strait security burden sharing activities, and competition more common where commercial interests are involved. The Indonesia case study has found that fledgling energy transit states will still participate in supply chain security activities, despite having no stake-based incentive to do so. Rather, Indonesia's constrained contributions and receipt of stakeholder assistance have helped further its interests in protecting its entire archipelago's maritime jurisdiction. Malaysia's transit oil stake exhibited characteristics of both Singapore's and Indonesia's. This indicated that rising energy transit states are best considered as linear median of enmeshed and fledgling counterparts. Accordingly, rising energy transit states' policy choices appear to be motivated by commercial energy sector interests and a desire to secure the transnational supply chain like enmeshed states, and also protect its territorial jurisdiction like fledgling energy transit states. While Malaysia has so far been able to manage its diverse interests, its ability to do so should not be taken for granted in the case that it becomes more enmeshed.

One final consideration, and another way to reflect on the outcomes of this study is in terms of what Alexander George calls the three levels of theory development through case study research. For George, the first level is that findings can add to, or detract from historical explanations, or alternatively identify new

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[201] See M S Haque, 'The Role of the State in Managing Ethnic Tensions in Malaysia a Critical Discourse,' *American Behavioral Scientist* 47, no. 3 (2003).
[202] T N Barley, 'Indonesia and Malaysia Battle over Batik,' *Jakarta Globe*, 1 Oct 2009; N Chatterjee, 'Malaysia Steps on Indonesia's Toes in Dance Dispute,' *Reuters*, 28 Jun 2012; A Hermawan and D Nurhayati, 'Malaysia, Indonesia Quarrel Turns to Music,' *Jakarta Post*, 5 Sep 2008.
[203] See the discussion in Chapter One, within the section entitled AN ENERGY TRANSIT STATE FRAMEWORK AND CASE STUDY DESIGN.

accounts for a phenomenon.[204] This thesis shows that the littoral countries' interests in the Malacca Strait are not 'common' as so often claimed, but converge and diverge depending on their transit oil stake. Similarly, an examination of their policy choices as energy transit states uncovered patterns of security cooperation and economic competition that occur in a vast geographical area, and not simply cooperation in the sea lane itself. George's second level of theory development is through contingent generalisations. In other words, this refers to the identification of a new concept or theory and subtypes that might sit within them.[205] My use of 'enmeshed energy transit states,' 'fledgling energy transit states' and 'rising energy transit states' as analytical tools can be considered as part of an overall attempt to strengthen the notion of energy transit states as important third party stakeholders within transnational energy supply chains. Generalising across types constitutes George's broadest level of theory development.[206] To this end, the analysis presented here of different types of stake (in terms of enmeshed, fledgling, and rising energy transit states) has shown that interests and policy choices do indeed fluctuate accordingly.

The Effects of Non-Oil Factors on Interests and Policy Choices

Some final observations can be made here about the effects of non-oil factors for Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests and policy choices. I hypothesised in Chapter One that if energy transit states could be distinguished by having 'low,' 'moderate' and 'high' stakes, then it followed that oil-centric factors would not necessarily account for all aspects of their strategic posturing. For example, it was anticipated that matters associated with the transnational energy supply chain would more likely motivate enmeshed energy transit states than fledgling energy transit states. While this research has shown that Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's transit oil stakes do indeed inform their approaches toward the Malacca Strait and beyond, it also revealed that several non-oil factors are influential as well.

In some instances, oil was central to the three littoral states' interests and policy choices, though not necessarily those focused on the Malacca Strait. The central role of Singapore's oil sector activities has meant that it is wary of anything

[204] George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*: 109.
[205] Ibid., 112.
[206] Ibid., 114.

that could affect its position as a regional energy hub port. Similarly, Indonesia has readily used force to secure its oil interests, such as throughout Sumatra, in the Ambalat region, and around Makassar. Malaysia too contests its border delimitations where it has stood to gain access to oil resources. In such examples, the significance of oil has predominantly been an economic one, though, as the case studies have shown, it often presented consequences for security and defence decision making. Thus, Singapore supports collaboration in Strait security initiatives, and Indonesian and Malaysian maritime forces have confronted each other at sea.

In other situations, Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests and policy choices relevant to their energy transit state positions were partly related, or unrelated, to oil factors. This was evident, for example, in Singapore's approach towards Makassar, which has mostly focused on bolstering general trading relations with Indonesia. Likewise, Indonesia's interests and policy choices in the waterway were motivated by its longstanding views about ensuring sovereignty throughout the entire archipelago. Malaysia's efforts to protect waters upstream from the Malacca Strait targeted its entire shipping sector, though this encompassed its commercial activities in oil as well. And while the MMEA addresses a variety of non-traditional challenges in the sea lane, only its pollution concerns are really linked to the transportation of oil.

These findings indicate that no matter how important an energy resource is to an energy transit state, an assessment of its stake cannot be conducted in isolation of other factors. In particular, the case study analyses found that Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's historical experiences, their geopolitical conditions and views of national security, foreign policy traditions and domestic factors were also significant for their interests and policy choices toward the Malacca Strait. For example, if a long view of the three countries' contemporary experiences had not been employed, this thesis would not have identified how the timing of their independence and establishment of commercial oil refining sectors relative to East Asia's post-Second World War economic development has had consequences for their current transit oil stakes in the transnational energy supply chain. In addition, Singapore's historical experience with the *Laju* incident is relevant to understanding the development of its military capabilities. It also meant that when piracy activity peaked in Southeast Asia and the region became the 'second front' on the global war on terrorism, Singapore already held concerns about non-state actor threats in the

maritime domain. Indonesia's and Malaysia's reluctance for extra-regional actors to be physically involved in protecting the Malacca Strait can also be traced to their difference of opinions with 'user states' during negotiations for UNCLOS III. Historical factors can therefore be said to have influenced three states' transit oil stakes and guided how they responded to challenges in the Strait in the 21st century.

The manner in which the three states approached the Malacca Strait was also influenced by their geopolitical conditions and pre-existing understandings of national security. While the economic characteristics of Singapore's stake in the transit oil supply is important in itself, its full significance would be lost without locating this within its goal of survival, which in turn seeks to mitigate its geographic weaknesses. Likewise, Indonesia's *wawasan nusantara* motivations to ensure national unity explained why the sea lane is not especially singled out in its Defence White Papers. Malaysia's need to secure lines of communication between the Malay Peninsula and the eastern states has also spread its interests away from the Strait. While geography in part contributes to these views, their transitions to independent states are also relevant. Singapore's separation from the Federation of Malaysia, Malaysia's independence from British authority and Indonesia's previous Dutch administration have had longstanding effects for how they regard political autonomy.

Indeed, all three states' approaches toward the maritime domain were also informed by their broader foreign policy characteristics, and were often associated with attempts to manage prestige in the international system. It is not unique to Southeast Asia that states seek to bolster their reputations in the international sphere, but the three cases did reveal that their interests in the Malacca Strait often played out in other multilateral fora. For instance, Indonesia's sensitivity to being seen as unable to provide security in the Malacca Strait prompted the establishment of trilateral naval patrols. Natalegawa's attempts to strengthen ASEAN's interactions on matters concerning the South China Sea can be understood as part of a *bebas aktif* foreign policy making tradition and interest in being seen as a Southeast Asian leader. Indeed, reputational factors, and not oil, were also significant in Indonesia's decision to deploy counter-piracy forces upstream in the Gulf region. Malaysia's promotion of a Malacca Strait model to safeguard other sea lanes is relevant to its stated support for multilateralism and can be considered as 'middlepowermanship.' Its success in being re-elected to the IMO Council has also provided it with a high level means of addressing international maritime issues. Singapore's active leadership approach

toward the Malacca Strait and advocacy for collaboration in the maritime domain is certainly intertwined with its need to be seen as a secure business destination, though it can also be considered against a broader backdrop of its support for the US relationship, and more generally, its interests in engaging actors in military and economic spheres of activity.

Various domestic conditions also shaped the way that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia approached the Malacca Strait. Malaysia's oil exports do not hold the same significance as they do for Singapore due to the major roles of palm oil products and integrated electronic circuits in the country's global trading patterns. Likewise, Singapore's reliance on imported fish has meant that pollution of the Malacca Strait's marine environment does not rate as highly in its strategic agenda as it does for Malaysia, which has a large population on the Peninsula that is reliant on catchments from the sea lane. And as the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, Indonesia has had to be particularly mindful of political sensitivities when establishing counterterrorism initiatives.

Such non-oil factors are of course not new to studies in International Relations. Nor do they impede this thesis's use of energy resources as the primary lens through which Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests and policy making toward the Malacca Strait have been assessed. For example, when conceptualising international relations in Africa, Michael O. Anda notes that "single-factor theories" must still be recognised "within some more realistic and 'multi-factor' theory."[207] Indeed, many studies about the roles of specific issue-areas in international politics readily state that other factors must be acknowledged as well, though Jeffry A. Frieden has reflected that it can be difficult to disentangle policy decisions from them.[208] For example, Timothy Samuel Shah's and Daniel Philpott's examination of religion in international relations concludes that ideas do not solely drive the politics of religion, but that, among other factors, religious actors' size, organisation and beliefs are important too.[209] Annette Jünemann's study of security in the

[207] J Kugler and M Arbetman, 'Choosing Among Measures of Power: A Review of the Empirical Record,' in *Power in World Politics* ed. R J Stoll and M D Ward (Boulder: Rienner, 1989), cited in M O Anda, *International Relations in Contemporary Africa* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2000) 43.
[208] J A Frieden, 'Actors and Preferences in International Relations,' in *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, ed. D A Lake and R Powell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 51.
[209] T S Shah and D Philpott, 'The Fall and Rise of Religion in International Relations: History and Theory,' in *Religion and International Relations Theory*, ed. J L Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 53.

Mediterranean notes that although the events of 9/11 are often flagged as a catalyst for change in the region's security-building activities, other factors such as the evolution of a European Security and Defence Policy and political elite changes in Mediterranean partner countries must be considered as well.[210]

Given that the notion of a country's stake in a transnational energy supply chain remains underdeveloped in the existing energy transit state literature, the interplay between energy-centric and non-energy centric factors tends to be overlooked. Certainly, historical experiences, domestic factors, foreign policy traditions and security conceptions are addressed on an *ad hoc* basis throughout studies of Eurasian energy transit states, though they have not yet been formally articulated. Future research into energy transit states, whether in relation to land-based pipelines or other maritime chokepoints, would do well to be cognisant of these factors.

CONCLUSION

The Malacca Strait's littoral states evaluated in this thesis reveal a keen awareness of the range of issues that can affect their stakes in the transnational energy supply chain. They displayed both a willingness to participate in a complex web of cooperative security initiatives, as well as tendencies to compete among each other when their transit stakes were viewed as being compromised. Here, Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's decision making reflected their different levels of involvement in Middle East-East Asia oil flows.

The analysis found that proclamations that the three states possess 'common interests' in the Malacca Strait only stand in a generic sense, and are unhelpful when used in the context of their oil trading activities. Once the distinctions in how they regard the sea lane in relation to their energy transit state positions are taken into consideration, Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's drastically different priorities become apparent. A better explanation—and one that goes beyond Balance of Power predictions for alliance and expectations of maritime unity according to the ASEAN Way—is that their interactions have progressed based on both converging and

[210] A Jünemann, 'Security-Building in the Mediterranean After September 11,' in *Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11: International, Regional and Domestic Dynamics*, ed. A Jünemann (London; Portland; Frank Cass: 2004), 1.

diverging interests instead. If anything, in instances where the littoral countries *have* had similar interests (such as Indonesia's and Malaysia's sensitivities to sovereignty infringements, or Singapore's and Malaysia's regional hub aspirations), competition (in the form of maritime officials' stand offs at sea, and port rivalry respectively) has been the outcome.

Competition and cooperation are different sides of the same coin, and there is no exception where energy transit states are involved. In all three case studies the motivations underlying security cooperation were the same as those driving competition: whether Singapore's need to remain one of the region's leading maritime logistics and energy hub, or Indonesia's attempts to protect its territorial integrity at sea. Such interactions, no matter how often applauded for their success, have by no means been without hiccoughs. Given the port rivalry that is emerging as a result of Malaysia's (and to a lesser degree, Indonesia's) growing enmeshment in the transnational oil supply chain, the existing limits to collaboration in protecting the sea lane and beyond are unlikely to disappear any time soon.

On this basis, energy transit states' policy choices in the Malacca Strait can be more productively analysed from taking into account their stakes in the transnational shipment of crude and refined petroleum through the Malacca Strait. Without it, explanations of their foreign policy and defence policy remain geographically bounded, divulge into superficial understandings of maritime security cooperation, and potentially obscured as a result of the proliferation of regional security architecture.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has examined how Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's stakes in Middle East-East Asia oil flows affects their respective approaches to security in the Malacca Strait. It has also focused on cooperative and and competitive dymanics among these states in order to determine whether 'common interests' among the three exist, or whether these are best understood as converging and diverging in the context of Strait security. The analysis was conducted by identifying each nation as a specific type of 'energy transit state,' taking into account the fact that the Malacca Strait is situated at the mid-point of transnational shipment routes for crude and refined oil from Middle Eastern producers to East Asian consumers. Despite the Malacca Strait's increasing importance as a world chokepoint for oil, and Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's renewed collaboration to ensure stability in the sea lane (at a time when non-traditional maritime security matters have been at the top of post-9/11 strategic agendas throughout the international system), there has been surprisingly little recognition of how the littoral countries' strategic policy making and their circumstances as energy transit states might be connected.

Existing understandings of energy transit states do not shed much light on this. Almost all contributions addressing energy transit states focus on the South Caucasus and Black Sea areas—in relation to the continental transportation of oil and gas by pipeline from Russia to Europe—and not other locations such as maritime Southeast Asia. As this area of scholarship is still in its formative stages, analysts have only considered the basic notion of an energy transit state, with *ad hoc* accounts to explain their policy choices. Furthermore, other than noting that merchant shipping uses the Malacca Strait as a main thoroughfare to reach China, Japan and South Korea, analyses of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interactions on sharing the Strait security burden have ignored the implications of Middle East-East Asia oil flows for their respective strategic postures. In isolation, energy and maritime security scholarship does not assist considerably in helping us understand Southeast Asia's energy transit states. But in combination, as this thesis has demonstrated, they provide both the conceptual and empirical foundations for such a contribution to be made. The central research question that this thesis has addressed is thus based on bridging these issue areas:

> How are Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's interests and policy choices informed by their stakes in the transnational supply of oil between Middle Eastern producers and East Asian consumers, and does an approach that recognises energy transit states yield better understandings of their attempts to secure the Malacca Strait?

AN ENERGY TRANSIT STATE FRAMEWORK

To answer this question, I developed an energy transit state framework and applied it to three case studies that respectively examined the positions of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia in relation to Middle East-East Asia oil flows. I proposed that a country's 'stake' had explanatory utility for understanding interests and policy choices on the issue of supply chain security. I argued that countries could be designated as one of three different energy transit state types: (i) fledgling energy transit states, which have a low stake in the transit supply, (ii) enmeshed energy transit states, which can be identified by their high stakes in the supply chain, and (iii) rising energy transit states, which have moderate stakes and sit at a mid-point between the two fledgling and enmeshed extremes—much like middle powers, which are neither small powers nor great powers.

Once establishing that a country fit the general definition of an energy transit state—a third party state through whose sovereign territory passes the transportation of key strategic energy resources—I proposed that its energy transit state type could be determined by examining two factors. The first required an evaluation of the significance of the country's domestic energy sector to its strategic outlook. The second was to identify the relationship between the transnational energy supply chain and the country's energy sector. In combination, these provided a picture of the state in question's position relative to the transit supply, and a sense of its importance relative to national priorities. After ascertaining the three littoral countries' positions relative to Middle East-East Asia oil flows, each case study then assessed their approach toward the Malacca Strait, while noting this context. I advanced the idea that an enmeshed energy transit state's high stake would prompt it to be sensitive to potential supply chain challenges, and that this would be visible in its policy choices. In contrast, a country experiencing a marginal level of involvement in the transnational energy supply chain would be unconcerned about such threats and would have little incentive to protect it. Applying this framework to Southeast Asia

was thus just as motivated by a need to explain littoral countries' interests and policy choices in the Malacca Strait as it was to strengthen conceptual notions about energy transit states.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The three case studies revealed that it is quite possible to explain Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's approaches toward the Malacca Strait in the context of their roles as energy transit states. The cases found that the three countries do indeed face distinctly different positions in relation to Middle East-East Asia oil flows, and that their interests and policy decisions do accord with those respective circumstances. Assessing the three countries according to the framework first determined that crude and refined oil processing is significant to Singapore's longstanding strategy of survival, and is politically and economically prominent for Indonesia's national development. It is important for Malaysia's strategic priorities for similar reasons to Indonesia, but slightly different ones to Singapore.

Second, the analysis revealed that although Singapore's and Malaysia's oil sectors are involved in the transit energy supply chain, Indonesia's oil interests are much more grounded in domestic production concerns. As such, the enmeshed energy transit state type best represents Singapore, Indonesia is a good example of a fledgling energy transit state, and the rising energy transit state type matches Malaysia. Indeed, Singapore has long been a regional hub for maritime logistics and hydrocarbon resources such as oil, just as it has long faced a geopolitical dilemma in how it should guarantee its statehood as a small island state. The first case study found that Singapore's attempts to become perceived as a 'Global City' has always been linked to its ability to be a major oil refiner in the region. This is remarkable because Singapore realises a great amount of economic benefit despite not having any of its own natural reserves. That said, given the rise of other large refiners and port centres throughout the region, there is a potential for Singapore's leadership position to be eroded.

The analysis of Indonesia's energy transit state position revealed that despite the important role that its domestic oil sector has played throughout its contemporary history, it has had little direct involvement with the Middle East-East Asia transit oil supply. Only since becoming a net oil importer has the prospect that Indonesia might

need to source oil from the Arabian Peninsula emerged. So far, there are only a few indications that this is occurring. Finally, the Malaysian case revealed that the country exhibits both of its littoral neighbours' characteristics. Malaysia faces Indonesia's energy transit state position as far as both countries' oil production has respectively been a hallmark of national progress. At the same time, the many completed and planned infrastructure projects along the Malay Peninsula's Malacca Strait coastline that aim to capitalise on Middle Eastern oil supplies is similar to Singapore's 'enmeshment.' This too would suggest that Malaysia is set on a path to increase its transit oil stake (like Indonesia), even though doing so could expose it to competitors such as Singapore.

The case studies also demonstrated that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia each uphold distinct strategic agendas in the Malacca Strait. The scope of these priorities can predominantly be linked to their transit oil stakes. Through the *Laju* incident, Singapore experienced a threat to its energy hub position at an early stage in its contemporary history. This event was linked to its current sensitivity about piracy and armed robbery at sea, maritime terrorism, and the potential for a nexus between the two to emerge—even when competing views suggest that this is unlikely. Conversely, Indonesia has tended to downplay such non-state actor threats, preferring instead to worry about 'traditional' sovereignty related issues that it upholds throughout its entire archipelago and not just in the Malacca Strait. Owing to its broad scope of interests in the Strait, Malaysia faces difficulties in managing competing priorities in the sea lane's safety, security and environmental protection. This view is linked to Malaysia's transit state position, in that it is often affected by oil spills at sea that damage the Peninsula's coastline. However, the case studies also showed that the importance of Islam to Indonesia and Malaysia, and the tendencies for extra-regional states to link Islam to terrorism following 9/11, is relevant to understanding why Indonesia and Malaysia do not highlight terrorism as much as Singapore. Indeed, in addition to such domestic circumstances, all three countries' historical experiences, security conceptions, and foreign policy traditions were broadly relevant to understanding their interests and policy choices in the Strait.

Thus, the three case studies demonstrated that the intensity and scope of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's cooperation in securing the transnational energy supply chain are proportionate to their respective energy stakes. Singapore engages in active leadership to ensure the Malacca Strait's security and allocates

significant resources to do so. While Indonesia's involvement is constrained by a lack of resources, so too are its maritime activities throughout its entire archipelago. Malaysia's contributions through the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) have often sought to address a multitude of issues in the sea lane like Singapore, but have encountered resource limitations similar to Indonesia.

Two main findings relating to the dynamics of cooperation and competition emerged from the analysis. The first is that *Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's collaboration to secure the transnational energy supply chain is not just limited to the Malacca Strait*, or even the Southeast Asia region. All three countries take steps to share the security burden in upstream and downstream locations from the sea lane toward the Arabian Peninsula and the South China Sea. Here, the three transit states' patterns of interaction play out in these areas in much the same way. Singapore is just as eager to protect its own interests in (and ensure the navigational safety of) Middle East-East Asia oil flows along this wider geographic expanse, and through active collaboration with others when doing so. Indonesia tried to prevent the United Nations Security Council from creating legal precedents in Somalia that might present adverse consequences for its sovereignty in the Strait, and has struggled just as much to resource its upstream deployments. Malaysia, too, vigorously seeks to protect its own oil interests in the Persian Gulf area even though the RMN does not always have enough assets.

The second main pattern is that *all of the three countries compete to maximise their commercial oil interests as transit states*. This is evident in how they manage prospective maritime traffic diversions and respond to port rivalry. Singapore often tries to mitigate circumstances that could see international merchant shipping favouring other countries' port facilities, such as Malaysia's infrastructure expansion, and reputation management has been a prominent part of this. Malaysian policy makers appear to be torn on the matter. Diversions away from the Malacca Strait would pose a commercial problem for its Strait-side facilities and its ability to exploit Middle East-East Asia oil trade, though it would also benefit the Malay Peninsula's marine environment. I also found that it is in Indonesia's interests as an energy transit state to encourage traffic routes away from the Malacca Strait, with the aim of using its other archipelagic sea lanes—such as the Lombok-Makassar route—instead.

Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia therefore do share broad interests and collaborate in the Malacca Strait as far as its general stability is concerned. None of

the countries have much to gain if any of the potential threats to the Strait were to actually occur. While this is partly recognised in Balance of Power notions of alliance formation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) principle of consensus decision making known as the 'ASEAN Way,' such explanations tend to gloss over any finer points of difference among the states' strategic agendas.

Indeed, when their energy transit state positions are taken into account, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia do *not* have 'common interests' in the Malacca Strait. Each country readily acts to promote its oil interests, whether they are grounded in Middle Eastern transit supplies, domestic reserves, or both. Evaluating these interests in combination with geography and national priorities has revealed stark differences in which issues are prominent in their Strait agendas—whether protecting from non-state actors' unauthorised activities at sea, upholding border integrity, or ensuring navigational safety. These interests are not mutually exclusive. Just because maritime pollution is prominent in Malaysia's sea lane concerns does not mean that Singapore and Indonesia are oblivious to such issues. Rather, the differences among the three countries' perspectives is a matter of intensity and scope.

An answer to the 'common interests-cooperation' issue can now be presented. Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia prioritise different interests in the Malacca Strait, but this does not prevent them from engaging in various forms of collaboration to ensure its safety, security and environmental protection. With a history of productive interactions tracing to the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG) in the 1970s, and their renewed efforts following Admiral Fargo's Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) announcement in 2004, the three countries' cooperation is certainly as ongoing as it is successful. Cooperation in the Malacca Strait can thus be said to be one outcome of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's self-interested pursuit of their energy transit state objectives. In particular, cooperation occurs when the transnational energy supply chain's safety, security and environmental protection is considered to be threatened.

Cooperation is not the sole characteristic of the three countries' interactions. Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's positions as energy transit states also prompt competitive policy choices as well. This principally occurs in circumstances where the countries see their oil trading activities as being jeopardised. With this in mind, Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's competition and cooperation is motivated by precisely the same factors. Whether these traits manifest as one or the other depends

on whether the issue is dealt with as a security issue, or an economic one. However, there is not always a clear line between the two, as the three countries' efforts to leverage their Strait security activities in other circumstances shows. Singapore's desire to maintain its regional leadership as an energy hub, for instance, has meant that its collaborative security activities help strengthen its reputation as a safe business destination, but also have the effect of competing with other regional ports.

AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This research has extended the geographic scope of energy transit state scholarship away from the South Caucasus and Black Sea regions. Yet great potential still lies in considering new case studies for both maritime and continental trade routes. As transnational energy supply chains continue to emerge throughout the international system, there is an ever increasing number of candidate energy transit states that are suitable for analysis. The following avenues for future research offer a means to refine notions about energy transit states' interests and policy choices, and continue building a broader evidentiary base of such countries in a maritime context.

Maritime Southeast Asia

Further analysis of states within maritime Southeast Asia offers a means to consolidate this thesis' findings. While Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia are the most easily identifiable as energy transit states in the region (owing to their positions adjacent to the Malacca Strait), they are not the only countries that had significant refinery capacity established in the Second World War's aftermath. Thailand's main plants were built between 1964 and 1978.[1] Around this time, oil represented 85% of Thailand's energy needs,[2] most of which was sourced from Middle Eastern countries.[3] Domestic exploration and production activities emerged in the Gulf of Thailand and Andaman Sea following the creation of the Petroleum Act 1971, and as a means to mitigate this oil dependence.[4] Thailand is still the second-largest importer

[1] Business Monitor International, *Thailand Oil and Gas Report Q1 2013*, 35.
[2] Tangsubkul, *ASEAN and the Law of the Sea*: 87.
[3] S Sharma, 'Structural Change and Energy Policy in ASEAN,' in *Energy Market and Policies in ASEAN*, ed. S Sharma and F Fesharaki (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 50.
[4] Tangsubkul, *ASEAN and the Law of the Sea*: 87.

of oil in Southeast Asia after Singapore.[5] In 2012, approximately 79% of its crude oil imports originated from Middle Eastern and African producers.[6] An analysis of Thailand would thus need to examine how a high supply chain dependence affects a country that is located further away from the Malacca Strait (compared to Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia), which has also been involved in patrolling the sea lane's waters at its northern entrance, and would likely be affected by projects to transport oil over the Isthmus of Kra (should proposals eventuate).[7]

The Philippines' refineries share a similar pattern of construction and dependence as well. Caltex completed a refinery at Batangas in 1954.[8] In 1974, it built an island terminal nearby to accommodate very large crude carrier (VLCC) deliveries.[9] In 2003, it converted the refinery into an import station.[10] According to Energy Secretary Vincent Perez, doing so aimed "to make [the Philippines] a regional oil storage hub like Singapore."[11] Petron's plant at Limay, Bataan, began operating in 1961.[12] Its reliance on Middle Eastern oil has gradually grown over time. In 1994, Saudi Aramco purchased a 40% share of the company.[13] With an aim to make the plant "one of the most modern integrated oil refining and petrochemical complexes in Asia,"[14] a media source revealed in 2011 that Petron would expand the facility to process a greater slate of oil types including those from Africa.[15] Indeed, on average during the 2001-2010 period, 91% of the Philippines' crude oil imports were obtained

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[5] United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'Country Analysis Briefs: Thailand,' 20 Feb 2013 http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=TH.
[6] Data available from Kingdom of Thailand (Ministry of Commerce), 'Harmonize System: Import of Thailand Classified by Commodity,' http://www2.ops3.moc.go.th.
[7] Thailand's suitability as a case study for this thesis is discussed in the Introduction, within the section entitled RESEARCH METHOD.
[8] Caltex, 'Caltex in Philippines: More Than 85 Years of Philippine Partnership,' http://www.caltex.com/ph/about/caltex-in-philippines; Chevron, 'Chevrontexaco Press Release - Caltex to Convert Batangas Refinery into World-Class Finished Product Import Terminal,' 23 Sep 2003 http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/09232003_chevrontexacocaltextoconvertbatangasrefineryintoworldclassfinishedproductimportterminal.news.
[9] Caltex, 'Caltex in Philippines: More Than 85 Years of Philippine Partnership.'
[10] Chevron, 'Chevrontexaco Press Release - Caltex to Convert Batangas Refinery into World-Class Finished Product Import Terminal;' D L Gatdula, 'Caltex Closes Refinery,' *Philipine Star*, 24 Sep 2003.
[11] Gatdula, 'Caltex Closes Refinery.'
[12] Petron Corporation, 'Baatan Refinery: About Petron Bataan Refinery (PBR),' http://www.petron.com/refinery.html.
[13] A H Cordesman, *Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty First Century* (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 472.
[14] Petron Corporation, 'Baatan Refinery: About Petron Bataan Refinery (PBR).'
[15] L Hanmin and N Suratman, 'Philippines' Petron to Expand Bataan Refinery, Triple C3 Output,' ICIS, 13 Apr 2011 http://www.icis.com/Articles/2011/04/13/9452036/philippines-petron-to-expand-bataan-refinery-triple-c3-output.html.

from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.[16] But despite being dependent like Singapore, the Philippines does not export oil like its neighbour. As an illustration, the Philippines' imported 65 million barrels of crude oil in the 2012 financial year, of which 52 million barrels (79%) originated from the Middle East. Its petroleum product imports totalled 55 million barrels. Its exports, in comparison, amounted to 9 million barrels of petroleum product and 1.4 million barrels of crude oil.[17]

A future Philippines case study would therefore help us understand the consequences of this import-export imbalance. As an archipelago, it would also be valuable for comparison with the analysis of Indonesia undertaken in this thesis. VLCCs travelling along the Lombok Strait and Makassar Strait must pass either the Philippines' eastern or western coast to reach East Asia. At a time when the Philippines' is in the process of designating archipelagic sea lanes,[18] and when its claims to the Scarborough Shoal are at odds with China's 'nine-dash line' delimitation of the South China Sea, it is worthwhile scrutinising what imperatives (if any) the Philippines' transit state interests prompt for its approach to the maritime domain. The fact that the Philippines' San Miguel took over Esso Malaysia's Port Dickson refinery in 2011[19] is also noteworthy, for it indicates that the country's transit oil interests are also geographically spread like Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia.

Although Vietnam's first refinery, Dung Quat, was constructed much more recently in 2009,[20] stakeholders in the transnational supply of oil between the Middle East and East Asia are looking to establish other in-country facilities. The Nghi Son plant is planned to process Kuwaiti crude and is backed by both Kuwaiti and Japanese investors. Sinopec, Saudi Aramco and South Korea's Daelim are reportedly negotiating the Nam Van Phong facility. The Vung Ro plant will process Middle

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[16] Republic of the Philippines (National Statistical Coordination Board), 'Energy and Water Resources: Crude Oil Importations by Country of Origin 2001 to 2010,' http://www.nscb.gov.ph/secstat/d_energy.asp.

[17] Republic of the Philippines (Department of Energy), 'Oil Supply/Demand Report FY 1H 2012,' 2012 http://www.doe.gov.ph/DO/OilSupplyDemandReport.htm.

[18] Republic of the Philippines (House of Representatives, 15th Congress of the Philippines), 'House Passes Bill Establishing Sea Lanes in Philippine Archipelagic Waters,' 2 Feb 2012 http://www.congress.gov.ph/press/details.php?pressid=5853.

[19] Yap and Porter, 'Esso Malaysia Falls by Record as San Miguel Buys at Discount.'

[20] Business Monitor International, *Vietnam Oil and Gas Report Q2 2013*, 45; Vietnam Oil and Gas Group, 'Refinery, Petrochemical and Bio-Fuel,' 5 May 2010 http://english.pvn.vn/?portal=news&page=detail&category_id=8&id=1056.

Eastern crudes, and Qatar Petroleum is interested in the Long Son plant.[21] Given that Vietnam is poised to become considerably more involved in Middle Eastern oil at a much later stage than its neighbours, a case study analysis could help shed additional light on the effects of timing on energy transit state status. It also offers a means to contextualise Vietnam's interests and policy choices in the South China Sea—especially amid its allegations that China cut its exploration vessels' cables in the area.[22]

World Transit Oil Chokepoints

Outside of Southeast Asia, maritime energy transit states can potentially be identified in proximity to a variety of other strategic sea lanes. In addition to the Malacca Strait, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) lists the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandab, the Turkish Straits, the Panama Canal and the Danish Straits as other 'world oil transit chokepoints.'[23] Since the geography of these waterways is fixed, and the maritime domain will be the most practical means to transport large quantities of oil for the foreseeable future, understanding their coastal countries' positions as energy transit states should be a priority. This is especially the case where transiting supplies could be disrupted. For instance, in late 2011, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to international sanctions, whereby Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi stated that "not a drop of oil will pass through."[24] During the Arab Spring political uprisings that occurred throughout Arab states from late 2010, Egyptian protesters claimed they would close the Suez Canal if their demands for reform were not met.[25] In 2008, Djiboutian and Eritrean military forces clashed over their disputed land border, which lies adjacent to Bab el-Mandab. According to Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the conflict could have threatened the entire Horn of Africa.[26] An examination of such countries' energy transit state positions would not only broaden the empirical knowledge base about

[21] Business Monitor International, *Vietnam Oil and Gas Report Q2 2013*, 45-7; D D Toan, 'Qatar Petroleum Signs Deal to Invest in Vietnam's Long Son Petrochemical Project,' *Platts*, 17 Jan 2012.
[22] 'Vietnam Accuses China in Seas Dispute,' *BBC News*, 30 May 2011; J Page, 'Vietnam Accuses Chinese Ships,' *Wall Street Journal*, 3 Dec 2012.
[23] United States of America (Energy Information Administration), 'World Oil Transit Chokepoints.'
[24] 'Iran Threatens to Block Strait of Hormuz Oil Route,' *BBC News*, 28 Dec 2011.
[25] I E Amrani and Reuters, 'Egyptian Protesters Threaten to Block Suez Canal,' *Financial Times*, 10 Jun 2011.
[26] 'Ethiopia-Eritrea-Djibouti-Dispute,' *Agence de Presse Africaine*, 13 May 2008.

maritime energy transit states, but also provide a new analytical setting regarding security challenges—namely, the potentially adverse consequences of global energy trading. In particular, it could provide a means to further refine the policy traits identified in this thesis' case studies and consider whether active leadership, constrained contributions and leveraging is unique to Southeast Asia.

Finally, while Turkey is already prominent in scholarhsip on Eurasian pipeline networks, its maritime security activities have received considerably less attention. In the context of its interest to secure the Bay of Iskenderun, where Ceyhan (the end of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline) and Yumurtalik (where the end of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline is located) meet the Mediterranean Sea, Turkey has contributed to NATO maritime activities through Operation Active Endeavour since 2001, and has patrolled Lebanon's waters as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.[27] It initiated Operation Mediterranean Shield on 1 April 2006, to secure supply chains to Ceyhan, its oil terminal area, and world energy security in turn.[28] In the Black Sea, through the multilateral Operation Black Sea Harmony, Turkey facilitates NATO intelligence collection.[29] Since 2009 it has contributed toward and commanded CTF 151 activities,[30] and for several years has been involved in regular pipeline security exercises in its own territory and that of other Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline stakeholders, Georgia and Azerbaijian.[31] As such, a future case study on Turkey would offer a means to strengthen understandings of how countries outside Southeast Asia seek to secure transnational energy supply chains in 'upstream' and 'downstream' locations.

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[27] A Kenanoglu, 'Turkey's Contribution to the Maritime Security in its Surrounding Seas, Particularly in the Mediterranean' (paper presented at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Second Preparatory Conference to the 16th OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum, Ashgabad, 6-7 Mar 2008).

[28] Republic of Turkey (Turkish Naval Force), 'Operation Mediterranean Shield,' http://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/english/dzkkuluslararasigorevler/AKH.php.

[29] G M Winrow, 'Protection of Energy Infrastructure,' in *Combating International Terrorism: Turkey's Added Value*, ed. J Ker-Lindsay and A Cameron, *Occasional Paper* (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2009), http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Turkey_terrorism.pdf, 20-1.

[30] See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Turkey, 'Piracy (Armed Robbery) off the Coast of Somalia,' http://www.mfa.gov.tr/piracy-_armed-robbery_-off-the-coast-of-somalia.en.mfa.

[31] For example, see 'Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey Hold Pipeline-Security Exercises,' *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty* 24 Sep 2012; BOTAS International, 'BTC Security Exercise Eternity 2010 Takes Place in Baku,' 2011 http://www.botasint.com/Haber.aspx?haberid=180&dil=eng; BOTAS International, '"Eternity 2011" Security Exercise Takes Place in the Capital City of Georgia,' 2011 http://www.botasint.com/Haber.aspx?haberid=189&dil=eng.

Interests and Policy Choices

As this thesis has found that Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia cooperate and compete to realise their respective interests, it is likely that other transit states throughout the international system face similar circumstances. For instance, Bulgaria and Hungary are not necessarily invested in the Nabucco pipeline in the same way as Romania just because they are its neighbours. While Myanmar and Uzbekistan are both set to be gas pipeline transit states for China, their positions in global energy trading are drastically different. The former opens onto the Indian Ocean, through which Middle Eastern supplies are shipped, whereas the latter is landlocked and dependent on exporting gas to Russia.[32] The Nord Stream pipeline traverses the Baltic Sea from Russia to reach Germany, but it is difficult to imagine that Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Denmark regard the supply in exactly the same manner. For example, Sweden's Defence Minister Mikael Odenberg and Royal Swedish Navy Commander Emil Svensson raised concerns that a pipeline service platform proposed to be built close to Gotland Island would facilitate Russian intelligence collection.[33] In contrast, Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen declared that Nord Stream would not present a major security threat.[34] Research exploring such stakeholders' differences would do well to pre-empt misunderstandings in their future interactions.

The nature of Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's Strait security burden sharing activities should not be presumed to be a Southeast Asian phenomenon either. For instance, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine signed a protocol in 1999 to jointly patrol the Baku-Supsa pipeline.[35] Nor should my finding that the three littoral countries endeavour to provide security through different mechanisms be considered as unique to the sea lane. Ankara's designation of the Turkish Armed Forces to provide for pipeline security, for example, contrasts with Georgia's establishment of an interdepartmental commission within its National Security Council to oversee its own activities.[36] And while Georgia's Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for providing transit security, it established, as part of a security arrangement with British

[32] 'Update 1-Uzbekistan Aims to Join China Gas Supply Route in 2012,' *Reuters*, 17 May 2012; B Blanchard, 'China Takes Risky Step with Myanmar Pipelines,' *Reuters*, 3 Feb 2010.
[33] C Pursiainen, 'Who is Afraid of the NEGP - and Why?' *Journal of Nordregio* 2 (2007).
[34] 'Finnish PM Says Nord Stream Pipeline is no Security Threat,' *Helsinki Times*, 31 Aug 2009.
[35] 'Georgia Issues Decree on Pipeline Security,' *Asia Times*, 27 Mar 1999.
[36] Ibid.

Petroleum, a 700-member Strategic Pipeline Protection Department, all of which were company funded and trained.[37]

Likewise, rivalry is also rampant among supply chain stakeholders. China and Japan, for example, competed bitterly to have the final section of Russia's Far East pipeline from Angarsk built in Daqing and Nakhodka respectively.[38] The concurrent construction of the Nabucco and South Stream pipelines has prompted a complex web of competition among prospective transit states throughout the broader Caucasus and Central Europe including Turkey, Romania, Austria, Greece, Serbia, Croatia, Bulgaria and Hungary, many of which are involved in both projects. The slated routing of South Stream through Turkey's waters was in part a result of Russia's gas disputes with Ukraine.[39] Indeed, Turkey has been so enthusiastic to become a regional oil hub that Ankara has supported all pipeline proposals even when there are doubts that it can manage them all.[40]

The two-factor method that this thesis developed and employed would be ideal for evaluating such countries' energy stakes. Greater attention could also be directed toward energy transit states' decision making other than just cooperation and competition. This thesis has taken steps to amalgamate how current *ad hoc* contributions about energy transit states can be used to understand supply chain security preferences as they pertain to trade routes, which I argue is the most pressing knowledge gap facing expanding notions of energy security. A broader application of this study's findings would reflect on the lessons learned from Southeast Asia's energy transit states as both producers and consumers in their own rights and apply them to other supply chain stakeholders throughout the international system.

Energy transit states will continue to hold a crucial position in the global trading of strategic energy resources, and not just as a new term that can be used to fill in widening notions of 'energy security.' All signs point to an increasingly interconnected world of natural resource trading within which energy supplies are prominent. For now, crude and refined oil is the most widely used, although a long view would expect such third party countries to increase in importance for new

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[37] A Petersen, 'Turkey: Oil Pipeline Security Questions Persist,' 2006.
[38] R Giragosian, 'The Sino-Japanese Pipeline Struggle,' *Asia Times*, 18 Oct 2005.
[39] L Pronina and A B Meric, 'Turkey Offers Route for Gazprom's South Stream Gas Pipeline,' *Bloomberg* 6 Aug 2009.
[40] S Heslin, 'Key Constraints to Caspian Pipeline Development: Status, Significance and Outlook,' *Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus: Working Papers* (1998): 36.

resources and in new locations. While different stakes may well lead to countries pursuing divergent interests, it does not preclude them from collaborating to share security burdens. And though stakeholders' interests can certainly converge in a supply chain in a general meaning, Singapore's, Indonesia's and Malaysia's endeavours to cooperate and compete in relation to Middle Eastern-East Asian oil flows have been driven by distinct agendas. In the final analysis, cooperation among these energy transit states on the broader question of the Malacca Strait's safety, security and environmental protection has been successful. But as far as transit oil is concerned, it has occurred due to both converging and diverging interests, rather than only 'common interests.'

APPENDIX A – MAP OF SINGAPORE

FIGURE 7: MAP OF SINGAPORE SHOWING CASE STUDY SIGNIFICANT LOCATIONS



Map developed using Inkscape software. Blank map template available at http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=5609&lang=en. Data taken from Freeman, *The Straits of Malacca*, 7-8; Republic of Singapore, 'OneMap Singapore,' http://www.onemap.sg/index.html.

APPENDIX B – INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION CONVENTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS

TABLE 2: SINGAPORE'S, INDONESIA'S AND MALAYSIA'S ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION CONVENTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS

Convention	*Singapore*	*Indonesia*	*Malaysia*
ANTI FOULING 01			
BALLASTWATER 2004			
BUNKERS CONVENTION 01	✓		✓
CLC Convention 69	Denounced	✓	Denounced
CLC Protocol 76	✓		
CLC Protocol 92	✓	✓	✓
COLREG Convention 72	✓	✓	✓
CSC amendments 93			
CSC Convention 72		✓	
FACILITATION Convention 65	✓	✓	
FUND Convention 71		Denounced	✓
FUND Protocol 2003			
FUND Protocol 76			
FUND Protocol 92	✓		✓
HNS Convention 96			
HONG KONG SRC 2009			
IMO amendments 91	✓	✓	✓
IMO amendments 93	✓	✓	
IMO Convention 48	✓	✓	✓
IMSO amendments 2006			
INMARSAT amendments 94	✓	✓	
INMARSAT amendments 98	✓	✓	
INMARSAT Convention 76	✓	✓	✓
INMARSAT OA 76	✓	✓	✓
INTERVENTION Convention 69			
INTERVENTION Protocol 73			
LLMC Convention 76	✓		
LLMC Protocol 96			✓
LOAD LINES Convention 66	✓	✓	✓

LOAD LINES Protocol 88	✓		
London Convention 72			
London Convention Protocol 96			
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex I/II)	✓	✓	✓
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex III)	✓		
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex IV)	✓		
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex V)	✓		✓
MARPOL Protocol 97 (Annex VI)	✓		
NAIROBI WRC 2007			
NUCLEAR Convention 71			
OPRC Convention 90	✓		✓
OPRC/HNS 2000	✓		
PAL Convention 74			
PAL Protocol 02			
PAL Protocol 76			
PAL Protocol 90			
SALVAGE Convention 89			
SAR Convention 79	✓		
SFV Protocol 93			
SOLAS Convention 74	✓	✓	✓
SOLAS Protocol 78	✓	✓	✓
SOLAS Protocol 88	✓		
STCW Convention 78	✓	✓	✓
STCW-F Convention 95			
Stockholm Agreement 96			
STP Agreement 71		✓	
STP Protocol 73		✓	
SUA Convention 2005			
SUA Convention 88	✓		
SUA Protocol 2005			
SUA Protocol 88			
TONNAGE Convention 69	✓	✓	✓

Data taken from International Maritime Organization, ‘Status of Conventions by Country,’ 2013 http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/status-x.xls.

APPENDIX C – MAP OF INDONESIA

FIGURE 8: MAP OF INDONESIA SHOWING CASE STUDY SIGNIFICANT LOCATIONS



Map developed using Inkscape software. Blank map template available at http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=291&lang=en. Data taken from Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*, 72-84; *Lloyd's List Ports of the World*, 1: 614-45; Republic of Indonesia (National Agency for Disaster Management), 'Peta Dasar: Administrasi Provinsi,' http://geospasial.bnpb.go.id/category/peta-dasar/provinsi; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section, 'Indonesia: Map No. 4110 Rev. 4,' 2004, http://www.un.org/depts/Cartographic/map/profile/indonesi.pdf.

APPENDIX D – MAP OF MALAYSIA

FIGURE 9: MAP OF MALAYSIA SHOWING CASE STUDY SIGNIFICANT LOCATIONS



Map developed using Inkscape software. Blank map template available at http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=477&lang=en. Data taken from *Lloyd's List Ports of the World*, 2: 840-54; Malaysia (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment), '1Malaysia Map,' http://1malaysiamap.mygeoportal.gov.my; MMC Corporation Berhad, 'Multi-Purpose Port,' http://www.mmc.com.my/multi-purpose.asp.

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