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# **Created Motion in Maximus the Confessor: A Dynamicist Reading**

by

Cullan Joyce Bachelor of Theology ACU honours

Submitted in fulfillment of the  
requirements for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

University of Tasmania

October, 2010

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis.

Cullan Joyce

26/10/2010

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## **Abstract**

This thesis explores how Maximus the Confessor understands created motion. It describes how he utilises not just one description of motion, but several. Recent literature has struggled to articulate the diversity of ways for describing motion available to Maximus. Sometimes these works have over-simplified Maximus' views. At other times the works gesture toward some important areas, but fail to go into sufficient technical detail. This study explores how Maximus' descriptions of motion play important but specific roles in his work. Accordingly, the thesis employs a strategy of closely reading texts containing key descriptions of motion, clarifying their meaning, and setting out some implications. The work begins by describing Maximus' cosmological context, and shows the importance of relating different senses of motion together. This suggests the need for more specific analyses. Chapters two and three describe a form of self-continuous motion, showing how it permeates Maximus' thought. Chapters four and five evaluate two approaches in the secondary literature. Chapter four focuses on motion as a general principle in the cosmos. Accordingly, it explores how the general account of motion emerges from a theology of creation. Chapter five analyses how personhood has been used, with some success, for describing specific instances of motion in Maximus. The sixth and final chapter examines how motion is comprised of several different processes working co-operatively. The thesis does not explicitly investigate how Maximus' views on motion might be reconstructed in contemporary contexts. Nor does it discuss the broader implications of created motion for his theology. It offers an alternative reading of this important but notoriously difficult figure of antiquity, suggesting new avenues of interpretation, as well as opening a range of topics for further research.

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I also dedicate it to my family, my mother Elizabeth Woods, my Father Steven Joyce, my sisters Ella and Astrid, my friends, those who, through their patience, supported me. And to the Angels, those forgotten clarities, whose inspiration may embarrass, but who cause the confrontation that allows a choice for good.

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## **Abbreviations:**

<i>CL</i>	Centuries on Love
<i>CK</i>	Centuries on Knowledge
<i>Amb</i>	<i>Ambiguum</i>
<i>Mys</i>	<i>Mystagogia</i>
<i>OF</i>	Commentary on the Our Father
<i>Ad Thal</i>	<i>Quaestiones Ad Thalassium</i>
<i>PG</i>	<i>Patrologia graeca</i>

## Introduction

### The Life of Maximus

Maximus the Confessor was born around the year 580<sup>3</sup> and died around 622.<sup>4</sup> He was an important figure contributing to the re-definition and defence of Chalcedonian orthodox theology. His thought is speculative, difficult, and mainly theological in intention, yet consistently refers to, and is influenced by, subtle philosophical discussions of κίνησις. He is influential in forming the basic core of later Eastern and Western Scholasticism especially within circles of speculative and cosmological theology.<sup>5</sup>

There are two sources on the life of Maximus: the Syriac *Life* and the Greek *Life*<sup>6</sup>. Neil and Allen conclude along Louth's line, that the Greek *Life* is the more reliable because it is believed the Syriac version was written by a party of Monothelites,<sup>7</sup> and was likely written to discredit Maximus' position, which they opposed. Because of the possible bias of the Syriac *Life* it cannot be relied upon for clear biographical detail.<sup>8</sup> Therefore I will sketch the outline of his life from the Greek source. According to the Greek *Life* of Maximus, he was born of noble parentage in Constantinople. Maximus was educated and took up a position in the imperial court under Heraclius who assumed the throne in 610. Maximus held this position at "a comparatively young age" of around thirty. He eventually left the court after about three years to take up residency in a monastery near Chrysopolis where the Greek *Life* says he was reluctantly proclaimed abbot. However, as Neil notes, he was addressed along the normal lines befitting a senior monk with the title of "Abba", indicating he

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<sup>3</sup> Andrew Louth, *Maximus the Confessor*, Early Christian Fathers Series (Routledge, London, 1996) 4.

<sup>4</sup> See: *The Life of Maximus the Confessor: Recession 3*. Translated and edited and B Neil & P Allen. Early Christian studies 6. (St Pauls, Strathfield, 2003) and: *Maximus the Confessor and His Companions: Documents from Exile*. Translated and edited by P. Allen and B. Neil. (Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 2002) Neil's introduction to the *Maximus the Confessor* text is an excellent overview to the life of Maximus as well as the sources for his biography, including notes on his likely education and a timeline.

<sup>5</sup> I am referring mainly to his influence on Gregory Palamas and John Scotus Eriugena. Eriugena's four fold division of nature emerged out of a synthetic reading of Maximus' employment of common cosmological features.

<sup>6</sup> Allen & Neil *The Life of Maximus*, 10.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, 11.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, 11.

may have been simply senior.<sup>9</sup> By 626, the year of the siege of Constantinople,<sup>10</sup> Maximus was forced into exile because of the Persian threat.<sup>11</sup>

During his first exile Maximus made his way to North Africa and spent approximately twenty years there.<sup>12</sup> While in North Africa he became entangled with the *Monothelite* controversy along with his fellow *Dyothelite* (a position that maintaining there are two wills in Christ, united in one person), Sopronius.<sup>13</sup> *Monothelitism* was an offshoot of *Monoenergism*.<sup>14</sup> Both these doctrines attempted to find conciliation between the greater Orthodox Church and the Egyptian and Syrian churches. The mutual dissatisfaction of the Egyptian and Syrian Churches with the creed of the council of Chalcedon eventually resulted in a schism, which prevails till today.<sup>15</sup> *Monothelitism* is the view that Christ had only one, divine will, with the human will being dissolved into the divine (these issues will be taken up in more detail in chapter two). This debate is a catalyst for Maximus' re-entry into Chalcedonian Christology. In this vein, the principle influences in his refutation of *monothelitism* came from Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem who were supportive of the Chalcedonian position.<sup>16</sup> It was through these two figures that

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<sup>9</sup> Neil & Allen, *The Life of Maximus*, 12.

<sup>10</sup> *Maximus the Confessor: Selected Writings*, Translation and Notes by George C. Berthold, Introduction by Jaroslav Pelikan (Paulist Press, New York, 1985) 3.

<sup>11</sup> This point indicates that the concern for a unified empire would have been important to even the more divergent elements of the empire such as monks. When the Monothelite controversy emerged one of the main elements supporting it was the Empire's need for unification. That the monks were often forced into exile due to invasion or other circumstances shows that they were by no means isolated from the greater life of the empire. Therefore we must presume more than a passing interest in the maintenance of imperial unity for Maximus especially given his imperial connections.

<sup>12</sup> Bronwen Neil, 'Two Views on Vice and Virtue: Augustine of Hippo and Maximus the Confessor', In: *Prayer and Spirituality in the Early Church*, Bronwen Neil, Geoffrey Dunn, Lawrence Cross (eds) Volume III, *Liturgy and Life* (St Pauls, Sydney, 2003) 261.

<sup>13</sup> Neil & Allen, *The Life of Maximus*, 13.

<sup>14</sup> This position is actually very similar to some sentences found in Pseudo-Dionysius and I must admit to favouring the tone associated with its theological sources. Maximus addressed the problem thus: Monoenergenism could be translated as: one manifested person in Christ, but it is amended with a proviso that does NOT indicate unmixed cohesion of essences (divine and human). As such the formula, although stating the most likely composition of the manifest activity of unity of divine and human, could not be utilised fully in respect to Chalcedon, because of its lack of clarity concerning the composition of said unity. Maximus took the expression, and other similar turns such as the ideas of 'innovation' of Christ's personhood, and argued that they indicate the unified character of the activity or the trajectory of the 2 natured person. Therefore the mono-energenist positions in Ps D, for instance, are argued to represent an opinion on the character of how the dual natured Christ exists in directional sense. In other words, the unity of orientation or trajectory is one that is actually the activity of the two natures.

<sup>15</sup> *Does Chalcedon Divide or Unite? Towards Convergence in Orthodox Christology*, Paulos Gregorios, William H. Lazareth, Nikos A. Nissiotis (eds) (World Council of Churches, Geneva, 1981) vii-xii.

<sup>16</sup> Demetrios Bathrellos, *The Byzantine Christ: Person, Nature and Will in the Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 39-45, 47-49. Adam Cooper also

Maximus inherited his understanding of the terms *ousia* and *hypostasis*. Leontius of Byzantium referred back to the Cappadocians for his understanding of these terms. The other Leontius was the influence for Maximus' exposition on Christ's composite hypostasis. This thesis however, is concerned with the adaptation of the distinction implied by the terms to an understanding of the human person.

Maximus opposed *Monothelitism* because of how the divinisation of the will, (θελημάτος) articulated by the Monothelite position, did not advocate the full existence of a human will in Christ. This implied that the human will is irredeemable. Maximus' position was that Christ had both a human and divine will, the human will being in complete unity with the divine without the mixing of natures. He saw this as consistent with the Chalcedonian position of the two natures in Christ and was known as dyothelitism (two wills). Maximus publicly confessed his adherence to the Chalcedonian position in 645 when he debated with the former Patriarch of Constantinople, Pyrrhus, who was a *Monothelite*, in 645.<sup>17</sup>

Maximus was brought to Constantinople in 655 at the order of Constans II (641- 668) to face charges of treason. He denied the charges and refused to enter into communion with Constantinople.<sup>18</sup> Pope Martin was also brought to trial in Constantinople the same year as Maximus. After Martin was found guilty and sentenced to exile 654, (he died that same year) the opposition to *monothelitism* "...was now virtually confined to one man, the monk Maximus."<sup>19</sup> It was not until after Maximus' death in 662 that the church again tackled the issue of *monothelitism* at the council of Constantinople in 680. The trial and exile of Maximus was a consistent embarrassment for the empire and as a result Maximus' name was not included in the council proceedings.

## The Philosophical Influences on Maximus

Maximus' influences have four interrelating areas: Greek philosophy, Greek Christian philosophy, and Christian theology and the Christian ascetic traditions. The influences in the first case can be found filtering through his association with the thought of his time. The thesis points out how he engages with the interpretive Aristotelian positions

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notes the influence of these figures on Maximus' understanding of the terms surrounding hypostatic union. Adam Cooper, *The Body in St Maximus the Confessor: Holy Flesh Wholly Deified*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) 105-6.

<sup>17</sup> Neil & Allen, *The Life of Maximus*, 13.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 19.

<sup>19</sup> Louth, *Maximus*, 18.

of Porphyry, the schematised neo-Platonism of Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius, the spiritual sensitivity and immanent cosmology of Plotinus ordered into a detailed understanding of *noesis*, and also that he utilises frameworks akin to formal or mathematical relations, to describe the internal coherence of Christian renderings of the divine ideas.

As seen in subsequent chapters his specific mention of non-Christian philosophers is rare, but his utilisation of non-Christian structures is, I would maintain, common. The importance of the Christian ‘philosophical tradition’ arises through peculiar readings of, influence by, and engagement, with the patristic tradition. Though it may be controversial as to what comprises a philosophical Christian, the influence of Neo-Platonist thought through Origen and the Alexandrian School, Justin Martyr, Evagrius Ponticus, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Cappadocian Fathers show up consistently through Maximus’ writings. This thesis implicitly argues that many of the structures underlying Maximus’ thought are dependent on earlier philosophical conceptions which he transforms often through an analysis of ascetic life inherited through Christian monasticism.<sup>20</sup>

The intention of the work, however, is not to point out his dependence or independence from a particular philosophical position, instead it is attempting to engage with, and draw out, the intricate conceptual substrata that inform Maximus’ work within which the different shades of the concept of κίνησις emerge.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> I would not, for instance, deny the importance of classical Plotinian cosmology within Maximus’ works. I would, however, argue that his account is unique because his analysis of the composition of thought and consciousness (Λογισμοί - see chapter 2) are connected to a description of *Physis* that is based on a dogmatic position which holds the incorruptibility (but not the un-changeability) of the trajectory of created things. It is difficult to argue that Maximus is ‘dependent’ on philosophical schools. By this historical period, in my opinion, ‘philosophical’ structures have been so thoroughly translated into the basic Christian expressions that the use of dependency images fails to explain the fluency and spontaneity with which the structures emerge in Maximus’ work. Philosophy and theology have become co-cultural.

<sup>21</sup> One might argue that Maximus is undertaking a reform of the Greek philosophical tradition, but this would be the same as arguing that he was changing the character of the Greek language. One would see evidence of contribution or of refutation, the sum of which might contribute to the development of a uniquely Byzantine Christianity. However one would see that this change comes about through his embedded-ness in his world and not because he stands as an alien sentinel guarding the gates of a cosmos he can change at will, like choosing the manner of his birth, this is not so. Instead one sees the emergence of philosophical schematics arising from his internal relationship to a philosophical tradition that, with amendments, supports his speculative theology. The utilisation of polemic readings are utterly unhelpful for describing in a world defined more by conversation (however terse) within a marketplace more than missiles thrown between independent towers.

## Maximus' Written Works

Three author surveys of Maximus' *corpus Maximus* give a well accepted classification of his work.<sup>22</sup> Maximus wrote ascetical, doctrinal and speculative theology. The texts under this category include the *Centuries on Love* (hereafter *CL*) and the *Centuries on Knowledge* or the *Centuries on Theology* (hereafter *CK*) as well as his *Commentary on the Our Father* (hereafter *OF*) and the *Mystagogia*.<sup>23</sup> The polemical or doctrinal texts include those texts where Maximus tackles a specific question such as in the texts *Quaestiones Ad Thalassium* (*Ad Thal*)<sup>24</sup> or in his *Epistles*.<sup>25</sup> His *Obscure* texts are generally polemical theology, specifically regarding Christological issues. There are few complete translations in English. Bathrellos makes specific translations of important dogmatic sentences.<sup>26</sup> Because of the general difficulty and density of the Greek texts,<sup>27</sup> I mainly quote the English translations with modifications. However there are several texts that I translate directly where the translations have been inadequate or imprecise.<sup>28</sup> The standard edition of the Greek texts is the *Patrologia Graeca* (*PG*).<sup>29</sup> There have been some recent edited editions

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<sup>22</sup> Polycarp Sherwood, *The Early Ambigua of St Maximus the Confessor and his Refutation of Origenism*, Studia Anselmiana, Volume XXXVI, Herder, Rome, 1955) 1-71. Louth, *Maximus the Confessor*, 20-21 (Literary forms) 22-3 (writings on tradition specifically his consistent referral and explanation of Gregory Nazianzus) 23-25 (the Ascetic tradition, the influence and transformation of Evagrius) 26-28 (the dogmatic writings) 28-29 (the sources of his cosmic theology). Meyendorff also gives some small space to the actual categories of his writings but the work largely summarises his theology and Christology, in: John Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Christian thought* (St Vladimir's Seminary Press, Crestwood, New York, 1987) 132 et al. Jean Claude Larchet, *Saint Maximus the Confessor*, Series: Introduction to the Fathers of the Church (les Éditions du CERF, Paris, 2003) 27-105. Along with Sherwood's discussion in *The Earlier Ambigua*, these texts give an extensive account of the specific works of Maximus and their internal classification.

<sup>23</sup> Berthold, *Maximus Confessor*, 101-119. Also in: *The Philokalia Volume II*, St Nikodimos and St Makarios, Edited and Translated by G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard and Kalistos Ware. (Faber and Faber, London, 1981) 285-305.

<sup>24</sup> Translated in: *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ: Selected Writings of St Maximus the Confessor*, Translated by Paul. M Blowers and Robert Louis Wilken (St Vladimir's Seminary Press Crestwood, New York, 2003)

<sup>25</sup> *Maxime Le Confesseur: Lettres*, Introduction by Jean Claude Larchet, Translation and Notes By, Emmanuel Ponsoye (Les Editions du Cerf, Paris, 1998).

<sup>26</sup> Bathrellos, *The Byzantine Christ*, 99-174.

<sup>27</sup> "His *teaching*, obviously, is considered difficult to understand, and with this statement the modern interpreter can only agree. We could suspect also that the *texts* are difficult because of the complexity of their syntax, and to this the modern reader could bear witness to as well. Philosophically hard, syntactically tough as they are, it is worth remembering that some of his writings are harder to read and understand than others. . ." Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology of Maximus the Confessor* (Oxford University Press, 2008) 3. (author's italics)

<sup>28</sup> *PG* 90, 1084A-B.

<sup>29</sup> *Patrologia graeca*, Vols 90-91 (Paris, J. P. Migne, 1865) Texts read Author (Maximus the Confessor) *Title of Text*, *Patrologia graeca* (*PG*) vol (90-91) Column Number eg: 1041, paragraph/page division A-D. A standard reference would read: Maximus Confessor, *Ambigua* 10, *PG* 91, 1041A-C. The order that I will take in referencing Maximus is to give the work, eg *Ambigua*, (*Amb*) and the number, *Amb* 4. In the case of the *Centuries on Love* or *Knowledge*, I will abbreviate *CL* or *CK*, then

such as those used by Blowers and Wilken for the *Ad Thal*, but I have stayed with the *PG* because the text, to my mind, is sufficiently clear.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, I focus on the *CL* and *CK*, with occasional reference to the *Ambigua* (*Amb*). Also the referencing system is standard for the majority of translations.<sup>31</sup> Other texts are on aspects of dogma or address the interpretation of some difficult passages within scripture or Patristic authorities such as Pseudo-Dionysius and Gregory Nazianzus. These two books are called *The Ambigua* (sg. *Ambiguum*) or *The Difficulties* are abbreviated using *Amb*.<sup>32</sup> Through these texts Maximus presents his theology within a specific context but often tackles broader themes such as ontology as well as criticism of the κατηγορία. Maximus' understanding of the world was framed, in part, through dialogue and debate with Origenism, principally through the descriptions of Evagrius.<sup>33</sup> The reversal of the Origenist creation triad makes the general sense of creaturely dynamism fundamental to his descriptions of how created being exists.<sup>34</sup> However, he receives much of the mode for his explication of the boundary structure of the world,

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list which century eg: CL III, then the verse number 35 then the full Migne (PG) reference. If I also use an English translation I will give the English citation after the reference from the PG.

<sup>30</sup> *Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones ad Thalassium*. I. *Quaestiones I-LV una cum latine interpretatione Ioannis Scotti Erigenae*. Edited by Carl Laga and Carlos Steel. Corpus christianorum, series graeca (CCSG) 7 (Turnhout, Brepols/ Leuven University Press, 1980). And: *Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones ad Thalassium*. II. *Quaestiones LVI-LXV una cum latine interpretatione Ioannis Scotti Erigenae*. Edited by Carl Laga and Carlos Steel. Corpus christianorum, series graeca (CCSG) 22. Turnhout, Brepols/ Leuven University Press, 1990.

<sup>31</sup> To avoid confusion, if I am citing the whole work or several works I use *Ambigua* 1, 3 etc rather than the PG numbers.

<sup>32</sup> Louth, *Maximus*. Contains *Ambigua* 1, 5, 10, 41, 71. Blowers & Wilken, *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*. Contains *Ambigua* 7, 8, 42. Panayiotis Nellis, *Deification in Christ: Orthodox perspectives on the Nature of the Human Person*, Translated by Norman Russell (St Vladimir's Seminary Press, New York, 1987) 211-221. Contains several *Ambigua*: numbered PG 91, 1248A-1249C, 1304D – 1312B, 1345C-1349A.

<sup>33</sup> Louth, *Maximus*, 24,27,37. Overall Louth reads Maximus through Origenism. This has some merit as a perspective. However, he works in the influence of Gregory of Nyssa more implicitly. Blowers rightly suggests that Gregory is Maximus' chief influence, especially in his thought on the will including its teleological orientation, but Blowers is inclined to an idea of 'Perpetual Progress'.

<sup>34</sup> Pablo Argarate, 'Maximus Confessor's Criticism of Origenism', in: *Origen and the Alexandrian tradition: Papers of the 8th International Origen Congress, Pisa, 2001*, L. Perrone (ed) (Leuven University Press Peeters, 2003) 1037-1041. Argarate's argument, repeats a common underestimation of the scope of 'non-being'. He argues that Maximus rejects the idea that an ethical (here meaning any activity that reflects an incorrect subjective intention) can develop or represent an alteration in the real status of the world. That is to say, he argues that Origen's thesis concerning how the fuller sense of human intentional disobedience 'forces' God into creating the world and that this denies the principle that God is free to create. I have always felt that the denial of existence to the products of, even a misdirected intentional action, misunderstands ideas of artefact and the efficient causality underlying any ethical action that affects or redefines a creature. The causal efficacy of creaturely action is only 'false' insofar as it misapprehends the φύσις of a creature and thereby 'creates incorrectly'. Causal efficacy is sufficient to be considered existent, but it seems that there are certain types of causally effective processes that are 'incorrect' lacking an established relation between the primal φύσις and the intentional action.

the apophatic divine,<sup>35</sup> from his relation to Pseudo-Dionysius.<sup>36</sup> The difficulty of Maximus as a thinker is not bridged by the observation of the consistent patterns in his work.<sup>37</sup> His status as a theologian is particularly enveloped within the ‘Christocentrism’ of his thought.<sup>38</sup> Christ’s revelatory function here is as the embodiment and deification of creation, the revelation of the true end of beings. Christ reveals the eschatological fulfilment of creation to be within God.<sup>39</sup> As the Word, Christ established creation prior to his condescension into the world.<sup>40</sup> As the Word incarnate he embodied the eschatological fulfilment of the cosmos and humanity in God. “Jesus Christ is the beginning middle and end of all the ages . . .”<sup>41</sup> This embodiment is marked by our deification, and this comes from Christ having united all the principles of the world to himself.<sup>42</sup> There is also an ‘existential’ or ‘moral’ element to the Christocentrism of Maximus. Christ is “ever willing to become a human being in those who are worthy.”<sup>43</sup> This influences his use of Neoplatonist thought.<sup>44</sup> Törrönen and Tollefsen give the best recent discussions on the relation between Maximus’ thought, and the traditions of logic and speculative cosmology.

## Κίνησις

The term κίνησις is not applied in the technical sense of a pre-classical physics. A physics might see κίνησις as characteristically of a body; that which is apparent

<sup>35</sup> The use of the term Apophatic refers to the classification of the expression of God’s existence as beyond all comparison. See: Maximus, *CK I*, 1-10. PG 90, 1084-1088. Berthold, *Maximus*, 129-130.

<sup>36</sup> Paul Rorem, *The Uplifting Spirituality of Pseudo Dionysius*, In: *Christian Spirituality I, Origins to the Twelfth Century*, Eds: Bernard McGinn, John Meyendorff, and Jean Leclercq (Crossroad, New York, 1986). Also: Paul Rorem, *Pseudo Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993) Janet Williams, *The Apophatic Theology of Dionysius the Pseudo Areopagite II*, *The Downside Review*, 409 (1999) 235-50.

<sup>37</sup> Nellas, *Deification in Christ*, 59.

<sup>38</sup> Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology*, vii-viii. (Preface) The title of the work, though initially received with some trepidation by Lars Thunberg seems to have become a well accepted reading of Maximus’ understanding of the cosmos.

<sup>39</sup> Maximus, *Amb 41*, PG 91, 1312A-B. Louth, *Maximus*, 160.

<sup>40</sup> *Ad Thal 22*, In: Blowers & Wilken, *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*, 115.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, 117.

<sup>42</sup> “He (Christ) united heaven and earth in Himself, joined what is sensible with what is intelligible and revealed creation as a single whole whose extremes are bound together through virtue and knowledge of Christ.” *OF*, in: Sts Nikodimos and Makarios, *Philokalia*, 287-288. The text is primarily ascetic and at times the translation has provided very strange readings of texts, especially in the *Centuries on Knowledge*, which prohibit them from being very helpful for a philosophical investigation which emphasises conceptual clarification. I have not used these texts because their interpretive structure is problematic for an explanation of concepts.

<sup>43</sup> Paul Blowers, ‘Realized Eschatology in Maximus the Confessor, *Ad Thalassium 22*,’ *Studia Patristica*, 32 (1995) 263.

<sup>44</sup> Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor*, Translated by Brian E. Daley (Communio, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2003) 56-7, 106-8, 115-136.



through the measurement of faster, slower, and can be measured. Although there is an aspect of measurement or comparison in Maximus' use of κίνησις, the sense is less of trajectory than a matter of how κίνησις is characteristic of the object's basic character *per se*. Hence character and trajectory are co-mutual. The individual sense of κίνησις still relates to the peculiar body, the body itself defines κίνησις. Character and κίνησις become interdependent. In the notion of the totality, or the *prosopon/individual*, κίνησις is united in an individual 'character'. Hence, the sense of measurement that is associated with the use of the term in physics becomes associated with the classification of the character of the creature itself. That is, one could utilise tools for setting the determinations of relative trajectory and measurement into Maximus' use of the concept, but as one does so it is simultaneously corresponding to the characterisation of the peculiar possibilities of an existent or set. Possibilities and extent determine character.

For instance, if we take 'faster than' as a qualitative measure, in Maximus' system, trajectory arises as a result of a certain proximal relation to the initiating cause. If all created things are in motion, they appear to possess κίνησις in the same way only as they appear from the side of the divine creativity. On the other hand, creation considered in itself is not self-identical. Created motion consists of distinct qualities, each distinctive type can be differentiated from another based on what they are, how they relate, and their specific differences from each other. Relative trajectory is co-present with the peculiarity of a thing. Proximal relations come to indicate character; therefore character and κίνησις arise together within Maximus' cosmos.

The thesis concentrates not so much on providing an intentional account of character, however, and this is primarily because the measure of Maximus' understanding of phenomena has been defined in a tension with schematic readings.<sup>45</sup> As such, the essay is generally concerned to set out and clarify κίνησις. The essay takes its starting point from the general cosmological structure where its regional character can be seen in the variation between predominant types.<sup>46</sup> However, the generation of a view on these matters is in tension with the larger orders that

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<sup>45</sup> One outcome of the work overall would be the possibility of an intentional account of schematics, but the thesis is more taxonomic and explanatory.

<sup>46</sup> As a thought that is, unfortunately, more of a speculation or possible point for further research for this thesis, a phenomenal account of character might be an engagement with the peculiar motion of something and how this peculiarity generates correspondingly distinct schematics. It would give us a realism of the arising and function of explanatory schema.

predominant in whatever locality a motivity might occupy (be). Under a cosmological reading, a schematic form of the concept unifies character with the peculiar κίνησις, to be sure, but instead of being considered on individual terms, they may be considered under a common set, or 'region'. Hence character, in the larger sense, can refer to the character found to predominate within a regionally specific set (where the motivity of certain elements can be determined as held in common by said set) as well as that which defines the character of the individual.

Κίνησις is not only a general states of affairs, but can also be arranged within distinctive types, within a set of different qualitative orders, each defined in relation to the other. This pattern of relating generality and specificity means that, as a general rule, the concept is flexible systemically. The world is kinetic in a plurality of ways. One must strike a balance between the idea of κίνησις as a general or persistent state proffered through merely being created, and a specific state that a particular thing or set exhibits in a manner that can be compared between other kinetic states. As both a general state or in its qualitatively distinctive appearances, kinetic states are characterised by their relation to the divine, but also knowable in themselves.

In the cosmos of neo-Platonism, experience as a whole is expressed as a structure of continuity, which arises out of the co-operation between the different levels of the cosmic hierarchy. The ordering of life occurs through the interaction between regions, where one specific characteristic prevails and defines its actions, to another, where a different type of momentum is more appropriate.<sup>47</sup> Whenever I use the term 'region' it refers to the boundaries or extent of a particular creature or set of common relational types. The idea of the demarcation of a region refers to any action or creature which, by the exercise of the motion inherent within its character, generates a measurable separation between it and something else. Hence a region can be the marker between beings, the mark of a particular set of principles, the extent of those principles, and also how one principle, through relating to another, generates through that relation, an idea of demarcation. The regions can be permeable, relate to each other, but if they do so, it is out of the individual qualities of their internal capacity. How these qualities are differentiated from others they relate to (this process is described in chapter 1) defines the cosmos as a co-ordinated co-operation of principles.

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<sup>47</sup> Deirdre Carabine, *The Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena*, Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs 19 (Peeters Press, Louvain, W.B. Eerdmans, 1995) 225.

Here the trajectory of life is a co-ordination of the structure of explanation, built up through the compilation of conclusions. “No created thing is its own goal, because it is not its own origin. . . . For every self-sufficient thing is, in some sense, without origin.”<sup>48</sup> “No creature can cease its own motion until it has reached the first and only cause, which gives to all existent things their being.”<sup>49</sup> These passages portray the directional quality of a being. The effects of these larger structures impact on the immanent processes of life as it is experienced in its various modes.<sup>50</sup> Within its appearance then, or in its activity, is an openness toward that which is not identical to itself. Hence appearance is a radically open proposition. Unfortunately some questions that impact the definition of κίνησις, cannot be posed directly to individual instances. And so, because κίνησις can be many different types of movement, each must be articulated understanding the general constitution and orientation of Maximus’ thinking.<sup>51</sup> The interrelations between these different elements complicate the definition of κίνησις.

In focusing on articulating on κίνησις in Maximus’ writing, I found not only the tension of generality and particularity, but the slow, evolutionary growth in the character of the cosmos. The thesis finds the sources of the evolutionary form mainly intertwined within Maximus’ consideration of structures that are affected by *noesis* and the consideration of emergent structures in the κατηγορία. It seemed to me, then, that a survey of the different forms of κίνησις would provide some insight into its variations. Human co-creativity participates in the general structures of the cosmos, yet other forms of κίνησις are described in dogmatic or soteriological forms. Ascetic discernment builds up of the understanding of κίνησις. Processes can be considered related to negative habits when they generate or perpetuate a particular type of motion or relation, which consistently elicits a false sense in the subject, and in the real. However, nevertheless the continuity of the process itself may be neutral, or free of an intrinsically negative sense. Even ‘false ideas’ have or depend on a structure of continuity, largely similar to normative motion. Hence, when any particular process is disclosed, and found to consist of certain elements or others, it can contain elements

<sup>48</sup> Maximus, *Amb.* PG 91, 1072BC. Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 144.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.

<sup>50</sup> Tony Kelly, ‘Maximus and Theological Method.’ *Oriente Lumen: Australasia and Oceania- 2000 Proceedings*. (Early Christian studies 6, Sydney, 2000)119-120.

<sup>51</sup> I keep certain terms untranslated such as κίνησις, λογισμοί, μνήμην, κατηγορία, οὐσία, ἐνέργεια and φύσις to emphasize that their intended meaning remains within the context of Maximus’ use.

that will tell us a great deal about that motion. This is, at times, considered ascetic because of how understanding the content and relations within a process comes as a result of discernment. This discernment is important for giving a certain sense of content and characteristic operation (φύσις) of the processes themselves.

I am going to look at the idea of the evolution of the understanding of a λόγος. Here the aim is to identify the movement between an indeterminate state (in which no circumscription under a λόγος has occurred) into a more determinate space in which a circumscription can or has occurred. And investigate the specific constitution of a peculiar demarcation in relation to other λόγοι.<sup>52</sup> These two issues are related. The intention of the work, although illustrating the presence of some growth or determination within structures that articulate κίνησις, is not to speculatively project the phenomena into a broader conception.

“The (all) knowledge of beings includes naturally, in view of demonstration, their own principles which naturally circumscribe<sup>53</sup> them in a definition.”<sup>54</sup> This passage represents the basic form that is utilised consistently for defining the status of ‘definitions’ ‘demarcations’ or λόγους. It represents the origin of the consistent use of circumscription and demarcation in reference to a creature, both as a distinctive locale of creation, having distinctive character (φύσις), being limited in a particular manner in co-operation with a noetic activity. Λόγοι have that distinctive element as representative of the operation of a being through the exercise of the internal capacity it possesses, which, in lieu of such interconnection, exercises limitation and therefore demarcates a locale. Identity, locality, character, its noetic character and circumscription, are all related to the term. Note also that the term used in Chapter One, region, has a very similar sense to that indicated here except that, in the case of the region, the events of course have a much wider distribution, but it is the distribution of a common type of limitation, movement, circumscription, demarcation etc. In this way, unless indicated otherwise, λόγος is not used in the cosmic sense of the intelligible principles in the mind of God.

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<sup>52</sup> Note also that most uses of the term λόγος are meant as a specific demarcation and also the divine ideas. Normally the context is clear, chapters one and four are the main sections that utilise the sense of the divine ideas.

<sup>53</sup> τοὺς οἰκείους λόγους. Belonging to, or being contained in them.

<sup>54</sup> CK, I, 9. PG 90 1085. Berthold, *Maximus*, 130. Αἱ τῶν ὄντων γνώσεις, συνηρημένους φυσικῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοὺς οἰκείους λόγους . . . (My brackets).

The process of circumscription in a λόγοι (intelligible locale), can occur when an object (νοούμενον) relates within the conscious subject, who apprehends it in a manner that is clearer than in a previous moment. This is an experience of insight peculiar to the conscious subject, but it is an engagement that apprehends the original activity (φύσις) of the thing more clearly. The process of determination can be discussed through the history of the previous moments of understanding that a conscious person might have (part 2). This later can also be represented as development in the history of ideas; such as if Aristotle's idea of φύσις might become augmented by a later thinker, for example. The 'experiential' element does not represent an attempt to implicate into experience, a non-conceptual or primordial aesthetic. Instead, it represents a transition, in which a site that was previously indeterminate becomes 'more' determinate, and as a result, is more strictly demarcated and is 'defined'. The term 'defined' is here a translation of λόγοι, but it is crucial that the term λόγοι be understood as representing a state of demarcated existence, in which peculiar characteristics are expressed in accordance with the natural limitation of creaturely extent.

## Forms of Motion Found within Secondary Literature

No secondary author maintains a static sense of Maximus' universe. Sherwood's presentation of Maximus' refutation of the Origenist program of original stasis caused the term 'stasis' to be banished for all subsequent authors on Maximus.<sup>55</sup> However, much of the literature maintains a sense of stasis in a subtle way, through the dominance of the formal conception of creatures as limited, and therefore kinetic, advocated by Balthasar. As such, one is liable to use κίνησις statically or in the same way across all instances. Before describing the formal conception it is important to note how the theological view has resulted in a positive idea of creaturely motion.

When Balthasar describes κίνησις he works with several principles, I name several, but concentrate on Balthasar's theological descriptions. One is his description of κίνησις through Maximus' extended excurses on Gregory of Nyssa.<sup>56</sup> As a theme, the most concrete depiction of generation and continuity, fundamental to κίνησις, is

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<sup>55</sup> Sherwood, *The Earlier Ambigua*, 103-123. See chapter 4 for a fuller explanation of the transformation of Origen's cosmology.

<sup>56</sup> Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Presence and Thought: An Essay on the Religious Philosophy of Gregory of Nyssa*, Translated by Mark Sebanc (Communio, San Francisco, 1988)58-9.

generated through the relation between different types of constitution principles (universals and particulars, ideal and material). Thus, Balthasar's depiction of Maximus' microcosm of creaturely continuity is as the co-operation between variations of formal constitution. The dynamic concrescence within creatures is a matter of how types of formal constitution cohesively relate.<sup>57</sup> Hence, Balthasar's description of a creature is that of: "Being manifold, having a variety of interwoven meanings." The constitution is that in which various conceptual principles relate as conceptions. Beings consist of "parallel quantitative wholes".<sup>58</sup> This presents κίνησις as a complex set of relations and emphasises how it is constituted down cosmological lines. I continue this description in Chapter 1.

At another place, Balthasar describes Maximus' reasoning against the Origenists. Here, creation involves the differentiation or distancing (διάστημα) of the cause from the effect, the creator and the creature.<sup>59</sup> This means that the classification of creaturely identity is based on the conception of the character of God as 'permanent' (in an apophatic or theo-symbolic sense) and therefore that derivative creations are distinct from this permanence.<sup>60</sup> Difference is indicative of motion, motion is indicative of creaturely movement. Movement is indicative of the total extent of creaturely possibility, ordained through the original limiting of possibility, originating in the act of divine creativity.<sup>61</sup> This is the largely negative conception originating from a theological move. The result of this is that, in proportion to their difference, creatures move ecstatically, replicating or reversing the original differentiation. Motion therefore indicates movement toward the divine.

This is how Balthasar retains a space for positive creaturely movement. Κίνησις is considered to relate to the activity of the creature moving toward a *telos*. Hence *ekstasis* and motion are described as the positive phenomena through which creaturely κίνησις are identified. It is a positive phenomena conditioned by an absence of creaturely perfection. The absence of creaturely divinity is conditioned by the act of divine creation. The descriptions of motion remain dependent on a theology

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<sup>57</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 164.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, 163.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, 137-8.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, 148-9.

<sup>61</sup> "Movement is indicative of the providence of beings." *Amb* 10, PG 91. 1133C. Louth, *Maximus*, 113.

of creation whereby the ‘supra-perfect’ generates creation, which is ‘imperfect’ in respect to the divine.<sup>62</sup>

Discerning that there is a common pattern among contingent beings (being contingent), leads Balthasar to formalise limitation as being a common principle.<sup>63</sup> Here the distributive mechanism comes through a created process, from the divine λόγοι. The origin of this view is closer to a formal distribution discussed further on. Plass’ reading of Maximus’ explication of time, for instance, concentrates on how temporality is the outcome of movement in the αἰών.<sup>64</sup> The explanation of the content of temporality is therefore dependent on an ‘external’ principle beyond the bounds of creaturely understanding. It is unlikely that a positive account of temporal or spatial continuity can be found if their conditions are dependent on theology and higher conceptual spheres being self-evident.<sup>65</sup> Hence the divine defines what movement is, rather than examining how creatures could represent those moments of difference from the divine source. Creatures become instantiations of the divine like lines and shapes become articulations of geometric space. Creaturely motion consists of the cohesive relation between different qualities of processes. Note that I use ‘creature’ to refer to any created thing, not merely animate beings.

In differentiation and *ekstasis*, the definition of motion generates all subsequent specificity. Because of how κίνησις descends from the divine, it becomes a general state; this means that κίνησις becomes understood as a self-evident totality. As such, there is less engagement with the specific senses of motion that might be important to specific instances of motion. However, just because the definition explains a general structure, does not mean that one should be content with utilising this form of definition to cover all instances, especially when the generality of the scope provides so little content to a description.

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<sup>62</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 137-193. A common methodology persists across Balthasar’s explanations of creaturely movement. He consistently re-iterates that positive creaturely motion is conditioned by the relation between small and large structural principles, universals to particulars, God to the world. Balthasar points this way, but does not describe it with sufficient concreteness.

<sup>63</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 143,145.

<sup>64</sup> Paul Plass, Transcendent Time in Maximus the Confessor, *The Thomist*, 44 (1980) 259-277. See pp 260-3.

<sup>65</sup> “The whole world is limited by its own principles and we attribute place and age to whatever it contains.” *CK*, I,70. PG 90, 1109A. Trans: Berthold, *Maximus*,140. Maximus would allow for the cohesion of such categories within the natural operations of creatures but there are also grounds (in this translation) for regarding him more as taking a nominalist position. Hence it is dangerous to assume that Maximus is a ‘realist’ about the existence of immaterial ideas. The whole topic requires much more investigation.

Balthasar's utilisation of *ekstasis* tends to be more general than Zizioulas, favouring a reading of *ekstasis* as a general condition reading the implications of the theological as transcendently conditioning positive motion. The comment to be made in reference to Zizioulas' views on personhood is that it looks more closely at specific motion than Balthasar does.<sup>66</sup> Balthasar, who identifies the principle of differentiation and its relation in positive creaturely motion: *ekstasis*, and prefers to consider the formal structures through which motion comes to be. The contemporary examinations depict phenomena of motion through *ekstasis*<sup>67</sup> and love.<sup>68</sup> Törönen's description of the origins of personalist logic, in which he identifies that the structure can be utilised without referring only to an anthropological intention, enables the analysis to be more precise.<sup>69</sup> These senses, the first manifesting as a movement outside of oneself, and the second as positive expression of the content or reason for that desire, namely love of the other and the other's love of oneself, both depend on a similar kind of structure. This structure is a particular type of assumption, in which volitional activity is considered as a unitive totality.<sup>70</sup>

The understanding of the subject as *ekstatic* and motional through love depends on the conceiving the subject as a temporal and spatial self-continuity. In other words, the subject is temporal, that we know, but the temporality of the individual is generated by how it projects itself outwardly. The being possesses outward-ness in proportion to an inner need, but this need, and the expression outward, makes the personal phenomena of love and outward-ness to be of the same

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<sup>66</sup> John Zizioulas, *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church* (St Vladimir's Seminary Press, Crestwood, New York, 1985) 51-55, 56-63, 76-7. Here (76-7) Zizioulas is describing how Origen's ontology led to a co-eternity between world and God.

<sup>67</sup> Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, 51-55.

<sup>68</sup> John Zizioulas, *Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and Church* (T&T Clark, New York, 2006) 53-56. These concepts (*ekstasis* and love as *agape* (a quality of process, not an analysis of a process per se)) are used because they represent the operative differentiation within a system that operates through biology and freedom. The operation of freedom and the biological have been traditionally opposed in the same way as freedom and necessity represent different elements. Zizioulas wishes to point out the co-operative order that is represented within the relation to the ultimate other. The problem is not that the distinction is wrong. Instead the model of integration, by which procreative continuity and personal freedom, are presented without identifying structural differences and therefore not identifying how one order might become constituted within the order of the other.

<sup>69</sup> Melchisedec Törönen, *Union and Distinction in the Thought of Maximus the Confessor* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) 26-7.

<sup>70</sup> My focus has been to articulate an idea of motion in Maximus and the later, systematic considerations of Zizioulas, to my mind, suffer from a structural error. Put in his terms, I would regard his explication of the biological as procreative to be basically true, but Maximus has processes that are self-continuous and procreative, but still have a sense of coherence and possibility so essential to his idea of person.



quality. Love, for Zizioulas consists, of several different senses of love, such as affection, of which some are proper, or not. What is meant here is that, in motion, the quality of the generality of the phenomena can be somewhat distinct from the compositional elements that make it up. Zizioulas takes several qualities of motion, and, assessing their general intention, proscribes a general λόγος. For instance, if I love someone, one can base the description of love on the range of possible emotions, and call these ways of ex-pression or outwardly motivated movements. Or one can say that the emotion being experienced itself is possessed of several different processes, and that the mode toward *ekstatic* expression can occur. This is because processes within the subject are ‘self-distancing’ or perform ‘self-differentiation’, by way of their basic constitution as existent.

Zizioulas’ description of the internal processes of created motion (*ekstasis*, love, desire) are a collection of qualities and types of intention. *Ekstasis*, regardless of whether or not it consists of a mix of love and desire, is possible only due to how a creature’s own composition and life is facilitated by how different qualities of processes interact. There is a difference between explaining the composition of love as a mix of desire, bodily need, etc, from explaining the structure of the phenomena in terms of how it is composed of several moments. One problem with the reliance on the unitive expression of how the creature, as a totality, acts is the lack of description of the constitution of that which facilitates this outward projection. This is generated through the inner constitutional conditions of the motion.

The individual instantiation of a creature represents the realisation, or the completion of a self-contained process. The collection of different processes condition its limits and identity. Was, is, will be, or spatial relations, was there, now here, will be there, are co-operatively and co-creatively present in the positive and affective locale of love, hate or whatever the condition of outwardness might be. *Agapic* love, or the positive outward expression of love for the other, is the expression of the character of intention as a totality, not its composition. *Ekstasis* occurs because of how the different processes relate co-operatively to condition how the creature acts. When it acts, however, though it does so as a totality, its capacity to do x or y is conditioned by the continuity of its conditions. Explaining how an individual acts is implicitly recognising that the capacity for action is possible only because of how it is the culmination of a process (ἐνέργεια). But to describe how a cake is the culmination

of processes of ingredients, mixing, which culminate in cake, is different than describing how that cake tastes (what it can do once its processes are complete). The description of positive motion in the individual itself depends on the on different processes relating through a single continuity (ἐνέργεια).

The structure of an *ekstatic* move, in which an individual does x or y, might only be possible because of a complex set of relations. Hence, it is important to acknowledge that κίνησις, is not identical to *ekstasis* per se, but depends on the continuity of the processes that condition it (ἐνέργεια). Love, arguably, is the best description of the operation of the ‘totality’. Hence, love, as exemplar, becomes the theme through which motion, as temporal and spatial continuity, is defined. However, the character of the continuity, to my mind, needs a closer examination.

Zizioulas does not spend much time considering how relating a description of a specific quality of personal motion, is implicitly utilising and relying on the continuity of processes (ἐνέργεια). Yet the character of every single thing is composed of different processes co-operating. This expression of love, as a quality of the movement of the totality, does not express all of what Maximus means by κίνησις. The operation of any action is composed of the co-operation between οὐσία, φύσις, and ἐνέργεια, which, through their co-operation, form the basis of procreative continuity.<sup>71</sup> The continuity of the whole forms the basic condition of individual action, without being identical to it.

These moments work co-operatively in a creature as temporal and spatial extension. They are not associated with a peculiar quality or another, but are ubiquitously present in love, hate etc. An absence, within the description of what comprises any of the peculiar qualities of love, is the lack of the composition of any state as emerging with a tri-partitional sense of temporal and spatial procession. There is the possibility that one will need to develop a different type of engagement for describing the conditions and composition of these conditioning activities.<sup>72</sup>

In other words, the description of motion may not benefit from utilising a single principle that acts like a unified or simple out-ward-ness. This thesis argues that the structure of motion in Maximus’ thought does have the sense of motion described

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<sup>71</sup> In Chapter 6 I utilised the term ὅλον, to describe the distinction between considering the continuity of the creature in itself, as distinct from what it does. The term, ἐνέργεια, is representative of the internal connections within a process insofar as their interaction is successful.

<sup>72</sup> Zizioulas, *Communion and Otherness*, 56. Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 159-177.

by *ekstasis*, albeit under certain circumstances. This is close to the intention of describing motion under a general or largely consistent notion. However, the definition covers times when the phenomena of motion, is being considered in the quality of its generality, or as it appears as a totality. This is as distinct from being considered in terms of its constituent relations. Moreover, even the development of an idea of *ekstasis* arises in a context of other descriptions of the quality of motion. As described in the final chapter, Maximus has a program for describing motion using a system of co-operative processes from whose continuity of relation emerges the temporal and spatial continuity of life. Sometimes, but not exclusively, a definition of motion as *ekstasis*, will be helpful for explicating the phenomena of motion.

Zizioulas refrains from exploring this avenue. This is because the language that is appropriate to this explication is the use of temporal and spatial interconnection. This seems to ‘neutralise’ or de-personalise the processes and the reasoning.<sup>73</sup> Its generality seems to strip the individual instance of creation of the peculiarity of an identity, but an important aspect of the reality of motion itself, is that all beings share the same structural limitation, albeit often in very different ways. The lack of consideration of processes as composed of interdependent co-operation has lead to the reliance on a single type of language for describing creaturely movement. It is a language that works with a sense of ‘totality’ in which temporal and spatial continuity can be found regardless of whether the phenomena is *anthropos* or otherwise.

For instance, if my argument expresses Maximus’ understanding of the composition of an instance of creation, no material or conscious event, no event that occurs, lacks the compositional elements of origin, processional continuity, and actualisation (οὐσία, φύσις, and ἐνέργεια). The co-connected or interdependent descriptions, that utilise spatial and temporal processional co-operation, occur as specific processes. This means that the consistent formal relations and the content or the material so constituted, so to speak, are harmonious with specific descriptions of the character of motion, but can each be considered in distinct ways. Personhood is sustainable on one level, where the consideration of action finds particular qualities of processes, act in similar ways. The locale of the person, as a totality, can enable

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<sup>73</sup> This may cause processes to appear almost indistinguishable from one creature to another. The rejection of certain types of analyses considered too abstract. I suspect, is caught up with a negative prejudice against the Enlightenment traditions and so-called humanism.

statements about the quality of the motion in general (is it x or y?). But if the grounds of the investigation shift into an examination of the conditions of those processes, to take the data of the initial point of departure is no longer sufficient, the criteria used for discriminating the former cannot be met by the later.

This is why there needs to be a second look at the constitution of personhood and motion. If one is relying on a certain frame work to explain a particular phenomenon, if that phenomenon is not verified, then it appears that the notion is entirely absent. If one expected to find the unity of personhood within the conditions of that personhood, the organisational continuity of the individual is not identical to how that individual can act. However, if, instead of expecting to find a unitive idea of motion, is it not better to attempt to encounter the phenomena themselves? In this case, motion comes to consist, not just of a single principle, but each process is composed of interdependent λόγοι, co-operating together to form the whole. The whole is actually composed of several interdependent processes functioning together co-operatively. If the processes of the conditions require a different language then the movement away from a dynamicist reading simply results in the loss of a subtle and nuanced sense of motion.

Overall, the explication of κίνησις in the secondary literature engages the concept in fairly general terms. As described in the last chapter, in Maximus' thought, there are two complimentary types or ways that the operation of motion can be described. One level pertains to the co-operative conditions that facilitate the operation of the organism and the unity or circumscribed locality of these processes which exhibits the positive character that is commonly called the individual being. However, the individual being is denoted as a locale, or the representation of the collection of the conditions, but the value or the qualities of that being are not thereby disclosed.<sup>74</sup>

## **The Shift between Indeterminacy and Determinacy**

The shift between different modes of κίνησις contains some sense of development. Although Maximus works with a soteriological aim, not all of the shifts take place in respect to the closer relation to divinity as such. Some discussions, as seen in chapters

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<sup>74</sup> Representation is never used to signify a 'mere representation' to deprive something of independent ontic value. I use it to describe how, if a being is the subject of enquiry, and it is established that it possesses certain conditions through which it came into existence, it is a representation of those conditions.

1 and 2, can be described as moments of clarification in which divinity is less consciously involved. Clarification is an important aspect of life even in cases where the *telos* is not explicit. The focus of this section is to highlight how the ascetic program must be understood as including in its primary concerns, a clarification of the character of creatures (φύσις). Not only do explicit acts of discernment, whereby one rejects one thing and embraces another, act to determine ‘ethics’ as the art of proper action, but each act changes the manner in which demarcation (λόγοι) occurs in thinking (νόεσις). Hence changes in the description of a process can indicate specific types of ascetic discernments.

Recent secondary literature has restricted the use of asceticism or of an ascetic program to the practices and (to a lesser extent) the beliefs through which a specific state of existence (the spiritual state) comes about. As a result, its role in creating clearer demarcations of creaturely extents (λόγοι) has not been discussed. Experience and concepts are mediated through a moment of active reflection in which an ill determined event or creaturely motion (φύσις) becomes more determinate.<sup>75</sup> Asceticism is the historical definition of the reflective moment; it is formalized within ascetic theology. Cooper and Thunberg in particular, although identifying how the concept of a theory of physics represents the ‘context’ and therefore the conditions of the ascetic program, do not adequately address how either aesthetic appearance of the motion peculiar to the body possess specific structures that co-ordinate with subsequent ‘higher moments’.<sup>76</sup> This is because, in both cases, the principle of the aesthetic or corporeal goodness is supplied by a higher order set of concepts.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Asceticism is employed not only to arbitrate a known order but to encounter possibilities and search for their meaning and so to understand their structural possibilities as arbitrating the movement toward concrete order, and therefore to change the continuity of the subject and the cosmos. (CLII, 83. PG 90, 1009C-D. CL III, 35. PG 90, 1028C)

<sup>76</sup> Lars Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed (Open Court, Chicago, 1995) 144, 218-28 et al.. Cooper, *The Body in St Maximus*, 19-20, 24. Cooper makes some mention of this type of relationship but his comments are general.

<sup>77</sup> Thunberg and Cooper both supply aesthetic with ‘possibility’ but do not see that Maximus’ own descriptions of the aesthetic articulate it as possessing a positive structure. This means that the aesthetic is a specific type of conceptual indeterminacy, and not a lack of conceptuality per se. The indeterminacy comes from how objective structures compete polemically and need to be clarified. The translation of this description into concepts would look something like this: Stoic physics is equally coherent as Aristotelian on the question of φύσις, therefore both are applicable. Or, Plotinus’ cosmology is as coherent as the cosmos of Chalcedonian Christianity even though one might necessarily exclude the other. The emergence out of the aesthetic does not ‘discover’ a conceptual or formal order, but represents a move that relates to the conceptual disorder of the aesthetic as something similar to a judgment concerning these various δόξα and the identification of an objective point, ie, Christ, as the objective representative of the previous disorder.

Thunberg and Cooper acknowledge the *metanoia* or positive recapitulation of a primitive or primal form of motion into a more determinate form but only generally. They provide no moments that illustrate this as an actual reality.

When the analysis is applied it finds only absence, because the motion located within aesthetic and somatic reality is distinct from the higher order intelligibilities. The peculiarity of one type of motion becomes lost in the generality of the later, higher order. However, Maximus' notion of procreativity is incorporated within an evaluative engagement. The world reflected in this region, called the aesthetic, is associated with certain types of movement and relationship and so presents a slightly chaotic but still intelligent ordering of the real. He uses it to explain the bare continuity of λογισμοί and μνήμην. Although procreative motion, as a type, may not be entirely spelt out, it nevertheless forms a fundamental structure conditioning subsequent definitions.

Hence, the conclusions of Thunberg and Cooper, on the relative importance on the ascetic moment or the aesthetic in itself are legitimate. However, they tend to diminish how procreativity has a self-sufficiency of motion, which Maximus spells out through λογισμοί, μνήμην and κατηγορία. This is because, in order to describe how asceticism transforms the individual, they neglect to spend time on what is being 'transformed'. Although Cooper generally acknowledges that the 'flesh' is incorporated into the divine, this flesh that he speaks of is that described through λογισμοί, μνήμην and κατηγορία yet one cannot find an extended description of the processes within biological continuity.<sup>78</sup> In relation to the role that asceticism plays in the recapitulation of an order of somatic reality they cannot allow for the legitimacy of the procreative except in very general terms. Moreover it is through the operation of an ascetic or dogmatic program, but under their reading they are more concerned with what the ascetic implements or brings about. The sense in which the 'ordered' or more determinate sense of reality is the aim of the exposition prevented the adequate explication of how procreativity represents a structural condition of Maximus' ethical engagement with the different conceptions of the aesthetic.

One can position Maximus' critique of κίνησις as an evaluative and soteriological engagement (a soteriological physics if you will) because, as the

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<sup>78</sup> This is reminiscent of the previous structural absence that permeates Zizioulas' work. The generality of the sense of biological movement is a serious impediment to the success of these studies. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, 50-53.

chapters show, changes in the definition of κίνησις represent alteration in the structure of the world. Maximus' understanding of the world, his 'physics', will, for a large part, be evaluative and therefore related to an 'ethical' engagement.

A nature [φύσις] endowed with reason [a reasonable psyche] and understanding [which is the directional or intentional employment of the rational faculty toward its cause] participates in the holy God by its very being, by its aptitude for well-being (that is, for goodness and wisdom), and by the free gift of eternal well being.<sup>79</sup>

I do not deny that Maximus is an ethicist of the physical, insofar as he evaluates procreativity in light of ascetic and eventually theological assumptions. Rather I argue that if Maximus is read only in light of an idea of a reality ordered by an explicit reflective (ascetic) act, then it is difficult to delve into other structures that might be present latently in his thought. My argument for a developmental reading is to: 1) Allow for the bracketing of higher purposive-ness in κίνησις. This is to attempt to articulate what Maximus is saying about a process which, like thinking (λογισμοί), utilises a peculiar type of procreative motion that is not found in every type of existence. This is a recognized procedure in writings on Maximus in which the idea of a 'natural state' refers to both a state of uninterrupted relationship to the divine, but also the sheer continuity of life.<sup>80</sup> 2) And to provide another mode of access to, and some understanding of, the structure that reflection is relating to. This state is one in which reflection is something which affects a previous moment, bringing it to a specific and new circumscription, and thereby extending or delimiting it in respect to its former locale. The transformation affected is one in which the continuity of biological self-continuity is receptive in specific ways to those noetic clarifications of its own processes.

Although Maximus would investigate the world through a prejudicial<sup>81</sup> mode or purpose, the role of the explanations and evaluations that emerge must be more closely related to their previous moment of aesthetic indeterminacy. This would then allow for the evaluation of types of κίνησις associated with the aesthetic as an unconditional principle, and contextualize subsequent claims. This represents an

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<sup>79</sup> CL, III 24. PG 90, 1024A-B. Trans: Berthold, *Maximus*, 64.

<sup>80</sup> Thunberg is the best exponent of the 'unfallen state'. Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, 144-7.

<sup>81</sup> Meant in the sense of Gadamer in which, through the discernment of prejudices as necessary for specific understandings, in relation to the universalisation of the hermeneutic as condition, the structure of prejudice takes on a sense of a condition of understanding. See: Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, Second, Revised Edition, Translation Joel Weinsheimer, and Donald G. Marshall (Continuum, New York, 2003) 9-19, 218, 265, 277-85.

example of how one ‘type’ of motion might supply content to a later demarcation. ‘Prejudicial’ means that, when a different type of movement appears, it relates through previous moments which might possess qualitative difference from the later. This is to say that Maximus recognizes how a singular demarcation, such as κίνησις as a ubiquitous λόγοι, does not represent a single type of limit or motion, but represents a culmination of several other moments.

Classifying Maximus through ‘developmental’ moves, in which the world comes to light in different clarificatory moments, attempts to read him through a different lens than those provided by previous accounts. The attempt is to show how there can be several types of κίνησις and that, in my view, Maximus’ predominant understanding given in the final chapter, represents a more sophisticated notion than that so far articulated in much of the secondary literature. Not only does he engage with aesthetic realities, but he also modifies conceptual structures internally, and new worlds emerge. The emergence of a more determinate form of κίνησις is a result of moving out of indeterminate moments and into more determinate demarcations.

The co-operation of these relations demarcates the creature (λόγοι). This represents how a lack of divinity manifests as positive phenomena with specific characteristics that can be described. The more sophisticated of the positive descriptions range from the discussion of ‘personhood’ as well as the triad discussed in chapters 5 and 6 respectively. In this investigation, the divine plays a role closer to that of pure space, through whose persistence, determinate relations are made clear.<sup>82</sup> Pure space is that which allows the arising of relations, which can then be measured, and considered in their relation to each other. Rather than explaining how they represent differentiations of pure space (although they are that, this is one way of articulating them as images and likenesses of the divine) I focus on how the relations are positive articulations, rather than how space acts as their condition. I do not seek to define exactly how divinity affects those orders discussed.<sup>83</sup> The creature as kinetic therefore, exists, not as an intuition *per se*, because the concept as understood by

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<sup>82</sup> I acknowledge that this statement does not engage the divine *agape* as such; however, it appears to the divine as the centre of all possibility, without generating a decision on the proper term to be used to describe this support. If this is the ascription that Balthasar actually used I would be happy to follow his descriptions however his engagement does not articulate how differentiation from the divine represents the absolute form of the differentiation of geometric points, for instance.

<sup>83</sup> Maximus, *Mystagogia*, Chp 7. PG 91, 685A. Berthold, *Maximus*, 196. This passage discusses how the law of interaction between sensible and intelligible is a condition of the limitation in which each individual being possesses.



Maximus is underlined within structures not immediately apparent. By focusing on areas where there seem to be evidence of shifts taking place, in which there is a move into greater determinacy, I hope to bring out more detail as to the structural shifts taking place.

## **Maximus' Relation to Pre-Established Λόγοι**

The recent work that focuses on Maximus' relationship to the broader philosophical contexts of his time is Tollefsen's *The Christocentric Cosmology of Maximus the Confessor*. Tollefsen's work situates his influences as befitting a standard Neoplatonist. These include Plato, Aristotle, the contemporary commentary tradition of Aristotle, Christian Alexandrian speculation through Clement, Origen, Evagrius Ponticus, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory Nazianzum, and Pseudo-Dionysius. Maximus is also influenced by Plotinus' milieu and cosmology, Proclus' descriptions of efficient cause and *perichoresis*, and Porphyry's 'logic'.<sup>84</sup> Tollefsen also notes the crucial importance of Christian dogmatic symbols (creeds), especially the Christology of Chalcedon. I would add that the ascetic milieu also leads to some important conceptual clarifications. Tollefsen's work lays out all the general principles that Maximus utilises within his understanding of the nature of the cosmos as a whole.<sup>85</sup>

Maximus works with pre-established concepts of necessity. Yet there are also developments that take place where he is grappling with the transition between indeterminate and more determinate senses of the world. This later element is not opposed to the construction of a better reading of the history of his thought or reception, but is another way to ground his use and understanding of concepts and conceptual structures.

These transitional moments also occur when there are confused or indeterminate engagements, which then, normally in specific moments, move into a

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<sup>84</sup> I apply the term 'logic' with the greatest possible reluctance, on reading the work, and I give an account of it in chapter 3, it is clear that, as a system of classification, it is largely consistent, and fairly modest. The standard interpretive tradition that traces itself to the *Introduction*, such as Boethius, and his descendents, have been interpreted as reading the work, in part, as a pretext for establishing the status of universals. The work's terminology and connexions are argued to imply certain types of existence, of necessity, due to how οὐσία, for example, organises without being organised. See: Etienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1965) 3-9. and: Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Sheed and Ward, London, 1955) 97-100, 154-160.

<sup>85</sup> My criticism of this work is that Tollefsen does not adequately identify, in an experiential sense, how the transformations of concepts in Maximus' philosophy take place through a re-definition of the cosmos, in light of *psycho-noetic-ontic metanoia*.

determinative conception (λόγος). The relation between conceptual orders can be displayed as a move from a locale where less clarity prevailed into a clearer conception of world. The evolution of the concepts, into their final form shows them to be developmentally and therefore structurally complex. His conceptions of motion, for instance, are, to some extent, the representations of the moments that have come before them, as well as a participation in higher forms. When one attempts to describe a concept in Maximus according to how it sits within a pre-established system of concepts, the result is complex because one must attempt a description of transitions between locales that are already quite well demarcated.

Elements of chapters 2 and 3 can be read as putting forward an example of how an ascetic distinction assists in bringing a phenomenon into a more demarcated sense. Μνήμην and the κατηγορία represent how types of movement associated with types of movement shared with the aesthetic contain specific types of activities and perform specific functions. So Maximus is already working within an experience of the world in which there are pre-existent demarcations that emerge through one's conscious experience. Hence demarcation does not involve the spontaneous generation of distinctions or meaning but augments specific, pre-determined λόγοι.

Placing Maximus in the history of ideas shows how his engagements with concepts result in an inter-relational system. One feature of the contemporary reading of Maximus is that his understanding of motion is a composition large and small, particular and universal, incorporating the creator and created. This can be classified as methodological insofar as Maximus' engagement with historical concepts generally tends to consist of a pattern of relating large and small. Perhaps the best classification of the use of 'large and small' concepts is that it reflects a methodological process.<sup>86</sup> Nichols discussion of method offers a structural overview of the principles implicated into a specific position however it does not clarify how the impact of these relations affects the constitution of specific meanings. Studies on Maximus rightly focus on the broader cosmic structures but this type of analysis does not provide detail as to how to understand interrelationship within the specificity of a single creature.<sup>87</sup> He generally

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<sup>86</sup> For instance the interactions within the Chalcedonian Negations, or, in Maximus' work itself, chapter 23 of the *Mystagogia* has Maximus describing the divine essence by negating positive determinations which are directly taken from the Symbol of Chalcedon: Lacking Division, being unconfused, not multiple etc. *Mystagogia* PG 91, 701A-B. Berthold, *Maximus*, 206.

<sup>87</sup> Aidan Nichols, *Byzantine Gospel: Maximus the Confessor in Modern Scholarship* (T & T Clark, Edinburgh, 1993)43.

moves important principles ‘back and forth’ between the states mentioned thus placing the reader in a complex set of interrelations. This shows that Maximus has a ‘consistent framework’ in relating to concepts in his description of an historical conception of the character of an interconnected cosmos. In one section he refers to the relation between general and particular (καθόλου and καθολικωτέρων). This reflects how, in his engagement with concept models, he prefers the creation of a dynamic mediation.

By the activity of this composite, the intentional operations of creatures are defined as composed of two or more conceptual structures working in harmony. Therefore that the intentional operation is perichoretically composed insofar as it occurs through the continuity of different qualitative relations operating in harmony. However, the continuity of positive intentionality is being described through the assumption that concepts are, to some extent, intuitively available as explanatory structures. Hence Maximus has been read through a conceptual dynamism that consists of the relation between large and small understood as perichoretic unification. Directionality of creaturely motion therefore, is identical to the continuity of its perichoretic composition between large and small, enacted in a holistic or inter-regional co-operation of temporality and spatial continuity. This interrelation has come to represent the predominant method through which Maximus is interpreted as dynamicist in relation to structures of life and meaning. This, with some modifications in light of Christological dogma, is the general reason he is considered dynamicist.<sup>88</sup> This view represents historical structures as dependent on the coherent relation between distinctive, and seemingly disparate, ‘conceptual’ entities. However, an alternative reading of the dynamic can sense how Maximus perceives creation as partly being constituted by how it accommodates, actively facilitates and encompasses

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<sup>88</sup> I note how figures such as John Milbank tend to relate to him. Milbank draws out how the perichoretic interrelation of Maximus’ cosmos is representative of a mutual exchange between different qualities of beings, so that, through this exchange, there is a mutual ‘economic’ penetration of self and other. I would note that all such claims would need to be backed up with a more thorough engagement with concepts like participation to reflect the specific types of activities, passivities, negations and affirmations peculiar to each ‘level’ of the cosmic hierarchy. The types of absence and presence thereby created, would be conditional on one thing receding and another coming forward, this could not be done in a dual system, but only within a hierarchy of four or so levels, so that the experience of level A is the result of the other levels ‘becoming implicit’. This, in my view, would help to specifically advocate for a language of speculative physics, as well as the economic and inter-relational language that Milbank utilises. John Milbank, *The Gift and the Mirror: On the Philosophy of Love*. In: *Counter Experiences: Reading Jean-Luc Marion*, Edited by Kevin Hart (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 2007) 254-317.

movement which is also of the character of changing from indeterminacy into more determinate senses.<sup>89</sup>

Of course there are other ways to look at the emergence of a concept. For instance, Tollefsen's discussions map out the historical order of the metaphysical principles, and lays out the history of philosophy as the conditioning ground. However, when he describes a moment in which Maximus makes a shift and engages the concepts as living realities thereby altering them in line with his intuition of their meaning, Maximus does not do this as an historian, but as someone in whom active reflection means philosophical asceticism. This is not to say that Maximus does not use οὐσία in an Aristotelian way, or λόγος with a Stoic bent, but that there are structures within Maximus' engagement that can only be explicated through examining his ascetic work as the accumulation and culmination of his own reasoning.

## Overview

Through working out the commandments the mind puts off the passions. Through the spiritual contemplation of visible realities it puts off impassioned thoughts of things. Through the knowledge of invisible realities it puts off contemplation of visible things. And finally this it puts off through the knowledge of the Holy Trinity.<sup>90</sup>

The thesis opens with a discussion of the general cosmological context in which Maximus sits and offers a reading of his understanding of the cosmos as a set of co-operative 'regions'. These 'regions' are composed of certain types of motion. Before κίνησις is contemplated as a normative structure, it needs to be understood in a sense that is pluralised and complex. This is reflective of how motion acts or exhibits differences in its extent and possibilities. Insofar as experience perceives that the cosmos is consistent and maintained by the co-operation of the various regions of motion, the person is amidst a massive plurality of forces. Both efficient cause and περιχώρησις play crucial roles as mechanisms for the co-operation between the different levels of the cosmos as modes for describing regional inter-penetration.

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<sup>89</sup> The interconnection between conceptual structures also alters the way that the secondary literature conceives of Maximus' method of developing a system of thinking. The discussion of Maximus' methodology, frequently examines the connections between large scale concepts, which form the structure of a complete cosmos. The secondary sources often focus on the interplay between 'complete' or defined principles. The interchange between regions or conceptual orders has become the mainstream interpretation of Maximus. I only object to this basic assumption because it does not ask where concepts arise in experience but only where they arise within a system.

<sup>90</sup> *CL* I, 94. PG 90, 982B-C.

However, after this complex interrelationship occurs, one is still required to explore how, within a notion of experience as ‘coherent’ this complex arrangement can appear without giving rise to confusion. The cosmological totality, with which Maximus works, is the compilation and relation between different senses of motion, working co-operatively, to facilitate the functioning of the cosmos. Still, this suggests the need for more specific analyses. Chapters two and three describe a form of self-continuous motion. This form of κίνησις is important within several different types of actions. Procreative continuity, almost like the biological continuity of a body, permeates Maximus’ thought. However, an additional element that facilitates the emergence of a consistent λόγος of motion is the context of ascetic discernment. This definition of requires some consideration in the ascetic context.

In chapter two, κίνησις is explored through the structure of λογισμοί. The structure is introduced after an examination of the status of φύσις. This is due to how φύσις, although normally associated with the determinate conditions and character of x or y, also incorporates a sense of how the realisation of creaturely possibility, and therefore the appearance of motion, is related to questions of purpose, telos. Purposiveness in the ascetic has a moral sense and so, to clarify the definition of κίνησις as procreative continuity, it is necessary to distinguish it from the ethical sense of purposiveness that the φύσις acquires in the ascetic discussion. Some issues around the concept of φύσις also include its being used like a causal or genetic principle.

The distinction between the ethical sense of φύσις, and its resemblance to a causal description, needs to be bought out. The causal descriptions have sometimes substituted for the examination of the internal relations that comprise a structure of procreative continuity. This has been the main reason for the neglect of the procreative motion of the λογισμοί. Λογισμοί is the exhibition of procreative continuity. Λογισμοί is a pattern through which meaningful thoughts relate to each other like a primitive examination of the flow of consciousness.<sup>91</sup> It exhibits an important element of κίνησις, namely, how self-continuity possesses both content and relations. The chapter argues for a structure of procreative that supplies content and relations without the aid of the larger claims concealed within the definition of

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<sup>91</sup> CL I, 99. PG 90, 981D. This chapter shows how the development of ‘simple ideas’ relates to their formal continuity which then becomes the grounds for a fuller contemplative engagement in the real.

φύσις. The continuity of the process is maintained without explicit reference to the teleological explanations. Most of the descriptions of this form of motion are within the ascetic writings. This does not mean that the motion does not permeate and affect other structures in Maximus' thought, arguably, procreative motion grounds many parts of Maximus' work.

The third chapter builds on some of the descriptions in the second chapter, and highlights the continuity of procreative κίνησις into other areas of Maximus' thought. A second shift or clarification comes as a result of the motion described as 'self-continuous' becoming foundational for μνήμην and κατηγορία.<sup>92</sup> This throws light on the centrality of procreativity, for the 'instinctive' process of naming given within μνήμην, and the κατηγορία. I discuss how Maximus sees the κατηγορία as a structure that attempts to identify the proper name of something.<sup>93</sup> The κατηγορία are a more formal engagement, to be sure, but in Maximus' view they represent a natural attempt to mediate meaning. I point out some structural equivalency between the procreative continuity of the λογισμοί with the κατηγορία and μνήμην.<sup>94</sup> Overall, the chapter shows the possibility of utilising a description of motion that supplies, as it were, its own content and relationships, without having to refer to cosmic actions as such. This is not to say that the other definitions of κίνησις will be invalid, but merely that some definitions of κίνησις will not be totally transportable. For instance, in chapter 4, I discuss some definitions of κίνησις that utilise a more uniform or consistent structure. These types of definition have a more extensive range than that supplied by the technical and detailed issues surrounding procreative continuity.

A definition of created being can be put forward to cover certain circumstances. The definition of κίνησις in chapter 4, transforms creation (κσέτις) into motion (κίνησις). The two principles become virtually synonymous. The definition suffers because there has not been adequate articulation of the limits of the use of κίνησις as a description of the general sense of the created world. Κσέτις engenders in κίνησις an increasing spatial and temporal distinction. The emergence

<sup>92</sup> CL II, 4. PG 90, 984C-985A. This chapter remarks on how ascetic practise allows the thoughts of things to become simplified.

<sup>93</sup> CK I, 8. PG 90, 1085C. Following this passage, another which is important for how an act of understanding is related to the grasp of the circumference of a being. "The knowledge of beings includes naturally, in view of demonstration, their own principles which naturally circumscribe them in a definition." CK I, 9. PG 90, 1085C-D.

<sup>94</sup> CL I 84. PG 90, 980B. This passage places μνήμη in a primal role in the arising of impassioned thoughts which alight on natural representations of creatures and cause us to misapprehend them.

from and continual relation to the akinetic divine, drives the positive content of κίνησις. Balthasar's reading is emblematic of how the secondary literature has moved to define κίνησις by juxtaposing it to an akinetic divine.<sup>95</sup> There is no problem with utilising this definition so long as it is not used to substitute for the description of specific beings. However, in some secondary literature, as mentioned previously in this introduction, the general definition of κίνησις has been used without adequate explanation of what this might mean for specific beings.

This means that there are few uses of κίνησις that can provide a framework for the explanation of creaturely power. Normal intentionality ends up requiring vast philosophical work to bring it into line with the normative physics of how any creature might move in its environment. The thesis argues that, although broadly correct, the use of κίνησις defined in relation to the theological ακίνησις does not supply sufficient content to the definition. This means that, rather than κίνησις being about the motion of real things, it is more about their mere difference from the divine. Κίνησις, in the way in which it is employed, does not refer to the internal motion of creatures, but simply their difference from an absolute principle. The affirmation of a general state of affairs does not actually result in the clarification of creaturely movement.

Hence, κίνησις becomes akin to an empty universal still requiring an examination of the specific content that is the basis of 'demarcation'. However what it does is point out the common structure of creaturely unity in such a manner as to organise created being under a single λόγος. Yet the basis of this validity is more to do with the internal capacity of the λόγοι. The claim for κίνησις is more like an explication of the reach of a structure precipitating a single principle (movement or creaturely limit). The thesis argues that the natural progression of the demarcation of a general characteristic to creatures is to examine the 'application' system, the λόγοι, which represents the conditions of the specific demarcation of creatures by a boundary, or exclusion concept, such as being kinetic (as distinct from akinetic). The chapter argues that the use of the relationship between kinetic and akinetic utilises the

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<sup>95</sup> Balthasar, on this point, consistently presents the same basic relational theory in which a higher order principle relates to a lower, more 'dense' or material set. In this way, he takes Maximus' relational order, which is basically the same, as his framework for interpreting most of Maximus' cosmological and theological definitions. Indeed his chapter IV, "*The Synthesis of the Cosmos*" is mainly composed around the description and consequences of the interaction between two distinctive orders of conceptual reality. See Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 137- 205.

doctrine of the λόγοι. The λόγοι are used to describe how creaturely limits are developed through the instruction of higher principles which act as boundary lines prescribing the extent of creaturely activity.

The fifth chapter is presented as an alternative to the generality definitions which rely on a theology of κίνησις. It focuses on the use of logical connexions, which generate a structure that can identify an individual instance of motion. The chapter finds in personalism the idea of a co-operation between two tiers within creature, one representing activity of the creature (*hypostasis*), the other the stable principle acting (φύσις). Hence, it understands how a ‘totality’ exists as an appearance, conditioned by several principles co-operating together. This gives scope for articulating an idea of motion as composed of distinctive co-operating principles, which co-ordinate together in a single ‘locale’, the individual. The connexions described here can be used to identify the site most likely to provide an explication of the structure of κίνησις, though they cannot supply adequate content to the site they identify. Moreover, unfortunately, the connexions rely on the assumption that the elements that generate movement can be described as having unitive content.<sup>96</sup> The composition of the essential principles of the creature, its φύσις, gives rise to the unity of creaturely movement. However, this is as a result of the unique way in which the various elements within the character of motion, relate together interdependently. Unitive appearance could be the result of a co-ordination of different elements working together to comprise an ‘essence’.

As the chapter progresses, it examines the possibility of explicating the content of a determinate locale of κίνησις. Utilising φύσις, but here signifying how the character of the moment as a totality, the continuity and specificity of κίνησις arises by the relation between essential elements that condition the possibilities and activities of any type of motion whatsoever. The relations are a set of interconnected principles (λόγοι). The continuity of κίνησις relies on the relationship between distinctive principles co-operating together. Some descriptions, utilising logical connexions alone, do not adequately explore how the elements of creaturely possibilities are conditioned by interdependent relations. This generates the same kind of result described in the previous chapter, in which motion appears to be a unitive concept, rather than a collaboration of distinct elements. Providing an example where

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<sup>96</sup> Törönen, *Union and Distinction*, 31-35.



internal differences provide the conditions of an active system and therefore its limits, I discuss a structure in Euclid's *Elements of Geometry*. Here the collection of several equi-primordial principles relate together to form the essential principles of a geometric system. This shows the appropriateness of reading a collection of equi-primordial structures into a unitive idea of essence. This presents us with a model that can appreciate the possibility that a thing can be a collection of co-operative principles without the thing's appearance actually being 'dissolved'. Hence it offers scope for the culminating view of the triadic structure that represents the content of what I describe as Maximus' dynamicist view of κίνησις.

In the final chapter the thesis attempts to show that the definition of an organic structure contains at two layers of interrelation working cohesively together. It contains 1) an acknowledgement of the interdependence between logically coherent principles (λόγοι). These λόγοι co-operate together, in a similar sense to that described in the previous chapter, to form the continuity of the creature, as a whole. I introduce the term to distinguish the collection and interrelation of aggregates to the activity of the totality (2).<sup>97</sup> This totality (λόγος or hypostasis) can be likened to the individual. What it does as the result of the continuity of its inter-relational aggregates. The reason I keep these two descriptions separable (but not separate) is because of how they are composed in different ways, and therefore cannot be explained by identical means.<sup>98</sup>

The internal relationship of the principles of οὐσία, φύσις and ἐνέργεια (the three principles or λόγοι which form the inner continuity of a creature) generates the phenomenon of the totality. Inner continuity, inner wholeness, generates the continuity of the creature, which appears as a totality, which can function and enact. I point out how the definition of the 'internal' connexions contains extension and implicit temporal continuity. These add to the content of the definition of κίνησις, in which temporal and spatial continuity, is the result of the co-operation between different principles. The intricacy of this later definition is generated by the interdependence within which the various elements relate. These are some of the grounds for describing Maximus' definition of motion as dynamicist, because of how any

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<sup>97</sup> These are different from their cosmological equivalents. They represent here, a cogent or affective activity in a creature (and one that can be defined).

<sup>98</sup> For instance, describing the connections between the conditions which constitute the whole 'grounds' and 'conditions' positive action, without being identical in kind.

instant of motion, is actually composed of a co-operation of several aggregated principles, relating together.

## Chapter 1 Maximus' Regional Cosmology

This chapter maps out the general cosmological context in which Maximus works. It sets the context within which, through a program of clarification laid out in subsequent chapters, he develops a complex demarcation (λόγοι) of created being. So that the reader can grasp the general scope of his project, this chapter lays out some central themes in Maximus' cosmology. The chapter sets out the structure in which the problem of κίνησις becomes apparent. Even though it may be the most natural thing to assert that creation and creatures change, the structures that Maximus develops make any general idea of motion, or of creation, quite complex.

I use the terms 'boundary' and 'region' in order to clarify how each 'region', is part of the cosmos, can be considered on its own terms. Region represents, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the collection of a common type. However, because there are several different types of motion that comprise the cosmos, the use of the terms can also signify how the boundary of a property or thing is also, in part, delineated by the space outside of it. Moreover, within the concept of inter-regionality, or perichoretic exchange between the regions of the cosmos, there will be a relation between different types of motion. Their interaction forms an inter-regional cosmology which invests much larger structures into the notion of an individual being. This allows the articulation of the relative coherence that accompanies each area and their interrelation. The implications of this type of structure changes the continuity of ordinary existence: it consists of several orders. The structure of the interconnected cosmos is important for defining any principle that relates to, or might affect how one understands creaturely motion.

The Cosmic regions are representations of the limits and affects of types of motion upon each other. Therefore, Maximus' understandings of κίνησις could depend on whether he is utilising a definition fit for a specific region or if he is using a general definition. He does not establish a method and follow a way of thinking to its conclusion, instead he looks at practical issues, raises and formalises practical solutions, and develops a consistent 'model' accidentally as it were. Most of Maximus' insights into the structure of creaturely motion seem to be laid out as a result of ascetic work. *Noesis* passes through them, and in doing so, sets them in relation to an order established through the activity of intention but that does not mean

they lack structure. Instead, they reflect a considered engagement in which different structures are linked together to culminate in a complex and coherent reading of the cosmos. Maximus maintains several regional definitions of κίνησις, yet also utilises a definition of κίνησις that is interregional, meaning that the scope and organisation of the circumscription could persist across the whole of the created cosmos. After introducing the issues, I clarify that, although one must maintain the regional senses, there are also senses of κίνησις that could be used ‘inter-regionally’. The chapter introduces the need for explorations of specific structures without eliminating the necessity of a solid general definition.

## Two Examples of Regional Thinking in Maximus

Maximus’ uses distinct types of motivity to describe cosmic regions<sup>1</sup> under the proviso that I flag a troubling constant; he has different regional demarcations and different reasons for these demarcations. The first discussion is found in *Ambigua* 7<sup>2</sup> and in various other texts such as *Ambigua* 10. I interpret Maximus as working within, but modifying, Neoplatonist structures. The principles that comprise Maximus’ universe are created, sustained and perfected by God’s free choice rather than through the efficacy of each region’s own causal power. This free action generates several different regions of activity: the intelligible principles (cosmic λόγοι) which determine creaturely limits in a general sense; and the physical world which is both material and noetic.<sup>3</sup> Thus existence is comprised of a variety of organisational arrangements. Each pattern in creation has a consistent manner of existence which can

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<sup>1</sup>Plotinus’ discussion of the three hypostases articulates them as distinct qualities of motion. The creative act of the One emerges spontaneously causing an affective outflow generates an other, who is perfected in time as *nous*. The *nous* contemplates the hyper-perfection of the one in a specific uniting act. *Nous* has is an immaterial unity which is complete insofar as it has realised the perfection of the One, but this is in time. This realisation is the perfection of an eternal procession of thinking which perfectly realises its object in an act. (Plotinus, *The Enneads*, Translated by Stephan MacKenna (Penguin, London, 1991) Part V. 1, 4. 351) “All its content, thus, is perfect, that it itself may be perfect throughout, as holding nothing that is less than the divine, nothing that is less than intellective.” (Plotinus, *The Enneads*, V. 1, 4. 351) ‘Thoughts’ for the *nous* are perfectly realised principles imitating the One. In the Soul’s contemplation of them in the divine *nous* they are perfected compounds, activities in which a distinct procession occurs. In the activity of the soul contemplating these thoughts there is a second activity which also produces a compound in nature. (Plotinus, *The Enneads*, II. 4, 3. 93.) As the divine ideas are contemplated their activity in the soul produces the compound of nature (φύσις) in which their activity tends toward perfection from an imperfect temporal imitation of the *nous*. As such, regardless of the content of the schematic, the reflection on different ways of conceiving an operation of unity shows how regional types can only be considered effectively whilst they are situated in a context of relationship to each other.

<sup>2</sup> *Amb.* 7, PG 91, 1077C-1089C. Blowers & Wilken. *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*. 54-65.

<sup>3</sup> *CK*, I, 9. PG 90 1085. Berthold, *Maximus*, 130.

be examined on its own terms or in its relation to the other regions. The term ‘region’ is used to refer to how a pattern of life becomes distinguishable by its internal principles and this creates individual topologies. The relationship between these regions is called *περιχώρησις*. This refers to the interchange between each self-consistent locality of the cosmos. For Maximus this process is filtered through Christian dogma concerning the incarnation hence *perichoretic* co-operation is emphatically pacific, and does not destroy the particularity of a region.

Each region has an internal coherence. Its coherence is made up from how the elements relate internally to each other. This quality defines how each region continues in itself and how that same relation will create. For instance, the internal connections in God are different than that of the internal connections within the intelligible principles (the *λόγοι*). These represent how the cosmos consists of specific types of limits. The creativity of a region marked out by a simple internal relation is more potent than a later, more complex type.<sup>4</sup> In turn material continuity functions differently than the creativity of the cosmic *λόγοι*.<sup>5</sup> For instance a pure triangle is more perfect than any single material representation or any proof supplied by Geometers. Geometric arrangements are axiomatic and self-consistent. A pure triangle requires fewer causal processes than a material triangle, the later needs material combination, formal, and final causality, etc. In an interactive cosmos, when a formal triangle relates to material procreativity to participate in the formation of a triangular body, the formal triangle exercises a causal relation to the matter.<sup>6</sup> One principle ‘causes’, the other but in doing so this does not deny the effect its own causal potency. The formal and material triangles express the extent of their causal efficacy through how the co-operation of internal conditions facilitates a certain limitation of their distribution. The material triangle can be used to engineer a wall. Yet the formal triangle ‘generates’ something able to relate to and affect other things. The things it produces are of a different order than the processes that make up the

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<sup>4</sup>The hierarchy is based on conceptual priority rather than priority in speaking. John J Leary, *Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority* (Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1988) 8-12.

<sup>5</sup> The *λόγοι* are contemplated as fully actualised potencies in which appearance, procession, and foundation are perfectly realised without being identical to the divine essence.

<sup>6</sup> The productive capacities of the cause are normally greater than the later (in the case of the immaterial triangle) but the effects may be more numerous than the cause itself (millions of material manifestations).

cause itself.<sup>7</sup> A common Neo-Platonist example is how the sun gives rise to light and heat. In other words, if the world is comprised of materiality that has been crafted according to intelligible principles or λόγοι, then any appearance will assume different operational principles interacting to bring that thing about.

Looking at the formal and material triangles as an example of cause and effect respectively, shows that there are 2 distinctive regions in operation. Once the immaterial cause ceases, or in application becomes demarcated under a material restriction, a demarcation or a boundary is thereby established between the prior and the later based on the peculiar differences between each operation. When one gives rise to another we can make an investigation of each on its own terms assuming that we have some grasp of both. The ray is not the sun but has its own internal consistency.<sup>8</sup> Likewise the intelligible principles, the λόγοι which function like the formal triangle, ‘circumscribe’ material beings giving them a type of movement peculiar to physicality. This means that the cause, the λόγοι, cause an effect, materiality, but both the former and the later are preserved.<sup>9</sup>

A region is where a certain causal system prevails which can be distinguished from another. Each is extended according to the inner constitution of the processes of which they are comprised. The terms ‘boundary’ or ‘region’ therefore define relation rather than division. The relation between two or more regions can be likened to how the figure of the circle exists in a particular way because of the extent of its internal limits and the corresponding demarcation of the space outside it: both contribute to its identity. The circle’s perimeter marks a boundary in these two ways. Negative

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<sup>7</sup> This reading comes from an extended engagement with two of Maximus’ texts on the character of the organism and the theological arrangement of processes. This is a reading related to my thesis where I claim that the notion of φύσις has a form of ‘complex unity’ which, in its unity includes a sense of causal efficacy. Hence a cause is an operation that is a unity of various distinguishable principles rather than a simple monad. They produce something capable of its own peculiar movement. See: Maximus Confessor, *CK*, I, 3. PG 90 1084, 3. Berthold, *Maximus Confessor*, 129.

<sup>8</sup> Moreover of course, the heat from the sun is not reliant on the intention. Plotinus, *The Enneads*, V. 1, 4, 7. MacKenna, 355.

<sup>9</sup> There are also ways of establishing distinctions through a temporal ordering, or one based on a form of priority (as mentioned). The priority type is in kind, and therefore pertains to a temporal ordering usually, in the case of the history of Euclid or Plato’s engagement with first causes, shows a great deal of reflective thought, and need not be self evident. Dominic O’Meara’s discussion is helpful as a way of describing some other possible ways that a hierarchy may be established. I would add that the typological compilation of priorities represents a good model for describing how, by building up a set of commons, one might form a picture of the hierarchical cosmos as the ‘sorting’ of the varieties of types of priority through a pro-generative reading. However, O’Meara can only give an outline of what as he admits is an enormous project, yet he spells out how the senses of priority have a spatial and temporal sense. Dominic O’Meara, *The Hierarchical Ordering of Reality in Plotinus*, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, Ed Lloyd Gerson (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996) 66-81. Esp 75, 78-9.

delimitation can only occur through a positive extension of a body and visa versa. Thus, a region is always positive and negative containing internal operates which limit it in a particular way. Both the body and the principles that are around it generate the nature (φύσις) of the region. This universe functions through the continual interaction between these different regions.

The chapter focuses on the actual contents within these various regions of Maximus' cosmos to give an understanding of how the idea of motion might vary between each region. The cosmos can be divided into three distinctive regions with one subdivision. There is the theological region, the region of intelligible realities that circumscribe the physical world, and the physical universe. The physical universe has two distinctive elements to it: 1) procreative or biological momentum and 2) noetic delimitation which interacts forming a rational or functional physicality. Procreativity is the basic continuity of existence. It is a type of self-continuity where the future trajectory of something only replicates previous dispositions though within new contexts. It simply maintains its form as much as possible. Qualitative evolution occurs through the exhaustion of the continuity of the life process, accidental change, or as a result of a relating to a higher principle that changes material trajectory.<sup>10</sup> Yet bare continuity is still able to operate without a conscious or explicit relation to higher operations since it has some genuine self-consistency of movement that does not depend solely on a description under a final *telos*.

The second aspect of the physical world is that in which procreative continuity is still persistent, and co-mingles by its resemblance to the structure of continuity that persists within the continuity of consciousness. This is personified in the *anthropos*. It is important to distinguish rationality from νοῦς. Rationality is both the continuity of intellectual processes and the qualities of principles (λόγοι) within that continuity. In the νοῦς the momentums, physical and heavenly, are lively in the site of subjective continuity. The contemplation and participation in other ways of being enlivens the normative state rationality and enlarges the possibilities of this state, by transforming

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<sup>10</sup> This point is very important for understanding Maximus' distinction between the natural or fundamental principles of an action and the derivative principles. "A passionate representation Νόημά ἐστι ἐμπαθές, is a thought made up of passion and representation λογισμὸς σύνθετος ἀπο πάθους καὶ νοήματος.. Let us separate the passion from the representation Χωρίσωμεν τὸ πάθος ἀπὸ τοῦ νοήματος, and the simple thought will remain. καὶ ἀπομένι ὁ λογισμὸς ψιλός. We can, if we wish, make this separation through spiritual love and self-mastery Χωρίζομεν δὲ δι' ἀγάπης πνευματικῆς καὶ ἐγκρατείας ἐὰν θέλωμεν (willing or intentional action)." CL III 43. PG 90, 1029B. Berthold, *Maximus Confessor*, 67.

the activity of human continuity. The trajectory of material life is altered through the saturation of our normative state, and conversion (*metanoia*) into the cosmos. The noetic-physical cosmos experiences life as a conscious encounter with various orders of existence. The νοῦς, when it contemplates the λόγοι changes how we experience and move through the world by redirecting the trajectory of an individual's existence and history in light of different regions.

For Maximus original sin, being in part a noetic and intentional act (θεληματός), altered the history of the cosmos and the incarnation, death and resurrection is a culminating event of history. The second aspect of material life is enlivened and more flexible and open to qualitative variation. It is the combination of these two that comprises the fullest definition of the physical universe.

In the second region there are the λόγοι the intelligible principles. The λόγοι are principles that, co-operatively with the Divine λόγος, determine the limits of noetic and physical life.<sup>11</sup> They demarcate the positive and negative limits of creation by prefiguring it through, and remaining within, the λόγος of God.<sup>12</sup> They function like the mathematical realities mentioned previously.

The theological region creates and maintains all things. A good model for describing its cosmic role is John Scottus Eriugena's theological division of a φύσις which "creates but is not created". Furthermore, this region is apophatic in character, meaning that it is spoken about as beyond being, non-being, infinite or finite etc. I will not be making extensive comments on theology through this essay because of the historical and conceptual complexity of the notion. I do, however, presume that God is the persistent cause of all things. Yet as I argue in chapter two, I am inclined to stratify and regionalise definitions of existence so as to allow each type of motion a better chance to be given a vocabulary specific to the relations and character that define its character in relation to other created things. This can allow an explanation to be understood as centred within one discourse rather than another (describing a biological cause may need a different vocabulary than a physical cause).

Overall, the various regions co-operate to comprise the cosmos either by creating or being created and creating or simple being created. For the human consisting of both soul and sensible body, by means of its natural

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<sup>11</sup> *Ad Thal* 2, CCSG 7, 268-272. Blowers & Wilken *On the Cosmic Mystery*. 99-101.

<sup>12</sup> Maximus Confessor, *Amb.* 7, PG 91, 1085A-D and 1088A. Blowers & Wilken *On the Cosmic Mystery*, 61-63.



relationship of belonging to each division of creation, is both circumscribed and circumscribes: Through being it is circumscribed and through potency it circumscribes.<sup>13</sup>

Being delimited by something, being bound in relation to it, gives a thing its identity. Insofar as differentiation occurs between differences, if this occurs within continual activity in which conditions and processes are related to from within the bounds of one to another, identity exchange or the dependence of one thing on another, does not facilitate mutual annihilation but continual procession due to being commonly created by God. This passage above, as well as arguing for interdependence between operative types, also describes the regional demarcation mentioned. Further more it describes a fuller picture of what is meant by the interdependence of creation: “All created being ‘moves completely or else is moved, causes or is caused, contemplates or is contemplated, speaks or is spoken, . . . acts or is acted upon.’”<sup>14</sup> The interrelation occurs according to the particularity (φύσις) of the partners. The increase in complexity of a region may not be an augmentation of the character *per se*. In fact, building up a complex picture of each region comes through identifying the character (φύσις) of the region prior and then posterior to the change.<sup>15</sup> By being circumscribed internally and externally each creature and indeed each region where a certain order prevails can be said to maintain that order. Moreover, in this inter-relational sense, each peculiar extension, support other types of motion.

For the whole nature of reality is divided into the intelligible and the sensible. There is that which is said to be and is [(perfected time) a perfectly completed time], since it receives the beginning of its being in eternity, and that which is temporal, since it is made in time; since it is made in time; there is that which is subject to intellection, and that which is subject to the power of sense perception. The entities on each side of this division are naturally related to each other through an indissoluble power that binds them together.<sup>16</sup>

“Thus he (Christ) divinely recapitulates the universe in himself, showing that the whole creation exists as one, like another human being, completed by the gathering of parts one with another in itself. . .”<sup>17</sup> If the different hierarchies that Maximus uses

<sup>13</sup> Maximus, *Amb.* 10, PG 1153A. In: Louth, *Maximus*, 124.

<sup>14</sup> *Amb.* 26 PG 91, 1296A. Cited by Balthasar: Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 87.

<sup>15</sup> Noting that the later may be the state for encountering the former, the speculations on the character of the world prior to the fall are like this.

<sup>16</sup> *Amb.* 10 PG 91 1153A, Louth, *Maximus*, 124.

<sup>17</sup> *Amb.* 41 PG 91 1312A-B. Louth, *Maximus*, 160.

are composed because of the relation between qualitatively distinct operations, then their connection, or lack thereof, is not due to how one mode of activity is naturally distinct from another.<sup>18</sup> In other words they distinguish themselves from each other by their predominant organisational type. The hierarchies are compilations of different activities, all of which co-operate together if their activities are mediated into a cohesive approximation. Each order reflects a different type of operation peculiar to that region. This is generated and maintained through the creative operation of God through the λόγος and its institution of creaturely limits (λόγοι) constituted in every rational existent. The example below shows, in more detail, the interaction between different orders and how the differences between the relative momentums of one explanatory order (such as mathematics) persist within another (physical or biological operations). However, incorrect intentions generate ‘false efficiency’, and set off motion which could relate polemically to other motive regions.

## A Second Set of Divisions

Before I describe the concepts and cosmic organisation of regions relating I examine some examples of other divisions in Maximus’ work which also could be given the status of regions. In *Ambigua* 41, Maximus’ divisions and the hierarchical conception of the relation between divisions, set out five sets of two which are laid out with the one preceding generating the next. By the time the final division occurs all the previous relations condition its appearance. The ‘distance’ of mediation between the first and final division means that it is difficult to perceive how each relates. The divisions begin with God and creation is the first division. The second division is between sensible and intelligible realities. The third is a further split of the sensible world into heaven and earth. The forth is the division between paradise and the inhabited world, and the fifth is the human being who is in turn divided according to sex.<sup>19</sup>

The regions are divided because of a different possibility of their character (φύσις) being distinctly manifest. Although they were naturally (here meaning

<sup>18</sup> Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, A Revised Text with Translation, Introduction and Commentary by E. R Dodds (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2004) Proposition 30, p 35. “In so far, then, as it has an element of identity with the producer, the product remains in it; in so far as it differs, it proceeds from it.”

<sup>19</sup> Balthasar’s work is an exploration and development of these divisions. Creation and co-creativity give rise to akinetic structures, but their permanence is different than a theological permanence. “First he (Christ) united us in himself by removing the difference between male and female. . .” *Amb.* 41 PG 91 1309D. Louth, *Maximus*, 160.

originally) co-operative, due to sin, the addition of a novel process instituted a different set of possibilities into certain aspects of the character of these regions. These divisions are defined by their initial departure from θεῖος as the most simple of all concepts and describing the order of creation as it diversifies itself in relation to the simplicity of God. The reconciliation of sensible and intelligible, for example, refers to the division placed there through *agnosia* in which their original natural affinity, secured through God's providential care for creation, no longer appears united to the operation of the sensible. Put another way, the λόγοι of creation become less able to be discerned and circumscriptions other than those originally intended emerge concretely. In the final creation Maximus describes the reconciliation of division as the activity given to humanity showing the origin of the 'problem' as partly due to incorrect operation of the will (γνώμη).<sup>20</sup>

Once understanding is regained, then the structure and mode of life presented in the region becomes a realisable possibility of the microcosm.<sup>21</sup> The opposite, ignorance, shuts off these regions and thus the modes of life they represent.<sup>22</sup> Human acts of will can create false structure and ways of life contrary to the order of created being originally laid out. Different mechanisms generate their own set of relationships. *Agnosia* sets off possibilities different from the 'pre-fallen' state. This indicates how, due to human actions, certain types of motion can be instituted that would have remained inert potential had not an activity employing said φύσις been able to direct it. This is where the distinction between φύσις and modes (τρόποι) becomes important (see chapters 2 and 5). Overall, regional demarcations can be

<sup>20</sup> Blowers and Wilkins note how the text also mentions that the division between orders of creation occurs in Adam but that Adam sins and brings these different divisions inadvertently to the fore (by his embrace and abuse of the passible (gnomic) will) instantaneously after his creation. The elements where and through which sin is manifested are in communities and language. The world is the structure at this stage, is also by that same moment of Adam's creation available to language. Therefore sin arises as linguistic (as a transcendental condition of positive meaning) and noetic. Adam responds to in moving away from God immediately but from what? Perhaps the divisions, though generated partially in Adam's sin, do not become clearly manifest immediately but only through time. *Ad Thal* 1, CCSG 7:47-49. Blowers & Wilken, *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*, 97.

<sup>21</sup> "Impurity of mind means first to have false knowledge ψευδη; next to be ignorant of any universals (καθόλου)- I speak of the human mind since an angel is not ignorant of particular things; thirdly in having (εχειν) passionate thoughts (λογισμούς); and fourthly in consenting to sin αμάρτια." CLIII, 34. PG 90, 1027B-C. Berthold, *Maximus Confessor*, 66.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, 66. The term εχειν needs to be interpreted more like the possession of, or the clinging to something that, in this case, is causing harm. To have λογισμοί is a product of thinking that need not be accompanied by consent to sin. Indeed Maximus clarifies what he means by negative λογισμοί at an earlier stage in the CL and it is in this manner that λογισμοί needs to be read. In other words λογισμοί can be read as a normal process rather than an intrinsically negative or passionate state.

made based on ascetic acts, or from acts of subjective intention. The reader must be prepared to consider the possibility that active *noesis* contributes positively or negatively to the scope of a demarcation (λόγοι) of created motion and how it works.

## Co-operation Between Qualitative Orders

Whenever orders of one type or another interacts, the appearance and conceptual structure that comes about as a result of this combination changes both the appearance and the conceptual topography. The regions within Maximus' cosmos come together to facilitate appearances (τρόποι) and characteristic types of motion (φύσις). The nature of existence, and therefore the motions of that existence, will change depending on which structural lens is relating to them. If one 'projects' a cosmology from the region of θεῖος, positive creaturely movement is reduced in its capacity, it appears to have less in respect to the omnipotence of θεῖος. Hence, one can understand a regional cosmology makes created motion more complex. There are different ways of establishing a specific λόγοι.

The following sections describe the concepts used to discuss the relations between different qualitative orders. These structures are important for defining creaturely motion. The regional cosmology has identified two general needs: 1) the maintenance of several regional definitions of κίνησις, and 2) the need to generate a definition of κίνησις that is interregional, meaning that its circumscription could persist across all created regions. There are several definitions that have been presented as reflecting the general structure of motion, utilised by Maximus for instance, the formal definition of κίνησις of Balthasar. However, as described in the following chapters, there are types of κίνησις that are 'regional' but are also important for describing mere-continuity. In the final chapter I describe how Maximus' triad of οὐσία, φύσις, and ἐνέργεια could be a candidate for a general definition.

The demand of maintaining several regional definitions is more complex insofar as a) the movement type in each region would need to be considered along with b) some understanding of how each type might interact.<sup>23</sup> Regional complexity

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<sup>23</sup> A thorough investigation of each region and their interaction is beyond the scope of the thesis, but I have made some progress, as seen in chapters two and three. The notion of anthropological movement and mediation is not discussed. The suggestion that I would make is that the best structure for this

remains within some discourses, for example, asceticism is an important element for considering the organisation of the procreative or self-continuous order, yet the motion of the λόγοι is self-expressive, and Maximus' descriptions assume this self disclosure. One kinetic type might relate across regions or even facilitate distinctive qualities of motion not thought possible within a more limited definition. It suspects that the permeation of one order into another reflects a complex form of activity and receptivity that results in qualitative evolution. Below are some general observations in which regional interaction is taken as a fact. Περιχώρησις is a speculative term for describing this interaction as a general law, and even most ancient authors could not do more than articulate this interrelation except in the most general terms.

Augmentation in a region can take place by way of the expansion of the understanding of the particular qualities that a region possesses. When an addition is made according to the λόγος of a particular area, due to sexual reproduction for example, the regional type increases numerically, but not in terms of its character. If spatiality moved from two dimensions into three, this would add significantly to a geometry increasing the scope of its φύσις. Measuring material movement using a formal system requires understanding how forms do not substitute for the body itself but establish rules of relation. This has the consequence of allowing spatial extension to be comprehended as an extension of the inactive void. Thus physical extension can be related to three-dimensional geometry without collapsing the formal order into the material. John Philoponus critique of Aristotle's idea of place shows this.<sup>24</sup> The argument examines how spatial extension should not be considered identical to somatic/bodily or physical extension. Considering spatial extension across a place does not cause division because it is incorporeal. "Even if place were a body, this would not follow (actual division into an actual infinity of parts). . . since it is incorporeal it does not follow either that the void goes through the contained body (because the body fills it), or that it divides it."<sup>25</sup> This 'going through' refers to the

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investigation may actually be an extension of the λογισμοί (the stream or continuity of consciousness) described in chapter 2.

<sup>24</sup> David Furley, Summary of Philoponus' Corollaries on Place and Void. (Translation by David Furley of Parts of Philoponus' *Corollary on Place*. Taken from: *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (CAG) ed H Diels, Berlin 1882-1909. Vol 16, 558,10.) In: *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*, Ed Richard Sorabji (Duckworth, Gloucester, 1987) 130-131. This work's subtitle is: 'Corollary on Place "Critique of Aristotle's argument that place cannot be a three dimensional extension"' p130.

<sup>25</sup> Furley, Philoponus' Corollaries on Place, 130. See also David Sedley, Philoponus' Conception of Space. In: *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science* 140- 153.

use of a third dimension, that of extension. The type of motivity Philoponus is referring to is a spatial extension in which ‘moving through’ refers to the incorporeal extension of a formal conception of a three dimensional body.

The key negation is that the addition of a third dimension to a formal conception of extension does not exercise causal power. It does not create the bodily extension but merely maps it. “Does void divide by being an extension? No: Lacking the qualities of body (hardness, etc.) it does not divide, just as the application of a surface or line to a surface or line does not divide them. . .”<sup>26</sup> The addition of third dimensional extension onto two dimensional extensions can approximate a body simply by the character of the former being adapted to a later region. Increasing a regions complexity does not dissolve its character, thus a third dimension is not an additional γένος. If these, and not the body being measured, are taken to be the basis of measurement then because they do not substitute for actual bodily extension space becomes three dimensional. The purity of the void moves through material extension without disrupting it. The exchange between different orders of reality by adaptation of one to the other does not displace identity. Rather their identities correlate in a co-operative-evolutionary-harmony. Unity can be defined through negative means. When an activity ‘does not conflict with another’ they can operate in the same locale. This, incidentally, is similar to the type of relation described in the Council of Chalcedon which I discuss below.

## Efficient Causality and Appearance

In the previous discussion, relations between orders were generally non-disruptive. The language of efficient causality, on the other hand, mediates how additional complexity charges a character with additional structures. These interactions cause ‘increase’ in the appearance of the possibilities of a region and therefore ‘unlock’ potential. In this way, where this type of interrelation occurs, the region has an increase in complexity and possibilities. When, as shown later, the precise links between each order become less tangible, ‘complexity’ in a region becomes ‘confusion’. Here the labour of tracing αἴτιον (founding principles of a peculiar state or region), if their relations are taken as entirely immanent in initial or unreflective engagement, causes normal confusion over states of names, for example, to become

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<sup>26</sup> David Furley, Corollaries on Place and Void, In: *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*, 130.

cosmic in scope. Competing names become like competing αἴτιον, a different story. Proclus clarifies how Plotinus' understanding of creaturely continuity is actually the continuity of several causal types. The efficient cause actually refers to several senses simultaneously. Hence, an appearance is being conditioned efficiently by several types of founding principles. This suggests that the appearance of complex and multifarious events from a prior cause exhibit, in their multiplicity and diversity, the continuity of that causal mechanism.

For example, the simplicity of power, δύναμις, generates elements that are distinct from it. Though the effects increase in quantity, the continuity of the original element does not cease. In this way, δύναμις, κίνησις and αἴτιον, remain consistently present within multiplicity. "In so far, then, as it has an element of identity with the producer, the product remains in it; in so far as it differs, it proceeds from it."<sup>27</sup> In this way the institution of 'a whole' as the basis of appearance has within Proclus, and indeed within *Ambigua* 1168a καθόλου and καθολικωτέρων, that the constitution of reality is 'ambiguous' in the positive sense of being denoted by several connections and relations rather than of a single type.

The two axioms in which Tollefsen identifies the efficient cause: (prop 31) "All that proceeds from any principle reverts in respect of its being upon that from which it proceeds". This describes the capacity of principles which are distinct from that which caused them to still bear the marks of the principle which they were caused by. And: "All that subsists (ὅπως οὖν) in any fashion (in possessing a predicable basis (οὐσία) or having a generative potency) has its being either in its cause, (through remaining in its cause: κατ' αἰτίαν ἔστιν) as an originative potency; or as a substantial predicate (ὑπαρξιν); or by (out of) participation (μέθεξιν) after the manner of an image."<sup>28</sup> This means that the image of the continuity of the creature, whatever quality the quality of motion might have, if it is able to exercise affect, it does so because of the continuity of its relationship to its own causes. "For either we see the product as pre-existent in the producer which is its cause; or we see the producer in the product; or else we contemplate each thing in its own station, neither in its cause nor in its resultant."<sup>29</sup> The continuity of a creature subsists in the principles which cause it. This likened to how a prior cause relates efficiently through

<sup>27</sup> Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, Proposition 30, p 35.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, Proposition 65. (My brackets).

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, Proposition 65. (My brackets).

the posterior. The posterior causes are regulated, or restricted or conditioned by the former, and thus find elements of their identity through their causal architecture. The limitation, complexity and multiplicity of that reality, by its limitation, complexity and multiplicity, imply the co-present maintenance by the simple, unlimited oneness of prior causal powers. When the causal links are comprehended, limitation becomes synonymous with dependence on a prior superior cause. If the connections are not concretely identified, or their non-destructive relations to each other are not comprehended, then limitation becomes confusion.<sup>30</sup> The schematisation of the hierarchical structure consists in illuminating the connection between causes as they constitute the object. But the meta-condition in which the constitution takes place is the pacific and dynamic inter-relation of the regions. In other words, a hierarchical reality is ‘the really real’ because it reflects the totality of the possibilities that arise in the interaction of God, the cosmos and the microcosm.<sup>31</sup> *περιχώρησις* is the concept used to describe this complex unity.

### **Περιχώρησις<sup>32</sup>**

When larger structures interact with smaller ones, the term *περιχώρησις* can be applied to translate the phenomena as the result of inter-penetrative-co-conditioning-relationships in the cosmos.<sup>33</sup> The term *περιχώρησις* was coined early in the neo-Platonist period with its Christian (Trinitarian) history coming later with John Damascene. It is used to describe the appearance that occurs when the cosmos is discerned to consist of various interlocking modes of existence and explanation. It refers to this interrelation as a ‘fact’ given the reality of how multiple modes can

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<sup>30</sup> One contemporary solution to this confused state has been to make a totalising demarcation as *κίνησις*.

<sup>31</sup> William Norris Clarke, *The Problem of the Reality and Multiplicity of Divine Ideas in Christian Neo-Platonism*. In: *Neo-Platonism and Christian Thought*, ed Dominic J. O’Meara (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1982) 111.

<sup>32</sup> Thunberg’s discussion gives a general survey of the different ways that Maximus uses the term, where he finds it (through Gregory Nazianzen, and Chalcedon’s method). The sources outside of the tradition are clearly Proclus and Thunberg and Balthasar mention Stoic Physics, related most likely to the description of the type of efficient inner-motivity of pneuma within grosser material. Created *κίνησις* continually moves toward the divine. Thunberg’s discussion, which elucidates the development of the interrelational and interpenetrative sense of the term, shows it to be a direct exposition of Chalcedon. Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, 21-36.

<sup>33</sup> The concept of harmony has been discussed in Stephen Gersch’s work. Stephen Gersch, *Concord in Discourse: Harmonics and Semiotics in Late Classical and Early Medieval Platonism*, Mouton de Gruyter, New York, 1996)



relate to each other within a specific site (a being).<sup>34</sup> This suggests that the term's translation could be rendered: the interpenetrative movement that takes place between regions. περιχώρησις describes the manner in which different types of different real or conceptual orders co-exist.

The term διαστολή (distinction or expansion) describes how the distinction between one thing and another comes about in the perichoretic movements in creation. The term συστολή, meaning contraction or the condensation of orders, and is the counterpart of διαστολή. Both describe how specific principles within the perichoretic exchange relate and individuate themselves.<sup>35</sup>

Once again, there is but one world and it is not divided by its parts. On the contrary, it encloses the differences of the parts arising from their natural properties by their relationship to what is one and indivisible in itself. Moreover, it shows that both are the same thing with it and alternatively with each other, and both fill the same whole as parts fill a unit. . .<sup>36</sup>

In Neo-Platonist influenced Christianity, the principle relates to objects of sense mediated through λόγοι which are like mathematical entities insofar as they are both atemporal and spatial.<sup>37</sup> These act efficiently in physical laws. Material entities participate in them and constantly change in proportion to their capacity to function in relation to laws. These exchanges are by a form of mutual regional interrelation.<sup>38</sup> Specific actions that occur do so in light of a divine first principle, the logical intelligences that condition the operation of laws devising function and somatic continuity. The structure of reality can hold multiple meanings and activities at the

<sup>34</sup> Jeff Malpas pointed out how the term is suggesting the specific co-operation between demarcated regions or 'chora' (personal communication). For Malpas' general position, see: Jeff Malpas, *Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999).

<sup>35</sup> "Indeed, the symbolic contemplation of intelligible things by means of visible realities is spiritual knowledge and understanding of visible things through the visible. For it is necessary that things which manifest each other bear a mutual reflection in an altogether true and clear manner and keep their relationship intact." Maximus, *Mystagogy*, PG 91, 669C-D. Berthold, *Maximus*, 189.

<sup>36</sup> Πάλιν εις ἐστὶ κόσμος τοῖς ἑατοῦ μὴ συνδιαιρούμενος μέρεσι. *Mystagogy*, PG 91, 669B. Berthold, *Maximus*, 188-9.

<sup>37</sup> See Chapter 4.

<sup>38</sup> *Amb* 41 PG, 1313A-B. Louth, *Maximus*, 161. ". . . the λόγοι of everything that is divided and particular are contained. . . by the λόγοι of what is universal and generic, and the most universal and generic λόγοι are held together by wisdom and the λόγοι of particulars, held fast in various ways by the generic λόγοι are contained by sagacity, in accordance with which they are first simplified, and releasing the symbolic variety in the actions of their subjects, they are unified by wisdom, receiving congruence making their identity from the more generic." *Amb*. 41, PG 91, 1313A-B. Louth, *Maximus*, 161.

same moment without conflict, without mixing and without confusion.<sup>39</sup> Tollefsen also makes a good comment in respect to his discussion of ethics and contemplation as an aid to the procession of human nature to communion with divinity. Θεορία, as an operative principle in the subject, redefined creaturely intention through a ‘graduated curve’ reflecting how motion becomes evidence of the perichoretic relation between God and the world.<sup>40</sup>

Those who look carefully at the present world, making the most of their learning, and wisely tease out with their mind the λόγος that folds together the bodies that harmoniously constitute it in various ways- they discover what is perceived through the senses, and what is understood and what is universal, everything contained in everything and turning by the exchange of the individual qualities of each.<sup>41</sup>

The line translated “everything contained in everything and turning by the exchange of the individual qualities of each”<sup>42</sup> contains the term ιδιότητος. It is used as the hypostatic or personal sense of the operation of exchange in which individuated things participate and relate with each other according to their own capacity. Individuated capacity is defined by the operations and directions of the created being. The activity of the creature in its foundations, processes and actuality, is the compilation that represents the intelligence or λόγος of any thing. The exchange between elements within the cosmos, as directed under divinely conditioned λόγος, is therefore a matter of the concreteness of the expression of the life of the organism relating to other principles. Appearances, in this universe, are manifestations of complex interconnections.

## Chalcedon as the Model of Interrelation

To re-iterate how this complexity permeates Maximus’ thought, the creed of the council of Chalcedon provides the dogmatic language for the interconnection between

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<sup>39</sup> It is important for Maximus because of his position as a ‘neo-Chalcedonian’ who champions the mutual hypostatic interchanges between divine and Human in Christ. He expands the implications of dogma into a fuller definition of the person and into a cosmic theology.

<sup>40</sup> Janet Williams, ‘The Incarnational Apophysis of Maximus the Confessor,’ 633. This article discusses the interdependence between God and humanity in relation to the Trinitarian model. “When the intellect has shaken off its many opinions about created things, then the inner principle of truth appears clearly to it, providing it with a foundation of real knowledge and removing its former preoccupations as though removing scales from the eyes...” CK, II, 75. PG 90, 1160B-C. Berthold, *Maximus*, 163-4.

<sup>41</sup> *Amb.* 10 PG 91, 1169C, Louth, *Maximus*, 134.

<sup>42</sup> ...πάντα δὲ πᾶσι περιεχόμενά τε καὶ περιτρεπόμενα τῇ ἐπαλλαγῇ τῆς περὶ ἕκαστον ποιᾶς ιδιότητος. *Amb.* 10 PG 91, 1169C, Louth, *Maximus*, 134.

regions. Chalcedon is an engagement with a specific problem<sup>43</sup>. It produces a program of the relation between God and the world, facilitating the possibility of total unity, without the destruction of the specific character of either the creator or the created. Its centrality for Maximus on Maximus' discussion of personhood and his general ontology is profound.<sup>44</sup> In the four negations, Chalcedon expresses a view of interconnection between orders of difference, which is akin to the expression of a perichoretic exchange. Human and divine are united together in the person of Christ:

Without confusion (ἀσυγχύτως), without change (ἀτρέπτως), without division (ἀδιάρετως), without separation (ἀκωρίστως), the difference of natures having been in no wise taken away by reason of the union.<sup>45</sup>

This institutes the possibility of interchange without the connotations of ontological loss or gain. Unity is a special type of co-operative relation. It is possible due to the conditions of existence in nature and in God co-operating with each other in Christ.

Maintaining about himself as cause, beginning, and end all beings which are by nature distant from one another, he makes them converge in each other by the singular force of their relationship to him as origin. Through this movement he leads all beings to a common and unconfused identity of movement and existence, no one being originally in revolt against any other or separated from him by a difference of nature or of movement, but all things combine with all others in an unconfused way by the singular indissoluble relation to and protection of the one principle and cause.<sup>46</sup>

Moreover, it is impossible for something to change without the specific conditions being continually maintained by God. The four negations are representative of the pattern that allowed existents to exist. They attempt to ascribe the generative pattern in things to pacific relation and define the conditions of relation as dependent upon the maintenance of character. Maintenance of character institutes the pattern in which union is in fact the co-operation in which the character of each participant is able to and receptive to the other. In this sense, the activity of union is generated through mutual receptivity. Receptivity is according to character but the maintenance of

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<sup>43</sup> The council discussed how Christ is of two natures (human and divine). And described how he united these two natures, in his person/*hypostasis*. This unification, because it bore the totality of both natures, deified humanity in him, and made the divine, fleshy, or 'thick'.

<sup>44</sup> I have not traced the influence here because of the amount of literature supporting the centrality of the council to his thought.

<sup>45</sup> Aloys Grillmeier and Theresia Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition: Volume Two. From the Council of Chalcedon (451) to Gregory the Great (590- 604): The Church of Constantinople in the Sixth Century*. Translated by Pauline Allen and John Cawte. (Mowbrays, London, 1995) 544. Just note that these are verbs representing the ongoing character of the union.

<sup>46</sup> *Amb.* 10 PG 91, 1169C. Louth, *Maximus*, 186.

character is the basis of potential and actual receptivity in things. The activity of intention and receptivity in specific existents is defined through discriminating how each is actually related to the other.<sup>47</sup>

## The Interregional Reading of Created Motion

Each region will contain differentiations of individuations of the type of motion prevalent to that order. Each interrelation between cause and effect institutes an individual instance that is maintained by the previous order. This ‘individual’ (it can be a λόγος, a divine idea) causes from within its specificity. Plotinus used *hypostasis* to signify the distinction between the generative principle and the activities it initiated. However, as was the case in the discussion of the lessening of causal power, the use of gradation within the various cosmic regions may make the idea of examining the concept of ‘φύσις’ problematic. It functions as a place marker. It also designates the locale or proximity between the relations that make up the essential characteristics of a movement. Inasmuch as this metaphor of locale as extension, limitation and relation persists then all things, even theological, mathematical noetic, or physical, possess a φύσις. Additionally, there is the complexity caused by having the regions there at all. If there are potentially different types of movement within each, then the idea of created movement could not be singular except if the definition were to be so general so that its usefulness might be reduced.

Some concerns of regionality are important for the definition of κίνησις. 1) How the structure of motion within each area will reflect a different set of qualities within the bodies interacting, hence a definition of motion or of the creature<sup>48</sup> can vary dramatically depending on whether the general or specific (regional sense is meant in a definition). With qualifications φύσις can also be used here (I discuss this below and in chapter 2). 2) The differences within the content that demarcates one region from another. 3) The differences between the structures of any definition of κίνησις. One definition will refer to qualities that are distinct from another definition and therefore the compositional structure will be distinct. For instance the definition

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<sup>47</sup> Though it must be said that the assumption underlying the negation’s are that the concepts are existent and their manner of relation is being described. The negations are retrospective judgements. The Chalcedonian negations describe how a relation between differences can produce or originate a new element. The relation between God and humanity is neither antithetical nor destructive of the conditions, processes and appearance that mark each participant. Chalcedon is a record of peaceful or pacific relation.

<sup>48</sup> With qualifications φύσις can also be used here, see chapter 2.

of a λόγος could be: that which is a derivative of the divine Λόγος. Or that which represents the intelligible principles in the divine mind. In each case the terms Λόγος and God are of a different order than the subject currently under definition.

In the following section the basis of my description of κίνησις utilises the sense in which an individual character, or φύσις, is, by existing, a specific instance of κίνησις. Φύσις is used as subject, or origin, and indicates how κίνησις interacts in specific ways. Balthasar uses the term with an intentional aspect, insofar as the subject is determined in relation to how a creature or activity is directionally orientated. In this way, subject represents 1) the origin of this action, 2) the bearer of the affects made through the interaction with the orientation. 3) It can be appropriate to call it the active component insofar as the origin of the action designates the ‘bearer’. In this way, φύσις is the expression of a specific kinetic capacity, albeit one which is defined as a ‘character’ or locality of peculiar motion, rather than as self-consistent type. Hence, it can be helpful to employ φύσις to illustrate the specificity, so long as φύσις is not substituted for κίνησις.

### Exploring an Appropriate Structure for a Definition.

And again the universal is corrupted by change into the particular, and the particular, turned into the universal reduction, also suffers corruption. And there comes about the corruption of everything that owes its coming to be to others. For the union of universals with one another, which causes the coming to be of particulars, is the corruption of one another by change, and the reduction of particulars to universals by the dissolution of their being bound together, leading to corruption, is the continuance and coming to be of the universals.<sup>49</sup>

The search for καθολος in the structure of created being is based, not only on the sense that the καθολος is desirable in itself, but on the experience of being confronted with immense complexity. The aim of producing definitions is to understand created motion so that the subject may ascend toward a more universal contemplation. Indeed, the idea of the universal and particular were seen as co-operative relations. This passage describes a basic model of the various regions that

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<sup>49</sup> Καὶ πάλιν τὰ μὲν καθόλου τοῖς μερικοῖς κατὰ ἀλλοίωσιν, τὰ δε μερικὰ τοῖς καθόλου κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν περιτρεπόμενα φθείρεται. *Amb.10*, PG 91, 1169C, Louth, *Maximus*, 134. Also: Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 159. I would mention that μερικοῖς is less literally ‘destruction’ so much as a division or separation which implies destruction of the former order. However, the transliteration has included the term: φθείρεται which has the sense of destruction or negativity of the separation.

Maximus maintains within his cosmology. It describes two specific regions, a) universal and b) particular or individual being (καθόλου (universal) ιδιότητος (individual or peculiar quality of something) and καθεκαστον).<sup>50</sup> The structures of the universals are not articulated using one single model.<sup>51</sup> Balthasar's translation and commentary is much stronger on the sense of 'self-alienation' and the dissolution of the universal structure when it becomes the particular. This is to say that there is a double demarcation taking place where the particular constrains and limits the universal and the universal constrains and limits the particular. The severance of connection is a result of how the character of each seeks maintenance rather than the dissolution of their essential character (οὐσία, φύσις). Arguably however, this type of reading is paradigmatic of Balthasar's emphasis on the role of difference (between creator and creature) as a motivator of motion. He tends to overemphasize the dependence of the higher order types on the particular.<sup>52</sup>

This passage defines the character of a universal and a particular, for it already assumes their reality and critiques an idea of their relative autonomy. It is also a paradigm for the relation between simple and complex ideas. This interplay is expressed in a structure of 'life as a whole'. The concern of this essay is not to develop a notion of universal and particular but it does focus down on the definitions of created being which have a universal sense. It also examines the internal composition of a universal λόγος of limitation and its relation to particulars. A universal depends on the scope of a statement as whether or not it is internally simple. Note also that in something's internal limit, its φύσις, or any structure representing the essential properties and activities of something, are collections of an interdependent set of differing qualitative operations.

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<sup>50</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 159.

<sup>51</sup> Porphyry's introduction mentions the conversation over whether universals are real or not. He articulates the issue as a complex one in which the competing idea of universals as either real or mere names cannot be resolved easily, so he doesn't attempt to do so, unlike Boethius and the early medieval logicians. Maximus does, at certain times favour a nominalist position, whilst in other places, namely through his engagement with λόγοι, favours a conceptual realism. So he is in one sense unclear, but, as is discussed through chapters 3 and 5, there are good claims for both readings. I think Maximus maintains both. Porphyry, *Introduction*, Translated with a Commentary by Jonathan Barnes (Oxford, New York : Oxford University Press, 2003) 14.

<sup>52</sup> Although Balthasar emphasises 'Balance' in point of fact, as the thesis argues in chapter 4, he does not have an extensive or clear program for describing the positive intentional existence of this 'balance'. Instead, the thesis goes on to argue that he misses some important descriptions of Maximus' that would seem to supply detail that Balthasar does not explore except through the implication that the consequence of the balance between difference is automatically a positive notion of κίνησις. See Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 154-165.

I refrain from giving a complete overview of Maximus' understanding of universals. Some texts including the one above describe an interdependent relation between καθόλου and καθεκαστον without dismissing their independent existence. However, Maximus also takes something akin to a nominalist view, where the traditional exemplars for immaterial structures (Αριθμός) sometimes appear to be merely names for quantities (see chapter 3). Nevertheless, there are good arguments for contextualising his view on Αριθμοι as not representing his understanding of the mathematical. Sufficient to say, that, in the text above, even given the variety of ways that a καθόλου and καθεκαστον could be understood, they are considered, by Maximus, to co-exist and to be co-constituted by each other. This passage does not advocate dispersion of identities so much as articulate the consequence of the necessary co-operation between two qualitative types of accounts. The passage also represents a methodological process as described in the introduction. Maximus' world, like ours, is imbued with concepts and ideas about how the cosmos functions. The ascetic plays a role of clarification in the development of an understanding of motion because of how these orders relate to and interpenetrate each other seamlessly.

The more efficient way to go about establishing a common demarcation (λόγοι) of created motion would be to generate a common definition. Yet the constitution of a demarcation depends not on just a general idea, but emerges from several possibilities and types as illustrated in each region. The issues facing the production of a common demarcation does not involve only choosing between concepts, but in how these concepts underpin ascetic activity. Because their structure emerges in moments where the subject does not necessarily understand the pattern it is encountering. Not all motion is documented under a clear demarcation. The illumination of a common sense of motion will have involved engaging types of motion, not abstractly but through how they manifest to the subject's experience of this complex cosmos.

## **Conclusion: The Emergence of Several Types of Motion**

This chapter illustrated the scope of qualitative difference by examining the scope and demarcation of the different regions. The chapter examined the independent structure and the interaction between the regions within the cosmos. It then looked at the structure of the universal and particular. It also showed how each region's φύσις can

be said to be a peculiar κίνησις, thus showing that they refer to an internal unity which demarcates and is demarcated. Theoretically then, one could be faced with the possibility that there will be different definitions of the character of created κίνησις that seem contradictory. The regions pose a challenge to the capacity to provide a single definition of motion.

I would not want to claim that there are only four or even more ways of demarcating the cosmos. The demarcations of this regional reading are therefore less clearly determinate as to their specific type, there are many different types of distinctions occurring, some internal to the regions, some given through their external relations and dependences. This thesis used ‘region’ and ‘demarcation’ to illustrate the co-dependence and the distinctive activity of each region of the cosmos. Their qualitative differences and the system of relations between them are constituted through different means, efficient causality, the term περιχώρησις, and the council of Chalcedon.

The various orders can become confused in subjective understanding and require clarification. The work of ascetic clarification can reveal the structures that lay implicit. The chapters describe these structures and how they become important in several areas of Maximus’ work. Although the definitions following are, perhaps, too specific to fulfil the role of a general λόγος, the structure, I would contend, remains important for understanding κίνησις even as its quality changes in other definitions.



## Chapter 2 Φύσις, Κίνησις, Λογισμοί

Discussion of Maximus' psychology and his epistemology normally focuses on the role of Christ within the constitution of a correct view of the world.<sup>1</sup> Broadly conceived as πρακτική,<sup>2</sup> or as practical discipline based on the settling of the mind, 'the world', is already has a deep conceptual complexity. However, at the heart of the ascetic moment is the emergence of the distinction within the definition of motion. It can be discussed in terms of two discourses. The first describes the qualities of motion; the second is more concerned with the constitution of that motion, what it consists of. This chapter is concerned to draw out how this distinction impacts the concept of φύσις. It argues that the investigation of φύσις will not provide a complete picture of motion.

There are good grounds for reading φύσις as representing the essential elements within any active principle. However the distinctions around the term that do the most work occur because of ascetic clarification. The concept of φύσις that Maximus refers works with comes about as a result of him determining the difference between the essential and non essential elements of a process. I examine how the term γνώμη<sup>3</sup> and τροπή refers to a misdirection of the essential qualities or character of a specific thing ('φύσις').<sup>4</sup> Φύσις can provide some sense of what motion does, insofar as it 'causes' appearances, or is the origin of a specific action. The concept implies a

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<sup>1</sup> Cullan Joyce, 'Maximus the Confessor's Theological Epistemology.' *Australian Ejournal of Theology* 5, February, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, Chapters 5 & 6 esp:277, 278-9, 282, 298 (transformation of negative vices), ἀπάθεια as the detachment from vices: history and Maximus' own views: 299-301, 304-9. On πρακτική within the three fold ascetic paths and the re-integration of the natural faculties: 337-343. This is the clearest investigation of the general context of the term. The way that I am using it, even up to the discussion of reflection (which is more like an integration between Πράξις and contemplation or natural contemplation (θεορία or θεωρία φυσική) but with an underlying sense of the necessity of the discernment through πρακτική, is as a discernment process in the subject.

<sup>3</sup> This term is often translated as 'deliberation'. Although the term deliberation has a neutral element the Greek term is considered largely in a negative possibility or at least 'an ambiguous term' at least by Maximus and most contemporary scholarship. (The term) "... does not denote an act of will but a disposition or *habitus* of will. . ." Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, 213.

<sup>4</sup> This topic, one of the more potent in recent scholarship, is regularly treated. The best text I have seen on the issue is Törönen's recent work. He is the first author to explore the characteristics of the tropoi, λόγοι structure within the context of Neo-Platonist (Porphyry mainly) logic and with reference to the Byzantine logical manuals. Although his work is somewhat controversial in his claiming for the reading of 'non-rational creatures' as 'persons' or individuals, it is clear that the use of the same language as a discussion of 'human-ness' does not necessarily mean that humans are thereby on the same level as a rock. Clearly he is pointing toward the persistence of a common logical structure for the identification of an individual thing. Melchisedec Törönen, *Union and Distinction in the Thought of Maximus the Confessor* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) 7-9, 12-18.

structure that can be utilised for the elaboration of the constituents of motion. However, Maximus has other descriptions that illustrate the actual constitution of motion more clearly than the mainly qualitative descriptions around φύσις.

The difference between λογισμοί and φύσις, for example, is that the λογισμοί refers to the constituents and connections within a specific process (thinking or consciousness) whereas the concept of φύσις is normally used to describe an event or element that changes as a result of the continuity in a process. The distinction between natural motion (φύσις) and deviant (τροπή) is dependent on the idea of self-continuity. After outlining these issues, the chapter outlines procreative motion and λογισμοί. Λογισμοί remains an important part of my description of κίνησις as self-continuity.

Maximus is largely dependent on Gregory Nazianzum's descriptions of procreative continuity. He clarifies Gregory's discourse by describing how the structure of meanings which arise within procreativity, are identical with the successful demarcation or determination of a specific character. Procreative motion, as a process, does not preclude the arising of specific events, or preclude these events having a soft sense of discontinuity or conflict with each other. Processes of self continuity facilitate the arising of demarcated relations, receptivity, without requiring a unity of content or type.

To illustrate this in terms of Maximus' extended engagement, I look at his conception of λογισμοί. The descriptions around the clarification of the relations and content of λογισμοί provide the content and relations for describing kinesis as in part, that which gives rise to, or facilitates concrete possibilities.

### Φύσις

If the term is taken to refer, most basically, to Aristotle's general sense of "that immanent thing from which a growing thing first begins to grow."<sup>5</sup> Like a 'proto' state, that which is prior to a posterior, which is representative of the 'thing'. It refers to that element, which, if described, will suffice as an explanation for how a thing has come to be. Hence one can see the tendency to regard φύσις as temporally prior to the thing, and prior in its identity, but productive or conditioning the thing. If thing can be classified as that which is classified in terms of its positive possibilities, it does this or

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<sup>5</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V. iv 1015-18. Trans, Hugh Tredennick, Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 221.

that. The role of φύσις above has a causal or originary sense. A causal sense represents the geneses of a specific type of identity. It can be structurally aligned to a material cause, for instance.

A frequent element in the translation of Maximus is how φύσις retains the element of genetic origin of a determinate action.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, although it still maintains a genetic role in Maximus it is one that arises with a specific caveat. The term indicates the basis of activity.<sup>7</sup> It works structurally, as the possibilities of a thing, in which ‘thing’ refers to the elements and actions in a thing that correspond to thing-ness as possessing a character that is defined within a specific soteriological concern. It does not, of itself, contain an explication of how this specific event might come to be. Indeed, the qualities within the φύσις, that allow x or y, are generally taken for granted. Its arising, as a concept of importance in Maximus, represents an ascetic moment, or, put more precisely, it is also an affect of an ascetic moment. The originary role becomes an ethical role. Φύσις, in Maximus’ use, is closer to the description of the origins of a particular action. Hence, one can describe the context of the concept by pointing out that when it emerges for Maximus, it arises out of a conception of origin of x, in other words it comes to describe how the relation to the theological is embodied in specific types of motion, that condition the character of a being to act in this way or that.

In one sense, the φύσις refers to the principles and elements that condition the activity of a specific locality of the definition of the creature as dependent on the hierarchies described in the previous chapter. These can in turn be clarified in relation to each other. However, the clarification of a process in respect to specific determined locale (φύσις) is not necessarily identical to the apprehension of the character of that processes direction or intended purpose. Φύσις is an essential principle, representing how all wholes are characteristic of the continuity of relationships, a principle related to the fundamental intentional activity that defines a creature, and a principle that facilitates all possible acts of willing that can divert natural movement toward a

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<sup>6</sup> CK I, 9, 12, (“Thus just as by nature the mud is dried out by the sun. . .”Berthold, *Maximus*, 130) 67.. II, 22.

<sup>7</sup> Maximus, *Obscure*, PG 91, 276C. “Willing is a natural power, that desires what is natural. Willing is a natural desire that corresponds to the nature of the rational. Willing is natural, the self-determining movement of the self governing mind.” See chapter 6 for a reading of this passage.

different, non-divine *telos*.<sup>8</sup> Hence, the notion of φύσις takes on extra distinctions. It becomes associated with distinctions that are used to describe the difference in how a specific being relates to the fundamental principles of action. There are demarcated apprehensions which are determinations and utilisations of the continuity of the processes within natural activity, which do not grasp the essential purpose of that process: this process is called τροπή, unsympathetically translated as ‘deviance’. When φύσις is used by Maximus, it can refer either to the fundamental processes through which a being acts. Or φύσις is described negatively as the alternative to non-natural purposiveness. This illustrates how φύσις is used as an ethical demarcation as well as a ‘classificatory’ principle. The classification of the difference between φύσις and τροπή can provide some distinctions important in the description of κίνησις as self-continuity.

Within the intentional structure of life, the φύσις exercises a role as a λόγος. Definition relates to the limits and extent or the perimeter of a process (the classification relates to φύσις as its necessary origin). Φύσις therefore stands as a boundary marking the extent of a particular action or principle. “The knowledge of beings includes naturally in view of demonstration<sup>9</sup> . . . their own principles which naturally circumscribe them in a definition.”<sup>10</sup> Natural laws are the same. When Maximus is commenting on lawlessness in subjective actions he notes how trespass occurs when, instead of desiring the gold because of its beauty, it becomes an object of covetousness and potentially theft. Also circumscription in temporal creation is denoted according to the *telos* of φύσις “All things created in time according to time become perfect when they cease their natural growth”<sup>11</sup>. These are actions that overstep natural principles. This is the same understanding that influences the development of the notion of τροπή or deviance. Within φύσις, the principle that is

<sup>8</sup> “If anyone desires anything, he naturally strives to obtain it. Now the divine is incomparably better and more desirable than all good and desirable things. What great zeal, then, should we show to obtain what is good and desirable by nature! (πόσῃν ἅπα σπουδὴν ὀφείλομεν ἐνδείξασθαι, ἵνα τούτου τοῦ φύσει ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμητοῦ τύχωμεν). Maximus, *CL*, PG 90, 968D. Berthold, *Maximus*, 38.

<sup>9</sup> Αἱ τῶν ὄντων γνώσεις, συνηπτημένους φυσικῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοὺς οἰκείους λόγους

<sup>10</sup> . . . οἷς περιγραφὴν φυσικῶς ὑπομένουσιν. Maximus, *CK*, I, 9, PG 90, 1085C. Berthold, *Maximus*, 130.

<sup>11</sup> Ὅσα μὲν ἐν χρόνῳ κατὰ χρόνον δημιουργεῖται τελιωθέντα ἴσταται, λήγουντα τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐξήσεως. . . Maximus, *CK*, I, 35, PG 90, 1096C. Berthold, *Maximus*, 134.

the basis of τροπή is not non-continuous with the operations of φύσις, but arises in relationship to it.

Deviance (τροπή), it seems to me, does not relate to the essence<sup>12</sup> of the soul itself, since this very deviance changes infinitely<sup>13</sup> and does not remain constant as belonging to the essence<sup>14</sup>. On the contrary, it belongs to the movement for which we are responsible<sup>15</sup> with our self-governing-will.<sup>16</sup>

Τροπή is introduced under the idea of γνώμη or deliberative choice by most commentators. Its meaning also comes from overstepping from the activities or principle of motion associated with the essence into something else. It can be read in either way because deliberation and choice are implicated in the overstepping of the boundary. The term τροπή has a location outside of φύσις because of how the action it represents is said to be outside the φύσις of the creature. Although the τροπή is a distinctive aspect of φύσις it does not exert action in the normal sense; it simply augments the motivity of the φύσις. Motivity can be internal to φύσις or external to it. Describing whether something is a proper or improper motion utilises spatial metaphors. Τροπή, γνώμη and φύσις have a motive sense based on whether the motion originates within the φύσις or not, this move gives them their motive and their moral significance. Although *noesis* does not bring φύσις into being, it is important for explicating where an action or motion is occurring. Clarifying the difference between the appearance of the content within a process as a whole (φύσις), and the structure of the continuity of the process itself, is what generates the distinction between φύσις and γνώμη.

The distinction between τροπή and φύσις occurs because there are possibilities for contrary utilisation of the content within the continuity of a process. Within the self-perpetuating continuity of life, different, and seemingly contradictory possibilities arise. The effect is that in cases where the contradiction is not disclosed, the subject apprehends processes as able to utilise good or ill, without any conception

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<sup>12</sup> ψυχῆς ὑπάρχει

<sup>13</sup> μετέβαλλεν ἀπειράκις

<sup>14</sup> οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ διέμενε κατ' οὐσίαν

<sup>15</sup> τὴν κίνησιν τὴν ἐφ' ἡμῖν

<sup>16</sup> τῷ αὐτοκρατορικῷ θελήματι συμφερομένη. Maximus, *Epistle 6*, PG 91, 432A-B. Translated in: Paul Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Concept of “Perpetual Progress”, *Vigiliae Christianae* 46/1 (1992) 151- 171. 157. (Author’s brackets)

of their difference (one has not ‘demarcated’ good or natural motion, from unnatural). This is shown in how, for Maximus the same can operations give rise to effects, whose character can portray a distinctive orientation. To put it in traditional terms, the operations of a process, such as λογισμοί, can either be utilised or delimited in a positive way as φύσις, or utilised incorrectly as τροπή. The τροπή is like a deviant causal possibility and it exudes action that can be measured.<sup>17</sup> Φύσις therefore, can conceal possibilities that can be utilised beyond intended bounds and subjective activity has objective effects that change creaturely organisation. Similar to Origen’s thesis, actions create a cosmos but it is a deceptive or merely apparent unity that is transfixed on the world onto the continuity of creation, by human will, as a mode of creaturely activity.

The φύσις is the continuity of a conditioning structure, and these conditions result in particular possibilities. τροπή are modes related to this primary continuity but can, unless they are clearly understood as distinct, can seem fulfil the criteria of the essential character (φύσις) of the object. For instance, desire for gold can lead to theft because of how the inherent value of Gold’s φύσις is also experienced as the site where accidents or intentional modes also arise, in tension with the φύσις.

### Clarifying the Causal Status of Φύσις

For who in his right mind, and not bereft of a love of virtue, is ignorant of the fact that the eternal movement of the soul around the Good is nothing other than a natural operation<sup>18</sup> (ἐνέργια φυσικὴ) of the soul on which and because of which the soul is perfected? Deviance, however, is unnatural movement suggesting the failure of the causal power of this natural energy.<sup>19</sup> For deviance is, in my estimation, nothing other than weakness and a falling away from our natural operations.<sup>20</sup>

The φύσις, in part, represents a moment in which the distinction between the proper or improper mode of operation arises (if φύσις is considered the proper mode of activity). It is a real distinction, that captures how the totality of the processes that

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<sup>17</sup> Cosmic decay within the created world because of the transgression of bounds, this caused death to arise as a principle of human life. See: Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 185-6.

<sup>18</sup> I think a better translation might be, realised, or perfect operation of the soul. An important element of ἐνέργια is that it represents the actualisation of a process.

<sup>19</sup> ἢ δὲ τροπή, κίνησις παρὰ φύσιν, τὴν ταύτης ἀποτυχίαν τῆς αἰτίας εἰσάγουσα.

<sup>20</sup> καὶ ἑκπτώσις τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ενεργειῶν. . . Maximus, *Epistle 6*, PG 91, 432B Blowers, the Concept of “Perpetual Progress”, 157 (Translator’s Brackets).

condition something, condition it in specific ways. Those specific ways, insofar as they both represent, but do not exhaust the conditions, constitute the character of the being. Hence, in discriminating how a process becomes more refined, one identifies that the specificity of an activity, determines the specificity of its possibilities. Character is destiny, but, within the representation of the φύσις, there will be the capacity for proper or improper realisations.

Although φύσις represents the fundamental character of a creature, insofar as to discriminate as to its content requires describing it in terms of what it is, and what it could do, the discernment of character is the discernment of the actual constitutional properties of something. Hence, for Maximus this process of articulating the purpose of something is fundamentally bought up with understanding it as ethical. Moreover, ethics, as constituting the capacity and extent of creaturely action, represents how the possibilities of a particular process are being realised within the continuity of its life. Possibilities within a specific creature, are not contained within the basic parameters of its immediate character. Indeed, all instances of even the most mundane being, are dependent on larger forces, which positively inhibit its possibilities.

Nevertheless, within the descriptions of how the φύσις acts as the origin of action, it seems to exercise something akin to a causal power. The φύσις is a specific manner in which a process appears. The process is being considered in terms of the different possibilities within it. However the position of the concept is closer to a consideration of the possibilities of a process, rather than the composition of that process in itself. Yet utilising a causal explanation of the φύσις illustrates how the modes of possibility within a created thing, emerge as concrete actions. However this must not be taken as meaning that the φύσις might have the same constitution as the traditional understanding of αἴτιον.

I explained the activity of φύσις first through describing how it is different from a normal causal process. The activity of φύσις in the example above, seems to consist of distinct processes co-operating together to form a unitary principle. It is through the co-operation of internal conditions that a cause can produce a unitive effect. This reading comes from an extended engagement with two of Maximus' texts on the

character of an organic structure and the theological arrangement of processes.<sup>21</sup> A cause generates productive relations but the effects that they produce can be of a different order than the processes that make up the cause in itself. Hence a cause is a unified operation rather than a simple monad like unity and it produces something capable of its own peculiar movement. A common Neo-Platonist example is how the sun gives rise to light and heat which are in variation from their cause but through which the cause can be understood. The light and heat also have a causal efficacy. Moreover when a cause generates an effect this brings into being a demarcation or a boundary between the prior and the later. For instance, the intelligible principles, the λόγοι, ‘circumscribe’ material beings into a type of movement peculiar to physicality. The term αποτυχίαν as ‘failure’ or more properly ‘missing an aim’ is associated with the failure to connect one thing with another.<sup>22</sup> A deviance (γνώμη) in a causal process, does not mean an alteration in its origination conditions, but a shift in how those conditions are put in motion. It can have the connotation of a causal misfire in this case in the sense of an incomplete realisation of a *telos*. It does not represent a necessary or permanent incompleteness.

It could be read as having ethical consequences, insofar as the lack of connection represents a weakness, but it could equally be argued that this is due to the lack of power in the causal principle itself, in the sense that it is unable to be fully realised when γνώμη moves away from the aims of φύσις. The translation of ‘causal’ or ‘foundational’ represents how the momentum of the φύσις exercises volitional activity. Activity in this volitional sense need not necessarily operate toward the divine. That is why there is a qualification of the exercise of natural activity as the compliance of the natural operation of willing (toward the divine).<sup>23</sup> Of course, the main meaning of φύσις is to refer to the characteristic operations that condition and maintain a creature ‘causing’ it to act in proportion to its possibilities.

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<sup>21</sup> The notion of φύσις has a form of ‘complex unity’ which, in its unity includes a sense of causal efficacy. The actual reference stems originally from: Maximus Confessor, *CK*, PG 90 1084, 3. , Berthold, *Maximus*, 129.

<sup>22</sup> τὴν ταύτης ἀποτυχίαν τῆς αἰτίας εἰσάγουσα.

<sup>23</sup> Maximus would argue that it is not always the case that there is a lack of connection, Christ being the principle example, but also in the allegorical readings of scripture where historical figures personify elements of the harmonious relationship to God. Whilst previous figures restored partly the image of God the totality or range of human actions by recapitulating human φύσις to God takes place in Christ because his deliberation is totally in harmony as human and as divine.



He (God) has made it very clear that when the intention has been united to the principle of nature<sup>24</sup> the free choice of those who have kept it so will not be in conflict with God since nothing is considered unreasonable in the principle of nature<sup>25</sup> which is as well a natural and a divine law<sup>26</sup>, when the movement of free will is made in conformity with it.<sup>27</sup>

It is useful to maintain the causal language of φύσις even though it is not actually correct. This language focuses on how the capacity of the creature produces, in its movement, substantive and effective relations, as a result of the continuity of its characteristic operations (φύσις). In cases where the motions are deviant, this is not to say that they do not have a causal efficacy. They reflect a set of possibilities not intended within the original conditions of the creature.

For Maximus, the language of φύσις is a strange mix of ἀρχή, but with a causal (αἰτιον) sense implied.<sup>28</sup> This is not to make it the same as an intelligible principle (λόγοι). In the context of the constitution of subjectivity it is meant more like a subject or origin of the action. It describes the origin of the activity by the creature or the conscious person. The exercise of its procession and activity causes its effects to be circumscribed into different types of limitation, but their extent are determined by the possibilities possessed within the φύσις. Through actions, there arise different possibilities in proportion to the essential capacity of the creature's limits. In τροπή by the propulsion of consequences of decay and death on the one hand, or co-abidance within divinity on the other, depends on how the intention is reacquainted with its originating essence. Because it exercises a circumscriptive action, as determinate of essential principles and therefore their extent, φύσις can be said to be causal, as the site in which possibilities are circumscribed under 'creaturely identity'. Although τρόποι are considered to be a deviant use of the possibilities of the φύσις and thus lack the solidity of actions in obedience to φύσις, this does not

<sup>24</sup> ὅτι τῆς γνώμης ἐνωθείσης τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως, . . .

<sup>25</sup> ἄστασίατος ἔσται πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἢ τῶν τοῦτο κατορθοκότων προαίρεσις· εἴπερ οὐδὲν πέφυκεν ἐνθεορεῖσθαι παράλογον τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως,

<sup>26</sup> ὅς καὶ νόμος ἐστὶ φυσικὸς τε καὶ θεῖος. . .

<sup>27</sup> ὅταν καθ' ἐαυτὸν ενεργουμένην λάβῃ τῆς γνώμης τὴν κίνησιν. Maximus, *Commentary on the Lords Prayer*, PG 90, 901D. Berthold, *Maximus*, 116.

<sup>28</sup> Πάντ τὰ σώματα, κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἀκίνητα κινεῖται δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς· τὰ μὲν, λογικῆς· τὰ δὲ, ἀλόγου· τὰ δὲ, ἀναισθήτου. CL III 31. PG 90 1027A. Berthold, *Maximus*, 65. The sense of congruity between the originary sense and the causal sense is not unusual in either primary or secondary discussions because of how φύσις also represents the fundamental strata motivating creaturely activity toward God.

mean that the language of causal efficacy is negated. The consequences of sin, though less ‘real’ than God and the good, nevertheless remain. The sinful world built up of τροπή has a momentum peculiar to it. This type of organisation has its certainties and uncertainties, its relationship can be juxtaposed to the organised momentum of φύσις and also to the inner relationships of the λόγοι.

One can expect that the definition of φύσις, for Maximus, will consist of the description of various principles and relationships that condition specific possibilities. However, the tones of ἀρχή and αἴτιον, quite valid in certain respects, illustrated above, can give the wrong impression of process *per se*. Processes and motion do not ‘cause’. The term is only helpful insofar as it illustrates the distinction between the principles that condition motion, and the possibilities of motion as a whole. The descriptions of φύσις rely on the persistence of the relationships within the fundamental constituents of the action. It is a distinction which comes at the dynamic externally by taking the dynamic as given, then remarking on its constituents. Moreover, it does not supply a neutral or classificatory language, but one associated with continuities of a specific character.

However, there are other processes within Maximus’ writings that take a different stance on the question of motion as a condition of action. There are approaches that take more time to illustrate the inner convergences within an active being. I classify these into two different descriptions, the first is an illustration of Maximus engagement with Gregory’s idea of motion, the second comes from his illustration of the continuity of a specific type of motion, the λογισμοί, or the self-continuity of consciousness. The different descriptions of procreative continuity below are distinguished from a description of motion as φύσις, by how they are referring to how the continuity of a process conditions anything whatsoever. However, procreative continuity emerges as an element within life through a distinction between within how a process possesses both content and extent possibilities. The difficulty of gaining an impression of the composition of the motion itself is that different preconceptions underline the notion of self-continuity.

The meaning of φύσις already assumes the continuity of processes. Φύσις utilises the conditions and relations that constitute any process whatsoever. Its position as ‘causal’ reflects how κίνησις has a demarcated locality and character; it is

within the cosmos and it can do something. The term refers to the connection between the processes and the thing under investigation. It relates to being a ‘thing’. I would stress that the distinction between the processes as conditioning the thing (if by ‘conditioning’ one recognises the processional or connective relation between the conditions and the thing that is closely related to the definitions of φύσις I have given) is real and reflects real changes in the cosmos. This does not prevent us from examining the constitution of the elements or the conditions through which a determinate principle might come to be. Continuity of processes, as argued below, facilitates the determinate demarcations that the term φύσις refers to.

### **The Effects of Γνώμη or *Noesis***

The distinction between processes and the various possibilities of these processes is not merely a subjective distinction. The sense of *noesis*, of understanding, is one in which insights are local recreations of the cosmos. To a limited extent, the idea of internal insights being concealed in our little minds, is absent from this world view. The world changes when we think. This principle, whilst it does not illustrate the content of κίνησις *per se*, does set up an element that is crucial for contextualising other, more positive descriptions. However, when one type of distinction occurs, this does not necessarily mean that the cosmos has undergone a radical change. Indeed, it could be that the distinction merely illustrates a different manner of relating to something, reflective of the different questions that might be asked by someone.

The content of any kinetic process consists of positive meaning. In the relation between possibilities, when one type of momentum is prevalent (as φύσις) this does not exclude the possibility an alternate force imposing or conditioning a change of trajectory (τροπή). Hence this distinction illustrates how several principles co-operate together, even within a single ‘thing’. Hence, it is important to distinguish how, if one argues that a perspective is encountering the appearances in one way or another, in what way the thing may change depending on the approach one takes.

In a connected system one type of movement can condition an opposite or a movement in a distinctive direction. For instance, the example of the wheel and the cart, the circular movement of the wheel around its axis draws a straight line along the

road.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, because of how an organic structure operates as an interconnected whole, when a quality of it changes this affects how the structure moves.

Every whole- especially every whole that is formed from the synthesis of various elements<sup>30</sup>- even as it preserves its own individual identity in a consistent way, also continues to bear in itself the unmixed difference of the parts that make it up, including even the essential, authentic character and role of each member in relation to the others. On the other hand, the parts-for all their undiminished continuity in their own natural role with in the synthetic relationship- preserve the unitary identity of the whole, which gives them a hypostatic condition of complete indivisibility.<sup>31</sup>

The relation between parts and whole conditions the manner in which a creature is put together. These statements are indicative of a structural interconnection in which relations play a constitutive role. Balthasar places the relationship between higher and lower, καθόλου and καθολικωτέρων (alternatively γένος, εἶδος, ιδιώματα as an example<sup>32</sup>), within this relation above, making the interaction within the γένος pervasive in the εἶδος.

Any definition that contextualises a specific event in light of a large framework not only supplies the structure of explanations but, according to Balthasar's reading of Maximus, creates the fundamental structure within creaturely existence. I discussed this issue in its ontic sense more within the discussion of περιχώρησις. However, insofar as the composition of individual beings can be defined according this vertical and horizontal relationship, this suggests that is an ascetic program were to alter or understand the generative system of a creature this insight will effectively re-iterate the structure of its internal motion. This is not to say that the creature is 're-created' however, insights can provide the transformation or return to the 'natural' order. In this way, incorrect understanding can be as dramatic as defining the generative properties of a specific being contrary to its actual operations.

Hence, the original basis in which the idea of demarcation emerges is through the original clarification of the distinction between the process as a self-continuous

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<sup>29</sup> This example is given as a 'mechanistic explanation'. In terms of delineating a complex movement there are areas within the example that possess rational *teloi* even if they do so only if seen within a broader context. S. Sambursky, *The Physical World of Late Antiquity* (Routledge, London, 1962) 105.

<sup>30</sup> "Πᾶσα γὰρ ὁλότης, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ σύνθεσιν, ἐκ διαφόρων θεωρουμένη, τῆς οἰκίας ὑποστάσεως μοναδικῶς φυλάττουσα τὴν ταυτότητα. . ." Referring to principles that do not bear a mathematically intelligible structure.

<sup>31</sup> Maximus, *Epistle* 13, PG 91, 521C. Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 68-9.

<sup>32</sup> These are the logical terms, ordered from most general to specific, which represents one way that Maximus organises his description of individual motion. I discuss this in chapter 5.

event, and the character of what that process does. As described below, φύσις, the locale of a being or principle under investigation arises, in part, through the distinction between the process and what the process does. The character of something, and its purpose, or destiny, arises through the continuity of the process of life. Both of these questions are representative of different discriminatory moments, and as such, it reflects an engagement that has no longer taken mere-continuity as representative of fact, but allows that the process may in fact contain elements that imply a structural difference from one another. This reflective difference enables the conception of motion as consisting of a causal relation between its fundamental constitutional conditions and the derivative effects. In the classification of the difference between the processes which condition something, and whether that thing is good or bad, etc, the discernment explicitly distinguishes the processes from the judgement concerning the quality of thing that the processes ‘produced’. Hence within the ascetic clarification is an implicit distinguishing between the processes and the qualities of those processes. Through distinguishing between processes and φύσις (the demarcated locales or content of those processes) one sees the context in which the first definition of motion as self-continuity emerges. That is why it is important to keep in mind that ascetic moves, whilst concentrating on certain types of content and relations, could be taking place in dependence on a process that may not be entirely apparent.

### **Procreative Causal Relations**

The previous sections have demarcated some elements of κίνησις. The concept underpins the more determinate form of procession in φύσις. The continuity of the processes continues through the φύσις. It retains some form of causal efficacy which implies a set of possibilities. It facilitates specific activities and possibilities. Whatever self-continuity is, it is not simply the compilation of inert things but is an active relation between these conditioning principles. Implicitly these principles generate concrete possibilities, which change and concretise in a diversity of manners. Hence, within the description of self-continuity, in which no determinate purpose or the ethics of φύσις are necessarily implied, there is already the sense that processes are meaningful.

One element, stemming from the previous discussion, is how, within the ascetic mode distinctions that some could call noetic in fact distribute ‘a new real’ and so recapitulate, in a small manner, the cosmos. The distinctions show changes in the cosmos. Pro-creative causal relations contain descriptions of how the distribution of the renewed cosmos can be found in self-continuity. Self-continuity is internally and externally receptive; its structure is receptive in its continuity. Moreover, the reception is not a shaping of inert material. Motion of this sort contains meaning. The description below examines Gregory Nazianzum’s discussion of procreative continuity. This section discusses how the idea of indeterminate relation, and the potential for definitions (λόγοι) to collapse into each other. It does not deny the relative cogency of any appearance, it simply questions whether or not that appearance stabilises in any consistent way. Indeed, although the criteria of demarcation is virtually identical to the discussion of φύσις and limitation, the Christian view emphasises the fragility of the demarcations being set into either a consistent sense of the world or a formal rule.

(On the structure and flow of spatio-temporal being Gregory says)  
Now it goes away, now it comes back in again, channelled like a constant, flowing river. There are many more aspects you can reflect on, facts about our limbs and parts, about their mutual adaptation, about how they are coordinated and differentiated with a view to practical utility combined with beauty, about how they are dove-tailed together, how they are parted yet function as one, how some act as containers of others- and all this by an in-built condition of their nature.<sup>33</sup>

Maximus examines Gregory within a more abstract discussion of logical relations such as actively uniting sensible and intelligible through the reasonable structuring of proportional being.<sup>34</sup> “For the human consisting of both soul and sensible body, by means of its natural relationship of belonging to each division of creation, is both circumscribed and circumscribes: Through being it is circumscribed and through potency it circumscribes.”<sup>35</sup> Beings are circumscribed internally through the manner of existence as a community of relations. They are circumscribed from without through existing within a community that sustains and supports it. The internal

<sup>33</sup> St Gregory of Nazianzus, *On God and Christ: The Five Theological Orations and Two Letters to Cledonius*, Trans Frederick Williams and Lionel Wickham, Popular Patristics Series (St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, New York, 2002) *Oration* 28, 54. (My brackets)

<sup>34</sup> *Amb* PG 91, 1153A. Louth, *Maximus*, 124.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

movement and orientation of a being gives it the basis of internal potency to act in respect to its own motives and in response to the world around it. The ocean has limits set by the land but it also sets the limits of the land. The ocean is a container of life and of the rivers. In a universe of relations it remains steadfast due to its relationships to others near it. Structures relate to each other together toward harmony. The world is in a pacific tension. Limits are here the specific manner in which a being interacts within a community. Limits are also determined by how a community interacts with it. Being limited refers to the principle of self identity, that a thing, in being itself, is not another. Existing alongside other creatures is also a basis of specificity. Through this relationship is given its determinate relations in time and place. “If, then, nothing that exists is without limitations, clearly everything, in a way corresponding to its nature, is specifically located in time and in place.”<sup>36</sup> “All created being ‘moves completely or else is moved, causes or is caused, contemplates or is contemplated, speaks or is spoken, . . . acts or is acted upon.’”<sup>37</sup>

The continuity of motion is related to internal extension and external delimitation. The exposition of the subject (οὐσία or ὑπωχαιμένων) of an account depends on the enquiry, however insofar as any being is described it has both positive and negative delimitation. Phenomena and enquiry are interdependent. In respect to causal continuity a creature exhibits the capacity for an emergence outside of its previous conditions (the limits of habitual understanding) through the elaboration of the potency accrued in its existence. The consistency of the subject, οὐσία, is a locus of change and the variations in the appearance of the thing come through it exhibiting a multiplicity of region that is can be situated in. An animal has a theological meaning, a biological pattern of life, physics in its movement, etc. οὐσία is ‘steady’ as the subjectivity that is regarded as the context in which these multiple moments occur.

A ‘whole’ does not cease to be once its parts or even its role is redefined in light of new engagements. οὐσία or ὑπερχομένων can denote the broadest sense of the subject of enquiry or meant in specific ways. The manners, in which they exist, have consistent non-self-contradictory features, and as undergoing change, remain

<sup>36</sup> *Amb*. PG 91, 10, 1185A. Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 163.

<sup>37</sup> *Amb*: PG 91, 1296A. Cited by von Balthasar, in *Cosmic Liturgy*, 87.

consistent. In specific sense these things change qualitatively and quantitatively.<sup>38</sup> The character of procreative being is in one sense consistent and in another sense changing. Procreative being, as a discourse, regards the general consistency of the subject and remarks on the variations of appearance that it can undergo. As an account of the variety of these changes, it does not engage with why or through what means they occur. However the predominant sense accompanying positive and negative delimitation is the polemic sense of how a creature is constituted but Maximus is careful to avoid making this tension genuinely polemical. Hence, the structure of procreative, or self-continuous motion, is that it is constituted by the relationship between demarcated principles.

### **Critiquing the Idea of Opposition as Creative<sup>39</sup>**

The procreative motion described, does not present a single stable meaning. The meanings are ‘collected together’ very loosely but have some sense of cohesion. If one pushes the idea that different elements within procreative motion conflict, this seem to suggest that continuity may involve *polemos*. Beings rely on a community of relations for their own existence.<sup>40</sup> There is some equivalence between Stoic ideas of ‘Tension’ as the element of maintenance within something.<sup>41</sup> The tension idea emphasizes the internal connexions that constitute something as essential to it’ maintaining its integrity. The tensile relationships within a process can be likened to the internal structures of relations in Maximus’ procreative continuity. A strong sense of *polemos* cannot maintain itself sufficiently long to contribute to an inherent

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<sup>38</sup> *Amb.* PG 91, 1217AB. Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 154.

<sup>39</sup> I refer to Gregory Nazianzum in this section because of his enormous and well accepted influence on Maximus and to give his relatively complex account of procreative continuity.

<sup>40</sup> Gregory Nazianzum, PG 37, poem 1.1.4, *De mundo*, 419 vs 41-4, and Poem 1.2.14, *De humana natura* 757, vs 25-7. PG 37, 426-7, 35-39. Gregory Nazianzum, *God and Man: The Theological Poetry of St Gregory of Nazianzus*, Popular Patristics Series, Translated by Peter Gilbert (St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, Crestwood NY, 2001) 54. 55,57-8. I note the sympathetic tone with which Gregory treats the orientation of the natural philosophers who, especially in the Stoics, seem to him to be thinkers seeking out the source of the ceaseless flowing world. See p49 note 62 Where Gregory praises the non-Christian thinker for his statement of desire to find the source.

<sup>41</sup> “The tense muscle keeps its shape even under external pressure, the string not only returns, when plucked, to its original position, but to its tension it also owns both its straightness and its sonority. Probably enlarging on such observations the Stoics believed that tension was the cause of all lasting states of things, and indeed of the durability of the things themselves.” F.H. Sandbach, *The Stoics*, Series: Ancient Culture and Society (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975) 76. See also: Charles Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, An Edition of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) Note fragments: XXXVII p 45, LXXVIII p65, LXXXI, LXXXII & LXXXIII p67.



purpose. Instead, the Stoic λόγος, exercises tension in a similar way to how a region affects what is on either side of it. Gregory uses the ocean as an example.<sup>42</sup>

The Christian reading emphasises the pacificity of causal relations. Continuity does not occur through an oppositional juxtaposition of forces. The immanent λόγος expresses the continuity of the principles that might constitute the motion. Differentiated does not denote conflict but relation. The pacificity embraced through the λόγος principle becomes implied within all movement and emplaced in all matter and temporality. The basis of the Stoic resistance to external influence is related to their identification of the process of natural λόγος as an activity untempered by its misapplications in unethical behaviour.<sup>43</sup> If the conflict at the heart of the emergence of something was not intrinsic opposition, but difference, the Christian reading of the Stoic creative emergence would largely agree. Differentiation underlies the emergence of a continuity.<sup>44</sup>

If the essences of creatures seem to move in and out of centrality, if they seem to be 'equal', this state cannot produce 'stable understanding'. Thoughts are implicated into a primitive idea of nature, and then taken in a broader context that includes the experience of a fallen world, the creative tension in the appearance of the 'natural' comes about precisely because there is no clarity regarding appearance and opinion. In my example of procreative self-continuity in λογισμοί, the appearances that are conceived incorrectly as possessed in the φύσις can be at odds with each other. However, they are at odds not because the process has engaged contrary ideas, but because continuity in Maximus, does not of itself include a self-declarative judgement upon its contents.

The theme of *Polemos* relates to notions of absurdity, complexity, and non-being. *Polemos* is not a state that stands as a necessary principle or are incorporating

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<sup>42</sup> Williams & Wickham, *Gregory: On God and Christ*, 58-9. In the Stoics the oppositional principles underlying created things result in a pacific tension. Conflict in the Stoics does not necessarily represent 'opposition' but I think the attempt to reconcile it would strike a Christian ontology as missing the presence of the λόγος within genesis.

<sup>43</sup> In reference to fame (the active character of a man as it is understood throughout a community) Seneca remarks: "... it is unimpaired not only amid silence but even amid denigration." Seneca, *Letter 102, On Immortality*, Translated by: Moses Hadas, *The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca*, Essays and Letters of Seneca (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1958) 251.

<sup>44</sup> The oppositional movement underlying the appearance, presented under the notion of the fire, is mediated through the ordering principle of *Logos*. Christians generally opposed this tendency to present *Logos* as a principle ordering the conflicting relations. One reason is because the cosmology assumed ideas of permanent matter prior to the active agency of a divinity creating from nothing.

or necessary for the codification of the λόγος. For Maximus aesthetic and polemical state of naïve experience represents a state where even God could seem to be on the same level as a lesser being within understanding. There are elements of polemical relations, as implicit in the description of φύσις and *gnomos*. *Polemos* occurs because of how two or more possibilities co-existing in what is an incoherent but still continuous sense of a non-integrated whole. Thus, regardless whether the final status of polemical relations is ‘real’ or they are mere illusions of habit, nevertheless *polemos* exists within a certain region of experience and it is the polemical relations within the world that asceticism attempts to clarify. The aesthetic sphere is a holistic indeterminacy produced from out of biological continuity. Λογισμοί, as a self-continuous motion, seems to include elements that are seemingly contradictory. There is no definitive unity or *telos* associated within the field of activity, in which there is no discernable distinction between the continuity of processes and the content demarcated within them. No purposiveness discloses itself because the process orders intelligibilities, but does not distinguish between whether those intelligible’s are right or wrong *per se*.

Rather than *polemos* or tension representing the constituency of λόγος, under this reading of the phenomena, no single λόγος can yet be discerned and order is mere coherency and continuity of a seemingly random state. Indeterminacy is the predominant manner in which objects appear. It is not a condition so much as how λόγοι can seemingly move back and forth, because the process is being maintained. Indeterminacy can be stated of the phenomena of λογισμοί, insofar as it describes how the continuity of the process appears as a complex cohesion of relations. In this way, and I would emphasize that the term complexity is an explanation of a characteristic and not explanatory. The sense of motion that prevails within λογισμοί, is one in which pacificity occurs because there is no discernment, internal to the process, which demarcates between correct or incorrect constituents and relations. Pacificity, therefore, is not identical to ‘natural knowing’. The mere continuity of the λογισμοί does not represent a state of natural understanding. Λογισμοί, as a process, is essential in maintaining the continuity of the psychic. Therefore it represents a condition, insofar as continuity is less concerned with true or false, but simply with the maintenance of itself. I claim that λογισμοί is good model for identifying the

constitution of procreative continuity more generally. This means that continuity does not entail multiplication of the same principles, but refers to the continuity and relationship between diverse elements.

### Compilation and Naming

This section discusses how the collection of content and the relation between principles that can be demarcated (λόγοι) are augmented by a receptive or incorporative element and a productive element. This description differs from the previous discussion of *noetic* receptivity so that it is ambivalent as to whether the incorporation achieves a positive or negative result. Indeed, it simply could be that it enables the process of self-continuity to continue.

Some thoughts are simple (λογισμῶν), others compound (σύνθετοι). The simple are without passion (ἀπαθεῖς (unaffected or passionless)), but the compound are with passion (οἱ ἐμπαθεῖς (affected, impassioned)) , as composed of passion (πάθος) plus representation (νοήματα). In this case, one can see that many simple thoughts follow on the compound when they have begun to be moved to sin by the mind. Take money, for example. A passionate thought arises in someone's μνήμην about gold. In his mind he has the urge to steal and with his heart he accomplishes the sin. Now with the μνήμην of the gold will come also the μνήμην of the purse, the chest, the room, and so forth. Now (at this time) the μνήμην of the gold is (has become) compound for it displayed passion; but that of the purse, chest, and so forth, is simple, for the mind had no passion toward them. And so it is with every thought, with vainglory, with women, and so forth. For not all thoughts which accompany an impassioned thought are themselves passionate, as the example has shown. Thus from this we can know what are impassioned representations (ἐμπαθεῖ νοήματα) and what are simple.<sup>45</sup>

I utilise this passage above for the description of motion because it can illustrate how the number of the considerations I have mentioned, come together to form what, for Maximus, is the continuity of the process of conscious life. The difficulty of reflecting

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<sup>45</sup> CL II, 84. PG 90 1009D-1012A. Berthold, *Maximus*, 58-9. I would like to point out the difficulty in translating the term πάθος as passion in this particular passage. The term of πάθος and ἀπαθεῖς can be translated as affected or unaffected in respect to the apprehension of the νοήματα. Pathos is referring to the affective or attribution of μνήμην data but this does not necessarily mean that the subject who is under πάθος is under the sway of passion as it is normally understood. In this passage πάθος refers to the subject being overly affected by the internal dialogue process to the extent that his apprehension of the world is affected in respect not to its own characteristics but through the impositions given through μνήμην. Here ἀπαθεῖς refers to the amount of internal influence on the object through μνήμην.

only on the section describing Gregory's views is that he does not illustrate how a procession can be the source both of self-continuity, in the sense he describes, but also the causal or originating element, within the character of a process as φύσις. The passage above shows the basic process occurring when any name becomes related to anything, and also how any φύσις can acquire added structures of moral significance. The structure of naming is conceptually complex and is a compilation of different activities. The organisation of the structure is initially naïve, insofar as the organisation of the engagement in the world does not immediately suggest the necessity of a process of critical analysis. The appearance of the consideration of compilation within our engagement in the world reflects the effects of asceticism in clarifying the potentially opposing structures in the world. Hence concepts and the λόγοι, in relation to the creatures they relate to, do so with immediacy that does not raise doubts as to its efficiency: it normally just happens. Because this relationship is so instantaneous unless critical engagement occurs then there would be no reason to presume that one's ideas about the world are incorrect.

The terms λογισμοί and σύνθετον refer to this operation whereby the subject experiences the world in a fairly coherent, if occasionally conflicting, manner. Both terms suggest the compilation of some things through cognitive and aesthetic processes σύνθετον, or the co-operation of the meanings (λόγοι) within a processional stream (λογισμοί). I would argue that an effective model for describing the processes whereby a concept is both related to an object and becomes related to the 'store house of meanings in μνήμην function through a process that is compilatory in character. The character of σύνθετοι and the compilation of meanings (λογισμοί) produce what appears as the processionally consistent phenomenon of psyche that is actually, upon further examination, a complex cohesion.

A passionate representation<sup>46</sup>, is a thought made up of passion and representation<sup>47</sup>. Let us separate the passion from the representation<sup>48</sup>, and the simple thought will remain.<sup>49</sup> We can, if

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<sup>46</sup> Νόημά ἐστι ἐμπαθὲς

<sup>47</sup> λογισμὸς σύνθετος ἀπο πάθους καὶ νοήματος.

<sup>48</sup> Χωρίσωμεν τὸ πάθος ἀπὸ τοῦ νοήματος. . .

<sup>49</sup> καὶ ἀπομένι ὁ λογισμὸς ψιλός. . .

we wish, make this separation through spiritual love and self-mastery<sup>50</sup> (willing or intentional action).<sup>51</sup>

The relation between λογισμοί and σύνθετοι does not render the *noemata* (meaningful thought) incapable of being represented through λογισμοί as a process. Παθος can affect the λογισμοί by binding it to an incorrect idea or association of the object. But the natural functioning of the mind, its basic processional activity, continues regardless. λογισμοί and even σύνθετοι are functions that are activities of the psyche that give the basis for understanding. The functioning of the νοῦς includes σύνθετος but σύνθετοι need not refer to the confusion between the conceptions given in internal generation and the active principle of ‘external’ λόγοι. Σύνθετοι are not always confused opinions upon the νόημα of the λόγοι. Each element retains a distinct function. Σύνθετοι is a process which can synthesize the παθοι as well as απαθος that arise through μνήμην, meaning that the internal activity that gives rise to confusions can be re-aligned through the apprehension of the λόγοι (proper functions in beings).

To be subject to οἱ ἐμπαθεῖς affections refers to how a neutral activity is subject to re-alignment according to the apprehension of *noemata*. Σύνθετος does not lead to the genetic structure of νοῦς being removed from the un-fabricated processes through which it can generate clear ideas. The mind is not destroyed through being too strongly affected by ill-conceived opinion. Maximus is suggesting that the nature of the λογισμοί, as a process, can be considered as ἀπάθη in respect to internal understandings insofar as the συνθέσις of μνήμην can be shown as a secondary collection that needs to be carefully scrutinized. But unless the role of the other co-ordinated functions of the rational mind can be seen in their proper light in respect to λογισμοί then we cannot distinguish between attributing *noemata* the false ideas that become part of the psyche that is recapitulated in the μνήμην. Hence patterns of false representation, do not affect the continuity of the psychic λογισμοί. This means that the structure of self continuity does not itself consist, nor actually depend on, discrimination between true and false content.

<sup>50</sup> Χωρίζομεν δὲ δι’ ἀγάπης πνευματικῆς καὶ ἐγκρατείας ἐὰν θέλωμεν

<sup>51</sup> CL III 43. PG 90, 1029B. Berthold, *Maximus Confessor*, 67.

Even the *τελος* of the ascetic explication of *λογισμοί* identifies no set of external criteria *per se*, but focuses on the internal arrangement of the *φύσις*. The *τελος* is the continuity of the organic structure itself. Internal continuity, internal *τελος*, therefore, is a distinctive element of motion. This type of description can be absent from a qualitative or evaluative discourse. No additional explanation is identified and the possibility of a broader *τελος* being implicated into *φύσις* is not yet achievable. In this way creaturely momentum is defined as mere continuity or the maintenance of the same form, focusing on the maintenance of internal ordering, which, by the continuity of its ordering, facilitates concrete demarcations. The ascetic moment articulates the orders impacted by *λόγοι* into the real so as to determine what type of *λόγος* impedes or allows the continuity of the creature. Hence the creature is defined by its previous states which form the content for any judgement concerning its *λόγοι*. It does not evolve as such; its activity is becomes demarcated.

Insofar as an action occurs, the constituent elements as *λογισμοί* and *σύνθετοι*, represent the fundamental continuity from which ethical or evaluative descriptions of *φύσις*, as the origin of specific events, are determined. Therefore, their continuity acts as a fundamental condition for the representation of ethical extent and evaluation. This means that, even though the character of how each element connects to each other has not been precisely shown, the continuity conditions all extents. Hence, in terms of how, as an active process, it engenders specific extents, the specific ingredients of the collection aside, the continuity of the process itself acts as the condition prescribing the extent of the possibilities of specific limits.

*Noemata* are important, not so much for the psychic content, but for how they have a delimited spatial sense. Although ‘evolution’ may be too strong a term for what is basically the characteristic operation of *λογισμοί*, it does illustrate how the difference between the indeterminate continuity in a process, and the determinate continuity of a process, is based on the extent to which a determination occurs. The *συνθέσις* is therefore a description of the affect of relations within those demarcated locales (here designated by *noemata*). Hence, those statements, concerning determination and quality, are representative of the basic constituents of continuity, as conditioning demarcation. Continuity consists of several different qualities of relation, but these are to be considered as part of the continuity itself. The addition of

qualitative evaluation can, and does, lead to a reading of continuity as the neutral continuity from which specific demarcations occur. The following section considers how these relations, through the term συνθέσις, are used to represent the receptivity of continuity.

### Λόγισμοι, Συνθεσίς and Psychic Continuity.

Recent scholarship has struggled to clarify the meaning of the term λογισμοί. It has been read as ‘sinful thoughts’<sup>52</sup> because it emerges from its use in ascetic contexts. However, it also has a more general tone, representing the continuity of meanings (λόγοι) within consciousness. Insofar as Maximus’ broader ontology recognises the distinction between essential operations and modes, the meaning of the term is ‘stream of meaningful λόγοι’ or the compilation of meaningful ideas of things. It is ‘neutral’ before it is ‘affected’. The problem is made increasingly complex by the addition of the terms εμπασθεῖς and πάθος, which can represent minds or psychic activities that are negatively affected. Maximus applies the terms: τὸ εμπασθεῖς ἔχειν λογισμούς<sup>53</sup> and καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς νοημάτων προβολή<sup>54</sup>. The context in which λογισμούς and νοημάτων become negative is dependent on what other terms they are related to. In the case of these two passages, the context is describing how the subject is affected by misuse of the representations of creatures.

It is important that Maximus does not necessarily identify συνθέται with sin when talking about the process of thinking itself. Instead there is a co-opting of the mode of natural thinking by thinking that is affected by incorrect ideas. This means that the ‘affection’ of the λογισμοί is a different or divergent aspect of its normative continuity. Even when talking about passionate thoughts Maximus does not necessarily use λογισμοί or συνθέσις to indicate mixing is negative, note the use of εμπασθεῖς.<sup>55</sup> In terms of the συμπασθεια and εμπασθεῖς in which the subject is

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<sup>52</sup> This is mainly from Berthold’s influential translation.

<sup>53</sup> *CL* III,34. PG 90 1028B-C.

<sup>54</sup> *CL* III, 35. PG 90 1028C.

<sup>55</sup> Although Berthold’s translation is much more clear and consistent to the text than the recent translation of the *Philokalia* the use of the word simple in reference to simple representations (*CL* III 49) Berthold has not been able to illustrate the subtle changes taking place between thinking λογισμοί, representations νοήματα. It is a monumental task to be sure, but the *CL* show Maximus at his most psychologically straightforward and profound on these matters. The change in terminology in λογισμοί and πάθος show how sensitive he is to distinctions between natural and affected processes.

disposed toward something λογισμοί is a neutral activity. It is just the stream of mental activity rather than a negative process. πάθεσις, ἀπαθεσις, συνθέσις, λογισμοί or μνήμην are not flawed in terms of what they do. It is when the continuity of their processes become negatively affected that they become ‘corrupted’ or covered over. This is Maximus describing how a mistaken principle can become a guiding ontological notion, even in the case where the process so co-opted is not intrinsically ‘evil’.

It shows a state where the subject is unable, at this stage, to present a formal representation of the λόγοι within λογισμοί that are the meaningful elements of the world as they are organised through the continuity of consciousness. The collection of different phenomena and their indeterminate coherence are loosely coherent yet they do not adhere to a specific ‘essence’. Even if affection in either contents or relationships within the processes themselves, was to be arbitrated as the pivotal notion of quality, it is important that the generative demarcations that arise are not prefigured by a determinate affect. Determination can mean how the operative specificity of this particular relation co-operates within the larger order.

Indeed, although the λογισμοί may seem to be a collection of specific demarcations (λόγοι) this is not to say that, within their processional relation, that they appear as singular. Indeed, it is not until the final chapter that the actual constitutional appearance becomes clearer. The λογισμοί are the collection of the variety of principles which are potentially demarcated within a locale. The procession of psychic continuity acts as the site in which concrete possibilities are realised. Yet insofar as their procession is self-continuous, the continuity of the processes appearance is not in the strict sense of φύσις, but is as self-perpetuation. Instead it is better to see in this structure, the emergence of a sense of self-continuity as being the representation of the collection of specific types of principles. In this case, what self-continuity is referring to will depend on the manner in which the process is constructed in terms of a demarcated locale (φύσις). Insofar as the content of the processes of consciousness are determined to consist in the co-operation between demarcated meanings, the classification of them as ‘mere continuity’ is a naive portrayal of what a process can refer to. Indeed, motion, under this definition, appears to consist of the continuity and co-operation between various principles. This basic



form remains important for the κατηγορία discussed in the next chapter. The following discussions show how gradually procreative self-continuity emerges as relating to processes that are considered quite sophisticated.

It is important to note that self-continuity gives rise to specific possibilities. These may not be totally determinate, but it is the continuity of their relation to each other, that provides for the increasing sense of purposiveness and demarcation, present in other structures, that rely on procreativity for the maintenance of their continuity. The κατηγορία represent what seems to consist of identifying an adequate λόγοι among many possibilities. And it is because of the lack of a break in habituation that no unifying structures seem to develop within the process of making an account of things. The somatic demarcates a conceptualised sphere in which the changing of λόγοι and realities seems to occur with such frequency that a unitive idea of experience cannot take hold. Things hold together, but no reason or hierarchy announces itself as to why. The potencies work in relation to a demarcated set of relations, they only perform actions in relation to their possibilities, but these are not determined by a higher formative order. Nevertheless, this disclosure is not unintelligible, the possibilities are real, but they are indeterminate, the continuity of the system makes λόγοι appear as somewhat interchangeable. The continuity of τροπή nevertheless exhibits consistent type of movement regardless of whether it is correct or affected. The ‘essential’ motivity of life is not fundamentally corrupted but its motion is misdirected.

The λογισμοί gives us the material to distinguish the content of self-continuous motion.<sup>56</sup> Motion is associated the indeterminacy of the relation between demarcated states λόγοι (ideas of creatures). Procreative continuity, therefore, is the seat of creaturely possibilities.<sup>57</sup> It is experienced as the continuity of life, but continuity is not empty of determinate content, it arises as the specific possibilities and limits of demarcated locales (λόγοι), determined through the continuity of their relation to each other. This corresponds to procreative continuity in which the understanding the world is not inert, but based on the continual relationship between

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<sup>56</sup> CL, II, 74, 84. PG 90, 1008B, 1010D. Berthold, *Maximus*, 58. “Some thoughts are simple, others compound.”

<sup>57</sup> CL, II, 31-32. PG 90, 993D-996A. 996A-B.

the continuity of a process, and the possibilities which that process enables.<sup>58</sup> The principle of the λογισμοί represents a process of life.<sup>59</sup>

The process of λογισμοί describes the element underlying the experience of the world as the sense of processional continuity. The description of the constitution of συνθέσις, shows that intrinsic to procreative continuity is the capacity of a process to relate and connect the determinate potencies of things. Hence connection is the adaptation of demarcated locales, into a relationship. Agency, or intention, is difficult to determine, that is true, for the subject is not in control of the process, but the process represents the condition of the subject's specific engagements. Processes can only provide specific conditions through remaining continuously related internally. Moreover, the consideration of φύσις showed that it represented a limitation of the extent of the effectiveness of the content produced by those processes. The first step to understanding what a process is, is to distinguish between processes and their effects, hence the initial intentional relation from which there is developed an idea of what a self-continuous process is, takes place out of an 'ascetic need'.

Motion is that which gives rise to determinate events and demarcated relations. The question is whether it might not be better to classify motion so far, as that which is the outcome of the relations between determinate locales, and as that which is affected through continuity. It is difficult to get a hold on exactly what is going on within continuity. If there is the whole, and the whole is internally receptive, this is not to say that the reception occurring in this description has a determinate *telos*. However, the contrary is not the case either, for the continuity of the process is not based on an inert stability. Relations within the community of logoi described above, do not consist of *polemos*, nor of pacificity if that is meant as a naturally arising comprehension of the order, purpose and character of something. Motion accomplishes the generation of determinable meaning, through relations and content remaining in a pacific tension. It is not clear, at this stage, if there has been sufficient description of relations in order to provide a consistent sense of how it is possible that motion occurs. What we have gained by looking at inner processes is the sense of self-continuity as indisputably part of natural operation, and moreover, a process that

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<sup>58</sup> CL II, 15, 17. PG 90, 988C-D, 989A-B.

<sup>59</sup> CL II, 84. PG 90, 1009D.

conditions specific relations and content. One must therefore be aware of the likelihood that the constitution of continuity may well be found elsewhere.

### **Conclusion: The Structure of Procreative Motion and the Move Toward Increased Determinacy**

Maximus understands that, it is only through the continuity of life of the intelligent creature, that new possibilities emerge. The term ‘procreative continuity’ represents the mere continuity of a state of life. This kind of κίνησις contains elements that are possibly demarcated, or already demarcated and in relationship to each other, within the continuity of their procession. Hence motion is not defined by a simple description of φύσις, for the possibilities described within the causal sense of φύσις emerge by assuming the self-continuity within a system. The definition of φύσις is likened to the activities available to a self-continuous system. The actions deriving from φύσις generate specific demarcations or character, from within its specific continuity, and thereby facilitate the production of certain effects. This eliminates using φύσις to represent the actual process of continuity. Φύσις employs a distinction that demarcates proper from improper, but in doing so, signals that there is still a self-persistent process occurring. The clarification of the ethical causal status of φύσις, allows one to see that, although both good and bad effects are discriminated, that the sense of causality is there as a distinctive quality of the continuity of procreative life. The φύσις as origin of potential is illustrative of the different possibilities constituted within the continuity of processional life. The description of λογισμοί articulates how motion consists, in part, of self continuity.

Procreative continuity consists of the collection of meaningful and demarcated relations, but only that the specific character of said demarcation can collect seeming random or even polemical relations. However, these relations, though often distinct, do not destroy continuity. Moreover, λογισμοί is distinguished by being useful for describing the neutral continuity of a process. It partly emerges out of the ascetic context which is engaged in the distinguishing of elements within a process. In this case the argument emerges out of a description of how the content and relation extends the possibilities of meaning. The production of self-continuity as pacific relation occurs as an ascetic mode, for distinguishing proper from improper, but from

## Chapter 2

identifying that both proper and improper are related to the capacity of self-continuity to 'produce' activity. Looking at the descriptions of λογισμοί in a neutral way allow us to see how the process underlying a quality, regardless of whether the quality of that appearance is considered proper or improper, is conditioned by the continuity of content remaining in relationship to each other. Therefore one can see that demarcation and determination are fundamental characteristics of motion itself.

## Chapter 3 The Development of Κατηγορία

The structure of motion, as generative of self contained principles in relation to each other, will become more clearly defined in other areas. Indeed, μνήμην (recollective dispositions) and the κατηγορία (the definitions of those dispositions, formulated into names: ὄνομα) are dependent on procreative self-continuity. The continuity, relations and content in these processes arise as a semantic order. Without having processional continuity, any arising of a determinate locale of meaning (λόγος) seems miraculous. And the language of the κατηγορία has a sense of them being ‘simply there’. The explanation of the ground of their emergence has been only vaguely given here. Suffice it to say, the organisation of names (ὄνομα) occurs because of how the self-continuity of consciousness exercises specific effects (ὄνομα). The character of self-continuity generates determinate meanings. The structure of λογισμοί, facilitates concrete possibilities. It is important to articulate how possibilities and relations are real, affective and, in this discussion, articulatory. The benefit of articulating the procreative continuity of the λογισμοί in relation to the μνήμην and the κατηγορία is that one can see the relation between biological processes, consists of the relationship between principles that can exercise effects (even if they are not adequately articulated). The experience of procreativity in conscious life, that is to say in a life where consciousness works within and generates structures called ὄνομα (names), is not as a set of random attempts, but the processional collection of the totality of names. Thereafter, the person knows and accumulates knowledge by because the system of biological life relies on the relation between differences. The continuity of the relation between demarcations reflects the continuity and content of a biological process.

The κατηγορία are not disconnected from the procreative sense described, but arises through it. The ‘system of κατηγορία’ represents the qualities of demarcations related to how the self-continuity of the system described above, can be utilised within the process of the collection of names. Even though the κατηγορία can be formally or systematically arranged, this does not mean that they are therefore unrelated to the procreative continuity. Instead, they are a developed demarcation of the general constitution and activity of the self-continuity of consciousness. Indeed, the process of consciousness, as explicitly that which engages in understanding, is

described through μνήμην. The κατηγορία are more formal, to be sure, but μνήμην is the basic activity, from which the κατηγορία emerge. Both μνήμην and the κατηγορία are clarifications of what of the actual affects of the continuity of procreativity within λογισμοί. It is where the life of consciousness has been investigated in terms of its fundamental properties and activities. In these relations it is possible to see that processes and motion, is not always the same, which it relates to specific types of processes, some of which act differently than others.

There are two important structures to be taken into account here: 1) the μνήμην, translated as memory or recollection (I prefer recollection which can be expanded into: the continuity of a consciousness discerned through specific acts of circumscription), and 2) the κατηγορία. In the first case, 'μνήμην' stands in a relation to λογισμοί as a description of the content of its activity. However, whereas λογισμοί is presented as a state in which meanings (λόγοι) cohere in relation to each other, 'μνήμην' is a term that describes the origins of these λόγοι as names (ὄνομα). Μνήμην is not a faculty because the term is meant to describe a process and not a location or set of activities, instead, Maximus seems to take it as a given. The unquestioned but representable position of μνήμην is akin to a primordial activity of consciousnesses activity of representing the world. Where there is consciousness there is μνήμην and hence μνήμην can almost be equated to consciousness. The difference between the two expressions is that λογισμοί expresses the process where as μνήμην expresses the content of that process. It expresses how consciousness is not neutral but provides concrete conceptions of the world through its continuity. The μνήμην is a more developed notion of λογισμοί. Thus the discussion has moved from the primary experience of discernment: asceticism and λογισμοί, and has begun to ask where these λόγοι even arise from. The strange fact is that the investigation of μνήμην does not yield a psychology. The equivalent structures that emerge as descriptions of its activities are the κατηγορία. In this way, the κατηγορία are an attempt to explicate the activity of μνήμην. These two structures, because of their position is almost a 'conditions' for the ascetic moment (even if their explication is more abstract and therefore posterior to asceticism), are the primary structures that demarcate the bare essentials within a rational psyche. It is therefore interesting that the choice Maximus makes is to remark on their formal structure rather than the

‘objects’ they intend toward. This shows that in the case for understanding the composition of reality Maximus is as concerned with defining phenomena as he is with defining the character of defining itself. When Maximus asks: what am I reflecting on? The structure that is implicit and the primitive system emerging are *μνήμην* and the *κατηγορία* respectively.

This shows that as reflection grows there is a tendency to ‘neutralise’ the phenomena (shown by how the *μνήμην* is a ubiquitous though implicit process of naming’) as well as demarcate a common activity (the activity of formal categorisation is defined by the concern for identifying the proper names that arise from *μνήμην*). Hence the explication of these two structures results in the identification of a natural activity, and the development of a formal definition of that activities ‘proper motion’. The *κατηγορία* are absolutely crucial for gaining an understanding of phenomena and they represent the introduction of a program that formalises the basic concerns over clarification found within practical asceticism.

The reason Maximus places *μνήμην* and *κατηγορία* within the description of self-continuity rather than regarding them as a closed system is because they lack the unity of a single intentional mode. They recapitulate themselves according to a complex cohesion of principles and orientations without the single unifying direction of a teleological idea of being. This lack of unification in which self-continuity, though intelligible, is nevertheless directed haphazardly, the two principles described in this chapter represent how procreative motion acts as knowing consciousness. The *κατηγορία* are the formalised formula for deciding between expressions of procreative continuity among competing conceptual structures. However, the continuity of the motion as these specific demarcations emerge, show how one motion emerges into the other. Their recapitulation and their organisation, rather than being of a purely material organism, organises conceptual structures to continue to ‘produce’ the pre-established structures in relation to the present. Unless a higher synthetic mode or *telos* is discovered through the form of a reflective moment the expression of *κατηγορία* and recollective unity arises as the natural happenstance of psychic continuity.

For Maximus the *κατηγορία* and *μνήμην* disclose an operation, where despite the intelligibility of creature, these representations are subject to constant change. *Κίνησις* here has become more determinate. Yet because the basis of the

name is only considered in respect to other possible names this type of enquiry is not considered to break with the unreflective acceptance of habits of sense or of meaning. Moreover, although *telos* was established in a primitive way within procreativity (as the concern for the persistence of a particular state of affairs) in this discussion the idea of purposiveness is yet to implicate or relate to larger structures like a general idea of created κίνησις.

## **Porphry and the Κατηγορία**

The κατηγορία are the first account or analysis of a thing. Their function is to encompass the content and operations of the thing assuming its identity (οὐσία) ‘what is it?’ as prior to the collection of data concerning how much? Where? Porphyry’s account utilises the preliminary questions of γένος and εἶδος to establish the general region of the οὐσία. In cases where subjectivity is not clearly established some engagements can proceed. These engagements are an attempt to clarify the type of name that may be applied to something. Porphyry did not consider, in the context of preliminary subjectivity, that identifying a γένος or εἶδος amounts to a speculative move:

Aristotle took the word predicate [κατηγορία] which was used in ordinary language of courtroom prosecutions, . . . and adapted it to the application of meaningful expressions [λεξις] to things. Hence every simple meaningful expression, when it is applied to or said of the meant thing, is called a predicate [κατηγορία]. For example, this stone, to which we point and which we touch and see, is a thing; and when we say of it that this is a stone, the expression stone is a predicate [κατηγορημά]; for it means a thing of this sort, and it is applied to the thing to which we point. And so in other cases.<sup>1</sup>

## **Circumscriptive Speech in Porphyry.**

This discussion is related to naming the character of the κατηγορία. The conceptual structure therein has a stated type of affection which is defined by the collection and or positing of a particular conceptual character to an object. It figures as the first structure of circumscription and, because a conceptual structure is present, the priority of understanding κατηγορία arises through the recollective movement of ‘application’. The κατηγορία reflect a motion that is a relation between an internal

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<sup>1</sup> Porphyry, *Introduction*, 69. Commentary by Jonathan Barnes quoting: Porphyry, *Commentary on the Κατηγορία*, 56.5-13.



propensity (internal framework) and an external thing. Collecting ‘expressions’ considering and describing what something is emerges through a particular noetic act. A *categoreal* examination pertains to the engagement peculiar to a circumscriptive relation in which subjectivity is assumed as the basis of further clarification.

### Γένος and Εἶδος: Establishing ὄνομα

From Porphyry’s *Introduction*: “Again we call a γένος that under which a εἶδος is ordered, no doubt in virtue of a similarity with the former cases; for such a γένος is a sought of origin for the items under it. . .”<sup>2</sup> His comment, relating also to his discussion of the relation between universals and particulars, remarks on the dependence of any effective explanation has of generic relation and particular qualities which mark its participation in a generic γένος. The statement of ‘dependence’ by which a γένος ‘organises’ the εἶδος is his way of co-ordinating the explanation of principles demarcated under a mode general notion. By stating that these demarcations are not causal *per se*, but related to the generation of an account, he is limiting the capacity significantly. In reference to Aristotle’s work:

Of secondary substances, the εἶδος is more truly substance than γένος, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if anyone should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the εἶδος than by stating the γένος.<sup>3</sup>

Rendering a proper account need not define a thing to a higher relation. Circumscribing something generically still incorporates specific moments. This indicates diverse structures in the circumscriptive act: 1) related to a specific thing in which a general proposition is assumed. 2) Using a genera which, once found, confirms the identity of a specific. Additionally, the specific or general helps to articulate the content of the other. Both of these cases generic concepts and specific things arise together. The circumscriptive act is neither generic nor specific exclusively, but has a co-operative constitution. If the causal status of γένος is that it is the origin from which a name is gathered then the structure cannot be abstracted

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<sup>2</sup> Porphyry, *Introduction*, 4.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle, *Categoriae*, Bk 5 2 5-10. In: Aristotle, *Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics*, Translated by H. P. Cooke, Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Classical Library, Ed Jeffery Henderson (325) (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 22-23.

into a further region of engagement such as theology or a specialised understanding of οὐσία as cause qua cause.

For example, γένος and εἶδος are hierarchical relations applied in the same sense of circumscription in the κατηγορία as explicitly generic names or accounts of something. Γένος and εἶδος, - in articulating that a specific is posterior to the γένος, makes a comment not only on consciousness but also of the object of investigation. This order possesses the same type of structural priority in ‘speech or thought’ suggesting that the generality and the specificity are mutually conditioning processes. Γένος and εἶδος are co-operative, and emerge with the particular circumscriptive movement of naming. Here a cause is simply stages in an act of meaning making which are dependent on certain structures evident from the arising of the speech act itself (and not linguistic or transcendental arcana perse). ‘Prior’ causal structures are the conditions of meaningful speech. For Aristotle εἶδος is considered more informative. Yet the constitutional basis of γένος is assumed to provide a genetic basis for the εἶδος. Γένος can at least be articulated as the form that facilitates subsequent elements within the process of naming.

Distinctions often reflect movements through different orders of reality. However, in the use above, the term ‘names’ (ὄνομα) denote an order that is not explicitly related to θεωρία, where the generation of names is not made in relation to a contemplative or causal schematic.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, ascetic re-ordering need not explicitly comprehend that there is a common order in which the functions of things are part of their broader relation (οὐσία, γένος and εἶδος). And θεωρία normally is meant as a higher or causal reflection. Yet if naming requires no explicit insight into the world for the organisation of, what is clearly emerging into a conceptual schematic, this is to say that the structure of the organisation reflects the lack of directed activity. The procreative elements of the κατηγορία and μνήμην, are occurring out of a demarcation emerging through procreative potency, rather than one attached to an explicit *telos* toward gnosis, for example.

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<sup>4</sup> Sarah Klitenic Wear and John Dillon, *Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neo-Platonist Tradition: Despoiling the Hellenes* (Ashgate, Aldershot, England, 2007) 87-97. This work gives a detailed sweep it indicates how names can become part of a symbolic or theoretical order.

## Maximus on Porphyry

The structure of γένος and εἶδος include subordinate principles (εἶδοι) and establishing principles (γένος). These levels are diverse, and the increasing hierarchies are employed to provide an analysis of the area of concern. In other words, the explanatory power of εἶδος, though relating to the ‘higher’ or more general γένος, does not need to identify an independent substantial λόγοι or οὐσία in the likeness of γένος as its procreative or generative cause. The concerns of κατηγορία do not necessarily imply a substratum (though they have been interpreted as having this through the predominant focus on a metaphysical reading of Aristotle). They are flexible terms of noetic and relations through λέγονται. If γένος and εἶδος are relations requisite for meaningful speech but not causes *per se* then they can be viewed pragmatically. Maximus sees these explanations as instituting a model of meaning based on the capacity of explanations to proceed further along a chain.<sup>5</sup> Maximus conceives them as constituted largely through pragmatic concerns around the idea of correctly naming something before asking why it came to be. This is part of his belief that a term or a description, even when highly effective, cannot capture the extent of the relations necessary (on a theological reading) for a single being to exist.

Maximus takes the basic constitution of the circumscriptive act as virtually assumed. It emerges in relation to how procreative continuity in consciousness is taken ‘as a fact’. Maximus says little that disputes how γένος and εἶδος are used. As discussed previously, he is less concerned with the constitution of the circumscriptive act, as the identity of the analytic direction that it could take. Maximus’ concern is with how circumscriptive act comprehends the limits of a particular field in such a way as to determine its content and therefore its relation to other regions.<sup>6</sup> The analyses through κατηγορία are of interest because of how they are the first elements considered in relation to other fields of understanding. As I later show Maximus does

<sup>5</sup> CK I, 7. PG 90 1085B. Berthold, *Maximus*, 130. Ἀρχὴ πᾶσα καὶ τέλος, εἰς ἅπαν τὴν σχετικὴν δι’ ὅλου κατηγορίαν οὐκ ἤρνηται. . .

<sup>6</sup> CK I, 9. PG 90 1085B-C. Berthold, *Maximus*, 130. Αἱ τῶν ὄντων γνώσεις συνηρημένους φυσικῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοὺς οἰκείους λόγους οἷς περιγραφὴν φυσικῶς ὑπομένουσιν. This text is particularly helpful for describing the state of the μνήμην. Berthold has translated the text as: “The knowledge of beings includes naturally, in view of demonstration, their own principles which naturally circumscribe them in a definition.” This is a particularly good translation, and shows how the operation of creaturely boundaries, intelligibility, and the arising of character through creaturely ‘nature’ are all condensed and co-related.

not regard this ‘level’ of subjectivity as very important because the nominal establishes a level of ‘sufficient meaning’ that will allow subsequent investigations.

Although terms such as Οὐσία and ὑπωχειμένων would still be used, when they are demarcated into name, they designate the basic ‘subject’ or φύσις from which a κατηγορία emerges. As previously mentioned, the terms do not always refer to a strong substratum but can be the basis or origin of subsequent descriptive circumscriptions. The terms are limited to designating locality and perform a descriptive role. When Maximus later rejects the idea of κατηγορία as a fundamental engagement, he also rejects the meaning of οὐσία as it is understood here from being carried into a subsequent discourse like theology. Porphyry understands that the οὐσία he refers to in the introduction does not carry the weight of later uses. οὐσία is initially defined and limited to being a thing from which a further account can emerge but this is not to say that it cannot stand in for the highest substance of cause of existence in a later regional use. This is important because the use of such terms suggest that although some clarification and analysis is occurring that one cannot extrapolate from this the deep metaphysics of some readings. The discussion on μνήμην below reiterates that the origins of naming amount to an unreflective process that ‘just happens’. These types of descriptions not only ground the discussion into more pragmatic and less speculative terms. With some clarification they show that they are extrapolations of the procreative continuity discussed previously.

### The Role of Μνήμην

Just as we speak of the two types of sense, the first a habitual one which is ours even when we are asleep and which does not perceive any [underlying principle] (ὑπωχειμένων) . . . The first (type of knowledge) is intelligent (ἐπιστημονική), which picks up the principles (τοὺς λόγους) of beings by (virtue of remaining in) habit alone; it has no (spiritual) usefulness since it does not tend toward the observance of the commandments.<sup>7</sup>

Μνήμην can translate to the re-collective continuity of the psyche. As a structure it is the psychic equivalent of the continuity of the procreative order. Μνήμην is the process of recollective activity built up through relating to phenomena in the activity of circumscription in specific and consistent ways. These create loci for the continual

<sup>7</sup> Maximus, *CK*, I 22. PG 90 1091B. Berthold, *Maximus*, 132. Μνήμην is also given a neutral value in *CL*, I 84. PG 90, 980B.

recollection of things. The processes within μνήμην produce τοὺς λόγους without the need of explicit attention. The loci of names form the basis of engagements for other analyses. In this enquiry the μνήμην is the build up of the analysis of the continuity of material appearance taken as is, i.e. assumed continuity but without an enquiry as to why this is the case. Μνήμην is not explicitly analytical, analytic through specific use, but is analytical in its natural function. However, though it provides a name, it does it ‘automatically’ as it were. The provision of the identity of the thing is the extent of the intellection of μνήμην.

The relation between the μνήμην and κατηγορία understanding has two main issues attached to it: one of whether the κατηγορία is a formal representation of the process of internal conceptual constitution or schema performed by μνήμην. The other concern is about what the type of activity μνήμην consists of tells us about how the κατηγορία arise through procreative or aesthetic processes. This section examines μνήμην as a psychic operation which is primarily connected with establishing and recognising relations between pre-established structures of understanding and phenomena. It is process whereby the cumulation of previous accounts is renewed in a subsequent moment where a new object is examined. It is not a causal or abstract analysis in which an explanatory principle is established on more abstract grounds than what it mediates although it provides the grounds for generalised statements. Further, the relation between understanding as in κατηγορία and the faculty of μνήμην is related to a somatic determination of phenomena prevalent in the previous chapter.

### **Data for Habitual Understanding: The Relation between Κατηγορία and Μνήμην**

The events of understanding occurring in μνήμην arise out of its self-continuity. The Latin text translates μνήμην using the term *Habitus* to indicate of propensity. In both there is a relation to a prior structure in which no explicit intention has been ‘manifest’. The structures, faculties or conditions have been set within the specific acts of investigation. This is a form of neutral understanding. Its analytic activity is to identify the limits of individual things and their qualities insofar as it is differentiated

from another thing.<sup>8</sup> In this way there is no specific ‘faculty’ which ‘produces’ habitual knowledge. However active knowing still comes about in respect to processes.<sup>9</sup> This represents the directional quality of the intelligence as connected with and implied in the processes themselves. Habitual knowledge is marked by locating the principle of beings without relating their existence to explicit directions beyond their continuity and changes that serve to maintain a name. It collects, but it does so without comprehending what it understands outside the limits of the bare requisites for subsequent habits/ acts.<sup>10</sup> It does not comprehend any underlying causal principle, intention, functional orientation, intelligible structure that can be a sign or symbolic of dependence on any level of non-physical principle.

“The mind receives passionate thoughts from these three sources: sense experience, temperament, and μνήμην.”<sup>11</sup> To know what something is requires μνήμην. To interact with a thing requires pre-established heuristic structures that have already some capacity for relation, even if it is inadequate and in need of receptivity. If knowledge of names is necessary for understanding something as it is encountered prior to explicit intention, to draw upon the μνήμην suggests a relation between the use of the κατηγορία and the application of the μνήμην. Μνήμην gives the data from which to draw out a name. The physic procession of recollection relates to, or is the active proponent of, the activity of naming. The κατηγορία are the generalised principles of the interaction between objects and μνήμην. They are not immediately apparent to consciousness: they are an implicit necessity for all acts of understanding whether explicitly intentional or otherwise.

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<sup>8</sup> The Latin translation has: *habitu rationes legens*. PG 90, 1091B.

<sup>9</sup> The term λόγους, here, has been used to signify the circumference of the thing (understood). Λόγους, in this context, has a connotation of something known but does not have an explicit theological tone. It is a powerful term which, in Maximus’ work is used to signify that which is directly understood. This is distinct from the terms οὐσία or ὑποκειμένων insofar as it relates to that which is joining or holding something, there is a nominal relation to a consistent non-specific principle as well as the individual constitution. Collectively the terms can often refer to a generalised characterisation of beings as having an intelligibility or relating to or dependent on underlying formative principles: αἴτιον.

<sup>10</sup> Additionally the term ἀναλεγόμενη refers to the continuity which is composite with how the principles appear. The harmony or continuity is organic and integrated but can still be called subordinate to immaterial causal functions. One’s world view can be harmonious in terms of their operations as procreative continuity. But even this harmonious relation is due to the consistency of a single type: it has limited scope.

<sup>11</sup> CL II, 74. PG 90, 1008B. Berthold, *Maximus*, 57. Berthold notes the importance of the relation of μνήμην to passionate thoughts for Maximus. (p57 n110 in: Berthold).

Both supply the conditions of future understanding, one through being a psychic function the other as a description of the activity performed in that function. They therefore function out of the sense of identifying the consistent site in which a self-maintaining activity is ‘producing’ or maintaining a λόγος (being). The procreative maintenance of the being is the basis its character and organic structure as well as its name. The persistence of a particular structure can be ubiquitousness without denying that same structure a genetic importance to subsequent different or new appearances. If that λόγος changes the process for delineating this alteration occurs through the re-capitulation of μνήμην but the explication of the process of questioning through which that name is established is formalised in κατηγορία understanding.

The structure of μνήμην maintains its continuity of understanding constantly relating to new content and new applications.<sup>12</sup> This functional structure emerges either with or without explicit analytic application. The content of intelligent engagement in the world is temporal, spatial, and concerned with continuity and pattern discernment. Patterns are here consequences of the movement of the thing that is named. Processes of thinking under these terms do not necessarily seek out an external motive cause. Psychic processes are constituted continually as components within a functional operation their continuity is not based on the engagement with any specific direction or *teloi* of willing.

Μνήμην conditions acts through maintaining the integrity of past structures, and conditioning future possibilities. This gives it faculty status.<sup>13</sup> The implication is that understanding κατηγορία will relate to an intelligent structure without necessarily taking on all possible levels of data. In this way the function of μνήμην is to maintain a structure of content based psychic continuity more than to relate or generate radical new ways of conceiving. Μνήμην builds on what it possesses. Continuity of μνήμην by and large relates to engaging with the same type of phenomena, its concepts can include the general laws deduced from within natural

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<sup>12</sup> The main exception to a negative reading of μνήμην stems from Plato and Proclus. Here recollection is cited as the occurrence of insight, or the patterning of the mind into a harmonious unity. In the later, Proclus’ commentary on the *Timeaus* argues for recollection as a unity of mind through the generation of a single intention. In the case of the cosmology of the *Timaeus* the motivity of recollection is vital for representing the proper order of the ‘myth’. Proclus, *Commentary on Plato’s Timeaus*, Volume I, Book 1, *Proclus on the Socratic State and Atlantis*, Translated with Annotated Notes, Harold Tarrant (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) Proclus’ text: 192, 30- 195-, 30. ps 292-4.

<sup>13</sup> Ubiquitousness, insofar as it is necessary for the function of a system.

functions.<sup>14</sup> An activity occurring at the time of an analysis of the psyche does not, nor cannot take in possible alterations of the faculty from moment to moment. Even though μνήμην, as a principle of analytic continuity, does not dissolve when events such as insight into causal structures take place, the event of insight has a different typology than mere continuity even though insights are then re-integrated into psychic continuity.

For κατηγορία insights are accumulative of principles (λόγοι) which are built on by subsequent mental activity. Μνήμην reorganises the history of previous cognitions within its continuity, likewise the continuity of previous moments contribute to the appearance (the circumscribed locale) of any existent. The κατηγορία are not an account of how something came to have this or that οὐσία or if they are, within the structure of naming, that account has become implicit within the name itself.<sup>15</sup> It does not ask: what is the purpose of this operation it is a state where continuity of the same type of thinking is regarded as the fulfilled operation of thinking. This shows that the μνήμην, even if it is regarded in a negative light on some readings, it is nevertheless ubiquitous. It represents an essential part of the continuity of the rational structure of κίνησις.

This process is one of bringing to the surface and establishing the constitutional arrangement of the intuitive and natural process of naming. The processes that are used in clarifying a name are given specific formula within the κατηγορία so as to present a path of clarification. As such they represent something more akin to ‘rule clarification’, insofar as the condensation of the processes of naming into a set of questions, concerns the attempt to assign a proper location of the thing within the sphere of pre-established understandings. In this way the generation of a rule is not invention but the clarification of a process that is already taking place in the events of habitual understanding. The introductions of the terms οὐσία, γένος, and εἶδος, when confined to the examination of names, indicate toward the object as the initial location of an account and not as a forceful metaphysical monad. The ‘individual’ passes through each area so as to contextualise its specificity and generate

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<sup>14</sup> I examine this issue in chapter 4 and 5 not in respect to natural law perse, but insofar as I assess the position of λόγοι as a demarcation of the limits of creaturely activity.

<sup>15</sup> Both of these structures co-operate with subsequent understanding. However, insights into immaterial structures and causes are considered distinct from how κατηγορία and μνήμην represent or function. Μνήμην is not only a type of conditioning principle it also has a type of analysis associated with it.



an ‘account’ which is an active taxonomy. As discussed in chapter 1, the object itself, its identity, is developed by the way in which its momentum moves through each area and either being appropriate or inappropriate to the relational and generative principles (λόγοι) that represent the function proper to each area.

In other words, κατηγορία posit that an object consists of certain forms of participation, insofar as its identity is gathered through co-opting the full spectrum of its movement through the various ‘types’. I do not use the Greek term μέθεξις because I want to ascribe to Porphyry’s understanding of how οὐσία etc act generatively. He takes a nominal approach to how names indicate relation but, unless the relation is posited within a genuinely generative principle (such as θεός) then it is inadvisable to identify οὐσία with genuine generative power. Hence it comes to reflect a participation in a formal set of logical orders if its explication does not invite a speculation concerning fundamental ontic αἴτιον. If however, the κατηγορία in some circumstances, serve as regional principles that indicate a real generative order (exercising actual power on κίνησις rather than acting as a name) then trajectories through κατηγορία will implicate the object under query as producing an ontological pattern. However the predominant sense of the categories as understood and used by Maximus as in the former version where οὐσία need not be a fundamental substrate except, through by being the genetic origin of an account. In this case they are expressions of logical relations, of which the οὐσία represents the origin.

## The Μνήμην

How, given the ubiquity of μνήμην, can it influence ideas of what a processional system is and what it consists of? The continuity of κίνησις was shown to consist of several co-operative elements, these elements work together to continually institute the life presented formally in the organic structure. Continuity, within a tri-partitioned and intentionally focused locale, is a collection of distinct temporal moments.<sup>16</sup> Μνήμην acts as the continuity of the name and the continuity of the character that

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<sup>16</sup> Bergson’s discussion of the relation between matter and memory is a helpful pointer at least about the possibility of reading a normally faculty based description in which x relates to y by doing x-i, by introducing organic continuity as the continual subsistence of the conditions and the concrete possibilities relating to the continual recapitulation of a set of principles. The main section of interest is through chapter 3, entitled: *On the Survival of Images: Memory and Mind*. Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, Translated by N. M. Paul and W.S. Palmer (Zone Books, Brooklyn, New York, 1991, 8<sup>th</sup> ed, 2008) 133-177, esp 133-7.

defines the creature. Moreover, as a principle it discloses the possibilities that lay available through the continuity of the creature. *Μνήμην* relates to the operation of the linguistic being according to the confines of its conditions. It functions to recapitulate the organisation according to the distinctive encounters that it relates to. It acts as the persistence of the linguistic character of the creature, as to condition its further possibilities. It is not orientationally indeterminate, except insofar as the recapitulation of the character of the process proceeds because of how the structures of previous moments condition its orientation. In this way, it is organised only insofar as it proceeds from its previous moments into the next. However, if the prior cause does not maintain anything more than a practical *telos*, then the implication is that unless a reflection can occupy a position indicative of qualitative distinction from the process, then any disorganisation of the previous moment will persist in the later. In a cognitive mode it does not give precedence to any particular operational quality except insofar as it perpetuates the continuity of the creature as a whole: it is not necessarily in the interests even of a conscious creature to be aware of orders outside its previous experience.

The recollection of thoughts through the *μνήμην* is associated with sin only insofar as the *μνήμην* is the mechanism through which an affected thought or an affected attitude toward something. It becomes a part of the subject's recollection of an object.<sup>17</sup> As is seen in *CL* II 94, the *μνήμην* also accumulates scripture. *CL* III, 74, describes how the habit of sin, is the continuity of the sinful state in which no dispositional change takes place as a result of either sin in thought or in deed. This means that the continuity of the process is neither evaluated nor seen as negative nor even necessarily positive, it is self-continuous, possessing its own energy. The *μνήμην* itself relates to the continuity of an activity and a lack of self awareness as to the character or disposition of the thoughts or activity that occur. Hence it is a state where the process continues without critical self-awareness.

Virtue is also performed out of the *μνήμην*, but the charge is the same, without some form of active understanding, *μνήμην* is basically a self-continuous process that occurs regardless of the validity or invalidity of what it recollects. This serves to illustrate how, as a process, its status is to recapitulate predominant

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<sup>17</sup> PG 91 1012B. *CL* II, 85. Berthold, *Maximus*, 59. "Still others say that the prevailing passion in the approaching demon arouses the passion and in this way the soul is inflamed for evil thoughts by recalling forms through the memory (recollection)." (μορφὰς διὰ τῆς μνήμης.) (my brackets).

dispositions. Hence it can accumulate true or false ideas. The preference of an organic structure for self-continuity does not raise preferences as to what constitutes good or bad in a moral sense, but simply what keeps itself moving. In a process the continuity of the process is primary. Content and orientation are geared toward the perpetuation of that body. As a process it is not primarily concerned with making qualitative distinctions within an analysis of its own operations.

### **Assessing the Κατηγορία in Maximus**

This section is a section that proceeds from the account that Maximus gives of μνήμην. Naming is a process that draws from within the pre-established structures built up through the continuity of the subjective and collective understanding of the world. It is paralleled with μνήμην because of how both structures are primarily structures of continuity.

Every beginning, middle and end does not totally exclude every κατηγορία of relation. God, on the contrary, being infinitely infinite, well above every relationship, is obviously neither beginning nor middle nor end nor absolutely anything of what ‘remains in or relates to the κατηγορία.’<sup>18</sup>

Note how the use of the term κατηγορία is in its negative sense.<sup>19</sup> It refers to the term translated as relation (σχέσιν) and signals the association with relation as a pre-established fact. The term can also stand for every type of thing and relation which is not theological in the apophatic sense. God is neither related to nor dependent on the κατηγορία. When the term is used in this passage does not stand for a neutral formal arrangement of the content of somatic being, but as the possibilities and limits of soma itself.<sup>20</sup> However, it is not clear what is actually being ‘excluded’ because the shift to theology has illustrated a type of negation, but given very little indication of what defines the character of the thing being negated only that it is ‘of the category of

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<sup>18</sup> Maximus, *CK*, I, 7. PG 1085B. Berthold, *Maximus*, 130. The translation perhaps clarifies to the point of misrepresenting what is actually set of difficult concepts. The final line: οἷς ἐνθεωρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν ἢ τοῦ πρὸς τι δύναται κατηγορία. An alternative translation might be: “remaining beyond every category realisable through relation.”

<sup>19</sup> “God is not of the category of the relative because he does not have anything at all included in him.” *CK*, I 68, 140. PG 1108C. Berthold, *Maximus*, 140. It also is used in respect to redemption in a negative sense in which God cannot be conceived in relation to the κατηγορία and in a positive sense where God becomes the ‘manner of relating to the world’ God becomes the phenomena which the intelligence grasps.

<sup>20</sup> Implicitly, universals and the immaterial λόγοι are also included or dependent on certain relational principles (the divine).

the relative'. The term shows how Maximus sees the activity of 'inclusion' (περιγράφεται or συνεπινοομένην) and 'κατηγορία' to be closely related. It shows a mode in which common types are recognised according to their possessing similar 'predicates'. Although there is a basis for expanding the sense of collection here, the possibilities being related to are a type of actualised connections rather than arcana.<sup>21</sup>

On my reading the κατηγορία contain an analytic type that accumulates the data requisite for differentiating one thing from another. The question could be used in theology, but theology is an analytic stance in relation to a different or explicitly directional encounter with the world. Maximus designates 'relation' as the specific domain of the κατηγορία, which is to say that the κατηγορία do not 'assume' or require a relation to a higher organising principle. All engagement in the world involves being bound to the forms and possibilities of the objects of sense and apprehension in virtue of their relation to us. Attachment to natural things stems from the processes through which consciousness relates to objects. This attachment is neutral insofar as it describes the process through which an object is being understood or knitted together inwardly. This process of binding is not thinking into existence, as objects are naturally distinguished from another in thinking and in themselves. The arising of κατηγορία recognition is that each thing is understood according to the manner it appears based on the questions of what it is, where it is, etc. There is a recognition of orientations or questions. This forms the analysis of the original account of encounter. Normal engagement proceeds un-analysed. When thinking is examined it is differentiated into the flow of νοημοι (through λογισμοί) and the activity of compilation of sense and thinking. Collectivity and accumulation is partnered with individuation. In this way κατηγορία, as a collection of terms and analyses, has characteristics common to any other way of engaging the world. The specific content of thinking contains a process that is κατηγορία, 'circumscriptive' or compilatory. These intentions relate to phenomena in a particular way. Κατηγορία is concerned with articulating differences and similarities between things. Hence questions of identity, in οὐσία, are distinguished according to being possessed by broader names, animated or inanimate, human, horse, artefact. The activity is

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<sup>21</sup> However a gradual or perspective/telescopic appearance of soma is dependent for its concrete appearance on the principles which sustain specific beings (λόγοι).

ubiquitous in thinking and produces a collection of recollective possibilities. The process of naming involves distinguishing how the present situation is distinguishable from previous instances or larger names that allow the contextualisation of an *aporia*. Whilst κατηγορία is an analytic framework, this is the result of distinguishing the basic formulas of naming and discriminating between things, but not necessarily making an assessment of them in respect to higher theoretical models through θεωρία.

Names are essences whose occurrences arise through the creature being identifiable according to a positive descriptive pattern (φύσις). They are encounters with the unitive idea of the creature, presuming continuity of the subject. They are active and dialogical events because naming is not spontaneous in the subject. However the intention to name is spontaneous and initial. Over time, naming and the processes for determining what something is, take on patterns of phenomenal association which are stable. These are ‘recollected’ the basis for the faculty of ‘μνήμην’. The variations between names, if the language and culture is shared, are rarely dramatic, for naming and communication are intricately related. It could be called a first principle for just this reason for the totality of κατηγορία ‘position’ and discrimination are the experience of *noesis* in everyday engagement. The act as a first principle insofar as they are necessary for subsequent questions, and being stable make the basis for the treatment of naming as primary or natural to subjectivity. Therefore, although the process in normal engagement is non-technical, once open to clarification, the priority to other questions comes from its being identified with a typical framework. The clarification of name, the concern over the identity of something, is the first conceptual engagement that the subject has. If there is a build up of other regions which aim toward distinguishing the content of the world according to more abstract methods and immaterial object, the status of the κατηγορία changes, becoming a preliminary analytic act rather than a culmination of thinking. The naming is basically automatic insofar as the process does not need to be intentionally instituted in order for it to be carried out, it self-perpetuates.

The naming is restricted to the clarification of the discrimination of what differentiates x from y. Primary here is to be related to questions that are considered more fundamental than name, but the establishment of name, being initial, cannot be dismissed, hence ‘primary’ means initial starting point. It is recognised that the

phenomena of naming is the initial engagement with the world but that other principles can seem to define the purpose of things more than their discriminatory states. Individuated names can seem to disappear when questions of cosmic pattern or orientation or theology, are considered.<sup>22</sup> If this framework exercises a more fundamental response that the discrimination of correct name then the orientation to questions of theology takes precedence over questions of name albeit after the name has been established. If other orientations can exercise themselves after naming in a manner that will define which things are to be given preference, then although remaining a fundamental process, naming becomes ‘neutral’ or a region wherein other questions are decided. So the framework can never be dismissed, but its position in relation to larger questions means that its status is decided not by its position as the primary orientation of speech but as the region from which larger purposes are discerned.

The κατηγορία reflect the process of finding an efficient name regardless of the whether the associations thereby are truly representative of the nature of the object in another region of thinking. As a process of association it is not a judgemental or self-reflective mode perse. They are natural reasons insofar as the environment of naming is one in which the world continues in life maintaining itself and its relationships. However, without the structure of the continuity of names it is impossible to ask questions and to receive revelation. Neutrality or continuity of function is transformed in relation to other questions such as the purpose of life. This means that κατηγορία thinking is fundamentally flexible, and can be co-opted by the orientations of the subject; it can be transformed well or badly, not according to its own standards but according to the exercise of the broader orientation.

The mind, when it applies itself to visible things, knows them naturally through the senses. So neither the mind is bad, nor the natural knowledge, nor the things, nor the senses; for they are all the works of God. What then is bad? Evidently the passion which our natural ideas undergo. Indeed this not be in our use of thoughts, if the mind keeps watch.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Theology, as is commonly understood, reflects a view of the cosmos and the history of humanity as under God’s care. Moreover, the orientation of the human, when it responds to God, cares for itself and its cosmos.

<sup>23</sup> Maximus, *CL*, II 15. PG 90 988 C-D. St Maximus the Confessor, *The Ascetic Life and the Four Centuries on Charity*, Translated and Annotated by Polycarp Sherwood (Ancient Christian Writers Series, Newman Press, London, 1955) 155.

Moral association is an additional movement from the initial engagements of natural perception. Natural perception is combinatory when it relates to previous memories of names. Perception, understanding, naming and self-continuity, are all descriptions which add to the extent and character of the process.<sup>24</sup>

The κατηγορία are mediated between previous histories of intelligibility and the new appearances that occur through the activity of living. The organic structure's understanding is not new at each moment, but the newness comes through the active manner in which intelligible comprehension of the character of things relates through previous, present and is presumably useful for subsequent names (unless otherwise proven). The content built up through the history of the intelligent organic structure mediates the νοήματα that forms the intelligible content that functionally continual in the subject. The relation between κατηγορία and memory consists in that the content that is recapitulated in memory forms the pre-established notions that are compiled together in the notion of κατηγορία. Maximus also has the additional detail of regarding the κατηγορία as built up through the comparison and relation between the established names and accounts of things in order to produce an effective name for something. Consequently, in the process of gaining understanding of something, although it is may not be entirely accidental and unique to previous engagements, because of the manner in which μνήμην recapitulates the structure of names, it does not break with habitual processes of naming. It is possible for naming, as a habitual process, can be equally associated with incorrect ideas as with correct.

Both the κατηγορία and μνήμην both represent ways of organization of a structure. They are related to a schematic account of thinking or language but, insofar as they both relate to the maintenance and recapitulation of the conditions for continuity they can be used to examine the appearance of procreative continuity in the creature. Μνήμην is an integral aspect of the continuity of the organic structure generally; it seems that the noetic connotations are overriding concerns for Maximus. An important part of μνήμην and κατηγορία is how they compile sophisticated conceptual schemas or structures as the organisation of normative phenomenal engagement in order to reproduce a structure of sense. Κατηγορία and μνήμην are ways that an organic structure would organise itself and its world; according to the accumulation of associations with things. The compilation structure is read without

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<sup>24</sup> CL, II 3-4. PG 90 984C- 985A.

πάθος when it is positive, but it also possesses παθος in its negative associations. Maximus associates correct or incorrect naming with the structure of compilation that compresses the association of names and objects with modes of operation that accrue negative or sinful associations with the world. πάθη, in this case, is reflective of the capacity of cognition to be adversely affected by incorrect ideas. Unless the structure of the mnemonic and κατηγορία is up for some review then it is impossible for a given definition of a creature, either in its name, as kinetic or as an organic structure, to have a way of being related across several regions. The discussion of the content of the κατηγορία is related to the idea of μνήμην Maximus regards both structures as representative of procreative continuity, albeit within physic and conceptual modes of operation.

### **Maximus on Phenomenal Κατηγορία**

If the κατηγορία are discussed as abstract or conceptual engagements with phenomena they are engagements or questions that gather and secure the identities of things. In this sense they are internalised terms for the collection of external associations. They co-ordinate and analyse λόγοι. They do so not through the utilisation of higher conceptions, but through the spatial and temporal ordering of the processes facilitative the successful demarcation of judgements such as: before, after, near, far, and quantity. The temporal and spatial notions emerge out of how procreative continuity is directional, one way (though reciprocal to recapitulation) and works through the relational co-operation within the contents of said processes.

The outcomes of κατηγορία analyses, identification of names, are recapitulated back into the continuity of the activity of naming. In practise, the κατηγορία are not abstractions, but fields of common associations with objects built up through recollection. These are then analysed to produce a formal account of naming as a way in which the world appears. Its appearance is the most necessary of engagements because of how naming distinguishes one thing from another by differentiating intelligible character (λόγοι). The ubiquity of the type of circumscription that ‘κατηγορία’, περιγράφεται or συνεπινοομένην represent is not expressed as a mode of intention associated with abstracted ideas of general predicates or generalised universals, but is the analysis of a pre-established but naively realised causal continuity. It is a basic activity of λογισμοί and μνήμην. For



Maximus an engagement through *κατηγορία* does not choose what will provide sufficient data for the discrimination between things.

Maximus refers to a process of *κατηγορία* analysis with the examination of localised events of procreative continuity because the organisation that the *κατηγορία* perform is not based on a unitive *telos*. The *κατηγορία* are dependent on a somatic or discriminating aesthetic engagement. *λόγοι* and *οὐσία* in this region are the continuity of a creature so named, having no further metaphysical overtone. The *κατηγορία* become a type of circumscription which associates with appearances without having an overall idea of destiny. Rather than demarcation taking place on the basis of physical characteristics alone, in the process of categorisation, the establishment of a name is based on the demarcation of the boundaries of sensibility.

Once that name ceases to be applicable, if the application of the term is deemed nonsensical, this decline of sense and arising of insensibility represents the creation of boundaries proper to a categorisation of a being. The chapter shows that the process of naming is dependent on the continual capacity to order relations to each other. The ‘passing out of sensibility’, through which a name is inapplicable, is a spatial metaphor taking place in time. The difference is that the demarcation occurring in the *κατηγορία* is based more on noetic relations and distinctions together with the phenomena in themselves. For the association with things, without engaging their basis, is a habit, because it is a ubiquitous intention, requiring no profound insight into why something is the way it is. Hence the continuity of the temporal and spatial relations implied in correctly identifying or discriminating between things, takes place as a matter of fact. Here, the ordering is accrued through the application of a relational judgement:

Beginning, middle, and end are characteristics of beings distinguished by time and it can be truly stated that they are also characteristics of beings comprehended<sup>25</sup> in history. Indeed time (*χρόνος*), which has measured movement<sup>26</sup>, is circumscribed (*περιγράφεται*) by number (*ἀριθμῷ*) and history (*αἰῶν*)<sup>27</sup>, which includes<sup>28</sup> in its existence the *κατηγορία* of when<sup>29</sup>, admits of

<sup>25</sup> αἰῶνι συνορωμένων. . .

<sup>26</sup> μετρούμενην ἔχων τὴν κίνησιν. . .

<sup>27</sup> History is here the totality of the temporal. It is time being thought as a whole rather than as a series of events.

<sup>28</sup> συνεπινοούμενην ἔχων. . .

separation insofar as it began to be. And if time and history are not without beginning, so much less are those things which are contained (περιεχόμενα) in them.<sup>30</sup>

The term συνεπινοομένην has the connotation of ‘includes’ or ‘inclusion’ referring to a broader activity taking place noetically and through the commonality between phenomena. The circumference-ing something, establishing a ‘set’ or a boundary designating a particular set is the sense of the term. In this way, only certain things can circumscribe others and these may themselves be circumscribed. The activity then sets up a distinction between what is inside. Being circumscribed implies a form of agency of a personal or impersonal principle which serves as a region from which to ‘survey’ the set. Adding that prior things encompass later effects more easily than later effects can encompass former.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, the generation of such a process incorporates the utilisation of a spatial metaphor, whereby to deduce, so to speak, requires establishing the validity or invalidity of a relation.

The terms περιγράφεται and περιεχόμενα are meant as a relation of a higher principle to a lower. It is not meant as an internal activity as such, but refers here to either the simpler over the more complex or the prior over the posterior by which the motion of the former represents the limits of the extent of the posterior. It is to determine whether the activity y has occurred before or after x. If a latter movement assumes the persistence of a previous form, then the co-operation that occurs in the later represents a dependence relation and not a ‘co-arising’. If this is the case, then ἀριθμῶ is meant in a strong sense, and the later ‘χρόνος’ is a division of the basic form of ἀριθμῶ and αἰὼν. Measurement then, is a relation in which the processes and constitution of the thing being named are established prior to the circumscription. Hence measurement and χρόνος are derivative moments of ἀριθμός and history. So this has a temporal priority and a spatial priority insofar as differences of type is in fact a difference of simple to complex. Its constitutional relation is reminiscent of the discussion of γένος and εἶδος, and it signals a constitutional complexity within the phenomena which are being made determinate through naming. In this case there is a pre-established λόγοι or οὐσίαι whose character determines the structures of relations

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<sup>29</sup> ὁ αἰὼν δὲ συνεπινοομένην ἔχων τῇ ὑπάρξει τὴν πότε κατηγορίαν. . . This is the classic reference to τὴν πότε κατηγορίαν and indicates Maximus’ acquaintance with the language traditionally associated with the categories of Aristotle.

<sup>30</sup> CK I, 5, PG 90, 1085A.

<sup>31</sup> Dodds, Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, prop 5 (5), 7 (9), 9-10 (11-13).

from which one deduces priority or posteriority. Hence, although the discussion above indicates a relation between naming and named, the analysis is actually causal in character. The circumscription of the κατηγορία do not analyse the basis that allows the discrimination between prior and posterior. There is a sense that the persistence of a prior structure, one which is not explicated through measurement, is examined through the analysis of cause.

The idea of a speech act delineates the field of exploration by limiting the activity of understanding to one of ‘positing’. It also limits this positing to a calculation of predicates which are ‘preliminary questions’. It selects speech as sufficiently meaningful and coherent to prescribe a robust framework but suggests that this activity may have substrata of claims in the form of conditions of meaning discussed previously. It suggests that within the κατηγορία that there are structures through which spatial and temporal senses emerge. To extend it, the continuity of the processes themselves generates their own spatial and temporal relations. The self-continuity of processes generates their own spatial and temporal senses utilised within specific demarcations, as relations which encompass and delimit.

### **How Concepts of Time and Number are Κατηγορία**

After describing the forms of motion in the previous sections, there are some areas that have been featured in recent work that will also need to be related to the procreative order, even within those areas generally designated as ‘more abstract’. In this discussion the ideas of number and time are generally thought to represent more sophisticated concepts. However, even if this is the case, their relation to the idea of circumscription tells us something important about how the κατηγορία becomes a locale for the identification of a demarcation of higher conceptual engagements. The processes seem to bring them into the clarification of the bounds of sensibility. This is not the case. The continuity of the processes themselves contain the spatial and temporal relations and sensibility. ‘Τὴν πότε κατηγορίαν’ is translated as ‘the category of when’.<sup>32</sup> The idea of separation is intended to characterise the function of ‘collecting’ as being over things of a similar composite character and shows how κατηγορία can be used neutrally to describe the process by which a term of measurement, such as πότε, is being used in a simple description.

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<sup>32</sup> Συνεπινοομένην signifies a collecting of or under the same type and is like the verb ‘to categorise’.

And so this indicates that the data underpinning the locale of *κατηγορία* does not display any added emphases. *Πότε*, or ‘when’, a term relating to *χρόνος*, refers to the capacity to be measured. The character of *κατηγορία* is ‘limited’ to a specific sphere of examination of posterior effects of the causal systems of the physics. The point is that the origin of the sense of temporality in the *κατηγορία* emerges from within the self-continuity of the process, and not within higher concepts as such. This is not to say that whenever there is a sense of temporal or spatial relation that the terms are meant to represent a non-mathematical conception. *τὴν πότε κατηγορίαν* refers to some thing as ‘priori’ or ‘posteriori’ to another thing. History here is a process of degree and progression into which the events which align and re-align personal and world progression. This can be superficial such as waiting for something to cook or ‘shattering’ like the death and resurrection of Christ. An event is a ‘re-designation’ of the ‘point’ defining momentum as a measure of change (*χρόνος*). The *κατηγορία* become the measurement of the relations between these defining events they do not define what a valid event for investigation is but instead signal the terms through which its measurement takes place. The terms are designated by the concerns of the subject but the events are ‘objective’ insofar as they are ‘occurrences’ with location and relation. The *κατηγορία* do not pick out esoteric events but the act of ‘application’ or ‘circumscription’ is the defining of a point of measurement. Hence there is no need to prescribe the *κατηγορία* from being unconditional conditioning principles, or preliminary engagements, for they are adapted according to the where the subject, starts and identifies the basis.

Measurement under these terms is not independent or immaterial *per se* precisely because the measurement is based on how a present point of investigation relates to previous points. Nevertheless, it can understand the relations defined by the distance between material bodies. In this way the idea of circumscription under history and time and number shows that it is topographic relations which define these principles rather than the ‘homogeneity of space’. However the relation between magnitudes considered external to specific bodies is the domain of arithmetic in which rule following, is as important as geometry. That is to say the idea of *αριθμός* as a concept involves both ‘spatial homogeneity implied by the continuity of the Euclidean system’ but also ‘spatial’ determinations made through relating known points.

The capacity of the principle of magnitude is defined according to geographic measurements which define the extent of the negative limit as well as rules of relations. For instance *x* could be a measurement of *y* yet subsequent re-valuation could push a determination of *x* lower or higher in relation to later objects appearing as valid points of comparison. Because of these two components to ἀριθμός the concept is marked out by two considerations which are also important for the concept of φύσις: that of necessary relations (consequential or law-like in the case of ἀριθμός and φύσις respectively) and dependence on specific bodies or revelation of its character in historical events.

### **Maximus on Αριθμός**

In several passages Maximus associates ‘ἀριθμός’ with the category of ‘ποσόν’ or ‘how much?’ However the association between ἀριθμός and the measurement of ‘ποσόν’ does not limit the applicability of ἀριθμός, Maximus maintains geometric thinking in which ‘necessity’ is atemporal but with a non-absolute (a non-theological) universal applicability. The difference is that his mathematical thinking does not involve questions of magnitude or relation, but is utilised in the understanding of the Divine λόγοι as persistent delimiters of the capacity of creative life, which function in this way due to the inter-penetrability of their relations to each other. This occurs in his idea of how perfected relations between exemplars represent a formal model for the description of creaturely limits (see chapter 4). My discussion focuses on how Maximus identifies ἀριθμός differently at different times and has a two tiered understanding of universals. The section shows that his understanding of quantity reflects the continuity of the program of ‘correct naming’ and does not reflect the implication of highly abstract ideas of the mathematical. Balhasar identifies how the emergence of the temporal and the spatial metaphors utilised in the descriptions previously, this relates to that etc, is a result of the temporal and spatial activity of self-continuous motion itself. Balhasar falters for two reasons: 1) he does not situate the origin of Maximus’ attitude toward ἀριθμός as actually representing the ascription of temporal and spatial orders and quantitative relations, to the order of procreativity within the κατηγορία. Balhasar hesitates to draw out how relation is the representation of the temporal and spatial order of procreative continuity itself. He

also misunderstands how the use of a formal order of the divine λόγοι are closer to the Neoplatonist sense of the mathematical.

Balthasar is the main authority on the issue.<sup>33</sup> Balthasar characterises Maximus' position incorrectly because he does not clarify the two distinct views of αριθμός. He centres the debate on whether or not the character of the *monad* or the *dyad* can be equated with a state of rest or motion and therefore of the state of the soul. Indeed, this mistaken analysis of the mathematical is representative of the contemporary down-play of 'so-called' traditional metaphysical structures. Arguably, reducing the mathematical to a system of κατηγορία does not eliminate the issue but merely collapses several senses in which Maximus could understand the mathematical.

Indeed, the structures of the *monad* and the *dyad* are distinct from questions of quantity. Maximus uses the term αριθμός in different ways. Balthasar recognises how Maximus does use monad and dyad under a Neo-Platonic sense but it is plain that this use of number is different from the question of quantity. The texts show Maximus also associates number, as it pertains to quantity, with the speech act. Describing number as a sound refutes ideas that associate the state, characteristic of mathematical reflection (and this is the whole point of discussing number in soteriological terms), with a perfect or imperfect state of the soul. Maximus' criticisms of αριθμός as quantity resemble his views of the κατηγορία. Maximus' understands the neo-Platonist position and use of numbers in metaphysical contexts, his criticism of this position occurs under his 'dynamic ontology of being' in *Ambigua* 7.<sup>34</sup>

The idea of a mathematical state resembling highest salvation is based on the conception that the production of mathematical consequences or systems in thinking is a re-capitulation of the causes or processes generative of stable geometric necessity. Mathematical laws were analogous to the ideal state of the soul for the Neo-Platonists and Christians such as Origen. However, though Maximus is critical of numbers as absolutely akinetic, their status is akin to the λόγοι as dependent but necessary and perfected thoughts in God. Maximus' developmental ontology and epistemology uses

<sup>33</sup> "Number, in Maximus' view, is neither substance nor accident, neither quality nor quantity, but is essentially a sign, whose function is to indicate quantity. Therefore it is also not exactly a concept; Maximus calls it 'rather a kind of sound and, at the same time a predicate associated with quantity'. It is not a concept because it is only joined to the expression of a concept obliquely, through the addition of a (number of) an indefinite article." Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 109. Quoting Maximus: *Epistles* 15; PG 91, 561D and 564D; *Epistle* 121; PG 91, 473CD.

<sup>34</sup> *Amb.* 7 PG 91, 1072C-D. Blowers & Wilken, *On the Cosmic Mystery*, 49.

multiple levels of subjectivity this means that he can consider a mathematical model of exemplars on their own terms without expecting them to possess identical character to divinity. His rejection of absolute ακίνησις in mathematical laws is based on the overriding role of theology rather than any internal incoherence within the mathematical οὐσία. He poses a caveat to αριθμός without dismissing the necessity of mathematical relations. Internal consistency in αριθμός poses no structural threat to theology as the absolute God. Αριθμός has an order of necessity that does not contradict divinity.

Maximus rejects the idea that quantity can be used to generate valid representations of φύσις, understood as having a relation to divinity, or God but agrees, or rather must allow that relational measurement possess more than a somatic status. In Aristotle's definition of quantity as is the basis of addition and subtraction there is a moment and movement of abstraction through which a principle of objective measurement is related to bodies with indeterminate (changeable) character. Maximus maintains that there are two types defined either purely by immaterial and necessary relations including or those whose reference is to physical (material) size:

No number indicates the relatedness of things itself- that is, their separatedness or connectedness- but only the quantity of the things spoken of. It conveys only the notion of 'how many?' that is proper to quantitative language, not a conception of how a thing is. How could number include the relatedness of things in itself, since that is surely prior to number and can be understood without it.<sup>35</sup>

This shows that for Maximus the idea of number is associated with the category of 'how many' which draws on the independence of the entity but not a mathematical ideal. It also indicates a general rule concerning the κατηγορία and their relation to the world. Hence number is conceptually dependent on an external principle for its correctness. "The Fathers thought they could not find any other form of expression so well suited to denote difference. But if someone were convinced he had a more practical way, . . . we would gladly yield to his learning."<sup>36</sup> The 'externality' of the basis of quantitative analysis, the thing, signals the dependence on αριθμός on a 'caveat'. "Things exist outside the mind while thoughts about them are put together inside (ἔσω συνίστανται). Therefore on it depends either their proper or improper

<sup>35</sup> Maximus, *Epistles*; 12; PG 91, 476C, Translated by Balthasar, 110.

<sup>36</sup> Maximus, *Epistles*; 12, PG 91, 480D- 481A, Translated by Balthasar, 111.

use, for the abuse of things follows on the mistaken use of thoughts.”<sup>37</sup> This passage shows an area of possible ‘corruption’ or the arising of mistaken views. The ‘mistaken use of thoughts’ shows how the relation to external locations can entail susceptibility to mistaken understanding, by its very character.<sup>38</sup> Maximus’ discussion, highlighted by Balthasar, confirms the ‘pragmatic’ approach to ἀριθμός but rather than being a pragmatic approach to a system of purely formal entities the caveat is a criticism of the idea of variations in linguistic meaning.

Importantly, the passage above is showing how relation, although relatively primitive, still supplies a temporal and spatial sense. In this way, the activities of connectedness, proper to the description of procreative or the self-continuity of a process, supply us with the basic forms of temporal and spatial relations.

Αριθμός still encompasses a set of necessary relations which, in applicatory ways do not entail a set rule. In this sense the concept itself is dependent not only on the relation between abstract measurements of quantity but on how the field for application is defined. The region of πότε is one defined not only by its internal consistency of measuring quantity but also of the thing quantified. Hence this addition signals how the idea of ἀριθμός within κατηγορία functions in a distinctive manner to geometry. The negation of the atemporal character of πότε is because of how it is used to measure relations that are intrinsically variable and relative. Quantity is pragmatically determined insofar as the data changes depending on circumstances. Hence the criticism refers to the possibility that historical circumstances may yield a greater or more precise way of speaking about how two subject’s whose character has been defined clearly enough that a measurement can be taken. As shown in chapter 4 there are good grounds for reading the λόγοι essentially as principles of intelligibility that are arranged in a mathematically ordered co-operation.

Maximus assumes the accumulation of mathematical truths through dialectic. This has some merit, but he does not thereby make the formal depiction of quantity or relation the basis for describing the totality of the mathematical. He is disputing that the idea of number should be accorded a pure, rather than possessing an abstracted value. Number does not differentiate, number is an appreciation of a differentiation

<sup>37</sup> CL II, 73. PG 90, 1008A-B. Berthold, *Maximus*, 57.

<sup>38</sup> ἡ πράξεις τῶν πραγμάτων ἀκολουθεῖ. The translation indicates a preference for identifying the orientation and even the meaning of thoughts with how they relate to actions. The term application could also be appropriate given the large scope of πραγμάτων.



between unitive bodies, but the structure of difference is according to the schematic of the λόγοι and hence, if one takes a Platonist view of mathematics, there is no need to regard abstractions as the total basis for a description of formal unity, difference and relation. These are transcendent properties with their own region. It is therefore a mistake to equate quantitative tope with the mathematical in itself. The consistent models that measurement provides in the κατηγορία mathematics do not exhaust the mode of the mathematical in itself.

### Αριθμός and Time

Beginning, middle, and end are characteristics of beings distinguished by time and it can be truly stated that they are also characteristics of beings comprehended in history. Indeed χρόνος, which has measured movement (μετρουμένην εξον την κινεσις), is circumscribed (περιγράφεται) by number (αριθμω) . . .<sup>39</sup>

In its quantitative sense αριθμός is also employed in relation to χρόνος and περιγράφεται. This indicates that χρόνος is regarded as an imperfect aspect of the εἶδος of temporality: χρόνος is collected or better still, arises as measurable under number. There is a conceptual tug of war occurring between types of circumscription. The reading of αριθμός given previously stated that there were two types operative in Maximus' work. However in the passage below it is not clear whether the subordinate activity of categorical circumscription is meant or if the idea of αριθμός as geometry and related to causal definitions is what is occurring. Indeed the term περιγράφεται does not exclude the possibility that αριθμός is part of an act of circumscription internal to categorical engagement with cosmos. The ubiquity of the process of the collection of intelligible names is expressed in terms of 'collectable' and under measurement rather than as an independent force: there is arbitration between the cosmos as a centre of meaning and the microcosm of thinking. Κρόνος could be time graded according to the relation between bodies which is the basic form of measurement. The internal structure of comparison between magnitudes consists of an interplay between measured and measuring.<sup>40</sup>

Now although number is not a strictly a governing principle within the κατηγορία the term περιγράφεται has a similar boundary defining principle even if

<sup>39</sup> CK I, 5. PG 90, 1085A.

<sup>40</sup> Κρόνος is parallel to the category 'when' as the passage progresses.

the number itself is regarded here as a measurement of comparative relation. As mentioned in the discussion of ἀριθμός, there is a notion in Maximus that the realm of quantity is related to explicit historical circumstances. Ἐρόνος is related to the variation between meanings from one point to another. This is where ideas of language as a living experience, and not as a transcendental condition, is examined according to its capacity to reveal meaning and also obscure it. To look at it as a region where certain types of negative limits are constantly being revised within the general scope of active and measured time the scope and extent of χρόνος and κατηγορία are defined according to the interplay of historical meaning and the development of the kinetic cosmos. In this way the idea of governing or circumscription is an evolution made possible through the interplay between centres of activity in which meaning emerges. Hence, as a field of time in χρόνος the equation to states of meaning make it virtually impossible to separate subjective experience of relation in the progression of time to the actual flow of history in its subjective and not in its cosmic sense of χρόνος.

Ἐρόνος is the field of relative history, aesthetic continuity of events. It is the realm in which the relations of history co-operate to change and re-express meaning either through the uninterrupted continuity of the process or revelatory. For Maximus this is where the play of revelation occurs as an aesthetic event. The procreative structure permeates senses of time and extension. In history the content is neutral or indeterminate insofar as the identity of its not entirely clear. It still consists of the potentially polemical relations in the sense discussed in the previous chapter. It is subject to possibly radical semantic redefinition in light of a redefining λογος. Therefore χρόνος under these circumstances, is not the force of αἰών, but the interplay between possible durations.

The two examples of χρόνος and ἀριθμός constitute part of the content that makes up the composition of κατηγορία for Maximus. The chapter showed that the elements are varied. The composition of the procreative principles is negatively couched because of how they do not include a self-reflective engagement. The self-reflective moment is necessary for generating an idea of how the organisation of any system, either structurally organic or purely, or mathematically conceptual, is put together. What demarcates the rational being is the capacity to orientate the procreative order of its own activity through the self-assessment of its processes in

reflection. Although much of the content of this section leads into work that is within the appendix, it is included below to indicate how the structural activity of the *Κατηγορία* and *μνήμην* is co-present with a specific type of noetic engagement.

Self-sustaining processes, as Maximus understands them, possess their own system for classifying internal relations. Although the sense of mathematical discussed by Balthasar is fundamentally wrong in its dismissal of the importance of a formal structure, what he does show is that the processes of naming, and the continuity of the processes of naming, possess the basis for the arising of temporal and spatial relations, which are brought into determination within the *κατηγορία*. Within procreative self-continuity, and the possibilities of determination which defines the content of these processes, are the primitive structures through which the classification of ‘before’, ‘after’, ‘nearer to’, further from. This also shows that, within procreative self-continuity there are temporal and spatial senses already operating. Insofar as these can be seen as emerging out of the structure of self-continuity, one can identify that there is, within the structure of motion, the basis for the construction of a sophisticated structure that is, for Maximus, the basis for our generation of a semantic system, which is actually based on the interrelations within processes producing a temporal and spatial order. Hence meaning itself is discerned through the capacity of processes to organise themselves sequentially both temporally and spatially.

### **Self-Continuity, Temporality and Spatiality**

*Κατηγορία* is the persistent accumulation of the *λόγοι* that amount to a general characteristic of a creature: what makes x an x? To answer this question requires assuming the subject. Accumulation and recollection extend the characteristic senses of a particular identity. If it abstracts from them a characteristic operation (*λόγοι*) then its general comprehension demarcates the totality of what will be the subject of an investigation. The *κατηγορία* involves clarifying the *λόγοι* and identifying correct application however insofar as the principle is to gather the tools of a generic definition and concrete instances where the *λόγος* holds the principle aim of the *κατηγορία* is discriminatory insofar as to gain the data that suffices for the correct definition. This involves some directed constitutional engagement with *aporia*, but the roles of *aporia* are not to generate a definition, but to clarify cases where a *λόγος* is in

dispute. But from where does the examination draw, how does the process discriminate between one or another? It is through the constitution of the processes themselves being ordered in temporal and spatial terms. The process of accumulating names or answering questions consists in utilising the temporal and spatial ordering that gives rise to determination. This element of procreative continuity also serves as demarcation of judgements of relative distance or order, or quantity. These are names. The discrimination of relative differences takes place through a system that categorises or names relations. This involves dividing the order under investigation from others. The generation of a definition (λόγος) seeks the differentiation of types and relations, but does not set out the laws of their own constitution. Hence the limits of the temporal and spatial ordering are limited to the preparation of specific accounts. When something is named it is discriminated from a different set, from there its own identity can be understood.

Discrimination of this order is not based on the classification of objective names, but simply through the discernment occurring within continuity of the processes of self-continuity which κατηγορία and μνήμην retain. Within the processional classification of names are temporal and spatial distinctions.

The relations which make the content of the κατηγορία or κίνησις have not been clearly explicated in most of the secondary literature this is because its composition has only been examined as the movement between particular and universal. This seems to be the right locale for the discussion for describing how Maximus talks about the structure of the concept, but the κατηγορία and μνήμην offer an alternative way of describing a structure normally considered strictly conceptually.<sup>41</sup>

Even though each is ubiquitous, the κατηγορία and μνήμην do not depend on self-reflexion. The processes being described, even in the κατηγορία are said to be rule governed inasmuch as they have consistent types of understandings. However, the process of naming and the process of the continuity of this intelligibility operate without needing to be brought to light explicitly. Along with an examination of the flow of thinking (λογισμοί) and the syntheses that occur therein, the activity of self-continuity in conceptual structures appears as a coherent phenomenon. There is not a structural fault with either. Instead, what is lacking, what prevents them from taking

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<sup>41</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 141, 159.

their place as developed definitions of κινήσις, is that they, of themselves, contain no unified account of purpose. The κατηγορία and μνήμην do not require a description of these higher orders in order to supply positive content. Sophisticated notions and structures arise through the self-maintenance appropriate to procreative continuity.

What this has shown though, is that continuity, if related to through a determinate analysis, supplies concepts of spatial relations and temporality. This is showing that, even within structures that retain the sense of self-continuity, that they are generating relations, which can form the description of relations. Hence, spatial- and temporal relationships are constituted through the continuity maintained within the form of procreative motion, but not through a process of mathematical abstraction (Balthasar is right there) but though possessing, within the structure of self-continuity, temporal and spatial ordering. These principles are discussed with greater detail in chapters four and five, where, through other definitions utilised by Maximus, the structural conditions that generate spatial and temporal continuity are identified.

## Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the structure of procreative life is complex and fills structures that demarcate meaning with a sense of being self-continuous. Moreover, procreativity possesses its own senses of continuity and temporality. The explanation of the κατηγορία and μνήμην have indicated that the structure of procreativity, even in structures that are based on the continuity of consciousness and understanding, has immense scope and flexibility and can be found in a variety of areas which have often been excluded from discussion of movement in processes which lack circumscription. The chapter has laid out the processes and shown their integration into each other but has been limited to describing the composition of each stage rather than how evolution occurs. The tendency to describe movements within the subject as if they were qualitatively different than that of the continuity of material life is a mistake. Hence one would be less inclined to take any later moves of definition or clarification on Maximus' part, for granted.

Self-continuity is the first sense of motion engaged with at any length in this thesis. The next chapter considers another origin of the meaning and application of κινήσις and finds that the formal characteristic of the definition provides a pervasive sense but lacks internal content. Descriptions of creation become indicative of the

generation of κίνησις. Here κίνησις is generated by the difference between the divine and created things. Κίνησις thereby becomes what is generated as a result of differentiation between the divine and creatures. Being kinetic is the same as being created; they are synonymous. The consistency of this structure is attractive but can lead to the neglect of other ways of defining κίνησις.

## Chapter 4 Singularity, Κινήσις, Μέσον and Κσέτις

This chapter articulates the emergence of the predominant structure reflecting Maximus' general idea of created motion. It does not claim that this is the only way to establish an idea of motion, but through the Origenist debate which concerns first principles. Maximus points out the internal contradiction involved in explicating 'created being' as ontologically identical with divinity whilst still maintaining distinctions whereby a specific instance of motion represents the pervasion of a general rule. The structural interactions between general and specific pervade the arguments for motion. The scope for the adoption of general and specific motion is provided for by the geometric relations within the λόγοι. I explain how the divine intelligences function internally and how they can be read as instituting common modes specifically.

The chapter then discusses how a leading secondary author, von Balthasar, sees Maximus' idea of created being. The model emerges out of a description of creation that Maximus gives in order to refute Origen's static universe and retains the same generality of scope. Balthasar has several variations of the formal argument, including an attempt to generate interdependence within the heart of the concepts. Whilst he re-iterates the content of κινήσις using different concepts and conceptual forms, he does not enquire into why the model functions the way it does. Balthasar simply modifies the internal structure of the mathematical argument. What is required is a closer look into specific motion. The chapter claims that there is indeed internal differentiation between the idea of κινήσις as a general state and specific instances, but argues that the reliance on this structure by the secondary literature has meant that the comprehension of κινήσις relies on the interaction between maximal and minimal. This has removed a significant aspect of Maximus' thinking concerning κινήσις in which the explication of creaturely motion occurs through the analysis of the conditions of the specific creature. Although the formal argument supports the inclusion of κινήσις as the predominant principle of created being, it does not actually tell us what that means in concrete instances. The formal view, if taken in isolation, will reflect its internal and mathematical consistency but provide little or no scope for organic or internal development in the creature.

## Created Motion in the Interaction with Origenist Theology<sup>1</sup>

This debate is considered the main shift that takes place in Maximus' work. It describes how, making a theological point and an analysis of the language used by the Origenists, he identifies motion or κίνησις, as comprising the fundamental character of creation. The explication of the general state of motion comes through Maximus' analysis that created beings move and that this represents a general state common to all created things.

The main text is Maximus' *Ambigua* 7 or: "*On the Beginning and End of Rational Creatures*".<sup>2</sup> The text is more likely a refutation of Evagrius Ponticus than Origen.<sup>3</sup> *Ambigua* 7's brevity does not do justice to the subtleties of Origen's description of the creation process but, as Meyendorff points out, Maximus' summary of Origen's position can be found in Origen's work.<sup>4</sup> The elements of the argument proceed as follows. Maximus presents Origenism as claiming that originally the 'intelligences': (beings begotten by God)<sup>5</sup> "were all connatural with God."<sup>6</sup> This state is referred to as the *henad*. Maximus says these intelligences who were "in the contemplation of God" (*stasis*), were not satisfied by this and became bored,<sup>7</sup> and moved (κίνησις) from this contemplation, which resulted in God creating the world (*genesis*) in order to contain them. God gave these intelligences bodies of differing ontological density in accordance with the level of distraction that they had succumbed to.<sup>8</sup> The eventual return (*stasis*) to God after intense ascetical effort ". . . the end is always like the beginning."<sup>9</sup> The final mode of abiding is like the contemplation (*stasis*) originally experienced by the intelligences before they fell. Maximus describes the Origenist creation cycle as: *Stasis*, κίνησις, and *Genesis*.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The main text used here is Maximus' *Ambigua* 7.

<sup>2</sup> Henri Crouzel, *Origen* (T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1989) 205.

<sup>3</sup> Evagrius Ponticus, *The Praktikos and the Chapters on Prayer*, Translated, with an Introduction and notes by John Eudes Bamberger (Cistercian Publications, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1981) Introduction: lxxv- lxxxi. The importance of *Apatheia* and the general emphasis on the static nature of theologia, as well as the noonday demon, acedia, which is basically boredom/ satiety and distraction, indicates how important the cosmology of fallen intelligences is for Evagrius.

<sup>4</sup> Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought*, 49.

<sup>5</sup> Crouzel, *Origen*, 206.

<sup>6</sup> *Amb.* 7. PG 91 1068D-1069A-B. In: Blowers & Wilkin, *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*, 45.

<sup>7</sup> Except for the Λόγος (Christ), who remained loyal and became incarnate for our reintegration into God.

<sup>8</sup> *Amb.* 7. PG 91, 1069D-1072A. Blowers & Wilkin, *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*, 46.

<sup>9</sup> Origen, *De Principiis*, Book 1 Chapter IV, II. Cited in: Crouzel, *Origen*, 205.

<sup>10</sup> "For movement driven by desire has not yet come to rest in that which is ultimately desirable." Maximus, *Amb.* 7 PG 91, 1069B. Blowers & Wilkin, *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*, 45.



Moreover it signals how the creature, through abandonment, caused God to create, can, through the exercise of will, generate or cause to be generated, a fully coherent cosmos for the ‘want to experience something different’<sup>11</sup> Moreover, if they were to abide then, as God is the ultimate perfection, the idea of their desiring anything other than making the Origenist deity imperfect. Maximus argues that it is absurd that creatures which have ‘come into being’ can be said to abide with a co-equal stasis within the Godhead. He points out that the implication of creation is differentiation and the principle definition of the character of this differentiation is that it is kinetic. Maximus argues for a reversal of the cycle into *Genesis*, κίνησις, *Stasis*. “Further, of the things made by God, whether intellectual or sensible, coming into being precedes movement. It is impossible to have movement before something has come into being.”<sup>12</sup> And it signals that the motivation of life is to move back toward the divine. “The movement that is tending toward its proper end is called a natural power, or passion, or movement passing from one thing to another and having impassibility as its end.”<sup>13</sup>

The reversal of the Origenist creation triad redefines the constitutional myth from creation being originally static co-existence in God into creation being fundamentally dynamic and kinetic. The debate with Origenism replaced the order of original stasis, with an order of original dynamism. He responds to the programmatic Origenist cosmology with an equally primordial claim. Although it is necessary to explore why the λόγοι act the way that they do this is to identify how the formal system incorporates differentiation and variation to ensure the dynamic exchange.

The discussion of subjectivity in the form of the intelligences in the *henads* is where Maximus begins his investigation. From engaging the consequences of the idea of original co-abidance these internally differentiated beings possess the common

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Also: Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought*, 132-133. Both of them support a view that sees the doctrine refuted by Maximus is composed of souls eternally begotten by God and in God. They argue the Origenist cycle consists of *Rest (stasis)*, *Movement (κίνησις)* and *Genesis* (creation which is a response to the fall). This is the description that Maximus puts forward as the Origenist argument. The argument that Maximus puts forward is for a dynamic ontology rather than a stasis displaced by κίνησις. In the Origenist position put forward by Maximus there is no movement prior to stasis.

<sup>11</sup> *Amb.* 7, PG 91, 1069C. Blowers & Wilkin, *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*, 46-7.

<sup>12</sup> *Amb.* 7, PG 91, 1072A. *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>13</sup> Ταύτην δὲ τὴν κίνησιν δύνανται καλοῦσιν φυσικὴν, πρὸς τὸ κατ’ αὐτὴν τέλος ἐπιγομένην, ἢ πάθος, ἢτοι κίνησιν, ἐξ ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον γινομένην, τέλος ἔχουσαν τὸ ἀπαθεῖς, . . . PG 91, 1072B-C. Blowers & Wilkin, *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*, 48. The translation captures the differences between the terms used for movement as well as the nuances that Maximus employs to express the receptive state of the local activity (the person).

sense of being created. This motivates Maximus' identification of a common principle. There is no reason to account for co-abidance with an identity of essence, differentiation, though it creates objective difference, nevertheless provides the condition of the motion of every state. Motion and subjective or specific motion arise together. Hence the identification of a common is to say persistent in individuals etc. If movement implies specificity and therefore admits the dyad, this does not make it unable to be identified under a singular λόγος. Πάθη and κίνησις are a certain type of organisation in the organism. They are an organisation in which a peculiar motivity occurs by which a state or present locale is, by reason of the kinetic character of the creature, orientated toward a point external to its present locale. There may be motivities in mathematics for example, where movement is not actually a displacement from a locale *per se* but a re-investigation of a common principle via a distinct appearance (like how a triangle or a square could be called moments of geometry). In this way the πάθη (receptivity) describes the organisation of the being toward a *telos*. This means that in an individual πάθη in the individual and therefore the individual itself will change character and its constitutional appearance once the movement begins without it ceasing to be πάθη. The idea of πάθη then, institutes a design into the shape of the organic structure. It is appropriate to the holistic way in which the organic structure prevails and how the appearance changes according to the operation in which movement from A to B, to C. Even if the motivity of the organic structure is still orientated toward C, its appearance at A differs than its appearance at B when A is now a 'past' locale. When a trans-temporal phrasing is used then the problem emerges of how to explain subjective endurance and change. However *Ambigua* 7 does not give a description of the internal organisational principle which institutes the orientational change.

Receptivity and activity therefore become additional terms applicable to the description of particular and common motion. Individual instances of κίνησις is the internal motivity of the creature motivated by the external God. When Maximus is referring to κίνησις, he is referring to alteration within a common structural make up in all created things, one could call it internal or structural interdependence between particular and common. This is the basis of Balthasar's descriptions of motion taken from Maximus' description of the co-operation between universals and particulars. The language being used implies a dual and co-operative structure of activity and

passivity being admitted into creaturely motion. Κίνησις is a place-marker for active and passive principles. Κίνησις is seen to consist of several things, the relation between common and specific, the common and specific possessing a structural equivalence insofar as κίνησις consists of receptivity, activity, and intention toward the divine *telos*. Therefore, the ‘common’ sense of κίνησις and the specific sense represent the maximal and the minimal of the same principle: κίνησις.

This is why the word ‘common’ can refer both to a maximal structure and the relation between common and particular. However, to put it into Maximus’ terms, the vocabulary is expressed through the λόγος/ λόγοι relation. In another major section of the work Maximus, after restating his thesis concerning κίνησις as the primary principle of creation uses a formal schematic of the λόγοι to describe how creatures possess a common sense of being dynamic. When Maximus makes a move in the text to orientate the kinetic thesis in relation to the λόγοι this indicates the emergence of a different qualitative order within the examination of the concrete constitutional elements that comprise a rational creature. This language provides for describing a condition of created beings that is akinetic. Hence ‘common’ and ‘particular’ are being described using a structure that is essentially mathematical or formal. When the creature is said to be dynamic, it is meant that it participates in the λόγοι of ‘dynamism’. This is similar to saying that ‘all creatures are limited’ equals ‘all creatures have the λόγος of limit. It is to express how creatureliness is related to a stable principle of becoming. This stability defines the essential character of created being.

This move, which he uses to institute κίνησις, uses a system of mathematical or immaterial constitution, the λόγοι.<sup>14</sup> The λόγοι abide within the mind of God as perfected principles of existence. Classical definitions of λόγοι regard them as distinct from God though abiding in God, through the λόγος, as the activities of creation made in the λόγος, they ‘move’ insofar as they are distinct from God. They do not ‘move’ insofar as the activities in existence which they mediate through the creative act

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<sup>14</sup> The history of the interpretation of the λόγοι begins from Philo, moves through the main thinkers of Alexandria is expressed as an intuitive activity of cosmic life by Justin Martyr, and moves up to Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus. As the units or thoughts of God’s wisdom (Sophia and Logos) they are distributed through the cosmos as the concrete representation of God’s rational completeness. Hence all creatures insofar as they exist, do so in and because of the coherence and continuity of God’s ideas.

remain as the persistent possibilities or boundaries which creatures do not overstep. They institute activity (which is simply the totality of conditions of existence moving within the creature) by mediating God's 'creativity' in each being. The term κίνησις can therefore be said to be 'distributed' in two ways, either through the geometric form expressed in the internal cohesion of the λόγοι, or through the examination of how internal conditions co-operated to form a 'whole'.

### **The Interaction Between Λόγοι and Κόσμος**

The similarity between structures of a cosmology and the mathematical is based on a conception of the active role of unity within any productive system. Differentiation between the components within geometry is based on a classification of different qualities amongst unities.<sup>15</sup> For Maximus the mechanism comes from the historical importance of the singular concept of λόγος and also *Sophia*. Movement within the ideas inhabiting the divine are, of course, conditioned by the divine wisdom. Hence, as divine wisdom possessed a structural primordially the term 'λόγοι σπερματικοί', stemming from the interaction with Middle Platonism, became an approach for the distribution of the divine ideas (λόγοι).

The co-operation between the divine ideas and the unity of creaturely activity that they instigate and mediate took the form of the distribution of divine unity in a differential creation. The principle under investigation here is the operation of movement within ideas of unity, and these have currency in Maximus and they are the distributive mechanism for differentiation. The definition requires differentiation of what can be a unitive object, like a circle. The distribution mechanism represents explanations of the principle being so distributed. The λόγοι help explain the λόγος. The passivity of the creature (in being dependent on divinity) and the constancy of creaturely movement that Balthasar emphasises are descriptions of the effects of differentiation that distribution institutes within the character of creatures. Moreover, the fact that Maximus regards creatures (as participants in λόγος) as in one sense passive in their reception of movement, shows how he relates momentum as an expression of possession in the principles performing the activity of creation. As I said in the previous chapter, intentionality is the expression of the activity of the λόγοι.

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<sup>15</sup> Stephen Gersch, *Concord in Discourse*, 55, 138-9 et al.

As the activity of definition is brought about in creatures through their dependence, it is appropriate that their λόγοι defers to the absolute. The passivity of creatures and their ‘lack of being’ is an operation that expresses through negative means, the unsurpassed activity of God. A circle is expressed as: “. . . that in which the distance from its extremities in all directions to the centre are always equal”.<sup>16</sup> “As the centre of straight lines that radiate from him he does not allow by his unique, simple, and single cause and power that the principles of beings become disjoined at the periphery but rather he circumscribes their extension in a circle and brings back to himself the distinctive elements of beings which he himself brought into existence.”<sup>17</sup> The distribution of ‘points’ is based on co-equality, personified in the circle, meaning that a specific locale is an individual instantiation of the common, taking its specific position in relation to a centre and the other radii. Maximus’ concept of the mathematical and the theological are not distinguished from one another by analogy *per se*.<sup>18</sup> For if the question is one of defining how unity is related to difference and co-operation between points is the basis of the image then the use of the circle not only describes the relation but participates in it and imitates it. Hence, there can be two types of relation occurring, one of analogy and the other of symbolic participation. If the image is taken seriously the idea of the λόγοι as distributions made through God’s activity becomes comprehensible: the λόγοι are ordered according to internal consistency which manifests as an objective order best described through the use of geometry. If the λόγοι are instances that infer and instantiate the persistence of a higher order then the activity of distribution and definition do not equate with the exact nature of the principle (λόγος) and yet, insofar as the totality of the distributed principles express their identity as the points of equi-extension, their instantiation expresses a truth of their distributor and their possession of ordered relations. The laws of distribution do not represent the dispersal of a motivator (λόγος), nor does the compilation of external explanations (λόγοι) exhaust the totality of the principle.

<sup>16</sup> Thomas Heath, *A Manual of Greek Mathematics* (Dover, New York, 1963) 173 (Paraphrasing Plato).

<sup>17</sup> *Mystagogy*, PG 91, 668B. Berthold, *Maximus*, 187.

<sup>18</sup> Maximus’ understanding of Αριθμη is divided into two viewpoints one of κατηγορεα or the measurement of quantities. The other as the mathematical, conceived as a formal reality that relates to, and can form other types of motion, by prescribing their limits. The first can vary depending on the relations and is therefore heavily contextual (the ascription of objective laws of relation are not factored in here). The other, represented by the λόγοι, is not contextual, and exercise limitation over all created things, in various ways.

This shows how, despite the compositional arrangement required of the λόγοι, acting as elements that guide creaturely operations and limits, that they are all principles unified in the same perfected processional manner. The discussion of the region in which the λόγοι relate internally to each other is a realm of perfected temporality. Rather than the processional operation producing variations between the conditions in λόγοι, the conditions mediate differentiation according their instantiation of a common pattern of existence. The idea of a ‘common pattern’ gives the grounds for the description of the ‘non-mathematical world’ under a single definition, such as being kinetic. Hence, although each λόγοι, each moment, is distinctive, in the common region and their common relation to the λόγος, they depict processional operation according to specific realisational modes. The unity of each λόγοι is different from one to another, and yet each completes the other and instantiates the other in a distinctive way. Their unity is a build up of the diversity of their distinctive impressions, co-ordinated through a common realisation of perfected processes, organised by God. A good description of the formal realm in Plotinus helps to depict the highest possible actualised processes and relation.

This being so, we must agree that there is, first, the unchanging Form, ungenerated and indestructible, which neither receives anything else into itself from elsewhere nor itself enters into anything else anywhere, invisible and otherwise imperceptible; that, in fact, which thinking has for its object.<sup>19</sup>

This passage seems to discuss eternal models of figures; yet in their later use by Plotinus he relates the ideas as atemporal moments in the mind of the divine. Hence, because of their regional relation, “the Absolute One may be left out of the account, since not even majesty can be predicated of it.”<sup>20</sup> “. . . the movement would be the second *hypostasis*.”<sup>21</sup> However: “The Intellectual Cosmos, thus a manifold, Number and Quantity arise: Quality is the specific character of each of these Ideas which stand as the principles from which all else derives.”<sup>22</sup> Plotinus accepts differential operation through intellectual momentum but denies, by reason of the region in which the activity is occurring (in the mind of the divine), that differentiation acts as anything but a co-operation within the life of νοῦς. Thus the principles attached to the

<sup>19</sup> Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, 192.

<sup>20</sup> Plotinus, *The Enneads*, III. 7, 2. MacKenna Translation, 214.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, V. I, 6. MacKenna, 354.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, V. I, 5. *Ibid*, 352.

primordial divine ideas are differentiated; their specific qualities differentiate their quantitative distinctions. Yet differentiation, if it includes a dispersal principle, argues merely for a weakening of an ideal self-persistent reality (λόγοι) with a self persistent real, such as the psyche. Yet it does not remove the idea that differentiation is still definitive. In the mathematical the use of qualitative differences can be attached to geometric bodies. Indeed, the *Timaeus*, in making them primordial, moves from an idea of depth and unitive surface. The primal patterns of differential geometric bodies are still differentiations.<sup>23</sup>

“Absolutely everything is in motion, . . . pure intellects just as much as rational souls that are moved by knowledge and insight, because they are not knowledge in itself or insight in itself.”<sup>24</sup> This is important, the notion of *dunamis*, activity or force, is persistent even when the region is defined by an absence of the motivity of that which it contains: λόγος to λόγοι.<sup>25</sup> The λόγοι circumscribe, even if the content that is intended thereby is not clear, the force of the infinite internal interpenetration of the λόγοι, inculcate that principle, across the totality of the created world. The philosophy of nature is at one moment an origin myth, a formal ontology of production, then the motivity of specific forces affecting the organisational unity of spatio-temporal things. This capacity to identify an object as a specific collaboration of forces and elemental properties identified creatures as micro-cosmologies. The divisions though, are now performed by specific explanation (λεγέιν) rather than generalised or formal cosmological account. Hence the unity of the object can maintain the capacities of the broader forces without its specificity being denied. κινήσις, and other general principles, can move through the physical world as common demarcations on account of the sheer difference between the λόγοι and the specificity of creatures. However, insofar as all created things incarnate a common limitation (having motion), the specificity of each created thing will express said common, though in a manner specific to that individual or region.

The cross over of physical theory and λόγοι in Maximus is still balanced between physical and cosmological explanations. Nevertheless, this signals a general

<sup>23</sup> Francis Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato Translated with a Running Commentary* (Routledge & Keegan Paul, New York, 1971) 212.

<sup>24</sup> *Amb.* PG 91, 1177AB. Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 145.

<sup>25</sup> Although the connotations of Cornford's work on religion and philosophy anticipate a developmental engagement, cosmogony, in relation to *logos* as 'binding or the circumference in a reason', is evidence of a growing purity of explanatory intention that utilises the active power of geometric and mathematical conceptions of force.

sense of relation between ideas of force, of *dunamis*, figure or ἀριθμός. Hence the theory of λόγοι, as it also did in Plotinus, straddles several areas of explanation. Differentiation becomes a site of collaboration. The deferral of certain forces to particular temporal moments is still current because of the developmental schemas described in previous chapters. God's life, which is dynamic, is not experienced to the fullest extent until the *eschaton*. However, the persistence of activity in creatures is a result of how God mediates the totality of actuality to singular moments. The arbitration of the λόγος mediates the totality of creaturely possibility into the singularity of creatures. Hence the mathematical explanations of the cosmos, in which a general principle is found to be commonly distributed, is mediated through the activity of creatures to be sure, but by the capacity of the λόγοι to be internally coherent in themselves and in their distribution. The notion of physical unity, the unity of an organic structure then, is this collectivisation that is mediation of divinity but in creation itself, manifests as a 'common sense'.

### The Λόγοι Institute a Self-Consistent Order

. . . the λόγοι of everything that is divided and particular are contained. . . by the λόγοι of what is universal and generic, and the most universal (καθόλου) and generic λόγοι are held together (περιέχονται) by wisdom and the λόγοι of particulars (καθολικωτέρων), held fast in various ways by the generic λόγοι are contained by sagacity (σοφίας συνέχεσθαι), in accordance with which they are first simplified, and releasing the symbolic variety in the actions of their subjects, they are unified by wisdom, receiving congruence making their identity from the more generic.<sup>26</sup>

This passage shows the distributive mechanism consists of the co-operative relation between most universal and generic, and the smallest most particular. The λόγοι have temporal and local differentiations within an atemporal and spatial unitive concept of the possibilities of life. The transcendence of the divine Eternal is far greater of course. They are expressions of the multiplicity of differences within the synthetic unity of the hypostatic distinctions that arises from God's essence in the concept of ἐνέργεια. This is a distinctive locale of the divine that is separable from the essence by way of mode. The mode (*hypostasis*) itself gives rise to the undifferentiated unity of divine life, generated by the λόγος. Hence, λόγοι persist as manifestations in the

<sup>26</sup> *Amb.* 41 PG, 91, 1313AB. Louth, *Maximus*, 161. (My brackets)



energetic locale and they do so as differentiations within that unity approximating God's apophatic transcendence.<sup>27</sup> Their subsistence in specific local operations of creatures consists not only in the unity of creaturely operation, but the indefinite intentionality that defines creaturely unity (see previous chapter). This means that the openness of creation itself, in its multiplicity of possibilities for subjective understanding and the change in how they are organised processionally, is based on the persistence of the λόγοι as non-circumscribable and specific exemplars. In other words, the possibility of evolution, in any form, whether spiritual, biological, intellectual, is possible due to how the λόγοι persist and prescribe certain limits on the world. Process, as the realisation of the organic structure described in chapter 2, is facilitated in its most general sense, by the capacity of intelligibility to be both a procreative entelechy and a momentary external in which subjective possibilities surpass the specificity of the abstraction of specific temporal and spatial moments and form a self-consistent structure of creative possibility. The idea of the infinite procession, whereby λόγοι appear to consistently surpass the specific boundaries and limits of subjectively circumscribed nature, is due to their own persistent relation to the absolute infinite God. Thus creaturely evolution in contemplative union with God, imitates the ever increasing unity that the λόγοι possess through their differentiation from the eternal movement of the λόγος.

Subjectively the λόγοι are infinite and indefinite quantities of distinctive operations bound by the same constitutional possibility λόγος. An infinitely ascending series bound by the common sense of their constitutional limits. They are the constitutional possibilities of intelligibility in all and any case. The term 'possibility' here is crucial, for the range of λόγοι is not determinate by acts of abstraction except when it is related to redemptive gnosis of individuated created principles. They retain objectivity because of how God conditions their possibility, hence there may be λόγοι that are not yet manifest, and God may freely choose to create new λόγοι. The λόγοι act as common principles of life, they manifest chiefly in the appreciation of the indissoluble unity, after God, in creation.<sup>28</sup> Hence their

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<sup>27</sup> Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology*, Chapter 4. The problem becomes one of incarnational theology and hence the distribution of any theological type of unity will consistently require an investigation of distinctions between God's essence, attributes, energies etc. These problems come to the fore in Gregory Palamas.

<sup>28</sup> *Amb.* 41 PG, 91, 1312B Louth, *Maximus*, 160.

appearance is not according to a differential model nor a unified common only, but a relational mix. To thinking they manifest in two general ways: as the activities of the unitive capacity of life as it manifests in specific organic and intelligible structures, and also as the objective structure of interdependent relations between qualitatively distinct orders in a common region. When all creatures manifest as participations in the divine differentiation occurs according to the same unitive operation of God's providential conditioning. This is expressed in the mix between the senses of causal dependence between the λόγος of God and the λόγοι.<sup>29</sup>

The geometric or mathematical reading is a result of comprehending that the distribution of qualitative difference in the λόγοι represents the infusion, in the smallest possible unity of existence, the totality of the intelligible orders of creation. In effect, the differences between the λόγοι are all compressed into a single moment of life. The geometry of life is accomplished through the momentum of actualised possibilities functioning in co-operation with their original λόγος, to give rise to the single totality persistent in a single unified organic structure. The institution of the totality is a result of both the interpenetration of the various differences of the λόγοι (by God's wisdom), as well as their commonality within a spectrum instituting the whole. A single moment includes an incalculable immensity of qualitative and quantitative relations, through their co-operation in the singularity of their region, that distributes actual and self-evident events, as dependent on λόγοι that are not necessarily apparent. The sacred balance, the liturgy of the cosmos, is this wise inter-dependence.

This change, in which the interdependent operations of the λόγοι are re-ordered or appear in distinct ways, affects the organisation of an individual φύσις dramatically. Not only does our understanding of an individual or a general understanding of it remain related to self-consistency of other self-organising organic structures, but an individual moment contains the totality of the λόγοι arranged in particular co-operation to the individual principle. The totality appears ordered and arranged and as simultaneously persistent in every moment of creaturely life. Hence a unitive operation of an organic structure is a comprehension and distribution of the totality of life. Not only is the human being the microcosm, but the merest instance of

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<sup>29</sup> Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology*, 76. Tollefsen's comments here are based on his identification of the terminological reference and historical origin of the term συνεκτική αἴτιον in Maximus from what he identifies as Stoic.

inert matter is an organisation of the totality of actualised life. It is accompanied by the host of λόγοι, distributed in the λόγος, in the specificity of its φύσις. “In this way they direct the mind in a single glance through the λόγοι in things to the cause (διὰ τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὐσι λόγων πρὸς τὸ αἴτιον νοῦν), drawing everything together (διαπορθεύσαντες) in a single gathering (συναγωγῇ), and passing over the dispersion of the individual λόγοι of the universe.”<sup>30</sup> The internal relationships within the λόγος and λόγοι, their interpenetration and co-operation, allow the interrelation between common and specific.<sup>31</sup> These relations facilitate the generation of a common demarcation or a common type of principle, such as κίνησις. The physical momentum expands geometrically into a spectrum of intelligible diversity within a single principle.

### Λόγοι and Αἴτιον

One must be careful with the sense of αἴτιον, because of how it can be utilised in so many ways.<sup>32</sup> However, here it is meant to represent how, through a process of coming to be, engenders effects. These effects, as stated in chapter 1, are restrictions on the activity of that which caused it. However, effect and limitation are to be seen as engendering positive possibilities, insofar as effects are able to engender causes. Λόγοι and αἴτιον are being related because of how, in respect to the one acting on another, each restricts in a manner concordant with the capacity of the former. A cause generates productive relations, but the effects that they produce can be of a different order than the processes that make up the cause in itself. Hence a cause is a unified operation rather than a simple monad like unity and it produces something capable of its own peculiar movement. A common example is how the sun gives rise to light and heat which are in variation from their cause but through which the cause can be understood. The light and heat also have a causal efficacy. Moreover, when a

<sup>30</sup> Amb. 10, PG 91, 1137A, Louth, *Maximus*, 114-115. *Authors italics*. (my brackets) καθ’ ὃν ἀπλὴ προσβολὴ διὰ τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὐσι λόγων πρὸς τὸ αἴτιον νοῦν διαπορθεύσαντες, καὶ μόνῳ αὐτῷ ὡς συναγωγῇ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐλκτικῇ προσδήσαντες...

Θεορία Φυσικὴ becomes the contemplation not just of individual principles or of individual λόγοι grouped together through abstraction and considered on their own terms, it occurs as the unification of the totality within the particularity of the singular *logos*.

<sup>31</sup> Tollefsen describes this phenomenon of internal interrelation and the mutual coherence of the λόγοι. Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology*, 71.

<sup>32</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Δ. I. II. 1013a, 25 -1014a, 25. Trans. Tredennick, 211-217.

cause generates an effect this brings into being a demarcation or a boundary between the prior and the later.

The intelligible principles, the λόγοι, 'circumscribe' material beings into a type of movement peculiar to physicality. They demarcate the positive and negative limits of creation by prefiguring it through, and remaining within the λόγος of God.<sup>33</sup> The universe for Maximus consists of the interactions between different circumscriptions. They extend according to the inner constitution of the processes that they are comprised of. For instance, the figure of the circle exists in a particular way because of the extent of its internal limits and the corresponding demarcation of the space outside it. The circle's circumference marks a boundary in these two ways. Negative delimitation can only occur with a positive extension of a body. The cause also works through the delimitation of limits or the extension of a perimeter. The unitive appearance of a cause, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, is a matter of the co-ordination between different elements and it is liable to appear unitive from one point to being a complex unity of interdependent operations. In the theological cosmos this complex unity is the predominant characteristic of universal κίνησις.<sup>34</sup> The creation of principles by αἴτιον produces unitive appearances that causal efficacy in which, the θεωρία of this dispersion, is the basis of a formal cosmic-mathematics.

More than this though, the λόγοι and their foundational qualities appear in creaturely κίνησις as limitation. The motions of creaturely unity mentioned in the previous chapter are participations in the extent or perimeters of λόγοι. Insofar as their activities enable a movement to proceed here, but not there, creaturely activity is delimited in the manner proportional to dispositions incumbent on it by its created status. Each principle or limitation accomplished through the λόγοι can be distributed generally across the totality of the cosmos. The type of motion that the λόγοι 'possess' organises all derivative moments (in specific creatures) according to the infinite possibility extension of the λόγοι themselves possess. Hence, insofar as they act mathematically and distribute in a cosmos that has physical limitations, noetic limitations, limited possibilities, the extension of said principles occur within the order of the λόγοι, meaning that all creatures can possess the same limitation.

<sup>33</sup> Amb. 7, PG 91, 1085A-D and 1088A. Blowers & Wilken, *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*, 61-63.

<sup>34</sup> Maximus, Amb. PG 91, 1177AB. Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 145.

Hence the motivity of creaturely life consists of the living out of extension granted by the unity prefigured in the λόγοι. Here the λόγοι and their connection in λόγος represent the fundamental demarcation of the possibilities of any form of κίνησις, no matter how diverse. They express the capacities and limits available to any creaturely activity. Individual φύσις perpetuates a characteristic operation in proportion to its capacity to relate and participate in the different qualitative orders of the real. The idea of extent here enables it to relate throughout the various operations that demarcate the totality of the cosmos. The φύσις and the λόγοι, their co-operation in determining the extension of life, is the expression of the possibilities of creaturely organisation. κινήσις is archaic insofar it can persist as a common principle. Its foundational status is accorded through how it, or indeed any common principle, could be distributed. The λόγοι are interconnected and their interrelationship generates the continuity between the qualities that might comprise their existence (being created, limited in relation to the absolute). By all sharing in each other's existence, they therefore distribute a single principle within themselves and to specific material instances. The mode of the distribution through the λόγοι (as an interconnected set of relations) provides for the possibility of multiple archaic principles to inhabit the basic constitution of the cosmos.

### **Κινήσις is Demarcated Through the Λόγοι**

All the principles that form the content of creatures are demarcated through the activity of the λόγοι. Where a definition of created beings is posited, for instance that they are kinetic, or put negatively they lack divinity, the inculcation of these demarcations comes through their pre-emption as states within the λόγοι. Insofar as the principles of creation are certain types of limitations, the consistency of this limitation is expressed, not in a specific way (for the demarcation is common) but as a general principle (λόγοι). Hence creaturely activities of certain common aspects, insofar as they are common, are distributed according to the demarcational bounds of the λόγοι. In this way, the specific content of κινήσις, in specific beings is proportional to their general adherence to, and production through, the intelligible limitations of creatures (λόγοι). If a common principle is found the mode of distribution, thought in itself and not through the persistence in beings alone, is a λόγοι. The identity of creatures is not contained in their internal motivity alone, but

subsists as a general character made possible through the continuity and persistence of created principles. The basis of the ‘external’ description, in which movement is transposed to the immovable, is based on the capacity of that principle to be 1) common and general in a manner that beings simply are not, and 2) non-theological. This reading does make the λόγοι appear to be the arbitrators of universal principles, if this is the case, and it may be, the basis of this extension is their mathematical interconnectivity.

The expression of the λόγοι of concrete κίνησις therefore takes on the language of being a ‘common mode’. Hence dynamism means ‘possessing the principle called κίνησις. What this means as an internal structure is not actually described in this text. Instead the structures that make life possible are distributed universally because of how the λόγοι represent a system of internally consistent relationships. As such: The conditions of motivity are can be found ubiquitously because they are covered by the interaction between a system of internal consistency. On the other hand, the creature is also able to be expressed as the concrete activities within a creature that represent its arising as a demarcated ‘whole’. This is a different reading of λόγος/ λόγοι and one which was found in Maximus’ understanding of a definition. This use of λόγοι is closer to the sense of the internal limits of the creature that represent the extent of its possibilities and actualities. In the internal sense, λόγοι act as the compatibility of the interactions that cause the creature to come into existence and these do not necessarily need to refer to the theological λόγοι. In this way, the constitution of κίνησις in creation, if it were dissected, can be described through a persistent character, such as perpetually dynamic, and also through the concrete interactions that cause the creature’s procreative continuity.

In this sense there are various different senses in which a creature can be defined as having motivity even as possessing a λόγος of κίνησις. This shows how creaturely continuity, expressed in φύσις, does not consist of a single idea of κίνησις. “If the intellectual being is moved intellectually in a way appropriate to itself, it certainly perceives.”<sup>35</sup> The κίνησις of the ‘creature’ actually indicates at least two ways in which it is kinetic. There are qualitative differences between the orders. These qualities are determined by the manner in which the processes are put together

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<sup>35</sup> Amb 7, PG 91, 1073D. Blowers & Wilken, *On the Cosmic Mystery*, 51. This implies that there are other types of movement possible within a single integrative unity of the rational organism.

either through a formal description of consistent λόγοι or as the internal activity of the creature that makes it coherent. Maximus has both of these types of expressions, but Balthasar does not, he remains within the consideration of the formal sense of κίνησις. There is quality demarcated by interdependence, these operations condition the whole. However insofar as the whole is a distinctive appearance it can be considered in different ways than the processes which make it up. Unless there are some descriptions of the differences between how these operations occur then adding numerous forces and increased complexity of language does not provide a stronger picture of creaturely κίνησις.

The term λόγοι could be used to express the fact of creaturely dynamism through acting as a term signifying the restriction of a certain set of actions from within created being. In other words, it demarcates the extent of the possibilities of a creature. In this sense, although not being motive in the same sense as a flower or a river, it circumscribes the conditions under which an idea of incompleteness and therefore ecstatic motion occurs, it represents creaturely limitation. Hence the idea of limitation, of non-being is based on the idea of a specific type of restriction. Therefore, not only do the λόγοι represent the examination of unity in itself, which I explore in the following chapter, but within that unity is a sense in which there is a negative restriction of creatures occurring. When Maximus is referring to creaturely κίνησις, he is referring to a specific type of restriction. Moreover, the idea of restriction can be considered in itself as an abstract idea. The idea of creaturely dynamism, in the same way as creaturely restriction, can be read as a consistent principle. Hence, λόγοι become 'stable' because the conditions that cause dynamism may shift somewhat but dynamism itself never ceases. There is a good case for reading a 'dynamic' principle as ubiquitous. Hence one can see how the discussion referring to consistent principles can result in the identification of a 'permanent structure'. This is why it is important to explain why the explication of dynamism is based on the interrelation between the conditioning principles of a being, not just as a general structure (λόγος) but as specific interactions.

### **Balthasar's Formal Conception of Dynamism**

Hans von Balthasar provides the main arguments in support of the persistence of dynamism in created movement. His arguments stem from the refutation of Origen

and his use of the relation between minimal and maximal notions to describe the positive content of individual motions.

## Extending the Κίνησις Thesis

This section looks at some of the mechanisms through which κίνησις becomes a ubiquitous principle. The methods used are particularly pertinent and indicate the reason for the preference for an engagement with the ‘whole’ rather than an analysis of the constitution of the ‘whole’. The result has been the codification of κίνησις as a ubiquitous condition. Each method for extending κίνησις reflects a pattern utilised by Maximus. In a sense, then, there is little wrong with utilising these types of explanations. What is incorrect is to rely on them to produce positive data on individual types or instances of movement.

The mathematical interactions in the λόγοι provide a space for the articulation of a general idea of motion or κίνησις as a persistent limit found in creation.<sup>36</sup> It allows the extension of a definition of a single character such as the general idea of motion, to move across creation generally. Hence, the basis of a general definition of κίνησις is motivated through a formal structure rather than one based on the motion caused by the relations between the regions of the cosmos *per se*. Instead of focussing on how the λόγοι fit within a hierarchy of creative activity, as having a type of activity peculiar to them, I discuss how their internal formation can act to distribute a common type of principle. This would seem to support a reading of the λόγοι as ‘universals’ however I have not made that identification explicitly because it would require significantly more investigation of the topic. Instead I have set out a schematic of internal relation within the λόγοι. The mathematical reading of the λόγοι points out their power for being able to implement a common principle for discussing the limits of creaturely motion. This reflects Maximus’ statement concerning how one, or how the concepts themselves possess a special moment where the multitude arises through the emergence of the plurality of objects.<sup>37</sup> However, the strength of the λόγοι is how they interact together and not only how they relate to different orders.

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<sup>36</sup> Tollefsen, *Christocentric Cosmology*, 21-92. The size of the reference is testament to the scope of Tollefsen’s discussion. He gives almost a complete history of the idea of how hierarchies incorporating qualitatively distinct orders relate to each other, within cosmology, theology, and logic. The distributive mechanism is supplied by the expansion and contraction (συστολή) that takes place between these orders pp106-110.

<sup>37</sup> CK, II, 5. PG 90, 1128A.



Although the internal structure of the λόγοι allows the implementation of a common idea, because they themselves reflect the perfection of created motion, they lack the sense of temporality and extension needed for explaining the internal conditions that produce creaturely motion. Re-iterating a point made concerning the idea of κίνησις in the secondary literature, this type of reasoning is ultimately limited by the concern to maintain a unified or single λόγος. Instead, the focus needs to return to the idea of the internal motivity of creatures. The λόγοι fail to provide a clearer understanding of motion because of their lack of capacity to explain structures with internal variation, but their mathematical relationships provide a valuable idea of the power of a concept to demarcate a certain general activity.<sup>38</sup> The way that λόγοι distribute a consistent concept, such as ακίνησις, is that their capacity within an interactive set of relations can restrict creation in a particular way across all its instances (in all three time periods). Hence κίνησις is distributed as a common principle because of how the λόγοι mediate on account of their ‘purity’ and ‘interpenetration’. The mathematical reading emphasises the importance of the internal interrelation within a formal structure to distribute a common principle.

These methods can be described in at least three ways. First, once a particular state is found to persist ubiquitously it becomes like a λόγος or a pervasive law of nature. These can be comprised of a collection of differentiations and limitations and can be attained without using a theological system, or a system of distribution, like the divine ideas (λόγοι). Second, insofar as the mechanism instituting this activity is based also on διάστημα then anything that is different from the divine can be considered as created and therefore in motion.<sup>39</sup> Third, Balthasar could also be extrapolating how a common sense in creatures is a result of their being preserved by a divine idea (λόγοι). The λόγοι, a different explanatory mechanism, define abstractly, the demarcations within a divinely created cosmos. Supporting this claim

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<sup>38</sup> Tollefsen’s program here has not taken sufficient account of the internal structure of the λόγοι. Instead he focused on the doctrinal and philosophical development of the notion of the creative ideas in God. Whilst this is directly responsible for the historical meaning of the structure, the structure itself remains unexplored. As a consequence, the reader is left thinking that Maximus does not use mathematical reasoning. The exercise of formal restriction is also the basis for the exploration and speculation on the theoretical side of the contemplation of natural laws (in λόγοι). Without the mathematical the reader is left with no sense of the possibilities of inner dynamism within such a structure. Moreover, by explaining the structure using a mathematical precedence it allows one to envisage the co-operation of a formal structure with the concrete. Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology* (Chapters 2 and 3).

<sup>39</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 138.

is the fact that Balthasar does not see that the role of mathematical cannot be reduced to a system of κατηγορία. His lack of extended engagement with this problem has led to his abandonment of what appears to be Maximus' extensive use of mathematic-like structures in his description of the λόγοι.

The structure of the λόγοι, though it is mathematical, is not an answer to 'how much'. It represents as system of contemplation, but, more than that, it represents the structure of the divine mind and the distribution of the common laws and characteristic limits (λόγοι) of creatures. Hence these three ways of engaging motive principles utilise a mathematical order by prescribing the formal limits of creatures but not their specific limits as such. Yet this provision of a formal structure neither prohibits them from being considered as having internal motivity, nor from relating through a system of increasing complexity (in organic life). The primary model for describing the initial order of differentiation from divinity is the internal coherence of a formal order, likened to geometry. This order would be the distributor of natural laws. This is because the mechanism of a formal order enables the totality of the constituent relations (λόγοι) to relate to and be dependent upon each other. They accomplish this by organising themselves as interrelated and self-supporting. Hence, one pattern of life is pervasive because the mechanism for distributing the creative act functions like an interpenetrative relationship. I am unsure as to whether Balthasar is postulating all three or just one. What is clear is that the projected result, the commonality of κίνησις, is considered the primary consequence.

The lack of clarity concerning these points has meant that a 'common limitation' has been collapsed in the predominant reading of Maximus. Hence κίνησις is read only as emerging from a theological point. Balthasar says is that space and time represents archetypical limitations, but more needs to be said about why this is.<sup>40</sup> These are representations of how objective difference from the divine institutes a discernable order in creation.

The dependence on formal analyses, utilised by Balthasar, pervades the recent work by Törönen. It does this by implicitly bracketing the relation between organic individual, existing as the continuity of conditions, could be representative of the structure articulated through a logic. His excellent description of the forms that

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<sup>40</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 137-8. I have only referred to Balthasar's comments here because his descriptions of the divine ideas are related to the discussion of divine freedom vs. divine necessity.

underline Maximus' logic of the person shows conclusively the importance of non-dogmatic sources for explicating the notion. The work can place Maximus within a broader philosophical debate. Törönen shows how ascribing an individual or a person is a matter of choosing between moments which accord with and rely on a larger structure.<sup>41</sup> For instance, the differentiation between the γένος, and εἶδος, involves an individuation move which is also utilised in more specific instances.<sup>42</sup> Even though a human and an elephant are different they can be considered common insofar as the distinction that is operating is concerned with the relation between a general (animal) and a specific state (specific instances). The logic therefore, does not disclose explicit content. The basis of their difference here is not meant as their possession of language or not, but in their common distinction from the γένος.

Moreover, to support his analysis of Maximus' use of logic, the set of qualitative relations occurring as positive phenomena (individuals), occur regardless of whether that thing is conscious or not. The structural interconnection that forms the constitution of all phenomena can be recognised as the basis of the logical order. The logical order does not need to serve as the basis of identifying autonomous locales and persons. In this way, the fact that they are very distinct is not the matter up for description. This is because individuation describes a movement of differentiation which does not depend on the individual being x or y *per se*. He shows that the structure of the logic used in personalism does not refer only to conscious beings. It does not refer only to anthropology.

However, Törönen's utilisation of the unitive model for describing creaturely activity replays a split between the logic of individuation and positive elements of creaturely growth which are the individual. The study does not push into the region required. This is to enquire whether the unitive phenomena singled out by logic are pervaded by the same type of logic of individuation or is the order in fact, different? Törönen does not suggest that logic would substitute for the descriptions of the conditions of the individual. However, as explored in chapter 5, there are solid grounds for actually reading the temporal and spatial intentionality mentioned previously even into the setting out of a formal logic. Törönen does not give adequate space to how the interdependent qualitative relations identified as co-operatively

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<sup>41</sup> Melchisedec Törönen, *Union and Distinction*, 26-7.

<sup>42</sup> The pattern moves between οὐσία, γένος, εἶδος, ἴδιος. Explained in chapter 5.

conditioning the positive locality of the individual. These different principles are interdependent λόγοι, which act co-operatively to establish ‘the individual’.

Yet, the logic through which a general and a specific state are differentiated can be based on the recognition that any state of existence is pervaded by the relation between qualities of processes. It can effectively allow that what it is attempting to explicate is the differentiation of units rather than an explication of their constitution. Through not describing how the person of logic is of a different order than the constitutions of a being means the continual separation between these two discourses. The individual becomes a site of the general principle of κίνησις. But the concept of person, even as a logic, can utilise the mechanisms of internal individuation if the discourses are recognised as co-operative and co-conditioning, and not in competition. This manner of engagement prevented the study from identifying how the increase of identity can be pervaded by the persistence of a specific and consistent organic set of relations. The details of the logical system are discussed in the following chapter.

### **Balthasar and Differentiation**

There are several structural senses operating within Balthasar’s discussion. However, these amount to a common pattern through which the emergence of one state out of, or from, or caused by, another, generates difference from the previous. The common sense of κίνησις, and its constituent’s descriptions arise out of this type of distinction. The theological emerges as a result of Maximus’ reasoning against the Origenists. Here creation involves the differentiation or distancing (διάστημα) of the cause from the effect, the creator and the creature.<sup>43</sup> 1) This means that the classification of creaturely identity is based on the conception of the character of God as ‘permanent’ (in an apophatic or theo-symbolic sense) and therefore that derivative creations are distinct from this permanence.<sup>44</sup> 2) This difference is therefore motion. On the other hand, Balthasar retains a space for positive creaturely movement. 3) Κίνησις is considered to relate to the activity of the creature moving toward a *telos*. Hence *ekstasis* and motion are described as the positive phenomena through which creaturely κίνησις are identified. In this context, the description of a theological action bringing about a change of state, κίνησις and *ekstasis* are determined in respect to additional movements described in chapter 1.

<sup>43</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 137-8.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, 148-9.

The terms διάστημα and διάστασις have been translated as distancing or spacing, they have been used to describe the process of the creation which give rise to an order of things.<sup>45</sup> The generation of a distinction of one thing from another occurs by a specific kind of action, by distinction of one or another, by distancing or expansion διαστολή “extension or distancing that finds its expression in momentum (φορα)”.<sup>46</sup> The term momentum is the crucial one and due to how the principle of momentum is ubiquitous in created beings (though in different ways). Individuation and διαστολή have some equivalence based on how, in a broader sense, creation occurs through the ecstatic movement of God’s ἐνέργεια and in doing so creates entities that have distinction from God’s self. Thus distance and distinction contain two elements simultaneously: the distancing of God from the thing in the activity of creation, and the difference of the thing’s identity in itself. The creation of meaning implies both positive identity on the part of the creature and God’s difference from it. Hence creaturely identity is positive and negative. The differentiation gives rise to the positive definition of κίνησις as spatio-temporal.

This type of differentiation, out of the theological rendering, gives rise to a formal sense of space and time as ubiquitous, but as yet, empty universals senses. The content of the concepts are supplied by the positive motion of creatures. And yet, in these cases, without a framework for explicating specific examples, the notion of space and time, quite simply, hangs in the air. Supplying additional content such as topos or demarcation, simply begs the question, and leads us back to ask about the conditions. Although the relations back and forth are attempts to relate specific to general instances, without a clarification of the internal sense of κίνησις, like the description of procreative continuity in chapters two and three, the classification of κίνησις has taken place as a result of an assumption that the content has been supplied. However, as discussed in the beginning of the chapter, it is not the intention of the theological rendering, to give specific reasons for creaturely motion.

Balthasar has ascribed a common state, desire or *ekstatic* κίνησις without adequately denoting whether his position is derived from a common sense of creaturely activity (the ground up), or is a result of the difference from the divine, mediated through a set of mathematical λόγοι. My argument would be that one could

<sup>45</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 137- 41. Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, 51-61.

<sup>46</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 137- 41.

approach the pervasiveness of κίνησις in any of these ways. Unfortunately, none of these approaches contributes to a description of the internal processes within creaturely motion. Hence, the aim of this project is to focus on what would represent the positive phenomena of motion, in as full a sense as possible. Although explicating an important definition, the thesis only suggests that this pattern could represent a common notion. It does not seek to identify how a definition of motion comes about in respect to the more speculative structures. It attempts to identify the form that the definition takes and therefore what needs to be considered when articulating the principle of κίνησις in Maximus. Utilising any of these models is fine so long as the provision is clearly given that they require an examination of how the particular limits of a creature express a specific type of negation of God's essence. On the other hand, in order to do this, one must have some idea of the structure and content of some other approaches that Maximus takes which specifically utilise positive descriptions of particular states of self-contained motion.

### Perichoretic Methodology

“At the heart of the developed being, however, lies also the necessity of motion”.<sup>47</sup> And “To answer the question of the ontological meaning of this essential motion, we must examine more closely the relationship between being in general and the individual being.”<sup>48</sup> As Maximus says: “Universals are destroyed by transformation into individuals, while individuals are destroyed by dissolution [into universals].”<sup>49</sup> This pattern of ‘balance’ is re-iterated in the pages following. The introduction and chapter 1 also mentioned the perichoretic structure of mutual, non-destructive exchange. The main claim of this chapter is that the use of perichoretic exchange results in the generation of ‘self-consistent’ or ‘common’ principle, in this case the general idea of ‘kinhsis’. Balthasar constructs motion out of the combination of these two orders. The perichoretic move, however, is reduced into a specific site, the individual φύσις.

1) The specific collection of principles in a being which gives the characteristic motion that defines its identity (φύσις). 2) The larger structures that, through co-operation, generate a general continuity that we call ‘existence as a whole’

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<sup>47</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 158.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, 159.

<sup>49</sup> *Amb.* PG 91, 1169C. *Ibid*, 159.

or the cosmos. The minimal and the maximal both are minimal or maximal expressions of a 'type' which can be commonly demarcated. Hence, since the theological principle organises the maximal and the minimal (according to their peculiarities) by distinguishing them from the divine essence, hence their common sense is based on their collective difference from God. This means that commonality can dominate the definition of the specific because, relative to God, both are ultimately distinguished. 3) The effect of using a 'singular' principle or λόγος to describe an organic process is that when adjusting to specific or general events cannot be provided for unless one moves out of a theological perspective. When expanded this appears like the common use of a single definition such as 'all creatures are kinetic' or something to the effect: 'the creature strives toward re-imbibing into its characteristic movement (φύσις) its first and final cause, God.' Hence the predominant characteristic principles that demarcate individual creaturely movement become a 'site'.

### Φύσις as Microcosm

The φύσις is marked out by how its intention, the area in which movement is conscious and free (to a certain extent) is defined not by a single sense of continuity that is apparent within ordinary human engagements in the world, but it appears only when the individual subject is contextualised in relation to broader patterns that inform cosmic life. Hence, ideas of human individual willing within φύσις are not the collection of essential qualities that make up individual motion. The use of a taxonomy as a device for differentiating grades cosmic creativity is an attempt to represents the compilation of compatible dynamic forces.<sup>50</sup> Instead is one in which the complexity of the broader cosmos, which the subject must respond to, entering the experience and freedom of the subject thus making it a 'microcosm'. When one reads intention itself as conditioned by larger cosmic forces, then the discussion of a subjective structure of intention becomes more complex. Balthasar reads individual φύσις as the concrete continuity generated and sustained by the co-operation of a

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<sup>50</sup> Stephen Gersh, 'Proclus' Commentary on the Timaeus: The Prefatory Material'. In: *Ancient Approaches to Plato's Timaeus* Ed Robert W. Sharples & Anne Sheppard (Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, 2003)146-7.

multi-regional universe. He is working within a co-operative cosmos.<sup>51</sup> Here, in a theological explanation, the divine is the constitutional principle that sustains its existence.

The perichoretic elements prevalent within the regional cosmology are also related to the movements of individual φύσις. Φύσις is defined according to its need of God expressing itself in human longing for to rest in God.<sup>52</sup> 1) Individual motion articulated within an idea of creaturely character, or φύσις, consists of the principles of creaturely life operating together, and demarcated by the term φύσις, which serves to demarcate the principle operations that define said individual.<sup>53</sup> 2) Balthasar sees a characteristic operation (φύσις) in beings, the concrete expression of their very life, is thoroughly within and sustained by its embedded-ness within an interregional world and specifically through having a positive relation to the divine region.

### **Change, Continuity and τὸ Μέσον**

As mentioned above, the perichoretic exchange results in the condensation into a single site. The intentional site, the φύσις, therefore remains the combination of the totality of the regions, co-operating in intentional motion. However, insofar as the explication of φύσις is structurally comprised of the relation between maximal and minimal depictions of a common: κίνησις the content of κίνησις is comprised of the co-operation between these orders. Balthasar positions the specific content of that continuity as based on the interchange between intelligible universals and concrete particulars, higher and lower, God and creation.<sup>54</sup> The perichoretic exchange manifests not as explicit stratum but as the continuity of the historical process. The continuity of life gives the data for the generation of an idea of change as persistent. Hence this definition is a matter of determining what is ‘most real’ or most apparent within the activity of life as experienced. Mediated by the continuity of God’s life, the motivity of κίνησις is a reconciliation or synthesis of these larger moments within the continuity of our creaturely experience. The complexity of these interactions almost

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<sup>51</sup> Balthasar does not represent the natural will (φύσις thelematos) solely as a matter of subjective choice but always as a matter of the co-operation of the structures that condition the cosmos and noetic *metanoia*.

<sup>52</sup> The mode of ‘natural’ operation (φύσις) the person is the recreation of the mode of reality God intended. φύσις comes to represent the activities of the human person that are retained as the creature’s relationship to God moves it outside of its previous habits. Movement, here, describes a human φύσις.

<sup>53</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 157-8.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid*, 159-61.



forces the conclusion toward a single principle or definition. This tension, therefore, is between attempting to take an approach that recognises individual regions or takes the various types of motion and organises them into a single idea of ‘motion’:

For all those things that are distinguished one from another by their peculiar differences are united by their universal and common identities, and forced together to the one and the same by a certain natural generic λόγος, so that the various kinds are united one with another according to their essence, and possess the one and the same and the undivided.<sup>55</sup>

The grounds of definitive concrete activity are defined according to the manner in which regional co-operation manifests as a general sense of continuity. If each region has a peculiar κίνησις associated with it then this surely makes ‘κίνησις’ a consistent principle for describing a reality that persists multi-regionally and generally. However, in the midst of this discussion, realising how κίνησις and creation are also mediating towards God, the most real, the use of a common term as κίνησις then becomes associated with a larger ontological claim concerning the cause and destination of motivity. Therefore the κίνησις of creation comes to be more and more associated with the idea of a ‘process of perfecting’ or ‘τὸ μέσον’.<sup>56</sup> Once a ‘common structure’ can be identified, the question of ‘common destiny’ comes to the fore. Does cosmic life, as a totality, have a destiny?

### **The Problematic Status of the ‘Middle’**

Thus is all ages, times and places and all that they include are after God who is the beginning without a beginning, and as they are much behind him as infinite end, they do not differ in any way from the middle. It has modes of thought naturally inherent in it which can produce a partial understanding of God’s wisdom over all things. So long as they serve for understanding, they cannot be anything but middle and thus partial understanding.<sup>57</sup>

Κινεσις as a τὸ μέσον is a generalised view of creation which stems both from a reading of the common principle demarcating each region and from the opinion of Maximus that creation is partial and in an ongoing process of revelation/disclosure. Because created beings can be said to be in motion according to their procreative increase and motionless insofar as the increase does not change the essential character

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<sup>55</sup> *Amb.* 41, PG 91 1312C. Louth, *Maximus*, 161.

<sup>56</sup> *CK*, I 69. PG 90, 1108C-D. Berthold, *Maximus*, 140.

<sup>57</sup> *CK*, I 70. PG 90 1109A. Berthold, *Maximus*, 140.

of something.<sup>58</sup> τὸ μέσον or ‘middle’ is used to describe the general state of beings at present. In this way it is a generic description. ‘Partiality’ or ‘τὸ μέσον’ is a mode that consists of the compilation of contrary sources in organic continuity. Because of how the generality is a production of several different elements, the terms τὸ μέσον and φύσις, are made more complex. Continuity consists of differential principles operating in a unitive sense of ‘κίνησις’.

On Balthasar’s reading ‘temporality’ can be divided between the αἰών and χρόνος. Balthasar articulates aspects of existence in which the general ages of the causal cosmos are distinguishable from God’s eternity. Temporality is used as a generalised notion of ecstatic momentum within an organic structure. The apparent coherence arising from different temporal and existential operations in organic continuity is the result of the co-operation between distinctive principles (λόγοι) that, working cohesively, form the internal life of the creature.<sup>59</sup> Balthasar identifies the constituents as consisting of several elements and understands that the general sense of the phenomena contains different constituents. It is over the balance of reflection, that φύσις comes to consist of a general sense of movement conditioned by its difference from the divine. “To become ‘being’, like the source it has left behind—namely God—this ‘pure becoming’ must be transformed into some qualitative kind of motion (ἀπλῶς κινεῖσθαι). . .”<sup>60</sup> Paul Plass’ discussion of time and eternity also shows how regional difference produces motion.<sup>61</sup> Unfortunately the various regional principles are again made implicit under the general notion. The idea of motion then, relates to the persistence of a state of activity in which life is equated to a generalised sense of ‘continuity’.

In Balthasar’s discussion, the internal relation between maximal and minimal, prefigured in the Λόγος/λόγοι become the model for the implementation of a general definition. When κίνησις demarcates what does or does not move, it does so because it is being used like the λόγοι of ‘motion’. Hence, λόγοι represent an expression of the limits of creaturely activity, but demarcated through a unitary model. Motion is implemented like a ‘limitation of creation’, but it does so from within its position in

<sup>58</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 154.

<sup>59</sup> Tollefsen also maintains the reading by re-iterating Maximus’ use of the term *topos*. Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology*, 114-5.

<sup>60</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 143. Extrapolating on: *Amb.* 1. PG 91, 1073 B-D.

<sup>61</sup> Plass, *Transcendent Time in Maximus the Confessor*, 263-4. *Amb.* PG 91, 1164B-C. Louth, *Maximus*, 130-1.

God. Hence creaturely motion, defined by such a general term, can only ever rely on the persistence of an absolute other and can never be discussed through its own internal moments. Hence at every turn, the possibility of a single idea of motion producing explanatory results becomes less satisfactory.

The particular and universal, if they are placed together in a co-operation, co-constitute a common principle (κίνησις). Indeed, if, on the other hand, the self-continuity structure of the being itself is taken as the basis of examination, the temporal structure of characteristic continuity ‘becomes’ a collection of qualitative moments. Balthasar expresses the temporal moments as related to the exchange of places outside of an evolutionary sense of time, or at least within a motion of temporality that is not spelt out.<sup>62</sup> Indeed, the αἰών, and the turning into time, consists of movement within the eternal and creaturely activity becomes expressed as a medium or process in the sense of being ‘a balance of contrary motions’.<sup>63</sup> And although he understands that movement as a general principle in beings is a result of a shift in the absolute, he does not articulate this in relation to the positive structure of evolutionary progression. The movement within eternity which ‘produces’ temporality, can be discussed as actual creaturely motion, so long as structural growth of creatures is seen to consist in the co-operation between οὐσία, φύσις and ἐνέργεια. The site of positive temporal progression is expressed through how the character of beings includes qualitative differences within its motion. These are three moments that are ‘self-intimating’ within a structure, for each relates to and comes about through the expression of the other.

However, the way that the argument actually goes is to 1) describe the activity of maximal and minimal, 2) denote them under a common (τὸ μέσον, κίνησις) 3) Ascribe the common a value either existence, non-existence (it doesn’t actually matter what the value is). 4) Relate the value to another point eg the divine or Non-existence. 5) Thereby the principle gains an objective value relation only in respect to the ‘other point, this value thereby becomes objective. 6) If the point is higher or lower this thereby generates the value of the term under investigation. 7) Thereby, in respect to non-being, in the case of evil for example, positive existence is absolutely distinct from this value. Or if the divine is the measure then if the valuation is taking place in

<sup>62</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 154, 159-61.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid*, 141.

respect to that, becomes the ‘opposite’ of that principle. Hence, partiality becomes related to an ultimate (not a maximal) other; hence, partiality is made the absolute other to the divine. This sets up a problem, for just as smaller units subject to gravity become miniscule in relation to larger planetary forces, this same reduction is caused by the use of a higher field in order to explain our normal experience of the world.

In order to establish the persistence of a common structure the relation needs to be established to a fixed point. Hence, the divine acts to arbitrate this permanent locale. In this way, the absolute gulf, which is mediated and moderated through Christ, is mediated in an incarnated hope, nevertheless remains in Balthasar’s descriptions. The ascription of non-being (τὸ μέσον) and the procession toward the divine causes the arising of a specific structural lack within the descriptions of created being. Whilst the formal ascriptions mediated a common amalgam of minimal and maximal, the mediation of the common kinetic with the divine ascribes to positive motion a negative value. In this way, positive life can act as immanent negations of the divine essence. However, instead of this type of language leading to a physics, the expectation is that the negative description can arbitrate sufficient content for creaturely motion. This causes the deference of their existence to something beyond them. Explanations concerning creatures move outside of their own activity in pursuance of an external *telos*. The movement thesis is a positive way of describing the reading of an ontic-lack in creatures. Creatures desire to find the object of their desire by moving ecstatically toward God. “God’s work which began in time are all beings which share, for example, the different essences of beings, for they have non-being before being”.<sup>64</sup> The affirmation of ‘dynamism’ arose with creaturely ‘dependence’ on the otherness of God to its present situation. The language of the Origenist controversy generated a certain manner of speech whereby positive activity in creatures that are outcomes of divine kenosis (self-emptying of essence so as to facilitate creation). Creation is described in positive terms because of the particular manner in which it lacks a complete correspondence to divinity. Its difference from God can be defined positively as ‘creature’. The fundamental point that comes through here is that the mode for the development of a ‘common’ consists of the co-operation between descriptions. These produce something which has not been given positive content except that supplied to it through the creation of a ‘Griffin’.

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<sup>64</sup> CK, I, 48 PG 90, 1100D. Berthold, *Maximus*, 136.

Hence, there is no motion within the description of motion; it is simply a ubiquitous state of affairs. Clearly Maximus has a more sophisticated account of internal motion than simply following the formal model. The next chapter describes the next step, to organise and contribute to a positive notion of intention. However, the same kind of issue arises again, the contribution of various qualities and principles are simply placed in a 'locality' the individual φύσις.

### **Conclusion: The Mathematics of κίνησις**

Insofar as the λόγοι mediate through their difference from the divine, such a 'κίνησις' in creation is representative of this differentiation of the divine withdrawal. The demarcated limits of creaturely activity are identical to the operation of creation. The basis of positive content has been expressed through a gesture of 'difference'. Hence, separation, demarcation, limitation, movement are all formal because of how they express the same moments. For this reason, although there is little positive content as of yet, subsequent insights that relate to internal activity will verify the common idea. In this creative movement, the clearer the differentiation between the cause and the effect, the more definitive is the expression of 'limitation'. The distribution of the same principle across λόγοι, indicates a common Λόγος. Distribution of the single Λόγος in many λόγοι and the many λόγοι in one Λόγος are themselves representations of this limit. There are grounds for reading a general idea of limitation, such as κίνησις, into the cosmos, but the structure for doing this is more appropriate to an exposition of the internal relations within the λόγοι and to explain how, in their capacity as a distributive mechanism, they arbitrate a general condition. The generality of κίνησις is mediated through a mathematical order.

Reading κίνησις as a restriction implemented by the capacity of an internally consistent principle, such as the λόγοι, is generated through the internal motivity of the creature, but through the perichoretic exchange between minimal and maximal regions. One can show the relation between different qualities might produce motion. Still, this type of enquiry reduces the idea of internal 'gravitas' in the creature into being a locale determined by larger forces. Even though this is true, if the objective of an enquiry is to ask: what does it mean to say that creation is in motion? then simply articulating how specific beings move due to their proximity and affection by larger structures reduces creaturely motion to explanations that will not capture their internal

responsiveness. Instead, the creature becomes passive to the large events, and become a 'mere location'. The terms make a judgement about the quality of the activity, which, though evidently occurring through internal motivity, are expressed in terms of its movement in which its cause is assumed. Hence, unless there is a clarification of how the internal motivities give rise to the unitive creature, the use of inter-regional relation and the qualification of the status of the whole, repeat the same error: a lack of enquiry into the inner constitution of creatures. There is no problem with κίνησις representing a common limit or sense of creaturely extent. The problem occurs when one wishes to employ the same mode of explanation, the formal one, across all possible uses. It is akin to how the space outside the perimeter of the circle demarcates the inner. Yet if the inner principle could also be used, as the internal extent of the circle, this could also supply the idea of a limit, but it is done through a structure that takes a different angle into the issue. In creatures the issue is more pronounced, for one cannot look at the demarcations of the movement of an arm and make an assessment concerning the existence of a specific tendon, only that there is some form of internal principle facilitating the motion. Κίνησις, instead, could be considered under a notion of an internal motive principle. Instead of being used to represent an internal principle of creatures, which it is not as yet, it is better to be looked at as an external demarcation. In this way, it acts to restrict the notion of ἀκίνησις or eternity (αἰών) or the infinite, from creatures. In this way, it works like a demarcation line separating like from unlike. This structure also does not implement content *per se*, but demarcates how any phenomena within this field will contrast with another field. Hence, if positive content in creatures verifies the idea of κίνησις, then this immediately, not only inscribes specificity to the idea of κίνησις, but increases the scope and precision of the akinetic. Hence, it adds to the content of the principle (ἀκίνησις) being used as the demarcation sense.

Κίνησις refers to a peculiar type of phenomena. However, if one utilises a mathematical criteria, if one assumes that the order instituting the motion is based on models which utilise and systematise generality (theology and the divine ideas), then identification is too general. 'Creatures being limited', for instance, extrapolates on the common sense of κίνησις but without adding significantly to the content of the concept. Moreover, to make a judgement that all permanent structures need to be rendered under the common sense of 'not divine' and therefore kinetic, leads to an

inability to explain why motion, in Maximus, does possess enduring structural elements. Instead, the discussion of κίνησις in Maximus assumes that the only conceptual structures useful for describing κίνησις are those that rely on generalities. These general structures do not possess different levels, but κίνησις comes to represent the persistence of a common type, being limited. Thus κίνησις appears as an intransigent universal. This is because the order of motion that the studies expect to find can be grasped simply by identifying 'limitation'. There has not been a drive to look closer and the result is that the structures of commonality, λόγοι, and differentiation from divinity because they perform their task but offer little opportunity for the development of content, become conceptually intransigent.

What Balthasar has neglected, because he only reiterates the formal model, is Maximus' description of the 'person' or the individual site. This seems to be the locale where Maximus seeks to begin his description of motion. The motion of creatures, their desire for God, their affection, is the content of specific motion. Whether through formal differentiation or the operation toward desire, the notion of person, the specific site of motion, represents the main foci of Maximus' mediation of the general principle of motion. The program examining the person is a more recent emphasis in scholarship. Yet, as I explore below, there has been a lack of investigation of the positive grounds of creaturely activity. The person represents the structure where the intentional life of the creature can be explored. However, the mode of intentional life in creatures is kinetic due to a very specific combination of factors. The differentiation of the individual occurs through a series of moments which do not emerge from the formal account but through a different investigation.

## Chapter 5 Personhood and Specific Κινήσις

The notion of personhood has been an important theme in recent Maximus scholarship. The uses of the personalist distinction to indicate non-humans has changed the consideration of the general ‘search’ for an individual into a blended mixture of analytic concerns and ethics. These two readings are in tension, with the locality of ‘person’ signifying a logical distinction as well as representing the site for any enquiry into the content of that locale. The identification of the person or individual for Maximus emerges out of the traditions of logic and Christology. I show how the notion of φύσις has implicitly remained composed of a simple unitive structure. A counter example comes from Euclid. The emphasis on unity instituted by the logical connexions mistake how the essential properties of an active principle (φύσις) relate internally and ‘produce’ the continuity of an individual. However the individual is a mix of distinct principles working together in a specific order. The logic consists of formal relations applied to organic operations.

Personalism impacts the definition of created motion because of how the logic is used to discuss the relation between a broader, consistent set of principles (the essence or οὐσία of the human), and the specific instantiation of those principles in directed activity (*prosopon/ hypostasis/* individual). As terms, *prosopon/ hypostasis/* individual represent a type of creaturely limit, in which the individual stands as an individual instance of the essential characteristics (Οὐσία or φύσις)<sup>1</sup> held in common by all individuals of that type. My investigation is therefore aiming toward the explication of the relations between these essential characteristics. This chapter attempts to determine whether the connexions and structures within the personalist distinctions, will assist toward a definition of κίνησις. A creature is generally ‘kinetic’ and also kinetic in specific ways. The connexions in the logic can be used to examine instances of individual κίνησις and can be the site and the proof of a general principle.

Within the logic of person, or individual more specifically, the individual, exists as the site of several different qualitative orders. However, the connective structure alone is not sufficient for establishing the content of creaturely κίνησις.

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<sup>1</sup> Οὐσία or φύσις have been used interchangeably because of their respective identity of locality rather than their differences in content. I discuss this below.



Identifying the site of an individual, even if it is an individual site of motion, does not grant one access to the internal mechanisms that make something move. It simply shows ‘where’ to look. Hence, whilst the connexions can indicate the locale, they do not provide content. Moreover, because of their unitive character, the logical connexions cannot really grasp differentiations within the unity of the constituents of the person.

## The Christological Context<sup>2</sup>

The personhood, the individual, is the specific motion or intention of a common essence. For instance, Peter is an individual instance of ‘human’. The ‘how’ and the where are the *prosopon*, or the *hypostasis*, these terms represent the person, the individual. The two specific activities of divinity and humanity are united in the individual: Christ. This individual is able to be the site of this unity between the two activities. And yet because the character of personhood is both a totality and an individual expression of the essential elements of the human, the human retains its identity even within the unity with the divine person. The consequence is that, although neither divinity nor humanity is destroyed, each permeates the other so completely that the description of deification of the human is simultaneously the enfleshment of the divine. The Christological explanation relates to the phenomena of how one thing can be, through its own activities, in unity with another type of activity. The Christological uses the person to define ‘where’ unity occurs. The person is potentially the site of several orders, working cohesively together.

Monotheletism is the Christological controversy of Maximus’ time.<sup>3</sup> Monotheletism, (one will/ *θελήματος*) in which, in the human person of Christ, the will is asserted to be wholly divine, rather than in a differential unity of human and divine will, forms the context for the technicality of the terms ‘person’ or ‘individual’. Bathrellos’ study, *The Byzantine Christ*, highlights the complexity of the issues and the precision of the realisation of the Neo-Chalcedonian synthesis that culminates in

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<sup>2</sup> The works I focus on are Demetrios Bathrellos’ *The Byzantine Christ* (Chapter 3) 105, 110-2, and Törönen, *Union and Distinction* (Chapters 1 and 2) 15-18, 38-9. These works define the traditional terminologies and move towards placing Maximus in relation to philosophical distinctions that defined his time and place.

<sup>3</sup> An excellent overview of the development of the controversy, and Maximus’ part in it, is supplied by the introduction to the volume: *Maximus the Confessor and His Companions: Documents from Exile*. Translated and edited by Pauline Allen and Bronwyn Neil (Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 2002).

Maximus.<sup>4</sup> The main thrust of the terminology considers the relation between two different types of organising principles (divine and human οὐσία or φύσις) which become united in the one *individual person* (Christ).<sup>5</sup> Thus the concern becomes how one can talk about unity between divinity and humanity in Christ, without either of the essential organising principles of either divinity or humanity being dissolved by the interaction. The solution was to describe how the unity takes place between the individual activities (person/ individual) of the divine and the Human.

In the Christological context οὐσία and φύσις are considered to represent the core and essential elements of an existent.<sup>6</sup> Balthasar and Louth note how Maximus can use οὐσία and φύσις interchangeably. However there is a difference between theological and non-theological use. God has no contrary, whereas created being does.<sup>7</sup> The fact that the terms can be used interchangeably suggests that the issue of content was not under question. Instead the issue is more about the relation between something said to be an essential characteristic (οὐσία or φύσις), and individual variations in the movement of that central characteristic (*hypostasis/prosopon/person*).

The sources of Maximus' understanding of the terms go back to Cappadocian Trinitarian thought and the *Leontioi*.<sup>8</sup> A difference of 'οὐσία' is equated to the difference between a human and a horse. For instance, their operative senses could differ (identifying a λόγος is the basis of a difference) through one animal possessing the essential quality of language, and the other not. The οὐσία or φύσις became the central character of something that generates individual variations. These variations in

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<sup>4</sup> In a conversation with Adam Cooper he mentioned how Bathrellos' work 'neatened up' the terminology. I take him now as referring to how pervasive the distinction persistent in *prosopon* and *hypostasis* is, and hence the variety of ways it can be understood. In the sense that Bathrellos does not trace out the other uses, his study is lacking; however he does disclose the logical consistency of the use of personalist terminology even if it is restrained within the dogmatic context. I support the maintenance of a logical consistency if the distinction can be found to be a consistent structure.

<sup>5</sup> Balthasar's presentation shows how Maximus struggles with the terminological relation between the senses of life given in οὐσία and φύσις and the terms of *hypostasis* and *prosopon*. It does not develop the same emphasis as later works by Zizoulas on the topic in which the depiction is an attempt to ground a metaphysics in an idea of divine human co-creativity and concrete *poesis* in which the person acts as the site of creativity. Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 207-228.

<sup>6</sup> Bathrellos, *The Byzantine Christ*, 104. Citing *Amb. PG 91, 1248A* (Translated in: Nellas, *Deification in Christ*, 216). Distinctions in content become important in other areas, and there is always some distinctions in the Christological debate; however the point that most commentators identify rested less on the content of the terms and more on their position.

<sup>7</sup> *CK, I, 7. PG 90, 1085B.*

<sup>8</sup> *Leontioi* is the pluralised form of *Leontius* which is used to signify the resemblance between these two thinkers in doctrine, in name and in their common influence on Maximus. Nichols, *Byzantine Gospel*, 65-66.

locale are individual persons, like Peter or Jane, or two rocks. This is one use. Another relates to how an individual rock, for instance, when described through the personalist distinction, is both a site of an individual rock and ‘rock-ness’ (the essential organising principles of any rock whatsoever). Hence the dual sense described by Balthasar develops.<sup>9</sup>

The logical connexions are not nominalist because each point of connexion indicates a differentiation of the real. However, it is less important for this project to give an overall classification of them. Within motion, it can illustrate, formally, the total relations within a locale. However, insofar as the investigation aims still to establish the character of motion itself, there can be little sense in extending a pervasive ontological claim as yet. Balthasar is stronger,<sup>10</sup> but generally I refrain from making the idea of a noetic or ontic division do much work. In my view, drawing out the noetic/ontic does not really help to illuminate the structural relations. I am not concerned so much with the status of the distinctions, merely that they are there, and being utilised.

If, then, every being in the world contains in itself two aspects—that of its ‘uniqueness’, through which it stands among other beings without reference to them, and that of its ‘relatedness’, through which it stands toward others in a relationship either of connection or of separation—then these two aspects are in reality inseparable but are distinguishable on the level of thought.<sup>11</sup>

The term person distinguishes between what something is, and how that something acts out of that fundamental sense. The rock’s individuality represents both an essential ‘rock-ness’ in its specificity. The terms *hypostasis* or *prosopon* are used to signify that both a general and a specific are present simultaneously, without being identical. This means that Christ, Peter, and Paul are human, but that they vary in activity. The difference between Christ and Paul is not on the basis of οὐσία or φύσις but of *hypostasis* or *prosopon*, just like how two rocks vary.<sup>12</sup> The hypostatic distinction arose from the difference between individual a) to individual b). This is based on the possession of common attributes though in distinct locales. They possess

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<sup>9</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 109.

<sup>10</sup> In Balthasar’s work on Gregory he explores the distinction between the logical and ontological making it a crucial element of his subsequent readings. Balthasar, *Presence and Thought*, 65.

<sup>11</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 109.

<sup>12</sup> Of course it is very problematic to make the association here when issues of free will may also be at stake, but the distinction between two individual rocks is appropriate at the moment.

identical common characteristics, they are both human, but they are human in distinctive ways. The personhood of created beings comes from their being the locale of the essential characteristics of existence (οὐσία and φύσις).

Having learned the common characteristics, (the subject) turns his consideration to individual qualities through which one thing is distinguished from another. . . This, therefore, is our explanation. That which is spoken of in the specific sense is signified by the word ‘person’ [*hypostasis*].<sup>13</sup>

*Hypostasis* “is an essence with idioms. . .”<sup>14</sup> Maximus uses the example of speech to illustrate the distinction between the two senses: “So being able to speak always belongs to the nature, but how you speak belongs to the *hypostasis*.”<sup>15</sup> He also relates to the Cappadocian understanding of the relation between the terms.<sup>16</sup> Maximus restates the issue in relation to non-rational beings:

Beings that are united according to one and the same nature (φύσιν) or essence (οὐσίαν) are distinguished from one another by *hypostasis* or person, as in the case with angels and men, and with all the related beings that are considered in εἶδος and in γένος. For an angel is distinguished from an angel, a man from a man, an ox from an ox and a dog from a dog, not according to nature or essence, but according to *hypostasis*.<sup>17</sup>

The logic of the distinction between οὐσία, φύσις and *prosopon* and *hypostasis* denote the difference between a central activity, and variations in possibilities within that same activity. Φύσις and οὐσία are considered to denote equi-primordial principles in a living being, even if they could refer differences in content. This means that the relation between οὐσία and φύσις and *hypostasis* and *prosopon* the two sets

<sup>13</sup> St Basil, *Epistle 38*, in: *The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation*, Volume 13. *St Basil Letters Volume I*, (1-185) Translated by Agnes Clare Way (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1951, 1981) 85 [translators brackets] (My brackets).

<sup>14</sup> Bathrellos, *The Byzantine Christ*, 102.

<sup>15</sup> *Opuscula 3*, PG 91, 48A. Louth, *Maximus*, 193.

<sup>16</sup> “One thing is distinguished from another either by essence or by hypostasis, or both by essence and by hypostasis. On the one hand, a man is distinguished from a horse by essence, and Peter is distinguished by Paul by hypostasis. On the other hand, such and such a hypostasis of man is distinguished from such and such a hypostasis of horse by both essence and hypostasis.” Gregory of Nyssa, *Comm. not.* (Gregorii Nysseni Opera 3, ed. Werner Jaeger (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958) Quoted in Törönen, *Union and Distinction*, 54. I am unsure of the precise title of Gregory’s work but give Törönen’s abbreviation of which the full title is not given in Törönen’s work.

<sup>17</sup> *Epistle 15*, PG 91, 549C. (my brackets) Törönen adds: i.e. ‘beings that are of one and the same nature’ in brackets in his translation. This reiterates the point concerning how the logic of hypostasis and person works from the foundational elements of an activity and into its operation.

of two can be placed together, because of how each designates the same quality. Οὐσία and φύσις represent ‘essential principles’ and *hypostasis* and *prosopon*, their activities. The essential elements of sound arise in specific sound. A distinction indicative of specific activity may be applied formally, but the distinction alone cannot determine the content of *hypostasis*/ person τροπή. The *hypostasis* exists in such a way, that the elements that comprise the organic structure in a creature, whilst being held in common, could, and do, constitute themselves in different ways between individuals. Individuated sounds are a reconstitution of the essential thing: sound, but their meaning can vary dramatically, between a word and music for instance.

Therefore as common notion is individuated, according to how it manifests in individuals or ‘persons’, it is still dependent on its content and relations being discernable. However, the pattern tells us that *hypostasis* and *prosopon* each relate in the same logical sense. This is on the basis of the similar position as they can refer to the specific operative appearances of οὐσία or φύσις. The use of a personalist logic, under these terms, cannot give access to the character of what the terms are signifying (the operations that defines a creature). It is merely the relation between the terms that is established. Synonymity of content between the meanings of οὐσία and φύσις is of little importance if they merely represent a primary element, from which a second specific arises. In other words, they can be read as providing a locale for a distinction. In order to explain the broader sense of the distinction the chapter also looks on how it indicates how what ever is said of the φύσις is said of the person, but whatever is said of the person, may not be identical with the φύσις. Yet, the purpose of the distinction is mainly to ensure that the description of the individual can contain the totality of the φύσις.

## The Individual and Existence

The person has full existence, Paul is no less a human because he is different from Samantha. The φύσις of human is in both. Hence, the use of the terms is to designate the relations between the essence and the activity so as to clarify how a specific thing varies in one sense (by being an individual) but not in another (being human). Sound functions, it does not *have* a function, its very existence is its function. However, the implication is also, that variations of the intentional activity in the person, can also determine their differences from each other. In other words, rather than individual

indicating merely a distinction wrought by biology and procreative multiplication, the individual so generated, can also distinguish itself by how it lives. Hence willing becomes an expression of individuation.<sup>18</sup>

The patterns of ‘λόγος’ to ‘τροπή’ (chapter 2) are applicable here. The specific exercise of freedom is a τροπή of the persistence of the possibility (λόγος) of differential activity. Hence, innovation defines the orientational intention of a self-consistent operative process (λόγος), but this can produce variations.<sup>19</sup>

The idea of ‘variation’ is important because it can signal, not only a quantitative distinction between two humans, but also the quality of how each individual is organised. This reading of the person includes how difference of will organises the individual towards distinct possibilities. Hence, a person can be specific because of procreative increase or ‘character’. The terms τροπή, γνώμη, both designate a type of individual wherein the operation of the common principle (the normative continuity of creaturely intention) is in variation with its intended purpose (φύσις as proper organisation). The individual is identified in respect also to how it displays common attributes in a particular way, not as mere numeric addition, but as an accumulation of specific activities. The term ‘individual’ can also be used as a recognition of the logical basis of individuation. It is an indicator of the difference between members of an εἶδος based on their distinct locality.

‘How’ the essential characteristics are utilised is denoted by either proper or improper intention. Maximus understands this later distinction through the term γνώμη, as in the ‘gnomic will’.<sup>20</sup> This term was developed in order to illustrate a difference between an essential motivity (φύσις) toward the divine where the will conforms to God and the operations of deliberative willing (γνώμη) where the lack of conformity causes a change in trajectory.<sup>21</sup> The term λόγος has been used to designate

<sup>18</sup> The use of individuation is valid if it is referring to the continuity of the will as a totality, as an individuated whole (see chapter 5). However the use of individuation is not valid in all circumstances, especially if the composition of the will is found to consist of internal variations.

<sup>19</sup> Amb 42, PG 91, 1341D- 1344A. Blowers & Wilken, *On the Cosmic Mystery*, 89-90.

<sup>20</sup> Tropos is akin to ‘mode’ or specific operative activity. Because of its relation to an operation of logos it is not thereby a ‘unique manifestation’ but a recapitulation of a common activity. In a similar way gnomos, although it is used in the negative sense to designate the operation of creaturely intention and choice which is at variation with the intended activity toward divinity also represents an individuated activity of a commonly possessed principle of intention (in this case).

<sup>21</sup> Gnomos thelematos is used to articulate the variation between will as a type of persistent operation demarcating rational beings, with the manner in which it can be in variation due to how the will is employed. Gnomos has a negative connotation but the important thing to note is how there is a

where a specific use of the will, for instance, remains in conformity to φύσις. Λόγος, γνώμη and τροπή and person designate the same locale; the activity of a principle, the difference is that they represent qualitative distinctions in the activity.

Hence τροπή is as a ‘*hypostatisation*’ of the characteristic operation of a given essential principle. As such, this distinction shows how an individuation can occur not just because of procreativity (by being John rather than Samantha) but by one or another acting in a particular way. This represents distinctive nuance. Though both John and Samantha, and Christ share essential characteristics, they 1) vary in locale by necessity; they also vary 2) in terms of how their momentum of their commonality results in a different capacity. They vary by their intention. This is why I have returned to the use of ‘τροπή’ to indicate the intentional element described in chapter 2.

Hence when Christ is united in the ‘person’ in his individuality, to the divine, this explicitly co-ordinates his common principles, as human, created etc, with God. This means that in these senses, Christ is fully united to God, both in the activity of his essential characteristics, which include in them the totality of his essence. Person is not a mere biological differentiation alone, but must also be understood as indicating the capacity to act.<sup>22</sup> It is also used to indicate a site of individuated intentional activity.<sup>23</sup> The importance of the operation of intentionality shows how the activity of specific intention changes the character of what it is to be human. This reading of individual activities of the person indicates procreative increase alone. Yet procreative difference alone is insufficient for proving intentional difference. Human beings are differentiated by biological difference and through free acts of intention. This indicates the distinction between thinking about the individual as a biological distinction and as a difference in intention.

However, the discussion of how intention also generates the individual is not the main issue that the chapter is concerned with. As I argue in the following chapter, even the mapping of intention needs to consider the possibility of utilising an

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distinctive pattern showing up in how an essential or generative operation gives rise to a distinctive local that can be differentiated.

<sup>22</sup> This type of unity does not result in the essential qualities becoming God; instead the humanity of Christ is divinised in how he acts. This type of language signals the intention to identify how the essential properties of a creature can change, in terms of their activity, but without the principles through which this activity is what it is (humanity or human willing) becoming ‘entirely divine’ so that the divine act’s rather than Christ’s humanity.

<sup>23</sup> Maximus, CK, I, 3. PG 90, 1084A-B.

understanding of the function of the θεληματός as a co-operation of aggregated relations working in a harmony, which is the unity of the whole. The connexions and relations utilised within the logic describes an individual instance of common or a specific thing relating to common activities. However, even as the distinctions incorporated an idea of intention, the fact remains that the site and the phenomena of intention are not captured under the logical connexions. Indeed, as argued later, there may be a difference within the structure of the language within the constituents of a whole then the logic used to find it.

### Qualitative Distinctions that Generate the Individual

The terms I discuss below are concerned with the determination of creaturely limits.<sup>25</sup> In the Christian use of individuation<sup>26</sup> the pattern for the expression of an individual involves locating where that individual sits in relation to broader classifications. Tollefsen shows the importance of the ordering between οὐσία, γένος, εἶδος, and ἴδιος. This sequence describes the move from the most general form of life ‘being created’ (οὐσία) into the γένος, animal, into the εἶδος, *anthropos*, then the individual person, John, Harry etc. The difficulty is how the vocabulary can relate to different orders: Existing (οὐσία), animated, (γένος), mammal (εἶδος), dog (ἴδιος individual/person etc). The γένος, εἶδος, ἴδιος, distinction works because of how the context can either include or exclude the most general γένος of ‘created existent’. The discussion can either include ‘created being’ thus signalling the scope of the term οὐσία or it can precede assuming ‘created’. This means that there is potential that a large ontological assumption becomes implicit. If a reality is presumed then once individuation occurs, the totality of the various structures that must come together are not fully grasped in the final locale (person). This means that although the logical order is still present and

<sup>25</sup> I note Cornford’s comments: “At Sophist 253D the specific Forms are ‘embraced on the outside’ by the generic form, but the genus does not extend father than the εἶδος it contains.” Note how the distinction in the Sophist is repeated in Porphyry’s Introduction, specifically by his restriction of the generative properties of the genus. This is an argument that the genus is not an εἶδος. This supports the sense in which the terms genus and εἶδος were meant as explanatory rather than speculative structures. Cornford, *Plato’s Cosmology*, 58.

<sup>26</sup> When I use the term ‘individual’ I use it as a recognition of the logical basis of individuation as an indicator of the difference between members of an εἶδος based on their distinct locality of operation.



valid, even if there is no consideration of οὐσία (under Tollfesen's presentation). The personalist distinction does not necessarily articulate a *telos* in a rational body.<sup>27</sup> The personhood distinction can be used in relation to non-rational beings.<sup>28</sup>

The use of γένος and εἶδος are indicating the relation between qualitative orders, but without implying that the εἶδος is unrelated to the previous orders. The logic of the general and the individual indicate the importance of understanding person through the idea of 'common' (το κοινόν) and 'individuated' or 'particular' (το ἴδιον). Törönen notes the broad ways in which Maximus understands and applies the distinction. "τροπή often expresses the individual aspect, that which differentiates the particular from the general, while λόγος stands for the universal."<sup>29</sup> The area of use also covers questions of will and willing, operative essence and the movement that characterises said operation.<sup>30</sup>

A common mode can be represented as the essential characteristics which make two things the same, and their 'individuality', their personhood, can therefore express both senses. This means that, in an important exchange, high level conceptions, if they figure in a system, exist in the concrete instances of life. Hence higher order claims are intrinsically related to specific activities in beings. This 'grounds' the discussion of motion in the concrete and establishes the parameters for sensibility being within the motions of an individual that present the general order.

Although both the Christological discussion and the general concern for finding an individual may incorporate identical logical structures, and therefore each can identify an individual instance of a general principle, the non-Christological discussion contains more 'levels'. There are additional distinctions employed in non-Christological instances of the logic. The Christology does not explicitly use the discussion of οὐσία, γένος, εἶδος, and individual, but the logical form is dependent on these relations. Törönen has highlighted the roots of the logic outside of Chalcedonian negation.<sup>31</sup> The terms, οὐσία, γένος, εἶδος, ἴδιος, employ more qualitative orders and recognise more processes which are used implicitly in the

<sup>27</sup> This is clear both in recent debates and in Maximus' work articulated in the οὐσία, genus discussion. Tollefsen, Balthasar and Törönen all lean away from the designation of a personal or individual based on the cohesion of activities within a purely rational being, there are grounds for material individuation.

<sup>28</sup> Törönen's presentation illustrates this point most clearly. Törönen, *Union and Distinction*, 54-56.

<sup>29</sup> Törönen, *Union and Distinction*, 26.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, 27.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, 3-4.

Christology. Whilst the personalist distinction can be used to identify an instance of an individual using Christological terms alone, other uses of the distinction function which serve for mapping out individual instances of a common principle. This is why the logic becomes important for mapping out instances of individual κίνησις. Moreover, it represents the logical framework for identifying specific instances, so that one may investigate and understand individual instances of motion.

Each term represents a specific type of logical order. Possible structural differences between οὐσία, γένος, εἶδος and ἴδιος are based on how each might operate in a different way. Each might reflect a distinct type of thing, a distinct type of operation, to be sure, and each is of a different kind. οὐσία, γένος, εἶδος and ἴδιος etc contain different types of motion. The εἶδος is an individual instance of a broader γένος like rats and mice being rodents. There is a qualitative distinction being preserved within the terms. The terms correlate with each other enabling one to trace a specific individual through to its εἶδος, γένος and up to its οὐσία. This taxonomic order can be used to trace different relations that contribute to the identity of a creature.

Individuation is a matter of a differentiating activity defining its own purpose through what relations it has and in what manner it relates to other phenomena. The content is distinct in each of the speculative orders is distinguished not only by how they are internally, how one γένος relates to another, but by reason of how they relate to the order logically prior or posterior to them. Distinctions are identified between individual operations in ἴδιος from εἶδος, εἶδος from γένος, γένος from substance (οὐσία). “Eventually all beings demonstrate the same basic identity of being instances of essence (οὐσία), and this means that they have the common denomination of being *something* and not *nothing*.”<sup>32</sup> Maximus uses the distinction assuming the highest category of ‘created by God’ (οὐσία). Törönen and Tollefsen both trace the use of sequence above as originating from Porphyry.<sup>33</sup> Tollefsen also investigates the structure of differentiation through the hierarchical relations between οὐσία, γένος, εἶδος and ἴδιος. The idea of phenomenal division and unity is given as the basis of the

<sup>32</sup> Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology*, 102. Author’s italics.

<sup>33</sup> See chapter 3.

logical distinction.<sup>34</sup> Differences are collective or inclusive insofar as they are divisive as when the quality of a γένος distinguishes it from the εἶδος.<sup>35</sup>

Tollefsen notes that the coherence of individual in εἶδος and γένος takes place because of how one order of name co-operates with the next so that the logic sets up a perichoretic (or Chalcedonian relation) of non-negatory participation. However he has not adequately assessed how the internal relations within a formal structure can be related in such a way to allow differentiation to act in the causal manner he ascribes.<sup>36</sup>

As argued in the final chapter one must allow that the difference indicated by individuation might conceal indeterminate relations. Οὐσία, γένος, εἶδος, ἴδιος, define a set of qualitative differences, according to increasing generality and decreasing specificity, or conversely increased specificity: ‘Being something’, ‘living being’, and the ‘human being’ or the sequence could be, ‘living being’, ‘rational animal’, ‘John’. Even after the increase in specificity, there is not yet an indication of how ‘John’ is composed, and moves.

Where the most general distinction starts determines the specificity of the *telos* of the logic. The pattern mediated through γένος εἶδος etc is also employed in relation to universal and particular.<sup>37</sup> This shows that the logic was used to show difference between activities or operations of different orders. He writes: “An extension of the universal and the particular is the pair λόγος – τροπή.”<sup>38</sup> Yet in describing this, the character of each element has been neglected in favour of the description of their connective relation. Indeed, the implication is that the differentiation taking place here is of the same order as that described in the previous chapter. Whilst the content is assumed, the logical connexions supply the tools for differentiating κίνησις into space and time etc. However, the same issue remains as depicted in the previous chapter. There is no capacity in these types of connexions, to articulate how the conditions of concrete individual instances of motion, might be of a quality that functions differently than that indicated by a logical relation. The content

<sup>34</sup> Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology*, 100-1.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid*, 100.

<sup>36</sup> Although there are hierarchies in Maximus they do not all act in the same way. He has not been able to incorporate, within the logic of individuation, grounds for internal differentiation in a person. Instead it is placed within a general notion of dynamism.

<sup>37</sup> Maximus, Epistle 15 PG 91, 549C. Quoted in Törönen, *Union and Distinction*, 25.

<sup>38</sup> Törönen, *Union and Distinction*, 26.

of κίνησις has not taken adequate examination of the constitution of individual instances of κίνησις.

### **Individual Increase: The Return to the Λόγοι**

Törönen's work on investigating the grounds of the logic has shown that the tools of Maximus' work draw on broader areas than the Chalcedonian union and Christological language.<sup>39</sup> He singles out the importance of the term 'Difference' *ιδιαιτητα* and he shows the permeation of this logic in Maximus work specifically as it is used in relation to the distinction between οὐσία and *hypostasis* or *τρόπος* (apparent orientational activity or the possibility of deviant causal power). Difference can also be a factor of qualitative distinction caused by a deviant causal possibility (*τροπή*). Difference can be either qualitative or quantitative, but neither of these terms can contribute to the identification of the internal mechanism of individual κίνησις because they simply incarnate the general idea of motion in specific ways.

The formula of differentiation between common and specific activities of a common is likened to a difference between a generative essence or archaic principle and the individuated moments of this phenomenon. This reading translates qualitative difference as also of logical difference in which there can be a cognitive moment that differentiates one from the other. Tollefsen shows how the term *λόγοι* traces intellectual and ontic individuation. This means that differentiation between individual variations, when it occurs in specific or real events and not just as a formal logic, describes an ontic distinction that is recognised by a logical variation. His discussion of the role of differentiation (which comes about from the two terms *διακριτική*- a divisive differentiation- and *συστατική*) is reminiscent of Balthasar's discussion concerning differentiation and creation.<sup>40</sup> What occurs is that, through maintaining the internal constitution of each order, but not setting out an idea of individual motion, the complexity within personhood remains one of quantitative increase of the same principle. κίνησις, as a general term, becomes specific. Of what help is this if neither the content of the general, nor the particular, have received any but the most general treatment?

<sup>39</sup> Törönen, *Union and Distinction*, 20-1.

<sup>40</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 137.

This numeric increase takes place through replication. The idea of ‘production’ is like ‘cloning’. The instituted order is distinguished by its difference from the prior but not necessarily in its internal activity. The individual operations are not given sufficient investigation. The logic of replication is one in which individuals are considered self-contained wholes. The conditions of κίνησις are thereby not actually investigated, merely the quantity of the same mechanism increased. Though it identifies the relation between essential principles and activities, rather than pushing onto examine the constitution of a given essence, it considers the abstract relations of the relation between any given essential property and its activity.

This approach does not adequately take into account the possibility of that the quality designated, the whole, might be an occupation of parts, whose relations are based on a different quality than that discerned within wholes. There is an implication that the connexions are referring to some form of creature, but there is little concern to articulate how the order of the creature, may consist of relations that operate differently than the logic.

### **Identifying the Individual**

This section argues that it is interdependence within the composition of the ‘essence’ which generates the stability of that ‘essence’. The logical connexions provide a sophisticated way of conceiving the relation between the character of a creature and what it does. It does not draw the distinction out too far. However, despite the increased complexity that personalism finds within the structure of created beings, the structure of φύσις remains inadequately explored. This meant that the same problem described in the previous chapter on κίνησις, but in a different context. One cannot only work within a definition of κίνησις as being a unitive principle. In fact, as will be shown in the below, an instance of motion is a co-ordination of different λόγοι (principles that have a self-contained meaning and a place within a broader set of relationships) that gives the φύσις its activity. Within personalism this it has not been adequately explained in terms of activity taking place internally. There arises a need to clarify the character of the motion taking place in specific beings.

If one wishes to invoke a general principle and then to identify that principle in specific beings, then one can either use the dynamism of the relation between the general and the specific or any of the levels mentioned previously. Or one can

investigate the grounds for how any creature at all exhibits its activity. The discussion above has given examples of the generation of κίνησις using the interaction between qualitative differences. The complexity of personalism comes from the different orders co-operating.<sup>41</sup> The hierarchical drive of the higher, then organises its subsidiary principle (the creature or aggregates within the creature). This has a perichoretic relation, however the internal activity, because it has not been described, has been assumed to possess the same structure as the logical relations. The περιχώρησις is between different qualities than that of ‘wholes’. Non-negatory participation is a matter of constructing both a solid model of internal activities and a model of hierarchical relations.

The personalist investigation, either Christological or not, when it looks to identify something, whether specific or general, takes several routes: 1) It gives a schematic that will be useful for identifying the object to be investigated. In other words, if there are general phenomena to be seen, personalism discloses a taxonomic structure through which one can identify that thing. 2) Personalism describes how a specific location can relate to other, more general principles.<sup>42</sup> 3) It does this by allowing for several different orders co-operating to form an individual. 4A) It provides a careful distinction for describing how a persistent principle can enact a distinct type of activity. 4B) It describes how a change in trajectory can remain within the same basic constitution. In this case it is useful for describing the co-existence between a general state of affairs and a specific state of affairs.

Instead, personalism provides context to the discussion of κίνησις. It gives an awareness of where to look, but also to be aware of different quality of relations. The main flaw in utilising the personalist structure, is that it did not extend its investigation. Moreover it did not consider the implications that the quality of the

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<sup>41</sup> The Symbol of Chalcedon articulates a hierarchy of unity between qualitatively distinct principles. The relationship becomes expressed through the adoption of the term perichoresis which I explain in further on in the chapter. “Without confusion, without change, without division, without separation, the difference of natures (φύσις) having been in no wise taken away by reason of the union, but rather the properties of each being preserved and both concurring in one Person [*prosopon*] and one *hypostasis*- not parted or divided into two persons [*prosopa*], but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, the divine Logos, the Lord Jesus Christ, even as the Prophets of old [have spoken] concerning him, and as the Lord Jesus Christ himself has taught us, and as the Symbol of the Fathers has delivered to us.” ‘The Definition of Faith of the Council of Chalcedon,’ Cited in: Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition, Volume One: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon*. Translated by John Bowden (Moberg, Oxford, 1975) 544. [authors brackets]

<sup>42</sup> Törönen indicates the importance of the foci: “Maximus begins with the created order and argues that the particular instances of created natures differ according to hypostasis, not according to nature.” Törönen, *Union and Distinction*, 25.

relations within οὐσία or the φύσις might require a different form of engagement. Few would accept that the logical connexions could substitute for the internal motivity of the creature, but yet the investigation has not taken place. The logical order can only function effectively when there is pre-established content, and it remains the strongest content provider for a notion of motion. Yet it repeats the same structural error, though on a more precise scale, as that described in the previous chapter by assuming that a complex and opaque concept is clear, or intuitive.

If the questions are asked: what is the constitution of the individual activity or thing, or the structural principles that demarcate an individual perse, both can enquire into the internal constitution of what it means to be kinetic. The primordial principles that produce activity in the creature form its kinetic constitution. This investigation looks at how a unitive principle, akin to the essential properties that demarcate the elements of the creature, can be the aggregation of a set of distinctive relationships. I use the example of a unitive term such as how ‘axiom’ refers to a cohesive and essential definituum. The section describes how, when axioms is used to designate a certain type of statement, the contents of these statements can vary internally, one from another. Moreover, these axioms relate to form the essential elements that enable a system to function. The essential properties that contribute to a system, under this reading, consist of equi-primordial principles. Their primordial character consists of a combination of their difference from each other, as well as their equi-primordial similarity.

### **Locale, Individuation and Increase in the Generation of Essence**

The idea of distinguishing personhood, in practise, works with identifying a primordial essence and designating an individual activity. However, the person or the φύσις may include several principles co-operating together. The danger is that οὐσία or φύσις have their contents assumed, or downplayed, in the attempt to generate an idea of ‘individual’. If this occurs then the personalist distinction will not add any content to the essence, because the essence is hidden by the assumption that its content has been provided. In order to show how the notion of φύσις (or any term that stands in for the essential principles of something) can contain many different principles, the next sections discuss the idea of a generative principle (οὐσία or φύσις) in geometry. This is a speculative effort to suggest the potential value in

adding additional content and relations to inform the notion of the essential characteristics. I outline how Euclidean geometry can be read through the axioms, whose arrangement requires that none of them can be excluded. These axioms, and their interdependent relationship to each other, ‘produce’ the ‘Royal way’ of Euclidean Geometry. This shows that, rather than the notion of φύσις or οὐσία being singular in terms of possessing a single organising principle, it can instead consist of several activities and definitive principles (λόγοι) working cohesively together within that ‘coherence’. It informs the idea of the individual, by adding that what it designates can consist of a distinctive quality of arrangement.

When the term such as φύσις is referring to the essential elements in a being, each of these things within the φύσις will be of equal value. Even when there is a persistence of a specific type of structure, being collectively axioms, for instance, there can still a differentiation according to priority to generate meaningful speech. As Heath points out, (see below) one of the revolutions in Euclid’s work was his ability to identify the necessary and sequential order which the fundamental axioms must be arranged. Even in qualitatively identical principles there will still be internal variations within that order. The definition of a point precedes the definition of a line. Analysis is used to distinguish the operations of one type of principle from another.

I discuss below how the continuity of any organic structure, expressed in general but not absolute terms, participates in its previous conditions, and in those gains the possibility of some procreative increase. However the continuity of a fuller definition of the distinction between ‘essence and specific activity’ is difficult, for there can still be differentiation made within equi-primordial principles, and these principles combine to produce elements that are distinct from their own ‘personality’. For instance, although geometry was present before Euclid he identified and ordered the central definitions in such a manner that enabled him to articulate a fuller and more complete set of derivative propositions and proofs. This means that the fuller range of propositions and proofs given in previous geometers did not result in the collection or proper definition of the full compositions of the foundational axioms. What may not be apparent is whether or not the natural differentiation in individuation or the organisation of creaturely dynamism can account for qualitative increases. Can the operations that define a creature be sufficient for describing qualitative differentiations within that creature? For ‘essence’ is explained as the gathering



together, in a single locale, the operations within a being that are indispensable for explaining derivations within that being's activity. Hence, in this case, because each axiom is indispensable, and an aid for describing the relation between various derivatives, that form the content of a geometry, they form the 'essence' of Euclid.

The generation of an effective definition therefore involves a continual movement between the operations of a being and what is said to be primarily characteristic of that being. If an individual is a specific instance of a character that can be generalised then the articulation of that being's structure or character will be the examination of the ubiquitous principles that demarcate each creature of that type. An individual will be a specific location in which ubiquitous operations are specifically exhibited. Although this may be subject to *reductio*, insofar as one could be said to need knowledge of the essential principles in order to explain when something is essential or not, in practise this involved judging between what is helpful or unhelpful in articulating the development of a set of things.

An intelligible locale (λόγοι) and the implicit definitional quality therein can be explained in reference to how a definition, in order to be most intelligible, must include only one primary element within its sentence which the sentence describes by using terms that are not similarly archaic/ foundational. Below are the first three (of twenty three) definitions that form the essential parts Euclid's elements.

1: A point is that which has no part (Σημεῖόν ἐστιν οὗ μέρος οὐθέν).

2. A line is a breadthless length (Γραμμὴ δὲ μῆκος ἀπλατές).

3. The extremities of a line are points (Γραμμῆς δὲ πέρατα σημεῖα).<sup>43</sup>

The position of the definition of the line being bound by points is posterior to the previous two definitions of a point as a point which has no part and of a line as a breadthless length. The position of the definition of the extremity of the line as bound is significant to this discussion because it shows how a locale of meaning is built up and individuated through its position in relation to prior points (its causes) and its position conditioning subsequent definitions. Heath recalls Aristotle's discussion of what comprises a scientific definition to explain a concept that is simpler and prior to a more complex concept, by using the posterior. Therefore Euclid changed the definition from being the extremity of a line by adding differential content onto the

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<sup>43</sup> Euclid, *Elements*, Book I. Definitions. In: Euclid, *The Thirteen Books of the Elements*, Translated with Introduction and Commentary by Thomas L. Heath (Dover Publications, New York, 1956) 153, 155, 158, 165.

definition “having no part”. He then considered the line autonomously as an extension of the breadthlessness of the point.<sup>44</sup> It seems that a definition, in order to mean as a specific semantic location, must come from its internal and individual limits as they are individuated from prior sense markers (definitions 1 and 2). If the aim of the above definition 2 is to describe the limits of a line then it cannot define itself and the point simultaneously in the sentence. A subsequent meaningful statement can be made because the explanation of line has been completed in a prior sentence. Euclid’s distribution of these definitions is significant because of how he attempts to ground subsequent, referential definitions in the most primitive, the point. Locating a point at either side of a line indicates the priority of the definition of point, in terms of location, as boundary defining principle of linearity. The position of the points on either extremity indicates how the line is bound by points and the definition of a posterior bound by prior.

Likewise, in a discussion of φύσις, it is possible that there will be certain principles that act as boundaries for other principles even though they may each be equi-primordial. In three foundational definitions in Euclid, his idea of conceptual precedence and co-operation indicates how the co-operation of prior and posterior is essential for building a coherent idea of an autonomous ‘essence’. He accepts that the form of the axiom of definition 3 makes more sense by not being composed of two archaic postulates (the requisite of a simultaneous grasp of point in line and line in point). By isolating the components of point and line and addressing each autonomously, although conceptual interdependence is persistent and necessary, in the generation of the sentence as the composite atom of sensibility, the structure of meaning in ‘the extremities of a line are points’ indicate how dependence and priority bind and condition the distinctive identity of a posterior.

Even though the sequential character is essential the composition of the definition of ‘the extremities of a line’ is not co-equal with the definition of a line immediately with the definition of a point. Point and line do not need to arise together in a sensible account; in fact there is more clarity if the original contact with the definitions is thought separately than if they are thought together. This would make the idea of a singular locale a composite of foundational principles. Additionally it

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<sup>44</sup> “It being unscientific, as Aristotle said, to define a point as the ‘extremity of a line’, thereby explaining the prior by the posterior, Euclid defined a point differently; then, as it was necessary to connect a point with a line, he introduced this explanation (Definition 3: “The extremity of a line are points.”) after the definitions of both had been given.” Heath’s Commentary on Euclid, *Elements*, 165.

would compress individuation and make the subject a composite of two autonomous λόγοι. This means that the definition of a point as the extremity of a line would beg the question, what is a line? Hence, although it is true to ask is a whole a mere negation of 'part' of definition 1, there is sufficient meaning in definition 1 to facilitate subsequent definitions which possess individuation. The term individuated does not mean that it is instantly accessible semantically, but that the comprehension of the specificity of the meaning does not require a grasp of another individuated principle (the line) immediately within the bounds of the sentence.

An essence is also a location of several other principles, working co-operatively. It is not to be thought of as a non-referential/ non-composite atom, but a specific point at which the location, in respect to other sensible locations, can delineate itself from them by containing or representing an individuated extension of the previous and the condition of the subsequent. In other words, individuation, in terms of delineating a posterior point and being distinguishable from a prior point of sense, is the basic *definituum* of a locale. An essence is both an extension of what is immediately prior to it in an account and an autonomous and distinct point of sense. Autonomy is that which can condition posterior locals in reference to it. In a regional ontology such as Maximus', the simplicity of prior conceptual schemas such as *theos* condition subsequent elements. These subsequent elements pre-suppose their continuity with the prior but subsist as autonomous points of sensibility. Each region extends the conditions of the previous by the combination of additional concepts. They also condition the posterior in a manner that, without their inclusion as a mediating step, the relation to the prior would not make sense. In other words, if God is 1 and God's ideas are 2 and the world is 3, the sequencing of sensibility means that 1 must be mediated by 2 in order for 3 to make sense both as an autonomous locale and as a sequential continuity. Removing 2 makes the sequence illogical even if 1 contains the necessary elements. The elimination of 2 in the sequence could take place; there is sufficient autonomy in three to make some sense, but having 2 there means that three does not have to bear the conceptual apparatus of two previous steps rather than one.

The cosmos, in its totality consists of self-limiting individuated principles. Place is spoken of together with age. By itself possessing modes of

thought by nature (the cosmos) generates the wisdom of God's power over all things. These understandings are provisional locales (of that power).<sup>45</sup>

A locale, like an individual, is a distinct entity. It functions according to the composition of its content which is the driver that distinguishes it from another. Each one is distinguished by how it relates to the previous, and with this relation its own content is determined and gains its positive limit. The historical reading of the compilation of definitions in Euclid, a reading in which the totality of the various axioms are seen as co-operatively supporting each other, form a unity that are defined by their qualification under a single term 'axiom'. The phenomenal difference between axioms generally and the specific axioms that form the λόγοι of the definition of axiom, are like λόγοι to a λόγος. Hence this shows how the problem of individuation is maintains a number of qualitative or regional markers.<sup>46</sup> When examining the notion of φύσις one must be careful not to dismiss from the discussion elements of equal importance to the activity of any creature even though one principle, such as God, has a logical priority over matter by means of God's greater simplicity. An articulation of the general structure of motion even if God is not discussed, can still claim to articulate the essential principles of movement even if the structure thereby articulated must retain God as an implicit 'prior' principle. In my investigation, this discussion above enables me to argue for differentiation within Maximus' definition of κίνησις. The equi-primordial characteristics of the definition of his triad of οὐσία, φύσις, ἐνέργεια. These terms are used in a different way when they are placed together, then when they are utilised independently.

The elements of the triad mentioned, are also subject to the argument for necessary priority, though they are equi-primordial. In the triad, because it is not strictly a cosmological principle, the sequence indicates the momentum of the creature. The triad forms internal distinction within 'co-equal principles' organise and create an important element for understanding the content and relations within kinetic life. The essence is being used in an 'independent' sense, but within it, there may be

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<sup>45</sup> Ο πᾶς κόσμος ἰδίοις περιοριζόμενος λόγοις, καὶ τόπος λέγεται καὶ αἰὼν, τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ διασωμένων · τρόπους θεωρημάτων ἔχων κατὰ φύσιν τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ προσφυσθεῖς, μερικὴν κατανόησιν αὐτοῖς ἐμποιῆσαι τῆς ἐπὶ πάντα σοφίας τοῦ Θεοῦ δυναμένων οἷς ἕως χρῶνται πρὸς κατανόησιν, οὐ δύνανται διχα μεσότητος εἶναι καὶ μερικῆς καταλήψεως. Maximus, *CK*, I, 70, PG 90, 1109A. My translation. See also: Berthold, *Maximus*, 140.

<sup>46</sup> Although what defines an axiom was the result of examining the foundational establishing an account of a specific area, i.e. as a retrospective judgment, the examination and qualification of the specific characteristics of an axiom were pivotal for Euclid in determining a more precise language.

utilised, terms that normally indicate independence. However, as is described in the following chapter, the terms οὐσία, φύσις, ἐνέργεια, are used ‘inter-dependently’, rather than ‘independently’.

This means that the locale, identified within the individual, and by the logic used to clarify the position of that individual, can be comprised of interdependent principles which relate together to generate the independent sense of ‘essence’. Efficient motion consists of the totality of the relationships of its internal principles acting co-operatively. Therefore, the identification of a logical individual is a formal demarcation of the whole, which is instantiated by various compositional elements.

### **Conclusion:**

The description of the personalist distinction concluded after showing the need to look closely at the essential processes that comprise an individual. Hence engaging with the problem of φύσις, οὐσία, and *hypostasis* is an attempt to identify the, not only the distinction between the essential elements of a creature, and how motion might vary in particular localities. The distinction also asks us to look more closely at the elements the various ‘essential principles of creatures’. The use of connexions to maintain a logical description of relation can locate an investigation wherein other elements that comprise the individual can be delved into. Moreover, the logical connexions allow for different qualities of activity to be occurring, co-operatively. It is important, however, that the relations utilised in the logic of personhood, are not uncritically assumed to provide the content or relations that comprise the internal principles that constitute a creature. What the chapter has shown is that the personalist distinctions betray the concerns over the character of a creature. The distinctions show enquiry toward a site, and show the reader some of the additional compositional elements that they can expect to be found within a discussion of κίνησις.

The content under scrutiny in this thesis is what comprises creaturely motion. The scope of the investigation only began moving toward an examination of the actual content that drives creaturely motion. Even though personalism identifies a creature as the concrete site of a general principle, the different orders collected together do not give us the content required for understanding creaturely motion. Hence there needs to be an investigation of the content of φύσις. This chapter concluded by showing how the notion of the axioms of geometry contain, not just a

single type of meaning, but several collected together to form the essential principles that generate Euclidean geometry. It shows that, what seems to be a unitive principle motivating a given system, which consists of elements which cannot be excluded, nor added to arbitrarily, can conceal a different quality of relationship. The following chapter, taking over from the examination of Euclid, into the elucidation of the triad Maximus uses to describe creaturely motion. Although each definition is different, it is only by working together that the functional system of Euclidean Geometry can assume its present form. By providing a framework in which difference can be identified within a common set; I have given the reader some background for understanding how the structure of creaturely motion can consist of difference and unity. The example provides precedent for the next discussion on another of Maximus' definition of κίνησις.

## Chapter 6 Explicating A Dynamicist Definition of Κίνησις

This chapter examines textual and semantic issues around the triad, including some contemporary readings. It argues that the structural relation within the triad lends itself to several different readings. Most of these readings emphasize the larger senses of temporality and tend to exclude how the relations can constitute the internal motivity of something. The triad can be read as a co-operation of equi-primordial principles, which facilitate the internal conditions of motion. The intention of the chapter is not to argue against these legitimate interpretations, but to situate the structure of the triad as a ubiquitous collaboration, but one whose internal relationship implies temporal and spatial extension. It does this through implicating several different qualitative moments into an inter-relational structure.<sup>1</sup> The triad creates a concrete whole whose internal structure of relation possesses three different aggregations: οὐσία, φύσις, ἐνέργεια, which, in their relationship, give the architecture or conditions of the individual moment of κίνησις.

The work deals with the relationships and the consequences of the relationships described with triad of οὐσία, φύσις, ἐνέργεια. The triad can be considered in at least three ways even before the content and consequences of these relations are translated in their temporal and spatial senses featured in secondary descriptions. It can be considered in terms of the content and relations, as they are found within the passage. These relations also generate the internal conditions of a whole (ὅλον). The whole therefore, is to be understood as the expression of the perfection of a process, in which the λόγοι, the constituent elements, are co-ordinated in relation to each other. However the ὅλον is to be distinguished from the totality. The term ‘totality’ could also be used to describe the ‘person’ the individuated ‘moment’. I use the term totality, because, though it is dependent on a set of relations (the ὅλον), it is the basis for describing action. The totality is the capacity generated by the conditions, enabling certain actions. This description is similar to the discussion of φύσις as ethical given in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 reading of φύσις as

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<sup>1</sup> The work of Sherwood and Tollefsen, in particular, refer to the relation between the terms οὐσία, φύσις and ἐνέργεια as representation of the interconnection, which generates the temporal continuity in created motion. Sherwood, *The Earlier Ambigua*, 103. Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology*, 117-9.

individuated also contributes to the description. Hence, these ways, gathered from the triad, facilitate different kinetic structures. Overall, I argue that in order to understand κίνησις one will need to be prepared for the persistence of several distinctions.

### Some Uses of the Triad

To move toward a dynamicist reading, I examine some readings in the secondary literature. I focus on Polycarp Sherwood because his initial comments form the foundations for the most recent work on the triad by Tollefsen.<sup>2</sup> Sherwood's work is authoritative in his description of the refutation of the Origenist cycle. Importantly though, Sherwood understands Maximus use of the triad of οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια as a parallel to γένεσις, κίνησις, στασις mentioned previously. This, as he admits, moves the reading into eschatological territory in line with the general concern over Origen's creation myth. Because of the scope of the work he focuses on the eschatological locale in which the individual intelligence (νοῦς) is said to abide from eternity in its οὐσία, δύναμις, and ἐνέργεια. Sherwood takes this step from Proclus.<sup>3</sup> Still, the concept has many variations and it is also used by Maximus to describe the continual activity of the psyche.<sup>4</sup> The equivalence between δύναμις and φύσις drives Balthasar's association of concrete being as τὸ μέσον.<sup>5</sup> Sherwood's reading focuses on the employment of the triad in this higher setting. Maximus does maintain the eschatological use of the triad but clearly it is representative of a perfection of a processional activity which, in imperfect aspects of creatures (elements lower than the νοῦς). The triad can represent the internal relations that condition motion. The fact of activity can, through analysis, present itself as the final point of the processes culmination.

Of the five points that Sherwood elucidates as the full range of principles that determine the composition of a creature the most important for this essay are numbered 2 through 4 and pertain to operations of the creature in which the primary cause and final *telos* are implicit within the functioning of the creatures natural

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<sup>2</sup> Sherwood, *The Earlier Ambigua*, 103-123.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 104.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.

<sup>5</sup> *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, Ed. A. H. Armstrong, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970) I.P. Sheldon-Williams, *Part IV, The Greek Christian Platonist Tradition from the Cappadocians to Maximus and Eriugena*, 498-500. Balthasar uses this very structure within his examination of the cosmic reconciliations performed by the co-operative divine-human partnership within an individual's spiritual advance (see chapter 1).



powers. “(1) God is principle, as creator (δημιουργός, γενεσιουργός); the substance itself is principle of its motions; 3) these motions are the activations of the natural powers tending to their goals; 4) the goal, is in one way, the operation itself or, in another, the result of the operation; 5) the tendency however to the goal is motivated by God the final cause (τέλος, περιγραφή).”<sup>6</sup> Sherwood argues out that the triad can be found in the *Ambigua* generally and sees the parallel in *Ambigua* 7 however he finds this within the idea of φύσις. His reading notes how qualitative differences interact to form the conditions of the totality, but without identifying the specific extent to which the triad can be found. Yet instead of the triad being used to clarify the creature as a plurality of qualitative operations, the readings tend to embrace larger eschatological claims without explicating the internal structure of motion. Their theological relevance has included an extrapolation on God as primal, efficient and final cause of beings.<sup>7</sup> There are also readings which utilise the meaning of the triad from present, to possibility, to eschatological τέλος. I favour drawing back from these readings in order to offer a definition of the structures they are explicating. Sometimes, for instance, it is more beneficial to consider the temporality of the triad to consist of ‘proto-moments’ that contribute to a ‘moment’, rather than to consider them as representative of ‘larger’ temporal periods.

Sheldon-Williams (here after S-W) also utilises a reading of Maximus whom he interprets as using this triad to represent several senses of existence. He shows that the systematicity of the successions within the triad has been read as a persistent structure that endues across Maximus’ work.<sup>8</sup> Although S-W presents the triad as a schematic or structural persistent, there is still a lack of discussion concerning why it persists. Each element can be isolated and examined on its own terms. Tollefsen also maintains this from his reading of the text.<sup>9</sup> Tollefsen points out the delimitational sense denoted by the specific use of the λόγος. Each of the three elements can be an independent point of consideration. The demarcational sense in the triad is likewise not intended to isolate the individual λόγοι by providing a self-consistent demarcation. The connection between relations within triad persists even if they are

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<sup>6</sup> Sherwood, *The Earlier Ambigua*, 110.

<sup>7</sup> Sheldon-Williams, *The Greek Christian Platonist Tradition*, 493-498.

<sup>8</sup> Sheldon-Williams, *Ibid.*, 498-500.

<sup>9</sup> Tollefsen, *The Christological Cosmology*, 116-118.

utilised to explain how a specific regional order of existence specifically constitutes itself.<sup>10</sup>

Tollefsen is the exception to this, but his reading simply notes how the structure persists over natural beings generally without noting how this is achieved by interdependent relations.<sup>11</sup> Maximus uses the triad to undergird his statements concerning the kinetic; he could still use descriptions of dual structures such as corporeal and incorporeal, as peculiar aspects of kinetic reality. This would provide the triad, with additional complexity, meaning that sensible or intelligible beings could be denoted by being different types of arrangements of the triadic structure. The moments and relations<sup>12</sup> that the terms οὐσία, φύσις, and ἐνέργεια express and generate produce many possibilities. In this context their internal connexion, regardless of the content, generates a co-operative interdependent relationship, to condition the possibilities of the creature. My concern has been to identify how the relations within the triad, contribute to the internal continuity of the creature.

## Terminology and Distinctions

The passage (*CK* I, III) depicts a set of relations as co-constitutive of the whole. When considering the relations within the whole, I use λόγοι, taken from Maximus' employment in the passage, to signal their co-operative interdependence. One will see that the description required for the internal relations constituting the whole, requires a sense of equi-primordiality, and co-constitution. These occur co-operatively. The first regards the principles (λόγοι) that are the processes and relations that condition and limit the operation within the motion. If the various aggregates are internally connected (ἐνέργεια) they form a whole,<sup>13</sup> which, considered in terms of what it does, represents the conditions and relations of a totality. The totality, the second element, must be thought of in a different way than the first. The second is concerned with the totality of the motion and how it acts and changes as a totality (for instance, how a cake might taste, as distinct from its composition). The quality and scope of individual existence, and the general notion of existence, are expressed as a co-

<sup>10</sup> Tollefsen, *The Christological Cosmology*, 106.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 114.

<sup>12</sup> When these terms are used in relation to specific beings, they are closer to 'proto-moments', or 'aggregates' which, through their cogent relation, produce the continuity of a moment.

<sup>13</sup> I employ this distinction as an explanatory tool. I retain the Greek όλον to refer to any system of relations as a collective set.

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operation between the different qualities of processes. The triad conditions the totality, which acts as a complex demarcation (λόγος) of creaturely motion.

Here the distinctions are drawn from my argument that it is different to consider the operation of the 'ὅλον', as the realisation of the various processes, than to consider how the realisation of the 'ὅλον' acts. The whole is simply the concretisation or completion of the process in itself, but without a mention of its possibilities. It is an important moment representative of the sense of the self-containment of the creature, laying the foundations for the subsequent consideration of concrete acts. This consideration is the basis for the clarification of the necessary or contingent elements of something. It acts as a boundary line. The demarcations of internal and external are based on constituents of the processes being within or without.

Hence, I argue for utilising the term 'totality', to refer to the operation or acts of the thing, rather than to see the thing's actions, as realisations of processes alone. To describe the character of something through a description of how its aggregated processes relate, will supply the conditions of actions, but not convey what that action does. The ὅλον consists of the interaction and realisation of the various processes, it represents the moment that a process is realised, but it is not identical to what that process does. Because the realisation of processes condition the creature to act, but because this engenders a different quality of operation, when the thing is being considered in terms of what it does, I employ the term 'totality'. Note, in reference to the previous chapter, totality is meant as a derivative of individual. Here it is investigated as the constitution of an individual hypostasis, which is the basis of my use of the term to mean an 'individual totality' or an individual who shares common relations individually. The use of these distinctions is to draw out the difference between considering the internal constitutional principles, the conclusion of the constitution in the whole, and the capacity of the individual to act.

If one's discussion is unaware of the different structural elements implied in each distinct discourse, then one will not be able to see the difference between questions of motion as a culmination of specific events. Take for example, x, related to y to cause z, and which z generates the value of 1. 1 can be fast, slow, ascending descending, etc. The distinction implied here is one in which the actualisation is meant to represent the culmination, or description of how the case is the culmination

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of processes. The actualisation discourse is not the same as referring to the whole as something descending ascending etc. In other words, the actualisation is meant to represent the state of the internal relation of the different principles which make the object, but not how that that object, that whole, might be as an independent thing. 1) Processes make the 2) thing. There is a difference between conceiving motion as the actualisation of processes or to consider the quality of that motion in itself.

### The Triad

Overall activity/ Totality =Individuated Φύσις / Λόγος/ hypostasis		
The completion of the internal relations (below), generates the ‘whole’: όλον		
Foundation (Οὐσία) (λόγοι)	Process (Φύσις) (λόγοι)	Actualisation (Ενέργεια) (λόγοι)

The English definitions above are to represent how the terms relate to each other procreativity; there are other ways of defining each of the terms.<sup>14</sup> In Maximus’ reading, φύσις (which for clarity might be better read as hypostasis) is the active outcome, of the culmination of several interconnected principles. The ενέργεια is an appearance of conditions (οὐσία) and the process (φύσις), it is a culminating phase of the relations. The fact of the relation between conditions, process and appearance are qualified as effective through a separate term λόγος. The term λόγος is used by Maximus to explain the intelligence of co-operative functions within the organic structure of the creature, and plays a prominent role in the passage. The totality of what comprises hypostasis is more than an exposition of φύσις as an isolated principle but is the incorporation of the relations between οὐσία, φύσις, ενέργεια as collective or interrelated meanings and as separable λόγοι. The collecting of the three together represents the completion, or ενέργεια, of a process. Maximus uses οὐσία, φύσις and ενέργεια to distinguish moments in the life of the ‘όλον’, which is the conditioning structure of an individual moment. In interconnection, each element is equally necessary.

<sup>14</sup> Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology*, 114-116, 118. He translates the terms interpretively as ‘Beginning, middle, end; then essence, potentiality, activity; creation, middle, end; Was, is, will be. When he is relating creaturely activity to God, God is to us as: Beginning, Middle and End, and provides: *logos* of being, *logos* of well being, *logos* of eternal being.

A definition (λόγος) is the co-operation between processes. It also signals the difference between the λόγος of a totality (such as when it is used of φύσις in the ethical sense as that which acts) and when demarcation is used to describe discrete elements within a process (όλον). The later is relevant to the connection within λόγοι. “For all created things are defined, in their essence and in their way of developing, by their own λόγοι and by the λόγοι that provide their external context. Through these λόγοι they find their defining limits.”<sup>15</sup> Although the use of the term λόγοι is normally applied to specific beings, it is used to describe the specificity of how each λόγοι within the triad denotes a specific function.<sup>16</sup> Its usefulness here is that its plurality depicts co-operation, rather than independence. The hypostasis and λόγος, as the characteristic operations of a creature, are not identical to the λόγοι of the interdependent operations. These need to be considered in a different way. They are less discrete and more interdependent than the descriptions that are used to describe the persistence of the totality (φύσις and λόγος). The λόγοι, in this ‘reduced’ setting, are displayed as the interconnected web of relations that facilitate the operation of motion.

### **Οὐσία, Φύσις, and Ενέργεια: The Internal Dynamism of the Creature.**

The aim of this section is to introduce a reading of the relationships that constitute the triad as one of internal pro-creative constitution. It utilises a passage from the Centuries on Knowledge.<sup>17</sup> In other words, to signal how the co-operation of the terms seem to indicate a sense of internal necessity, and interconnectedness.

Every essence is bound through possessing the conditions of its limit, (and it) is a principle of movement when understood as being a motivating potency.<sup>18</sup> Every natural movement coming toward actuality, contemplated around essence and contemplated prior to actuality, is an indeterminate process insofar as it is taken as naturally between each as

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<sup>15</sup> *Amb.* 7 PG 91 1081B. Blowers & Wilken, *On the Cosmic Mystery*, 57.

<sup>16</sup> The section following examines the importance of λόγοι within the text.

<sup>17</sup> *CK I*, 3. PG 90 1084.

<sup>18</sup> Πᾶσα οὐσία τόν ἑαυτῆς ὄρον ἑαυτῇ συνεισάγουσα, ἀρχή πέφυκεν εἶναι, τῆς ἐπιθεωρουμένης αὐτῇ κατὰ δύνάμιν κινήσεως.

a middle.<sup>19</sup> And every act having its own principle of movement is the culmination out of the movement that it succeeded from essentially.<sup>20</sup>

This reading departs from Tollefsen in reading the triadic relation as co-operative activities under a continuous activity.<sup>21</sup> Tollefsen's presentation of the organic structure of creaturely organisation, emerges from his discussion of the character of created being in its essential temporal and spatial as dimensions as 'topological' or given in place.<sup>22</sup> He articulates it in reference to Aristotle's discussion of something having a natural locale in lieu of its relations and of its characteristic operation (the φύσις understood in the sense of totality). He understands how this organisation presents grounds for describing the orientational structure of the person, through intentionality or θελημάτος. This idea represents intention as a judgement concerning the activity of the creature as a totality. Intentional φύσις is not part of the internal order, but describes how the triad appears in a specific 'moment'. However, φύσις is sometimes used as part of a process, and sometimes not. Intentional φύσις is more like the basis of ethical action, or that which acts. It is like the individual or the totality as mentioned in the previous chapter, but it is one that is more directly linked to interdependent operations.

My concern is that the interdependence of the internal co-operation of the triad, and the unitive activity of intentional totality, be distinguished. Indeed there are two distinctive types of operations occurring here, one which can be discussed and analysed as unitive intention, and the other as a an inter-dependent interrelationship between constitutive principles. Each will need to be thought in a different way though Maximus may use the same terms to signify either order.

The directionality of the creature, the basic structure of its intentionality, is normally defined through a theological reading in the secondary authors (see chapter 5). "No created thing is its own goal, because it is not its own origin. . . .For every

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<sup>19</sup> Πᾶσα δὲ φυσικὴ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν κίνησις, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας μετεπινοουμένη· προεπινοουμένη δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας, μεσότης ἐστίν, ὡς ἀμφοῖν κατὰ τὸ μέσον φυσικῶς διελημμένη. . .

<sup>20</sup> . . . καὶ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια τῷ κατ' αὐτὴν λόγῳ φυσικῶς περιγραφόμενη, τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς πρὸ αὐτῆς κατ' ἐπίνοιαν οὐσιώδους κινήσεως.

<sup>21</sup> Tollefsen's presentation is the most recent to note the interrelationships and temporality of the ordering but he has not described how the organisation can be a specific and a formal representation of creaturely intentionality.

<sup>22</sup> Tollefsen, *Christocentric Cosmology*, 111-113.

self-sufficient thing is, in some sense, without origin.”<sup>23</sup> However, the exploration of the internal relations within the triad does not complete the process of identifying the operations of an individual being. The set of regional distinctions can also be used to explicate the internal organisation of the organic structure, as one of a co-operative operation. All dynamism consists of foundational, processional, and actualised principles. The actualised organism is the revelation of processional and conditional elements. Organised in time and possessing its own history, the organic structure of the creature is a coherent *ὅλον*, with each element acting as a consistent and logical necessity of the previous. Their incorporative co-operation enables the activities of the totality. The continuity of the conditions of the individuated totality/ *hypostasis* is conditioned by the internal continuity described by the relations of the triad.

### The Text

“Every essence is contained, possessing the conditions of its limit, (and) is a principle of movement when understood as a motivating potency.”<sup>24</sup> The use of the term οὐσία, in this context, means the constitutional architecture that represents the possibility and therefore the extent of a given principle. Its self-limitation is the form that the potency takes in reference to other possibilities. However, in this passage, because of the abstract way in which potency is used, it can extend to cover every sense in which a foundation is necessary for something to come to be. So it is a generalised statement concerning how potential acts as ‘plan’, but one in which its culmination is in the continuity. As seen later, it does not need to be organised in respect to an external τέλος, such as the divine, per se, but can contribute to the mere self continuity of the subsequent principles (φύσις and ἐνέργεια). Hence it is thought of in relation to an actualisation, in relation to which, it is thereby reconfigured to constitute the conditions of the continuity of a process. As a phenomenon it is not concrete when something occurs, and is therefore not an abstract principle. Under this turn οὐσία is known through relations and the active potential of the whole. It does not literally appear. It is specific to personalised or temporal moments as their

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<sup>23</sup> Maximus, *Amb*, PG 91, 1072BC. Translated in: Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 144.

<sup>24</sup> Πᾶσα οὐσία τὸν ἑαυτῆς ὅρον ἑαυτῇ συνεισάγουσα, ἀρχὴ πέφυκεν εἶναι, τῆς ἐπιθεωρουμένης αὐτῇ κατὰ δυνάμιν κινήσεως.

necessary foundations, and therefore is essential for making an account of specificity in concrete relations.

“Every natural movement coming toward actuality, contemplated around essence and contemplated prior to actuality, is an indeterminate process insofar as it is taken as naturally between each as a middle.”<sup>25</sup> The use of the term φύσις here is not to represent its definitive conceptual position, such as that described above (as a totality which acts). Nor is it used in the sense of a demarcated locale, as discussed in almost all previous sections. The term, here is, as the text says, κατὰ τὸ μέσον. The processional element is partly generated by its mediating relation. Moreover the processional character of the term makes it more difficult to pinpoint in the manner of οὐσία or ἐνέργεια. Its position is distinct from foundation but also from actualisation. In fact it is the cumulation of previous conditioning structures. Being motivated by these, and yet, through the concrete directionality of the organic structure, the creature is a temporal thing, which, in the continuity of its internal differentiation, conditions its possibilities and extent.

The idea of a middle, (τὸ μέσον) discussed in the previous chapter, being synonymous with the processional or incomplete status of the creature, can be taken from this passage. However, insofar as its processes are secured by previous conditions and in relation to a culminating ἐνέργεια, definitiveness is deferred to (logically, as in divisible by the difference in λόγοι previous and posterior but this deference is nevertheless a real process. Hence, indeterminate can be used to describe how the interrelation between these elements ‘produces’ the whole, but in this production, each element appears also to constitute the other. This is to say, the inter-connexion of the terms, the manner in which they are dependent on each other, facilitates an appearance whereby foundations and appearance, appear together.

In other words, φύσις is similar to how processional continuity has a certain element of indeterminacy. This is due to how the character of interrelation appears ubiquitously. The creature consisting of indeterminate arrangements is not the same as it being unable to be defined; it simply means that its constitutional principles cannot be explicated in using the same logic as one would use to examine a ‘totality’. The

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<sup>25</sup> Πᾶσα δὲ φυσικὴ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν κίνησις, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας μετεπινοουμένη· προεπινοουμένη δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας, μεσότης ἐστίν, ὥς ἀμφοῖν κατὰ τὸ μέσον φυσικῶς διελημμένη·



processional sense of φύσις is re-iterating the connexion of the elements. Continuity is expressed as necessary interrelation. The principles appear co-operatively or not at all. This is why the plural sense of λόγοι is useful. The ascription of strict demarcations will assist one in gaining a separate impression, but not concretise how the relations occur.

“And every act having its own principle of movement is the culmination out of the movement that it succeeded from essentially.”<sup>26</sup> In this structure, the culminating realisation is the realisation of a process, the collection of its processes co-operating successfully. This final passage considers how the internal relations come to realisation, but do not remark on the consequences of these relations. This final section is important as it represents the manner in which the previous conditions are summed up or circumscribed in the whole. The term ‘activity’ is defined as the completion within any process. In this manner, its outward-ness and orientation comes from the success of the previous principles, οὐσία and φύσις. The possibility of its extension is due to how the internal relations interact. Actuality is the co-operation of the creature’s foundations and processes. Actuality is a culmination phase of the principles that conditioned it, and therefore remains in need of them.

There is a need to make a distinction between ἐνέργεια and the completion of the creature. This arises from the distinction in the language of the internal relations between ἐνέργεια, οὐσία and φύσις. The internal co-operation of triad is different to the operation of the totality, the λόγος. The difference between the totality or the whole is whether or not the definition requires a reference to its previous conditions in order to make sense.

In the case of ἐνέργεια, it specifically expresses a relation of co-operation. Hence, to give a crude example, ἐνέργεια represents a whole in a similar way to how the ‘capacity of an algorithm to function’ might be the culmination and the representation of the processes such as ‘numbers’ ‘generating an algorithm’. Here ‘functional capacity’ is understood as the result of previous steps, and not in terms of what it does. On the other hand, the λόγος, as a totality, is closer to being the representation of the outcome of these processes as x or y (what the outcome can achieve). It represents the qualifications concerning what the result is saying.

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<sup>26</sup> . . . καὶ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια τῷ κατ’ αὐτὴν λόγῳ φυσικῶς περιγραφομένη, τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς πρὸ αὐτῆς κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν οὐσιώδους κινήσεως.

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Explaining what it does cannot take place without the completion of the processes, to be sure, but the explanation of what it does is not assisted by constantly re-iterating how the internal processes work. My throwing a ball may be conditioned by tendons, but the description of tendons will not help someone to understand the distance I threw it. However, if one were to investigate the grounds of the effect of  $x$  or  $y$  (λόγος), one would have to re-construct the processes.  $\text{ἐνέργεια}$  represents the cumulative efficacy of a set of processes,  $\text{λόγος}$  assuming the efficacy of the conditions, describes the effects.

The power of the term  $\text{ἐνέργεια}$ , therefore, refers, not so much to the whole as a whole, but how the whole is accomplished by the successful relations and culmination of processes. Hence actualisation is meant to describe the processes that contribute to, or make the whole, not the quality of the whole as such. The relations between processes do not represent how the whole might act, yet the whole cannot be separated from the completion of the processes. Is there a dependence between the continuity of the processes and the totality? Yes, but the two are not identical. There is a different thing to consider the culmination of the processes in whole, and the quality of the whole in itself.

Overall, the passage is referring to the internal constitution of a given moment or individual. In the passages each element conditions and completes the other, which, their culmination is represented as an internal integrity, rather than a description of the possibilities of the process itself. The use of the term  $\text{ὅλον}$  is, under this reading, the representation of the culmination of processes, so it is there mainly to distinguish the mode of operation as being a distinct concern. The culmination of a process is not the totality or person *per se*, but represents the successful culmination of the conditions. The individual, the totality only exists because of the successful interrelation between the elements within a process; therefore it is only to be formally distinguished from the process. The distinctions therefore show the difference between considering the internal constitution of a process, and what it does. Below are some comments on the notion of the will that bring the usefulness of the distinctions to light.

### **The Relation between Willing and the Triad**

Some qualifications are needed here. This discussion is not concerned with the idea of the will as constituted by a set of activities that might undergird an intention, such as

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understanding, making a decision to do something, etc. Instead, it argues that the depiction of the structure of the will is representative of the triadic form identified in the previous sections of the chapter. The extrapolation of the triad can provide the basis for describing a functional system. When Maximus considers the concrete effects of a unitive principle he uses inter-relational terms. Hence, although one does not see him equating the components of will (θέλησις) and the components that make up a unitive triad of the various elements that constitute an existent, there are strong similarities in the structure. Moreover, it can explain how the will acts ‘ecstatically’ without being a part-less composition.

Willing is a natural power, that desires what is natural. Willing is a natural desire that corresponds to the nature of the rational. Willing is natural, the self-determining movement of the self governing mind.<sup>32</sup>

This text is foundational in locating a triadic structure in creaturely κίνησις. Here it is attached to the notion of will. The text utilises θέλησις closer to a sense of hypostasis/

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<sup>32</sup> “Θέλησις ἐστὶ φυσικὴ δύναμις, τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ὄντος ὁρεκτικὴ. Θέλῃσας ἐστὶ φυσικὴ ὄρεξις, τῇ τοῦ λογικοῦ φύσει κατάλληλος. αὐτοκράτορος νοῦ αὐτεξούσιος. Αὐτεξουσιότης ἐστὶ νοῦς κατὰ φύσιν κινούμενος ἢ νοερὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησις αὐτοκρατής.” Maximus, *Obsculta*, PG 91, 276C.

The origin of this quote from Maximus has been questioned (Cited in: Neil, ‘Two Views of Vice and Virtue’ 266). Louth suggests that this description was from Cyril of Alexandria. B. Neil follows Madden who suggests it was peculiar to Maximus. In either case, Louth, Madden and Neil all maintain its importance for Maximus’ conception of the will. Louth, *Maximus*, 60-61. Neil, ‘Two Views on Vice and Virtue’, 6. Neil cites J.D. Madden: ‘The Authenticity of Early Definitions of Will’ in: F Heinzer and C. Schonborn (eds) *Maximus Confessor: Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur*, Fribourg, Septembre 1980, Paradosis 27 (Fribourg-en-Suisse, 1982) 61-79.

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totality, because of how it acts as a location for elements that are considered an essential character of an operation.

Moreover, these characteristic operations show a temporal progression. It is used as the basis in which activities are found to move and in this way, their location in, not only demarcates their operative parameters to be given through the intentional structure given in the delineation and progression of the totality itself but also denotes the general structures that instantiate the fundamental operations of a being. Hence, when there are processes taking place, they do so because they are operating together out of a unified continuity, thus ‘will’ can be used as an exemplar of the operations of the triad. “Θέλησις ἐστὶ φυσικὴ ὁρεξις, τῇ τοῦ λογικοῦ φύσει κατάλληλος.” “A natural desire corresponding to the rational”, the term *κατάλληλος* is stronger in its sense of connection than any idea of accidental relation, it is a fundamental connection that is distinguished through a specific way of speaking.

The constitutional sense of totality is that, as a momentum, it relates to a fundamental intentionality. It implies that the totality, the intentional orientation in the organic structure of creatures has, at its heart, a *telos*, although the direction of the creature is maintained through its continuity expressed in how the totality acts. Desire is ecstatic and moves the structure of the creature outward toward things outside of its present identity and proximity.

The creature’s action as a totality, as *θέλησις*, usually takes the form of an ‘ecstatic’ moment. Here it is the realisation of the elements that compose the creature, moving as a totality, toward something external. The representation of a totality, rather than a description of internal relations, assists with the explication of specific possibilities. Instead the indication of *ὁ θέλον*, *θέλησις*, and *το θέλητον* (will, willing, willed) brings with it an order that is more suited to the construction of a definition than the specificity of the content of the triad of ‘will, willing, willed’. Hence, when the will is spoken of in terms of what it does, this is the examination of its totality, rather than in its constitutive proto-moments. Hence the relation between *ὁ θέλον*, *θέλησις*, and *θέλητον*, whilst it is not identical to *οὐσία*, *φύσις* and *ἐνέργεια*, express the same sense of continuity and relationship, to form the totality (demarcated as ‘θέλησις’).

The internal relations provide an architectonic for the descriptions of individual possibilities. Hence, the internal relations of *το όλον*, condition the

possibilities of x or y, acting in specific ways. However, the two modes of description are to be distinguished.<sup>33</sup> The θέλησις, as a totality, is a collection of processes which, as related to λόγος, is subject to explanations of direction and extent, it is an ethical locale. On the other hand, to reiterate the reading of ἐνέργεια, θέλητον is the culmination of a set of processes which acted as conditions for its appearance, moreover, these are directly responsible for the particular state, how one came to have something.

If one were to look closer at any human action one would see that it involves different qualities of processes interacting together. The composition of human intention can only change and create because of how, within its own operation, there are different types of processes occurring co-operatively to form the continuity of what we experience as living. Take the example of a colour wheel. In order to create the spectrum of the colour wheel using paint, one requires the three primary colours, Red, Yellow and Blue. These can be represented as the foundations, the process for the generation of the wheel is the mixing of the colours together, and the actualisation of the wheel is the relation between the shades that produces the spectrum. The qualities of each principle described shows that differential ordering can be found conditioning the totality, the colour wheel. It results in the clarification of the principles within an existent, as comprised of different relationships. It is possible to find different qualities of moments constituting the continuity of a specific operation. A motive principle does not consist of a simple unity.

### **Spatial Extension and Temporality**

This section elaborates on the sequential elements of the passage described previously. It re-iterates the temporal and spatial sense, but makes a clarification of the language. It advocates the use of ‘proto-moments’ so as to recognise the necessity of interaction, as the basis for activity. An instant of motion is different than how internal relations constitute the co-operation of elements within a holov. An instant of motion is actually a totality, which acts in certain ways. Conceptual interdependence refers to how different and logically distinct processes are dependent on each other for forming their meaning. φύσις is where foundations, processes and actualisation are

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<sup>33</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book Δ 1013a25-1013b1-4. The relation to Aristotle’s discussion of causes is referenced here to provide precedence for thinking about how processes of qualitative difference can co-operate with each other to form a ‘whole’.

unified with distinction. Tollefsen's presentation begins with articulating the temporal extension of the being by examining the implications of the terms οὐσία, φύσις and ἐνέργεια. They become related to “‘was’- ‘is’ – ‘will be’”.<sup>34</sup> The unitive being is composed of several temporal senses of past present and future. Tollefsen rightly regards the terms as expressing a causal relation that expresses how the creature is unitive because of its compatibility between three tenses. He then goes on to argue that the position of the λόγοι is directly related to the triad of τὸ εἶναι, τὸ εὔ εἶναι, τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι.<sup>35</sup>

The expression of positive limit is not based on re-iterating a single principle, but on showing how a single principle is a co-operation of aggregated relations. Note the tri-partition of the ‘Will’ as ὁ θέλον, θέλησις, and το θέλητον. Also the νοῦς or ‘Mind’ as consisting of νοῦς (thinking subject), νόησις, the process of thinking and νόημα (thought).<sup>36</sup> Finally, in the most general classification that Maximus utilises the ‘internal organisational elements of the creature’ (a totality but the operative term is φύσις) as foundation, process and actuality. This co-operation represents the internal activities of the individual being. In this way, tri-partition and interrelationship between these concepts describe the conditions ‘internal’ to the operation of the creature as a whole. Will, νοῦς and the creature as a totality (here utilising φύσις) demarcated in a specific definition (λόγος) are intentional structures that arise through the continuity of grounding and transcendent operations. Interdependent elements in the psyche are operations that function together to constitute a unitive appearance.

The various elements within intentionality, within any thing, co-operate to form the totality. In the third passage the term ἐνέργεια was used to signify the completion of the previous moments. This leads me to posit a different reading of the temporal structure toward one that utilises the inter-connection between the elements within the process. Looking at it in temporal terms, if a moment is the smallest unity of time, then these separable entities of the λόγοι are not separate moments, even if they can be separated by analysis, they are in fact aggregates which, through co-

<sup>34</sup> Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology*, 117-118.

<sup>35</sup> This later triad has a normative temporal extension, in which creatures are a combination of differing organisational modes, purified time in well being, and an eschatological time of eternal well being. It is virtually identical to Sherwood's discussion mentioned previously.

<sup>36</sup> Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 166.

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operation, form a moment, form a whole, which acts as a unified whole. In the contribution of the λόγοι, the interdependent relations co-operate to form the ‘whole’ as a moment. This means that the conception of temporal and spatial relation needs to be refined, for they are units that condition a moment. A moment is described either as the collection of proto-moments, or it can be described in terms of its action as a totality. Indeed, aggregation, or processes that are combined together, represent partial or incomplete principles.

For the components, or aggregated ‘proto-moments’ having a temporal sense is to mean that they are separable from each other only analytically. It is their relation that produces a whole, which conditions the identity of the λόγος, as the overall locale, or τόπος of the unit of motion. This is because the spatial and the temporal aggregations are one and the same. The complete relation of these interdependent λόγοι generates the integrity of the whole. The whole, which is the continuity of motion itself, is an emergent property conditioned by the co-operation between the three temporal (and spatial) aggregates. These are not self-contained atoms, but the necessary constituents of something. To say they are spoken together is to say that they are necessarily related, they have no real meaning except through their social relation. Thus the continuity of the process is the spatial and temporal connexions, meaning that they are ‘incomplete’ if they are considered without relation together.

It is useful to employ τόπος here to describe how the relations between the processes do not allocate a general sense of culmination so much as culminate in a determinate locality with character. Τόπος has been used to describe the general structure of how a creature’s appearance, is always specific and spatio-temporal.<sup>37</sup> Maximus explores the notion of place in reference to the idea of ‘abode’ or the locale or place of abidance. “The cosmos, in its totality consists of self-limiting individuated principles. Place is spoken of together with age. By itself possessing modes of thought by nature (the cosmos) generates the wisdom of God’s power over all things. These understandings are provisional locales (of that power)”.<sup>38</sup> This, to my mind, misses

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<sup>37</sup> Cooper, *The Body in St Maximus*, 191-7. Cooper presents the notion of τόπος in relation to the idea of physicality as inclusive of locale and temporality, thus, in the inclusion of positive recapitulation of ‘topos’ there is the inclusion of space and time. He utilises the general sense in which τόπος is a condition positively facilitating motion in which God becomes a place of rest. The sense in which I utilise spatio-temporality is more in terms of how the co-operation between qualities of processes are equiprimordial with spatio-temporal extension.

<sup>38</sup> ‘Ο πᾶς χόσμος ἰδίοις περιοριζόμενος λόγοις, καὶ τόπος λέγεται καὶ αἰὼν, τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ διατωμένων · τρόπους θεωρημάτων ἔχων κατὰ φύσιν τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ προσφυεῖς, μερικὴν

Maximus' meaning which can also take up the theme discussed by Sambursky that Cooper specifically quotes.<sup>39</sup> Here the idea of 'filled space' is also linked to an idea that what τόπος encompasses or 'possesses', in that circumscription, activities that appear as unified and co-operative. Temporality co-operates with extension and 'location' in this sense, demarcates and allows the limitations of a body.

The senses in which spatio-temporality is used here is more in terms of how the co-operation between qualities of processes arise equi-primordially with, or have identity with, spatio-temporal extension. Τόπος represents specific spatio-temporal extension, which arises through the co-operative determination of the inter-connection between the processional elements. This means, for instance, that to define hypostasis or Λόγος as having a specific locality, is to imply that there are subterranean processes co-operating. As such, the notion of positive limits is useful because of how relationships produce a determinate locality. The continuity of τόπος in Maximus is therefore the result of the co-operation between temporal and spatial aggregates.

Hence, 'τόπος' is not limited to describing the external conditions around a body that give it its identity but also positive extension in a process. The motion in the triad represents the positive extension of a body in which its surroundings are implicitly defining creaturely limits. Given that Maximus' also makes τόπος a general principle accompanying κίνησις as well as regionality (which is a typology of different conditioning principles); it is appropriate to retain internal and topographic distinctions within the description of the definition. The dynamicist structure in creatures acts as a positive extension of temporality and spatiality within individual as each being a determinate locale or λόγος. Definition (λόγος) therefore is temporal, spatial, internally extended, and circumscribed, the spontaneous emergence of continuity.

The dynamic itself possesses specific character, even as it possesses common structural tendencies. The employment of inter-relational structures, along with the sense of the totality, both attempt to represent the conditions underlying appearance of κίνησις, without expecting to substitute for the qualities and specificity of each

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κατανόησιν αὐτοῖς ἐμποιῆσαι τῆς ἐπὶ πάντα σοφίας τοῦ Θεοῦ δυναμένους οἷς ἕως χρῶνται πρὸς κατανόησιν, οὐ δύνανται δίχα μεσότητος εἶναι καὶ μερικῆς καταλήψεως. Maximus, *CK*, I, 70, PG 90, 1109A. My translation. See also: Berthold, *Maximus*, 140.

<sup>39</sup> Cooper, *The Body in St Maximus*, 191-2. Quoting: S. Sambursky, *The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism* (The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem, 1982) 16.



moment. Κίνησις is the outcome of the cohesion of specific spatial and temporal relations. Κίνησις is a topographic notion within its description, as its spatio-temporal-continuity. The whole consists of the coherence of qualitative relations. The totality represents the activity of this processes relating coherently in specific acts.

### Conclusion

Explicate the triadic sense of κίνησις has not provided a description of specific content, so much as advocated the structural diversity implicit within the definition. When talking about κίνησις, it is conceivable, and indeed necessary, to utilise a variety of different distinctions. And indeed, in my view, it is necessary to make this analysis along with other analyses that seek to clarify the content and scope of the various qualities of κίνησις. One cannot capture κίνησις simply by using terms that imply the continuity of a single quality; these will work for some of the time, but not all. For instance, in the case of the relations amidst the triad, each of these elements was distinct, but co-operated together to form the conditions of positive motion. Hence, when looking at the internal structure, one must utilise an inter-relational description. The co-operation was such that I called them aggregated, or ‘proto-moments’ to illustrate the necessity of their co-operation.

The whole also featured in this discussion, as the culmination of the process as process, rather than what that process does. The utilisation of the term illustrates a specific type of relation to the continuity of the internal order of the triad. It is the collection of the various constituents. The unity of the whole is thus described in terms of how the processes co-operate together as intentionality. However, it is another thing to consider how these things act.

Is there interdependence between the continuity of the processes, the whole and the totality? Yes, but they are not identical. There is a different thing to consider the relations within a process, the successful culmination of a process, and the quality of the totality in itself. The difference is that one needs to consider each in distinct ways, considering what a cake is of made and how it is put together and whether this

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has been successful, whereas whether the cake tastes good is a matter of considering the totality. The totality needs to be considered in a distinctive manner, but the connexion of the processes and their culmination instantiate the possibility of good or bad. Hence the totality is perfectly representative of, but not identical to, the ongoing relationships within the processes that form its essence.

The question that looms here again is whether κίνησις needs to be taken as an assessment of the collection and relation of aggregates, or as a completed process or whole, or as a totality. Indeed one may need to accept the possibility that all three distinctions may need to be utilised at different times. Perhaps the idea of ‘κίνησις’ being conditioned by subterranean processes might indeed force a rethink of questions of what κίνησις is and how it can do what it does.

Κίνησις has been argued to consist of an interaction between several different moments which incorporate temporal and spatial continuity. Temporal and spatial extension could be within the basic constitution of created moment. The interrelation is the basis of positive action in κίνησις. This chapter has pointed out the persistence of several ways of relating to any quality of κίνησις whatsoever. The effect is that one will require distinctive types of explanations of the various qualities of κίνησις.

Greater precision can be applied in an explanation of the varieties of motion found in Maximus are explicable within the senses described. One can now separate the varieties of κίνησις from the several ways in which any particular moment may appear and be explicated. The usefulness of these distinctions is that they enable descriptions to be more aware of their prospective limits.

## Conclusion

This thesis has surveyed some important elements of Maximus' work, and identified some structures that provide an important insight into his understanding of created motion. Abstraction has been a necessary component for the articulation of the concept. Hence different readings are not only possible but also have value. The introduction introduced some of the areas of concern outlined in the secondary literature, and proposed that, although generally accepting κίνησις as fundamental to Maximus, that the investigation of the concept can be taken further. The thesis outlined the complexity of his cosmology. The work introduced it as providing the interpreter with several options if they would wish to identify an understanding of the concept. It established that a good solution to the complex variety of possibilities is to engage specific types of motion and to provide an extended reading of them. To this end, it sought out the ascetic writings and found that they contained some important descriptions of motion, in the form of a self-continuity. One of the more complex issues was the distinctive role of φύσις, providing, as it does, some important content and distinctions to the discussion. However, chapter 2 showed that the concept is used in specific ways, and so provides important elements, but it does not actually engage the program of self-continuity, except insofar as it accepts it, and clarifies its quality and extent. Nevertheless, it does appear to have some important things to say concerning continuity, and its role is not diminished despite how it relates to, what becomes, and ethical quality of movement.

One theme of κίνησις that the chapter considered was how procreative continuity can, in most circumstances, be described as composed of pacific and receptive relations. It described the importance of the pacificity of the processes of procreative self-continuity, the continuity that sits 'neutrally' as it were, within self-continuous motion. Even though the ascetic considerations showed that there were occasional conflicts, the pacificity of the motion of λογισμοί is an important element of its continuity. The λογισμοί represented a structure where self-continuity is specifically described as consisting of connections and relations between discrete content, which, when in relation to each other, were considered as demarcated locales. The structure of that system provided or facilitated relations between meanings which later became important for the articulation of the κατηγορία. Although seemingly a

good starting point, already one could see the complexity of such an investigation, where even the basic continuity of life was associated with the maintenance of several qualities or regions of activity. The chapters discussing *μνήμην* and *κατηγορία* expanded on how the relations between localities, generate a determinate meaning (*ὄνομα*). Although it did not make judgements on the content or character of the *κατηγορία*, it did show the importance of relating a structure, normally considered more abstract, is dependent on a sense of continuity that is almost like the biological production of meaning. And by showing how the process of the *κατηγορία* included a circumscriptive activity in its compilation of *ὄνομα*, it articulated with additional detail, some of the processes that emerge through a self-continuity.

To this end, one finds that the content implied, even within forms of *κίνησις* which do not necessarily imply conceptual structures, is quite complex. Moreover, this thesis suggested the importance of procreative continuity on more complex structures. Nevertheless, insofar as the aim of the project is to show the diversity of motion, and its relatively complex content, chapters 2 and 3 have described some of the structures, which seem to remain implicitly within a type of self-continuous motion.

Chapter 4 described the context for the emergence of a general and a theologically influenced definition of *κίνησις*. It noted the limits of this definition, and engaged with some secondary work, showing how the generalist or formal definition of motion is distributed across the totality of the cosmos through a divinely created act. The context of the debate with Origen showed the limits of this particular conception of motion, to being a general sense, rather than relating to specific instances of motion as such. Nevertheless, the basic constitution of the description remains important in many recent works. I critiqued how some of the approaches utilised the generality of the descriptions, and argued that it made motion seem too formal, or mathematical. Although there were hints that the Maximus and the secondary sources had a nuanced sense of the formal sphere, the need for care and clarity is pervasive, especially as the concept of motion depends on a theological move. Chapter 6 pointed out how the general thesis had been altered in recent work, which, utilising logical connexions, articulated individual instances of motion, without necessarily disclosing specific content.

An individual is the ‘result’ of a set of processes relating together, rather than a monad, demarcated as the result of connexions between modes of classification. Therefore, the use of connexions between qualities or regions, can effectively locate where the investigation of motion in specific instances, is to take place. Yet this project of spelling out connexions is at its best when the relations are not substituted for the articulation of the content and relations that constitute the individual. I pointed out that the added precision of the logical connexions did not provide sufficient content. Moreover, if the locality of the individual is not further explored, there is a possibility that it will be regarded rather simplistically. As the discussion followed into the final chapter, the usefulness of articulating the individual, the person, became two fold.

Not only did the discussions in chapter 5 provide a useful tool for focusing down on the question, but also gave a language for describing the difference between the constitutional conditions of the individual, and how that individual acts. Hence the connexions provided far more precision to the description of created motion. Thereby, one could begin to articulate the different elements that go into motion as a composite whole, or as a totality. Moreover, it can facilitate a description of the whole being constituted by a collection of different processes.

The final chapter attempted to explicate what was called a dynamicist reading of Maximus. I based this description on how the relationships within the various elements that constitutes the motion, and the various ways that the κίνησις appears, maintain a consistent interchange and inter-dependence, in order to function. Indeed, there was little place for identities being developed or arising without references to a continuity of relations. Relationships constituted the inner continuity of κίνησις and condition its appearance and action as a totality. In this later description, the inter-relational structure is constituent of the various qualities of κίνησις. The internal continuity of any specific κίνησις is not necessarily the appearance of a singular type, but may be a collection of different relationships co-operating together. This description does not prevent the continuation of various other questions, or a discussion of the quality of a single event of κίνησις. Moreover, the directionality of κίνησις, whilst it has not received extensive treatment here, would be an important element of the investigation, but one that can only emerge as a result of clarification, and description of the complex orders that might underline a phenomenon.

As Maximus says: “No creature can cease its own motion until it has reached the first and only cause, which gives to all existent things their being.”<sup>1</sup> However, along the way, there are, implicitly, and available to the careful observer, structures that contribute to a fuller sense of κίνησις, that would remain merely implicit, were we to read Maximus’ work only in terms of theology. The structures within his work relate to elements that cannot be expressed in a single engagement. One must carefully unpack elements along the way. In these various locales, or eddies in which κίνησις appears one way, and then another, one can see the institution of a particular set or a particular type. It can be defined in many ways, and, perhaps, even after reaching the heights accorded to our natural powers, it might persist as a cogent approximation to the divine creator.

The work has provided a survey of some of the different senses running concurrently in Maximus’ thought. It has exposed some depth and intricacies that evade a cursory glance. It offered descriptions of motion that, though occasionally critical of the secondary literature, acknowledges that the basic structure articulated, has remained an important element in Maximus’ work. The thesis criticised the tendency of secondary literature to pursue definitions in a way that is not sensitive to their context, or to the possibility that there might be structural variations between types of κίνησις. I acknowledge that I cannot argue for a complete recapitulation of Maximus’ thought based on the material presented. Instead, I have shown that to gather the meaning and scope of an important term can include significant detail and diversity. Even as the term κίνησις is enquired into, it is clear that one term cannot capture the senses that motion might possess. This, more synthetic project, is one for later consideration, and is best left as a potency, whose realisation must be infused within the Christological cosmos of Maximus the theologian.

There is still much that, given more research, could be excavated from Maximus. To extend the classification of movement further, in ascetic discrimination, to perhaps indicate a primordial sense in which procreative continuity might be the source of semantic connexions. Perhaps there is, lurking within the structural dynamism of the organic triad, a distinctive understanding of language. At most times for Maximus, natural or created activity, will strive as if through imitation to that,

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<sup>1</sup> Maximus, *Amb*, PG 91, 1072BC. Trans: Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, 144.

absolutely real, which lies beyond its grasp. And in the grasping, it might understand the cosmos. The small articulations Maximus gives, invites a closer look. The investigation undertaken in this thesis, though, still begs questions concerning creaturely content and ultimate purpose. Given further study, that there may be other structures to be described and embraced, that later could emerge within a more definitive structure than the one I have given. Thus, the possibility is there for depicting structures which engender greater complexity to experience. The evolutionary emergence of a processional order is a tantalising image, but one that requires considerable care within a description.

However, one benefit of exploring a dynamicist reading is that it can recognise how Maximus' work seems to embody the processes within its explanatory schematic. This allows us to potentially express κίνησις as a culmination of complex internal relations, rather than rely on overarching theological or cosmological forces alone. The definition can assist us, not just by clarifying our language, but also understand that this represents a state of created life. To this end, the thesis has shown that it is realistic to expect the work of figures of antiquity to provide ample material for sustained analyses.

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