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Masculine Madness

The normality of evil in the Western cultural
imaginary

Ross Honeywill



Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
of

Doctor of Philosophy

September 2014

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Date: 30 September 2014

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to Dr Greer Honeywill whom I married in 1977. Since that time, on every day, she inspires me and reminds me how a fully agentic woman gives hope and optimism not only to other women, but also to men who are prepared to recognise and acknowledge the unearned privilege they enjoy. She teaches me constantly to see and hear the world in new ways. Given that it is important for men to feel unimportant – in her presence that is a blessed and welcome condition.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply grateful to Dr Lucy Tatman whose guidance and inspiration have in challenging my thinking, taken me down rich paths that would otherwise have remained empty country lanes. The process of undertaking a doctoral thesis by research is rightly filled with anxieties and uncertainties, but Lucy made this project a rewarding pleasure, a self-discovering, self-defining experience. I am now a different person, dare I say, a better person, and I have Lucy Tatman to thank for that.

Thanks also to Dr Richard Corry who provided sage advice along the way.

ABSTRACT

All men – ordinary and exceptional men – have a potential for evil. What is it? Where does it originate? How does it impact society? Can it be overcome? This thesis explores the masculine potential for evil, and traces its various manifestations in cultural texts, social systems and everyday life practices, from the birth of modernity to the present. ‘Masculine madness’ is shown to be, not a pathological or psychiatric condition, but a potential for evil in the normality of the everyday, a potential inherent to all men. Combining psychic mechanisms with critical theory, and using an interdisciplinary or bricolage research framework, the thesis examines the origins and impacts of masculine madness from the Enlightenment and modernity, through postmodernity, and into the present; and exposes the violent suppression of Woman and women in the creative and symbolic dimension of the social that forms the Western cultural imaginary. Modernity is shown to be an epoch of institutionalised androcentrism, in which the Enlightenment narrative of plurality was rejected in favour of the script of male mastery, control and domination. A major effect of this was the incorporation of ‘madness’ as a feature of ‘ordinary’ masculinity and the ensuing normalisation of evil. Referencing the work of critical theorists, philosophers, feminists and scientists, the thesis describes how the ‘banality’ and ‘ordinariness’ of evil points to the Second World War, the Holocaust and the social death of Woman, as explicit outcomes of masculine madness. It reveals an ‘Oedipal schism’ as the origin of masculine madness, a rupture that negotiates between the extremes of social constructionism and biological determinism, and draws analogies between individual lives and social processes. Masculine madness in postmodernity is shown to be a period of rebellion against the constraints and certitudes of modernity, and an attempt to continue the liberal and pluralising legacy of the Enlightenment. The thesis shows, however, that postmodernity failed to reverse the genocide of Woman or to renounce the self-deception of masculine madness. A continuing process of re-masculinisation after the end of postmodernity is exposed, in a period which, referencing Bauman, is called the ‘liquid present’: a time in which masculine madness lives on, as evidenced by inequality in the workplace, growing gender conservatism, and constant eruptions of male violence. The consumer culture of the liquid present is identified as a culture in the making, where the shallow consumer monoculture exists alongside the deep knowledge culture. While the consumer monoculture melancholically nurtures masculine madness, the knowledge culture embodies the conditions for surpassing it by, for example, individualised choices by men. This thesis not only diagnoses masculine madness, but also identifies a possible, and feasible, way forward – a prognosis for society to surpass the annihilative potential of masculine madness.

Abstract classification: ANZRC 220319 (Social Philosophy)

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is located within, and makes a contribution to, the burgeoning field of feminist cultural studies. In it I explore the potential for evil in men, and trace its various manifestations in cultural texts, social systems and everyday life practices, from the birth of modernity to the present. The central pillar of the thesis is ‘masculine madness,’ defined not as a pathological or psychiatric condition, but as ‘a potential for evil in the normality of the everyday’ that is inherent to all men. Using bricolage, or a multidisciplinary methodology, ranging across philosophy, feminism, psychoanalysis and critical theory, this thesis explores the origins and impact of masculine madness. It documents the violent suppression of Woman (the mythical figure of woman, the collective feminine) and women (gendered humans in a physical world) in the creative and symbolic dimension of the social that forms the Western ‘cultural imaginary’.

The thesis is divided into four sections, dealing with the Enlightenment and modernity (Section One), a description of the ‘Oedipal schism’ as productive of masculine madness (Section Two), postmodernity (Section Three) and the present (Section Four).

The first section describes the birth of masculine modernity in the ideas of the Enlightenment, whose masculine ethos is revealed as supplying the basis for legitimising the future systemic discrimination against women. Modernity is exposed as an epoch of institutionalised androcentrism, in which the Enlightenment narrative of plurality was rejected in favour of the script of male mastery, control and domination. A major effect of this was the incorporation of madness as a feature of ‘ordinary’ masculinity and the ensuing normalisation of evil. Referring to the work of Hannah Arendt, Zygmunt Bauman, Stanley Milgram, and Philip Zimbardo, among others, I explore the ‘banality’ and ‘ordinariness’ of evil, and expose the Second World War, the Holocaust and the social death of Woman, as explicit outcomes of masculine madness. This social death of Woman in the cultural imaginary is presented as a symbolic genocide, as a mythical evacuation of meaning for Woman, causing women in the physical world to be non-men, or as Catharine MacKinnon terms it, non-human.

The discussion of links between normative masculinity, politics of indifference and structural misogyny is expanded in Section Two, which begins with a re-

consideration of the sex/gender model, supplemented here by an examination of the Oedipal schism. Oedipal schism is defined as a psychic procedure and a founding moment in identity formation, through which a violent separation between Woman (the creator) and Man (the created) is effected, and which provides a script to be re-enacted in future gender relations. Taken together, the critique of biological determinism and the inclusion of the psychic element in the expanded sex/gender model, attribute more autonomy to individual acts and choices, thereby pointing to one means of transforming dominant masculinity, discussed in more detail in the final part of the thesis. The Oedipal schism is examined against increasingly popular accounts of biological determinism and Neo-Darwinism.

Section Three examines masculine madness in postmodernity, approached as a period of rebellion against the constraints and certitudes of modernity, and as an attempt to continue the liberal and pluralising legacy of the Enlightenment. I point to an overall emphasis on difference in postmodernity, and how, with the exception of female difference, postmodernity failed 'to reverse the genocide of Woman or renounce the self-deception of masculine madness.' Notwithstanding the fact that 'gender' and women's rights became a major topic of discussion in the latter part of the twentieth century, this thesis presents the cultural politics of postmodernity as leading to re-masculinisation, whether of the private sphere, cultural criticism, or work relations. Following a number of critics, including Slavoj Žižek, I argue that the crisis of ideology, or metanarratives, and the emphasis on contingency in postmodernity, did not lead to plurality and recognition of Woman, but resulted in a levelling of differences and a questioning of the very possibility of feminine agency, producing, in the wake of the period, a pervasive sense of anxiety and emptiness.

The final section reveals the continuing process of re-masculinisation after the end of postmodernity, in a period which, referencing Bauman, I call the 'liquid present'. The liquid present is described as a time when masculine madness lives on, as evidenced by inequality in the workplace, growing gender conservatism and eruptions of male violence. At the same time, we see it as a period of renewed interest in moral issues and the figure of the creator. I reveal the consumer culture of the liquid present as a culture in the making, where the shallow consumer monoculture exists alongside the deep knowledge culture: while the consumer monoculture melancholically nurtures masculine madness, the knowledge culture creates the conditions for surpassing it by, for example, individualised consumer choices. The

discussion of contemporary culture, and particularly of the patterns of consumption, is used to support the concluding claim that it is in the culture of knowledge that the potential for men to ‘exercise true, fully agentic morality’ is located.

In this thesis, I offer a reading of the impact of masculine madness on the Western cultural imaginary by considering the various ways in which the legacy of the Enlightenment has been constructed (in modernity), deconstructed (in postmodernity) and reconstructed (in the liquid present). By emphasising the role of the Enlightenment lineage, and by invoking Jacques Derrida’s conceptualisation of any present as always haunted by the past, I explore the continual presence of gender violence in the history of Western civilisation, as well as pointing to a possibility of different (moral) becoming.

‘Masculine madness’ and ‘Western cultural imaginary’ are terms that require explanation. As mentioned above, masculine madness is *not* a pathological condition, is not madness or insanity in the traditional or psychiatric sense. It is the potent potential for an eruptive evil in the male normality of the everyday. Masculine madness can be a private evil and it can be public, frequently cruel and always punitive. It can be likened to a beast that lies dormant until provoked or aroused and then, having done its terrible business, returns to reflexive slumber. Eruptions of masculine madness can destroy a relationship, a community, a race, an enemy, an innocent bystander, a society, a civilisation, all life. It has caused world wars, ended epochs like modernity and postmodernity, and occupies terrain at the centre of the war against nature. It is essentially male but not essentialist – it is endemic to Man but, like the potentiality of certain genes, not expressed in all men. Once again, like genes, it requires a situation to trigger its expression. Take for example the German bank clerk, a young married man with two daughters, who to any onlooker epitomised the everyday. When the situation presented itself, when the circumstances (which I explore in Section One) were in place, this normal man’s potential for evil expressed itself as he became part of the Nazi killing machine in Germany’s death camps. Every individual or society has the potential to intercede, suppress, and control masculine madness. While it can be recognised, mediated, inhibited, overcome, it is nonetheless everywhere in the private and public realms: rape, child-abuse, domestic violence, street violence, crimes against humanity, genocides, national conflicts, and the war against nature. That is masculine madness.

The term ‘cultural imaginary’ is the creative and symbolic dimension of the social, the dimension through which human beings create their ways of living together and their ways of representing their collective life. This thesis is a review of the Western cultural imaginary since the Enlightenment, in the sense that Mette Bryld and Nina Lykke define ‘cultural imaginary’ as ‘the concept used within cultural studies to characterize the fantasy images in which a culture mirrors itself, and which thereby come to act as points of reference for its identity production’ (1999, p. 8 note 2). This highlights the difficulties inherent in any analysis of an ‘entity’ – in this case, the ‘cultural imaginary’ – suffused simultaneously with fantasies bearing no relationship to reality, as well as with fantasies closely related to factual reality, and filled as well with contradictory assertions (e.g., humans are utterly rational/hopelessly irrational). In this thesis, I therefore rely upon different rhetorical strategies, and sometimes flourishes, in response to the inherent challenge of navigating multiple, and frequently competing, realities (and irrealities).

So, here, the term ‘cultural imaginary’ refers to a representation of our social fabric and its place in the world – the very fabric that allows for our practices and ways of living to make sense, to have authenticity and legitimacy, that allows us to have what Charles Taylor calls ‘a common understanding of how to interact with each other and when we’re doing so, how to comprehend what we’re up to’ (2004, p. 23). The cultural imaginary is a mythical edifice: as Lucy Tatman says, without myth ‘no moorings ... no compass bearings, no meaning to any when or where or who or what, just an unbearable homelessness’ (2007, p. 8). The cultural imaginary is a flexible mirror to the real world, sometimes magnifying, sometimes distorting, but not always reflecting human actions and beliefs.

In relation to methodology, I owe an unredeemable debt to Zygmunt Bauman for his inspirational approach to multidisciplinary:

Concepts tend to outlive the historical configurations which gave them birth and infused them with meaning. This tendency is rooted in the natural propensity to absorb and accommodate new experience into the familiar picture of the world; habitual categories are the main tools of this absorption. New experience does not fit the categories easily. (Bauman 1982, p. 192)

Accordingly, in this thesis, following Bauman's lead, I work across categories by using a broad multidisciplinary, multiperspectival theoretical framework that cuts through disciplines and offers examples that come from various sites of cultural and social production and/or conflict. Multi- and interdisciplinarity is used here as a bricolage, described by Joe Kincheloe as 'conceptualizing a new rigor in qualitative research, where disciplinary boundaries are crossed and the analytical frames of more than one discipline are employed by the researcher' (2001, p. 685). The bricolage adopts a position that the frontiers of knowledge work rest in the liminal zones where disciplines collide.

The researcher constructs the most useful bricolage his or her wide knowledge of research strategies can provide. The strict disciplinarian operating in a reductionist framework, chained to the prearranged procedures of a monological way of seeing, is less likely to produce frame-shattering research than the synergized bricoleur. Employing Nietzsche's notion of perspectivism to ground his version of a multimethodological research strategy, Kellner (1995) contends that researchers must learn a variety of ways of seeing and interpreting in the pursuit of knowledge. (Kincheloe 2001, pp. 681, 685)

In this thesis, multidisciplinary, or bricolage, deals, not only with divergent methods of enquiry, but also with diverse theoretical and philosophical understandings of the various elements and disciplines encountered in the act of research. The variety of references in this thesis informs the bricolage and demonstrates the complex nature of masculine madness, and a need for revealing links between seemingly disparate cultural phenomena and critical discourses. Similarly, the decision to consider the Western cultural imaginary from the Enlightenment to the present makes it possible to discern recurring tendencies and unchanging heterotopias. This is *not* a historical analysis of western culture from the Enlightenment to the present, but is instead an analysis of the Western cultural imaginary.

This thesis, therefore, combines the general with the particular, and the theoretical with the practical, by supplementing descriptions of long periods of time with references to specific cultural texts or social problems. Embracing the bricolage, it includes discussions of a variety of texts, including poetry, plays, canonical critical

works, news items, scientific texts and sociological research. Throughout the thesis are references to a range of contemporary political and social problems, as well as the results of my own research (Sections Two and Four).

To leave methodology and return, in conclusion, to content, the discussion of the liquid present in the final part of this thesis includes an examination of the concepts of ethics and morality, a postulate to replace the ‘selfish gene’ with a moral phene, and, most importantly, an exploration of the various phenomena that form the liquid present. The description of contemporary culture, as filled with anxiety and as positioned between the modern desire for sense and the postmodern legacy of uncertainty, not only diagnoses masculine madness, but also reveals a possible – and feasible – line of redemption for men.

SECTION ONE: MODERNITY: the birth and death

1:0 INTRODUCTION

Modernity was a masculine enterprise, concealing yet nourishing masculine madness.

In Enlightenment England in 1782 a judge ruled that a man might beat his wife without legal consequence so long as the stick was no thicker than the width of the man's thumb (Berkowitz 2012, p. 301). Such androcentrism has however flourished for millennia. In ancient Greece a respectable woman of Athens was regarded as merely a sperm receptacle, what Sophocles called a field to plough (1978, p. 80). The resultant progeny was viewed not only as belonging to the father, but as having no relationship to the mother, other than that between wet-nurse and baby. As Aeschylus (in his *Eumenides*) puts it:

*The so-called mother is not the child's
begetter, but a nurse of the newly sown embryo;
The one who mounts begets.* (Mitchell-Boyask 2009, p. 118)

While I focus on masculinities within Western culture, it is useful to note contextually that the oldest record of gender discrimination is from the Sumerian kingdom of Ur-Nammu, more than four thousand years ago. Ur-Nammu's Law No. 7 mandated that married women who seduced other men were to be killed. While the male lover was to be fully excused, death awaited the wife who dared be unfaithful to her husband (Mitchell-Boyask 2009, p. 13).

To emphasise a point made earlier, the Enlightenment represents a special point of departure that is unique: it was the beginning of the *modern* masculine narrative. The identification of modernity with masculinity is, of course, not new, not simply an invention of contemporary theorists (Felski 1995, p. 16). I examine how the theoretical and applied structures of science, industrialisation and technology that flourished during enlightened modernity excluded women more than at any previous epoch, and made that exclusion a point of departure. The recurring identification of the modern with the public was largely responsible for the belief that, in modernity,

women were situated outside processes of history and political, economic and social change (Felski 1995, p. 16). This encouraged and gave opportunity to masculine madness for eruptions so catastrophic it would kill the epoch of modernity.

The Enlightenment is treated throughout this thesis as a set of values that in some form flow into the present, whereas modernity was an epoch incubated and nourished by Enlightenment values but which, in the nature of all epochs, had a beginning and an end. The end is easier to define than the beginning. Modernity, the epoch rather than the cultural or applied movement known as modernism, ended, as we shall see, with the Second World War. Its beginning is more amorphous. As Rita Felski and Lawrence Cahoon attest, modernity was not a *Zeitgeist* born at a particular moment in history, but rather a collection of parallel but interlocking institutional, theoretical, philosophical and cultural strands which emerge and develop at different times (Felski 1995, p. 12). That said, it was unquestionably identifiable.

Modern philosophers such as René Descartes and David Hume distinguished modernity as characterised by an activist, engineering, machine-age attitude toward nature and toward itself. In addition to the modernist epoch institutionalising the Age of Reason that was the Enlightenment, it was also the age of invention: in science, in industry, in nature and even in being human.

While the tyranny of reason defined the spirit of the age, reason, individuality, the development of a market economy, secularism, and the creation of autonomous spheres of science were all complemented by creative arts and a new sense of civilisation devoted to the drive to self-perfection. Modernity represented the gradual liberation of the individual from the bonds of mediaeval tradition, into a new tradition, a decidedly masculine enterprise: androcentric modernity. I will be arguing that the feminine was present in modernity but Woman was excluded from its enterprise – Woman as Woman, not as non-Man.¹ Modernity was a masculine epoch characterised by dominance and oppression without consideration of consequence.

By the twentieth century, masculine modernity had reached its zenith. Modernity gave men permission and a platform on which to organise. The growth of urban populations and personal wages saw men organise into societies, trade unions, councils, parliaments, armies. Modernity had introduced a taxonomically efficient

¹ The capitalised nouns Woman and Man when used in this thesis refer not to women and men but instead, using the example of Woman, to the collective feminine, the experiential existential feminine in the Western cultural imaginary.

bureaucracy, management systems, industrial production and therefore the step to industrialised war was a short one. With the advent of the Second World War, the modern war, tens of millions of civilians were killed in the Holocaust and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This was masculine madness and cold tyrannical reason so deep and surgical that it signalled the end of modernity.

I explore how throughout modern history men, unable or unwilling to surrender the unearned privilege of androcentrism, subjugated women. I reveal the androcentric evolution of masculinities and ask if a dominative patriarchy was inevitable, and if so why the progressive optimism of the Enlightenment failed to stop masculine madness erupting as it did.

1:1 THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION: Enlightenment masculinity

In the autumn of 1789, the royal palace at Versailles was attacked and in the early hours of the morning about four months after the largely symbolic storming of the Bastille, a mob of men broke into the palace and Marie Antoinette's guards were massacred attempting to prevent the rabble from entering. The queen and her ladies-in-waiting only narrowly escaped with their lives before the crowd burst in and ransacked her chambers. The queen and her entourage fled to the king's bedchamber and, when their two children were hustled in, the doors were firmly locked.

A large crowd of men had gathered in the palace's courtyard demanding that the queen come to the balcony. She eventually appeared wearing only her nightgown. The children soon joined her but the mob insisted that they be sent back inside. The queen acquiesced and then, in her night attire, stood alone on the balcony while the male crowd ogled her. Slowly she bowed her head regally and the crowd fell silent. The only sound was the roar of the pitch torches. In that lascivious silence, Marie Antoinette returned inside. Later that night, the royal family was escorted by the mob back to Paris, but not before the men destroyed many of the treasures of Versailles.

Despite the Enlightenment's humanist plurality, men had waged an insurrection against the authority of not only the foppish and wasteful royalty, but ultimately against a woman who stood as a woman, not a wife, not a mother, but a sexualised object.

(Honeywill 2008, p. 17)

The Enlightenment project began in Europe in the late Renaissance, transfiguring ideas concerning God, nobility, ignorance and intolerance through the revolutionary lenses of reason, individuality and pluralism into an attitude of *daring to know*. It replaced outmoded mediaeval, irrational ways of thinking with the rational, the sensible and the progressive (*The Enlightenment* 2004, p. 2). In that sense it was self-consciously modern: a grand narrative about throwing off the shackles of superstition, intolerance, and abuse in both church and state. Immanuel Kant believed the Enlightenment was mankind's coming of age, the emancipation of the human consciousness from an immature state of ignorance and error (Porter 2001, p. 1).

Out of the Enlightenment came a cultural imaginary, a lineage of cultural values that would eventually inspire the radicalised civil, race and sexual rights movements of the twentieth century and flow on into the present. Out of the

Enlightenment also came a wave of punitive androcentrism that calcified into a pillar of the cultural imaginary. This revealed two faces of the Enlightenment – one, a humanist pluralism filled with optimism and hope for freedom, tolerance and democracy, and the other a continuation of hegemonic masculinity.

According to Colin Davis:

Michel Foucault drew on Kant (and subsequently Baudelaire) to characterize the Enlightenment as an attitude: ‘a mode of relation with regard to actuality; a voluntary choice made by some; and finally, a way of thinking and feeling, also a way of acting and behaving, which at the same time marks a belonging and is presented as a task.’ (2004, p. 47)

This conception of the Enlightenment and modernity allowed Foucault to situate his own work in the Enlightenment lineage (Davis 2004, p. 47). Historian Jonathan Israel maintains that by the 1730s it was the fervent expectation of all the radical thinking men of the age, including the three principal architects of the Radical Enlightenment – Baruch Spinoza, Pierre Bayle and Denis Diderot – that, however formidable the difficulties, the world could be revolutionized by philosophy and that, in the end, they would revolutionize it (Israel 2006, p. 42). And in a way they were right. It was from this nascent movement that contemporary values emerged, or at least modern potentialities – democracy, freedom of thought and expression, individual freedom, comprehensive tolerance, rule of law, and equality – all of which increasingly constituted the declared values of western modernity (2006, p. 42).

In addition to Spinoza, Bayle and Diderot, John Locke, David Hume and Isaac Newton were also fundamental to the Enlightenment’s evolution from established religion and the aristocracy to democracy, reason and evidence: from God as determinant of the shape of the world, literally and metaphorically, to a humanist imaginary. Progress was everywhere and was unstoppable.

By situating reason in the discourse of social progress however, the Enlightenment also set in train a dark wave, a dominative male prejudice against women that would continually supervene upon the enlightened. In the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, reason was a masculine domain; men accepted René Descartes’ invitation to accept reason as a universal instrument of society and to participate in that society with full agency (Descartes 1999, part 5, p. 40). Kant wrote:

Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his reason without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use your own reason. *Sapere aude!* Have courage to use your own reason - that is the motto of enlightenment. (Kant 1996, p. 1)

The emerging scientists, the popular writers, the intellectuals, the philosophers, were men, and as we will see, in reacting against superstition and irrationality on the one hand, and radical religion and royalty on the other, this new Enlightenment gave men an anti-authoritarian, anti-establishment platform on which to organise and build strength in numbers, accentuating the chasm that separated the socially determined genders, differentiating the roles of men and women. The Enlightenment produced an intellectual movement that actively critiqued the medieval tradition of eschewing reason in favour of faith, historicism and the traditional ways of behaving. However this re-evaluation of society was refracted through a determinedly masculine lens. Felski contends that modernity was fundamentally masculine, and that feminine values of intimacy and authenticity remain outside the dehumanising and alienating logic of modernity. She affirms that modernity is predicated on the elimination of Woman and sexual difference (1995, p. 17). While women were active and undergoing their own social and political evolution, their own progress, Woman was excluded from modernity.

Man in the cultural imaginary, and in this case men in the everyday, made the rules and the rules entrenched and enhanced the unearned privileges of masculinity. Referencing Kant, Michel Foucault summarized the Enlightenment as

the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority; now it is precisely at this moment that the critique is necessary, since its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped... Enlightenment is the age of the critique. (Foucault 1984, p. 38)

This, for Foucault, meant a mode of relating to contemporary reality, a voluntary choice made by certain people. The Enlightenment is, he contends, ‘a way of thinking and feeling, a way too of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an *ethos*’ (Foucault 1984, p. 39).

Despite leaving behind mediaeval superstitions, prejudices and an unreconstructed rationality, the Enlightenment, with all its promise for social inclusion and plurality, was the movement, the condition that perfected the language and politics of exclusion. Foucault’s voluntary ‘choice made by certain people: a way of thinking, a way of acting and behaving that marks a relation of belonging’ was the language of men, those who set the rules of the Enlightenment and who, in the socio-political sphere of the public, took the power roles: of government, of academia, of commerce, of the guilds, the lodges and societies.

The Enlightenment’s masculine *ethos* was accelerated in France and England in the second half of the eighteenth century when, prior to the emergence of science as a field of formal scholarship, Georges Cuvier, Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire in France, and Erasmus Darwin in England, personified the naturalist-philosophers transforming Europe. Lamarck, who predated Charles Darwin by fifty years in developing the first cohesive theory of evolution, captured the Enlightenment spirit of Rousseau and Voltaire in his description of the naturalist-philosopher as the antecedent of all scientists:

He is the man who, prepared initially by education, has contracted the useful habit of exercising the organ of his thought by devoting himself to the study of basic knowledge available. He observes and compares all that he sees and all that affects him. He forgets himself in order to examine all that he can perceive. He varies without limit the acts of his intellect. He has gradually become accustomed to judge everything on his own, instead of adopting a blind confidence in the authority of others. Finally, stimulated by reverses and especially by injustice, he reascends peacefully through reflection to the causes which bring into existence everything we observe, whether in nature or in human society. (Burkhardt 1995, p. 132)

While the Enlightenment spread rapidly through mainland Europe, England and America, France and the French Revolution epitomised its zeal. France at the time of

the Enlightenment had been shaped not so much by King Louis XV, who reigned for almost sixty years, but rather by his mistress Madame de Pompadour. It is a paradox of the Enlightenment that an aristocratic figure who was also a woman, two active targets of exclusion for the new wave of masculinity, shaped court life with her elegant refinement as she befriended great artists, literary figures and philosophers including Voltaire and Rousseau (Carlson 1998, p. 67). Under her influence, a new literature emerged during the last years of Louis XV, innovative ideas were discovered and discussed in the salons and debated in the streets. Science, music, literature, and art flourished. The Enlightenment was in ascendancy.

Following the death of Louis XV in 1774, Louis XVI and his queen Marie Antoinette, whom he had married when she was fourteen, ascended the throne at Versailles. They inherited a country in financial disarray with a nobility that was self-destructive, bored and detached. Deeply in denial about the severity of the economic crisis, the new king failed, as had his predecessor, to take decisive remedial action. Louis XVI was obsessed with living a royal life and he indulged his every fancy—his favourites being the Royal Menagerie at Versailles with its exotic animals from around the globe, and a Venetian Grand Canal complete with gondolas (Honeywill 2008, p. 15). While the king and a favoured few floated dreamily on the imitation Grand Canal between menagerie and palace, the enlightened middle class was organising itself into a powerful movement of dissent. Demand for intellectual freedom and a better future spread rapidly, and the traditional pillars of the clergy and the nobility came under siege.

Philosopher, novelist and composer Jean-Jacques Rousseau had a particularly profound influence on the thinking of the entire middle and professional class as they forged the intellectual pre-conditions of the French Revolution. Thirty-nine years before the storming of the Bastille, Rousseau wrote *Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences* (1750), imploring the French to beware of the increasing strictures of a civilisation that robs citizens of their personal freedom (Rousseau 1978, p. 53). He feared the flourishing industrialisation and new technologies that produced weapons and destructive machines. Identifying deep and growing inequality, Rousseau lamented that while the natural state of men is to be happy and innocent, social structure made them cruel and bloodthirsty (Rousseau 1984, p. 114). This was accurate, prescient and influential Enlightenment thinking.

According to Robert Hooker, when Rousseau produced *The Social Contract* (1762) he proposed a mutual indenture between the people and the government, in which ‘the governed agree to be ruled only so that their rights, property and happiness [will] be protected by their rulers’ (Hooker 2005). Rousseau’s influence on the increasingly anti-aristocratic population of France was profound. Over the next two decades the idea crystallized that should this new concept of a social contract ever be violated, ‘the governed are free to chose another set of governors or magistrates’ (Hooker 2005). This idea had international impact, in due course influencing the drafting of the *Declaration of Independence* (1775, the American Constitution) and the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* (1789, the French Constitution). The French Revolution was thus not a revolution of a downtrodden working class, but a bourgeois revolution: an enlightened revolution of the Enlightenment.

During the decades leading up to the Revolution, women had undoubtedly participated in the discussion and dissemination of new social objectives and Enlightenment principles. As we have seen, Madame de Pompadour impressively influenced the development of science, music, literature, and art. Debate was robust and a small number of women contributed. Some, like aspiring playwright Marie Gouze, who wrote under the *nom de plume* Olympe de Gouges, even wrote and published pamphlets calling for improved standing of women in society, and for girls to be educated (Cole 2011, p. 96). Male writers dominated, however, and they spoke against the significance of women – Rousseau, Charles Darwin, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, John Adams, among others.²

The great influence of these writers in general, and Rousseau in particular, crushed any real aspiration of women to achieve status beyond the bedroom, kitchen or nursery. In his book *Emile* (1762), Rousseau writes, ‘This collection of scattered thoughts and observations ... was begun to give pleasure to a good mother who thinks for herself’ (2009, p. 4). Thinking for herself, in Rousseau’s opinion, meant keeping to her predestined and naturally determined subservience: ‘Men’s clothes are made by women. The same hand cannot hold the needle and the sword. If I were king I would only allow needlework and dressmaking to be done by women and cripples’ (2009, p. 361). For Rousseau, women were akin to cripples, to inferior, lesser men: ‘all women are alike to a man who has no idea of virtue or beauty,’ (2009, p. 389). In *Emile* he

² Anti-women writers of the Enlightenment are further explored in Chapter 2:3, specifically in relation to biological determinism.

implored women to be what nature intended, to raise children and to be knowledgeable of bodily matters and ‘all that concerns the senses’ (Rousseau 2009, p. 676).

Under no circumstances should they engage in discussion or offer opinions beyond their status: ‘Authors who take the advice of blue-stockings will always be ill-advised’. On the matter of sexual politics, Rousseau judges women to be the lesser sex, as secondary participants in marriage and family, and declares this inequality to be a matter of natural law: ‘Women do wrong to complain of the inequality of man-made laws; this inequality is not of man’s making’ (2009, p. 716).

Rousseau recalls the writing of Plato: ‘Having got rid of the family there is no place for women in his system of government, so he is forced to turn them into men’ (2009, p. 720). For Rousseau, the patriarchal voice of Enlightenment, men were the beginning and end of society, from the highest order to the family home: ‘Can patriotism thrive except in the soil of that miniature fatherland, the home? Is it not the good son, the good husband, the good father, who makes the good citizen?’ (2009, p. 721). Responding to the call for the education of girls, Rousseau writes, ‘Well then, educate them like men. The more women are like men, the less influence they will have over men, and then men will be masters indeed’ (2009, p. 722).

In writing *Emile* Rousseau used his status as one of the architects of the Enlightenment and its eventual radicalization as the French Revolution to introduce and normalise the language of exclusion inspired by his commitment to the masculine ethos. This was a man whose writings shaped the American *Declaration of Independence*, who was widely followed in England and across the Continent, and who was regarded as one of the most influential social thinkers of his age, an influence that continued unabated throughout the second half of the eighteenth century ultimately setting the scene for the French Revolution. The brilliant darling of the enlightened, Rousseau helped invent modern society, and in doing so consigned women to the status of lesser beings, of non-men. Women’s place was in the home and male progeny were the only children to have any value to parents and society. In *Emile* Rousseau commanded good republican mothers to stay at home, and produce strong, virtuous, patriotic sons for the Republic – he did not see women actively involved in politics or playing an authoritative public role (Clark and Lafrance 1995, p. 134).

He did not however escape criticism. Jean-François Marmontel denied that virtuous women were rare and added that softening one sex by the other drew men

away from the class of beasts (Clark and Lafrance 1995, p. 129).³ JHS Formey considered indecent Rousseau's assertion that women were passive, weak and made to be subjugated (1995, p. 132), and British opposition came from influential writers that included Catherine Macaulay and Mary Wollstonecraft (1995, p. 135). Wollstonecraft, for example, excoriated Rousseau in *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792) for falsely devaluing the potential of Enlightenment women and for playing a leading role in excluding women from opportunity:

According to the tenour of reasoning, by which women are kept from the tree of knowledge, the important years of youth, the usefulness of age, and the rational hopes of futurity, are all to be sacrificed to render women an object of desire for a *short* time. Besides, how could Rousseau expect them to be virtuous and constant when reason is neither allowed to be the foundation of their virtue, nor truth the object of their enquiries? (Wollstonecraft 1996, p. 92)

Despite the impact of Rousseau's writing on the status of women, it was at least limited only to words. Masculine momentum in Enlightenment France was by 1789 about to erupt into a masculine madness that defined the French Revolution. While freeing France from the inane excesses of the aristocracy, the French Revolution ushered in the sort of oppression that emerges only when cultural zealots and intellectual ideologues ascend to power, with a new and more dangerous hegemony replacing the old. The storming of the Bastille heralded the arrival of a new cultural brutality, a vicious retribution that bore the ideological catchcry, *Liberty, Fraternity and Equality*. While the heads of aristocrats fell with the sickening swish of the guillotine blade, in revolutionary Paris even ordinary citizens came under suspicion. The age of deep ideology had arrived.

The new Republic's reign of terror, or more simply the *Terror*, had begun to strike, crushing dissent in the name of a newly enlightened social reality. And it soon became clear to women that only the *Fraternity* could participate in the *Liberty and Equality*. Two years after the Revolution, Olympe de Gouges published the *Declaration of the Rights of Woman* (1791), modelled on the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen*.

³ This reference to the beast in men is the belief that at one extreme of the male psyche resides a dangerous beast and at the other an angel. It is explored in Chapter 1:5.

Following the structure and language of the male declaration, she called on the National Assembly to recognise and respect all women:

Mothers, daughters, [and] sisters [as the] representatives of the nation, demand to be constituted into a national assembly. Considering that ignorance, omission, or scorn for the rights of the WOMAN⁴ are the only causes of public misfortunes and of the corruption of governments, they have resolved to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, inalienable, and sacred rights of the WOMAN, in order that this declaration, being constantly exposed before all the members of the society, may ceaselessly remind them of their rights and duties in order that the authoritative acts of women and the authoritative acts of men may be at each moment compared with and, be respectful of the purpose of all political institutions; and in order that the Woman-citizens' demands, henceforth based on simple and incontestable principles, may always support the constitution, good mores, and the happiness of all. (Gouges 1979, pp. 92-96)

However, thanks to a newly organized and enthused patriarchy inspired by the intellectual and political influence of the ethos of the patriarchy, including Rousseau, women were unable to gain any political rights during the French Revolution. The National Assembly refused to consider legislation granting political rights to women, and neither could they vote or hold office (Scott 1996, pp. 34-35).

When the politics of indifference and the patriarchy intersected with the evil of masculine madness, newly enlivened during the Terror, the bloodbath saw 16,594 executed by guillotine alone, with another 25,000 killed in summary executions across France (Greer 1935, p. 115). Despite widespread optimism that the Enlightenment transcended the particular (blood, race, creed, religion – and gender), the oppressive madness of the French Revolution shocked Enlightenment thinkers in other western countries into recognising that socio-political ideology, even in a seemingly balanced, more tolerant Enlightenment, could quickly and dramatically spiral into oppressive violence and intolerance. The consequence was plain: the eruptions of masculine madness witnessed during the French Revolution in the name of an ideology, and the exclusion of women across Western society, threatened core Enlightenment values.

⁴ Her emphasis.

Throughout the Enlightenment, the ethos of masculinity had institutionalised and produced a systemic discrimination against women. Women were, before the Enlightenment, considered lesser beings, but the prejudice and discrimination had never been so organised, so institutionalised, so systematised. The male ethos in the Enlightenment was a way of thinking, a set of ideals, a contagion of discrimination that co-opted the Enlightenment to spread it across countries and continents. In eighteenth-century Britain for example, Mary Wollstonecraft expressed dismay at the manner in which women were conditioned by men to be weak and pathetic creatures, ‘the feathered race’, like birds confined to cages who have nothing to do but plume themselves and ‘stalk with mock majesty from perch to perch’ (Wollstonecraft 1996, p. 56).

In America, on the eve of the French Revolution, the thirty-year resistance to restrictive British rule, which evolved into the War of Independence (1775-1783), came to a successful close – successful, that is, for the nascent nation. American women were, however, as socially, economically politically and sexually oppressed as their French counterparts. Indeed, women in America during the Enlightenment were presumed to be members of an inferior, dependent class. The ideology that excluded women in France infected revolutionary politics in America. In 1789, the year of the French Revolution, the Masonic Grand Master of New York, a striking symbol of hegemonic patriarchy, administered the oath of office to the first president, George Washington, using a bible from St John’s Masonic Lodge in New York City. It was no oversight that the Revolutionary generation of American men classified women as outside the body politic and outside useful society, along with children, slaves and servants (Gunderson 1987, p. 59). Abigail Adams, wife of the second president, John Adams, and mother of the sixth, was an active agitator for the rights of women in the embryonic nation. In March 1776, the year of the American Declaration of Independence, Adams wrote to her husband John Adams:

I long to hear that you have declared an independency. And by the way in the new Code of Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make I desire you would Remember the Ladies, and be more generous and favorable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited power into the hands of the Husbands. Remember all Men would be tyrants if they could. If particular care and attention is not paid to the Ladies we are

determined to foment a Rebellion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any Laws in which we have no voice, or Representation. That your sex are naturally tyrannical is a truth so thoroughly established as to admit of no dispute ... why, then, not put it out of the power of the vicious and the lawless to use us with cruelty and indignity with impunity? Men of sense in all ages abhor those customs which treat us only as the vassals of your sex. (Rossi 1973, pp. 10-11)

Adopting the masculine language of exclusion and resisting his wife's pleadings, Adams wrote in May 1776 to James Sullivan, a state court judge sympathetic to those who would challenge the subordination of women:

Depend upon it, sir, it is dangerous to open So fruitfull a Source of Controversy and Altercation, as would be opened by attempting to alter the Qualifications of Voters. There will be no End of it. New Claims will arise. Women will demand a Vote. Lads from 12 to 21 will think their Rights not enough attended to, and every Man, who has not a Farthing, will demand an equal Voice with any other in all Acts of State. It tends to confound and destroy all Distinctions, and prostrate all Ranks, to one common Level. (Kerber 1997, p. 287)

In the 1790s Adams, as President, became deeply concerned about the French Revolution. Initially popular with Americans, the brutal nature of the Revolution and French incursions against other European countries led to discussion of war with France. War was averted; American women, however, were to remain disadvantaged and treated by powerful men as a lesser caste. The right of women to stand for office and vote was not mandated in the United States for another hundred years.

It is disconcerting to observe that even today many contemporary scholars continue to ignore women in the Enlightenment era of the American Revolution. Historian Joan Gunderson observes for example that, except for Linda Kerber, most scholarship on political ideology during the American Revolution excluded discussion of gender:

Bernard Bailyn (1967) discussed the rejection of virtual representation without once mentioning how women might be accommodated by the

new theory of representation. Likewise, Paul Conkin (1974) developed a chapter to popular sovereignty without seeing any need to explain the exclusion of women. Gordon Wood (1969) covers the topic in one sentence in his more than 600-page study. (Gunderson 1987, p. 59)

Kerber devoted the first chapter of her book to a discussion on how Enlightenment thinkers who influenced American Revolutionaries excluded consideration of women as part of a political community (1987, p. 59). Women were seen in Revolutionary America as chattels, useful at best to staff the kitchens and hospitals of the armies under the direction of men engaged in destroying one another (1987, p. 60).

In England powerful men were similarly infected by a sense of patriarchal privilege. Charles Darwin, writing in the mid-1800s, borrowed much from Rousseau's disciple Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck, the French evolutionist. Lamarck had managed to survive the Terror of the French Revolution, despite being a minor nobleman and therefore a prime candidate for the guillotine, and published in 1809 a treatise on evolution that deeply influenced Darwin (Honeywill 2008, p. 6).

Charles Darwin went on to become arguably the most influential philosopher of science ever. Where Rousseau influenced a century, Darwin influenced a millennium. Like Rousseau, Darwin's writing was instrumental in the social thinking of his time, and like Rousseau he declared women inferior to men:

The chief distinction in the intellectual powers of the two sexes is shewn by man attaining to a higher eminence, in whatever he takes up, than woman can attain—whether requiring deep thought, reason, or imagination, or merely the use of the senses and hands. If two lists were made of the most eminent men and women in poetry, painting, sculpture, music, — comprising composition and performance, history, science, and philosophy, with half-a-dozen names under each subject, the two lists would not bear comparison. We may also infer, from the law of the deviation of averages, so well illustrated by Mr. Galton, in his work on 'Hereditary Genius,' that if men are capable of decided eminence over women in many subjects, the average standard of mental power in man must be above that of woman. With social animals ... they have, in the case of man, to defend their females, as well as their young, from enemies of all kinds, and to hunt for their joint subsistence. But to avoid enemies, or to attack them with success,

to capture wild animals, and to invent and fashion weapons, requires the aid of the higher mental faculties, namely, observation, reason, invention, or imagination. These various faculties will thus have been continually put to the test, and selected during manhood; they will, moreover, have been strengthened by use during this same period of life. Consequently, in accordance with the principle often alluded to, we might expect that they would at least tend to be transmitted chiefly to the male offspring at the corresponding period of manhood (Darwin 2004, pp. 629-630).

Men were, according to Darwin, altogether superior to women, more powerful, bolder, more imaginative, braver, more intelligent, and more creative (Darwin 2004, pp. 344, 624). That women were considered lesser beings – domestic functionaries, sexual companions to men – while unacceptable, is unsurprising given the unequal balance of power. What is surprising is the vehemence with which they were excluded by the great and influential progressive thinkers of the epoch: John Adams in America, Charles Darwin in England, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in France. Even more devastating was the active and violent oppression they suffered. When viewed through the prism of androcentrism, the Enlightenment, the birthplace of Western culture, is seen as the conduit for deep, oppressive and violent masculinity. Rape, physical violence and murder became common political tools in the oppression of women – the masculine ethos excluded and masculine madness brutalised women.

The Enlightenment encouraged western society to aspire to a new equality, but it was patently not available to women. While not solely responsible for preventing women from being truly agentic,⁵ enjoying fully autonomous agency, participating in the formation and administration of Western culture of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, androcentrism was what Foucault calls a heterotopia (1967): the dark ‘other space’ of the Enlightenment. According to Foucault, heterotopias are simultaneously both a mythic and a real contestation of the space in which we live (1967, p. 4). They are distinguished by a breach of traditional time, juxtaposition of incompatible places, and mode of (apparent) inclusion that conceals exclusions (Kohn 2002, p. 2). Concealed in utopian Enlightenment, with its egalitarian ideals that appeared to include women, was the greatest incompatibility in social history – the social exclusion of Woman. This was mythic and real contestation of the space in which gender

⁵ Agentic: having or exhibiting full agency – social cognition theory perspective in which people are producers as well as products of social systems.

situates, the heterotopian terrain where ideals of equality were in contestation with the dominant masculinity, concealing the exclusion of women and the social death of Woman.⁶ Woman in the Enlightenment was configured by Man as a negative space, non-Man, not fully human, delivering women without agency, feathered and decorative breeding stock, included biologically but excluded socially, economically and politically.⁷ We saw from the exchange between Abigail and John Adams that, in the personal sphere, women were to be feared for their disruptive influence and opinions. This fear fuelled the public politics of exclusion and contributed to the narrow space women were afforded in Enlightenment societies.

As the Enlightenment or Age of Reason evolved, the masculine politics of indifference, the language of exclusion, all part of the masculine ethos, matured into a seemingly unstoppable force, and while part of a long lineage, had never before been so filled with hubris and the potential for ruin on a massive scale. Technology and industry made the Western world a smaller place, a modern place, but the organisation and empowerment of men in the name of reason and rationality made eruptions of masculine madness not only a domestic or local issue, but now a national and international problem.

Unquestionably, many of the Enlightenment's social foundations – tolerance, diversity, and empiricism – today remain worthwhile humanist goals. However, Foucault's Enlightenment lineage continues into the liquid present and will do so as long as humanists value education to realise their cognitive potential, as well as freedom of speech, equality, secularism and the creative arts that allow an expression and understanding of the human condition (McQueen and McQueen 2010, p. 96).

However, the dominative masculine ethos of hegemonic patriarchy that also underpinned the Enlightenment swept like a wave through modernity, postmodernity and into the vast sea of the present. The Enlightenment paradox is its humanist optimism: the friendly face of reason, inclusion and equality. The truth has an altogether different mien: the ugly face of inequality, discrimination and exclusion, poisoned at the disruptive well of masculine malice towards women, two faces on one

⁶ The *social death* of Woman alludes to my theory detailed in Chapter 1:4 that the social death of Woman was a genocide.

⁷ This, of course, reminds one of Aristotle's views on women. While it is acknowledged that the Ancient Greek philosophers were a major influence on many Enlightenment thinkers, space does not permit the inclusion of a discussion of such philosophers.

head, one smiling and friendly, the other hating and murderous – implicit inclusion concealing explicit exclusion.

1:2 GOD DOES NOT PLAY DICE WITH THE WORLD: modernity, a masculine enterprise

Modernity is a unique if not absolutist epoch in that it differs from other kinds of periodization by possessing a normative as well as a descriptive dimension – one can be *for* or *against* modernity in a way that one could never be for or against, for example, the Renaissance (Felski 1995, p. 16). The modernisation phase of the modern epoch was distinguished by an activist, engineering, machine-age attitude toward nature and toward itself. This was the age of invention: in science, in industry, in nature and even, in an ontological sense, in being human. For Foucault the ‘modern man’ did not attempt to discover himself, but rather attempted constantly to invent himself (Parrott 2008, p. 68).

In shaping a new world for itself, modernity arose with the Enlightenment, looking not to a certain past but a contingent future. With the enlightened move from superstition to inventive science, and in direct response to a social adhesion to taxonomic precision that placed every human specimen in its proper place, came a new romantic modernist consciousness characterised by the idealised Middle Ages. However, as Jürgen Habermas says, emphasising the reflexive paradox of modernity, out of this new ideal age established early in the nineteenth century emerged a radicalised consciousness of modernity that freed itself from historical ties (1981, p. 4). This version of the modern condition, ‘simply makes an abstract opposition between tradition and the present; and we are, in a way, still the contemporaries of that kind of aesthetic modernity...[but] that which is modern preserves a secret tie to the classical’ (1981, p. 4). Modernity in the nature of great epochs evoked a sense of the heroic – a heroic kinship with the present and a relationship to an optimistic, better, even more heroic future. According to Habermas, once a new epoch takes hold, the past is seen as something less, something to be purged. Historical memory is replaced by the heroic affinity of the present with the extremes of history – a sense of time in which, ‘decadence immediately recognizes itself in the barbaric, the wild and the primitive. Modernity revolts against the normalizing function of tradition, it thrives on the experience of rebellion against all that is normative.’ (1981, p. 5)

Was modernity not simply a new tradition? Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that what determines the romantic understanding of tradition is its abstract opposition to

the principle of enlightenment (Gadamer 2013, p. 293). Romanticism, he argues, conceives of tradition as an antithesis to the freedom of reason and regards it as something historically given, like nature. And whether one wants to be revolutionary and oppose it or preserve it, tradition is still viewed as the abstract opposite of free self-determination. 'However problematical the conscious restoration of old or the creation of new traditions may be, the romantic faith in the "growth of tradition," before which all reason must remain silent, is fundamentally like the Enlightenment, and just as prejudiced. The fact is that in tradition there is always an element of freedom and of history itself. It needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated' (2013, p. 293). That is why, he says, both the Enlightenment's critique of tradition and the Romantic rehabilitation of it lag behind their true historical being (2013, p. 293).

The emerging new tradition of industrialised modernity, in full rehabilitative normativity, was heroic to the great thinkers of the time. Charles Darwin marvelled at the transformation of London, despite the polluted air from burgeoning industry (Honeywill 2008, p. 61). To a man of science the changes were breathtaking, providing a sense of optimism and excitement at the velocity of progress. Newly installed gaslights lit the streets at night and transformed social mobility: the middle class at last felt safe to walk down illuminated carriageways. Darwin imagined the coal-fires roaring under the retorts at the London Gas Light and Coke Company and the hundreds of miles of pipe that transported the gas to each street lamp. As a geologist, he was fascinated by plans to excavate tunnels under London enabling steam-trains to pull carriages from one part of the city to another without disrupting pedestrian and carriage traffic on the streets above, unimaginable in a previous time (2008, p. 61).

In contrast to the grand sweep of change experienced by Darwin in the mid-nineteenth century, the early twentieth century produced an unexpected response to inventiveness, an unusual yet central plank of modernity: a fascination with the small. The focus and emphasis on the large importance of the small conditioned and defined the signifiers of modernity, with emphasis shifting from the general to precise and exact words, and to the concrete image: terms frequently used by modernists themselves. Popular culture and the everyday language were signposted by the familiarity of strange words like the *particle* of science, the *data* of social science, and the *microcosmic* and *introspective* world of the arts. Consequently, in the twentieth century the shift from the big to the small, from the general to the particular, made much of

nineteenth-century thought, philosophy, science, and social science totally meaningless (Cantor 1988, p. 36). What was not made meaningless was modernity's industrialisation, the bureaucratisation and modernisation of western society, with social practices that accompanied industrial transformation, urbanisation and cultural and political systemisation. God-like plutocrats, including Andrew Carnegie, Cornelius Vanderbilt, JP Morgan, Henry Frick, John D Rockefeller and Henry Ford joined the masculine deities of science and autocratic bureaucrats in creating, engineering, and manufacturing, inventing a potentially better world. Modernisation was, however, more than the everyday processes of mass production, mass consumption, mass media, and the persistent belief in the superior value of the bigger picture. Attention shifted from a redundant history and an industrial present to a qualitatively superior future, balanced precariously on the shoulders of invention.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, inventiveness in science, technology, economics and industry had a metaphysical purpose as well as a practical ambition. Zygmunt Bauman suggests that science in modernity was not to be conducted for its own sake; it was seen primarily as an instrument of awesome power allowing its holder to improve on reality, to re-shape it according to human plans and designs, and to assist it in the drive to self-perfection (1991, p. 70). Scientists and industrialists became like gods, engineering social conditions and practices, each with a larger sense of themselves and their power. Their newly minted authority structured acquiescence, obedience and devotion into a secular arrangement that made less significant the religious hegemony that pre-dated it; and that authority was masculine.

Woman was therefore no more present in the twentieth century than in the eighteenth century and while women were participating, hegemonic masculinity continued to prevent them from influencing the construction and administration of society. Men controlled the means, the economic value and the usefulness of production. In the machine age the value of production, or what economists call utility, was a critical factor. Utility, the measure of something's usefulness, became dominant in the social practices that surrounded the rise of science, industrialisation and the bureaucracy of modernisation, and utility itself was a decidedly masculine modality. When discussing social life we start with the assumption that it is made up of *practices*, that is habitualised ways relating to and reflecting particular times and places in which people utilise resources – physical, financial, creative, political, human – to act together in the world (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, p. 21). The practices that

surrounded modernity transformed from those in and around feudalism and serfdom, agrarian hand-to-mouth production and rudimentary commerce, to the organised social practices created by secondary production, industrial innovation and scientific invention. All channelled to re-shape utility and improve on reality, to create a heightened utility. So as modernity and modernisation evolved, the practices of industrialisation and the assembly line transformed to construct a society beyond utility, beyond the means and outputs of production, and into the social. Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough propose that practices have three main characteristics. First they are forms of production of social life, not only economic production, but also production in the cultural and political domains. Second, each practice is located within a network of relationships to other practices, and these external relationships determine its internal dimension. Third, practices always have a reflexive dimension: people generate representations of what they do as part of what they do (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, p. 22). All three were in stark relief during the modernisation of the Western world. Science, innovation, education, the arts, politics, urbanisation, the media: all flourished, transposing not only economic, but also human and cultural capital onto a higher plane, a more abstract, tertiary plane, as we shall see.

While a tyranny of reason defined the spirit of the age and in doing so created a new Western cultural imaginary, the development of a market economy, secularism, and the creation of autonomous spheres of science were all complemented by creative arts and a new sense of civilisation devoted to the drive to self-perfection. As creativity, innovation, authenticity, education and networks of relationships elevated utility to a higher, tertiary plane, women's participation accelerated the inventive momentum of social progress. Felski believes that a growing body of scholarship is critical of the view that the essentially masculine nature of modernity effectively writes women out of history by ignoring their active and varied participation in different aspects of their social environment (1995, p. 18). Each side of the debate is complex, however it is prudent to signpost the contradictions here. Felski notes that works from writers including Elizabeth Wilson, Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Rachel Bowlby, Nancy Armstrong, Andreas Huyssen, and Patrice Petro encourage recognition of the complexities and contradictions of and between both categories:

What these [writers] share is a self-conscious recognition of the complex intersections between [W]oman and modernity, of the mutual imbrication as well as points of contradiction between these two categories. Rather than espousing either a progress narrative which assumes that modernization brought with it an unambiguous improvement in women's lives or else a counter-myth of nostalgia for an edenic, nonalienated, golden past, their writings offer a sustained engagement with the shifting complexities of the modern in relation to gender politics. (Felski 1995, p. 18)

Luce Irigaray is, however, not so equivocal. She believes Enlightenment values were not applied to women, who consequently were excluded from the masculine enterprise of modernity (Whitford 1991, p. 16). She is equally clear that the devotion to reason that underpinned the Enlightenment and modernity put humanity at risk by underestimating the non-rational elements in the human mind and its will to power, to control, manipulate and destroy in the name of reason (1991, pp. 16-17). She interprets as peculiarly male this paradox: that obedience to reason makes one blind to its risk, to its danger, to its potential treachery (1991, p. 17). Simone de Beauvoir highlights the paradox, writing that in no other epoch had men manifested their grandeur more brilliantly, but, 'the more widespread their mastery of the world, the more they find themselves crushed by uncontrollable forces. Though they are the masters of the atomic bomb, yet it is created to destroy them' (Beauvoir 1948, pp. 8-9). Ignorance of the risk inherent in blind obedience to the enshrined reason and rationality of modernity encouraged men to adopt destructive behaviour so dangerous that as modernity evolved, freeing Western culture from the past, a dominant, conscious, interconnected, masculine madness became its leitmotif. Modernity was inaugurated by men, delivered by men and ultimately destroyed by men.

Scientific reason and modern rationality found itself reaching a speed, an uncontrollable speed that promised, threatened, to run out of control, to crush the very men who created it, in a wave of annihilative narcissism. Everything was a race: the first to explode the atomic bomb would win, but in doing so would poison not only its inventors, but also civilization with a fear never before experienced. The winners became the losers and the wins were recognised as unaffordable good fortune. In modernity men ignorant of the risk established, through science, politics, economics

and social practices, the genocidal conditions for the dispossession and exclusion, the social death, of Woman: a dystopian and annihilative condition of Eden without Eve. The modern paradox is that without Eve, without Woman, there is no mother womb, no nature, and if there is no mother womb, no nature, there can be no Man. Dominant masculinity had set itself on a drive to self-perfection but its own annihilative velocity threatened to destroy humanity.

Masculine madness made men gamble the lives of friend and foe alike. As Albert Einstein famously said, ‘God does not play dice with the world’ (Clark 1971, p. 19) – but Man does. Modern men in the twentieth century were creating a quantum paradox in which they were simultaneously alive and dead: alive in an era of scientific achievement so transcendent it touched the sun of self-perfection, but at the same time dead as they invented devices and ideologies capable of annihilating civilization.

The famous *Schrödinger’s Cat* thought experiment exemplifies this contradiction. In 1935 Erwin Schrödinger imagined a box that contains a radioactive source, a Geiger counter, a glass bottle containing cyanide, and a live cat. The Geiger counter is switched on for just long enough that there is a fifty-fifty chance that one of the atoms in the radioactive material will decay and that the detector will record a particle. If the detector does record such an event, then the glass container is crushed and the cat dies; if not, the cat lives. Put simply, the observer cannot see the cat in the box, so until he lifts the lid, the cat is neither dead nor alive; in effect the cat is simultaneously both dead and alive. Schrödinger’s thought experiment was designed to show the absurdity of quantum theory’s implications.

The strangeness of the quantum world means the atomic decay has neither happened nor not happened, the cat has neither been killed nor not killed. The cat is both dead and alive, existing in some indeterminate state, until an observer looks inside the box. This is a recurring metaphor in this thesis, emblematic of the annihilative potential of masculine madness. The sub-atomic quantum science of modernity reflects a view that civilization was simultaneously annihilated and thriving, at once self-perfecting and self-destroying, utopian and dystopian. Thus modernity’s theories, no matter how heroic their pursuit of a perfect future had a counter reality. This was the masculine condition of modernity.

The threat and promise of heroic men in their revolt against history, against the normalising function of former traditions across different societies, also formed into coherent trajectories that travelled from the theory of modernity beyond science

to more predictable but no less perilous economic, political and social conditions (Inglehart 1997, p. 65). Economic, cultural and political changes go together in coherent patterns that change the world in practical and predictable ways. This is the central plank of modernisation theory proposed in different forms by both Karl Marx and Max Weber (1997, p. 65). This is the masculine practicality and predictability, the imposed order that augurs dystopia. On its path to dystopia, modernisation doubtless increased the economic and political capabilities of Western society. The theory is that economic capacity and capabilities are increased through industrialisation, and political capabilities are increased through bureaucratisation. Industrialisation, according to Marx, provides the economic life force of modernity by applying capital to concentrate, organise and train a workforce in the mass production of goods for consumption (1997, p. 5).

Socioeconomic theory of modernity divides into two main threads. The Marxist thread argues that economics, politics and culture are closely linked because economic development determines the political and cultural characteristics of a society. The Weberian version argues that culture is the dominant force that shapes economic and political life. Both agree that socioeconomic change follows coherent and relatively predictable patterns (Inglehart 1997, p. 68). While Marxist theory endeavours to advance economic reality and in doing so reinvent society from the bottom up, the Baumanian view that industrialisation, like science, went beyond economics and the utilitarian nature of modernisation to become a tertiary instrument of awesome power allowing its holder to improve on reality, to re-shape it according to human plans and designs, and to assist it in the drive to self-perfection – in short to practice social engineering. Germany for example perfected in the 1930s the power of economic and social precision that set the ideal pre-conditions for social engineering. Instead of hope and optimism, the awesome power of Bauman's *instrument* ultimately had an altogether more sinister design, and the dreadful shape that dystopian masculine madness took was that of the Holocaust.

Modernisation brought about urbanisation, industrialisation, vocational specialisation, mass production and the systematised assembly line, mass education, mass media, mass consumption, bureaucratisation, and the emergence of the modern state. With the newly created nation states came an endemic xenophobia. In a self-perfecting, self-destroying paradox of simultaneous utopia and dystopia, these characteristics of modernisation were all suicidal tools, essential preconditions for the

death of modernity. The Holocaust could never have happened without every one of them being in its right place in taxonomic modernity – yet modernity could never survive the masculine madness of the Holocaust.

The modernisation of Western culture was defined by the emergence of plutocrats like Ford and despotic bureaucrats like Adolf Eichmann, the industrial assembly line mentality that preconfigured the Holocaust, the complicity of great thinkers of the time, the acquiescence of ordinary people unable to question authority, the drive for self- and racial-perfection, the xenophobic immanence of the nation state, and the new devotion to a deific science. Foucault's heterotopia, the 'dark other space', was taking on a decidedly modernised shape.

1:3 TYRANT OR HANGMAN: the evil of ordinary men

Enlightened modernity represented as we have seen the gradual liberation of the individual from the bonds of mediaeval tradition. It was not, however, equally liberating for men and women: it was the epoch of institutionalised, bureaucratised androcentrism. Additionally, masculine madness continued in modernity as ordinary, everyday men showed themselves capable of terrible acts against women, other men and humanity.

Its potential for cataclysmic harm required modernity to be masculine, constructed and run by men, unmediated by the intuition, imagination and sensitivity of women. To emphasise the point made in the previous chapter, that modernity excluded Woman, Anne Witz and Barbara Marshall (2004) argue that women, cast as unable to fully transcend the bonds of tradition, and therefore incapable of becoming fully agentic, could not take their place in the landscape of modernity. They argue that within modernity, and the newly systematised institution of patriarchy, Woman could not participate in the masculine enterprise. Referencing both Durkheim and Simmel, gender differentiation was, Witz and Marshall contend, explicitly identified as integral to modernity. For Durkheim, it is a 'morphological' difference – a categorical difference in classification – that marks the inequality of men and women. For Simmel, it is a metaphysical difference that grounds modernity as explicitly masculine. For both, 'if the experience of modernity was encapsulated, for men, by their self-consciousness of differentiation and change, then women, quite simply, could not experience this' (Witz and Marshall 2004, pp. 19-20).

As we saw in the previous chapter, Felski asks us to consider that both men and women participated, played visible roles, in the epoch of modernity and its applied sibling, modernism. She asks how our understanding of modernity would change if instead of taking male experience as paradigmatic, we were to look at texts written primarily by or about women (Felski 1995, p. 10). Additionally she asks, what if feminine phenomena, often seen as having a secondary or marginal status, worthy but worthless, were given a central importance in the analysis of the culture of modernity? This rhetorical musing, while definitionally hypothetical, does bring into question the nature of the social not only in modernity but also in the present Western cultural imaginary. The emblematic modern heroes in the texts of Faust, Marx and

Baudelaire after new interrogation, are, she says, ‘symbols not just of modernity but also of masculinity, contributing in their gender bias to an Oedipal revolt (in which Woman is a figure drenched with authority) against the tyranny of [male] authority, a tradition that, in drawing on metaphors of contestation and struggle grounded in an ideal of competitive, idealised masculinity’ (Felski 1995, p. 2). Were there not women writers, architects, psychologists and academics? And were they not present in the texts of modernity? Witz and Marshall believe that while they may have been present, we have misrecognised and failed to interrogate, in the canon, the utter and explicit masculinity of modernity, and the legacy of this with which we continue to struggle as theorists (Witz and Marshall 2004, pp. 19-20). Women were *in* modernity but Woman was not *of* modernity.

Masculinity imprinted on modernity and on the Western cultural imaginary a competitive, aggressive brutalism that was insuppressibly dominative and oppressive. Modernity is, in the most pessimistic analysis, characterised by what Felski calls ‘the progressive domination of a fundamentally phallogentric reason, with catastrophic consequences’ (Felski 1989, p. 48). The radical consequences were the Holocaust, the social death of Woman, and ultimately the violent death of modernity itself.

The relation between masculinity and rationality is frequently stated as a given, particularly in feminist discourses. Anne Ross-Smith and Martin Kornberger go much further by arguing that the concept of rationality elaborated in Western society from Descartes to Kant and Weber is, at its core, masculine (Ross-Smith and Kornberger 2004, pp. 283-284). Weber’s notion of rationality can be read as a commentary on the construction of a particular kind of masculinity based on the exclusion of the personal, the sexual and the feminine from any definition of rationality (2004, pp. 283-284). ‘The embeddedness of the relationship between the concepts rationality and masculinity,’ contend Ross-Smith and Kornberger, ‘were seen to extend, historically, back to classical Greek philosophy and, subsequently, to influence deeply the discourse of modernity and the ideals of Enlightenment thinking. The link between these two concepts was also found to be resilient, durable and capable of reinventing itself such that it still dominates organizational discourse’ (2004, pp. 283-284). Carol Gould believes that much activity that can be described as distinctly human (or rational), in the Kantian sense, has been reserved for men (1976, pp. 5-44).

The masculine epoch inherited as ahistorical hero the masculine character of dominance and oppression free of consideration of consequence, freed by the

absolution, the blessing, of a shared ethos of exclusion, free to oppress and destroy in the name of a masculine social and self-perfection, casting man in that heroic role of the warrior who will rise to the occasion, and camouflaging the imminent danger of masculine madness erupting on a global scale. Even in the most fundamental Hobbesian view, the natural state of man is one of war and strife. According to Hobbes, men's natural competitiveness drives an instinct to conquer and rule in a manner devoid of consideration for others (Hobbes 1985, p. 215).

Simone de Beauvoir had an ideal vantage point from which to view the same subject. Writing *The Ethics of Ambiguity* only three years after the end of both the Second World War and modernity, she observed:

The man we call an adventurer ... is one who remains indifferent to the content, that is, to the human meaning of his action, who thinks he can assert his own existence without taking into account that of others. The fate of Italy mattered very little to the Italian condottiere; the massacres of the Indians meant nothing to Pizarro; Don Juan was unaffected by Elvira's tears. Thus nothing prevents him from sacrificing these insignificant beings to his own will for power. He will treat them like instruments; he will destroy them if they get in his way. He cannot win the game without making himself a tyrant or a hangman. And as he cannot impose this tyranny without help, he is obliged to serve the regime which allows him to exercise it. (Beauvoir 1948, p. 61)

Beauvoir is not without her own ambiguities. In her many philosophical writings she uses the term man sometimes to imply 'humanity' and at other times to mean 'men'. Re-examination of her texts, according to Sheila Malovany-Chevallier, co-translator of the new (2009) edition of Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*, reveals much more emphasis on gender than previously accepted by Beauvoir scholars.⁸ In the extract above from *The Ethics of Ambiguity* she is unambiguous in her meaning: she is indeed referring to men. Her reference to men's inability to impose the masculine tyranny without help, without the regime that allows them to exercise that tyranny, is directly relevant to both the Second World War that ended modernity, and the French Revolution that witnessed its first tentative steps. Beauvoir's allusion to a 'tyrant or a hangman' evokes

⁸ Primary research, June 2012 – personal conversation with Malovany-Chevallier at the 20th International Simone de Beauvoir Conference in Oslo, Norway.

the terror both of the gas chambers of the Holocaust and of the bloodthirsty French Revolution.

The madness of men erupted into World War I, striking a deep wound in modernity's side. It saw rationality and tyrannical reason exercise a newly organised and systematised bureaucracy of carnality. Far from being 'the war to end all wars' however, it was just the precursor to humanity's greatest eruption of masculine madness. By the 1930s, industrialisation had accelerated to such an extent that a world war was winnable only by the most industrialised nation state. War was no longer men against men, but one man's machine against another man's machine. The Second World War was a machine war, an industrialist's war – and, above all, a bureaucrat's war. The Jewish genocide was a masculine atrocity whose time had arrived. It was an atrocity made possible only by personal detachment, vast systematisation, an industrial production-line mentality and a bureaucratic authority over individual agency. It was possible only in the epoch of modernity (Honeywill 2012, p. 113).

The Holocaust was not, however, a direct consequence of the cruel, retributive brutality previously witnessed in the French Revolution. Modernity's heterotopia, its dark *other* space, stimulated masculine madness, making murderers of ordinary men: not soldiers, not monsters, just everyday men. Over its cohesive trajectory towards authoritarian masculinity, modernity produced a new human paradox: on one hand a new individuality filled with opportunity and, on the other, a loss of agency. Beauvoir believed that modern men *qua* men in modernity felt this paradox acutely. 'They know themselves to be the supreme end to which all action should be subordinated,' she said, 'but the exigencies of action force them to treat one another as instruments or obstacles, as means' (1948, p. 9).

Men in the first half of the twentieth century exhibited in extreme circumstances the two sides of Man. Docile farmers going to war had always behaved like murderers when forced to confront an enemy. In modernity, however, the machine age transformed this into a meta-condition that dramatically amplified the scale of destruction, and men confronted by the exigencies of action treated enemies as instruments, as machines to be dismantled, as non-humans. The instrument symbology of machine-age detachment became emblematic of another kind of inhumanity. That modernity's rupture of war was so devastating, on a scale never before witnessed, was due to a number of decidedly modern factors. Military leaders in World War I had learned valuable lessons on the correlation between distance and

brutality: orders that would have devastating human consequences were far easier to issue from a building thousands of miles away than when standing in the trenches.

The combination in late modernity of the heterotopia, the technical perfection of machine warriors, automaton against automaton, detached masters controlling the world only to find themselves crushed by uncontrollable forces, all pointed to a new kind of inhumanity. In the machine age of bureaucratic and technical perfection, ordinary men were capable of inhuman acts on the scale of mass murder. Adolf Eichmann, for example, one of the principal organisers of the Holocaust, was, after many years living in Argentina, arrested and tried in Israel in 1961. He was charged with fifteen criminal offences, including crimes against humanity. Throughout his trial Eichmann insisted he was a small cog in the Nazi machine and was just an ordinary man doing what was expected of him. Indeed Hannah Arendt, in *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1994), reports that psychiatrists certified Eichmann as normal, that Eichmann had Jewish relatives he helped, and that he viewed himself as a law-abiding citizen. He had never killed anyone and personally had nothing against Jews (Arendt 1994, pp. 22, 25-26). Nevertheless, he was found guilty by the three presiding judges and sentenced to death.

Stanley Milgram says inhumanity is a matter of social relationships. As social relationships are rationalized and technically perfected, so is the capacity and efficiency of the social production of inhumanity (Bauman 1991, p. 154). Milgram, an American psychologist from Yale University, famously conducted social psychology experiments in the 1960s which measured the willingness of 40 men to obey a detached authority figure, a man who told them to apply a non-lethal electrical shock to an innocent recipient they could not see. The voltage was increased over time in response to different reactions, and by the end of the experiments 65 per cent of participants administered the final, fatal massive 450-volt shock. Unknowingly the participants were administering no shock at all: an actor playing the shocked recipient would scream and bang the wall to simulate appropriate injury. What the experiment showed was that, given an appropriate situation, ordinary men will act in unimaginably cruel and destructive ways in direct contravention of their own moral or ethical framework.⁹ The participating men were not students or academics – Milgram

⁹ In later experiments Milgram also used women. While women showed higher levels of stress, in the situation they behaved like women qua men. Beauvoir is excellent on this phenomenon. Men are the focus of this study.

had advertised in newspapers for construction workers, factory workers, clerks, labourers, barbers and others. Authority, in the guise of white collar, well-educated academics, steeped in the bureaucracy of one of the most famous universities in the world, over these ordinary men, highlighted one of the critical preconditions for industrial scale genocide – loss of agency in the face of both individual and institutional authority.

The results of the experiments caused wide controversy. As Bauman puts it:

Disquiet and rage were caused by Milgram's hypothesis that cruelty is not committed by cruel individuals but by ordinary men trying to acquit themselves well of their ordinary duties; and by Milgram's findings, that while cruelty correlates poorly with the personal characteristics of its perpetrators, it correlates very strongly indeed with the relationship of authority and subordination, with our normal, daily encountered, structure of power and obedience. (1991, pp. 153-154)

Even men who profess strong ethical beliefs can *express* or manifest their potential for masculine madness. A man who, with inner convictions, loathes stealing, killing, and assault, may find himself performing these acts with relative ease when faced with a conducive set of circumstances.¹⁰ Behaviour, unthinkable in an individual acting on his own, may be performed without hesitation when carried out under orders (Milgram 1974, p. xi).

More recently Philip Zimbardo explored this phenomenon in what he called the *Lucifer Effect* following a landmark psychological experiment at Stanford Prison:

The Lucifer Effect describes the point in time when an ordinary, normal person first crosses the boundary between good and evil to engage in an evil action. It represents a transformation of human character that is significant in its consequences. Such transformations are more likely to occur in novel settings, in 'total situations,' where social situational forces are sufficiently powerful to overwhelm, or set aside temporally, personal attributes of morality, compassion, or sense of justice and fair play. (2008, p. xiii)

¹⁰ These circumstances, these conditions, are explored fully in the next chapter.

Beauvoir agrees: 'For the military man, the army is useful; for the colonial administrator, the highway; for the serious revolutionary, the revolution – army, highway, revolution, productions becoming inhuman idols to which one will not hesitate to sacrifice man himself' (Beauvoir 1948, p. 49). In other words, men, in surrendering to the structure, the process, the goal, lose full agency and abandon their individuality and moral compass. They become things. Since we can only conquer our enemies only by reducing them to things, we have to become things ourselves (1948, p. 99).

Invoking the language of modernity, Bauman adds, 'The more rational [and detached] is the organization of action, the easier it is to cause suffering – and remain at peace with oneself' (1991, p. 154). This does not however absolve men from their acts. Beauvoir quoting Jean-Paul Sartre's notion of 'a being who makes himself a lack of being in order that there might be being', says he means that men's passion is not inflicted upon them from without (Beauvoir 1948, p. 49). They choose it. She adds that men are dangerous because they naturally make themselves into tyrants. 'Dishonestly ignoring the subjectivity of his choice, [a 'serious' man] pretends that the unconditional value of the object is being asserted through him; and by the same token he also ignores the value of the subjectivity and freedom of others, to such an extent that, sacrificing them to the thing, he persuades himself that what he sacrifices is nothing' (1948, p. 49).

Beauvoir lived through late modernity. She was six when the First World War broke out, and in her analytic prime during and after the Second World War. Few foundational feminists had such a vantage point from which to witness the masculine enterprise of modernity. Beauvoir exposed late modernity as an era of men practising the politics of indifference, persuading themselves that in ignoring the desperate plight of others they 'sacrifice nothing'. Acting under the conditions of war, a man becomes a tyrant, killing the enemy and raping the woman he does not know, 'sacrificing nothing', losing nothing, it is not his fault, someone else is responsible – a superior forced him to do it, a victim allowed him to do it. In the peacetime of modernity, men ignoring and excluding women, sacrifice nothing, lose nothing. Someone somewhere set the rules and men just do what is expected of them.

The masculine culture of reasoned detachment and indifference in modernity extended to the rape of women as a weapon of war – martial rape (Card 1996, p. 5). Despite this fact and widespread reports of rape in Europe and Japan, the World War

II Nuremberg indictment and judgement did not mention rape, although evidence of rape was entered into the record (Van Schaak 2008, p. 14). The contemporaneous Tokyo Tribunal did hold Japanese officials liable for failing to control their troops. However the proceedings were entirely silent on the sexual slavery suffered by the so-called 'comfort women' (2008, p. 14). In war crimes tribunals oppressors frequently invoke the Nuremberg defence, another name for *superior orders*. This is a plea in a court of law that a perpetrator not be held guilty for the actions ordered by a superior. According to James Insko, however, decisions during the Vietnam War reaffirmed the principle that obedience to orders that are manifestly illegal is not a defence:

In *United States v. Keenan*, the Court of Military Appeals approved an instruction stating that the justification for acts done pursuant to orders did not exist if 'the order was of such a nature that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know it to be illegal.' Keenan was convicted for following an order to shoot an elderly Vietnamese citizen. The court-martial and premeditated murder conviction of First Lieutenant William Calley for his participation in the My Lai Massacre on March 16, 1968, is one of the most controversial criminal trials in this nation's military history. The military court rejected Calley's plea of obedience to superior orders and sentenced the lieutenant to life imprisonment. The court held that the order on which Calley relied for a defense 'is one which a man of *ordinary sense and understanding* would, under the circumstances, know to be unlawful.' The public outcry in the United States was overwhelming and on April 1, 1971, one day after the sentence was imposed, President Nixon ordered Calley's release. (Insko 2003, p. 406)

Despite this rigorous prosecution, superior orders typically becomes a moral rather than legal defence given that most of the perpetrators of war crimes are never charged, and return unremarked to civilian life (Rhodes 2002, pp. 275-276). The pervasiveness of oppressive superior and compliant underling continues as a natural condition of violent engagement, as does the relationship of compliance between the oppressor and the victim. Simone de Beauvoir believed the oppressor would not be so strong if he did not have accomplices among the oppressed themselves; and Erasmus Darwin wrote, 'He who allows oppression, shares the crime' (Smith and Arnott 2005, p. 73). According to Arendt, of the Jews who acquiesced to Nazi instructions and ended up in

death camps, only 1 per cent survived (1994, p. 124). Conversely, she reports, those who refused to submit and fled had a survival rate of 50 per cent (1994, p. 124).

Beauvoir, despite her belief that the oppressor would not be successful without the complicity of those he oppressed, has a qualified if somewhat metaphysical sympathy for the superior orders defence: she argues that men, and women qua men, are not guilty if their adhesion is not a resignation of their freedom. She acknowledges that freedom is readily assigned to the oppressor and that even the most seemingly innocent of participants is still an accomplice of the oppressor, enabling oppression. She writes:

When a young sixteen-year old Nazi died crying, 'Heil Hitler!' he was not guilty, and it was not he who we hated but his masters. The desirable thing would be to re-educate this misled youth; it would be necessary to expose the mystification and to put the men who are its victims in the presence of their freedom. But the urgency of the struggle forbids this slow labour. We are obliged to destroy not only the oppressor but also those who serve him, whether they do so out of ignorance or out of constraint. (1948, p. 98)

As Beauvoir says above, the acquiescent accomplices should be held guilty for the actions ordered by their superior. Authoritarian masculinity created in modernity a new institutional, bureaucratic hierarchical condition for ordinary men. They were simultaneously murderous tyrants and compliant accomplices in life and death choices that seemed just out of their reach. They were liberated from decision-making by surrendering agency. It was not their fault, either in war during which, a now institutionalised madness of masculinity they killed strangers, or in peace, when they passively yielded to the heterotopian dark other space occupied by a very personal potential for masculine madness. The dominative nature of passive compliance was cast into sharp relief when masculine madness expressed simultaneously as actively destructive and destructively acquiescent.

The phallocratic¹¹ condition of the Enlightenment had exploded into a patriarchal pandemic as masculine madness redefined itself from spiteful assassinations and battles for independence, to an intersection of tyranny and acquiescence that marked an unstoppable, annihilative, self-destructive force that would threaten Western civilisation.

¹¹ Phallocratic: relating to, resulting from, or advocating masculine power and dominance.

The masculine ontology of the social was indicative of deep gendering of the very concept of being human, making a distinction between the metaphysical and institutional exile of Woman from modernity (Witz and Marshall 2004, p. 21). Women were in modernity but Woman was not of modernity. As we see in the next chapter, the social death of Woman in the Western cultural imaginary was genocidal.

1:4 TWO GENOCIDES: the sins of modernity

The epoch of modernity experienced many social and political ruptures including the American Revolutionary War, the French Revolution, and the First World War, but nothing could equal the masculine madness of the Second World War. This was the deadliest conflict in human history resulting in more than 50 million deaths. It was the first war to eliminate the boundaries between civil and military infrastructure, and between civilian and military casualties. Millions of civilians were killed in the Nazi death camps, in conventional bombings like the firebombing of Tokyo, and by the atomic bombs invented by male scientific heroes of modernity and dropped by male military heroes on the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This was the consequence of cold tyrannical reason, masculine madness so deep and surgical that its shock ended modernity.

During the Jewish genocide known as Shoah or the Holocaust, Adolph Hitler's Nazis systematically murdered six million European Jews. This included the deaths of one million children and two million women. As we have seen, Foucault, referencing Kant, summarized the Enlightenment condition of modernity as 'the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority...its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine...what must be done' (1984, p. 38). It is hard to imagine a better description of how modernity's masculine poster child 'reason' stimulated such unparalleled levels of violence during the Second World War, of how it was put to use without subjecting itself to any authority, and of how it was used to legitimate 'what must be done'. The tyranny of reason could not, however, survive as the lifeblood of an epoch that had at its apotheosis one of the greatest acts of genocide in history. And if systemic reason had destroyed itself during an explosion of masculine madness, modernity had no way of surviving.

The Holocaust is viewed as the paradigmatic instance of genocide, the zenith of masculine madness – a non-agentic masculinity out of control in its hubris, exhibiting little or no self-awareness, self-control or self-regulation. The Holocaust was however joined by another genocide that commenced with the Enlightenment and continued through postmodernity into the present: the social death of Woman in the

Western cultural imaginary. This unremarked second genocide¹² was the subjugation, eradication, and social death of the mythical figure of Woman. The use of ‘myth’ here owes nothing to the allegorical or poetic but rather to a mode of reality: myth as a central belief that appears in the course of history and upon which human consciousness seizes, myth as integral to the philosophy of culture, to the cultural imaginary. David Bidney believes myth is an autonomous cultural form that must not be explained by reduction to some other symbolic form, such as language (1955, p. 383). The mythical symbol is understood, not as a representation concealing some mystery or hidden truth, but as a self-contained interpretation of reality. As explained in the introductory chapter, in myth there is no distinction between the real and the ideal. No myth, no moorings, says Lucy Tatman: no myth, no compass bearings, no meaning to any when or where or who or what, just an unbearable homelessness (2007, p. 8). The image, the symbol, the figure of Woman is therefore simultaneously real and ideal in the cultural imaginary. It was against this mythical figure of Woman that the second genocide was committed.

This was a modern genocide that in its scope and scale, and in its lack of examination, of interrogation, condemns us in perpetuity to repeat the sins of modernity. This was a genocide that, like the Holocaust, was entirely modern, but, unlike the Holocaust, was not limited to modernity, a genocide that once initiated, could not be stopped. Modern genocide, according to Bauman is, ‘a genocide with a purpose. Getting rid of the adversary is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end ... the end in itself is a grand vision of a better, and radically different, society’ (1991, p. 91). So it was that the Nazi extermination camps were a means to the end of improving the human race by eliminating the ‘corrupting nature of Jews’ (1991, p. 91).

The means to an end of the other genocide was permanently to legitimate the subjugation of women by the subjection, the destruction of the social existence of the free figure of Woman. Carole Pateman argues that the narrative of the ‘sexual contract’ reveals that the patriarchal construction of the difference between Man and Woman is the political difference between freedom and subjection. Gender mastery is the major means through which Man affirms manhood (1988, p. 207). The construction of the difference between the sexes as the difference between freedom

¹² While there were other genocides in modernity, including the Armenian genocide (1915-1922) and Joseph Stalin’s artificial famine in the Ukraine (1930s), referred to on page 47, none was as vast and far-reaching as the Holocaust and the genocide of Woman.

and subjection is not merely central but is embodied cognition: ‘the very structure of our society and our everyday lives incorporates the patriarchal conception of sexual difference’ (Pateman 1988, p. 207).

In the cultural imaginary of modernity a genocidal society with an embodied cognition that was phallocratic commenced a destruction of Woman so comprehensively that for centuries immanence and the unrelieved subjugation of women became normative. According to Tony Barta, a genocidal society, as distinct from a genocidal state, is one in which the bureaucratic apparatus might be expected to protect the innocent, but in which an entire human group is nevertheless subject to remorseless pressures of destruction inherent in the very nature of the society (1987, pp. 239-240). The very nature of the society of modernity was dominantly and dominatively masculine and the systemic phallocracy that adhered it failed to protect Woman in a metaphysical sense and women in a social, political, and economic sense. That, however, merely explains that Woman was not protected from genocidal actions; it does not provide evidentiary causation of genocide.

The social death of Woman – the pluralist collective feminine, the experiential existential feminine, not the essentialist, structuralist ‘eternal feminine’ so disdained by Beauvoir (2009, p. 4) – was caused, I contend, by masculine madness flooding out of the heterotopian dark other space of Man. Social death is explored in detail later in this chapter, so it suffices to say here simply that it is *symbolic disappearance*, the transformation of the subject into *nothing*: that is social death; and social death is genocide (Jones 2011, p. 29).

Witz and Marshall, as we have seen, affirm that women were *actively prevented* from taking their place in the landscape of modernity, within modernity and the newly systematised institution of patriarchy (2004, p. 21). Luce Irigaray is clear that women were *excluded* from masculine modernity. She believes the culture of modernity was framed by and based upon the exchange of women, ‘without which we would fall back into the anarchy of the natural world, the animal kingdom’ (1985, p. 170). Women, Irigaray believes, are to men merely a commodity: just as nature has to be subjected to man in order to become a commodity, so it appears, does the development of a normal woman. Commodities are chattels, things to be traded, products with no life of their own, ‘and just as a commodity has no mirror it can use to reflect itself, so woman serves as reflection, as image of and for man, but lacks specific qualities of her own. Her value-invested form amounts to what man inscribes

in and on its matter: that is, her body' (Irigaray 1985, p. 187). Irigaray argues that the only value women possess is the meaning ascribed to them by men (1985, p. 187). Women are non-human objects – commodities for men's use and trade. In short, Woman is *nothing* and that constitutes social death.

In late modernity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights defined what it is to be a human. It, like modernity, excluded Woman. If women were *something*, Catharine MacKinnon asks, 'would men with whom we are close beat us to death? Would we be sexually molested in our families? Would we be raped in that undeclared war that goes on every day in every country in the world in what is called peacetime? If women were human, would our violators enjoy our violation?' And, she asks, 'if we were human, when these things happened, would virtually nothing be done about it?' (MacKinnon 2007, pp. 41-42) Her questioning makes the case that women are excluded from human ontology, from almost everything that defines what it is to be human. The attitudes and behaviour towards women, the political, social and economic exclusion of women in roles that structure and administer society, cements their position as non-men, as the Other of men, or as non-human, and therefore as legitimate targets for masculine madness. Woman is 'not yet a name for a way of being human,' says MacKinnon citing Richard Rorty quoting her (2007, p. 43):

If we measure the reality of women's situation in all its variety against the guarantees of the Universal Declaration, not only do women not have the rights it guarantees ... but it is hard to see, in its vision of humanity, a woman's face. Women need full human status in social reality. For this, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights must see the ways women distinctively are deprived of human rights as a deprivation of humanity. (MacKinnon 2007, p. 43)

Women, made unequal by men, are robbed of humanity, not allowed to be human – at the hand of Man, made not human, made nothing. I therefore propose that for the mythical figure of Woman – symbol of the collective feminine – the deprivation of humanity and the political, social and economic exclusion goes beyond dispossession: it is genocide.

Since Raphael Lemkin coined the term genocide in 1944, scholarship on the topic has mostly been legal and historical. While the new international tribunals established for the Yugoslav and Rwandan cases have produced important casework to be analysed, and historical research has fanned out from the Holocaust to many other instances, the actual meaning of genocide has advanced little since the early 1990s (Shaw 2007, p. 3). This lack of examination has left genocide's broader sociological and cultural applications suspended in a formalist legal framework that has little relevance to contemporary scholarship. Even today, the narrow formal definition of genocide is so subject to interpretation that the Association of Genocide Scholars asks members on its information page to specify which definition they use in their work (Card 2003, p. 68).

Most definitions of the act of genocide refer to a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. It is disturbing that they recognize human taxonomy – race, religion, ethnicity – but exclude gender, a key condition of the very state of being human. One explanation is that one gender, specifically woman, did not even occur to the androcentric decision makers framing the politico-legal definitions of genocide. Another is that women were actively excluded from definitional consideration, considered non-human, nothing.

Mary-Anne Warren (1985) coined the term *gendercide* to characterise the selective destruction of one gender component of a group. But while it gave attention to gender within specific groups it provided no real theoretical framework and failed, in the 1980s, to take the topic of crimes against humanity beyond killing and into the realm of sociology, social philosophy and culture. It hardly seems a radical premise that the analysis of genocide and gender consider broader social and cultural contexts and gender as an entire human group. A third explanation is that something as troublesome as gender was too deep, too fundamental and too complex for inclusion. Nationality, religion and even ethnicity are invented classifications,¹³ morphological constructions that allow us to see the complex world more clearly, and to attribute to these the motivation for genocide is to create a surface condition of the complexity that can be understood by virtually everyone. Each taxonomic factor however is just one way of viewing identity in a social and political order, and in terms of genocidal conflict frequently not the most salient factor (Newbury 1998, p. 86). Genocide

¹³ While also a sociocultural construct, gender operates on a more fundamental ontological level in the condition of being human. This is explored fully in Chapter 2:3.

associated with killing or violent atrocities recognises that these atrocities need to be *done* to someone, man or woman; to elevate the act from homicide to genocide requires that it be done to a group. Taxonomy therefore becomes useful in simplifying group identification. However, the exclusion of gender from most definitions of genocide, whether through conspiracy or blind ignorance, must not go unremarked.

Another genocidal factor in most definitions is the need for *intent*. Increasingly, however, genocide scholars are questioning whether intent is really necessary or if awareness of a 'foreseeable effect' is sufficient. They question if conscious intent is necessary to destroy, to cause physical or social death, to turn a group to nothing; or if recognising a foreseeable effect is in and of itself constitutive of genocide. Claudia Card questions the position of critics who, for example, want to discount as genocide the death of millions of peasants from Joseph Stalin's policy to grow wheat not for food but for trade – to exchange for industrial materials. If it were not purely accidental that the peasant class was destroyed, she argues, Stalin could be said to have destroyed the peasants, and to have committed genocide in doing so (Card 2003, p. 71). Lack of direct intent and foreseeable effect need not avoid a genocidal consequence so why should they avoid the charge of genocide? An analogy may be found in the distinction between murder, which is intended and plotted, and manslaughter, in which death is an outcome or result or consequence, not necessarily intended, of some other action.

Card takes the scholarship of genocide beyond the late twentieth-century stasis and usefully introduces into its examination threads of social philosophy and sociology. For example she quotes Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit to frame genocide as 'indecent' in that it not only destroys victims but first humiliates them by deliberately inflicting an 'utter loss of freedom and control over one's vital interests' (Card 2003, p. 73).

While many genocide theorists emphasize physical killing as primary in the equation, in a distinct acceleration of genocide scholarship Adam Jones (2011) argues that physical and mass killing was just one of a range of genocidal strategies. He broadens the definition of genocide beyond Warren to include the destruction of a group as a sociocultural unit rather than necessarily or primarily the physical annihilation of its aggregate members. This questions what precisely is destroyed in genocide (Jones 2011, p. 29). Far from restricting genocide to killing and specific social groups, Jones goes on to stress that it is the destruction of social power and existential

identity that is the essence of genocide. He cites Daniel Feierstein to legitimate his position claiming that for Feierstein, the ‘connecting thread’ among cases of genocide is ‘a technology of power based on the “denial of others”, their physical disappearance and their *symbolic disappearance*’ (Jones 2011, p. 29). The main objective of genocidal destruction is therefore, he argues, the transformation of the victims into nothing ... that is, their social death (2011, p. 29).

Social death is, argues Card, utterly central to the evil of genocide, whether it is primarily cultural, or homicidal on a massive scale. Centring social death accommodates the position that genocidal acts are not always necessarily homicidal (Card 2003, p. 63). Orlando Patterson drew upon Claude Meillassoux to develop the original concept of social death. His hypothesis is that social death occurs when the victim has no social existence beyond the subject, endures social negation, becomes a non-being (nothing) and remains forever an unborn being (Patterson 1982, p. 38). Significantly he also argues that after social death the victim, the non-being, remains nonetheless an element of society (1982, p. 45).

Social death is a concept so central to the harm of genocide, contends Card, it is at least as important as mass physical murder in characterising evil (Card 2003, p. 76). Genocides that intentionally strip victims of the ability to participate in a social enterprise aim to cause their social death. The harm of social death is not adequately captured by formal definitions of war crimes and other crimes against humanity:

If social death is central to the harm of genocide, then it really is right not to count as genocide the annihilation of just any political group. Not every political group contributes significantly to its members’ cultural identity. But then, equally, the annihilation of not just any cultural group should count, either. Political groups and cultural groups can be temporary and specialised, lacking in the continuity and comprehensiveness that are presupposed by the possibility of social deaths. (Card 2003, p. 76)

Card argues here that for social death to qualify as genocide it must surpass specific social groups and encompass an entire human group or social classification.

According to the 1946 *Genocide Resolution* of the United Nations General Assembly,

‘Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, such denial of the right of existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the united nations.’¹⁴ *Woman* as gender is a sociocultural classification and *women* constitute an entire human group.

So it is, from the central definitional factors outlined above, that the social death of Woman qualifies as genocide. To reiterate my proposition from page 44:

Masculine madness caused, and continues to cause, the social death of the mythical figure of Woman, symbol of the collective feminine, the experiential existential feminine in the Western cultural imaginary. This was for Man a foreseeable effect, a social genocide of Woman from which women would not recover.

The factors that confirm this genocide are, in summary:

- The society of modernity was profoundly masculine
- A society, particularly a masculine society, can be genocidal
- A genocidal society is one that subjects an entire human group to remorseless pressures of destruction
- Genocide is the denial of the right to existence of an entire human group
- ‘Woman’ is the mythical symbol for an entire human group
- Genocide goes beyond killing and physical death
- Stripping an entire human group of the ability to participate in the social enterprise, thereby causing its social death, is genocide
- For social death to qualify as genocide, it must surpass specific social groups and encompass an entire human group or social classification
- Masculine madness, the heterotopian dark other space of Man, socially negates Woman, makes Woman *nothing*

¹⁴ United Nations General Assembly *Genocide Resolution*, 1946, 96 (i)

- The social death, the genocide of Woman, is caused by masculine madness

The question remains, however: how was a brilliant, inventive, dominant, bureaucratic masculinity so morally vacant that it not only allowed masculine madness systemic influence but also failed to see the annihilative consequences of Eden without Eve?

Herbert Kelman and Lee Hamilton assert that ‘crimes against humanity and genocides occur not through psychological dispositions to engage in murderous violence or even profound hostility against the target group, but rather the major cause of genocide is policy’ (Kelman and Hamilton 1989, p. 15). The real question that cries out for psychological examination is not violent hostility but rather why so many people are willing to formulate, participate in, and condone policies that result in atrocities and genocide (1989, p. 15). Kelman and Hamilton agree intent is not an essential pre-condition of genocide. In a profoundly Baumanian moment they look past the acts that constitute genocide to what allows moral inhibitions to be so weakened as to allow genocidal acts to occur. How did the moral inhibitions of the phallocracy become so weakened that masculine madness was able to flood out of the heterotopian dark other space causing the principal genocide of modernity? Kelman and Hamilton identify three pre-conditions that create such a situation: authorisation, routinisation, and dehumanisation (1989, p. 16).

First, genocide is *authorised* by, for example, official orders coming from a legal authority; second, all actions are *routinised* using, for example, rules, regulated practices and precise role definition; and third, the victims are *dehumanised* or made appear less human in the eyes of wider society – all seen earlier in the bureaucratisation of brutality, Eichmann’s normality of evil, and the Milgram experiments.

Were the moral inhibitions of hegemonic masculinity so weakened in modernity that masculine madness was able to cause the social death of Woman? Do the three pre-conditions of genocide apply in these circumstances?

First, was the destruction of social power and existential identity of Woman *authorised*? In the androcentric enterprise of modernity no woman had ever been elected head of state. National, religious, scientific, political, economic, business and social leadership were masculine domains. Modernity was a masculine enterprise. For centuries men made the rules of political, economic and social life, and those rules

advantaged men in every classification of society, delivered to them unearned privilege, and authorised the exclusion of Woman. From the early days of patriarchal misogyny to the masculine military of the Second World War, and beyond, men dominated and were authorised by men in charge to exclude, to subjugate women. Great authority figures from Rousseau to John Adams to Hegel to Darwin authorised men to believe they were superior to women in every way. The dominative power of the phallocracy authorised at every level the destruction of the social power and the existential identity of Woman. The issue here is not only that women were made second-class citizens and subjugated to men from the Enlightenment onwards, since this was always-already the condition of women in Europe throughout history. More central is the question of *why* the Enlightenment, given its stated ideals of the equality and justice and liberty, failed to emancipate women.

Second, was the stripping from Woman the ability to participate in the social enterprise *routinised*? Dominative masculinity and the exclusion of women were routinised from the moment the production of goods, together with their usefulness or utility, was transferred from the home to the factory. The daily routine of male domination evolved into generational androcentricity such that masculine dominance and the exclusion of Woman from the social enterprise was so routinised that it became normative. The rules that governed universities, religious orders, armed forces, voting, the workplace: all formalise precise role definitions that routinise the exclusion of Woman.

Third, was Woman *dehumanised*? Tyrannical reason favoured men in modernity and with scientific advancements and industrialisation, men subscribed to a social, economic and political system that dehumanised women, denying their value to society and to themselves. MacKinnon asserts that ‘women were and continue to be systematically subjected to physical insecurity, targeted for sexual denigration and violation; depersonalized and denigrated; deprived of respect, credibility, and resources; and silenced—and denied public presence, voice, and representation of their interests. Women were and are considered no longer human’ (MacKinnon 1989, p. 9). She asks, ‘if women were human, would they be a cash crop shipped to America’s brothels? Would they be sexual and reproductive slaves? Would they be bred, worked without pay their whole lives, burned when their dowry money was not enough or when men tired of them, starved as widows when their husbands died’ (1989, p. 9)? Woman was not only dehumanised but became non-human, nothing.

Meeting the three pre-conditions of genocide means that the moral inhibitions of the phallocracy were so weakened that the foreseeable effect of the ‘denial of others’, the symbolic disappearance, the social death, the genocide of Woman was allowed to occur.

A final conundrum in the genocide of Woman is that, without gender, there is no human condition – it is a fundamental ontological pre-requisite. A primate, no matter how biologically evolved, cannot be human without gender.¹⁵ If Woman was annihilated in genocidal perpetuity, where did that leave Man? There can be no Eden without Eve, no humankind without Woman. It is a great paradox of gender ontology that to destroy the creator is to destroy the created: to destroy Woman is to destroy life. So it was that despite the genocide, women remain an element of society – as Other, as non-men. Recall Orlando Patterson declaring, on page 47, that social death occurs when the victim has no social existence beyond the subject, endures social negation, becomes a non-being, and remains forever an unborn being. But despite social death the victim the non-being can remain, nonetheless, an element of society (1982, p. 38).

For example, Derrida insists:

We understand the word *I* not only when its ‘author’ is unknown but when [s]he is quite fictitious. And when [s]he is dead. The identity of *Bedeutung* here has by virtue of its structure the value of a testament ... My death is structurally necessary to pronouncing the *I* ... The statement ‘I am alive’ is accompanied by my being dead. (Santner 1993, p. 10)

To paraphrase Eric Santner, the subject has crossed over a bar that separates her from the benevolence as well as the tyranny of nature and the imaginary relations of myth. She is marooned in a world of ruins, of fragments, of stranded objects (1993, p. 12).

In this the two genocides join. Both women and Jews, marooned in a world of ruins, continued in society, albeit as stranded objects bereft of all comforting teleologies (1993, p. 12). The difference is that the Holocaust came to an end with the demise of modernity, while the genocide of Woman continues to be perpetrated by a

¹⁵ This is discussed in more detail in Section 2.

patriarchy so indestructible that it constantly reinforces the social death of Woman. And yet women continue in society today, resiliently, but as non-men.

That the modern genocide of Woman has to date been unexamined joins it with the Holocaust in frightening recognition that these are not unnatural acts. As explored in Chapter 1:3, these are evil acts of everyday normality. It would be fatally flawed to consider the eruption of masculine madness during the Second World War in general and the two principal genocides in particular as aberrative, atypical passages in time of inexplicable insanity, a temporary or transient condition. They were everyday consequences of masculine madness.

1:5 FLIP OF A COIN: the radical dimension of normality

Man in modernity had two faces: one illuminated by the brilliance of invention and innovation, and the other, the heterotopian face of a dark other space, concealing and nurturing masculine madness. Bauman suspects that what we perhaps fear most is that neither of the two faces can no more exist without the Other any more than can the two sides of a coin (1989, p. 7). Masculine madness is not the price of inventive masculinity – it is masculinity. Or it is at least, male.¹⁶ It is the flipside, the other side of the coin, an ontological condition of masculinity. Every aspect of modernity, and the modern genocides, reflected two sides of the one coin. They were modern masculinity's *Zeitgeist*, its priorities and its vision of Bauman's 'means to an end of modern genocide' (1991, p. 91). Nazi Germany wanted to be free of Jews and the phallocracy of the Western cultural imaginary wanted to be free of Woman.

Further exploring man's inventive spirit and its other face, Bauman cites Stillman and Pfaff:

There is more than a wholly fortuitous connection between the applied technology of the mass production line, with the vision of universal abundance, and the applied technology of the concentration camp, with its vision of a profusion of death. We may wish to deny the connection, but Buchenwald was of our West as much as Detroit's River Rouge – we cannot deny Buchenwald [as] a casual aberration of a Western world essentially sane. (Bauman 1991, p. 9)

The machinery and bureaucracy of destruction used in the Holocaust was structurally and organisationally no different from the supremely systematised German society as a whole (Hilberg 1985, pp. 78-79). German efficiency was perfected to such a degree that little room was left for error. This was the genesis of quality assurance, of systematic measurement and comparison against 'world's-best-practice'. This *was* world's best practice. There was no comparison.

¹⁶ The origin of masculine madness is explained in Chapter 2:5. Whether masculine madness is essentially and endemically male, or transported across gender with masculinity as its vector, is explored in Section 4.

However even the most efficient production system needs raw products – a supply chain – and Jews were the raw products of the Nazi machine. Investigative journalist Edwin Black (2012) spent years uncovering how the Nazis identified with pinpoint accuracy Jews across Europe. Without a process to locate every Jew, identify what they did and where they lived, the industrial assembly line of death would be inefficient (Black 2012, p. 22). Inefficiency, of course, was unthinkable in the Germany of modernity. Germany, Black discovered, had an accomplice uniquely modern in its everyday functionality, an accomplice from another continent, an accomplice that would reach into a technological future to deliver the ideal identification process and in doing so outlive the Holocaust, modernity and everything that came after. Black discovered that, in Europe generally, and then in the death camps particularly, millions of human beings were being identified, sorted, assigned, and transported by means of the Hollerith system (2012, p. 22). A scientific system was authorising and routinizing the killing of Jews as tiny numbers and small punch cards dehumanised every victim. Numbers and punch cards would kill them; but where did this surgically efficient supply chain, this scientific system of numbers, punch holes and the machines to interpret them come from?

One December morning, even as the numbered man ... in his tattered uniform, stepped toward the Bergen-Belsen Hollerith office to stay warm and to stay alive, another man, this one dressed elegantly in a fine suit and warm overcoat, stepped out of a new chauffeured car at 590 Madison Avenue in New York. He was Thomas J. Watson. His company, IBM – one of the biggest in the world – custom-designed and leased the Hollerith card sorting system to the Third Reich. IBM also serviced its machines almost monthly, and trained Nazi personnel to use the intricate systems. Duplicate copies of code books were kept in IBM's offices in case field books were lost. What's more, his company was the exclusive source for up to 1.5 billion punch cards the Reich required each year to run its machines. (Black 2012, p. 22)

German inventor Herman Hollerith had founded IBM in 1896 as a census tabulating company. Census was its business, and what better way could there be for identifying individuals, and where they lived, than an everyday census business? According to Black, when IBM Germany formed its philosophical and technologic alliance with

Nazi Germany, census and registration took on a higher purpose: IBM Germany invented the racial census, listing not just religious affiliation, but bloodlines going back generations – not just to count the Jews, but also to identify them through the ages (Black 2012, p. 10).

The murder of millions of innocent people was made possible by a technological, systematised star of modernity: just as modern genocide is a means to an end, so was the census, the technology of IBM, the proto-globalised relationship between IBM and the Third Reich, the efficiency of the German industrial machine, all a means to the end of the ethnic cleansing of Germany. European Jews were a stain to be cleaned from the face of Germany, and to the Nazi hierarchy they were already dead. In *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1948), written soon after the end of the war, Arendt wrote that camps that arise in totalitarian regimes are isolated and seek to establish that the targeted groups of people never really existed, and were never meant to exist, as if they were already dead (Fry 2009 p. 21). As we have seen in the previous chapter, moral inhibitions against atrocities are eroded when victims are *dehumanised*, made potentially dead in the eyes of wider society. Hence, the Nazis were systematically relentless in mapping, measuring, identifying, and casting into abjection¹⁷ those they wanted to destroy in the Holocaust.

Beauvoir believes the disgust that the victims felt about themselves stifled the voice of revolt in them and justified the executioners in their own eyes: ‘the more miserable [the Jews] were, the more contemptible [dehumanised] they seemed, so much so that there was never any room for remorse’ (1948, p. 101). The Nazis and their accomplices were at every level what Milgram, with respect to his electric shock experiment, described as ordinary men who given the right set of conditions act in cruel and destructive ways in direct contravention of their personal moral or ethical framework (Milgram 1974, p. xi). In this way, in a situation such as the Holocaust, the victims are, to themselves, already dead. And to their oppressors, to ordinary men, the victims are so contemptible that they are already dead. Masculine madness – the face of the devil, flipside of the angel face – is the radical dimension of normality.

This was not ideological, it was ruthlessly, unemotionally bureaucratic.

Bauman believes a multitude of vengeful and murderous individuals would not match

¹⁷ In invoking Julia Kristeva’s notion of abjection here, there is intended an ironic implication that what is abjected ‘out there’ is also always-already from ‘in here,’ so that in effect there is no final escape from that which is abjected.

the effectiveness of a small, yet disciplined and strictly coordinated bureaucracy (Bauman 1989, p. 20). He also questions how everyday German clerks and teachers could be transformed into genocidal mass murderers. Arendt calls this detached social condition the 'banality of evil' (1994). She believed that societies, even totalitarian societies, did not necessarily produce evil monsters, but rather, once violence was authorised, routinised and dehumanised, societies produced citizens with diminished agency, allowing evil to surface. Arendt's evil is banal, not because it lacks importance, but because it occurs without diabolical intent, because it is utterly thoughtless¹⁸ (Fry 2009 p. 28). The thoughtless surfacing of evil is the radical dimension of normality: the twin faces of the coin which, when thoughtlessly flipped one way, produces productive normality, teachers and bank clerks, inventors and innovators; and when equally thoughtlessly flipped the other way, allows evil, masculine madness, to surface, producing violent men and murderous war criminals. Bauman believes modern civilisation was not the Holocaust's *sufficient* condition. It was, however, most certainly its *necessary* condition. It was, he says, the rational world of modern civilisation that made the Holocaust thinkable (1989, p. 13). It is the same with masculine madness: it was a *necessary* condition of masculine modernity.

Holocaust or genocide of Woman: both were the work of ordinary men and their flipside, masculine madness.

While the oppression of women is an everyday, normative condition, frequently it erupts into bestial behaviour in the homes, streets, cities and countries of the world. The expression of this peculiarly masculine bestiality is Bauman's second face, the flipside. Men on one side live a conditional life mediated by social and ethical imperatives, but the other, the second face, is always present, ready to participate in terrors small and large, and frequently with unimaginable consequences. This is the Jekyll-and-Hyde narrative of the unthinking beast coexisting in the same body with the educated, socialised gentle man. One is the face of freedom and agency, the other, that of acquiescence and complicity.

The two-faced human is, however, a well-worn trope. What is needed is a fresh figurative or metaphorical, allegorical even, *Doppelgänger*, and one solution is the sphinx: a composite creature, human above the navel and beast below. In the twelfth century a Byzantine philosopher Michael Psellos portrayed sphinx and man as a

¹⁸ 'Thoughtless' here means 'lacking thought'.

composite being able to operate on several ontological and psychological levels. ‘Each of us is an animal,’ he wrote, ‘but the animal life, the life of the body, is something to surpass in rising to intelligible reality’ (Miles 2012, p. 5). Writing in Volume 1 of his *Philosophica Minora*, Psellos explores the allegory of the sphinx and, in presenting it as a composite monster, likens it to man.¹⁹ The sphinx, according to Psellos, is nothing but a human put together from dissimilar parts: ‘Our existence is a thing of parts’ (2012, p. 5). Being human for Psellos is a matter of extremes: an ontological amalgam. At one of these extremes live ‘speechless dogs and pigs and wild animals’, and at the other extreme live angels and ‘children of God’ (2012, p. 5). ‘A great chasm separates a beast from a god, so it is necessary,’ Psellos says, ‘to posit a middle life which some of the Chaldean oracles call partly light and partly dark, but which I would simply call a man’ (2012, p. 5).

The riddle of man is how in one being he can simultaneously be beast and angel; how he can be mild-mannered teacher one year and the next, part of the killing machine of the Third Reich, and the next, again a doting father and mild-mannered teacher, partly dark and partly light, but still one man; how inventive brilliance can be subverted by an evil surfacing to reveal masculine madness. According to Psellos the sphinx does not merely convey a riddle about the nature of man, but is itself the image of man: half beast, half human. Ordinary men are capable of heinous crimes.

The sphinx is symbol for the potentiality of masculine madness. This is the narrative of modernity’s principal genocides.

Towards Postmodernity

With the death of modernity came a change in our sense of what it means to be a ‘self.’ According to James Mensch, the self could no longer be taken as an autonomous unit, something that in its basic laws and processes is the same for all (1996, p. 1). In other words, we could no longer take it, as Kant did, as an unchanging ‘ground of the lawfulness’ of what we experience (Mensch 1996, p. 1). The complicity and compliance of modernity had ended. The Holocaust needed modernity, it was a wholly modern project. Now that modernity had ended, the conditions for a Holocaust had also ended. The ‘ground of the lawfulness’ was no longer fixed and

¹⁹ I am grateful to Graeme Miles, a classics scholar at the University of Tasmania, for his translation from the ancient Greek of relevant sections of Psellos’ *Philosophica Minora*. No published translation exists.

unchanging. The shift from the modern is a shift from the foundational, systematic thinking of modernity to a pluralistic view, one that emphasizes the perspectival character of reality. Accordingly, the change is not just one in the understanding of the self, but also in how we comprehend reality. It is a shift in our understanding of being. Modernity's legacy therefore is a plurality of absolute, yet contradictory systems (Mensch 1996, p. 1).

Concomitant with the end of modernity, according to Joseph Natoli and Linda Hutcheon, comes the denial of any possibility of a grand narrative, of an account that would unify its legacy (1993, pp. 71-72). They warn that the historical basis of modernity's narrative, subjectivity, is denied in modernity's passing. Yet, for all its apparent newness, this response remains a response conditioned by the modernity that called it forth (1993, p. 225): 'Modernity, in the reading of its eulogy, can be seen either as the genuinely emancipatory philosophical, cultural and sociological movement to which its replacement epoch – postmodernity – is but a parasitical and reactionary successor, or as a germ of liberation whose outworn husk it took the radical energies of postmodernity to strip away at last' (1993, p. 157).

Masculine madness in modernity was organised, it was everyday, it was dangerous and it was always going to destroy the epoch. Modernity was crushed at the hand of Man in a war that was as predictable as it was shocking. The genocide of Woman, however, flowed unabated into postmodernity and beyond. Masculine madness continued to cause the social death of Woman and the subjugation of women. The question was: would the plurality of postmodernity favour the angel or its flipside, the monster; would masculine madness be mediated by an epoch shocked by its own masculine brutality into a more gentle pose?

First however we will explore what causes masculine madness.

SECTION TWO: OEDIPAL SCHISM: the rise and rise of masculine madness

2:0 INTRODUCTION

This section explores the role of biology and gender, and the psychoanalytic origins of masculine madness.

Biological determinism forms the basis of a structural belief system of masculine advantage and androcentrism, drawing on structuralist universality, and a lineage of ancestral and biological causation. I explore whether what makes us human can be reduced to generalist, essentialist structures, be they biological, anthropological or sociological; and I examine the elemental questions: does being human transcend biological or anthropological morphology? And does biology determine human behaviour and gender?

I deal specifically with gender and what it is to be female or male, woman or man. I propose that where sex is determined by genetic chance, gender is endlessly variable, situating itself within the elastically mutable relationship between sex, body, feminine/masculine, and psyche: gender is a continuous becoming, ending only in death.

Social inequality exists in gender differentiation and stratification, and what makes acceptable the social, economic and political subordination of women, the modern genocide of Woman, and masculine madness is examined in this section. I establish that stereotypes of gender, even at early ages, are not based on fact, pointing to boys exhibiting aggression at a young age as a warning of the nascent potential of masculine madness.

I look at masculine indifference and what Zygmunt Bauman calls moral blindness – Albert Einstein famously said, ‘The world is in greater peril from those who tolerate or encourage evil than from those who actually commit it’ (Corredor 1957, p. 11). A desensitizing of this kind, what Robert Lifton calls ‘psychic numbing’, was, we see, described by Wordsworth in 1800 as blunting ‘the discrimination powers of the mind’ and reducing it to ‘a state of almost savage torpor’ (Hartman 2002, pp. 100-101). I observe that people were losing their ability to be moved by shocking

sights and events, and how that led to indifference in the face of eruptions of masculine madness.

I also examine the underpinning of masculine madness, deep in the psychoanalytic symbology of the Western cultural imaginary, and how in psychoanalytic terms masculine madness inhabits the heterotopian space filled with hatred of mother womb. Locating it in the Lacanian 'imaginary' where the ego is fashioned and a child's identification of its own image forms in the mirror-stage, it is what I call the Oedipal schism.

Finally this section looks at why many men do not recognise the potential for masculine madness, and explores how their frustrated drive to exert social power over women frequently expresses as masculine madness, specifically as rape. One specific tool of masculine madness, we see, is aggravated or violent sexual assault, more commonly known as rape, an unsocialised act of hatred – an unreconstructed expression of masculine madness brutally revealed.

2:1 HUMAN ONTOLOGY: biological determinism

The sense of justice and injustice is not derived from nature, but arises artificially, though necessarily, from education and human invention.

David Hume (1896, p. 483)

To date, the discourse of masculine madness has been a lens through which to comprehend western culture and the death of modernity. But is heterotopian masculine madness a normative condition, programmed by genes and determined by biology? To begin, I explore whether the argument that biology is destiny holds up, and ask, is biology the root cause of masculine madness and the genocide of Woman? Is the privileged rank enjoyed by Man, and the potential for masculine madness, a consequence of evolutionary biology? These questions are fundamental to this project and their exploration essential to what follows.

Psychologist Nicholas Humphrey believes it is social intelligence or the richness of our qualitative life, rather than biology or even our quantitative intelligence, that truly makes humans what they are (Humphrey 1999, p. 121), for example what it is like to be a human being living at the centre of the conscious present, surrounded by smells and tastes and feels and the sense of being an extraordinary metaphysical entity with properties which hardly seem to belong to the physical world. Social intelligence describes the exclusively human capacity to use very large brains to effectively navigate and negotiate complex social relationships and environments. Social intelligence is an aggregated measure of self- and social awareness, evolved social beliefs and attitudes, and a capacity and appetite to manage complex social change. It is not enough just to be clever according to Humphrey. Autistic children, for example, are sometimes extremely clever (1999, pp. 120-121). They are very good at observation and remembering it all. However they have low social intelligence.

What is needed in this critique of biological determinism is a theory of self, a theory of how people work from the inside. For many years the field was dominated by behaviourism. 'Behaviourists look at animal behaviour and ascribe it to humans.' (Nevid 2013, p. 496) Scientists believed they could understand animal behaviour – human beings, rats, pigeons – just by watching what goes on, writing it all down, doing correlations. It turns out you cannot. It has to be thought about in terms of the

inner structure of behaviour (Humphrey 1999, p. 120). Behaviour is, after all, a consequence of the values and attitudes of a person and any analysis of behaviour can provide only a brief and incomplete glimpse into the self of the subject.²⁰ Social construction, social becoming, social intelligence are more accurate lenses through which to view the psyche.

Professor of Early History at Reading University, Steve Mithen, believes there were two key periods of brain expansion that contextualize social intelligence (1998, p. 72). The first was around two million years ago when brains expanded by about 50%. Human antecedents went from brain size of around 450cc to one of around 1,000cc by 1.8 million years ago. Archaeologists noting this change in primates asked: why are brains getting larger and what are they providing? Brains would not get larger for just any reason, because brain tissue is metabolically very expensive, so it had to be serving an important purpose (1998, p. 72). Mithen believes the social intelligence hypothesis suggests that the expansion of brain size at that time occurred because early hominids were living in larger, more complex groups, and so having to keep track of different social patterns. In short, then, they had to comprehend a larger number of social relationships and required a larger brain to do so. The second increase in brain size happened between 600,000 [*Homo heidelbergensis*] and 200,000 [*Homo sapiens*] years ago, and during that period the brain reached its modern human capacity. Explaining the second expansion in brain size remains a challenging question. Mithen's view is that it is directly related to the evolution of language. Language is arguably the most complex cognitive task we undertake; it is directly related to social intelligence because we mainly use language to mediate our social relationships (1998, p. 72). To contextualize this, some scholars date the beginning of proto-language – primitive language-like systems – as early as *Homo habilis* (2.33 to 1.4 million years ago), while others place the development of symbolic communication with *Homo erectus* (1.8 million years ago) or *Homo heidelbergensis* (0.6 million years ago). There is broad agreement, however, that the development of full language began with us – *Homo sapiens* – around 200,000 years ago (Nichols 1998, pp. 127-170).

Social intelligence was a critical factor in the expansions of brain size – there is co-evolution between social and cognitive complexity (Mithen 1998, p. 72). Today social intelligence is pivotal in humans managing the complexity of being social

²⁰ While controversial, this dismissal of behaviourism is based on my own social research over two decades on three continents with more than 800,000 respondents.

animals. Cultural evolution and social intelligence allow humans to imagine, to create, to think conceptually, to solve differential problems, to build complex relationships, and to remember. But where is the explanation for war?

At heart of this enquiry remains the pivotal question about the origin of masculine madness. According to Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson ‘demonic masculinity’ was born of biological determinism erupting out of evolutionary necessity (1996 p. 22). Wrangham and Peterson undertook extensive field research in Africa, observing in particular the behaviour of adult male chimpanzees killing each other in internecine conflicts. What they drew from their work was that demonic masculinity, conceptually similar to masculine madness, led to human wars, and that it had to come from somewhere. They believed they found it, erroneously in my view, in the killing behaviour of chimpanzees.

Wrangham and Peterson found that the primate killings they witnessed explained the causal relationship between masculinity and war, and ‘simultaneously undermined the human excuses for extreme violence, such as culture, brainpower, or the punishment of an angry God.’ (1996 p. 22) To elevate observation to theory Wrangham and Peterson invoke the selfish-gene theory of evolutionary biology, a theory they describe as ‘elegantly popularized’ in Richard Dawkins’ *The Selfish Gene* (1976). Selfish-gene theory modernised Darwinian thinking through its insistence that the ultimate explanation of any individual’s behaviour depends on how the behaviour will maximise genetic success: to pass that individual’s genes into subsequent generations (Wrangham and Peterson 1996, p. 22). It appears to provide a cogent explanation for selfishness, even killing. However, a prominent critic of Dawkins’ selfish gene theory, Stephen J Gould takes issue with the gene as the unit of selection. Gould’s criticism of selfish-gene theory brings into focus two fundamental flaws in the belief that human behaviour is genetically, biologically determined, and in so doing Gould debunks the theories of Dawkins, and Wrangham and Peterson. According to him, the unit of selection is the phenotype, not, as Dawkins contends, the genotype (Gould 1990, pp. 72-78). A genotype is the *input*, and a phenotype is the *output*: a composite of observable characteristics or traits, of behaviour or the products of behaviour. Phenotypes result from the expression of an organism’s genes as well as the influence of environmental factors and the interactions between the two. For instance, a beaver dam might be considered a phenotype of beaver genes, the same way beavers’ powerful incisor teeth are phenotypical expressions of their genes.

Phenotypic variation is a fundamental prerequisite for evolution by natural selection. Thus, the first flaw in the selfish-gene theory, asserts Gould, is that the genotype does not determine behaviour – either good or bad: it is purely a passive recorder of what worked in a life lived, and what did not. This is important in gaining insight into what causes masculine madness in humans.

Wrangham and Peterson's study appeared to prove unequivocally that animal behaviour, like that of warring chimpanzees, was consistent with, and paralleled, human behaviour. The researchers used the biologically determined behaviour of non-human animals to mirror the behaviour of humans in order to explain human behaviour. Apart from this being a circular argument, and a unique form of extended false syllogism (men appear demonic, chimpanzees are like men, chimpanzees are demonic, men are demonic), it relies on the evolutionary urgency of the animals' genome to cause them to be incapable of modifying behaviour. In other words, biology – the chimpanzees' genes – made them do it.

Critics of Neo-Darwinist Dawkins claim he relies on a theory of evolution that is historically and scientifically outdated. In a radio interview in 2007, author and former editor of *New Scientist* magazine, Nigel Calder, was asked for an example of a current orthodoxy he considered errant and that will be exposed as such. Without hesitation he replied:

Oh, an easy one is Richard Dawkins. His account of evolution is hopelessly out of date. There are all kinds of things that happen to genes that just don't figure in his way of thinking: all kinds of ways in which accelerated evolution can occur involving several genes at one time and yet the idea of the single mutation being tested by natural selection, which has been the dogma for what, seventy or eighty years, I mean it's dead, defunct. But the people who are discovering the other things just don't get reported very widely even though they are distinguished scientists themselves. I mean that to me is an example of where a top expert is wrong. (Calder 2007)

The second flaw in the selfish-gene theory rests on Wrangham and Peterson's own conclusion that chimpanzees are animals and not human. Even if some validity were granted to the position that the chimpanzees' genes made them do it, chimpanzees are not human, they are not even the antecedents of humans. Humans undoubtedly feel

protohuman urges, desires, needs and impulses, but their socially mediated mega-brains intercede before urge turns to action, before impulse becomes behaviour. Abraham Maslow emphatically declared, 'Too many of the findings that have been made in animals have been proved to be true for animals but not for the human being. There is no reason whatsoever why we should start with animals [biology] in order to study human motivation. It is no more necessary to study animals *before* one can study humans than it is to study mathematics before one can study geology or psychology or biology' (Maslow 1987, pp. 29-30).

Carl Ransom Rogers takes the ontological position that a human comes to be in consciousness what he is in experience: 'There is only man in man' (Rogers 1989, p. 105). When the uniquely human capacity of conscious awareness is functioning freely and fully, we find that we have, not an animal whom we must fear, but an organism able to achieve, through the remarkable integrative capacity of its central nervous system, a balanced, realistic, self-enhancing, other-enhancing behaviour as a result of all these elements of awareness (1989, p. 105).

Social intelligence enables men to have conscious and unconscious agency, the ability to decide: to capitulate to the beast, or to become self-enhancing and other-enhancing, fully agentic humans. The battles of chimpanzees or human genes cannot be used to excuse, or even explain, the masculine madness in Western culture that causes revolutions, wars, genocides and, more recently, the destruction of the very climates and environments that support life itself.

Humans have the capacity to go beyond biology, beyond sentience, to self-consciousness, subjectivity, and morality. According to Simone de Beauvoir, it is impossible to propose ethics to man (human) if one defines him as nature, as something given. As she notes, Hegel tells us in the last part of *The Phenomenology of Mind* that moral consciousness can exist only to the extent that there is disagreement between nature and morality (Beauvoir 1948, p. 10). Despite that, evolutionary psychologists famously liken contemporary humans to their hominid antecedents, claiming that modern humans are just an evolutionary nano-second away from their predecessors who lived in caves. Males, the story goes, were dominant providers and women were subservient, food preparers, sex slaves and mothers. We are today, they claim, cave dwelling primates in suits and skirts, subject in everyday life to our biological differences: we are, in short, social beings whose status and behaviour are determined by biology.

Biological determinism forms the basis of a structural belief system of masculine advantage and androcentrism that draws on structuralist universality, and a lineage of ancestral and biological causation. By way of example, in April 2012 an advisor to a Senator in the Australian Parliament expressed biological deterministic sentiments in an email to social justice advocate and academic Dr Carole Ford. It was reported in the *Brisbane Times*:

An LNP staffer has resigned after sending an email to a Queensland feminist about the superiority of men, telling her to 'get a life' and calling her a 'sourpuss' for writing an opinion piece about the need for more women in parliament.

Max Tomlinson, the then media adviser to Liberal National Party Senator Ian Macdonald, wrote to Dr Carole Ford after she penned a newspaper column criticising the lack of female representation in Queensland's parliament.

In his email, Mr Tomlinson tells Dr Ford:

Dear Carole,

I have just read your pathetic piece in the Courier-Mail. While I generally ignore the bleatings of sourpusses like you, your piece was so depressing and negative that I was moved to find your email address and simply say: Get a life.

The world would be a better place if people like you stood for political preselection and learned the hard way that ability is not measured by chromosomes.

Question: Why don't you have a go? Answer: Like most women, you probably don't possess the necessary drive, determination and decisiveness that men innately possess. It's not a personal criticism; it's a fact of biology. Where, for example, are the great female explorers, mountaineers, warriors, inventors, chefs? Blokes dominate most areas of human endeavour because Nature equipped them with something called testosterone. That was part of Nature's grand design to enable men to be stronger, more fearless and more determined than their sisters. Sorry, Carole, fact not fiction.

Women occupy a special but different place in the world to that of men. I've been married to a wonderful woman - a proud mother of four successful adult children, not a nuclear physicist - for nearly 40

years. For years, I've heard women like you ask my wife at cocktail parties, functions and dinner parties: And what do you do? The clear inference in the pregnant silence that follows my wife's answer that she is a proud home-maker makes my skin crawl. Women like my wife are the life-givers, the embodiment of sacrificial love (the purest form of love), the primary keepers of the flame of civilisation that separates us from the animal world, and yet the Sisterhood frowns on them for not joining the anti-male club that you so typefy [sic].

The anti-male world of conspiracy theories in which you and the Sisterhood inhabit is the complete antithesis of the world in which positive women thrive. Women who can't cut it in - what did you call it? the boys' club - can easily cover their inadequacies by claiming bias, sexism, misogyny, chauvinism etc. etc. ad infinitum. It's so tiring to read such twaddle.

Face reality, my dear. Smell the coffee. Try to turn your sour, negative, anti-male view of the world into something more positive and productive. Demonising men may be your life's quest but fewer and fewer people are listening.

I repeat: GET A LIFE.

Kind regards,

Max (Jabour 2012)

Why Tomlinson was forced to resign probably remains a mystery to him – after all, what did he do wrong? His deeply felt belief that men dominate most areas of human endeavour because Nature equipped them with ‘something called testosterone’, that it was all part of ‘Nature's grand design’ to enable men to be smarter, stronger, more fearless and more determined than women, is entirely consistent with the views of Charles Darwin, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Hegel. Hegel's contribution to the discourse of biologically-determined masculine advantage and the exclusion of women sees him comparing men to vital animals, and women to dumb, static plants. He warns that if women are put in charge, we are all in danger because their decisions will be based not on universal principles but on arbitrary inclinations and emotional opinions. He writes in his *Philosophy of Right* (1820):

Women may be well educated, but they are not made for the higher sciences, for philosophy and certain forms of artistic production which require a universal element. Women may have insights, taste and delicacy, but they do not possess the ideal. The difference between man and woman is the difference between animal and plant; the animal is closer in character to the man, the plant to woman, for the latter is a more peaceful [process of] unfolding whose principle is the more indeterminate unity of feeling. When women are in charge of government, the state is in danger, for their actions are based not on the demands of universality but on contingent inclination and opinion. (Hegel 1991, p. 207)

The writings of great thinkers serve to establish and reinforce stereotypical social values disadvantageous to women; they make a contribution to the belief system that stops men facing the reality that their privilege is largely unearned and almost always inequitable. ‘Fact not fiction,’ Mr Tomlinson wrote in his email to Dr Ford, and if he and other biological determinists, including Darwin, Rousseau, Herbert Spencer (2000, p. 463), and Hegel were right they would be on safe ground. Let us recall Beauvoir saying of biology, ‘by its light alone we could never decide the primacy of one sex or the other’ (1997, p. 68). Assessing the very fundamentals of biology and gender, she acknowledges sexual difference, that males and females are different, but finds that ‘never’ could we use biology, biological differences or sexual differentiation to determine the ‘primacy’ of one sex over the other. Her use of primacy is interesting, given its shared etymology with ‘primate’ – from Latin *primas*, *primat-* ‘of the first rank’. Primates enjoy primacy in the animal kingdom, humans have primacy among primates, and there the primacy taxonomy ends. Evolutionary biology has delivered primacy to humans, but biology does not determine primacy of one sex over the other.

However, biological determinists reject the premise that in biology no primacy exists between the two sexes. Darwin, for example, states unambiguously that men are superior to women and refers specifically to ‘inequality between the sexes’ (2004, p. 631). Toril Moi accuses biological determinists of taking this even further when they claim that nature and biology ground social norms, that sooner or later biological differences will express themselves in the form of social difference (Moi 1999, p. 38). This is the contribution Max Tomlinson made to the bio-determinist lineage: that biology has determined males to be the stronger, more fearless and in every way the superior sex, and that this biological advantage must apply in social relationships, that

is, between genders. This argument is strong, however, only if evidentiary causality exists between biology and society. As soon as we deny there is a necessary relationship between human biology and social organization, we can cheerfully accept that there are biological differences between men and women without believing that this gives us grounds for organising society in an unjust and non-egalitarian way (Moi 1999, pp. 384-385).

Biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling agrees that biology does not determine gender difference:

I do not argue for a program of behavioral research that ignores biology. Instead I put forth a plea to release biology from its sacrosanct status as First Cause and give it a more appropriate place in the network of disciplines that constitute the proper study of mankind. The more we know about the brain, the less we will see it as a printed circuit and the more we will conceptualize it as plastic, constantly molded by the organism's interactions with its environment. Only by leaving behind fixed, linear models of the brain and behaviour and progressing to complex, plastic, networked approaches will we get somewhere. What we will lose is a false sense of security. What we will gain is dynamic and contextual understanding and with it the knowledge that the social acceptance of sexual difference is ground to be gained through the body politic, not the body biological. (1975, p. 256)

What makes us human cannot be reduced to generalist, essentialist structures, be they biological, anthropological or sociological. To be human is to transcend biological or anthropological morphology. Biology does not determine human behaviour and it does not determine gender. In the case of men there are conscious and unconscious choices²¹ to make: to succumb to masculine madness and behave like monsters, like the beast in the sphinx, or to rise above and behave as socially intelligent humans. The only factor determining masculine madness is men themselves.

²¹ The conscious and unconscious choices men make is explored more fully in Chapter 4:6.

2:2 GENDER ONTOLOGY: sex and gender...and the psyche

Can men theorise feminism?...only when the situation is politically intolerable. Therefore it is crucial that [men] are kept vigilant about their assigned subject positions. The position that only the subaltern can know the subaltern, only women can know women...cannot be held as a theoretical presupposition, for it predicates the possibility of knowledge on identity...and knowledge is made possible and sustained by irreducible difference, not identity.

Gayatri Spivak (1988, pp. 253-254)

Masculine madness, responsible for the genocide of Woman in the Western cultural imaginary, cannot be understood without analysis of what masculinity itself is; effectively, what human-ness is. In order to reach that understanding the relationship between sex and gender and what it is to be female/woman or male/man requires examination. I have argued that biology does not determine human behaviour, but neither does biology determine gender – sex yes; but not gender. This chapter explores that relationship.

Beauvoir declared that a society is not a species, for it is in a society that the species attains the status of existence (1997, p. 68). By society Beauvoir refers to the body politic, culture, and ultimately the social typology: *man* or *woman*. By species she is referring to the body biological: *male* or *female*. A woman is a female human, but a woman is not *only* a female human. Beauvoir says, ‘the body is not enough to define a woman’ (1997, p. 69).

The human female body begins at birth with the myriad physiological characteristics that establish it *as* female. At birth however the female human is not woman. Being woman must be seen in light of an ontological, economic, social, and psychological context (Beauvoir 1997, p. 69). The body continues throughout life as biological, but not just biological, it is morphological in the sense that it is an always-changing relationship between elastically evolving physical and metaphysical constituent parts.

Margaret Mooney Marini contends that the term *sex* refers to biologically based distinctions between the sexes, and the term *gender* refers to the social construction of differences between women and men. Marini believes sex refers to the biological typology and gender to the social typology (1990, p. 95). However, if

biology determines sex but does not determine gender, what is the difference between sex and gender?

Sex is a biological/physiological term identifying either of the two main categories (male and female) into which humans, and most other living organisms are divided based on their potential reproductive function. Gender incorporates masculine and feminine traits in elastic being, producing a social typology, the most common types of which are man and woman. Let us recall how Stephen J Gould's devastating critique of selfish-gene theory destroyed the belief that in humans social behaviour is genetically determined, and in doing so discredited the theories of Dawkins, and Wrangham and Peterson. Sex, in the language of Gould is genotypical, resulting from the expression of genes, while gender is phenotypical, resulting from the expression of an organism's genes as well as the influence of environmental factors and the interactions between the two. In this context environmental factors are social, political, economic. Gender is therefore phenotypical, an outcome of the complex interplay between sex, body, feminine/masculine, and social factors.

Borrowing from Šaumjan Soboleva, Julia Kristeva talks of a linguistic distinction between the genotext and the phenotext. Kristeva's genotext is composed of a space that is pre-linguistic and pre-subjective; it inhabits a place that is pre-gender, original sex: 'Unstructured and unstructuring, the genotext has no knowledge of the subject' (1969, p. 223) The phenotext, by contrast, is a complex outcome, a becoming, 'an interpretation, an algebraic way of constructing meaning, it contains the [non-Lacanian] mirror effect of germinating and producing infinitely elastic, motile meaning' (Kristeva 1969, p. 223). While Kristeva uses these terms to populate a linguistic universe, the parallels with pre-subjective genotypical sex, and the complex becoming of phenotypical gender are clear. Indeed, they are allegoric for 'sex' (genotext) and 'gender' (phenotext). Paraphrasing Kristeva: sex and gender function together but not always in exactly the same way or to the same degree. This is an effect of socio-political and historical constraints as gender tries to minimise sex intrusions disrupting and over-coding its desire (Grosz 1989, p. 51).

Sex and sex drives will always intrude, through the body, on gender, just as gender with its socio-political, ethical and historical constraints will resist sex disrupting and over-coding its psyche to turn it back towards primary sex. Kristeva also uses the term 'the semiotic' to designate the contributions of sex drives to signification. This can be taken as the contribution to gender of the pre-gender sexual

drives of the sexed child. Elizabeth Grosz, interpreting Kristeva writes that the semiotic marks out the space or locus the subject-to-be will occupy as a subject. For Freud, this space and energy is dominated by the 'primary processes'. Grosz writes of Kristeva's view:

The semiotic is composed of non-signifying raw materials. It is an anarchic, formless circulation of sexual impulses and energies traversing the child's body *before* sexuality is ordered and hierarchically subsumed under the primacy of genitality and the body becomes a coherent entity. (Grosz 1989, pp. 42-43)

Genes determine sex and participate in coding the body, body and social externalities participate in the ontology of gender. Biology determines sex, bears on body and influences gender. Gender draws from and simultaneously resists sex. On its own this view of sex/body and gender is unpopular: Toril Moi and her *bêtes noires*, the poststructuralist feminists including Judith Butler, Donna Haraway and Elizabeth Grosz, consider it a constructionist, essentialist approach (Moi 1999, p. 33). The poststructuralists argue that to conflate sex and body determines them as abhorrently ahistorical and prediscursive. Moi provides a checklist of terms that regularly recur in the Butler's, Haraway's and Grosz's discussion of sex and gender (1999, pp. 33-34).

SEX

biological
natural
essence
essentialist
body
passive
base
being
substance
fixed
stable
coherent

GENDER

political
cultural
construction
constructionist
mind
active
superstructure
doing
performance
[mobile, variable]
unstable
non-coherent

prediscursive	discursive
prelinguistic	linguistic
presocial	social
ahistorical	historical

Moi correctly asserts that sex and gender cannot easily be assimilated to the binary oppositions so frequently found in the poststructuralist canon. I agree with her when she criticizes this orthodoxy: ‘Many critics believe that a sexed human being is made up of the sum of sex plus gender...suddenly sex and gender start to look like a deconstructable pair’ (Moi 1999, p. 35).

She writes:

Whether I consider a woman to be the sum of sex plus gender, to be nothing but sex, or nothing but gender, I reduce her to sexual difference. Such reductionism is the antithesis of everything feminism ought to stand for. In this context it makes no difference at all whether the woman’s difference is taken to be natural or cultural, essential or constructed. All forms of sexual reductionism implicitly deny that a woman is a concrete, embodied human being (of a certain age, nationality, race, class, and with a wholly unique store of experiences) and not just a human being sexed in a particular way. (Moi 1999, p. 35)

Reducing the sex/gender discourse to sex and/or gender consigns any discussion on the sex/gender continuum to an anathematic discourse, first, by excluding from gender any sociocultural values and, second, by reducing the debate to only sex and gender, excluding any other directly influential factor. To place herself beyond poststructuralist criticism, Moi skilfully introduces sociocultural and demographic references *around* sex and gender. Significantly, however, while saying that the only antidote to reductionism is sound judgement, she herself runs the risk of being accused of reductionism for not situating such features *within* either sex or gender, or by failing to add to sex and gender an additional factor that embodies socio-psychological influences and experiences. A human is born primarily female or male, according to

complex evolutionary and chromosomal combination. That fact is determined by genetic chance.²²

Beauvoir ironically characterises the oft-quoted imbalance between the gametes as the active and vital testicles, on the one hand, and the passive and diminished ovaries on the other (2009, p. 29). Does this tell us that masculinity is more vital from pre-conception? It does not. The biological competition between sperm and ovum is pointless. Biologically, they are simply two messengers, each with half – an equal half – of the story to be told in the progeny they initiate. The new organism, in this case human, cannot be initiated without the DNA from each equal contributor. The germline of the new life needs two complete, separate and complete deliveries of DNA, two hands in one glove. Biologically, the method of delivery is irrelevant. Sexual reproduction occurs even in coral, for example, when millions of eggs and sperm are floated into a neutral sea lit by the moon. These swimmers in the secret sea are participants in sexual reproduction. This is biology. The delivery mechanism and the incubation medium is the warm, eerily lit salty ocean.

Sexual reproduction is more individualised in advanced species. But sperm and ovum, even in humans, are just delivery mechanisms for the two bits of code that, when joined, provide the combination to unlock new life. Even Beauvoir, writing in 1949, recognised that under Mendelian law the chromosomes contain the factors of heredity and they are conveyed equally in eggs and sperm. Talk of passive mother orb of egg, swollen and expectant, surrounded by active lean sperm, ‘free, slender and agile, typifying the impatience and restlessness of existence’ is, argues Beauvoir, totally fatuous. She believes that ‘The truth is that these notions are hardly more than vagaries of mind.’ She continues, ‘male and female gametes fuse in the fertilised egg, they are suppressed in becoming a new whole’ (1997, pp. 35-68). Chromosomes are aggregates of genes that determine everything from hair colour, height, skin and eye colour, to sex. Whether one is born male or female directly depends on the presence or absence of certain genetic combinations on chromosomes.

Nineteenth-century German scientist August Weismann discovered this remarkable phenomenon (1904). He found that a tiny number of cells—the reproductive cells—were separated from the entire universe of somatic (body) cells.

²² I fully acknowledge but do not explore chromosomal abnormalities that provide exceptions to the male/female modality. I do think that such variations are worthy of study, but because of their comparative rarity and the limited space in this study, I leave them to others for now.

These germ cells, as he called them, carry over from generation to generation, bearing a hereditary blueprint for the entire body. The soma, the disposable self, is the body that dies. The germline (sperm and egg) is the force that, through inheritance, lives forever. And Weismann realised that what happens is that the germline stays forever young, insulated from the degeneration of the body. The body ages and is thrown away, but by this time the next generation is reproducing.

Human cells contain 23 pairs of chromosomes for a total of 46. There are two sex chromosomes, X and Y and they combine at conception. The male gametes or sperm cells in humans and other mammals contain one of two types of sex chromosomes. They are either X or Y. The female gametes or eggs, however, contain only the X sex chromosome. If a sperm cell containing an X chromosome fertilizes an egg, the resulting baby will be XX or female. If the sperm cell contains a Y chromosome, then the resulting baby will be XY or male. However even the XX / XY modality is complex and elastic. Biological sex-determination is not simple and certainly does not put one sex or the other in charge – even at the moment of conception. The Y-chromosome, for example, is tiny by comparison with the X and only produces 20-odd proteins, mostly concerned with highly male-specific functions like sperm-production. The X, by contrast, has almost 1200 genes, with at least 150 implicated in intelligence and cognition. But because hardly any genes related to maleness are on the male chromosome, the vast majority must be on autosomes (the 22 non-sex chromosomes) of the X, which are of course carried by females. Evolution is ultimately a question of some genes getting into the future at the expense of others, and consequently genetic conflict, not simple sex-chromosome determinism, is what explains sex-determination. At the very least, these evolutionary and genetic insights give the lie to the common belief that biological sex-determination is crude and simple, that it favours one sex over another, and that it predicts clear-cut sex differences (Badcock 2009, p. 180).

Biological simplifications give rise to stereotypes, and what the evolutionary, genetic and chromosomal complexity in sex expression demonstrates is that reductionist clichés are frequently epistemologically dishonest. If we were to take to heart Hegel's view, for example, that females are fixed and flaccid like plants rooted to one spot throughout their lives, awaiting a visit from the robust and peripatetic male, we might be encouraged by the image of the stationary plump ovum awaiting the vital and vibrant sperm swimming against the tide in competition with all others to be the

one to penetrate the egg and create a new life in its image. Both symbology and science in this case are offensive and wrong. Research by the biophysics laboratory at John Hopkins University realigned the description of the egg from passive to active. According to Emily Martin, the researchers discovered to their great surprise, given the apparently immutable stereotypes around sperm and egg, that the forward thrust of the sperm is extremely weak, and the sperm and the egg actually stick together because of adhesive molecules on the surface of each.

[According to the researchers at John Hopkins] the egg traps the sperm and adheres to it so tightly that the sperm's head is forced to lie flat against the surface of the zona (surface of the egg), a little bit, they told me, 'like Br'er Rabbit getting more and more stuck to tar baby the more he wriggles.' (Martin 1991, pp. 492-493)

As we have seen, the embryo created at conception has a unique DNA, half from the mother and half from the father. It is plain that no advantage adheres to either the X or Y-chromosomes, their complex combinations of genes, or to their resultant male or female embryo. Sex *in utero* is socially, economically and politically neutral, and so is sex after birth. Evolutionary drives and genetic chance determine if we are male or female in all the complexity of gene expression. However while biological facts are important, Beauvoir denies they establish a fixed and inevitable destiny: 'They are insufficient for setting up a hierarchy of the sexes, they fail to explain why woman is the Other, they do not condemn her to remain in this subordinate role forever' (Beauvoir 1997, p. 65).

Gender [woman or man] is social alchemy and, as Beauvoir says, its ways and customs cannot be deduced from base biology, 'for individuals are never abandoned to their nature, rather they obey that second nature...in which the desires and fears that express their ontological attitude are reflected' (Beauvoir 1997, p. 36). Here, when referring to 'that second nature' she refers to 'the self' or the psyche, and adds that 'physiology cannot ground any values, rather the facts of biology take on the values that the existent [the self] bestows upon them' (1997, p. 36). As a baby grows she gains experiences, develops values, builds a personality, embeds in a psyche, becomes a woman. Why she is, in all probability, condemned to remain in a subordinate role forever is addressed below.

Returning to the essentialist criticism by poststructuralists of the sex/gender position, that of the biological typology [male and female] and the social or cultural typology [woman and man], if we take another look at the list of poststructuralists' words frequently applied to *sex*, they view it not only as ahistorical and prediscursive but also as an essence or a substance, and argue that anyone who thinks of the body in relation to biology must be an essentialist. In the poststructuralist feminist discourse, essentialism is an abomination in both a metaphysical and political context. Broadly, essentialist gender positioning is taken to imply that the identities of men and women are biologically fixed and determined (Phoca 2000, p. 58). While this is largely true for sex it is untrue for gender, and as Moi says there is no good reason to assume that someone who thinks it makes sense to speak of sex as natural or biological must therefore be an essentialist (Moi 1999, p. 36).

Beauvoir believes that woman at the level of biology, what I call female, can be defined by reference to the usual primary and secondary sex characteristics, and it would be 'ludicrous to characterise Beauvoir as an essentialist' (Moi 1999, p. 37). The possession of biological and physiological characteristics that define one as female or male, in Beauvoir's view, has no *necessary* social and political consequences, and is therefore not in any sense essentialist, and I agree with Moi that even if it were judged to be in any way essentialist, it would bequeath no negative consequences whatsoever to feminist politics. The only kind of essentialism that feminists need to reject is biological determinism (Moi 1999, p. 37).

Accepting scientific, biological facts does not therefore automatically or necessarily produce causal linkages to social outcomes. That a sexed human being can be either female or male has no essential determinism on the socially evolved woman or man: comparatively yes, but essentially, no. And every woman is differently filled with potentialities for diversity: unique biology and unique expression of gender. Both biological and social evolutions are built around a non-essentialist imperative to deliver diversity and heterogeneity. Our bodies are, as Beauvoir says, an outline or a sketch of the kind of projects it is possible for us to have. The body of woman, she says, is one of the essential elements in her situation in the world, but that body is not enough to define her, it does not gain 'lived reality' unless it is taken on by consciousness through activities and in the bosom of society (Beauvoir 2009, p. 49).

Geddes and Thomson wrote in 1890 that the differences between men and women, 'may be exaggerated or lessened, but to obliterate them it would be necessary

to have all the evolution over again on a new basis,’ and then invoked their famous aphorism, ‘What was decided among the prehistoric Protozoa can not [Sic] be annulled by Act of Parliament’ (Geddes and Thomson 1890, p. 247). It should be noted that Geddes and Thomson were using this maxim to suggest not equality, but rather inequality between the sexes. It has been widely and erroneously used against inequality. That said, it is a useful expression of the disconnectedness of genetic determination of sex [female or male] and the social sketch of the kinds of gender [woman or man] it is possible for us to have.

Resuming Moi’s argument that any discussion focusing only on sex and gender excludes other factors such as age, nationality, race, class, and a wholly unique store of experiences, there is no doubt that the sex/gender model on its own is inadequate. What is missing is an additional factor absent from both Moi’s judgement and poststructuralist discourse, a factor critical in understanding and explaining another important aspect of the sex/gender debate. If we follow Beauvoir’s lead it is the *second nature* and the self or *psyche*. Originating from the Greek word ψυχή (*psūché*) the earliest meaning of psyche was ‘life’, and over time meanings evolved into ‘the self’ and ‘conscious personality’. In Freudian psychoanalysis the psyche refers to the ‘forces’ that influence thought, behaviour and personality. For Freud the psyche was composed of three components:

- The id, which represents the instinctual drives of an individual and remains largely unconscious
- The super-ego, which represents a person’s conscience and his or her internalisation of societal norm and morality
- The ego, which is conscious and serves to integrate the drives of the id with the prohibitions of the super-ego. Freud believed this conflict to be at the heart of all neurosis (Cf. Freud 1960, pp. 18-27).

Cognitive psychology has replaced Freud’s psychoanalysis as the dominant school of psychology, and the word ‘mind’ is preferred to ‘psyche’ (Bucci 1997, p. 14). In the context of this study however, ‘the mind’ is too limiting a catalyst to produce alchemy from sex and gender. The ‘self’ in both psychology and philosophy is one of the dominant aspects of human experience and through the psyche delivers a

compelling sense of one's unique existence, so *psyche* is the additional contributing factor to the sex/gender/body discourse.




Figure 1: Diagram showing sex-gender-psyche relationship

Where sex is determined by genetic chance, gender is endlessly variable. Gender situates itself within the elastically mutable relationship between sex, body, feminine/masculine, and psyche: gender is a continuous becoming, ending only in death (see Figure 1). The body, with its feminine/masculine influences, is the interstitial and dynamic world connecting sex [female] and gender [woman]. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes in *Phenomenology of Perception* (2005), ‘the body is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is restricted to the actions necessary for the conservation of life, and accordingly it posits around us a biological world, at other times, elaborating upon these primary actions and moving from their literal to a figurative meaning, it manifests through them a core of new significance...to be a body, is to be tied to a certain world...our body is not primarily in space: it is of it’ (2005, pp. 169-171).

The body is physiology, sexed and, with the psyche and feminine/masculine influences, inspires gender. According to Beauvoir, the body is the instrument of our grasp upon the world, and through its endless variability, the world is bound to seem a very different thing when apprehended in one manner rather than another. One interpretation of this changing perception is the continuous circular interplay between body, feminine/masculine and the psyche as the ontological reality of gender (e.g. being woman) moves back and forth along the gender continuum (see Figure 1). Julia Kristeva asserts that although the elements here engrained in gender are correlated

with sexual characteristics, they are not readily coded in terms of male/female sexual *identities*. Rather, within each subject and each social and signifying practice, there is a play of masculine and feminine, a play not of sexual difference but of differentiation (in Grosz 1989, p. 69).

Irigaray in saying that ‘across the whole world, there are, *there are only*, men and women,’ (1996, p. 47), joins Grosz and Spivak (quoted as an introduction to this chapter) in refusing to situate identity in gender. She also joins Spivak in arguing for recognition of difference between men and women – not the binary difference of Lacan that sees man as man and woman as non-man, but rather the difference of two irreducibly distinct entities. In fact, gender is a crucial ontological factor in what makes humans human: being human requires gender. Without the presence of gender, humans are only animal. Every mammal has a sex, but only humans have gender. To be gendered is to be human, and to be human is to be gendered. Sex is a concrete, fixed state. Gender, human gender, is a fluid becoming constantly in flux. This cultural ontology is critical to understanding gender and differentiating it from sex.

A woman’s sex-related body charged by feminine and masculine polarities, suffused through the psyche with the potentialities of becoming, and causally connected to gender, is what Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Beauvoir call ‘a situation’ (Beauvoir 2009, p. 49; Merleau-Ponty 2005, p. 92). It is not a fixed, carved-in-stone object but a situation. It is situated physically and metaphysically along the gender continuum, and is in itself a situation in which all factors are at play. Gender, once initiated, changes its meaning as it changes its location. As Linda Alcoff writes: ‘To say that location *bears* on meaning and truth is not the same as saying location *determines* meaning and truth’ (1991-2, pp. 5-32). Put another way: to say that biology *bears* on the meaning and truth of gender, has an influence on gender, is not the same as saying that biology *determines* gender.

Biological determinists like Darwin, Spencer, Rousseau, Hegel and the ill-fated political advisor Max Tomlinson concoct a meaning of the relationship between biology and gender that has no truth. What is true is that biology does not determine gender and, as Richard Dawkins is fond of saying, if something is true, no amount of wishing can make it untrue.

2:3 DIFFERENCE AND DISCRIMINATION: subjugating women

Having analysed biology, human sex, and gender, the next stage of evaluation is what and why social inequality exists in gender differentiation and stratification. What, for example, makes acceptable the social, economic and political subordination of women, the modern genocide of Woman, masculine madness? And what makes subordination of women the ‘natural order’?

The lineage of androcentrism is not a just a failure to include, but represents the active oppression of, women. To paraphrase Michèle Le Dœuff, the problem is not really how to include women but how to rethink the ways in which society has participated in women’s oppression (Grosz 1989, p. 204). Biological stability is often invoked to excuse the treatment of women. Women were seen as the fecund yet passive channel through which new life, spawned by active men, was delivered. To protect breeding integrity, women must be faithful while men’s promiscuity was healthy for the survival of a race. In later times it became known as natural selection for genetic fitness. Biological facts, however, as we have seen, fail to explain why woman is the Other, and do not condemn her to remain in this subordinate role forever.

Beauvoir claims that (1) biological facts only take on meaning when they are situated within economic, social and psychological contexts, (2) biological facts are nevertheless important elements in women’s situation, (3) biological facts alone cannot define a woman, (4) the body alone does not define a woman – on the contrary, she needs to make it her own, turn it into a lived reality, (5) biology cannot explain the social subordination of women (in Moi 1999, p. 71).

The social subordination of women has long been and remains the life’s work of men subscribing to a social, economic and political system that devalues the worth of women, diminishing their significance in society. It places women in a subordinate role forever. After centuries of androcentric phallocracy, it is reasonable to propose that regardless of how sensitive to social injustice some men are, they do not do enough to change the system of dominance, to redress the widespread disadvantage women experience throughout their lives, to prevent the genocide of Woman and eruptions of masculine madness. In short, agreeing with Grosz, I am arguing that women’s oppression is not caused by their anatomies or physiologies, but by the

transmission and internalisation of the social meaning and value accorded to women's bodies by a misogynist culture (Grosz 1989, p. xx).

It is easier to understand why some women would want to get ahead in the male system, even at the cost of leaving behind other women, than it is to understand why some men would want to jettison the privileges of male supremacy (MacKinnon and Douglas 1983, p. 2). This inability or unwillingness to disadvantage themselves by dismantling systemic privilege leads to a simmering combination of loathing for women for making men feel guilty, and the construction of a belief system that quarantines men from facing the truth that they enjoy vast privilege that is unearned. Most countries, asserts Catharine MacKinnon, proclaim a commitment to equality and yet few, if any, deliver it substantively to women: 'You don't have countries saying, "Yes, we have sex discrimination here and want it. We're entitled to it and enjoy it." You don't have them saying that, you have them doing it' (1989, p. 161). Men in power simply fail to undo the unthinkable: disadvantage themselves by eliminating unmerited advantage. MacKinnon believes society so comprehensively fails to recognise the hierarchies that have subordinated women for so long that those structures have become perceived as *natural*. The dominance of men over women has thus been accomplished socially as well as economically prior to the operation of law, in the guise of everyday life.

Gender is a social system that divides power. It is therefore also a political system. In this way, over time, women have been economically exploited, relegated to domestic slavery, forced into motherhood, sexually objectified, physically abused, used in denigrating entertainment, deprived of a voice and authentic culture, and disenfranchised and excluded from public life (MacKinnon 1989, p. 9). In Western culture the social and economic subordination of women within a political system created and perpetuated by men with oppression and exclusion as its ethos, appears immutable, a necessary pre-condition for masculine domination that has at its core masculine madness. Recall Carole Pateman revealing that the patriarchal construction of the difference between man and woman is the political difference between freedom and subjection, and that sexual mastery is the major means through which men affirm their manhood. The construction of the socio-political difference between genders as the difference between freedom and subjection is not merely central, it is the very structure of our society, and our everyday lives, and incorporates the patriarchal conception of difference (1988, p. 207).

Difference is frequently at the heart of feminist theory and debate. *Difference* between men and women is often depicted as oppositional and binary – a positive condition (man) and an opposing negative condition (woman), the *subject* (man) and the *Other* (woman). Difference is therefore invoked to affirm the freedom of men and subjugation of women; it unfavourably compares women unfavourably to men, with men constituting the standard against which women are considered lesser beings or non-men.²³ *Difference* must however not be confused with the *dichotomous difference* of Lacan. Where *dichotomy* defines a pair of terms by a relation of presence and absence, *difference* denotes that each of the two terms has an existence autonomous of the other. Each term exists independently in its own right. Where dichotomies take on the A/not-A form, differences take on the form of A/B relations (Grosz 1989, p. xvii), that is, non-binary, non-opposing independents. Irigaray declares that she ‘cannot avoid the conclusion that women and men represent two different worlds, two visions of the world that remain irreducibly distinct’ (2000, p. 151).

Lisa Guenther observes that the forms of this difference are shaped by ways of engendering and being engendered (2010, p. 25). Women are engendered in a body that is of the same sex, they procreate within their own bodies, and they are able to nourish others with their bodies (Irigaray 2000, p. 151). Men are born to a different gender, they procreate outside of themselves, and their bodies are not able to nourish others directly (2000, p. 151).

Irigaray criticises androgyny as a passing fad that offers what may seem to be an ‘ethical solution to the division of the genders’ but turns out to be ‘delusional,’ ‘decadent,’ and ‘weird’ unless it takes ‘sexual [gender] difference as both its setting out point and its destination’ (1993, pp. 122-123). In a rather outdated view of difference, Jacques Derrida, in agreement with Nietzsche, claims that there are two kinds of women. The first are *feminists*, whose project is simply the reversal of phallocentrism, that is, to strive to be like men, to have a fixed identity. Here Derrida correctly identifies the flaw in the equality narrative, but to claim that it is the only aim of feminists is not now (if ever) true (Grosz 1989, p. 34). Certainly it is a criticism of Beauvoir by some poststructuralist feminists, but it is no truer for Beauvoir than for contemporary feminism. Derrida’s second and more relevant kind of women are those who *differ* from rather than act as opposites of the masculine, and in their difference

²³ This attitude has permeated since Aristotle wrote that women are not in fact fully human. Aristotle’s ‘first principles’ are the existence of slaves by nature and the inferiority of women (Irwin, 1989, p. 358).

subvert and threaten to undermine masculine privilege (Grosz 1989, p. 34).

In truth the patriarchy incubates and cultivates the dichotomous view of difference at a personal and a state level. Women are destined by discriminatory regulation at a country level to remain the diminished opposites of men. Colin Farrelly questions why it is that some countries lag in terms of improving the treatment of women (2011, pp. 14-15). Are the religions of these countries oppressive? Is it because these countries simply lack the political will to treat women more as equals? According to the version of Marxist feminism Farrelly advances, all of these questions and their answers misdiagnose the real cause of gender oppression: 'The real answer lies in the differences among the productive forces of these different societies' (Farrelly 2011, pp. 14-15). It is not rational, he argues, for societies with more limited productive powers, and higher rates of morbidity and mortality, to forfeit higher fertility rates for the benefits of women gaining greater access to the paid workforce. So improving the life prospects of women lies with overcoming the challenges of scarcity and high child mortality. 'Economic liberalization (in particular, market-labor flexibility), which was spurred by advances in public health like the sanitation revolution, immunizations, and so on, have helped free some of the world's women from the most oppressive forms of patriarchal relations.' Farrelly advances gender oppression as the natural order, that is, natural according to nature (strength, productivity, reproductivity), natural according to what is expected, status quo, universal. He claims that certain economic or social conditions can free women from their 'natural' oppression. While it may be true that the power of patriarchy can weaken in an enlightened, socially progressive society – or when women have economic or property power – it is problematic to embody the *natural* status for women as men's inferior. And it is anthropologically inaccurate to claim that 'improving the life prospects of women lies with overcoming the challenges of scarcity and high child mortality' (Farrelly 2011, pp. 14-15).

According to Marini in her landmark anthropological meta-analysis of research into gender discrimination, it is access to valuable resources rather than the challenges of high child mortality that creates a power imbalance in gender inequity, and men have always been in a better position to acquire and control valuable resources. Indeed, power, privilege and status have rarely, if ever, been shared by women and men on an equal basis (1990, p. 96).

Again, while discrimination against women can be viewed as structuralist, that is, generalised, universal, and based on a long established historicised oppression – or through the lens of a prediscursive, ahistorical sense of gender difference proposed by post-structuralists – it is the life's work of men regardless of theoretical or political agendas. Men subscribe to a social, economic and political system that devalues the worth of women by excluding them from the valuable resources of social, political and economic capital. So it is that men drive dichotomous gender role differentiation and results in gender stereotypes that do more to determine gender disadvantage and dispossession than biology ever could.

Marini finds that gender role differentiation is associated with behaviour, attitudes, and dispositional traits (1990, p. 96). This differentiation, she says, leads to gender stereotyping. Put another way, stereotyping is the process of consensual *beliefs* about differences between the genders – dichotomous differences – so stereotypes are not evidence-based but rather perceptual beliefs, in this case propagated by men, and under duress compliantly agreed to by women. As mentioned previously, Beauvoir famously said the oppressor would not succeed without the (consensual) compliance of the oppressed. If women in a dichotomous relationship of difference to men are excluded from the valuable resources of social, political and economic capital for long enough, even they will yield to the pressure and consent to stereotypical gender classifications. However, there is no evidence to support the stereotypes of dichotomous difference. Gender stereotypes persuade people to believe the social, economic and political differences between women and men to be far greater than they actually are. Marini reports that research on genuine gender role differences indicate that there is very little basis in fact for gender stereotypes. While men and women 'represent two different worlds, two visions of the world that remain irreducibly distinct' (Irigaray 2000, p. 151), they are both humans with almost identical strengths and weaknesses.

On the psychosocial surface, at the level of stereotypes, there is no consistent evidence that women and men differ in cognitive style, creativity, independence, susceptibility to influence, general self-esteem, emotionality, empathy, nurturance, sociability, or loquacity (Marini 1990, p. 98). It is beneath the surface that masculine madness lurks, beneath stereotypes, as a potentiality awaiting expression and eruption. What gives rise to shallow, incoherent and misleading stereotypes is the lineage they share from the Enlightenment and modernity, through postmodernity to the

patriarchy of contemporary society. Androcentrism and dominative masculinity were always was the work of men, great thinking men and ordinary compliant men, who believed that biology favoured them from birth. Research on infants and young children debunks the belief that, because they have had relatively little exposure to cultural/social influences, gender advantage emerging at a young age must have a biological basis (Marini 1990, p. 98). In fact, research between girls and boys in abilities and dispositional traits has found surface evidence of few differences before late childhood and adolescence. Of all assumed gender role differences in children, only aggression in boys appears to emerge at preschool ages (1990, p. 96). The stereotypes of gender, even at early ages, are therefore not based on fact.

In relation to gender stratification, Rae Lesser Blumberg highlights the connection between power and privilege. She sees economic power as the key determinant of women's access to the scarce, valued resources of a society – including possessions, perquisites, prerogatives, freedoms, honour, preference, status and prestige. The power of property, real and monetary, is more important than the power of force, the power of political position, or the power of ideology. For example, when their economic power is high, the use of force against women tends to be restrained (Blumberg 1984, pp. 23-101). The rise of real and monetary property influence is situated in the industrialisation of modernity, and the record of historical change since the coming of industrialisation provides strong evidence of the malleability of gender roles and associated attitudes in response to social influences (Marini 1990, p. 108). It was in modernity and modernisation in particular that the gender disadvantage was entrenched, specifically the systemic and organised social subjugation of women. With the advent of industrialisation, production and as a consequence work, increasingly became performed away from the home for monetary compensation. Marini finds that an absence of demand for women's labour outside the home led to a heightened differentiation of roles and influence within the family. Men increasingly became central to the production of goods away from home and therefore participants in the production of economic value, and women decreasingly participate in the production and utility of goods, and integral to the rearing of children in the home. This was an impossible position for women. The goods they had produced in the home were now being mass-produced by men in factories and the economic influence of women became correspondingly further diminished. The economic power of men, contrasting the loss of economic power of women, privileged

men in late modernity. They were able to earn money, accumulate capital, rent or purchase property, and in doing so assumed a position more powerful than that of their wives. Regardless of how forceful, political or ideological the women were, the power of property was more important. Even during the Second World War, when women took the place of men in fields and factories, they only became pseudo-men. Women had an opportunity to fill the metaphorical shoes of men, to assume a masculine shape, to construct an allegory of woman as woman in the guise of man, albeit without the benefits of being men. Unsurprisingly, as men returned from the war they reclaimed the place considered they not only normative, but their transcendent right.²⁴

Yet while the power of property explains the concretion of masculine dominance during modernisation, the latest step in the four thousand year-old lineage of man/superior – woman/inferior, there is simply no evidence for masculine superiority. Despite a lack of evidence, discrimination against women, and the creation of gender stereotypes gained momentum during the industrialization and modernization of Western culture. Men were free of the home, economically more powerful, and mixing and identifying with other men. They saw themselves as more valuable than women, and women, lacking the tools of power, compliantly agreed to the discriminatory relationship. Janet Chafetz views gender stereotypes and the degree to which systemic dominant religions or secular ideologies explicitly support them, and the inequality they promulgate, as key factors that buttress the system of gender stratification (in Marini 1990, p. 105). The lineage of androcentric dominance and the masculine politics of exclusion explicitly support gender stereotyping and inequality.

The creation of stereotypes however, appears one-sided. The presence of aggression as the only differentiating factor between young boys and girls for example gives rise to no stereotype. Aggression in young boys is normative (Bhana 2009, pp. 327-339), because men, buttressing the system of gender stratification to their advantage, do nothing to dismantle systemic oppression. That boys exhibit aggression at a young age should be taken as a warning of the nascent potential of masculine madness. How is it that we stereotype the behaviour of girls in play with dolls and tea sets as subservient women in the making, but fail to see aggression in boys as the beast stirring in the sphinx? Refusal to stereotype masculine aggression epitomises the use of

²⁴ This point about women working during World War Two is repeated and expanded in Chapter 4:4.

dominative reason by the dominant masculinity (men) to secure advantageous position, and it extends beyond childhood into manhood. Meeker and Weitzel-O'Neill found that because men have higher status than women, competitive behaviour is viewed as legitimate for men but not for women (Marini 1990, p. 113). Aggressively competitive behaviour by men is viewed as a reasoned masculine legitimacy rather than stereotypical masculine aggression.

Men have used, have owned, reason and rationality, most recently since the Enlightenment, to dominate and constrain, and the principal outcomes have been dystopian. This is the true heart of masculine madness: a privileged use of gendered power to dominate and destroy. As we have seen, gender reveals itself to be an ontological necessity in being human, or in the language of Rita Felski, a central organising metaphor for the human condition itself, where, 'the fantasm of the feminine plays a pivotal role, embodying the principle of resistance and a utopian alternative to the constraints of dominating reason' (1995, p. 2). Stereotyping and inequality act to subjugate women, revealing that the patriarchal construction of the difference between men and women is the political difference between freedom and subjection, and that sexual mastery is the major means through which men affirm their manhood (Pateman 1988, p. 207).

Marini writes:

Because women and men perform different social roles, they exhibit different repertoires. Gender differentiation in social roles therefore produces gender differences in behaviors, abilities, and dispositional traits. These learned differences have little or no biological basis. These stereotypes exaggerate actual differences and ascribe them to biological factors. Although it is logically possible for [men and women] to be 'separate (different) but equal,' the degree of gender role differentiation in a society is strongly related to the degree of gender inequality (Sanday 1974). 'Different' usually [typically] means unequal, since the roles filled by [women and men] do not bring the same power and privilege. (1990, p. 110)

Another process by which individuals adopt gender-specific behaviour, attitudes and traits is through the allocation of individuals to institutional positions based on gender. Where socialisation shapes the choices of individuals by conditioning their desires and

expectations, allocation involves the channelling of individuals into positions based on gender, irrespective of their desires and expectations. In 1990 it was estimated that 96 per cent of the workers of one gender would have to change job titles to equalise the distribution of the two genders across a workforce, and that perceptions about the suitability of women and men for different types of work are based largely on gender stereotypes that are inaccurate (Marini 1990, p. 110). No evidence has been found to indicate that much has changed since then.

Men and women are different, seeing the same world through very different yet equally valid eyes. There is no and should never be gender sameness; there is and should always be true, separate, gender difference. The social, political and economic disadvantage faced by women is therefore unjustifiable. Men do not enjoy any natural advantage, only the corrupt advantage of social inequity enjoyed on the dominative surface condition that throws a thin veil over the potential for masculine madness.

2:4 SAVAGE TORPOR: moral blindness

Laws to, at a minimum, redress artificial gender inequities are made by the state, but MacKinnon believes the state is male in a gendered sense, and the law sees and treats women the way men see and treat women. The state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interests of men as a gender, through its legitimating norms, forms, relation to society, and substantive policies (MacKinnon 1989, p. 11).

The law often has a difficult time judging women's social, political and economic inequalities, or simply is powerless to do so because of the distinction between private and public life. Since much of the injustice women experience occurs in intimate private settings, legally, this puts them legally in a very vulnerable position. MacKinnon theorises that the opposite of equality is not dichotomous difference but hierarchy as social constructs. Equality therefore requires the promotion of status equality for historically subordinated groups, dismantling group hierarchy. This goes beyond gender equality depicted as oppositional and binary, and points to the need for status or social equality. It summons the need for true difference in which men and women each have value autonomous of the other.

The gender equality narrative inaugurated by early feminist philosophers and successively prosecuted by socially progressive men and women adheres to a legacy of women trying to be like men, of binary opposition in which men are A and women are not-A, but would like to be A, because then equality would be achieved. As a gender argument this is deeply problematic given that women simply move from the status of non-men to that of pseudo-men. Social equality is, however, a worthy goal. In MacKinnon's view, this challenge requires a substantive approach to equality jurisprudence in its examination of hierarchy, whereas before, abstract notions of equality sufficed (MacKinnon 1989, p. 161). She writes:

Women have systematically been subjected to physical insecurity, targeted for sexual denigration and violation; depersonalized and denigrated; deprived of respect, credibility, and resources; and silenced—and denied public presence, voice, and representation of their interests. Men as men have generally not had these things done to them; that is, men have had to

be Black or gay (for instance) to have these things done to them as men.

Men have done these things to women. (MacKinnon 1989, p. 9)

As for why women consent to stereotypes and are complicit in their oppression, MacKinnon believes that women have a substantial stake in not seeing their situation from the standpoint of women: 'Some women relate to women's situation in ways that are very much like the way men relate to women's situation, because they think it is in their interest, although of course I think it is against their interest' (1983, p. 18).

In the subjugation and oppression of women, men and, according to MacKinnon many women, subscribe to a politics of indifference: either they do not know and therefore do not care, or they know and do not care. Paradoxically enough, says Geoffrey Hartman, even the media's extended eyes and ears, so important to informed action, to helping men and women *know*, also distance the reality of what is perceived. Terrible things, acts of masculine madness, by continuing to be shown, begin to appear normal, a natural rather than manmade catastrophe. Eruptions of evil, including domestic violence, gang rapes, murders, wars and genocides, take on an air of normality when frequency and rationality are applied. Zygmunt Bauman spoke of the production of moral indifference (Bauman and Donskis 2013) and Albert Einstein famously said, 'The world is in greater peril from those who tolerate or encourage evil than from those who actually commit it' (Corredor 1957, p. 11). A desensitizing of this kind, what Robert Lifton calls 'psychic numbing', was already noticed by Wordsworth near the beginning of the modernity's Industrial Revolution. He complained in 1800 of a 'degrading thirst after outrageous stimulation' which was blunting 'the discrimination powers of the mind' and reducing it to 'a state of almost savage torpor' (Hartman 2002, pp. 100-101). People were losing their ability to be moved by shocking sights and events. Bauman calls this savage torpor *moral blindness* describing it as a callous, compassionless and heartless kind of behaviour (Bauman and Donskis 2013, p. 13).

One night during the 2012 London Olympics when young swimmers, girls as young as 14 away from their parents for the first time, were trying to get a good night's sleep before their events, Australian swimmer Michael Cowley and other men on the swimming team caused a major disruption. Later interviewed for a newspaper, Cowley said:

I know the night, there's no denying that stuff happened in the hotel: we'd been out on a movie night. We went and saw the new Batman movie – all the boys together, just hanging out and just being boys, being dumb. I'm being truthful. We were just being boys. Just prank calling in the hotel and stuff and door-knocking the girls' doors, but it was all harmless fun. (Cowley 2012)

Cowley and his friends considered *being boys* and consequently *being dumb* as an acceptable causal linkage and a perfectly reasonable explanation for their behaviour. Although only young they had already lost their ability to be moved by ordinary conditions, sights and events. Their 'savage torpor' made them indifferent to the needs of the young women, and in the men's eyes their disruptive behaviour was acceptable because it had been normal from childhood to treat girls as non-men. To the young men it was 'harmless fun', they were just kidding around, it was just a joke. The usual response of men caught in the spotlight of sexism, that surface infection of entrenched discrimination, is 'Get over it, it was just a bit of fun,' or 'Move on, it's no big deal: what's your problem?' The normative narrative masking masculine madness numbs us to its brutality in form of *habituation*: simply put, habituation is a decrease in response to a stimulus after repeated presentations. Habituation is the behavioural practice of the politics of indifference.

In October 2012 the then Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard in Parliament berated Opposition Leader Tony Abbot in Parliament for his repeated discriminatory comments on the public record including, for example, 'I think it would be folly to expect that women will ever dominate or even approach equal representation in a large number of areas simply because their aptitudes, abilities and interests are different for physiological reasons' (Abbott 2010). In less than two weeks 3 million people viewed Ms Gillard's anti-misogyny response on YouTube, with international media applauding the Prime Minister for expressing what millions of women thought and felt. In Australia however the parliamentary press gallery barely reported the speech other than to urge both sides to 'stop the gender wars' or to 'get over it' and 'move on'. One national newspaper ran an editorial labelling the speech as 'an absurd insult to the vast majority of Australian men and women.' I have included the editorial in full:

The extreme feminist position that Opposition Leader Tony Abbott is a woman hater because he reflects endemic misogyny in our society is an absurd insult to the vast majority of Australian men and women and a sorry commentary on the indulgent nonsense that fomented in our social 'science' university departments.

It is troubling that Australia's first female Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, should indulge in this post-1960s tradition by labelling Mr Abbott a misogynist and that our national dictionary should so readily follow the diktat to conflate the centuries-old idea of a pathological hatred of women with modern feminist notions of sexism.

This newspaper champions free debate. But many readers would have been astounded by Susan Sheridan's opinion piece yesterday in which she claimed that misogyny is a 'cultural norm' rather than an individual aberration.

Dr Sheridan, an adjunct professor in English and women's studies at Flinders University, argues that Mr Abbott is a misogynist because he inhabits and reflects a culture 'with a long tradition of hatred and fear of women'. She claims even women who do not consciously resist our modern society's long tradition of sexism may speak and act in ways that are misogynist. This type of feminist fundamentalism bears similarities to other fundamentalist ideologies including Marxism, green environmentalism and religious fanaticism, all of which draw on notions of oppression and hierarchical power structures that jar with the reality of our modern pluralist culture.

Dr Sheridan's suggestion that even women can unconsciously act and speak in a misogynist manner harks back to the Marxist idea of 'false consciousness', whereby even the consuming middle classes don't understand they are being oppressed. The proletariat may have been 'oppressed' in the early industrial revolution that prompted Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to publish *The Communist Manifesto* in 1848. Rather than revolting, however, the working class has long ago mostly morphed into a prosperous middle class that itself increasingly owns the means of production. As Paul Keating notes, Labor has failed to embrace the aspirational class that its own economic reforms encouraged in the 1980s. Similarly, the role of women has been transformed since Germaine Greer's *The Female Eunuch* 40 years ago. Ms Gillard would have had far better cause to raise the status of women, particularly low-caste women, in

India over the past few days. Contemporary Australian women can still face some discrimination. But it is ridiculous to claim we are part of a culture ‘infected’ by a hatred and fear of women. Sexuality and gender roles are far more complex and deeply embedded in the human condition than antagonistic ‘power’ relations: you could say there are many shades of grey to it. In other words, there are many shades of gray to this issue.

Ms Gillard’s decision to accuse Mr Abbott of misogyny was based on political motives rather than any genuine grievance, and the debate has subsequently been hijacked by social media radicals and our politically correct chattering class. Rather than using outlandish claims and Orwellian word manipulation to exaggerate differences between people, politicians and thought leaders should encourage all Australians to make the most of the abundant opportunities this privileged society provides, whatever their gender, race or social background.²⁵

To claim as ridiculous that ‘we are part of a culture “infected” by a hatred and fear of women’ serves to highlight the politics of indifference and to emphasise the habituation of structural misogyny. The numbing and desensitizing of a society in inverse proportion to how much misogyny it is exposed to assumes a normative condition: the more we see, the less we care. According to Hartman, however, there is a link between epistemology and morality, between how we get to know what we know and the moral life we aspire to lead (2002, p. 102). Olympian Michael Cowley, Opposition Leader Tony Abbott, and, one assumes, the leader-writer at the *Australian Financial Review*, all influential men, behave as men numbed and desensitized to the culture of misogyny, contributing to rather than combating the normative condition of entrenched discrimination against women.

Terrence des Pres shapes the dilemma of moral indifference with the precision of a proverb: ‘Thanks to the technological expansion of consciousness, we [can] know the extent of political torment, and in truth it may be said that what others suffer, we behold’ (in Hartman 2002, p. 104). ‘What others suffer, we behold’ is like a second fall from innocence, a second bite of the Edenic apple. It removes all excuse by taking away our ignorance, without at the same time granting us the power to do something decisive (2002, p. 104). Despite knowing, men do nothing, and when good men do nothing, masculine madness feeds on savage torpor in readiness to express itself in

²⁵ Editorial (leader-writer unknown), *Australian Financial Review*, Friday 29 October 2012.

unthinkable ways. Throughout the era since the humbling death of modernity, the re-emergent patriarchal power struggle has been observed and documented. Merely observing the social imbalance does not however explain the underlying cause of the need for masculine domination.

Beauvoir believes that humanity ontologically is male and that man defines woman not in herself, but as relative to him: she is not regarded as an autonomous being. He is the subject, he is the absolute, she is the Other.

To decline to be the Other, to refuse to be a party to the deal – this would be for women to renounce all the advantages conferred on them by their alliance to the superior caste ... women have no past, no history, no religion of their own ... they live dispersed among the males, attached through residence, housework, economic condition, and social standing to certain men – fathers or husbands – more firmly than they are to other women. (Beauvoir 1997, pp. xviii, xix, xxiv)

It is through gainful employment, asserts Beauvoir that woman has traversed most of the distance that separates her from man, and nothing else can guarantee her liberty in practice. 'Once she ceases to be a parasite, the system based on her dependence crumbles; between her and the universe there is no longer any need for a masculine mediator...she concretely affirms her status as subject' (Beauvoir 1997, p. 775). Men are, however, resistant to women achieving liberty. Discriminatory stereotypes and unearned advantage suit men: they are symbols of normality, of moral blindness. Masculine madness disrupts the symbology, however, with sexual harassment and physical violence against women, spilling out of the heterotopian space. The genocide of Woman, perpetrated by Man in the grip of masculine madness, defied law and morality, and in the name of tyrannical reason set in train a new brutal lineage of social, political, economic and physical oppression that continues today. MacKinnon points out that every year roughly the same number of women are murdered by men as were killed on 9/11 in the Twin Towers disaster.

That event triggered a war on terrorism. But where is the war on masculine madness? We are perpetually blind to it, inured to it, insensitive to it. Western society appears to have an infinite capacity for observing the unspeakable and remaining not only mute, but blind and deaf: unmoved, untouched and unknowing. This

phenomenon can be witnessed in the workplace, where women's sexual availability has for so long been taken for granted by men that many fail to even recognise when they are sexually harassing a woman; they know that sexual harassment is inappropriate but do not know that what they are doing is sexual harassment.

Men are abusing and battering an increasing number of women. According to the US National Center for Victims of Crime Web, an estimated six million women are assaulted by a male partner each year. Almost two million of these women are severely injured (Giroux 2002, pp. 55-80). But where is the outrage at these eruptions of masculine madness? We see on our television screens a dolphin bashed by young offenders, and national outrage ensues. In Australia a young man shot and killed 35 people at historic Port Arthur in Tasmania and the nation came to a standstill faced with the terror of innocent lives snuffed out so senselessly. The shooting of students on a university campus or the attempted assassination of a politician has millions of people rushing to their screens. But where is the outrage when millions of women are, in acts of masculine madness, murdered, mutilated and sexually assaulted? We are so used to the subjugation of women, to gender stereotypes, to systemic discrimination, to masculine madness, that the perpetrators hide in plain sight. So much of the beast stirring in the sphinx is experienced in private, out of the reach of the law, beyond legislative protection, that, in savage torpor, it goes unremarked and largely unexamined. And the social, political and economic subjugation of women remains the life's work of men subscribing to a social, economic and political system that devalues the worth of women, diminishing their value to society. Men do nothing to change the system of dominance, to redress the disadvantage women experience forever.

MacKinnon said in a *Guardian* interview in 2006, 'I think it's only because it's men doing it against women that it isn't seen as war' (Jeffries 2006, p. 8). The war is, however, real, and seemingly unending.

2:5 OEDIPAL SCHISM: the origin of masculine madness

Masculine madness is a potential becoming of Man, an ontology over which men have conscious and unconscious influence. It manifests differently in different men but is nevertheless immanent and perpetually imminent. Such behaviour is driven, not by biology or evolutionary psychology, but by deeper drives. In this chapter I examine the underpinning of masculine madness, deep in the psychoanalytic symbology of the Western cultural imaginary. In psychoanalytic terms masculine madness inhabits the heterotopian space filled with hatred of mother womb. Locating it in the Lacanian *imaginary* where the ego is fashioned and a child's identification of its own image forms in the mirror-stage, it is what I call the Oedipal schism.

Masculine madness originates in the Oedipal schism.

At the Oedipal schism Woman is *creator*. She is ultimate power. Man is *created* only at the will of Woman. *Created* is a past participle, the past tense of the verb *create*, subordinate to the present and future denotation of *creator* (*noun*: one who creates). Deep in the psyche Man is subordinate to the present and future denotation of Woman.

The violent separation between *creator* and *created* occurs at the Oedipal schism when the baby son stops being in harmony, at one with the *creator*, and is banished to the futile territory of the *created*. This parallels Freud's third or phallic stage of the Oedipus complex, when the boy wants the mother exclusively (Schaffer 2009, p. 40). The introjection of the father's threat of castration serves only to fuel the boy's anger against the mother. Loss of masculine subjectivity at the Oedipal schism is replaced by eternal rage at the Mother, at Woman. Throughout time Man strives to regain the equilibrium lost at the schismic moment.

Hatred for Woman and the irredeemably demoted condition of the *created* initiates a desire in men to be dominators, sexual predators, irrepressibly ambitious, and driven to regain power from the *creator*; and it develops in Man the potential for masculine madness. What men describe as desire for women is, in Hegelian terms, a need for negation of the *creator*, a compulsion to revisit what can never again be realised, that is the Kristevan pre-Oedipal phase where sexual difference did not exist, in pre-linguistic, pre-subjective sex (Lowe 1993, p. 154). All male desire is therefore a combative trigger for the son to destroy the power of Mother and cuckold Father.

This drive for negation of *the creator*, destruction of Mother, is the potential of Man, and masculine madness is the weapon. This is the mythic division of Woman and Man, the fountainhead of masculine madness, the unconscious drive to cause the social death of Woman. This is the beast stirring in the sphinx. Since Freud, these unconscious drives have been widely accepted as elemental by contemporary psychoanalysts. German psychoanalyst Karen Horney believes that unconscious strivings in the centre of psychic disturbances are developed in order to cope with life despite fears, helplessness, and isolation (1968, p. 38). Post-schismic psychic disturbances caused by the loss of synergy with Mother initiate unconscious drives to dominate and subjugate Woman in order to help Man cope with the intense sense of helplessness and isolation. Nietzsche makes use of the term ‘unconscious’, but more frequently refers to instincts and drives as the real motivations determining our actions and our consciously held values and beliefs (Mitcheson 2004, p. 42). As Katrina Mitcheson says, this seems to imply operations at an unconscious level (2004, p. 42). Unconscious drives pose moral choices to Man and conscious decisions to men. According to Abraham Maslow, psychoanalysis demonstrates that the ‘relationship between a conscious desire and the ultimate unconscious aim that underlies it need not be at all direct, that everyday conscious desires are unreliable and to be regarded, as surface indicators of more basic needs’ (1987, p. 30).

Man’s dreadful potential is concealed from him in the unconscious and camouflaged by the very cultural and social norms that give men agency to choose how they respond. Typically, in response to diminished Man, compensation takes place in the psyche of men, giving rise to the phallocratic power structures of science, business, the media, philosophy, the discourse of Man as subject – those places where Woman is still the *creator* but women are oppressed by men struggling to redress the *created* status of Man. In psychology, *compensation* is a strategy whereby one covers up, consciously or unconsciously, weaknesses, frustrations, desires, and feelings of inadequacy or incompetence in one life area through the gratification or drive towards excellence in another area. The compensation strategy, however, does not truly address the source of inferiority and results in a reinforced feeling of inferiority (Singy 2002, p. 89). This loop of insignificance guarantees tenure of the beast in the sphinx.

While *the creator* is anchored in a Western cultural imaginary, embedded deep in the power of myth, it has a useful parallel in Eastern culture:²⁶ the Hindu *Shakti* is the divine feminine creative power, the sacred force that moves through the entire universe, the female counterpart without whom the male aspect remains impotent and void (Degler 2009, p. 11). There is no Eden without Eve – annihilate Woman and one annihilates Man.

Earlier reference to the Freudian phallic stage does not necessarily invoke the Lacanian argument that the penis is not the phallus and that there is no phallus inequity between the genders. Lacan's notion of the *Phallus* privileges masculinity and owes its existence to a deep social conservatism (Sarup 1993, p. 28); it fuels the phalocrats' position that the feminine is defined as lack, deficiency, or as imitation and negative image of the subject (Lacan 2006, pp. 79-80). Lacan's mirror stage is, however, useful. In contrast to Freud's five stages of psychosexual development (oral, anal, phallic [Oedipal], latent and genital) Lacan, in an important step in his critical reinterpretation of Freud, proposed self-recognition in his mirror stage (Žižek 2006, p. 77). The driving-force underpinning the creation of the ego as mirror-image is for Lacan the prior experience of the phantasy (Sadler 2006, pp. 11-12) of the fragmented body crushed in the Oedipal schism. The body, before self-recognition in the mirror, and before the development of ego, is, in the imaginary (Žižek 2006, p. 384), shattered by the Oedipal wrench and only reconstructed when recognised in the mirror. Irigaray rightly accuses Lacan (and Freud) of licensing and approving a conceptual system that offers little opportunity or hope for radical change (Sarup 1993, p. 28). I suggest that the opposite is also true. Through the cultural imaginary's Oedipal schism, Man is demoted and diminished, in perpetual drive to regain equilibrium, to generate radical change that can only spring from choice: either masculine madness, the retributive choice of the Psellos's beast, or the redemptive choice of Psellos's angels, to celebrate the subjectivity of Woman. Nietzsche calls this the genius of culture:

If anyone wanted to imagine a genius of culture, what would the latter be like? He would manipulate falsehood, force the most ruthless self-interest as his instruments so skilfully he could only be called an evil, demonic being; but his objectives, which here and there shine through, would be

²⁶ While Eastern culture is outside the purview of this thesis, the parallel is nonetheless illuminating.

great and good. He would be a centaur, half beast, half man, and with angel's wings attached to his head in addition. (1996, p. 115)

Irigaray, among many others, is critical of the misogyny of Lacan and Freud that was so entrenched and yet so habituated they were blind to it. Lacan does, however, allow for the evolving development of the infant to have its roots in a postpartum conflict with the Mother. The Oedipal schism of the son creates what Lacan problematizes as a 'symbolic wrench from the mother that is at once devastating and delicious' (Sarup 1993, p. 7). The cost of discovering the self in the imaginary mirror, arrogating the status of subject, assuming Lacan's 'I', is, from the boy's perspective as casualty of the Oedipal schism, to view Mother as other, as object, no longer one with the infant. This first flawed view of Woman as object stays with the infant male for life, situating his pattern of desire within Woman as object. From that instant, the boy views all girls and eventually women, as objects, as counter-Gestalt phenomena: less than the sum of their sexual parts.

In the case of an infant female, the first glimpse of father as subject, in the case of heterosexual females, or the mother as object, in the case of homosexual females, sets life's patterning of desire.²⁷ At the mirror stage Man arrogates to himself the status of subject but not to the exclusion of Woman. She is not the other, she is subject.

Poststructuralist feminists rigidly reject what they call victim feminism: that women are irredeemably assigned the status of Other or object and that men, as subjects, will always dominate. Women can, they say, claim for themselves the role and status of subject at will. This is true, but conversely a woman becomes object or Other by failing or refusing to claim subjectivity as *creator*. To become Other she must abandon the individual right to subjectivity. A man on the other hand must introject into his mirror image the values of subjectivity, but even then usurped subjectivity is slippery and will be won and lost through time: men have a choice to abandon subjectivity for the beast or to share subjectivity with women. Loss of subjectivity for Man threatens non-existence and yet for boys the mirror stage mitigates the post-schismic shattering and dread of non-existence of which Julia Kristeva warns when, following Plato's *Timaeus*, she defines the space of the mother's body as the semiotic *chora* (Moi 1986, p. 101). This is the space from which the subject is both produced

²⁷ Exploration of daughter and the Oedipal schism is limited in this project, not because it is unimportant but because the topic at hand is masculine madness and its root cause.

and threatened with annihilation, the space of the subversion of the subject, the space in which the death drive emerges and threatens to engulf the subject, to reduce it to the inertia of non-existence (1986, p. 101).

Man's irrepressible drive is to regain the equilibrium with Woman lost at the schismic moment, but this is a vastly varying, non-essentialist condition for both men and women. Men and women make continuous individual, conscious and unconscious choices with regard to subjectivity: either to claim subjectivity or, in the case of women, be other, non-men, and, in the case of men, occupy the other heterotopian dark space of the beast. The use of the notion of the unconscious in this thesis leans more to the Nietzschean than the Freudian: unconscious concepts are not simply latent but actively shape conscious actions (Mitcheson 2004, p. 43).

That subjectivity is pre-gender, prediscursive, prelinguistic sex, and yet unlike sex boundlessly elastic, confirms it as non-essentialist. Every man and every woman deals differently with the schismic inheritance situating it in plurality and non-dichotomous difference.

The dominative drive of Man has its roots in the Oedipal schism but the behaviour of men is either elected or vetoed. There is no Original Sin in the Oedipal schism, no convenience of the confessional: men make agentic choices in the lived experience to respect or deny Woman's subjectivity. They make choices on how to deal with women and with their own potentialities. Whether they choose to behave well or badly towards women is subject to everyday choices at both a conscious and unconscious level. This is the surface indicator of masculinity, the border that exists between beast and man. As Psellos said, each of us is an animal – every man has within him the beast – but the animal life is something to surpass in rising to intelligible reality. In the extreme of the beast live speechless dogs and pigs and wild animals, and at the other extreme live angels and 'children of God'. Men choose to live as speechless wild animals or as angels (Miles 2012, p. 5). According to Andrea Dworkin, women recognise the hope of angels over speechless wild animals:

I do not believe rape is inevitable or natural. If I did, my political practice would be different than it is. Have you ever wondered why we are not just in armed combat against you? It's not because there's a shortage of kitchen knives in this country. It is because we believe in your humanity, against all the evidence. (Dworkin 1993, pp. 170-171)

‘Dworkin wanted to help men transcend masculinity,’ contends political ethicist Robert Jensen (2007, p. 7). ‘Our goal,’ he says, ‘should not be to reshape masculinity but to eliminate it. The goal is liberation from the masculinity trap’ (Jensen 2007, p. 5). To paraphrase, Dworkin wants us to transcend masculine madness. Our goal therefore should not be to reshape masculinity, and Jensen urges, but rather to manage it. The goal is liberation from masculine madness. The masculinity trap is masculine madness.

In making the choices that arise from the Oedipal schism, agentic men in Western culture are qualified to recognise desire and the desire faultline, where biologically essential and socially acceptable sexual desire crosses the line into the dark heterotopian space of masculine madness. The healthy ability to recognise the desire faultline and to respond to its limitations, contributes positively to the normative condition of masculinity. Desire is driven by the natural intrusion of sex into gender. As we have seen, sex and sex drives will always intrude, through the body, on gender. In the same way gender, with its socio-political, ethical and historical constraints, will resist sex disrupting and over-coding its psyche to turn it back towards primary sex. The ethical edges of the desire faultline are frequently blurred for men driven by the urges of the Oedipal schism and many lose the ability, or the will, to discriminate between socially appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. Many allow masculine madness to express itself in their psyche.

The phallocracy and systemic discrimination against women is blatantly obvious and remarkably public; but just as remarkable is the private nature of sexual predation, most frequently experienced in the self-idolatry and phallic narcissism of men’s behaviour in millions of private lives. In uncanny alignment with Catharine MacKinnon, Jensen makes the case for a dramatic transformation in men’s private lives by connecting private behaviour to public justice (2007, p. 29). Such a move would shine the light of understanding into bedrooms and kitchens where the dreadful potential of Man is so frequently played out in acts of inexcusable violence, would illuminate the reality that terrible acts are committed by ordinary men trying to stop the dread of Man: of non-existence. Most men know that the desire faultline exists, can recognise the margin between beast and man, and many know that they know. Some, however, know the beast but do not know that the beast and man are separate, and civilisation depends on all men knowing. To these men the private shame of

masculine madness, of not knowing that the beast situates them in the irredeemable role of the diminished, is to lose agency, to be beyond choice, to succumb to hopelessness. They must be made to know. Connecting private behaviour to public justice is to attack the epistemic crisis by moving men from 'knowing but not knowing' to 'knowing and knowing that they know'. Public exposure and ridicule are popular responses in the shift from private behaviour to public justice. However, Jensen raises the distinction between *shame* and *guilt* (2007, p. 169). The two words are often used interchangeably, but they refer to two quite different concepts. Borrowing from John Bradshaw, Jensen points out that shame is a sense that one is a bad person, while guilt is the sense that one has done (or is doing) a bad thing (2007, p. 169).

In this sense, shame can easily lead to a self-loathing that hinders a person's emotional development. If one believes oneself to be bad in some intrinsic sense — as if it were a part of one's self — then it becomes difficult to imagine modifying the bad behaviour, since it arises from an intrinsic failing (Schwyzer 2007). But guilt is more complex. It is a positive aspect of human psychology to be able to recognize when one has engaged in an act that is contrary to one's own moral and/or political principles, especially when that act injures another. Without the capacity to recognize the gap between who we say we are and how we behave, between what we know and what we do not know, it is difficult to imagine individuals or societies making moral and political progress toward a more just world (Jensen 2007, pp. 169-170). Combined with myriad other dominative strategies of men, rape, for example, entrenches the phallocracy in an enduring ambition to rob women of subjectivity. Oedipal schism theory accepts that woman's role as *creator* frequently fails to deliver subjectivity to women situated in an androcentric society. However Spivak argues that in theoretical examination, the category of Woman must not be taken as an object of analysis. Instead she must be restored to the questioning subject (Phoca 2000, p. 59).

In *Self-Analysis* (1968), Karen Horney recounts the case study of a young woman, Clare. I have included the full account because it is a poignant allegory for the easy loss of subjectivity by women:

She was an unwanted child. After having one child, a boy, the mother did not want any more children. Clare was born after several unsuccessful attempts at an abortion. She was not badly treated or neglected in any coarse sense: she was sent to schools as good as those the brother attended,

she received as many gifts as he did, she had music lessons with the same teacher, and in all material ways was treated as well. But in less tangible matters she received less than the brother, less tenderness, less interest in school marks and in the thousand little daily experiences of a child, less concern when she was ill, less solicitude to have her around, less willingness to treat her as a confidante, less admiration for looks and accomplishments.

As a consequence of this situation Clare never had a good chance to develop self-confidence. There was not enough of open injustice to provoke sustained rebellion, but she became discontented and cross and complaining. As a result she was teased for always feeling herself a martyr. Clare, never having felt secure, easily yielded to the majority opinion about herself and began to feel that everything was her fault. Compared with the mother, whom everyone admired for her beauty and charm, and with the brother, who was cheerful and intelligent, she was an ugly duckling. She became deeply convinced that she was unlikable.

Clare lost the feeble vestiges of self-confidence she had. To use a somewhat vague term, she lost herself. By admiring what in reality she resented, she became alienated from her own feelings. She no longer knew what she herself liked or wished or feared or resented. She lost all capacity to assert her wishes for love, or even any wishes. Despite a superficial pride her conviction of being unlovable was actually deepened. Hence later on, when one or another person was fond of her; she could not take the affection at its face value but discarded it in various ways. Sometimes she would think that such a person misjudged her for something she was not; sometimes she would attribute the affection to gratitude for having been useful or to expectations of her future usefulness. This distrust deeply disturbed every human relationship she entered into. She lost, too, her capacity for critical judgment, acting on the unconscious maxim that it is safer to admire others than to be critical. This attitude shackled her intelligence, which was actually of a high order, and greatly contributed to her feeling stupid.

In consequence of all these factors three neurotic trends developed. One was a compulsive modesty as to her own wishes and demands. This entailed a compulsive tendency to put herself into second place, to think less of herself than of others, to think that others were right and she was wrong. But even in this restricted scope she could not feel safe unless there

was someone on whom she could depend, someone who would protect and defend her, advise her, stimulate her, approve of her, be responsible for her, give her everything she needed. She needed all this because she had lost the capacity to take her life into her own hands. Thus she developed the need for a 'partner' – friend, lover, husband – on whom she could depend. She would subordinate herself to him as she had toward the mother. But at the same time, would he restore her crushed dignity? A third neurotic trend – a compulsive need to excel others and to triumph over them – likewise aimed at restoration of self-regard, but in addition absorbed all the vindictiveness accumulated through hurts and humiliations. (Horney 1968, pp. 48-52)

It is illuminating to apply Horney's analysis to the oppressed condition of, and indifference towards, women. In characterising the potential for a loss of subjectivity by women, Horney identifies various psychological stages that can be used as normative for women in the Western cultural imaginary:

- Indiscriminate need to please others and be liked and approved of by others
- Automatic living up to the expectations of others
- Centre of gravity in others and not in self, with their wishes and opinions the only thing that counts
- Dread of self-assertion
- Dread of hostility on the part of others or of hostile feelings within self
- The neurotic need for a 'partner' who will take over one's life
- Centre of gravity entirely in the 'partner,' who is to fulfil all expectations of life and take responsibility for good and evil
- Overvaluation of 'love' because 'love' is supposed to solve all problems
- Dread of desertion
- Dread of being alone
- Necessity to remain inconspicuous and to take second place
- Belittling of existing faculties and potentialities, with modesty the supreme value

In a ruptured and disabling practical world in which men socially and psychologically privilege themselves at an oppressive cost to women, both genders develop strategies for dealing with their situation.

As we approach the next section on postmodernity it is useful to observe that Oedipal schism theory may be seen by some postmodern theorists as monocausal in that it looks to one set of characteristics to explain the psychoanalytic underpinnings of gender inequity, dominative masculinity and sexism endemic in the Western cultural imaginary. It should however be viewed from a contemporary feminist perspective rather than an irrelevant or outdated philosophical standpoint. The Oedipal schism places gender conflict at the epicentre of human behaviour and establishes it as the most basic form of human conflict. The Oedipal schism theory is comparativist rather than universalist, ‘attuned to changes and contrasts instead of to ‘covering laws’’ (Fraser and Nicholson 1990, p. 24). It in no way postulates that all women behave according to a ‘covering law’ but rather as alliances; that they do not gather in unity around a universally shared interest or identity. It recognizes the diversity of women’s needs and experiences. It acknowledges that the status of *creator* frequently fails to provide a socially superior position, and also that within any social structure different women will deal differently with both their own subjectivity and the men around them fighting constantly to arrogate subjectivity to themselves.

Ultimately Oedipal schism theory situates masculine madness in the terrain of dark, disruptive masculine potential – the dark other place of Man. In closing this chapter I reiterate that through the Oedipal schism, Man is demoted and diminished, in perpetual drive to regain equilibrium, to generate radical change that can only spring only from choice: either masculine madness, the retributive choice of the Psellos’s beast, or the redemptive choice of Psellos’s angels, to celebrate the subjectivity of Woman, Nietzsche’s genius of culture.

2:6 RAPE: men making a choice

Many men do not recognise the bestial face of the sphinx, that potential for masculine madness. This chapter explores how their frustrated drive to exert social power over women frequently expresses itself as masculine madness, specifically as rape.

One tool of men is aggravated or violent sexual assault, more commonly known as rape: an unsocialised act of hatred – an unreconstructed expression of masculine madness brutally revealed. Rape is a destructive, oblitative act designed to degrade the true subject, to rob her of her subjectivity and to smash her gender, to make her empty. Given that gender is a critical ontological factor in being human, a rapist when attempting to destroy a woman's gender reduces her to object status, to a 'she' that is sex without gender: no psyche, no feminine/masculine, no elastic, hope-filled becoming. To the rapist she becomes *thing* at best, and *nothing* at worst. Sexual assault is an attempt to dispossess or at least reverse the *creator's* power, or, in Freudian terms, to project the rapist's dread, to fill the victim with the rapist's emptiness.

Biologists and anthropologists like Randy Thornhill and Craig T Palmer argue that sexual drive and its hate-filled cousin serious sexual assault (rape) are the natural order of animal-man, that these are all part of an evolutionary drive to broaden the gene pool. The idea that rape evolved as a genetically advantageous behavioural adaptation was a theory popularised by Thornhill and Palmer. They proposed that the received wisdom on why men rape relied on wrong, dangerous and outmoded dogma (Thornhill and Palmer 2001, p. 30). The correct explanation for rape, as for human behaviour generally, they argue, lies in understanding the Neo-Darwinian model of natural selection. According to Thornhill and Palmer, rapists want sex, and so rape, or the drive to rape, is a natural, biological phenomenon that is the product of human evolutionary heritage (2001, p. 30). It is, they say, an adaptation: during human evolution, early humans increased their reproductive success by mating with unwilling partners, and the successful evolutionary behaviour became hardwired in contemporary men. Women, they add, have evolved adaptations against rape, and against getting pregnant if they are raped (2001, p. 30). This view is echoed in more recent news reports concerning several US politicians. In the lead-up to the 2012 election Republican Senate candidate Todd Akin of Missouri ignited the issue of rape

in August of that year when he explained to a local television station his opposition to abortions in cases of rape and described the process a woman's body goes through to terminate a pregnancy in cases of 'legitimate rape' (*CNN Politics* 2012). He was followed two months later by Republican Senate candidate Richard Mourdock, who said in a debate that pregnancies occurring as the result of rape are 'something that God intended to happen' (*CNN Politics* 2012).

Thornhill and Palmer propose that rape is the partner-selection strategy of choice for sexually and romantically unsuccessful men: 'getting chosen is not the only way to gain sexual access to females. In rape the male circumvents the females' choice' (2001, p. 53). Michael Kimmel describes Thornhill and Palmer's work as 'a silly and unwarranted extension of evolutionary psychology's preposterously reductionist sociobiology written by two vainglorious and self-promoting researchers who have never done any research with actual human beings but feel perfectly comfortable making all sorts of cross-cultural generalisations about them anyway' (2005, p. 217). He goes on to discredit Thornhill and Palmer's use of the reductionist evolutionary theory that proposes that, because male reproductive success comes from impregnating as many females as possible, males have a natural predisposition towards promiscuity, sex without love, and parental indifference. This, Kimmel argues, makes two fundamentally flawed assumptions about rape and sex: first, that rape is only for sex, and second, that sex is only for reproduction (2005, pp. 219-220). In humans, rape is a multifaceted act, rarely simply about sex, and sex is a complex phenomenon, rarely simply about reproduction.

Neil Malamuth and his colleagues contend that rape proneness among men is proximately caused not by evolutionary genetic variation, but by developmental situations involving learning. Their analyses indicate that rape-prone men come from harsh developmental backgrounds involving impersonal and short-term social relationships, and backgrounds in which manipulation, coercion and violence are valid ways of conducting social relationships (Malamuth and Hellmann 1998, p. 523). In other words, men with the highest potential to commit rape, have the lowest social intelligence – regardless of their IQ – and developmental backgrounds that prevent them from knowing that a boundary exists between beast and civilised man. Malamuth, using his extensive empirical research, identified twenty-two interacting pathways that result in sexual aggression. The 'impersonal sex pathway' is characterized by association with delinquent peers, introduction to sexual activity at a

young age, and having many sexual partners. The hostile masculinity pathway is related to an insecure sense of masculinity, hostility, distrust, and a desire to dominate women (Malamuth and Hellmann 1998, p. 538). What Malamuth has identified in his hostile masculinity pathway is the evidentiary basis for men using hostility and overt masculinity to dominate women in a vain attempt to regain lost equilibrium: an allusion to the Oedipal schism and the beast in the sphinx.

But does not Carl Ransom Rogers' famous axiom, that there is only man in man, risk contradicting the beast/man dualism of the sphinx allegory? Not at all. Rogers went on to say that when man's unique capacity of awareness is functioning freely and fully, we find that we have, not a beast who must be controlled, but an organism, a fully agentic man able to achieve a balanced, realistic, self-enhancing, other-enhancing behaviour as a result of all these elements of awareness – a man exhibiting full agency for whom the beast is something to 'surpass in rising to intelligible reality' (Rogers 1989, p. 105). Men thus have the potential to succumb to the beast of masculine madness or, in rising to intelligible reality, to surpass the beast. So it is that we have the psyche dominating the body, 'the self' controlling the beast. Only when we find a man incapable of achieving balanced, self-enhancing behaviour, a man with diminished agency, a diminished social intelligence, do we find the beast stirring masculine madness: when the hostile masculine pathway opens to expose an insecure sense of masculinity, hostility, distrust and a desire to harm women, violence and rape are a short step along this pathway.

Rape occurs when Herbert Kelman's three critical pre-conditions for violent atrocities are in place. Let us recall that moral inhibitions against violent atrocities are eroded once three pre-conditions of detachment are met. First, the violence is *authorised* by, for example, official orders coming from a legal authority. Second, all actions are *routinised* using, for example, rules, regulated practices and precise role definition. And third, the victims are *dehumanised* or made to appear less human in the eyes of wider society (Kelman 1973, pp. 29-61).

There are many kinds of rape. However the three most documented categories are (1) acquaintance or partner rape; (2) predatory stranger rape of girls or women in an everyday situation; and (3) rape during war or racial conflict, frequently organised and systematic, and sometimes genocidal.

The most common type is acquaintance rape, perpetrated in private places to avoid public justice (World Bank, 1993). Acquaintance rape that involves some degree

of relationship accounts for between 80 per cent and 90 per cent of rapes. In a study by Koss, Gidycz and Wisniewski of over 3000 American college women, 84 per cent of the reported sexual assaults were committed by persons known to the victim, 57 per cent were dates (Cowan 2000, p. 807). It is acknowledged that the acquaintance rape category (indeed all categories) also includes boys and men, particularly boys in religious institutions, however consistent with the Oedipal schism context, dominative or predatory behaviour against women is the focus of this project.

In the first category, acquaintance or partner rape, the perpetrator (1) believes he is *authorised* because he has legal or moral authority granted him by social sanction (acquaintance rape), marriage or legal statutes (partner rape), or biblical assent to behave towards his date, wife or partner as he wishes; he has rights and she has responsibilities. He also believes (2) that taking sex from his date, wife or partner is all part of a routinised set of practices, that the right to have sex is a regulated practice and enshrined in a precise role definition of masculine behaviour. Finally, (3) his victim, particularly wife or partner, is in his view dehumanised, appearing less human in the eyes of wider society. Compared to his partner, he sees other women as more attractive, more interesting, more sexual. He is ashamed of his wife or partner as other, ashamed of what wider society thinks of her. In all cases, including date rape, he has emotionally detached himself from her so completely that she is no longer human, just a life support system for a vagina.

Those three preconditions having been met, the man is authorised to commit his own personal crime against humanity, but he rarely kills the woman because to do so would almost certainly make it public. His delusional self-approval is conditional on it being private, unseen, unremarked and unprosecuted. His goal is not to make public his hatred, his deeply individual misogyny, but rather privately to dispossess and reverse the *creator's* power, to project his dread, and fill the victim with his emptiness.

In the second category, predatory stranger rape of girls or women in an everyday situation, the perpetrator (1) believes he is *authorised* by well-established beliefs about rape that function to blame the victim and exonerate the rapist. Known as rape myths they are to the perpetrator anything but mythical. They are, rather, authoritarian codes of authorisation (Burt 1991, pp. 26-40). 'Female precipitation' – the idea that the rape was provoked by the victim, by how she dressed or behaved – is the most common mythic regulation (Cowan 2000, p. 809). Another is that men cannot control their sexual urges, making women responsible for preventing rape: if

he cannot control his sexual urges, then it is her responsibility not to provoke him. These mythical regulations form an authorising structure around the perpetrator. Acting under the charter of mythical authorisation, a rapist becomes a tyrant, raping the woman he does not know, sacrificing nothing, losing nothing. It is not his fault, someone else is responsible – a system authorised him to do it, a victim provoked him to do it, someone somewhere set the masculine rules and he just did what was expected of him. While these authorisations are unconscious – and remember Nietzsche’s declaration that unconscious concepts are not simply latent but are actively shaping conscious actions (Mitcheson 2004, p. 43) – social morality, the perpetrator’s moral filter, can and should override the unconscious system of mythical authorisation. ‘Social morality’ describes that intersection between individual and collective morality, a set of social-moral rules that require or prohibit action.²⁸

The second condition is that stranger rape must be *routinised*. Stranger rapists typically establish a routine of predatory surveillance that the victim intersects with. Let us recall that men when surrendering to the routine, the structure, lose full agency and abandon their individuality and moral compass; or, to paraphrase Beauvoir, since rapists can conquer women only by reducing them to things, they must become things themselves. Stranger rapists are predatory and opportunistic, but above all organised. To invoke Bauman, the more rational and routinised is the organization of action, the easier it is to cause suffering – and remain at peace with oneself (1991, p. 154).

The third condition of stranger rape is that victims are *dehumanised* or made appear less human. To paraphrase Beauvoir again, by dishonestly ignoring the subjectivity of his choice, a rapist pretends that the unconditional value of the object is being asserted through him, and by the same token he also ignores the value of the subjectivity and freedom of others, to such an extent that, sacrificing them to the thing, he persuades himself that what he sacrifices is nothing (1948, p. 49). The victim in stranger rape is dehumanized to the status of *thing*. As in acquaintance rape, in stranger rape the perpetrator has emotionally detached himself from his victim so completely that she is no longer human, just a life support system for orifices to violate. Of the three most common categories of rape, stranger rape is perhaps the most acute example of the perpetrator’s attempt to dispossess or at least reverse the creator’s

²⁸ Social morality is explored more fully in Chapter 4:6.

power, or, in reiteration of Freud, to project the rapist's dread, to fill the victim with the rapist's emptiness.

In the third category, rape during war or racial conflict, the perpetrator (1) believes he is *authorised* by official orders coming from a legal authority, his superiors, and by right to domination, racial, ethnic, national or religious. We read in the Bible:

So the congregation sent 12,000 of their bravest men there and commanded them, 'Go and strike the inhabitants of Jabesh-gilead with the edge of the sword; also the women and the little ones. This is what you shall do: every male and every woman that has lain with a male you shall devote to destruction.' And they found among the inhabitants of Jabesh-gilead 400 young virgins who had not known a man by lying with him, and they brought them to the camp at Shiloh, which is in the land of Canaan. Then the whole congregation sent word to the people of Benjamin who were at the rock of Rimmon and proclaimed peace to them. And Benjamin returned at that time. And they gave them the women whom they had saved alive of the women of Jabesh-gilead, but they were not enough for them. (Judges 21, pp. 10-24)

Here the superior orders authorisation and absolution include both commission and omission. In the first instance superiors order rape as a form of, for example, ethnic cleansing in the knowledge that, as the women of one village are raped, so word spreads to the next village and soon an entire ethnic group has left the path clear to the invader. In the case of omission, superiors simply fail to order men not to systematically rape, fail to prevent such crimes against humanity.

Susan Brownmiller believes that when men discovered they could rape they employed it to keep women in a constant state of intimidation, forever conscious of the knowledge that man's capacity for rape must be held in awe because it may 'turn to weapon with sudden swiftness borne of harmful intent' (1975, pp. 14-15). Catharine MacKinnon argues that Serbian soldiers participating in the Bosnian genocide raped ethnic Muslim and Croat women to create what they imagined would be Serbian babies, using sex reproductively on an ethnic basis with the aim of producing a dominant ethnicity (2007, pp. 232-233). Elizabeth Heineman urges analysis of 'the ways that sex enables people to commit genocide' and MacKinnon herself adds that

this has been the missing piece of the genocidal paradigm (in MacKinnon 2007, pp. 232-233).

Sexual abuse is, in reality, a perfect genocidal tool. It does to ethnic, racial, religious and national groups what has been done to women from time immemorial in one of the most effective systems of domination-to-destruction in history. The perpetrators, MacKinnon says, have not failed to notice (2007, pp. 232-233). That the Serbian soldiers believed they were acting under orders was made clear in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and in September 2006, former Bosnian Serb leader Momcilo Krajišnik was found guilty of multiple instances of crimes against humanity.

The second condition is that all actions are *routinised* using rules, regulated practices and precise role definition. In the Second World War, for example, Japanese soldiers filled makeshift brothels in the West with so-called comfort women who were routinely raped. In the spring of 1992 Serbian men, participating in the Bosnian genocide, wrenched adolescent girls from their families and, with young Muslim wives with their children, locked them into former cafés, or roadside hotels or animal sheds. These were redesignated as brothels where the women were routinely violated until they died or escaped (MacKinnon, 2007, p. 211).

The third condition is that victims are *dehumanised* or made to appear less than human in the eyes of wider society, MacKinnon believes that one is less human when one's violations do not violate the human rights that are recognised. Put another way, human rights can be observed to be a response to atrocity denied. Acts common in human experience, such as rape in war, have been beneath serious notice because they are so commonplace, so familiar, while acts that are uncommon, like the Nazi's industrialised murder and the Serb's industrialised rape, have been beyond belief (MacKinnon, 2007, p. 3). According to MacKinnon, the status and treatment of men still tacitly but authoritatively define the human universal, ignoring the ontological particularity of being man. Women are therefore rendered 'not fully human legally or socially' (2007, p. 3).

All three categories of rape therefore correspond to the three critical pre-conditions for crimes against humanity, and desire is not a pre-condition. These acts of undisguised hatred are not the healthy ability to recognise the desire faultline and, in response to its recognition, make a positive contribution to the normative condition of masculinity. Rather they enact a drive that springs from the Oedipal schism. Desire

is as different from rape as women are from men. They are not dichotomous they are separate *differe*nts. Rape delivers sexual gratification to men but does not spring from a desire for sexual gratification. Rape swells, not from sexual desire, but from a desire to obliterate.

Some men, borderline beast men, deny that rape is oblitative and conflate it with enthusiastic sexual intercourse to make it both normal and normative.

MacKinnon reports that men targeted and accused Susan Brownmiller of secretly wanting to be raped: one wrote, 'she really wanted to be raped, that's why she wrote the book on rape' (MacKinnon 2007, p. 97). According to Mackinnon, in creating a sexually explicit account of a phantom date with Brownmiller, the man produced the anti-rape crusader as pornography, as a woman who wants to be violated, whose 'No' means 'Yes'. 'Consumers of this pornography have a sexual experience of Susan Brownmiller to invalidate her opposition to rape' (MacKinnon 2007, p. 97).

Rape is a formidable weapon to dehumanise women: women who oppose it, women who fear it and women who have been victim to it. It represents the profound failure of a man's personal civilisation to surpass the dreadful drives of the beast. It is the ultimate act of weakness, of psychic suicide, in which men have insufficient strength to resist a loss of agency and the annihilative momentum of self-destruction. Kimmel proposes that what is missing from the 'facile reductionism' of writers like Thornhill and Palmer is the distinctly human capacity for change, for choice. 'What's missing,' he adds, 'is human agency' (2005, p. 226).

Beauvoir, citing Hegel, proposed that moral consciousness exists only to the extent that there is disagreement between nature and morality (1948, p. 10). Masculine madness therefore in no way robs or absolves men of free agency, in fact the opposite is true: it is only under the condition of the beast in conflict with morality that moral consciousness exists. Notwithstanding pathology, man always chooses, always has free agency.

SECTION THREE: POSTMODERNITY: birth and death

3:0 INTRODUCTION

Madan Sarup believes Western societies since the Second World War have radically changed their nature. A fashionable description of such societies is that they are, he says, postmodern (1993, p. 129). In this section I explore how, after the Second World War, the national and social imbalances were addressed, but not gender imbalance. The humanism of the Enlightenment that survived the Holocaust came out the other side with gender as unbalanced as it always was.

By way of introduction to postmodernity: 'Modernity' refers to the condition, the epoch. 'Modernism', by contrast, describes the cultural movement, the applied practice that outlives the epoch. The succeeding disruption to stability ran across both *postmodernity* (the epoch) and *postmodernism* (the cultural movement). Terry Eagleton describes the difference:

Postmodernity is a style of thought which is suspicious of classical notions of truth, reason, identity and objectivity, of the idea of universal progress or emancipation, of single frameworks, grand narratives or ultimate grounds of explanation. Against these Enlightenment norms, it sees the world as contingent, ungrounded, diverse, unstable, indeterminate, a set of disunified cultures or interpretations which breed a degree of scepticism about the objectivity of truth, history and norms, the givenness of natures and the coherence of identities.

Postmodernism is a style of culture which reflects something of this epochal change, in a depthless, decentred, ungrounded, self-reflexive, playful, derivative, eclectic, pluralistic art which blurs the boundaries between 'high' and 'popular' culture, as well as between art and everyday experience. (1996, p. vii)

Postmodernity had a beginning and end, while postmodernism lives on as a way of interpreting, itself a tool, a lens through which to participate in and interpret a constantly transforming world, a world in which narratives are both constantly

reinvented, individualised and contingent. As we see, for Lyotard and his postmodern condition, all narratives exist together, side by side, with none dominating.

I propose that the epoch of postmodernity ended in 1991 when it was drowned under an avalanche of information that paradoxically, while offering surface condition and shallowness also made redundant the need for deep ideology and any of the ‘-isms’ that survived the death of modernity to become entrenched in postmodernity.

Postmodernity transformed the way the West thought and behaved. Its reflexive and reflective nature however, invited its own demise.

3:1 CERTITUDE and CONTINGENCY: from modernity to postmodernity

By the middle of the twentieth-century modernity had become so institutionalized that it was considered ‘post avant-garde’, indicating that it had lost its power. Invention was the spirit and practice of modernity, and it ended with modernity. To place the demise of invention in a scientific context, according to Gribbin many of the great questions had been answered by the second half of the twentieth century: the general theory of relativity, quantum physics, biological evolution, nanotechnology, molecular genetics and the rest. Yet the most complex feature of the universe remained unexplained, and that was human behaviour (Gribbin 2004, p. 1). The question was: given that human behaviour brought about the end of modernity, would its death shine a light on human behaviour and reinterpretation?

A decade after the death of modernity, the legacy transformed into an unfamiliar ‘condition’, a way of thinking that could not have been more different from the certitude, the depth, the weight, of modernity. It was postmodernity. And when we saw the legacy of modernity through postmodern eyes, we paradoxically made postmodernity see it through modern eyes.

Tina Beattie (2007) contends that postmodernity had its genesis in the aftermath of the Second World War, when all the values that had sustained modern western societies for two centuries were in meltdown. How could visions of progress and the civilising power of reason survive two world wars and the Nazi genocide? How could science provide answers to human suffering, when it had provided us with such a devastating capacity for destruction and killing? Never in human history did so many people slaughter one another in the name of so many ideologies and visions of progress (Beattie 2007). Tyrannical reason, the core of modernity, had proven an ideal vector for masculine madness, eruptions of which had caused the Holocaust and initiated the genocide of Woman in the Western cultural imaginary. Foucault called reason, ‘the ultimate language of madness’ (1965, p. 93).

When modernity came to a cataclysmic end in the 1940s, the legacy it bequeathed came without instruction but with tools for interpretation. Derrida says that every legacy oversteps itself to obtain the analysis of that legacy, and, better still, the instruments by which any legacy might be analysed. A legacy always bequeaths to

us surreptitiously the means of interpreting it (Derrida 1990, p. 82). The legacy is, he says, always a *secret* needing further interpretation. Yet this secret changes and reinterprets itself with every attempt at interpretation. Immediately a tool for interpretation is engaged we alter the secret and recast the legacy.

Whereas late-modernity was primarily concerned with principles such as identity, unity, authority and certainty, postmodernism was associated with difference, plurality, textuality and scepticism. Postmodernity was liberation from modernity's constraint and certitude. Such liberation is interpreted here as a reinvigoration of the Enlightenment lineage. In death life continued; the legacy, the bequest, was a secret, simultaneously readable and illegible. If the legibility of a bequest were given, natural, transparent, unequivocal, says Derrida, if it did not call for and at the same time defy interpretation, there would be no need ever to inherit it (Derrida 1990, p. 82). The act of simultaneously interpreting and failing to interpret the changing legacy is what makes it an unending project. The Enlightenment is an unending project.

Craig Owens dates the arrival of postmodernity as the mid-fifties. He believes that the modernist hegemony of European civilization was replaced by postmodernity in the post-war decade: 'since the mid-1950s, at least, we have recognized the necessity of encountering different cultures by means other than the shock of domination and conquest' (1983, p. 57). Lyotard, while acknowledging 'temporal disjunction', also placed the birth of postmodernity in the 1950s. He encouraged optimism that Enlightenment principles would again surface as the moral compass of a new and more hopeful condition. 'Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to differences and increases our ability to tolerate the incommensurable,' said Lyotard (1984, p. xxv). Incommensurability, put simply, means 'no common measure'. My project takes the post-Kuhnian²⁹ approach that incommensurability neither means nor implies incomparability or irrationality (Kuhn 1970, pp. 36,155), leaving room for a tolerance of seemingly rational disagreements in theory comparison, and a tolerance of apparent epistemological conflicts. For Lyotard, postmodern sensitivity and tolerance of incommensurability were not, however, backward-compatible to the metanarrative of modernity. In *The Postmodern Condition* (1984), Lyotard drew on Wittgenstein's idea of the language game, which had pointed

²⁹ Thomas Kuhn was an American physicist, historian, and philosopher of science whose controversial 1962 book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* was deeply influential in both academic and popular circles, introducing the term 'paradigm shift'.

out that different groups of people use the same language in different ways, which in turn can lead to their looking at the world in quite separate ways (1984, p. 40). So, for instance, the priest might use a word, say *truth*, in a very different way from the scientist, who in turn would understand the term in quite a different way from the policeman, the journalist, the philosopher, or the artist. In this way, the notion of a single, overarching view of the world – a dominant narrative or metanarrative – vanishes (Docx 2011, p. 10-11). This was the postmodern condition. And the condition, claims Stephen Hicks, was decidedly non-European. Postmodernity's strongholds were, he says, in the American academy rather than European (Hicks 2004, p. 67).

Given that Foucault, often viewed as the father of postmodernism, Lyotard and Derrida were all French, the America claim appears *prima facie* to be counter-intuitive. Rorty, he adds, was of course American, 'and [the French philosophers] have many more adherents in America than they do in France or even Europe' (Hicks 2004, p. 67).

For Lyotard, modernity had been the discourse of metanarrative. He uses the example of science to define it:

To the extent that science does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the truth, it is obliged to legitimate the rules of its own game. It then produces a discourse of legitimation with regard to its own status, a discourse called philosophy. I will use the term *modern* to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject or the creation of wealth. I define *postmodern* as incredulity towards metanarratives. To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy. (1984, p. xxiii)

Postmodernity was an epoch with a beginning and end, while its applied sibling *postmodernism*, alive today, is no epoch at all, but rather a way of interpreting, itself a tool, a lens through which to participate in and interpret a constantly transforming world, a world in which narratives are both constantly reinvented, individualised and

contingent. While postmodernity followed modernity – it was by definition *after* modernity [**post**: *prefix - after in time or order; following; subsequent to*] – to apply an epochal approach or periodization to postmodernism is to problematize the condition, subject as it is to ‘temporal disjunction’ and continuous reinterpretation. Derrida’s tools of interpretation equip us to see the problematic not as epoch, but as Lyotard’s *postmodern condition*: at once intractable and resolved.

While the epochs of modernity and postmodernity had a beginning, middle and an end, in the nature of non-binary quantum theory, both modernism and postmodernism are concurrently extant and extinct. This chapter, indeed this thesis, deals, however, with the epochs, the conditions, of modernity and postmodernity.

For Lyotard and his postmodern condition, there was no single narrative, no privileged standpoint, no system or theory that overlaid all others. All narratives existed together, side by side, with none dominating. Incommensurability was not only tolerated, it was of the postmodern condition. This conflict, contrast, confusion of narratives was the essence of postmodernity. Contingency was its natural condition. In the beginning artists, philosophers, linguists, writers and musicians were bound up in a movement of great force that sought to break with history, with the past, and did so with such energy that a new and radical permissiveness was the result. Postmodernity was a high-energy revolt, an attack, a strategy for destruction. It was a set of critical and rhetorical practices that sought to destabilise the modernist touchstones of identity, historical progress and the goal of epistemic certainty (Docx 2011, pp. 10-11).

Let us recall Habermas saying that once a new epoch takes hold, the past is seen as something less, something to be purged (1981, p. 5). Historical memory is replaced by the heroic affinity of the present with the extremes of history – a sense of time in which ‘decadence immediately recognizes itself in the barbaric, the wild and the primitive’ (Habermas 1981, p. 5). Habermas’ pronouncements on modernity intrude onto postmodernity: ‘[post]modernity revolts against the normalizing function of tradition, [post]modernity thrives on the experience of rebellion against all that is normative’ (1981, p. 5).

Postmodernity was physically and temporally reflective of modernity, a turning from an image in the mirror to imagine a new shape, while all the time unable to completely escape the visceral memory of the original form – even in its contingent difference. To witness modernity was to identify with substantive meaning and to

interpret that meaning. To witness postmodernity was to participate in its continuous reinterpretation with each gaze. To invoke Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, in postmodernity a witness is by nature a participant, for nothing can be observed or witnessed and remain unaltered (Gribbin 1984, p. 160). An important aspect of the uncertainty principle is that it does not work in the same sense forwards and backwards in time. There is a definite and measurable 'arrow of time' (1984, p. 159). The path from modernity to postmodernity could be viewed as the enlightened journey from knowing to unknowing, certainty to uncertainty, the path to a condition that disrupts ideas and reinterpretations ahead of facts. Lyotard's view is that it is the very instability of postmodernity that is seminal. Quantum mechanics, he says, disrupts the stability of the system:

By concerning itself with undecidables, the limits of precise control, quanta, conflicts caused by incomplete information, '*fracta*', catastrophes, pragmatic paradoxes, postmodern science theorizes its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, non-rectifiable, paradoxical. It changes the meaning of the word knowledge, and it explains how this change can take place. It produces not the known, but the unknown. And it suggests a model of legitimation which is absolutely not that of the best performance, but that of difference understood as Paralogy. (1984, p. 60)

Postmodernity is frequently seen as non-modernity, or more accurately, not-modernity. Postmodern thought was no longer binary. Let us wage war on totality, Lyotard famously said (1984, pp. 81-82). While postmodernity variously replaced and reinvented modernity, its difference was dichotomous – A and not-A, where A was modernity and postmodernity not-A, that is, not modernity. While postmodernity's ambition was to be more than merely oppositional, ironical, merely gestural, some kind of clever sham, a hotchpotch for the sake of it, Docx contends, it ultimately became defined by what it was not rather than by what it was. It had the opportunity to be genuinely different but failed, it was reflexive yet unreflective (2011, pp. 10-11). Hal Foster challenges this repudiative approach of postmodernity towards modernity. An opposition exists, he believes, between a postmodernity that seeks to deconstruct modernity, to resist the status quo, and a postmodernity that repudiates the former to celebrate the latter: a postmodernity of resistance and a postmodernity of reaction.

Postmodernity of resistance arises as that counter-practice not only to modernity but also to the ‘false normativity’ of a reactionary postmodernity (Foster 1985, p. x). This contradicts the Docx contention that postmodernity was defined, not by what it was, but by what it was not. The following examination of the differences between a modern person and a postmodern subject sheds light on the defining of postmodernity.

A modern person will:	A postmodern subject will:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Place reason before belief, depicting any statement that is not demonstrably true through reasoning or observation by the perjorative term ‘metaphysics’; • Think of language as a tool, one which reflects or depicts reality by relating the objects which it relates through logical forms and thus creates verifiably true statements; • Depict himself as an agent acting out the progress which evolves through the collection of data; • Place the universal before the particular, universals which are either axioms presupposed in reasoning or truths generalized from observed patterns; • Depict culture as relative, but the relative nature of culture defined by logical and empirical laws; • Expect their behaviour to be consistent, either through their own reasoning or consistent within the boundaries of an empirical study of man. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deny that language is a form of calculus, but assert that language is filled with metaphysical presuppositions; • State that since language reflects language and not reason, knowledge is neither transcendent nor logical, but a set of discursive practices, or discourse; • Depict themselves as an actor, constructed by the texts and narratives they are born into, capable of independent action, but always situated within some [deconstructing] form of cultural presupposition; • Place the particular before the universal, or, more accurately (since these terms are correlative) the historic and local (contingent on time and place) displaces the essential; • Reject relativism as a false analogy to the science of perspective, and depict culture through the metaphor of chaos; • Abandon contradiction as a valid form (since there are no valid forms) and embrace diversity - ‘nobody’s human’.

Beyond its critique of modernity, and dichotomous difference from modernity, postmodernity is nonetheless an attack on the dominant social discourse. All art is philosophy and all philosophy is political. Furthermore, the epistemic confrontation of postmodernity – the idea of de-privileging any one meaning, this pluralistic idea that all discourses are equally valid – it has therefore led to some real-world gains for humankind (Docx 2011, pp. 10-11). Immediately the dominant discourse is under siege, marginalised and subordinate groups gain voice. In this hard-fought, centuries-old battle, postmodernity helped Western society again focus on the politics of difference, and in doing so mitigated many of the miserable injustices which had hitherto either been ignored or taken for granted as in some way acceptable. Docx believes one would have to be from the depressingly religious right or an otherwise peculiarly recondite and inhuman school of thought not to believe, for example, that the politics of gender, race and sexuality have been immeasurably affected for the better by the assertion of their parallel discourses. The transformation from an endemically and casually sexist, racist and homophobic society to one that legislates for and promotes equality is a resonantly good thing (2011, pp. 10-11).

Postmodernity aimed further than merely calling for a deconstruction and re-evaluation of power structures: it said that we are all in our very selves nothing more than the breathing aggregates of those structures. Postmodernity for Docx contends that we cannot stand apart from the demands and identities that these structures and discourses confer upon us. Instead, he believes, it holds that we move through a series of co-ordinates on various maps – class, gender, religious, sexual, ethnic, situational – and that those co-ordinates are actually our only identity. We are entirely constructed. There is nothing else. This is the main challenge that postmodernity brought to the great banquet of human ideas because it changed the game from one of self-determination (Kant et al) to other-determination (2011, pp. 10-11).

Throughout its grand epoch, modernity had lived in and through self-deception. According to Bauman, concealment of its own parochiality (this can be read also as patriarchy) was the core of modernity's self-deception (Bauman 1993, p. 10). It was perhaps thanks to that self-deception that modernity could deliver both the wondrous and gruesome things that it did (1993, p. 10). Modernity was what Bauman calls a hegemonic form of domination or a bid for domination-through-hegemony. That part of the world that adopted modern civilization as its structural principle and constitutional value was bent on dominating the rest of the world by dissolving

alterity³⁰ (Bauman 1993, p. 11). Modernity deceived itself. Søren Kierkegaard recognised this when he used the much-quoted Latin aphorism, *Mundus vult decipi* that in translation reads, ‘the world wants to be deceived’ (Kierkegaard 1998, p. 58). Modernity invented a façade to conceal its true masculine nature. It wore the mask of the angel to hide the beast. The mask was, however, no camouflage and self-deception no truth. Modernity existed for men who dominated the home, politics, society, the economy, and the rest of the world. The beast, like its sponsor, masculinity, could not hide its desire to blend political order and true knowledge into domination and a desire for certainty.

Richard Rorty explains that the (modern, masculine) language of certainty and absolute truth cannot but articulate humiliation – humiliation of the other, of the different, of the not-up-to-standard. The (postmodern) language of contingency, on the contrary, avoids the humiliation of others (1989, p. 86). Modernity, says Bauman, could dismiss its own uncertainty as a temporary affliction (1993, p. 15). It was just a matter of problem-solving, and the reason and science of modernity could solve anything. This was just another form of self-deception. The promise of certitude and self-knowledge as the result of modernity’s new rationalist quest for meaning was never delivered. Where there was certainty, there was neither meaning nor self-knowledge; where there was meaning and self-knowledge, there was no certainty. The bid for certainty was abandoned, says Heller, and the taking hold of necessity ended up in the consciousness of contingency (1990, p. 40). Bauman also quotes Heller: ‘We could try to transform our contingency into our destiny’ (Bauman 2013, p. 231). Perhaps postmodernity transformed our destiny into our contingency.

While postmodern cultures or interpretations were disunified, the subject and the Other met. In modernity the other, the stranger, was a dichotomous opposite. The Other was a member of a binary: the non-I, the non-subject. Modernity spawned the certainty principle to validate domination – if the Other is not I, she must be dominated. With postmodernity the problematic of the Other deconstructed itself. No longer were the binary self and non-self, subject and non-subject legitimated. The Other was reinterpreted as alternative image of the self, the ontological reinterpretation of being human. Bauman says, ‘in postmodernity it is from the right of the Other that my right legitimises. The “I am responsible for the other,” and “I

³⁰ The state of being ‘other’ or ‘different’.

am responsible for myself,” came to mean the same thing. Having chosen them both, and having them chosen as one thing, one indivisible attitude, not as two correlated, yet separate stances, is the meaning of the reforging contingency from fate into destiny’ (1993, p. 14).

The Western cultural imaginary during modernity had been characterised by self-deception. The world wanted to be deceived. Modernity was self-deception on a grand scale, its deception one of its own grand narratives. Postmodernity introduced a new kind of self-deception: not the grand narrative, the arterial, but rather a million capillaries. Small personal, individualised self-deceptions, small individual deceptions promising that masculine madness had been mediated. Personal contingencies, angelic faces, they were deceptions nonetheless.

3:2 DENIAL OF LEGITIMACY: masculine madness in postmodernity

*Bring domination out in the open [instead of hiding it]. Don't play
'we're equal' games.*
Slavoj Žižek (2009)

Postmodernity was a contingent crisis of cultural authority, an absence of ideology that again allowed, forced, the exclusion of women. It offered a deception of reduced masculinity, but resulted in no real relief from or reduction in the hegemonic masculinity of modernity.

What emerged after the birth of postmodernity in the mid 1950s was a will to conceal the meta-madness of masculinity that had so disrupted society during the Second World War. The dark heterotopian beast was, for a time, confined to private brutalities. In 1961, however, the failed incursion by American troops into communist Cuba, in what became known as the invasion of the Bay of Pigs, saw masculine madness again erupt onto the world scene. What followed was the Cuban missile crisis, a tense military standoff between the US and its allies and Russia, and the Cold War between the East and the West.

Moving from the generality to the particular of masculine madness, in 1963 US President John F Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, and his murderer, Lee Harvey Oswald, was in turn killed by Jack Ruby. Less than five years later, Kennedy's younger brother Robert F Kennedy was shot and killed. In Northern Ireland civil resistance erupted into violent killings from the late 1960s until the end of postmodernity, while American race riots throughout the Sixties saw African Americans bashed and killed by police and the military. Civil rights campaigner Martin Luther King was assassinated in 1968.

On the face of it, masculine madness did not appear to be moderating under the calming plurality of postmodernity. Despite the inevitable resumption of public masculine madness, however, the civil, race and sexual rights movement of the 1960s did see the politics of gender, race and sexuality immeasurably affected for the better by the assertion of their separate discourses (Docx 2011, pp. 10-11).

Coincidentally, at the same time that postmodernity entered Western culture, gender came to its contemporary meaning. Until the 1950s, gender marked relations between words rather than people. While there is evidence the term was used

sporadically during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Jennifer Germon contends, the mid-1950s stands as the historical moment in which gender was codified into the English language as a personal, ontological and social category (2009, p. 1).

The power of gender, both private and public, rested with the dominant masculinity as a normative condition and under law. In the 1950s and '60s, support for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the Constitution of the United States, guaranteeing equality of rights to women, gained momentum. By 1970 millions of American women had organised a nationwide strike, demanding social, economic and political equality. While designed to provide systemic and immutable social, economic and political equality between men and women, the ERA was not without the support of men. In the 1920s Senator Charles Curtis, a future Vice-President, and Representative Daniel R Anthony introduced the Equal Rights Amendment. In 1958, President Dwight Eisenhower asked a joint session of Congress to pass the ERA. In 1961 John F Kennedy was elected President on a pro-ERA platform. The Amendment was, however, strongly opposed by religious and conservative organisations fighting to maintain the patriarchal status quo, and by unions and the League of Women Voters, fearing loss of labour legislation protecting women. Eventually, in 1972, the ERA was approved by Congress, and immediately supported by President Richard Nixon. After a decade of state legislatures ratifying, rescinding and rejecting the legislation, however, on 30 June 1982 the ERA lapsed. The once-in-a-century opportunity to enshrine socio-economic gender equality vanished. The masculine power politics of exclusion pervasive in the phallocracy had triumphed.

Given that postmodernity's strongholds were in the American academy rather than European (Hicks 2004, p. 67), it is valuable to look at masculinity and masculine madness through the prism of American society. Psychologist and 'father of motivational research' Dr Ernest Dichter spoke of a new morality in America, one of unabashed hedonism, emerging at the start of postmodernity:

We are now confronted with the problem of permitting the average American to feel moral ... even when he is spending, even when he is not saving, even when he is taking two vacations a year and buying a second or third car. One of the basic problems of prosperity, then, is to demonstrate that the hedonistic approach to his life is a moral, not an immoral one. (Brenton 1966, p. 30)

In *The Hearts of Men*, Barbara Ehrenreich wrote of this American hedonistic masculinity, characterised in the 1950s by *Playboy* magazine, as a male rebellion against the feminisation of their lives. In any discussion of masculinities and politics, power is a first-order consideration. This is particularly true in Raewyn Connell's work.³¹ However, men in postmodern America already had power. They did not need to rebel, but they were getting bored with a nine-to-five life, and women were organising. So it was in the private dominion that masculine authority was being challenged by ERA sponsored talk of equality. Ehrenreich believes that, in the 'battle of the sexes', the men's magazine *Playboy* encouraged the sense of membership in a fraternity of male rebels (1983, p. 44). According to Ehrenreich, Hugh Hefner, publisher of *Playboy* magazine, established the *Playboy* office in Chicago as the masculine side's headquarters for wartime propaganda. Hefner laid out the new male strategic initiative, recalling that in their losing battle against 'female domination', men had been driven from their living rooms, dens and basement workshops. Escape seemed to lie only in the great outdoors. Now Hefner declared his intention to *reclaim the indoors for men* (Ehrenreich 1983, p. 44). Men had vacated the indoors during modernity's industrialisation, leaving women to tend the house, care for the children, cook, clean, be *house* wives. Men had, in taking the production of goods public, outside the domestic, rendered the house exclusively a private place, and a feminine site – and for non-men.

Ehrenreich quotes a mock advertisement in *Playboy*, published in 1963:

TIRED OF THE RAT RACE?

FED UP WITH JOB ROUTINE?

Well then ... how would you like to make \$8,000, \$20,000 - *as much as \$50,000 and More* - working at Home in Your Spare Time? No selling!

No commuting! No time clocks to punch!

BE YOUR OWN BOSS

Yes, an Assured Lifetime Income can be yours now, in an easy, low-pressure, part-time job that will permit you to spend most of each and every day as *you please!* - relaxing, watching TV, playing cards, socializing with friends! (Ehrenreich 1983, p. 48)

³¹ Raewyn Connell, born Robert William (Bob) Connell, widely known as R.W. Connell, is an Australian sociologist and masculinities scholar. Her work is explored in chapter 4:4.

‘Incredible though it may seem,’ a *Playboy* editorial began, ‘the above offer is completely legitimate. More than 40,000,000 Americans are already so employed’ (Ehrenreich 1983, p. 48). They were of course women, housewives. Hefner was inviting men to *borrow* the playboy lifestyle he embodied, legitimating desirable women as less than the sum of their sexual parts, while simultaneously encouraging men to reclaim the indoor space they abandoned a century before: a space that was now *dominated* by women. The exquisite paradox was not widely grasped in Sixties postmodernity.

In the first half of the twentieth century, masculine madness had been liberated from the shackles of social morality, freed and legitimated by the cause of men ‘fighting to keep the world free.’ Atrocities had been sanctioned. Now in relative peace, men were again reasserting their dominance, with masculine madness simmering beneath the surface. Powerful men controlled public life, and now they were recuperating the private domain back as well. Conformity and monotony of everyday office or factory life, they believed, robbed them of masculine identity. Men ruled the world but women were taking their wages. And if a man’s home was his castle, and women were appropriating that as well, it was time to re-masculinise the private, and to make it political.

As a consequence, the phallocracy remasculinised and dominated throughout postmodernity. Androcentrism was a little less relevant, less real, more fractured, more simulated. While the public politics and conflicts of men were no less destructive, they were just another news item. The politics of indifference, moral blindness, and savage torpor became postmodernity’s equivalent of Bauman’s concept of modernity’s drive to self-perfection. Atrocities legitimated by the cause of a free world were broadcast on televisions into the living room of the West – atrocities like children and women with their skin melted by napalm – but that very immediacy, through an artificial, electronic window, served only to make the atrocities appear simulated. Moral blindness and indifference became normative, and masculine madness found new legitimacy. According to Jean Baudrillard, what no longer existed was the adversity of adversaries, the reality of antagonistic causes, the ideological seriousness of war (1983, p. 66). He uses the Vietnam War, the postmodern war, as an example and asks: what sense did that war make, if not that its unfolding sealed the end of history in the culminating and decisive event of our age? (Baudrillard 1983, p. 66). What sense it did

make was to mark the beginning of the end for ideology. People cared less about masculine madness and more about entering new realms of self-delusion concealing the beast.

Postmodernity unravelled ideology, made it irrelevant and readied the West for transition to a post-ideological age. If all philosophy is politics, the converse, that all politics is philosophy, is not true. On the one hand, says Eagleton, ideologies are passionate, rhetorical, impelled by some benighted pseudo-religious faith which the sober technocratic world of modern capitalism has thankfully outgrown; on the other hand they are arid conceptual concepts which seek to reconstruct society from the ground up in accordance with some bloodless blueprint (1991, p. 4). Žižek regards ideology as being commensurate with the self-delusion of postmodernity and as a naïve view that conceals the beast, but draws from Lacan and Peter Sloterdijk a more sophisticated perspective that the beast will, should, never be revealed. I have included his full passage for context:

The most elementary definition of ideology is probably the well-known phrase from Marx's *Capital*: 'Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es' ('they do not know it, but they are doing it'). The very concept of ideology implies a kind of basic, constitutive naïveté: the misrecognition of its own presuppositions, of its own effective conditions, a distance, a divergence between so-called social reality and our distorted representation, our false consciousness of it. That is why such a 'naïve consciousness' can be submitted to a critical-ideological procedure. The aim of this procedure is to lead the naïve ideological consciousness to a point at which it can recognize its own effective conditions, the social reality that it is distorting, and through this very act dissolve itself. In the more sophisticated versions of the critics of ideology—that developed by the Frankfurt School, for example—it is not just a question of seeing things (that is, social reality) as they 'really are', of throwing away the distorting spectacles of ideology; the main point is to see how the reality itself cannot reproduce itself without this so-called ideological mystification. The mask is not simply hiding the real state of things; the ideological distortion is written into its very essence. We find, then, the paradox of a being which can reproduce itself only in so far as it is misrecognized and overlooked: the moment we see it 'as it really is', this being dissolves itself into nothingness or, more precisely, it changes

into another kind of reality. That is why we must avoid the simple metaphors of demasking, of throwing away the veils that are supposed to hide the naked reality. We can see why Lacan, in his Seminar on *The Ethic of Psychoanalysis*, distances himself from the liberating gesture of saying finally that ‘the emperor has no clothes’. The point is, as Lacan puts it, that the emperor is naked only beneath his clothes, so if there is an unmasking gesture of psychoanalysis, it is closer to Alphonse Allais’s well-known joke, quoted by Lacan: somebody points at a woman and utters a horrified cry, ‘Look at her, what a shame, under her clothes, she is totally naked’ (Lacan 1986, p. 231).

But all this is already well known: it is the classic concept of ideology as ‘false consciousness’, misrecognition of the social reality that is part of this reality itself. Our question is: Does this concept of ideology as a naive consciousness still apply to today’s world? Is it still operating today? In the *Critique of Cynical Reason*, a great bestseller in Germany (Sloterdijk 1983), Peter Sloterdijk puts forward the thesis that ideology’s dominant mode of functioning is cynical, which renders impossible—or, more precisely, vain—the classic critical-ideological procedure. The cynical subject is quite aware of the distance between the ideological mask and the social reality, but he nonetheless still insists upon the mask. The formula, as proposed by Sloterdijk, would then be: ‘they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it’. Cynical reason is no longer naïve, but is a paradox of an enlightened false consciousness: one knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular interest hidden behind an ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it.

Is then the only issue left to us to affirm that ... we find ourselves in the post-ideological world? Even Adorno came to this conclusion, starting from the premise that ideology is, strictly speaking, only a system which makes a claim to the truth — that is, which is not simply a lie but a lie experienced as truth, a lie which pretends to be taken seriously. Totalitarian ideology no longer has this pretension. It is no longer meant, even by its authors, to be taken seriously — its status is just that of a means of manipulation, purely external and instrumental; its rule is secured not by its truth-value but by simple extra-ideological violence and promise of gain. (1989, pp. 30-33)

When politics abandoned ideology, it also abandoned philosophy. As postmodernity rose and fell, politicians in the West became surface functionaries with no depth, no ideology or philosophy, no teleological propositions to prosecute. Since depth ideology acted for homogeneity and authority, the contingent crisis of cultural authority denied it legitimacy. Without authority, there was no depth ideology, and without depth ideology there was no politics of inclusion, just exclusions, prohibitions.

Woman was excluded, prohibited. Owens agrees: 'among those prohibited by the postmodern condition from Western representation, whose representations were denied all legitimacy, were women' (1983, p. 59). Postmodernity and the end of depth ideology excluded Woman and further disenfranchised women. It reinvigorated, reinterpreted, and perfected, the politics of indifference and exclusion. All reforms became 'structural' and all politics became transactional, managerial, shallow ideologies. Nothing mattered except simulations, indifference and power, a reinterpreted dominance, subjugation and disruption.

Still, despite the plural and separate discourses and notwithstanding optimism and gender advancement, the exclusion and genocidal social death of Woman continued unabated. If one of the most salient aspects of postmodern culture was the presence of an insistent feminist voice, says Owens, theories of postmodernism tended either to neglect or to repress that voice. The absence of discussions of sexual difference in writings about postmodernism, as well as the fact that few women have engaged in the modernism/postmodernism debate, suggest, he says, that postmodernism may have been another masculine invention engineered to exclude women (1983, p. 59).

The individual discourses of the women's movement in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s doubtless progressed the social, political and sexual condition of women participating in those discourses: recall Docx asserting that one would have to be from the depressingly religious right or an otherwise peculiarly recondite and inhuman school of thought not to believe that the politics of gender, race and sexuality have been immeasurably affected for the better by the assertion of their separate discourses (2011, pp. 10-11). However, men still ran the institutions that ran the world, and the Western world increasingly ran itself.

Masculinity learned nothing: masculine madness killed the modernity it had spawned, and in doing so threatened its own dominance. Masculinity's antagonistic

causes and post-ideological wars became simulated, unreal, parodic, or more accurately, comedic. No Feydeau farce could be more hysterically senseless.

Certainly the masculine ontology of power, being *in* power, was replaced by a more feminine being *with* power. Simulations, parallelisms, autonomy, rather than obedience and servility, dominated the Western cultural imaginary. Masculinity did lose its universality, its temporal momentum, finding itself in a parodic crisis – no less deadly, but its dread spoken without authority or conviction, more desperate but less effective, less affecting. It was more plural, but pluralism is not in and of itself an automatically positive condition. It reduces us, believes Owens, to being an Other among others, it is not a recognition, but a reduction of difference to absolute indifference, equivalence (1983, p. 57). To sustain this belief, Owens turns to Paul Ricoeur:

When we discover that there are several cultures instead of just one and consequently at the time when we acknowledge the end of a sort of cultural monopoly, be it illusory or real, we are threatened with the destruction of our own discovery. Suddenly it becomes possible that there are just others, that we ourselves are an ‘other’ among others. All meaning and every goal having disappeared, it becomes possible to wander through civilizations as if through vestiges and ruins. The whole of mankind becomes an imaginary museum: where shall we go this weekend – visit the Angkor ruins or take a stroll in the Tivoli of Copenhagen? We can very easily imagine a time close at hand when any fairly well-to-do person will be able to leave his country indefinitely in order to taste his own national death in an interminable, aimless voyage. (1965, p. 278)

Humanity in the Western cultural imaginary may have embarked on ‘an interminable, aimless voyage’, but in its self-delusional aimlessness, pointlessness, it was deeply aware of the distance between the ideological mask and the social reality; it nonetheless insisted upon the mask. The formula, as proposed by Sloterdijk, would then be: ‘they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it’. Cynical reason is no longer naïve, but is a paradox of an enlightened false consciousness: one knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular interest hidden, but still one does not renounce it (Žižek 1989, p. 33). Despite the presence of masculine madness erupting in each decade of the epoch of postmodernity, despite its becoming

a factor of enlightened false consciousness, a veiled self-deception, it was not renounced.

3:3 ENABLING FICTIONS: postmodernism thrives as postmodernity falters

As we have seen, postmodernity was an epoch partially characterised by a hope that androcentrism would be mediated by the Enlightenment values of plurality, diversity and individuality, but it failed abjectly to reverse the genocide of Woman or renounce the self-deception of masculine madness. While the focus of this thesis is theoretical in nature rather than cultural or applied, postmodernism, in contrast to postmodernity, was and remains today a cultural force too significant to ignore. This chapter stretches the context to explore the end of ideology and the sexual differentiation, male privilege and Woman as other, through cultural artefacts of postmodernism: two ‘lived experiences’, two postmodern phenomena, two fragmented and contingent personal narratives of postmodern culture, are included to situate the parallel universes of theoretical postmodernity and cultural postmodernism.

MELBOURNE: 2001

My role is to play some small part in preparing the business world for postmodernism – to steer a fundamentally structural and centrally modernist world of certainty into a postmodern landscape of pluralism and contingency.

So it was that I found myself sitting in a theatre straining for the silver bullet, a metaphor or simple simile that would symbolise the shift society has experienced, unobserved and unremarked by leaders of business for whom modernist inheritances are the stitches in a safe, albeit obsolete, social fabric.

Little did I know that the answer would unfold on the very stage behind the theatre curtain. That night’s dance performance outraged a city for its spoken obscenity while simultaneously, and with delicious irony, proving that our society has evolved into a reconstructed subject.

American philosopher Richard Rorty believes that revolutionary achievements in the arts or science typically occur when someone realizes that two or more vocabularies interfere with each other and then proceeds to create a new vocabulary to replace them both.

William Forsythe did just that in his *Eidos:Telios* performed by Ballett Frankfurt. He replaced both narrative and the tradition of dance with the

vocabulary of postmodernism. In an interview published in the program Forsythe said: 'There tends to be a universal desire to project narration into dancing, and one of the things I always want to say is that you don't have to understand this, you just have to watch it, and then maybe something will happen to you without thinking.'

Our society has exited the modern mechanistic worldview, the narrative, the linguistic structure, and on this night in this theatre I had a symbol.

Forsythe delivered a deconstructed work that invited the audience to make of it whatever they wished. No narrative, no tradition, no history, no thematic construction.

This was quintessential postmodernism. High art mixed with street, gutter, language, new technology, documentary and theory to create a pluralism and an exchange between high art and popular culture. This was a new vocabulary whose meaning was yours. And yours. And yours.

This was a reconstruction of art, or as Mary Hesse would have it, a metaphoric redescription of art itself, echoing Nietzsche's definition of truth as a mobile army of metaphors. This was a Jacques Derrida postcard in action, in three-dimensional action. But as Rorty observes, Derrida is coming to resemble Nietzsche less and less and Proust more and more, with the fantastical rearrangement of what he remembers, of how he rewrites history.

As I was sitting in the theatre waiting for the curtain to rise, my subconscious filled with rearranged thoughts of a world that had begun to unravel, and while some of us heard the rustling portent, many around the world seem to have missed it. While our eyes were averted, postmodernism had spread through the West and individuals were calling the shots.

This new social composition sees new individualists, rather than institutions, shaping and interpreting a new vocabulary while modern traditionalists preserve the tried and true. Individualists throughout the world are exercising their own influence, assuming small pieces of power that combine to create change. Many are in business, others are not, but one thing is certain: they all worship private idiosyncrasies and take an individual position, and their combined effect is being felt across the developed world.

The emergence of these influential individuals coincides with, or, some would say in reaction to, rejection of, the globalism, the modernism and the institutionalism of the twentieth century. And this makes for a tussle

between postmodernism and the modern, between the masculinity of modernity and the pluralism of postmodernism.

Innovations and advancement in the postmodern economy rely on 'quantum leaps' into the new rather than on doing traditional things in incrementally improving ways. In the universe of postmodernism the machines and management processes that sit at the centre of the modernist business model are replaced by Rorty's *new vocabulary*.

As Arias and Acebron tell us, in a postmodern economy material advances are driven by new and revolutionary theoretical views of nature and society rather than refinements of existing technologies.

This is an economic shift from the production of goods propelled by energy, to the production of services propelled by information, marketing, credit and consumption; a shift into the Information Age.

William Forsythe, the choreographer, should consider a new career as a postmodern management consultant.

An essential contributor to the new vocabulary is the awareness that consumption in the postmodern world has moved to a tertiary level. It no longer loiters in the marketplace of basic needs, but rather has evolved to represent social links, a changing cultural identity and life trajectories.

While the postmodern individualists interpret their own stories – or as Carl Jung would say, their own 'enabling fictions' – modernist corporations continue merging to become global giants with budgets greater than some European countries. For the first time in history we are witnessing hegemonic corporate behemoths whose CEOs, with a few well-chosen words, can alter the course of world economies, influence the value of the world's most dominant currencies and change governments.

On the world stage, government and political power is increasingly tied to international corporations and their financial influence. We are experiencing a convergence between business and politics.

In the US it would be pointless to contemplate running for elected office without significant business partners, as it is largely corporate support that feeds the voracious financial appetite of a presidential election. What makes the emerging society so interesting, however, is that the power game can be seen in big government and big business but simultaneously can be witnessed at the grassroots level of the postmodern individual.

At the big end of the business/political convergence the power game no longer just relates to financial donations and concerns about inappropriate

post-election corporate influence. It is a much bigger game than that. Corporations are now so large they no longer try to buy inside influence in governments that might get in their way. They are now more powerful than the governments themselves.

In a profoundly paradoxical twist, global corporations now need to prop up governments to ensure the appearance of democracy is maintained. They have few social responsibilities to the communities in which they operate which, of course, do not elect the corporate boards and CEOs. Maintaining the façade of democracy, the scrim of egalitarianism, is vital if they are going to co-exist with representative, albeit less influential, governments.³²

But in the personal or individual universe there is a countermovement in society. Just as genuine political power at the top is weakening, its grassroots devolution is strengthening. Individuals are getting stronger and exerting influence at a grassroots level right across the world. Postmodernism makes paradox a daily experience. The reality of the strengthening force of corporations while individuals also get stronger is emblematic.

We can see examples of this individual power — or the reconstruction of authority and influence — around every corner. It just takes different forms in different parts of the world. Everywhere people are reclaiming the ability to make small changes add up to powerful influence. The structures are dissolving and postmodern individuals are reinterpreting society.

We see and hear this influence that occurs on an individual level every day in our own lives — on talkback radio, through the polls that politicians now find impossible to live without and in the local planning decisions that are slowly beginning to reflect the will of the local resident over the out-of-town corporation looking for a fast profit at the expense of community interests. Certainly we have a long way to go but the signs indicate that postmodern individuals are reclaiming the might. They are not prepared to accept the traditional rules of politics, of business, of religion, are no longer prepared to accept the burden of ideology. And they *will* be heard.

In the twenty-first century there is a place for ideology, for religion, for history, for global, modernist corporations. But only men and women who understand there is life after modernity [and postmodernity] will lead

³² Noam Chomsky addresses this topic in more detail in Chapter 4:4 *The One-Gendered State*.

those legacy models to success. They will be the ones who understand that the world has changed irrevocably, who grasp the need to either embrace the new pluralism or be locked forever in the sanitised straightjacket of structural purism.

William Forsythe's *Eidos:Telios* provided a metaphor for postmodernism. It was contingent, parodic, paradoxical, apolitical, ahistorical and ideology-free. The world is certainly a changed place. (Honeywill 2001, p. 36)

In this short piece, *Eidos:Telios* characterises the cultural overhang of postmodernism, a decade after the death of postmodernity. It identifies the end of ideology – and its standard-bearers religion, communism, Marxism – as a cause of postmodernity's demise in 1991³³. In Britain for example, Margaret Thatcher had been Prime Minister between 1975 and 1990. She swept to power on an ideological wave and her entire reign was defined by ideological clashes. By the end of her term as Prime Minister, however, ideology had exhausted itself in the West, its great bulwarks were in terminal decline.

Karl Marx described religion as the 'sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, the spirit of unspiritual conditions' (Elster 1986, p. 182). He went on to predict the decline of religion in inverse relation to the growth of education and social development. Instant, autonomous and infinite access to information and education, now known as the Information Age, would, according to Marx's prescient prediction, spell the decline of religion and it did (Elster 1986, p. 182). Religious attendance in the US, for example, experienced a slide throughout the 1980s, and '90s, with a 25-point decline in attendance occurring during those decades (Religion and Social Capital p. 2).

In 1990 Margaret Thatcher's ideological fervour was exhausted, structural communism had come to an end, religion was in severe decline, while capitalism and secularity were thriving. By 1991, knowledge and ideology suffocated under an avalanche of information and the technology essential to its distribution. In the 2001 essay I recognised the death of ideology and the growth of information as dual assassins of postmodernity. Let us remember that Žižek regards ideology as being

³³ In this thesis, the end of postmodernity is postulated as 1991. This is explored in detail in the following chapter.

commensurate with postmodern self-delusion and as a naïve view that conceals the beast (Žižek 1989, p. 33).

The second cultural exemplar of postmodernism is Laurie Anderson's *Americans on the Move*, first performed in April 1979 at The Kitchen Center for Video, Music, and Dance in New York City. In 1983, at the height of both postmodernity and postmodernism, Craig Owens, reflecting on his own critique, explores sexual difference, sexual differentiation, male privilege and the exclusion of Woman:

Several years ago I began the second of two essays devoted to an allegorical impulse in contemporary art—an impulse that I identified as postmodernist with a discussion of Laurie Anderson's multi-media performance *Americans on the Move*. Addressed to transportation as a metaphor for communication—the transfer of meaning from one place to another—*Americans on the Move* proceeded primarily as verbal commentary on visual images projected on a screen behind the performers. Near the beginning Anderson introduced the schematic image of a nude man and woman, the former's right arm raised in greeting, which had been emblazoned on the Pioneer spacecraft. Here is what she had to say about this picture – significantly, it was spoken by a distinctly male voice (Anderson's own processed through a harmonizer, which dropped it an octave—a kind of electronic vocal transvestism):

In our country, we send pictures of our sign language into outer space. They are speaking our sign language in these pictures. Do you think they will think his hand is permanently attached that way? Or do you think they will read our signs?

In our country, good-bye looks just like hello.

Here is my commentary on this passage:

Two alternatives: either the extra-terrestrial recipient of this message will assume that it is simply a picture, that is, an analogical likeness of the human figure, in which case he might logically conclude that male inhabitants of Earth walk around with their right arms permanently raised. Or he will somehow divine that this gesture is addressed to him and attempt to read it, in which case he will be stymied, since a single gesture signifies both greeting and farewell, and any reading of it must oscillate between these two extremes. The same gesture could also mean 'Halt!' or represent the taking of an oath, but if Anderson's text does not consider

these two alternatives that is because it is not concerned with ambiguity, with multiple meanings engendered by a single sign, rather, two clearly defined but mutually incompatible readings are engaged in blind confrontation in such a way that it is impossible to choose between them.

This analysis strikes me as a case of gross critical negligence. For in my eagerness to rewrite Anderson's text in terms of the debate over determinate versus indeterminate meaning, I had overlooked something—something that is so obvious, so 'natural' that it may at the time have seemed unworthy of comment. It does not seem that way to me today. For this is, of course, an image of sexual difference or, rather, of sexual differentiation according to the distribution of the phallus—as it is marked and then re-marked by the man's right arm, which appears less to have been raised than erected in greeting. I was, however, close to the 'truth' of the image when I suggested that men on Earth might walk around with something permanently raised – close, perhaps, but no cigar. (Would my reading have been different—or less indifferent—had I known then that, earlier in her career, Anderson had executed a work that consisted of photographs of men who had accosted her in the street?) Like all representations of sexual difference that our culture produces, this is an image not simply of anatomical difference, but of the values assigned to it.

Here, the phallus is a signifier (that is, it represents the subject for another signifier); it is, in fact, the privileged signifier, the signifier of privilege, of the power and prestige that accrue to the male in our society. As such, it designates the effects of signification in general. For in this (Lacanian) image, chosen to represent the inhabitants of Earth for the extra-terrestrial Other, it is the man who speaks, who represents mankind. The woman is only represented; she is (as always) already spoken for. (Owens 1983, p. 59)

In reviewing his own earlier critique Owens reintroduces Woman as the other, and representation as an element in postmodernity” ‘it is the man who speaks, who represents mankind ... [W]oman is only represented, she is (as always) already spoken for’ (1983, p. 59).³⁴

Postmodernism is a constructed reality, a fractured social condition that has postmodernity as its theoretical web. Every day we live with the legacy of

³⁴ I am consciously paraphrasing Owens here.

postmodernity, experiencing it in postmodernism, an everyday reminder of the self-delusion of postmodernity, of the concealment of the beast of masculine madness.

3:4 THE END OF POSTMODERNITY

Edward Docx wrote in *Prospect Magazine* that ‘we can officially and definitively declare that postmodern[ity] is dead. Finished. History. A difficult period in human thought over and done with. How do I know this? Because the Victoria and Albert Museum [is staging] what it calls “the first comprehensive retrospective” in the world: *Postmodernism—Style and Subversion 1970-1990*’ (2011, pp. 10-11).

The epoch of postmodernity came to an end in 1991. It was drowned under an avalanche of information that paradoxically, while offering a surface condition and shallowness, also made redundant the need for deep ideology and any of the ‘-isms’ that survived the death of modernity to become entrenched in postmodernity. Postmodernity had transformed the way the West thought and behaved. Its reflexive and reflective nature, however, invited its own demise.

Institutional communism ended, history ended, ideology ended, as the evil of masculine madness again erupted in an orgy of financial avarice and militaristic hegemony. At the end of postmodernity, masculine madness erupted in Wall Street and after the Dow Jones Industrial average plunged by 22.6 per cent, the greatest one-day fall on record, the patriarchal greed of the financial markets generated a contagion as the American savings and loans industry collapsed, and the malaise spread to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Europe. In late 1990, President George Bush, exhibiting the power of hegemonic masculinity, sent troops into the Gulf War, triggering a series of Middle Eastern wars that have not yet ended. America escalated its role as the world’s sheriff, gathering around it a posse made up of the great powers of the West. The Gulf War and its successors were different from the Second World War: they were asymmetrical, surgical, and technological; they were a surface war conducted like a video game, a simulation of reality. Talk of World War Three and an uncontrollable global war swirled through the media.

The beast surfaced, turned on the angel and in an orgy of self-destruction determined, if it could no longer kill what it hated, namely, mother womb, it would kill mother earth. Like modernity before it, postmodernity could not survive the masculinity of unlicensed dread. Rita Felski believes that when the *fin de siècle* feminists of modernity spoke of evolution and revolution, they did not simply mimic an existing masculine discourse, but drew on and contiguously reshaped the parameters of

contemporary thought to offer alternative, female-centred visions of historical possibility (1995, p. 172). The depth of a female-centred vision of historical possibility contrasted sharply with the shallowness that spewed from postmodernity's grave.

Postmodernity is dead, but its applied persona, postmodernism, became the dominant discourse and continued taking its place on the artistic and intellectual palette alongside all the other great ideas and movements (Docx 2011, pp. 10-11). In the same way as we are all a little Victorian at times, a little modern, a little Romantic, so we are all, and will forever be, children of postmodernism. All these movements subtly inform our imaginations and the way we discuss, create, react and interact. But, more and more, postmodernism became just another one of the colours we might use. Why? Because we are all becoming more comfortable with the idea of holding two irreconcilable ideas in our heads: that no system of meaning can have a monopoly on the truth, but that we still have to render the truth through our chosen system of meaning (2011, pp. 10-11). Simultaneity was the new condition where two irreconcilable ideas were held in our head and two irreconcilable cultures vied for dominance – but more of that later.

So the postmodern challenge that had risen in the wake of modernity faltered, staggered, and died in 1991 in the face of another eruption of masculine madness. We found ourselves reinventing the postmodern condition, witnessing and participating in its reinvention, not inventing, not renewing, not reinterpreting, but reinventing, reconstructing. As institutional communism collapsed, a new difficulty was created: because postmodernity attacks everything, a mood of confusion and uncertainty began to grow and flourish until it became ubiquitous. The paradox is this: by removing all criteria, we are left with nothing but the market – the opposite of what postmodernity originally intended. Of course there is a parallel paradox in politics and philosophy. If we de-privilege all positions, we can assert no position, we cannot therefore participate in society or the collective and so, in effect, an aggressive postmodernity becomes, in the real world, indistinguishable from an odd species of inert conservatism (Docx 2011, pp. 10-11).

The postmodern condition could no longer muster a response to the world in which we found ourselves. According to Docx, as human beings, we avowedly do not wish to be left with only the market. That conversation between artist and the public is therefore changing again, hastened by and in parallel with the dawn of the digital age. Certainly, the Internet is the most postmodern thing on the planet. The immediate

consequence in the West seems to have been to breed a generation more interested in social networking than social revolution. But, if we look behind that, we find a secondary reverse effect—a universal yearning for some kind of offline authenticity. We desire to be redeemed from the grossness of our consumption, the sham of our attitudinising, the teeming insecurities on which social networking sites were founded and now feed. We want to become reacquainted with the spellbinding narrative of expertise. If the problem for the postmodernists was that the modernists had been telling them what to do, then the problem for the present is the opposite, nobody has been telling us what to do (Docx 2011, pp. 10-11).

If we tune in carefully, we can detect this growing desire for authenticity all around us. We can see it in the specificity of the local food movement or the repeated use of the word ‘proper’ on gastropub menus. We can hear it in the use of the word ‘legend’ as applied to anyone who has actually achieved something in the real world. (The elevation of real life to myth!) We can recognise it in advertising campaigns such as for Jack Daniel’s, which ache to portray not rebellion but authenticity. We can identify it in the way brands are trying to hold on to, or take up, an interest in ethics, or in a particular ethos. A culture of care is advertised and celebrated and cherished. Values are important once more: the values that the artist puts into the making of an object as well as the values that the consumer takes out of the object. And all of these striven-for values are separate [parallel] to the naked commercial value.

We can see a growing reverence and appreciation for the man or woman who can make objects well. We note a new celebration of meticulousness, such as in the way Steven Wessel makes his extraordinary handmade flutes out of stainless steel. We uncover a new emphasis on design through making in the hand-crafted work of the Raw Edges Design Studios, say, with their Self-Made collection, objects that are original, informed by personal stories and limited edition. Gradually we hear more and more affirmation for those who can render expertly, the sculptor who can sculpt, the ceramist, the jeweller, even the novelist who can actually write. Jonathan Franzen is the great example here: a novelist universally (and somewhat desperately) lauded, raised almost to the status of a universal redeemer, because he eschews the evasions of genre or historical fiction or postmodern narratorial strategies and instead tries to say

something complex and intelligent and telling and authentic and well-written about his own time. It's not just the story, after all, but how the story is told. (Docx 2011, pp. 10-11).

These parallel ideas of a monocultural market system crammed with the shallow irrealities of technology and simulated friendships contrast but exist in simultaneity with the specificity of values and of authenticity. All are at odds with what came before, with postmodernity. We have entered a new age. Docx calls it the Age of Authenticism and challenges us to 'see how we get on' (2011, pp. 10-11).

SECTION FOUR: THE ETERNAL SEA OF THE PRESENT

*There is no next week,
I texted back, there is now
and there is never.*
New York Times Haiku

4:0 INTRODUCTION

After the end of postmodernity, the dominant intellectual and social framework, the Western cultural imaginary, changed. As we see in this section, while postmodernity's cultural offspring were consigned to the same historicised status as the ghosts of modernity and romanticism, its intellectual tendencies (feminism, postcolonialism, etc.) found themselves alive in a new cultural imaginary. Derrida, as we have seen, believed that ghosts are never quite avowed or ever fully relinquished, that like Schrödinger's cat, they both are alive and dead, present and absent, they are the trace of something dead but which in some sense lives on. In the era that follows postmodernity, we see traces of modernity, something dead, but which in some sense, ghostlike, lives on. Borrowing from Bauman, I call this the liquid present.

In this section the present is nurtured by the wave of modernity that flowed around postmodernity, observing as it flowed, and in that observation participated in it and changed. It is the ghost of modernity that, like the Enlightenment lineage, lives on, not just as a reflection caught beneath the surface, but rather a reconstructed, revitalised, redefined reality that borrows from modernity the scaffold upon which to grow new tissue, to embody the ghost, to make real a new form: the liquid present.

I introduce the twin cultures of the liquid present – the shallow consumer monoculture and the deep knowledge culture. Knowledge is deep and information is shallow. I establish knowledge as a tertiary modality connecting information, relevance, interpretation, understanding and experience. In the knowing liquid present, information is ubiquitous, fluid and free. It threatens to drown society in its ubiquity and availability. Knowledge on the other hand, given its interpretive introjection of relevance and understanding, is more valuable and valued.

The concept of a one-gendered state is introduced and I provide primary research data to establish the stark inequity that occurs in society and the workplace in particular.

This section also deals with masculinities and their plasticity across genders, and poses the question: Is the potential for masculine madness exclusively male or does it move with masculinity as its vector across genders? It looks at how the subject of masculinities turns mainly on the social landscape of masculine power and hegemonic status, and posits that one might be forgiven for expecting sensationalist reports on the nightly news of how the consequences of blind masculinity and masculine madness – the terror, the social inequity, the outrage of partner violence, unspeakable rapes – were being dealt with. One might even expect a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, like the body assembled in South Africa after the abolition of apartheid.

The role of morality in mediating masculine madness is followed by a chapter that draws together the threads of the thesis and ends with a note of cautious optimism that what is needed as the antidote to masculine madness is a language of power that situates morality within and without the population of men that exercise true, fully agentic morality, the morality of free will.

4:1 AFTER POSTMODERNITY: the liquid present

‘The world thereby momentarily loses its depth and threatens to become a glossy skin, a stereoscopic illusion, a rush of filmic images without density. But is this now a terrifying or an exhilarating experience?’

Fredric Jameson (1992, p. 34)

The challenge in examining or explaining the passing of postmodernity and what follows it is that postmodernity itself disinherited us. As Lyotard said, the postmodern condition rejects grand theories and metanarratives. It leaves us with no tradition to carry forward, no narrative looking glass through which to frame and articulate the present (1984, p. xxiii). French poet René Char wrote, *‘Notre héritage n’est précédé d’aucun testament’* which Hannah Arendt translates in her preface to *Between Past and Future* as ‘our inheritance was left to us by no testament’ (2006, p. 3). Nonetheless, there are invisible ghosts in the looking glass that allow us to catch a momentary glimpse of the secrets beneath the surfaces of the visible: ghosts of the Enlightenment, ghosts of modernity, ghosts of postmodernity. Derrida, always fascinated by the extent to which ghosts figure in the writing of Marx, said that, unlike tradition ghosts cannot fully be relinquished; like quantum matter they are both present and absent, they are the trace of something dead but which in some sense lives on (Davis 2004, p. 5).

Modernity and postmodernity are both dead, and yet like Erwin Schrödinger’s famous quantum thought experiment of the cat penned in a steel chamber with a small flask of hydrocyanic acid, they are simultaneously dead and alive. Their ghosts – or the paradoxical possibility that they are simultaneously dead and alive – afford us a glimpse of the secrets beneath the surface of the visible. Simultaneity is the new ontological reality, and its flux, the mutability of being, spills life into the present, into a fluid, liquid *now*. In the present according to Bauman – he does not use the term ‘liquid present’ – social forms and institutions are liquid. They no longer have enough time to solidify and cannot serve as frames of reference for human actions and long-term life plans, so individuals have to find other ways to organise their lives. They have to splice together an unending series of short-term projects and episodes that fail to add up to the kind of sequence to which concepts like ‘career path’ and ‘progress’ could meaningfully be applied. The liquid present conceives no future and is testamentary to no past. Such shattered fragments require individuals to be flexible

and adaptable – to be constantly ready and willing to change tactics at short notice, to abandon commitments and loyalties without regret and to pursue opportunities according to their current availability (Bauman 2007, p. 1). Time in the liquid present stopped accelerating as history melted and endings evaporated. Leonidas Donskis recalls Sławomir Mrożek's words that tomorrow is the present day, except that it comes the day after (Bauman and Donskis 2013, p. 197).

Elias Canetti raises a tormenting thought, 'as of a certain point, history was no longer real. Without noticing it, all mankind suddenly left reality, everything happening since then was supposedly not true, but we supposedly didn't notice. Our task would now be to find that point, and as long as we didn't have it [couldn't find it], we would be forced to abide in our present destruction' (in Baudrillard 1995, p. 1).

The unimaginable acceleration of modernity and the vertiginous, disruptive momentum of postmodernity, industrial technology mutating into digital technology, the revolution of media, the transformation of exchanges, political, economic, social, and sexual – all have propelled us to an 'escape velocity' in the language of Baudrillard, with the result that we have flown free of the referential sphere of the past (1995, p. 1). Put another way, we have reached 'terminal velocity' or stasis, that point at which acceleration ceases. In fluid dynamics, an object is moving at terminal velocity if its speed is constant due to the restraining force exerted by the fluid through which it is moving. At terminal velocity, the stasis of zero acceleration dissolves the arrow of time. History melts, and the future evaporates. All that exists, all that is real, is the vast liquid present.

In the uncharted present, time is fluid, without direction. As TS Eliot wrote, '...say that the end precedes the beginning, and the end and the beginning were always there before the beginning and after the end, and all is always now...' (1936, p. 8). Nothing is analogue, binary, fixed or solid, and the future is not somewhere we are heading; it is just something that has not yet happened. It is just somewhere the ontological cartographers have not yet plotted. The past is a forgettable place, foreign and unapproachable: 'The past is a foreign country, they do things differently there' (Hartley 1997, p. 5).

Where we are is in a digital, quantum, fluid present which, while its flux draws sustenance from modernity and the Enlightenment, pulls away from and reacts against postmodernity. It is in terminal velocity. It is characterised by self-determinism and reflects not 'order out of chaos', but the 'order in chaos' and its self-governing,

self-reinventing nature separates it from the solid unity rules of modernity and the dense anarchic practice of postmodernity. The glimpses in the mirror are contingent but real. What remains is to grasp those that pause and reinvent those that do not. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, arguably *the* central plank of quantum theory, states that while we cannot know a particle's location *and* momentum simultaneously – at work is what is known as *high probability*. This simultaneity of uncertainty and probability, this formality and freedom, is the tidal rhythm of the liquid present.

The fluid and fluent present finds fertile the shallow, the surface from which myriad fractured rays reflect. Susan Sontag points out that Roland Barthes is constantly making an argument against depth, against the idea that the most real is latent, submerged. In Sontag's opinion, the central argument is the idea that depths are obfuscating, demagogic, that no human essence stirs at the bottom of things, and that freedom lies in staying on the surface, the large glass on which desire circulates (Sontag 1982, p. xxviii). The endless sea of the present is not an epoch because it has no beginning and end, and because there is no great epoch there is no great heroism. In its shallows it stands for nothing and has nothing to stand for. To paraphrase Rita Felski, one could be *for* or *against* modernity in a way that one can never be *for* or *against* the eternal present (Felski 1995, p. 16). Similarly, as modernity was characterised by Bauman's drive to self-perfection, the present witnesses a drive to narcissistic self-reflection in the mirror of the surface.

That the liquid present surged beyond postmodernity, which in turn came after modernity, in no way implies that we are done with them or 'that we are *over* them.' As Colin Davis says of poststructuralism and postmodernism, 'we may come after them but we are not yet over them. The terms are still to be used, even if they are to be re-thought and displaced, even if they are to be reinvented' (Davis 2004, pp. 5-6).

Neither modernity nor postmodernity can be observed and then ignored because to ignore them is to fall under their spell, to be bewitched by the living dead. Derrida believed that attempting to bypass something runs the risk of falling under its spell (Davis 2004, pp. 5-6). It is better, using Derrida's position, to engage and then situate modernity and postmodernity as ghostly footfalls in the memory – it is through engagement with them that their secret legacy can be glimpsed and contested. Engaging, Derrida suggests, will not settle the ephemeral legacy once and for all,

rather, it will keep the dispute alive, providing new resources with which to preserve and to re-interpret the monuments of our intellectual history (Davis 2004, pp. 5-6).

Postmodernity implied a clear distinction between itself and modernity, and by implication between itself and the present. They are, however, not divisible but instead go together (Tester 1993, pp. 28-29). This notion of indivisibility is imbued with a wish for the extension of the project of modernity, rather than its overturning by postmodernity, and again, by implication, the overturning of postmodernity by the multifaceted present (Radstone 2007, p. 123). The liquid present definitionally is not a solid moment in time, it is endlessly fluid – as Baudrillard says, a perpetual present, an instantaneousness of all psychic events, which show on its shallow surface in a continual, potential *passage à l'acte*, a potential impulsive acting out (1995, p. 73). There is no clean decisive end to one epochal condition and the immediate commencement of the next. Each is like a wave flowing around the other. The modern wave carries formality into the tidal present where freedom, boundaries and creativity coexist peacefully and sometimes passionately with science.

The quantum theories of chaos and complexity reaffirm a belief in, and a need for, humanism, holism, interconnection and the idea of an autonomous self-regulating nature. The perpetual present envelops nature without making it sacred, recognising that we are free and responsible to imbue authenticity in, give meaning to, our existence while accepting that existence is beyond our control. It rejects what came before, embracing a humanist tradition of self-determination and reinvention and binds it to a quantum reality. What small legacy it inherits is visible through the prism of terminal velocity that, diverse and multifaceted, allows us to see the problematic not as epoch but as timeless, fluid: at once intractable and resolved. As TS Eliot wrote:

Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future,
And time future contained in time past.
If all time is eternally present
All time is unredeemable.
What might have been is an abstraction
Remaining a perpetual possibility
Only in a world of speculation.
What might have been and what has been
Point to one end, which is always present.

Footfalls echo in the memory
Down the passage which we did not take.
Towards the door we never opened.
...
Human kind cannot bear very much reality.
Time past and time future
What might have been and what has been
Point to one end, which is always present. (Eliot 1936)

Eliot's poem begins with a classical Augustinian notion of time, positioning as it does past and future in the refuge of the present. In this sense, argues Morris Weitz, all temporal experiences are in the present, at every moment, and we cannot redeem the temporal because it is never away from us to be redeemed (Weitz 1952, p. 52). The temporal is the present and the present, like temporality, is fluid. Also, and this becomes clear in the total context, Weitz says, the phrase 'All time is unredeemable' has another meaning: there is no redemption if we recognize only the flux. Flux has a significance central to this project: *flow, the continuous, endless flowing in of the tide, make or become liquid*. Further, says Weitz, even the realm of pure possibilities – of things that might have happened – is no different from the temporal: past, present, future and possibility all point to one end which is always with us, that is, which end. And the Eternal or Timeless, immanent in the flux, is the ultimate source of explanation of it (1952, p. 52).

Since humankind, as Eliot suggests, 'cannot bear very much reality' the liquid present is a gulf of irrealities, of lunar tides of surface unreality, temporary temporality and the dissolution of history. Even reality situates in irreality – reality television is, for example, only a performative simulation of reality – a scripted reality. The vacuum formed by the evacuation of postmodernity, deep ideology and history filled with ghosts, ahistorical ghosts of modernity and postmodernity, was filled by a wave of irrealities. The liquid present was suddenly riven with irrealities, and meaning cannot withstand them.

In this flux of simulation and unreality, everyone seeks something or someone to blame. 'It's someone else's fault. Someone made me do it,' people say. Men blame war experiences, or women. Women blame their fathers. Both genders blame priests. It seems everyone needs a trauma to explain the way they feel, because the way they

feel is artificial, unreal. And it is in this tidal frenzy of self-justification that the beast of masculine madness conceals or excuses itself: 'It's not my fault.'

Deep in the gulf, the temporary replaces temporality, the transient supplants the transcendent, the epoch is superseded by the ephemeral, and all are the subject of constant reinvention, situating them as flux. For Habermas, this new time consciousness does more than express the acceleration of time and the deceleration of history, the discontinuity of everyday time. It finds value in the transitory, the elusive and the ephemeral, the very celebration of dynamism (1981, p. 4). As we have seen, Norman Cantor declared modernity anti-historicist and asserted that it rejected any idea that truth lay in telling an evolutionary story: 'Modernity cared little for history, it was in fact hostile to it. Truth finding became analytical, rather than historical' (Cantor 1988, p. 35). This became the 'new condition' when the liquid present washed into the void left by postmodernity.

The end of history has been heralded over two hundred years, from when Hegel believed this hour had come with Napoleon's victory over Prussia at Jena, breaking the power of the *ancien régime* in Germany and laying the basis for the universal spread of the principles of the French Revolution (Anderson 1992, p. 283). While prescient, Hegel's pronouncement of history's demise was premature. It was in the space after postmodernity, in the eternal sea of the present, that history ceased to exist. Jean Baudrillard and Francis Fukuyama wrote extensively on the death of history. Fukuyama created an intellectual maelstrom in 1992, standing on the grave of postmodernity, when he published *The End of History*. He declared, 'What we may be witnessing is not just the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution' (1992, p. xi). This was, he pronounced, the twin deaths of history and ideology. Baudrillard described the end of history proposition as a painful idea (Baudrillard 2008, p. 36): he suggested that beyond a certain precise point in time, history was no longer real, that without being aware of it, the totality of the human race would have suddenly quit reality. All that would have happened since then would not have been at all real (an irreality) but we would not be able to know it. We know it now.

The end of mankind's ideological evolution paralleled the death of history. History drowned in the flux of the present, filled with a looking back to reconstruct in a new guise what was lost in a guise previously despised. The murderer does not want the victim resurrected, he wants another version of the victim – to hear the footfalls

echo down the passage he did not take towards the door he did not open – to assess for death or life. That is the dead, dry breath of modernity, the desiccated, decaying ghost of the postmodern: to restore a past culture, to bring back all past cultures to a liquid present, to resurrect everything that one has destroyed in joy and which one is reconstructing in sadness, to reimagine a liquid present that is less speculative and maniacal. Of the chiasmic vacuum, Baudrillard says, we dream of harnessing this flood, this energy, but this is sheer madness. We might as well harness the energy of automobile accidents, or of dogs that have been run over (2008, p. 40).

According to Cantor, TS Eliot, a prime theoretician of modernism, wrote in 1923 that the ‘narrative method’ had been replaced by the ‘mythic method’ (Cantor 1997, p. 44). The historical approach, in Eliot's view, was superseded by the very different program of concentrating on direct, inner, symbolic meaning that was both completely external to history and irrelevant to considerations of temporality. Again in the early 1930's, Eliot wrote that all time is unredeemable. What might have been and what has been point toward the same end: an ahistorical, unredeemable liquid present, as human beings living at the centre of the conscious, surrounded by smells and tastes and feels and the sense of being an extraordinary metaphysical entity with properties which hardly seem to belong to the physical world.

Postmodernity shattered so quickly that it left only the rubble of tradition to be washed, as if panning for gold, by the tidal present. The question, posed by Arendt, is that, in the shattering of tradition, what do we salvage? That raises a further question: with history drowned and life being lived in liquid time that swirls into spaces evacuated by prodigal epochs, what is the condition of the Western cultural imaginary? In searching the cultural imaginary for the ghosts of postmodernity and modernity swept away on the flooding present, do we mourn the inheritance of masculine madness?

In attempting to mourn masculine madness and the genocide of Woman, men in the liquid present confront a mandatory sentence: to mourn, to have full agency, to be self-determining, self-governing, to make choices, conscious and unconscious. According to Freud, mourning occurs when an object that one had loved for its intrinsic qualities as separate and distinct from oneself is lost. Men face a new reality in which they acknowledge *the creator* and search for a new equilibrium with Woman, mourning the loss of the other, of what was once loved. They then determine whether or not to surpass the beast. Susannah Radstone believes Eric Santner's central

proposition is that the move from modernity to postmodernity would be successfully negotiated only when and if mourning came to take the place of nostalgia. Since we have no nostalgia for masculine madness, mourning is at last possible. The end of postmodernity heralded a fracture of mourning and nostalgia. Reinvention replaces both. After postmodernity, no history exists because both time and temporality are undergoing reinvention.

The Enlightenment lineage has experienced many epochs, but only three major waves:

1. First Wave: Modernity was the **construction** era – metanarratives, structuralism, industrial revolution
2. Second Wave: Postmodernity was the **deconstruction** era – individual interpretations, post-structuralism, end of industrialisation, micro-narratives
3. Third Wave: The eternal sea of the present is the **reconstruction** era – reinvention, reimagined modernity, collective narratives, self-regulation, knowledge, reconstructed narcissism, anxiety, re-masculinisation

The Western world is witness to this reconstruction and reinvention. In the language of Heisenberg, a witness is by nature a participant for nothing can be observed or witnessed and remain unaltered. We are witnessing (observing) and changing (participating in) the Western cultural imaginary. However reinvention is no meta-discourse: it occurs in diverse shards of temporality, with different results and cultural shifts. Remember the liquid present is characterised by self-determinism and reflects not ‘order out of chaos’ but the ‘order in chaos’, and its self-governing, self-reinventing nature separates it from the solid, unity rules of modernity and the anarchic practice of postmodernity.

Networked narratives now fill the liquid present, replacing history, postmodernity and metanarratives. Woman was subjected to genocide in modernity and abandoned in postmodernity – Woman, the collective feminine, is a metanarrative, so Woman could not exist in postmodernity where metanarratives were banished. In the liquid present, however, the structuralist metanarrative has

been reimagined, reinvented into diverse, fleeting, temporary, networked narratives – ahistoric and post-discursive. So Woman, despite the continuing genocide, has the potential to exist simultaneously with masculine madness in a sea of networked narratives. This provides some small glimmer of hope on the shallow surface of the liquid present.

In the liquid present, women are increasingly loving Woman: *the creator*. This promises agency and subjectivity, and averts Heidegger's *mode of being* characterized primarily by the female waiting to be used by others. Heidegger's *Zuhandenheit* is a mode of being Lucy Tatman describes as 'waiting patiently, passively, to be used by another *for that other's* purpose' (2004). However in the liquid present Woman is not waiting patiently, passively, to be used by another *for that other's* purpose.

The *Third Wave* sweeping across the eternal sea of the present reinvents gender in the ontological sense of being woman or being man. The stammering temporality of modernity's demise saw a temporary shift from masculine reason and rationality to the deconstructed masculinity of postmodernity, masked in scientific objectivity. Dominative masculinity, however, has lost none of its dominance, the genocide of Woman has lost none of its diminishing effect on women. Feminist and post-structuralist critiques have demystified the substantive content of mainstream Western scientific practice, revealing the shallow ideology of domination concealed behind the façade of 'objectivity' (Davis 2004, p. 22). In the liquid present, pregnant with possibility for simultaneity and feminine optimism, the potentiality of masculine madness again steps from the heterotopian dark other space as the Western cultural imaginary remasculinises – and women, while experiencing potential for simultaneity, are complicit. Let us recall Beauvoir's belief that the oppressor would not be successful without the complicity of those he oppressed. Recall, also, MacKinnon's view that women are consensual on stereotypes and complicit under oppression because they have a substantial stake in not seeing their situation from the standpoint of women, and that some women relate to women's situation in ways that are very much like the way men relate to women's situation, even when it is against their interests (1983, p. 18). In the liquid present, men are remasculinising the West. Over the twenty years between 1986 and 2006 there was a constant decrease in the view that the role of women is in the home – a decrease from 17 per cent to only 7 per cent. Alarming, however, and consistent with the re-masculinisation of society, from 2007 that trend

has reversed. Today almost 10 per cent of the population – an equal mix of men and *women* –believe women should just run the home (see Figure 2).




Figure 2: Women should just run the home (I).³⁵

Despite the complicity of women, it is young men, boys and men, who belong to the generation that increasingly disrespect women. Alarming, as older men increasingly disagree, young men increasingly agree that women's place is in the home. This attitude increased from 6.5 per cent in 2008 to 11.6 in 2013 (see Figure 3). But it is the trend line that illuminates the stark picture that in the vast sea of the present young men are becoming more conservative. Over the past decade the percentage of young men believing women belong in the home has increased from 7 to 12 (rounded). That is a 40 per cent increase in just one decade. In the same period, the proportion of men aged 65+ has reduced from 21 per cent to 13 per cent – a 62 per cent decrease.

³⁵ Primary research using original data from Roy Morgan Research.




Figure 3: Women should just run the home (II)

Young men, in particular, are therefore remasculinising, are choosing conservative over progressive social attitudes, and are eroding the social morality. Nowhere is this remasculinisation starker than in the USA where it has been examined in law as the following extract from a July 2013 issue of *Slate* magazine shows:

In Atlantic City's Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa, cocktail waitresses are not just drink servers. They are, in the opinion of New Jersey judge Nelson Johnson, 'sex objects.' The casino calls its waitresses the 'Borgata Babes.' Their job description is 'part fashion model, part beverage server, part charming host and hostess. All impossibly lovely.' When the Borgata hires a new babe, it puts her on the scale, then requires her to weigh in periodically throughout her career to ensure that her weight does not increase by more than 7 per cent of her initial poundage. If it does, the casino reserves the right to suspend the babe until she slims down.

Last week, 22 of these babes lost a lawsuit against the casino. They had alleged that the Borgata discriminated against them based on both weight and sex. Male servers at the Borgata, they said, are not judged on their babeliness, or their poundage. But Judge Johnson found that the Borgata's requirements were legal because the babe label was applied to a waitress with 'that person's participation

[compliance/complicity].’ He wrote, ‘Plaintiffs cannot shed the label ‘babe’; they embraced it when they went to work for the Borgata.’ If you take a job as a babe, you better stay a babe. Even if the casino admits that its standard for loveliness is an ‘impossible’ one.

The case shines a spotlight on the lingering acceptability of weight discrimination in the American workforce: Michigan is currently the only state to explicitly bar discrimination based on weight and height, thanks to a 1976 law meant to protect the jobs of female workers regardless of their size. ‘That’s a horrible ruling,’ Michigan disability rights attorney Richard Bernstein said of the case. ‘That decision gives employers a tremendous power over people in the workplace.’ But the ruling also raises questions about the role of ‘babes’ in workplaces across the country. It’s conventional wisdom that male gamblers will keep pulling away at the slots as long as they’re lubricated by strong drinks served up by bachelorette women. But wouldn’t some female patrons prefer to be served by hunky pieces of man candy? And couldn’t most workplaces argue that its jobs are better performed by babes, regardless of the venue? Is it OK to require that strippers be babes? Casino waitresses? How about investment bankers?

While the Borgata babes are heading back to the scale, three women who worked for Merrill Lynch have filed suit against the company for sexing up their own job descriptions. The women allege that their employer forced them to attend female-only seminars on how to dress, to act ‘perky,’ and to read a book called *Seducing the Boys Club: Uncensored Tactics From a Woman at the Top* (and to attend a mandatory lecture by the book’s author). The book counsels women to stage workplace interactions with their co-workers that play out like ‘great sex.’ It tells women that it’s ‘important to reinforce his hunk status,’ to tell him ‘I love you,’ and to use comments like ‘Wow, you look great. Been working out?’ to curry favor among their male peers. That last line, the book says, ought to be applied to any male co-worker who is not ‘morbidly obese.’ Male Merrill Lynch employees may not be hired based on their

bodies, but it was apparently the job of female employees to insist on their inherent babeliness. The case was recently refilled in state court after a similar federal suit was dismissed ... maybe American employers ought to stop viewing their female employees as sex workers, and get back to their jobs. (Hess 2013)

While reason, rationality and objectivity, all masculine conditions, have throughout the Enlightenment lineage hidden in plain sight, masculinity and patriarchy are undergoing reinvention. Dominative masculinity, and the masculine madness that caused and perpetuates the genocide, the social death of Woman and the subjugation of women, no longer politely mask their presence behind the façade of objectivity. They are dominant but visible, and in the face of gender reinvention, men are simultaneously mourning the genocide of Woman and fearing the reinvention of what it means to be man – and also woman. They are simultaneously alive to their role in the social death of Woman, and dead to the yielding of unearned privilege – in Atlantic City, at Merrill Lynch, across the globe. The patriarchy is under siege, but men will mourn for Woman only briefly before again repelling any threat to dominance.

4:2 KNOWLEDGE CULTURE + MONOCULTURE: a new epistemology

In the liquid present, digital dimorphism overflows into the shallows of a monocultural consumerism. Analogue reality – conscience, self-awareness, ethics, responsibility – is declining, and digital media irrealities like celebrity, public relations spin, pornography, are becoming a norm. But there is another culture rising out of the shallows. It is the production and consumption of knowledge and of culture itself. Alan Kirby says postmodernity is dead and buried. In its place, he reports, comes a new paradigm of authority and *knowledge* formed under the pressure of new technologies and contemporary social forces (Kirby 2006).

Baptised on the grave of postmodernity, a new tertiary knowledge culture flooded in on a tide of authenticity to conduct a permanent dialogue with the human experience. Thomas Stewart dates this blossoming of knowledge culture and the birth of its shallow cousin the, Information Age, from 1991, when US companies spent more on information technology than on production technology. Capital expenditure on information machinery ballooned from \$US49 billion in 1982 to \$US86.2 billion five years later. By 1991, for the first time in history, spending on information technology (\$US112 billion) outstripped capital expenditure on production technology (\$US 107 billion). ‘Call that Year One of the Information Age,’ Stewart wrote (1999, pp. 20-21). He adds that, ‘Ever since, companies have spent more money on equipment that gathers, processes, analyses, and distributes information than on machines that stamp, cut, assemble, lift, and otherwise manipulate the physical world.’

The Information Age and its stalking horse on the terrain of conflict, knowledge culture, had overtaken the product world. Also in 1991 the Pope invoked a blessing on this transforming world when he declared in his encyclical *Centesimus Annus* that while the decisive factor of production used to be land and capital, it was now knowledge. This rare convergence of the Pope’s blessing and the exponential growth of information presaged tectonic change.

In 1991 the western world staggered from the depths of one of the worst economic recessions and commenced one of the longest military aggressions since the Second World War. The old and established patterns of behaviour were no longer relevant. The impoverished consumer monoculture complicit in the economic malaise struggled on, but out of dystopian uniformity arose private idiosyncrasies, authenticity, and a knowledge culture to repudiate monoculturalism. Richard Rorty reminds us of

Derrida saying, 'I shall send you no children, just postcards, no public generalities, just private idiosyncrasies' (Rorty 1989, p. 129). Knowledge and culture became concurrent – and concurrently private and social; and the private was everywhere in the social, spawning knowledge postcards and private idiosyncrasies.

Another world-changing event marking the death of postmodernity was, as we have seen, the demise of Communism after a long and lingering illness caused by the evacuation of relevance of institutional power and the ending of a politico-social situation. The latter had begun in 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and which reached its terminal stages when, in 1989, the Russians, bloodied by ten years of US-funded conflict, withdrew from what had become then, and is still now, a country reduced to physical and metaphysical rubble. The end of institutional communism marked a final end to depth ideologies, which in turn contributed to the death of postmodernity.

Not coincidentally, 1991 was also the year that the Lotus Development Corporation was forced, by the power of individuals, to abandon the branding and release of an innovative new CD-ROM database for market research companies. Consumer advocacy groups, acting on consumers' fears, forced Lotus to spin off the product into a separate company in an attempt to manage the public backlash. This was the first very social demonstration of concerns about privacy's relationship to information technology, and the refusal by individuals to recognise any *public good* in monocultural knowledge manipulation.

As the vast irreversible sea of the present filled the void left by postmodernity, a tide of simultaneity flooded in with it that invigorated individual and social knowledge, thrusting the dagger of diversity into the heart of monoculture, and simultaneously breathing life into social order-making and individual identity-creation. Postmodernity, like modernity before it, had fetishised the author, even when the author chose to indict or pretended to, in a frenzy of deconstruction, abolish him – or herself. But the liquid present fetishises the *recipient* of the text to the degree that she or he becomes a partial or whole author of it. This makes the individual's action the necessary condition of the cultural product (Kirby 2006, p. 1). If we bear Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle in mind, this situates the individual as witness, witness as participant, with nothing observed remaining unchanged.

Knowledge lost its unity as postmodernity's deconstruction was reconstructing in a new self-determining guise, and new narratives, fresh narratives, even collective

narratives, were surfacing; not the metanarratives of modernity or the grand narratives of the Enlightenment, but social narratives bifurcated by simultaneity, shattered shards in loose but vital connection. Simultaneity became the wellspring of a new epistemology. Concretion and contingency were simultaneously the same and different, one and not one, dead and alive. Life in the liquid present was simultaneously moral and obscene, pornographic and erotic, concrete and conceptual, private and public, patriarchal and plural. As Kenneth Keniston says:

The implications of a world of global networks, of instantaneous communication, of electronic commerce, of households 'wired' at a rate that doubles every year, of international monetary markets and economies linked electronically [are all] worthy of and receive intensive study. And not least important are the legal problems of reconciling the standards for the Information Age of more than one hundred countries, of determining what is right, proper, secret, public, pornographic, militarily dangerous, privately owned, obscene, subversive and so on. (1998, p. 1)

The implication for masculine madness lies in the problematic of reconciling the standards of what is right, obscene and brutal with what is concealed from examination by a new moral blindness. The beast is concealed, for example, inside social media where putrid venom is spewed into the everyday, where normal men, and women, behave abnormally, disguising and camouflaging masculine madness, making abnormality normative.

The terms *information* and *knowledge* are not interchangeable. Information is vast and operates only at a primary (*what*) and secondary (*why*) level of gathered facts, news, and data sets. Knowledge is deep, and information is shallow. Knowledge is a tertiary modality connecting information, relevance, interpretation, understanding and experience. In the knowing liquid present, information is ubiquitous, fluid and free. It threatens to drown society in its very ubiquity and availability. Knowledge on the other hand, given its interpretive heritage of relevance and understanding, is more valuable and valued. Many media organisations believe they can charge for information, for news, but in doing so mistakenly attribute a value to a commodity that is delivered free by millions of personal narrators producing networked narratives.

Information is the flotsam and jetsam of knowledge culture, polluting the vast ocean of the present, creating a shallow surface condition of temporary connections.

Information is the shallow, encrusted meniscus of knowledge. Information is what is shared on the networks of acquaintances on, for example, Facebook. Just as information will never compete with knowledge in the liquid present, networks of acquaintances will never match genuine communities of interest in the knowledge depths of the present. According to Leonidis Donskis, the digital present encourages the deliberate forgetting of the other, and a purposeful refusal to recognise and acknowledge a human being of another kind while casting aside someone who is alive, real, and doing and saying something right beside us:

All for the purpose of manufacturing a Facebook 'friend' distant from you and perhaps even living in another semiotic reality. We also have an alienation while simultaneously simulating friendship; not talking to and not seeing someone who is with us; and using the words 'Faithfully Yours' in ending letters to someone we don't know and have never met - the more intensive the content, the more courtly the address. There's also wishing to communicate, not with those who are next to you and who suffer in silence, but with someone imagined and fabricated, our own ideological or communicational projection - this wish goes hand in hand with an inflation of handy concepts and words. New forms of censorship coexist - most oddly - with the sadistic and cannibalistic language found on the internet and let loose in verbal orgies of faceless hatred, virtual cloacas of defecation on others, and unparalleled displays of human insensitivity. (Bauman and Donskis 2013, p. 10)

The 'orgies of faceless hatred, virtual cloacas of defecation on others, and unparalleled displays of human insensitivity' work to conceal the madness of men by desensitising us to danger, even drawing us in to behave with madness ourselves. The potential for masculine madness is alive in the liquid present. Computer games and pornography, for example, give young (mainly) men a moral blindness to physical and sexual violence reducing their mid-brain to automaton responses, desensitising them to realities.

While acknowledging the ‘correlation is not causation’ caveat, this could be viewed as a contributor to the remasculinisation of society, which we know is led mainly by young men: the porn generation, the gaming generation.

Another display of human insensitivity is profundism, the twenty-first-century version of Andy Warhol’s ‘fifteen minutes of fame.’ In the monocultural world of shallow ideologies, desiccated beliefs, shallow information and transactional networks of strangers-as-friends, it appears everyone needs to have a moment of recognition, a profound moment of acknowledgement. Recently a new acronym has appeared in the popular culture – FOMO or fear-of-missing-out: fear of being robbed of profundity. A defining characteristic of profundism is that, rather than demonstrating difference, the vast, monocultural media delivers uniform profundity. Everyone’s profound moment must be, to be valued, like everyone else’s. Men killing other men with one punch, men sexually assaulting women, men shooting innocents are frequently copying other perpetrators – and they are doing it on television.

On the monocultural side of bifurcated society, the shallow side, an unspoken rule of normative uniformity and its poster child, profundism, is that if an event is not witnessed, it did not happen. Young men video bullying, violence, sexual assaults on their iPhones and text them to each other. Some put them up on Facebook, believing it must be witnessed for it to exist. Other violent crimes are captured on closed circuit television. Perpetrators not only know they are being recorded they bask in the publicity. The two male students responsible for the Columbine High School massacre, for example, documented every move they planned to make, videoed their rehearsals for the atrocity, and knew they would be filmed during the killing spree (BBC 1999). According to a BBC report, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris planned to kill 500 students and teachers. In the end they murdered twelve students and one teacher (BBC 1999). Profundity and normative uniformity took over after the Columbine massacre:

Across the nation after the 1999 Columbine tragedy, other kids called in bomb threats, wore trench coats to school, or used the Internet to praise what Klebold and Harris had done. Only ten days later, on April 30, people feared the eruption of some major event because that day marked Hitler's suicide in 1945. Schools in Arizona, New Jersey, Michigan, North Carolina, and DC closed to investigate potential threats. It wasn't Paducah,

or Jonesboro, or Springfield that they wanted to imitate; the mantra was 'Columbine'. (Ramsland 1999)

The condition of normative uniformity has been a long time coming. This decidedly contemporary condition had its roots deep in modernity. Modernity was a project with central goals that included industrialisation, mass production, mass media, mass consumption – all designed to eliminate difference. Difference, a culture of particularities, was disruptive, costly. What the world of manufacturers and assembly lines wanted was not difference, but sameness, and what modern consumers needed was a Ford in any colour, as long as it was black. This adherence to standardisation became known as Fordism, and Fordism became a byword for repetitive uniformity. The elimination of difference became culturally normative in modernity, reaching beyond the assembly line into people's lives, and ultimately reaching beyond modernity, through postmodernity, washing into the shallows of the liquid present. Even Auschwitz was masculine madness as precursor to normative uniformity: it embodied the industrial ethos and apparatus for the elimination of difference (Santner 1993, p. 9). European Jews were seen as generalities rather than particularities – to be Jewish was a reductively uniform label, not a characteristic of particular individuals or even a social aggregation of individuals. After modernity, postmodernity homologised industrial uniformity with globalisation, and difference was further reduced. Ostensibly, postmodernity's condition was to resist universality and homogeneity, to create and laud diversity and heterogeneity. However, while it achieved that in linguistic and personal modalities, during the years of postmodernity globalism reduced difference across the globe.

In 1989, as postmodernity stood stutteringly on the brink of its grave, Ray Oldenburg reported that we had lost the ability to be different, that we were consumed by our work and our homes, that we worked to live, and lived to work (Oldenburg 1989, p. 16). We worked to feather a better nest and, in so doing, had lost what was beyond work and beyond what was emerging as a consumer monoculture. We need to again find, he said, a 'Third Place': the contingent breathing space of natural pleasure beyond work and home, a new plurality beyond the consumer culture run by corporations (1989, p. 16). Oldenburg advocated the need to find depth in the knowledge culture that was slicing away from the monocultural shallows of traditional consumerism.

The Third Place of our childhood was where we played, where many of our formative experiences were incubated, when the football match on the corner oval was owned by us. But, as the consumer monoculture spread, because the oval had no commercial value, it had no place in the global economy. It had to be commercialized. It had to be privatized. Shopping malls were soon built on the open fields where we used to picnic and, as kids, where we used to kick footballs. Picnickers became customers, sports fields became stadiums, and watching a game suddenly came with an admission price.

Now, in the liquid present the consumer monoculture, having survived postmodernity's demise, grows unabated and attempts to overwhelm the knowledge culture, to drown true diversity and originality. Its new gathering place is in the office of the unelected plutocrat, in Starbucks, in the artificial atmosphere of a shopping mall with synthetic stores and global brands that look the same and have no story or relevance to our lives. This is where shopping is privatized fun, where competitive consumption is all part of the new entertainment, where the price of entry is the cost of a product. Even the fierce flux of the present cannot dissolve the myriad tentacles of the shallow consumer monoculture, but simultaneity – the simultaneous growth of the deep knowledge culture – is energising individuality and social knowledge, stabbing at the wound that will not heal, lunging at the heart of monoculture, simultaneously breathing cool life into knowledge culture and stale evanescence into the consumer monoculture. It incubates a new reverence for the small, diverse and precious personal experience beyond the mass consumer monoculture by mobilizing depth consumers to join other depth consumers in creating a changed place. I call it the *Third Wave*, where the networked narratives coalesce to form, not the immaterial monotony of society, but social identities filled with individual stories, narratives that not only expose but surpass the potential for masculine madness.

Those residing deep within knowledge culture know that their relationships with purchases must be personal and diverse, not monocultural. Amy Scherber's story, for example, makes it personal. Having graduated from St. Olaf College in Minnesota, Scherber began a career in marketing in New York City, but after three years in the corporate world inspiration hit her while searching for a small taste sensation in the ironically tasteless Big Apple. She yearned for warm, crunchy, artisanal hand-made bread, and simply could not understand why her only option was a loaf manufactured on a factory assembly line. She believed that if something

wonderful did not exist, then she should bring it to life. Driven by her imagination and passion for depth, Amy enrolled in the New York Restaurant School, and then got a job as a pastry cook at Bouley restaurant. To learn even more about bread, she trained briefly in three bakeries in France, then returned to New York City and baked bread at the famed Mondrian Restaurant. Filled with confidence, optimism and commitment to the rare pleasures of freshly baked, hand-made bread, bread as a symbol of something beyond its utility, she launched Amy's Bread in a small storefront on Ninth Avenue (Hell's Kitchen). Today Amy Scherber is known in local neighbourhoods across America for her delicious hand-made, traditional breads. Amy celebrated difference and differences.

In the liquid present, shallow differences are drenched in the tears of loss – *tristesse de la perte* – the loss of difference, diversity, heterogeneity. The use of a French phrase in the preceding sentence underscores the otherness of languages that are not English, and the sadness of loss. According to Stephen Pax Leonard, as one section of the present embraces the synthetic monoculture of populism and consumerism, linguistic and cultural diversity is being erased. For monocultural consumerism to operate efficiently, he proposes, it requires as few operating languages as possible (Leonard 2011).

The efficiency of English as the *lingua franca*, and the spread of English as the dominant international operating language is as inevitable as it is hegemonic and neo-colonial. Rich language is not valued in the shallows of the Information Age; rather, it is largely considered irrelevant and frequently trashed. But in the rich depth of the knowledge culture, language, like difference, individuality, unpredictability and disruptive creativity, are all deeply valued. Certainty is a beacon in the shallows, and, let us remember, where there is certainty, there is neither meaning nor self-knowledge: where there is meaning and self-knowledge, there is no certainty (Heller 1990, p. 40).

In the liquid present, certainty tries to rob the knowledge culture of meaning and self-[individualist]knowledge, in a vain attempt to flood the Western cultural imaginary with a monoculture. Despite the fact that a monoculture destroys culture, the knowledge culture resists and insists on existing in deep diversity alongside the shallows of the monocultural information inundation, with its traditional consumer culture. Wherever monoculture floods, it attempts to destroy or co-opt the other cultures. David Frawley believes that monoculture causes deculturalisation in which entire cultures and civilisations are sanitised, subverted or eliminated, and the

destruction of cultural diversity, like that of biodiversity, is devastating to living systems (Frawley 2001, p. 1)

Diversity and heterogeneity survive in the Enlightenment lineage, and the last ideology, no matter how thin, is knowledge and its culture. According to Kenneth Keniston culture can be defined as

The basic presuppositions, fundamental myths, unstated assumptions, linguistic taken-for-granted, historic grounds and creation myths that unite a society: all of those conceptual, linguistic, imaginative, literary, musical, artistic, and intellectual threads that bind people together to make them feel 'of one kind.' 'Culture' in this anthropological sense, then, is a core part of our identities as human beings, connected to our mother tongues, to our families as children, to our root assumptions about life and the world, to our links to our ancestors, and to the fundamental texts, written or unwritten, of our social world. It is the glue that binds us together with those whom we recognize as being 'people like us.' It is what makes a set of individuals a people and not simply a gathering of strangers. (1998, p. 137)

The cultural implication of diversity loss, of homogeneity, of monoculture looms threateningly. Keniston warns that, in a major boost to global monoculture in the shallow flux of the present, more than 90 per cent of all websites in the world are in English. By 'global monoculture', Keniston means the *de facto* dominance of a single culture across all the important sectors of the world:

Coercion is absent; many languages are tolerated; multiculturalism is officially extolled. But the power of the dominant global culture is such that it tends to overwhelm, or reduce to a status of inferiority, all local cultures. Such was the case with Roman-Latin culture during the apogee of the Roman Empire; such was the status of Moslem culture and the Arabic language during the greatest epoch of Islam. And such, some claim, is the power of today's global monoculture, embodied in satellite TV, World Cup games, CNN, the Three Tenors at the Baths of Caracalla, Hollywood, Murdoch, Bollywood, Microsoft, Intel – a culture where 90+% of all Web sites are in English, and a world where, in contemporary India, unless one speaks, reads, and writes good English it is virtually

impossible to use a computer much less send email. (Keniston 1998, p. 139)

Knowledge culture is simultaneously situated alongside the monocultural surface condition of base consumption, above human needs and above the utility of products or the function of traditional consumption. Simultaneity turns on the radical structural difference between the consumer monoculture and the new culture of knowledge and individual identity. The distinctive mark of the new multicultural consumer society is therefore not consumption at all. According to Bauman, what sets the members of the new society apart from their forebears is the emancipation of consumption from its past, setting consumption free from functional bonds and absolving it from the need to justify itself by reference to anything but its own pleasurability (2001, pp. 12-13). At the heart of new consumerism is desire. The *spiritus movens* or moving spirit of consumer culture, says Bauman, is no longer a set of articulated, let alone fixed, needs, but desire: ‘a much more volatile and ephemeral, evasive and capricious, and essentially non-referential phenomenon, a self-begotten and self-perpetuating motive that calls for no justification or apology either in terms of an objective or a cause’ (2001, p. 13). And, he adds, desire is narcissistic: ‘it has itself for its paramount object, and for that reason is bound to stay insatiable. However tall the pile of other (monocultural) objects marking its course may grow. The “survival” at stake is not that of the consumer’s body or social identity, but of the desire itself: that desire which makes the consumer – the consuming desire of consuming’ (Bauman 2001, pp. 12-13).

So it is that tertiary consumption – beyond primary and secondary consumption, reaching into the narcissism of desire – is becoming the new canon: consumption based not on a desire for *things* alone, but the unique personal meaning of *things* to each individual. Swiss jeweller Otto Kunsli created a matt-black rubber bracelet titled *Gold Makes You Blind*. The bracelet has, under its black rubber exterior, a secret cache of pure gold. Only the wearer, and those few in the know, is aware there is gold beneath the matt rubber, aware of the ironic social commentary in the artwork. This is tertiary consumption in the extreme: the elevated desire of deep consumption where symbols and *passwords* outrank the shallow utility of things. This knowledge culture is the world of whispered secrets, deep personal knowledge, where individuals create cultural capital from diverse ideas, local experiences and small treasures in the knowledge culture.

Consumers in the knowledge culture, in contrast to those in the shallow monoculture, are less interested in the commodities of the market and more fascinated by discretionary spending: what is known as elective consumption. So they buy fewer things and spend more on creating emotional experiences. They are, for example, paying for yoga or Pilates classes and private trainers, they are drinking better quality but fewer glasses of beer and wine, they are travelling more, they are investing more, they are going to the theatre and arts festivals more, they are reading more e-books and passing them on to their friends. They are drinking cocktails in an anonymous bar or meeting friends out for an espresso and pastry. Because they define themselves by who they are and what they stand for, they feel no need to define themselves by brands or symbols of belonging.³⁶

In short, they are becoming collectors of memories, not consumers of commodities.

The shallow traditional orthodoxy of consumer monoculture threatens to deculturalise the new knowledge culture, exhibiting what Donskis calls ‘purposeful refusal to recognise and acknowledge a human being of another kind’ (Bauman and Donskis 2013, p. 10). Walking in the footsteps of Amy Scherber, however, individuals rejected the canon that bigger is better, that bureaucracy is, as Weber said, the embodiment of legal-rational authority, that centralised buying and selling is in any way better than local knowledge and individual decision-making.

Masculine madness is concealed and nurtured in the monoculture with the latter’s normative uniformity and profundism desiccating social morality. In the knowledge culture however, men are free to make conscious and unconscious choices to surpass both monoculture and the beast it tries to conceal. That wide bifurcation of the Western cultural imaginary is what fills the tidal vastness of the liquid present.

³⁶ All examples of consumer behaviour described in this chapter have as their source my own primary research over two decades, with KPMG and Roy Morgan Research as data sources.

4:3 THE ONE-GENDERED STATE: women reinvent themselves

The power of the phallocracy is monocultural: one sex matters and all others do not. A few men make decisions for everyone, decisions that favour men and disadvantage women. In a critique of the monocultural society, dominated by big bureaucracy, big business and big politics, and all controlled by a few men, Noam Chomsky identifies undemocratic authority with plutocracy, and plutocracy with hegemony (Chomsky 2013). According to Chomsky, a handful of men, 'way fewer than the overhyped one per cent,' make the key decisions that determine the direction of governments, economies, and nation states, and, having decided, expect the rest of the world to fall-in behind in uniform lockstep. He reveals that 70 per cent on the wealth/income scale have no influence whatsoever on public policy, because 'they're effectively disenfranchised'. 'As you move up the wealth/income ladder a little bit more influence on policy is achieved,' he says. When you get to the top, which according to Chomsky is perhaps a tenth of one per cent, you find the handful of people who directly determine policy. His conclusion from these statistics is that the proper term for this condition is plutocracy, the hegemonic domination of both electors and elected by the unelected power elite. The consumer monoculture however leaves little room for individual identity, individual significance. Accordingly, the United States is, says Chomsky, a one-party state – monopolitical and monocultural – and that one party is business (Chomsky 2013).

The power elite is profoundly masculine, indeed profoundly male – men run all but 46 of the top *Fortune* 1,000 companies in the US. That is 95.4 per cent (Catalyst Knowledge Center 2013). What is both interesting and relevant in Chomsky's argument is not just that the hegemonic power base of the powerful makes democracy unreal, but also that the hegemonic masculine power base of the powerful makes women irrelevant, non-human. Borrowing from Chomsky, the United States is, like the rest of the West, a one-gender state, and nowhere is this more visible than at work.

As digital dimorphism saw analogue vestiges swamped in the tide of the present, technology and digital skill enabled women again to control of the creation of knowledge products and services from the home – for the first time since modernisation moved the production of goods into factories, leaving women to tend the home and children. In a monogender state, however, the challenge for women

drawn to the knowledge culture is to surpass the psychosocial baggage of a dominant masculinity that for its own survival must dominate women, to be fully agentic and, even under the crushing weight of a monoculture and a monogender patriarchy, to create their own individuality, their own culture, their own knowledge.

In late modernity, war women, those women working in the roles of men while the men were at war, became pseudo-men. Women then had an opportunity to fill the metaphorical shoes of men, to assume a masculine shape, to construct an allegory of woman as woman in the guise of man, albeit without the benefits of being men.

Unsurprisingly, this narrative allegory was a short story, as men returning from the war reclaimed the place they considered not only normative, but their transcendent right. The backbreaking and heroic work women did in factories and on farms led, not to an appreciation of their ability to participate positively in the workplace, but rather to a remasculinisation of Western society and an evacuation of power that women had fleetingly regained during the war and had earlier enjoyed during the Enlightenment: a time when men feared them.

Now, however, in the irrepressible sea of the present, women have an opportunity to go beyond allegory, beyond faux maleness, to claim true subjectivity and to retake the power of production, only this time to take the cultural power of knowledge and education, combine it with technology, and place themselves again in a position of control: control of individual production in the home, control of their own careers in the professions, control through management, control of their reproductive lives in the new culture, the multifaceted, multicultural knowledge culture.

Using Australia as an example, one can observe women taking the cultural power of knowledge and education. Over the past decade the number of adults with a university degree jumped from 18 per cent to 26.5 per cent, and that increase was dominated by women completing tertiary education – up from 17 per cent in 2002 to 26 per cent a decade later (Roy Morgan Research 2013). While the proportion of men and women in the Australian workforce has barely changed over the past decade, women have advanced in the professional roles historically dominated by men. For example, according to the 2011 Census, half (49 per cent) of the 1,170 gynaecologists and obstetricians are women (up from 39 per cent in the 2006 Census). More than half (55 per cent) of all veterinarians (up from 45 per cent in 2006), 58 per cent of

pathologists are women (up from 48 per cent), and 53 per cent of paediatricians (up from 45 per cent) (Salt 2013).

Men have, however, not been blind to the threat delivered by this gender disruption and, as we saw above, in 2007 a new remasculinisation of the West commenced. So for women enjoying opportunity, subjectivity, newly within reach, continues to be threatened by men. Nancy Hartsock, standing on the shoreline of the present as it emerged from postmodernity, asked, 'Why is it that just at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes problematic' (Rose 1994, p. 51). However, the subject, like woman, like the present, is irrepressible, irreversible, and reports of its death are greatly exaggerated. According to Derrida:

We would appear to have a history of subjectivity which, in spite of certain massive declarations about the effacement of the figure of man, certainly never consisted in 'liquidating' the Subject. And in his last phase, there again, a return of morality and a certain ethical subject. For these three discourses (Lacan, Althusser, Foucault) and for some of the thinkers they privilege (Freud, Marx, Nietzsche), the subject can be re-interpreted, restored, re-inscribed, it certainly isn't 'liquidated'. The question 'who', notably in Nietzsche, strongly reinforces this point. This is also true of Heidegger, the principal reference or target of the doxa we are talking about. The ontological question which deals with the subjectum, in its Cartesian and post-Cartesian forms is anything but a liquidation.

(2009, p. 1)

Sartre's existentialism, apart from exploring how human life has meaning, was also a doctrine that affirmed that every truth and every action implies subjectivity (Pomerleau 1997, p. 427). Men have for centuries failed in their attempt to liquidate the subject, more specifically, in their attempt to rob women of true subjectivity. As discussed, during World War II women worked like men but were treated and rewarded like women. Value and worth were denied to them. To have done otherwise would have signalled to men that they were diminished by their valour, that if they stepped away briefly to conduct themselves bravely, the Other would fill the void, take their place and make them worthless. This piece of psychosocial baggage has never

slipped from the strong grasp of men, embodying as it does the symbolic order that produces gender inequity floating on wretched rips running through the liquid present.

Reward is a profound signifier in the symbolic order, both linguistic and semiotic, that the dominant masculinity can never afford to slip from its grasp. So women can *never* receive equal reward for equal work. This goes beyond the economy of production to become a profound symbol of survival for the patriarchy, a condition of the liquid present, where symbols outrank the mere utility of work and reward. Practicing misogyny, men must always control reward, and control the relationship between reward and dominance.

This is perhaps another version of masculine madness, not the violent, terrible beast that lurks in the dark heterotopian monogender space, but a shadow warrior with a simulated attractiveness that ensures, with unending smile, that the genocide of Woman continues unabated and that women will never be rewarded equitably and certainly never influence the relationship between reward and dominance.

A second beast of the liquid present, less dangerous but more damaging, resides deep in the masculine power elite. As we saw above, Chomsky believes that the real dread of the institutionally powerful, the power elite, is that they always influence outcomes, regardless of politics, regardless of democracy. The power elite in the workplace is the board of directors and the chief executive. CEOs determine reward and its power relationship to gender, and CEOs are men – the proportion of women CEOs in Australia's top 200 ASX companies has remained below 5 per cent for the past decade. Male CEOs therefore have in their hands the hegemonic tools to resist any disruption to the *natural order*. Some will choose to behave honourably, others, exhibiting masculine madness, will entrench disadvantage to women and actively continue to cause the social death of Woman.

The threat runs deeper. Because company directors appoint CEOs and 85 per cent of ASX 200 company directors are men, the male power hegemony is entrenched. How does this play out in life? Despite the work of women to claim their inheritance of subjectivity and to embrace education, knowledge and professional status, of all Australians who earn in excess of \$80,000 a year, three-quarters (74 per cent) are men and only a quarter (26 per cent) are women (Roy Morgan Research, 2013). The effect of the genocide of Woman is that women are treated as lesser men. Men in the power elite expressing masculine madness ensure women are reluctantly

paid for their work, grudgingly, as though one needed to pay slaves one has already bought.

In the knowledge culture however, women will not be stopped. Work is but a floating island in the vast semiotic sea of the present. Ágnes Heller's work is concerned with moral anthropology and, 'probing ... for a non-predatory humanism that combines the existential wisdom of ancient theory with modern values' (Chall 1952, p. 2040). Heller believes in

the stress on the individual as agent; the hostility to the justification of the state of affairs by reference to non-moral or non-ethical criteria, the belief in 'human substance' as the origin of everything that is good or worthwhile, and the hostility to forms of theorizing and political practice that deny equality, rationality and self-determination in the name of 'our' interests and needs, however defined. (2001, p. 18)

In her view, the present accommodates some aspects of postmodernity's critique of modernity, notably the idea that modernity elevated the world view of dominant groups to the status of objective fact, thereby failing to express the viewpoint of 'subaltern groups,' such as women and ethnic minorities (Heller 2001, p. 18). Heller yearns for a non-predatory humanism, which, as a legacy of the Enlightenment lineage, resists monoculture and the one-gender state, resists the power elite and the smiling face of masculine madness. Plurality and gender equity is central to the new humanism, to a new culture of individual identity and social morality, to the culture of knowledge. And while post-humanist thought has become popular, according to Rosi Braidotti humanism needs to be rescued as we witness the unrelenting violence to which it, like Woman, has been subjected in its multiple recompositions and reinventions (Braidotti 2013, p. 36).

As Sartre said, the West has betrayed humanism, and now, embracing the new epistemology, the knowledge culture, the new knowing, it is time for the Western cultural imaginary to again see individual consumer culture and knowledge culture as two hands in the one glove. So it is that the culture of the consumer is a contest between the consumer monoculture and knowledge culture.

Knowledge has reached a tertiary level. For example, in the First Wave (modernity) bread was sustenance and nutrition. In the Second Wave (postmodernity) bread became discretionary and subject to vast choice. In the sea of the present, bread

is for some a symbol, a sign of cultural intensity, a signifier of cultural depth and knowledge. The irrepressible, irreversible present brings with it an elevated desire for a cultural epistemology nurturing writings, knowledge, diverse ideas, creativity, authenticity, the human-scale – where symbols and *passwords* outrank the mere utility of things: the orbit of deep desire where the symbolic and imaginative nature of the rare experience, Maslow's peak experience, is pursued. According to Maslow, a peak experience is a transient moment of self-actualisation (Maslow 1971, p. 48). This ultra refined fascination with the peak experience creates new perspectives beyond the desire for objects and the economy of their production. It is a rare and uniquely personal expedition in parodic masquerade as consumption, encouraging and incubating a new reverence for the small, diverse and precious personal experience outside the mass consumer monoculture. This fascination challenges Irigaray's conceptual system that offers little opportunity or hope for radical change, a system that seems to suggest that the demoted and diminished place of woman is irreversible. Despite the weight of a plutocratic, hegemonic patriarchy, there is an entire cultural milieu where women, as swimmers in the secret sea³⁷, value and are valued for work that lies outside the hegemonic monoculture, work that has metrics of success that go beyond banal commercialism and traditional economics: the work of writers, of artists, of mothers, of creators – the work of *the creator*. It offers a sliver of hope for radical change – a reversal of the socially diminished place of women – to subjectivity, to *the creator* as networked narrator.

In cultural feminine fluidity there is a love of narrative and narratives of love. As Kristeva begins her novel *Les Samouraïs*, 'There are no more love stories. However, women want them, as do men when they are not ashamed to be tender and sad like women' (1992, p. 5). Almost a million Australian men and nine million American men are unashamed to be *tender and sad like women* (Honeywill 2010, p. 3).

In the culture of knowledge, swirling in waves in and around the consumer monoculture, women join with socially progressive men as two socially equal and irreducibly distinct entities. Moral participants in the feminine discourse, these men recognize, like women, that recounting, writing, participating, is what makes humankind human. Kristeva, interpreting Arendt, says the ability to recount one's life,

³⁷ Phrase borrowed from the title of a book by American novelist William Kotzwinkle (2010).

and to live life as recountable is what lifts human life above pure animal existence (Davis 2004, p. 133).

Men who are unashamed to be like women lift human life by exhibiting social and masculine morality instead of masculine madness. They tell, write and read stories to momentarily to elevate above, to recast, reinvent, their masculinity. In recognising it as hegemonic but in refusing to recognise its hegemony, they make the choice to step away from the patriarchy to stand with women and by doing so demonstrate, in its hopeful shards of diversity, the rich heterogeneity and simultaneity of the present. Women, and men who are unashamed to be like women, carry knowledge culture gently on a tide of networked narratives that flush between *the creator* and the *created*, where women regain lost subjectivity and men regain lost equilibrium. In Carson McCullers' play *The Member of the Wedding*, Frankie says at the end of Act One, 'I know that the bride and my brother are the "we" of me. So I'm going with them, and joining with the wedding ... I love the two of them so much and we belong together. I love the two of them so much because they are the we of me' (2006, p. 52). The bride and her brother are allegorical figures in the narrative of the cultural present where men become the *we* of *the creator*, again finding equilibrium.

In the liquid present, women who are undaunted by hegemonic patriarchy, who refuse to be or be seen as victims, who refuse to be *non-beings* or lesser men, construct a diverse, multifaceted, ambiguous culture of knowledge and an unambiguous knowledge of culture. Let us recall Orlando Patterson declaring that social death occurs when the victim has no social existence beyond the subject, endures social negation, becomes a non-being, and remains forever an unborn being – but despite the social death the victim, the non-being, *remains nonetheless an element of society* (1982, pp. 38, 45).

After exclusion and social death in the genocide of modernity, Woman was paradoxically excluded during postmodernity by the very phenomenon that offered women redemptive hope – the death of the metanarrative. Lyotard declared that the postmodern condition rejects grand theories and metanarratives, leaving us with no tradition to carry forward and no narrative looking glass through which to examine a present (Lyotard 1984, p. xxiii). The grand theory, the metanarrative of the mythical figure of Woman, was excluded in modernity and 'rejected' in postmodernity. Both caused the social death of Woman in the Western cultural imaginary, both were causal linkages in a genocidal lineage that ran from modernity to the present.

In the vast secret sea of the present however, the grand myth, the collective narrative of mythical Woman has arisen. To paraphrase Eric Santner, the subject has crossed over a bar that separated her from the benevolence as well as the tyranny of nature and the imaginary relations of myth. She was marooned in a world of ruins, of fragments, of stranded objects, but now she is come again (Santner 1993, p. 12).

Objects that were stranded are now subjects holding hands in flux across the vast ocean of the present, abandoning the abandonment of postmodernity.

4:4 MASCULINITIES: beyond men, beyond help?

As we saw in the previous chapter, not all men have the same values, the same attitudes and the same behaviour. Every different man thinks differently and believes different things. Different men behave differently. Contemporary scholarship on the subject of masculinities, however, turns mainly on the social landscape of masculine power and hegemonic status.

Tim Carrigan, RW (Raewyn) Connell and John Lee contend that the overall relationship between men and women is one involving domination and oppression. This is, they say, a fact about the social world that must have profound consequences for the character of men (1985, p. 552).

There is, however, no ‘type’ of masculinity. Gender is not an essentialist construct. Not all male humans behave like men, and not all masculine behaviour is male. Masculinities go beyond maleness, beyond men. But does masculine madness go beyond the dominant masculinity (men) and flow to a greater or lesser degree across all genders, with masculinity as its vector, or vehicle? Or is masculine madness a potential only of dominant male masculinity, men?

To repeat an earlier observation, while sex is determined by genetic chance, masculinity is endlessly variable, situating itself within the elastic relationship between sex, body, masculine / feminine, and psyche: masculinity is a continuous becoming, ending only in death. In Sartre’s existentialist position, for instance, the contradictions of gender are not fixed and their result is not an identity. Sartre replaced the Freudian ‘unconscious’ with a view of the different ways our self-knowledge is organised. The ‘mystery in broad daylight’ (Sartre 1992, p. 729) could be unravelled by tracking back down the life history to establish the primary commitments through which a masculinity had been produced (Connell 2005, p. 18). This is remarkable for its prescience – it would be another half century before researchers like Neil Malamuth produced empirical evidence that life history produced the attitudes and behaviour of the man. As we saw earlier, Malamuth began his research program in sexual aggression from a feminist perspective but decided that issues of rape, power, and control could not be sufficiently explained without evolutionary concepts. Based on his extensive empirical research, he identified twenty-two interacting pathways resulting in sexual aggression were identified. ‘The *impersonal sex* pathway is characterized by association with delinquent peers, introduction to sexual activity at a young age, and

having many sexual partners. The *hostile masculinity* pathway is related to an insecure sense of masculinity, hostility, distrust, and a desire to dominate women' (Malamuth and Hellmann 1998, p. 538). All flow from circumstances and situations during the developmental life of the respondents.

Sartre's existentialist position was also remarkable in that his 'view of the different ways our self-knowledge was organised' (Sartre 1992, p. 10; Connell 2005, p. 18) illuminated the fully agentic choices men make constantly, particularly in the subordination of women. Carrigan, Connell and Lee declare the starting point for any understanding of masculinity must be men's involvement in the social relations that constitute the gender order. The central fact, they say, is the subordination of women. When they claim, however, that one of the central facts about masculinity is that men are advantaged through the subordination of women, they overlook the crucial point that men are not *advantaged* by the subordination of women, they simply do not lose pre-existing advantage. The critical division in the case of masculinities, they claim, is between hegemonic or dominant masculinity and various 'subordinate' or minority masculinities (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985, pp. 589-590). Connell contends that masculinity is shaped in relation to an overall structure of power, specifically the subordination of women to men, and in relation to the general symbolism of difference, specifically the opposition of femininity and masculinity (2005, pp. 19, 223). In that opposition it is the unearned privilege of masculinity than builds into a wave of hegemonic power. As MacKinnon said, the status and treatment of men still tacitly but authoritatively defines the human universal, ignoring the particularity of being a man (2007, p. 3).

However, masculinity is not just the province of men. Judith Halberstam agrees that many lines traverse the terrain of masculinity, and far from being an imitation of maleness, female masculinity or gay masculinity, for example, afford us a glimpse of how masculinity is constructed as masculinity (1998, p. 1). Using film culture, Halberstam argues that gay masculinity and female masculinity provide a remarkable representation of the absolute dependence of dominant masculinities on minority masculinities (1998, p. 4). What Halberstam is arguing is that the dominant masculinities can be identified and defined only through the prism of minority masculinities, by, for example, a 'queer subject who exposes the workings of *dominant heterosexual* masculinity' (2002, p. 357).

Halberstam also argues that masculinity represents the power of inheritance and the promise of social privilege. This point needs emphasis: she contends that *the power of inheritance and the promise of social privilege* are represented by masculinity, not by maleness, not by men. If Halberstam is right that all masculinities, rather than just men, represent the power of inheritance and the promise of social privilege, then the power and privilege afforded to, inherited by, the minorities like gay and lesbian masculinities should make them no better than the dominant and dominating power masculinity – heterosexual men. If she is right, then it is masculinity that is vector to dominance and dominating behaviour, to social power and unearned privilege, and possibly therefore to masculine madness.

Rachel Adams and David Savran support Halberstam's position by quoting her saying that when female masculinity plays a part in lesbian relationships, men are written out of the equation altogether (2002, pp. 337-338). Despite saying that she finds dominant forms of straight, white men 'relatively uninteresting', Halberstam herself contends that someone who is biologically female can act like a man.

Halberstam lauds Eve Sedgwick and Judith Butler for proposing that masculinity may have little to do with men, and Sedgwick for criticising those committed to linking masculinity to maleness (2002, p. 361). Valid recognition of a range of masculinities, including female masculinity – 'masculine women and boyish girls' (Halberstam 1998, p. 362) – does however not lessen the linkage of masculinity to maleness. To suggest, as Halberstam, Butler and Sedgwick do, that masculinity 'may have *little* to do with men', distracts and detracts from the authors' position. Halberstam argues that a focus on male masculinities serves only to privilege the dominant masculinity – men – and disadvantage the minority masculinities – like female and gay masculinities. This would be true only if alternative masculinities were ignored. Halberstam is justly critical of writers who focus on masculinities in men as the dominant form of masculinity. This criticism will apply to me. However in doing so she fails either to recognise or acknowledge that there is a price in too eagerly standing close to contamination. Masculine traits are not in and of themselves male. So is it in masculinity or maleness that resides the potential for masculine madness, for misogyny, for genocide against Woman, for membership of the unearned privilege of patriarchy? If masculinity is vector to the dominance narrative, and to dominating behaviour, to social power and unearned privilege, and to masculine madness, then surely it is an evil to be avoided.

Eventually Halberstam makes a personal declaration that is clear and welcome. It is, for her, 'important to state that this book is an attempt to make my own female masculinity plausible, credible and real':

For a large part of my life, I have been stigmatized by a masculinity that marked me as ambiguous and illegible. Like many other tomboys, I was mistaken for a boy throughout my childhood, and like many other tomboy adolescents, I was forced into some semblance of femininity for my teenage years. When gender ambiguous children are constantly challenged about their gender identity, the chain of misrecognitions can actually produce a new recognition: in other words to be constantly mistaken for a boy, for many tomboys, can contribute to the production of a masculine identity. It was not until my midtwenties that I finally found a word for my particular gender configuration: butch. (2002, p. 19)

Nevertheless, while the need to make female masculinity, 'plausible, credible and real' (Halberstam 2002, p. 19) is entirely valid, the *primary* linkage of masculinity to maleness, of men to dominance, is not thereby lessened. Proving that masculinity has much to do with women does not prove that masculinity has little to do with men. Such an argument not only lacks logic but invites a fundamentalist masculine reaction. Connell suggests that such a reaction to instabilities in gender arrangements that include contestation by women of all-male networks (Eisenstein), the disruption of sexual identities that produced 'queer' politics (Seidman), pro-feminist politics among heterosexual men (Pease), and media images of the 'new sensitive man', is, on the part of the groups whose power or identity is challenged, to reaffirm gender hierarchies (Connell 2005, p. 262).

According to Victor Seidler whether the stress is placed on gender equality or upon the deconstruction of dominant masculinities, we think of masculinity in terms of privileges men take for granted (Seidler 2006, p. 34). It becomes, he says, a matter of heterosexual men learning to identify politically with the struggles of women against patriarchy, and so committing themselves to deconstruct, demolish, male privileges. For me it is a matter of heterosexual men learning to identify politically with the struggles of women against patriarchy, and of minority masculinities defining themselves against the dominant masculinity, and, in doing so, committing themselves to deconstruct, demolish, male privileges.

Increasingly Seidler emerges through his writing as an apologist for men and produces an unhelpful tension between theoretical framing and the lived experience by frequently referring to his young male students, despite very limited sample size, as exceptions to the ugly norms of dominant masculinity: 'They reject the notion that masculinities can be conceived of exclusively as relationships of power [and] feel they cannot be made responsible for the actions of other men' (Seidler 2006, p. 34). In another example, he proposes, without providing any evidentiary source, 'that young men are often keen to involve themselves in the campaign against violence against women but that they question the moralistic analysis' (2006, p. 55).

Despite arguing that men, particularly young men, are largely misunderstood and their position in the patriarchy overstated, Seidler does add value by pointing out that we assume that because men have power, they cannot have virtue. This is both valid and valuable. He goes on to offer a partial solution to male dominance and domination: 'paradoxically, a hegemonic analysis of masculinity has often silenced the men to whom we need to listen and made them feel guilty and ashamed of their masculinities. We should make them aware that, while inherited patriarchal masculinities may be part of the problem, revisioning masculinities can be part of the solution' (Seidler 2006, p.72).

To return to the question of whether masculine madness goes beyond the dominant masculinity (men) and flows to a greater or lesser degree across all genders with masculinity as its vector, or is masculine madness a potential only of dominant male masculinity, of men, opponents of masculine madness theory argue that violence and genocides are not exclusively the domain of, or limited to, men. They point out that women were present as guards in the Nazi death camps, that Margaret Thatcher, as one example, was more masculine than men in similar power positions. While masculinity is dominant in heterosexual men, it flows along the gender spectrum, through the intermediate zone of liminal spaces, delivering, in a minority of cases, what Beauvoir described as 'women as men.' Following Halberstam's path, male antagonists of the concept of masculine madness, in arguing that 'women can be as bad as men', attempt to situate masculine madness in masculinity across genders and not exclusively in men, and in doing so attempt to distribute responsibility. Halberstam believes that it is both helpful and important to contextualise any discussion of female masculinities in direct opposition to a more generalised discussion of masculinity within cultural studies that 'seems intent on insisting that masculinity

remains the property of male bodies' (Halberstam 1998, p. 15). While I do not feel that Halberstam's project and mine are at odds, the danger of this view is the dawning recognition that if, as she claims, masculinity is the vector of power and privilege across the gender spectrum, then it may well be the vector for masculine madness; and if masculinity is its vector, masculine madness, so consistently seen as the invisible beast in men, must also reside in some women. Would that explain women murderers, women as Nazi death camp guards, women who behave violently to other women and even their own children? Or are these examples of 'women as men', situational necessity, or human pathology?

Women and men both respond atypically to situational necessity. Connell treats masculinity as a discursive construction. Citing Wetherell and Edley, Connell proposes that when they are studied within a discursive studies framework it can be seen that men are not permanently committed to a particular pattern of masculinity, but rather respond to situations, making situationally-specific choices from a cultural repertoire of masculine behaviour (2005, pp. xviii-xix). Thus a man may be, one day, a doting father and teacher, the next, a mass murderer working in a Nazi death camp, one day an adoring partner, the next a violent monster bashing the person to whom he pledged eternal fealty. The former choice is a response to an external situation or circumstance, the latter physically and metaphysically to how particular masculinity is suffused through the psyche, and where it sits on the gender continuum – itself a situation in which all factors are at play.

In his study of the leader of the American torturers at Abu Ghraib, Philip Zimbardo reported that

...there is absolutely nothing in his record that I was able to uncover that would predict that Chip Frederick would engage in any form of abusive, sadistic behaviour. On the contrary, there is much in his record to suggest that had he not been forced to work and live in such an abnormal *situation*, he might have been the military's All-American poster soldier on its recruitment ads. (Bauman and Donskis 2013, p. 24)

But what of the vector question? This can best be resolved within a psychoanalytical context. As we have seen, masculine madness has its psychoanalytic roots in the violent separation between *creator* and *created* that occurs at the Oedipal schism when

the baby son stops being in harmony, at one with the *creator*, and is banished to the barren status of the *created*. This post-schismic shattering and loss of subjectivity for Man is intensified by the dread of non-existence. Let us recall Julia Kristeva defining the semiotic *chora* as the space from which the subject is both produced and threatened with annihilation, the space of the subversion of the subject, the space in which the death drive emerges and threatens to engulf the subject, to reduce it to the inertia of non-existence (Moi 1986, p. 101). Hatred for Woman and mother womb, loss of inheritable subjectivity, and the irredeemably demoted condition of the *created* initiates a potential in men to be dominators, hubristic explorers, sexual predators, irrepressibly ambitious, and a drive to regain power from the *creator*. The resultant masculine madness produced wars and genocides, including the social death of Woman from which women would not easily recover, the genocide of Woman that floods into the liquid present.

The answer to the vector question is therefore: masculine madness originates in Man; it does not carry across gender on the shoulders of masculinity but resides as a potentiality in the nature of men.

A man is a multiplicity of masculinities, one day benign, the next hateful and malignant, just like Chip Frederick at Abu Ghraib. Each is an animal, Psellos wrote, 'but the animal life, the life of the body, is something to surpass in rising to intelligible reality' (Miles 2012, p. 5). The potential for masculine madness exists in men as a potentiality, but it is something they, individually, can surpass. Being a man is a matter of extremes: an ontological amalgam. At one extreme, live monsters, and at the other, angels. Monster or angel? It is up to every individual man to surpass the former and become the latter. According to Connell men choose which.

As we saw earlier, everyday men make choices every day, constantly and unconsciously – in the Nietzschean unconscious where concepts are not simply latent but actively shape conscious actions (Mitcheson 2004, p. 43). Bauman, reflecting on Mozart's opera *Don Giovanni*, says that the life of its womanising lead character, Don Juan, is thinly sliced into separate and unconnected moments but it is Don Juan himself who has sliced it this way. 'He *made his choice*. It was his decision to float from one amorous adventure to another, to drift through life rather than sail. No fate obliged him to be like that. His life could be different: Don Juan *could* be different' (Bauman 2001, p. 11).

Kierkegaard views the man-metaphor, the allegorical Don Juan, as a monster, an abominable and detestable exception and a cancerous growth on humanity (Bauman 2001, p. 11). Every man therefore has the potential for evil, and every man makes a choice in life and in every life situation.

The narcissistic evil of masculine madness is not only that it originates in Man and that its potential silently runs through men, but that it is lethally charged by situations, external and internal; that civilisation cannot prevent: genocides, domestic violence, rape, misogyny, unseen tyranny of the power elite, in short, the subjugation of women.

The most shocking truth of the liquid present is that evil floods in silent surges across the landscape of men, eroding the very civilisation it sponsored. This evil is weak and invisible, and therefore, proposes Donskis, much more dangerous than any imaginary demons conjured by philosophers or novelists. Evil lurks, he believes, in every normal and healthy man. However, 'the worst is not the potential for evil present in each of us but the situations and circumstances that our faith, culture and human relationships cannot stop' (Bauman and Donskis 2013, p. 10). Men frequently fail to see, to recognize situations. For example, most men are oblivious, blind to the patriarchal privilege they enjoy, and many also, failing to recognise their behaviour as aggressive see it rather as normal. We have seen that the choices men make are also often unconscious. All this blind masculinity contributes at one end of the spectrum to an evil of omission that prevents masculinities, particularly men, from even being aware of their situation, and, at the other end to the active, commissioned evil of masculine madness.

Masculine madness expresses evil constantly in outbreaks of violence, from a hegemonic punch to a hegemonic genocide to a hegemonic war, eruptions of hegemonic, destructive discrimination; but the ultimate evil occurs when hegemonic masculinity becomes so annihilative that it destroys itself. As an example, the masculine declaration of war against nature appears to be the one situation and circumstance that our faith, culture and human relationships cannot stop. There exists a truism that beyond a certain state of human development we re-learn a respect for nature. Some of the excesses of the early modern age – attempts by gamekeepers to kill all competing species, mass slaughter by white hunters in the colonies, the grubbing up of hedgerows and ancient woodlands – have lessened, though we still eat endangered fish and buy timber from old-growth forests. It is also true that we give

more money to conservation projects and spend more time watching wildlife films than ever before, but as soon as we believe that our economic interests are threatened, our war against nature resumes (Monbiot 2010).

According to Reese Halter, our planet is experiencing a crisis of epic proportions. The war against nature has become, he declares, a seemingly unstoppable looting spree – plundering terrestrial and oceanic wildlife on a global scale never witnessed before: shark finning, slaughtering bluefin tuna, massacring rhinos, elephants and tigers. As the demand for rhino horns, elephant ivory, fur and animal parts skyrockets, he says, these incredible beasts and others have no chance whatsoever to continue to live on planet Earth (Halter 2013). What kind of a world are we leaving for our children, he asks? The destruction of nature including illegal harvesting of forests for an unquenchable palm oil market, and the trafficking of animal parts, is valued in excess of \$300 billion, annually:

Humans are so unconscious and detached from the natural world that the media headlines now report one heinous act against nature after the next attempting to best one another in brutality and illegal sales of animal parts. These unimaginable atrocities against nature: killing whales, dolphins, bluefin tuna, sharks, polar bears, grizzly bears, African lions, Sumatran and Indian tigers, South American jaguars to name but a few apex predators -- are crimes against humanity! Without predators to keep prey fit and cull the old and weak, diseases will spread, ecosystems will crumble and the human race will perish. (Halter 2013)

A war against nature is, because women are still so closely related to nature, a masculine war against women, the latest in a lineage of masculine time, of unimaginable atrocities against women in the Western cultural imaginary. Tatman contends that masculine linear time has to ‘confront the possibility of its end, an end potentially brought about by the penetration of matter *which ought not be penetrated*’ (2004, p. 4). She uses an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction as example; however, this unstoppable urge for both masculine destruction and self-destruction was central also to the inhuman acts during the Second World War, and no less so as played out in global warming – a price humanity pays for the male industrialist’s unmediated need for significance through power and wealth, for the war against nature.

The social mortality of women remains the life's work of men who fail to surpass the beast, devaluing the worth of women, diminishing their value to society, placing Woman forever in jeopardy. This is the expressed potential of masculinity throughout the ages. To revisit an earlier point, if Halberstam is right that all masculinities, rather than just men, represent the power of inheritance and the promise of social privilege, then the power and privilege afforded to, inherited by, minorities like gay and lesbian masculinities should make them no better than the dominant and dominating power masculinity – heterosexual men. With masculine madness rampant in a remasculinising world, with blind masculinity, with the masculine war against nature and the genocide of Woman, surely this is something to be resisted, denied?

If, as we have seen, contemporary scholarship on the subject of masculinities turns mainly on the social landscape of masculine power and hegemonic status, one might be forgiven for expecting sensationalist reports on the nightly news of how the consequences of blind masculinity and masculine madness – the terror, the social inequity, the outrage of partner violence, unspeakable rapes – were being dealt with. One might even expect a Truth and Reconciliation Commission similar to the South African model inaugurated following the dismantling of apartheid. Racial prejudice and state sponsored violence by whites against blacks was the subject of international outrage. But where is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for masculine madness?

In the US alone, six million women are assaulted by a male partner each year. But where is the outrage? Where is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for the genocide against Woman? Where is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for the war against nature, for the potential destruction of the human race? And what is the fear in dismantling the patriarchy? After all, the undoing of patriarchy does not produce matriarchy, it delivers plural communities of difference without superiority or inferiority: independent differents. It produces knowledge culture suffused with men and women making choices, fully agentic men and women making choices. However, there is no Commission. Despite scholastic awareness that contemporary masculinities deal with the social and political implications of masculine power and hegemonic status, there is no Commission, not even a thought of it. Such is the normative indifference, the moral blindness to masculine madness, the dominance of the dominant masculinity, the power of patriarchy, the social and political ineffectiveness

of dominant and minor masculinities, that resistance to masculine madness evaporates. In the vast liquid present the beast continues to swim just beneath the shallow surface.

The necessity [is] for men to redefine masculinity...to produce a masculinity whose desire is no longer dependent on oppression, no longer policed by homophobia, and one that no longer resorts to violence and misogyny to maintain its sense of coherence. That is a major political project...(Chapman and Rutherford 1988, p. 18)

4:5 THE MORAL PHENE: not the selfish gene

Faced with the elimination of difference, the end of history, the death of depth ideologies, masculine madness and the remasculinising of Western culture, there nonetheless remains a glimmer of hope in this vast sea of shallow transactional values. Hope resides not only in the women who refuse to be or be seen as victims, who refuse to be *non-beings* or lesser men, who are constructing a diverse, multifaceted, ambiguous culture of knowledge and unambiguous knowledge of culture, but hope also resides in the disruptive nature of true morality, the final floating citadel of humanist resistance to an excess of utopian fantasies and dystopian anxieties.

Ethics set by and for a society unable or unwilling to practice agentic moral decision-making are fracturing, ebbing, evacuating even, in the tide of the present. Yet despite the decline in ethics, contemporary scholars, including Zygmunt Bauman, see morality on the incline. That acknowledged, currently only a minority of the population exercises true morality, the morality of our own will. Kant's moral philosophy, for example, situates everyone as equal and subject to a reality in which the consequences of our actions, which are not under our control, are morally irrelevant. Our will, argues Kant, is the only basis for moral exercise and evaluation (Kant 2003, p. xxvi). This thesis follows the 'free-will' *spirit* of Kantian morality rather than the fixed letter of his argument.

Evidence from primary research conducted over the three-year lifespan of this project, using data from 55,000 respondents a year,³⁸ reveals that in developed Western culture around one in ten adults (18 years and over) constantly and consistently apply agentic morality to the decisions they make in everyday life. They are society's moral pundits, its moral mavens – its *moral citizens*. In Australia the number of moral citizens is 1,461,000 adults. In the US the number is 18 million, and in Britain, 5 million.

Moral citizens have progressive attitudes to social issues, and rank specific issues of most importance as:

1. Making decisions based on principle or integrity
2. Open and honest government
3. Fair workplace and employment regulations

³⁸ I conducted the research using Roy Morgan 'Single Source' as my fieldwork provider (Australia, USA, UK, New Zealand). Analysis conducted using Asteroid tabulation software.

Moral citizens definitionally care about progressive social issues and are, for example, 25 per cent more likely than the general population to agree that, ‘at heart I’m an environmentalist’, and 40 per cent less likely than the population to believe that ‘threats to the environment are exaggerated.’ They are comfortable with society’s rapid change and 72 per cent of them agree that same-sex couples should be free to adopt children – 33 per cent more than the average population. Almost half (44.3 per cent) have a university degree, 65 per cent more than the population, and they are 70 per cent more likely to be in the top ‘AB’ socio-economic quintile, and 46 per cent more likely to earn in excess of \$80,000 a year.

Moral citizens are 63 per cent less likely than the average population to believe women should just run the home. Their number one life goal is to ‘live an exciting life’, 62 per cent ahead of the average population. The majority of moral citizens are under the age of 50 and are less likely to have children – 70.3 per cent have no children under 16 in their household. And they are 71 per cent more likely to be engaged in professional occupations. Reconstituting the subject, reconfiguring the *moral* or *ethical subject*, is a goal of moral citizens.

If individual, agentic will is a basis for moral processing and evaluation, and one and a half million Australians and 18 million Americans exercise a constant moral imperative. What determines that? Could it be that there is a positive evolutionary urgency to suppress destructive masculinity, to surpass masculine madness? Is reclaiming our will in the exercise of moral decision making a survival success strategy? Are decivilisation and deculturalisation being resisted by one in ten? And is it the only evolutionary antidote to decivilisation and deculturalisation, to monoculturalism, monogenderism, and masculine madness? Could it be that a genetic causation, an evolutionary spark, promises to relieve us of an ontological calamity?

While acknowledging that correlation is not causation, millions of citizens in the West place moral judgements in the foreground of their behaviour. Do psychological or neurobiological processes produce moral judgements? Is this causation, and if so is it genetic or phenetic? Is there an evidence-base in science that shines an evolutionary light into the heterotopian dark other space of masculine madness and the choices men make?

For many years the search has been on for an evolutionary basis of moral behaviour. Morality is undoubtedly, argues Robert Wright, an evolutionary adaptation designed to maximize genetic self-interest, a function that is entirely

hidden from our conscious experience (1994, p. 36). Patricia Churchland believes the neurobiological platform of bonding that, modified by evolutionary pressures and cultural values, has led to human styles of moral behaviour (2011, p. 27). Morality is evolutionary, is linked to the genome, and operates unconsciously, 'hidden from our experience.' And once again we may recall Nietzsche: 'Unconscious concepts are not simply latent but are actively shaping conscious actions (Mitcheson 2004, p. 43). Steven Pinker, cited in a paper titled *The Moral Gene*, asks: if our moral psychology is a Darwinian adaptation, then what does that say about human nature? About social policy, which always presupposes something about human nature? About morality itself? (Pinker 1994, p. 1)

Let us again reflect on Richard Dawkins' *The Selfish Gene*. As we saw earlier, selfish-gene theory modernised Darwinian thinking through its insistence that the ultimate explanation of any individual's behaviour depends on how the behaviour will maximise genetic success: to pass that individual's genes into subsequent generations (Wrangham and Peterson 1996, p. 22), however Stephen J Gould took issue with the gene as the unit of selection. Gould's criticism of selfish-gene theory brought into focus two fundamental flaws in the belief that human behaviour is genetically determined, and in doing so Gould also criticised Richard Dawkins: the unit of selection is the phenotype, not, as Dawkins contends, the genotype (Gould 1990, pp. 72-78). Repeating an earlier point, a genotype [gene] is the *input*, and a phenotype [phene] is the *output*: a composite of observable characteristics or traits, of behaviour or the products of behaviour. A phene, 'the unit of selection', results from the expression of an organism's genes as well as the influence of environmental factors and the interactions between the two. In short, while a phene is a genetically determined characteristic or trait such as eye colour, height or behaviour, it influences evolution. Phene variation is a fundamental prerequisite for evolution by natural selection, but only if phenotypical characteristics can truly be the 'unit of selection' and be passed back into the genome, altering the blueprint for future generations.

I contend that it is phenes, not genes, that determine the evolutionarily advantageous exercise of agency and the will to achieve individual and reciprocal altruism that surpasses masculine madness in those individuals affected. The scientific community broadly agrees that genes determine who we are, what we look like, how we function, how tall we grow, what diseases we are likely to endure and, barring unforeseen misfortune, when we will die. These genes are with us from the moment of

conception. And when we in turn conceive a child, they are passed on from both mother and father, unaltered by the experiences of a lifetime. To our genome, it is irrelevant that during our own life we may have developed specific values, new abilities or powerful immunities to disease. Genes learn nothing from a life lived, despite the potential for evolutionary benefit. Phenotypes, on the other hand, not only learn from the life lived, recognising evolutionarily advantageous success strategies, but also have the potential to encode those evolutionary benefits back into the genome to carry forward into future generation. Such an idea is not Darwinian but rather decidedly Lamarckian: in 1809 Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck proposed that characteristics acquired during a lifetime, what we now know as phenotypes, *could* be passed on to the next generation. The Lamarckian theory contends that, during their lifetimes, humans develop specific values, acquire new abilities and behaviours, and then transmit these evolutionarily beneficial traits, such as altruism, on to their sons and daughters, to be born already hardwired with the instincts, values, attitudes, moral improvements or immunities that helped the parents survive and thrive (Honeywill 2008, p. 9).

Fifty years later, however, when Charles Darwin sowed the seeds of change with the publication of his own theory of evolution in *On the Origin of Species*, the scene was set for scientific devotion to the one-way hereditary process. After another fifty years, the discovery of genes cemented the dogmatic era of Neo-Darwinism, and Lamarck's original theory of evolution was under siege. Darwin got his theory of evolution largely right. His natural selection was pivotal in the history of biological evolution. But the missing link in Darwin's theory of evolution was the mechanism of inheritance. Additionally, he never provided an explanation for the generation of new species, let alone that gigantic leap of evolutionary progress that sees an aquatic animal breathing with gills emerge from the water and start using lungs on dry land. And *On the Origin of Species*, ironically, never did explain the origin of species.

Lamarck and Darwin changed our view of the world around us – from a place that was considered static to a universe filled with change. We now know that the continents beneath our feet are moving, that the universe itself is expanding, that life is changing, that we are evolving, that we are descended from ancestors with apes as

cousins. For all this we are grateful to them both for making evolution a scientific fact. Today evolution remains an absolute plank of science. Its truths cannot be undone.³⁹

The twentieth-century scientific establishment embraced Neo-Darwinism, and thus precluded consideration of the notion of transfer of acquired characteristics into the gene pool. For Neo-Darwinists, hereditary information comes only from DNA in our sex cells. Our body cells, the building blocks of our entire being, have no say in the matter. It is a one-way street with a brick wall at one end. As we saw earlier, this imaginary mechanism is known as the Weismann Barrier, named after the nineteenth-century biologist August Weismann, who proposed that DNA in those very few sex cells – sperm and eggs – remains unchanged as a repository of the instructions that determine the next generation.

This context is both relevant and necessary to situate in contemporary scholarship the proposition that, despite the failure of Dawkins to substantiate the Selfish Gene hypothesis, Moral Phenomenon theory, and its effect in surpassing masculine madness, has a basis in scientific fact. Dawkins' Neo-Darwinian approach has the world evolving in a way that relies on gradual genetic mutations or changes, and natural selection: a gene changes, mutates without any environmental stimulus, and natural selection ensures that only the beneficial changes survive. This approach precludes genes being influenced or changed by events going on in the body, the benefit of experience being lost at every final closing of the eyes. Neo-Darwinists believe that our lives have no influence on evolution and are solely the result of a random past rather than also the causation of a better future.

With the dawn of the twenty-first century, Lamarck's theory began serious ascendancy. In 2006, riding a wave of new evidence coming from across the globe, Italian geneticist Corrado Spadafora and San Francisco-based molecular biologist Patrick Fogarty separately produced evidence that the Weismann Barrier was an illusion. They delivered scientific proof that characteristics acquired during a lifetime can be passed to sons and daughters by communicating new information from body cells to sex cells.

³⁹ I am indebted to Steve Jones, Professor of Genetics at University College London, some of whose expressions used in this paragraph are drawn from the unpublished transcript of an interview conducted with him by documentary filmmaker Lou Petho.

In June 2007, the *Economist* magazine published an article subtitled, 'It's Evolutionary, My Dear Watson'. It read:

What is being proposed is the inheritance of characteristics acquired during an individual's lifetime, rather than as the result of chance mutations. This was first suggested by Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck, before Charles Darwin's idea of natural selection swept the board. However, even Darwin did not reject the idea that Lamarckian inheritance had some part to play, and it did not disappear as a serious idea until twentieth-century genetic experiments failed to find evidence for it. (Honeywill 2008, p. 191)

Epigenetics – literally above, or on top of, genetics – emerged as the new biology as Neo-Darwinian dogma fell from grace. Modern scientists are producing evidence that the RNA operating system is the real player in the evolutionary process. Molecular biologists now know that even cloned animals, with carbon copies of each other's DNA, can look dramatically different because of the way those genes are 'expressed'. For example, the pattern of the spots or the shape of the ears of cloned Friesian cows may be different. Human identical twins also have the same genes but, because those genes are expressed differently in each person, they have different freckle and fingerprint patterns. The world of evolutionary biology is a changed place (2008, p. 195).

So, how is morality an evolutionary factor in human survival? How does it work to surpass the drive of masculine madness? In commencing the search for answers, it is necessary to take a very brief look of morality and ethics. Morality is a *becoming*. Like gender, morality is suffused through the psyche with the potentialities of becoming. It is not fixed, carved in stone, but a situation. Again like gender, it is situated physically and metaphysically along a continuum, and is in itself a situation in which all factors are at play. Different moral judgements are made according to the state of the individual's *moral becoming*, and the situation both of the individual's morality on its personal continuum and the particular situation subject to judgement. This is the constant and continuous choice process men, whose infinite *moral becoming* determines their moral behaviour, undertake every conscious and unconscious moment. Morality is therefore cultural, but not dependent, as is ethics, on society. According to Zygmunt Bauman, the connection between morality and society is not a

1:1 relation wherein morality is produced by a particular form of society. Manni
Crone says of Bauman:

In opposition to the modern conception of ethics that reached its apotheosis in modern bureaucracy, Bauman proposes an alternative conception of morality that is largely inspired by Emmanuel Levinas. In this postmodern conception, morality is not located in current rules, laws or norms, but in the infinite responsibility that I must assume when faced with another person. Morality is then not a universal and abstract law that ignores the particular situation and the particular Other, but the infinite responsibility that occurs when face-to-face with another human being. (Crone 2008, p. 63)

For the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, the term ‘ethics’ was used as an analogue of morality. In this context, James Fieser observes, *evolutionary ethics* refers to the view that moral behaviour is that which tends to aid in human survival. Herbert Spencer in his nineteenth-century book, *The Data of Ethics*, distinguishes, like Darwin, between a biological and sociological component of evolution. Spencer identified three interrelated areas of evolution in animals: (1) the animal’s species, (2) the animal’s bodily functions, and (3) the animal’s conduct. Fieser points out that ethics involves the third of these three aspects of evolution – namely, the development of the animal’s conduct. Summarising Spencer he locates ethical, or moral, conduct as the most evolutionarily advanced conduct, emerging only in the most advanced human societies. This most advanced human conduct involves mutual cooperation, which in turn promotes universal pleasure. In our present evolutionary condition, he says, the promotion of universal pleasure involves a compromise between self-regarding and other-regarding inclinations. As we evolve, predicts Fieser, ethical standards will become more altruistic (Fieser 2001, pp. 214-215). And the individual’s *moral becoming* will evolve. Almost two-thirds (60 per cent) of *moral citizens*, mentioned earlier, exhibit above-normal altruism, believing that ‘helping others is my duty as a global citizen.’ That is 50 per cent more than the average population. More than three-quarters (76.1 per cent) donated to charity in the past 12 months, and they are 33 per cent more likely to believe that a percentage of everyone’s income should go to charities.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Again, data from my own primary research, conducted in association with Roy Morgan Research.

Spencer's influence did not however, go unchallenged. In 1903, British philosopher GE Moore set a new direction for twentieth-century moral theory. Moore analysed Kant, Mill, Spencer and all the great ethical theorists of his time, and concluded they all wrongly equate moral goodness with a natural or metaphysical property. Moore, somewhat controversially, disagreed with Spencer that moral goodness was directly connected with advanced evolutionary development (Fieser 2001, p. 215).⁴¹ Moore believed that Spencer's evolutionary ethics identified moral goodness with evolution, that he confused 'being more evolved' with 'gaining ethical sanction:'

All that the evolution-hypothesis tells us is that certain kinds of conduct are more evolved than others; and this is, in fact, all that Mr Spencer has attempted to prove in the two chapters concerned. Yet he tells us that one of the things he has proved is that *conduct gains ethical sanction* in proportion as it displays those characteristics. What he has tried to prove is only that in proportion as it displays those characteristics, it is *more* evolved, it is plain, then, that Mr Spencer identifies the gaining of ethical sanction with the being more evolved. (Moore 2000, p. 100)

Fieser argues that Moore's criticism of Spencer for conflating 'more evolved' (a natural property) and 'ethically commendable' (goodness) is baseless, and that while they are not identical, ethical commendability is always *accompanied* by more evolved conduct (Fieser 2001, pp. 217-219). Fieser adds that Moore also confuses 'more evolved' (a physical condition) with 'evolving' (a process). Having rescued Spencer's account of evolutionary ethics from Moore's criticism, however Fieser claims that without a clearly defined evolutionary spectrum of social behaviour, 'we cannot draw a correlation between such behaviour and varying degrees of moral development' (2001, pp. 217-219). While acknowledging that Moore's open question argument created a legacy leading many moral philosophers to examine the virtue of entangling biological reductionism with normative ethics, Fieser's contestation is contextually relevant to this thesis.

Late in his life Thomas Huxley also came to question the connection between morality and evolution. His argument was, however, based on the false assumption

⁴¹ WK Frankena provides a very good critique of Moore in 'The Naturalistic Fallacy' published in *Mind*, Vol, 48, No 192 (Oct 1939) by Oxford University Press.

that good and evil, morality and immorality were binary, dichotomous, and not simply two faces of the one man. For example, he wrote:

The thief and the murderer follow nature just as much as the philanthropist. Evolution may teach us how the good and the evil tendencies of man may have come about; but, in itself, it is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil than we had before. (Huxley 1993, p. 66)

Huxley believes it is a mistake to think that, just because natural selection is the source of all organic development or progress, it is also the source of our ethical standards (Fieser 2001, p. 221). ‘Ethical standards’ are social constructs and are, as Huxley says, beyond natural selection and therefore not subject to evolution (1993, p. 344). What Huxley fails to catch in his wise gaze, however, is that ethical standards do not equate to morality, that true morality is found in the depths of the psyche, deeper than any social scheme of ethics, and that this deep realm of the psyche is the result of evolutionarily advantageous success strategies, of phenes that also have the potential to encode those evolutionary benefits back into the genome to carry forward into future generation.

Values inform attitudes, and attitudes determine behaviour. The repertoire of masculine behaviours from which situationally specific choices are made is therefore determined in a phenomenological sense by the attitudinal and behavioural rules of ethics, and at a fully agentic level by moral values: the individual’s *moral becoming*. The evolutionary question does not centre on Huxley’s murderer or philanthropist since, as we have seen, they are frequently the same person, and always individually responsive to situations. What the question turns on is evolutionary success strategies – does an individual’s *moral becoming* deliver altruism and a will to surpass masculine madness, and will that improve reproductive and therefore evolutionary success?

In human societies there is the challenge of which attitudes and behaviours an individual communicates to his fellows, who in turn should view with favour any evidently altruistic actions, including group-sustaining behaviour. Indeed, argues Richard Alexander, we frequently exhort our children to behave as unselfish altruists, even though such tendencies would, in evolutionary terms, consistently be selected out of human populations, except for one paradoxical and crucial fact – that actions

which would otherwise be truly altruistic will increase the reproductive success of their bearer if they are viewed as true altruism by his fellows (Alexander 1974, p. 377). If it is reasoned, he proposes, that parental exhortations to unselfish altruism have, during human history, led human progeny to reproductive (evolutionary) success, then it can be argued that sincerity and altruism represent valuable social assets even when they derive from a real failure to recognize the reproductively selfish background and effects of one's own behaviour. In other words, he says, in within-group social interactions, selection may have consistently favoured tendencies for humans not to be aware of what they are really doing or why they are doing it (Alexander 1974, p. 377).

Spencer argued that ethical commendability is always *accompanied* by more evolved conduct and Alexander correlated ethical commendability in the form of altruism with evolutionary success, and morality with evolution. Similarly, Edward O Wilson, the founder of sociobiology, found that morality was involuntary and evolutionary, so much so that in his view biologists were better equipped than philosophers to deal with issues of morality. 'If there is any truth to [the] theory of innate moral pluralism,' he said 'the requirement for an evolutionary approach to morality is self-evident' (Wilson 1975, p. 564).

We are witnessing a shift, beginning in the 1990s, in how ethics and moral practice is viewed and evaluated, from epistemological questions (what we can know) to questions of what ethics is about, from the Kantian construct of ethics as law to the view of morality as relativistic, agentic.

Bauman takes the original stance that the vanishing of the modern conception of ethics constitutes an opportunity for morality (Crone 2008, p. 60). Changing ethics, even their 'vanishing', may pave the way for a new understanding of morality. Crone argues that, in contradistinction to a modern understanding that reduces ethics to a capacity to follow norms, rules and laws, Bauman understands morality as the autonomous moral responsibility of each individual human being, irrespective of the particular laws prevailing in a particular society (2008, p. 60). He considers the individual moral situation – 'the moral party of two' – to be pre-social in the precise sense that (1) it is a moral capacity that is inherent in every human being, and (2) in the sense that it can be actualized in any human society, irrespective of the particular cultural understanding of ethics prevailing in that particular society. This pre-social moral capacity can of course be actualized in the social realm (2008, pp. 66-67). It is in the social realm that new and interesting morality insights are to be found.

Social morality, a term used before in this thesis, describes that intersection between individual and collective morality. Gerald Gaus follows Mill in taking, erroneously in my view, a particularly ethics-based approach by defining social morality as ‘a set of social-moral rules that require or prohibit action’ (Gaus 2011, p. 2). In other words, he sees social morality not as a human response, but as a human constraint. Social morality is imperativel, he insists; it is the basis for issuing *demands* on others that they *must* perform certain actions (Bauman 2008, p. 6). Kurt Baier, however, defines social morality in a more collectivist way, proposing that a society’s morality is the joint product of the moralities of its individual members. As far as content is concerned, he says, individual members are its joint makers, not merely its subjects (1995, p. 218). Each personal morality is the result of a member’s socialisation, which, he adds, is subject to individuation and profound evolutionary influences, including diverse ethnic and religious influences, education, increased access to ethical theories, and technology (Baier 1995, p. 218).

Baier contends that social morality has the potential to contribute to a better world:

One may hope that the population explosion and its impact on our lives and thereby on the soundness of our current population policy and of what we take to be our relevant moral views about such practices as birth control, abortion, poverty, racism, conservation of resources, protection of the environment, and so on, will eventually seep into public consciousness, and that this increase in knowledge and understanding will bring about an improvement and a convergence in our views concerning the policies that would promote human flourishing. (1995, pp. 218-219)

He continues that, ‘for a society to have a morality, for something to be a social morality, it is sufficient for that society to be a moral order, for that is sufficient for the production of new generations with individual moralities’ (1995, p. 219).

Given that moral decision-making, individual or social, is an evolutionary success strategy, is it just correlative or does causation, that is genetic or phenetic determination, exist? In 2011 Abigail Marsh and her colleagues from Georgetown University and the US National Institute of Mental Health revealed that moral decision-making was influenced by different forms of a single gene (Wilcox 2011).

Previous research found that people taking a particular group of anti-depressants known as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) were less willing than the rest of the population to agree, for example, that given a choice, killing one person to avoid killing five is morally justified, even if it is unavoidable. Marsh and her colleagues found that variations in serotonin transmitter genes resulted in different moral choices. Those with the short form of the gene felt that harming one person rather than five was morally neutral. However, those with the long form of the gene were much more willing to approve of harming one person to protect five. They felt that doing so was the better moral choice. Is this correlation or causation? Marsh believes it is causative, that moral decision-making is rooted deep in our genomes (Wilcox 2011). A serotonin transmitter gene influences our moral becoming. That does not however make it the Moral Gene, it influences, not just morality, but numerous cognitive and behavioural outcomes.

Moral values, the evolved structure, processes, and chemistry of the brain, all incline humans, Churchland argues, to strive not only for self-preservation but also for the wellbeing of allied selves – in other words, altruism (2011, p. 31). In this way, caring is provided, conscience is shaped, and moral intuitions are strengthened. A key part of the story, she believes, is oxytocin, an ancient body-and-brain molecule that, by decreasing the stress response, allows humans to develop the trust in one another necessary for the development of close-knit ties, social institutions, and morality (2011, p. 71). While this is pivotal in the examination of whether or not the suppression of masculine madness is evolutionarily advantageous and in exploring how such evolutionary advantage might come about, genetic influence only ever provides the physical precursor to, a situation for, agentic morality – never morality itself.

A study recently published in *Nature* magazine highlights the role of both oxytocin and serotonin in genetically encoding evolutionary success. Oxytocin is linked with behaviours, and polymorphisms in the oxytocin receptor gene are associated with varying degrees of social dysfunction (Flight 2013).

To return to evolutionary success, morality is ontological and epistemological, a *becoming* to strive not only for self-preservation but also for the well-being of allied selves, that is for altruism (Churchland 2011, p. 31). Masculine madness is itself a selfish drive to achieve self-preservation and in that sense delivers evolutionary success. That is not in question. What is in question is the drive to surpass masculine madness, to choose the wellbeing of our allied selves, to choose the drive to altruism in general

and reciprocal altruism in particular, ahead of choosing brutal selfishness. Remember that unselfish altruists would, in evolutionary terms, consistently be selected out of human populations, except for one paradoxical and crucial fact – that actions which would otherwise be truly altruistic increase the reproductive success of their bearer if they are viewed as true altruism by his fellows (Alexander 1974, p. 377). So if morality (social and individual) and true altruism (individual and reciprocal) deliver reproductive success and evolutionary advantage, are they genetically determined?

Remember that a genotype (gene) is the *input*, and a phenotype (phene) is the *output*, p. a composite of observable characteristics or traits, of behaviour or the products of behaviour. Phenotypes, the true unit of natural selection (Gould 1990, p. 72), result from the expression of an organism's genes as well as the influence of environmental factors and the interactions between the two. Is there a Moral Gene? Oxytocin and serotonin at the genetic level allow, provide a framework, for morality and moral values to flourish. Marsh called it causative, believing that positive moral decision-making is rooted deep in our genomes, and in the sense that reproductive success comes from increased morality, and morality is genetically enabled, it could be causative. But genes do not directly influence moral decision-making. As we saw a little earlier, genes influence a range of cognitive and behavioural outcomes. So there is no precise genetic causation, and so no Moral Gene to suppress masculine madness.

What can be argued, however, is that in a decidedly Lamarckian way, the moral values of reproductively successful parents connect phenotypically with the genes discussed above and positive changes are written back into the genome. This is the Moral Phene at work, genetically *and* socially influenced, and making its evolutionary way through generations who benefit from being moral, who benefit from, among other factors, surpassing the destructive madness of masculinity. The Moral Phene provides a glimmer of hope reflected off the shallow surface of the vast liquid present.

4:6 NOW I AM BECOME DEATH: masculine madness in conclusion

We knew the world would not be the same. Few people laughed, few people cried, most people were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita. Vishnu is trying to persuade the Prince that he should do his duty and to impress him, takes on his multi-armed form and says, 'Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.' I suppose we all thought that, one way or another.

J Robert Oppenheimer speaking after the first explosion of the atomic bomb he helped develop (Oppenheimer 1945)

Postmodernity had failed its latent purpose: to resist masculine madness erupting across the West. But for men in the liquid present, it is different. Melancholy and mourning for the damage done by masculine madness bifurcated along the dividing line between the shallow monoculture (melancholy) and the deep knowledge culture (mourning).

When Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich published their study *The Inability to Mourn*, they were struck by the absence in post-war German society of any deep feelings of contrition or shame at the annihilation of millions of European Jews during the Holocaust. The ego of every single German individual suffered a central devaluation and impoverishment. This creates at least the prerequisites for a melancholic reaction (1975, p. 26). As Eric Santner observes, the Mitscherlichs are referring to Freud's distinction between two different patterns of bereavement: mourning and melancholy. According to Freud, mourning occurs when an object that one had loved for its intrinsic qualities as separate and distinct from oneself is lost. In the case of melancholy, the pattern by which loss is worked through is different because the loved object fulfilled a rather different function in the psychological life of the bereaved. A melancholic response to loss, the symptomology of which is a severe, often suicidal anxiety, self-loathing or depression, ensues when the object was loved not as separate and distinct from oneself, but rather as a mirror of one's own sense of self and power. To paraphrase Santner, melancholy is the monocultural rehearsal of the shattering or fragmentation of one's primitive narcissism (1993, p. 2). The melancholic response to the loss that occurs during the Oedipal schism, the shattering of one's own sense of self and power is melancholy, anxiety and a profound sense of

shame – and self-loathing. Monocultural self-loathing has its origins deep in schismic shattering and loss of subjectivity.

Radstone argues that

Lacan's linguistic translation of Freud's 'Totem and Taboo' continues Freud's emphasis upon loss as the foundation of both masculinity and patriarchy. The paternal metaphor produces masculine subjectivity through a chain of substitutions which eventually replace (repress) the loss of the mother ... Santner's Winnicottian reworking of Benjamin stresses that, unless the loss of a hallucinatory fusion with the mother can be mourned, the subject will remain caught in the closed half-world of narcissistic melancholy. (2007, p. 172)

Reviewing recent theoretical re-workings of Freud's essay *Mourning and Melancholia*, Radstone proposes that it can be usefully rethought in relation to contemporary masculinity and patriarchy. Referring to the 'new age of anxiety' she questions whether (monocultural) subjects are all subject to the same or even similar responses to – let alone whether they all inhabit the same – epochal cultural moment. Nostalgic melancholy, she argues, may be deployed as a specifically masculine defence against loss (Radstone 2007, p. 159).

There may be multiple epochs, different cultures, but each has simultaneity and shared response, shared motivations, shared burnings of the bridges of the past, shared indifference and denial. So it was that in the seven decades since the initial genocide of Woman, indifference and denial metamorphosed into monocultural anxiety and self-loathing. Just as the Mitscherlichs found German citizens employed defence mechanisms that served to burn affective bridges to the past, (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1975, p. ix) so too narcissistic Man in the Western monoculture employed defence mechanisms that annulled genocidal responsibility for the social death of Woman.

Simultaneously, bereavement for masculine madness and its genocides was acknowledged by men in the knowledge culture, and as a direct consequence masculine madness, for those men, abated in the vast sea of the present. The failure, however, of monocultural men to acknowledge masculine madness spells potential

disaster not only for them but for all society. This is what Theodor Adorno calls the socio-psychological relevance of the unmastered past. There remains only one conclusion, believes Adorno: secretly, unconsciously smouldering and therefore especially powerful, collective narcissism was not destroyed but continues to exist (Adorno 1986, pp. 121-122), to grow as a pile of psychosocial wreckage that, in the language of Walter Benjamin's famous thesis on the philosophy of history, grows skyward under the melancholic eyes of the angel of history (Santner 1993, p. 9).

To again paraphrase Santner, the figure of the mourner-survivor is a kind of arch-trope for the violence of masculinity that may be traced to a repression of the catastrophes, to a disavowal of the opportunities for and necessities of bereaved thinking, speaking and writing (1993, p. 9). And in the monocultural West it is precisely this work of denial and repression of the inherent fragmentation of life in the symbolic order that produces the pile of psychosocial wreckage.

According to the Mitscherlichs, that so few signs of melancholia or even mourning are to be seen can only be attributed to a collective denial of the past (Santner 1993, p. 4). Monocultural men hold their heads high, so high they fail to see or hear evil, and do nothing to change the system of dominance, to redress the widespread disadvantage women experience throughout their lives. This refusal to disadvantage themselves by dismantling systemic advantage leads to a simmering combination of loathing for women for making men feel guilty, and the construction of a belief system, a burning of bridges to the past, a denial of guilt that quarantines men from facing the truth that they enjoy vast privilege that is unearned. This denial of vulnerability, this disavowal of responsibility is a shallow surface tension of the liquid present, a meniscus comporting a new pathology, a narcissistic illusion of control. Narcissists inhabit a monocultural world of their own making, a world of masculine acquiescence and an all-pervasive illusion that everything in present life can be controlled: an illusory surface condition riven with irrealties, threatening not only the destruction of both cultures, but of nature, of Woman, of life itself.

That monocultural Man has refused to mourn, either for the genocide of Woman or for the dreadful shattering during the Oedipal schism is not hubristic but instead creates anxiety, shame and self-loathing. As the Mitscherlichs say, if somehow, somewhere, one finds an object deserving of sympathy, it usually turns out to be none other than oneself (1975, p. 25). Monocultural Man derived reflexive sympathy from his demoted status, and experienced a pathology of object relations from Oedipal

abandonment and the inability to mourn the genocide of Woman. The consequence was anger, aggression and rage. According to Shmuel Vaknin, the dynamic unconscious consists of dyadic relations between self-representations and object representations in either of two contexts: elation or rage (1999, p. 51). Rage has a function, evolutionary and adaptive. It is intended to alert the individual to a source of pain and irritation and to motivate him to eliminate it. It is the legitimate son of frustration and pain. It is also instrumental in the removal of barriers to satisfaction of needs. As most of the sources of our bad feeling are human – aggression (transformed to rage) is directed at human ‘bad’ objects – those who are perceived to be deliberately frustrating the satisfaction of our needs. This is where we find the will to make such a frustrating object suffer (Vaknin 1999, p. 51). In this resides blind masculinity and moral blindness. Rage, born legitimately of masculine narcissism, is directed symbolically at Woman and practically at women. For monocultural Man, Woman is the frustrating object, so it is at women that masculine aggression (transformed to rage) is directed. The wounds of Man cause the genocidal social death of Woman.

As Neil Kressel wrote:

A narcissist openly reveals his megalomania, but craves admiration, praise and flattery. He has little sense of humour, he cannot form significant relationships, and blows to his self-esteem can elicit violent anger. He has a paranoid distrust of *others*. He can appear self-confident and secure, but deep down feels shame, insecurity and inferiority. (2002, p. 113)

He may, at one moment, appear a charming, benign benefactor, and at the next turn into a raging, aggressive attacker, turn in an instant into Psellos’ beast. This underlying narcissism is the nature of monocultural Man, the wound that will not heal, the wound that in its weeping soreness continues the genocidal death of Woman. All these wounds, says Lyotard, can be given names. ‘Their names are strewn across the field of our unconscious like so many secret obstacles to the quiet perpetuation of the “modern project”’ (Santner 1993, p. 8). Masculine wounds ‘strewn across the field of the unconscious’, narcissistic masculinity deserving of sympathy, self-loathing and hatred of mother womb, of the one that should be killed, all conflate to flood in on the monocultural tide of the liquid present, to perpetuate elements of the modern project in the condition of a reconstructed, reinvented modernity. In the vast irrepressible

present, the psychosocial wreckage of monocultural Man has grown skyward, creating an irredeemable anxiety on a foundation of the narcissist's self-loathing.

By the time postmodernity had run its fractured race across the arid surface of western culture, and by the time the monoculture of the West boarded the interminable, aimless voyage, the one legacy bequeathed was shallowness. Monoculturalists knew a little about everything. Increasingly, they took aimless voyages, literal and metaphorical, voyages that skimmed across the shallow surface of civilisations they touched. Information, pseudo-relationships, acquisitive acquaintanceships and celebrity replaced authenticity, ideology and knowledge. Social self-cannibalism had arrived. Man had excluded, prohibited Woman. But monocultural Man was now eating himself in an orgy of self-loathing.

Emblematic of the tyrannically tidal present, W.H. Auden's dramatic poem *The Age of Anxiety* (1947) is allusive, allegorical, and at times surreal. The characters meet, drink, talk and walk around, then they drink, talk and walk around some more. They do this for 138 pages, then they go home. Despite the epochal nature of the phrase, from a sufferer's perspective, observes Daniel Smith, anxiety is not epochal (Smith 2012). It is always fluid and absolutely personal. From the moment it appeared, the phrase has been used to 'characterize everything perilous about the contemporary world: the degradation of the environment, nuclear energy, religious fundamentalism, threats to privacy and the family, drugs, pornography, violence, terrorism, and of course, that endemic social bifurcation of narcissistic hatred' (Smith 2012) – masculine loathing of women, and masculine self-loathing. Smith reports that, since 1990 and the death of postmodernity and depth ideology, the phrase has appeared in the title or subtitle of at least two dozen books, on subjects ranging from science and politics to parenting and sex. According to the National Institute of Mental Health, anxiety disorders now affect 18 per cent of the adult population of the United States, or about 40 million people. By comparison, mood disorders – depression and bipolar illness, primarily – affect 9.5 per cent. That makes anxiety the most common psychiatric complaint by a wide margin (Smith 2012).

In the vast present, masculine madness swims in the shallows, just beneath the surface. Terror is commonplace, millions of women are raped every year in the US alone, and, in response to advances made in gender equity, the world is re-masculinising. A direct consequence is that monocultural men can no longer burn the bridges of the past, escape the inescapable facts of their masculine madness. They are,

at last, experiencing shame – feeling the sense that one is a bad person and suffering excoriating self-loathing. Anxiety and self-loathing are conditions ever-present.

Monocultural men loathe themselves and women because the masculine right to subjectivity has been rendered illegitimate; subjectivity has been lost in the shattered mirrors of the Imaginary.⁴² They loathe themselves because they subjugate women and enjoy unearned privilege while women who fail to re-take their fully agentic subjectivity loathe themselves because they are complicit in the face of masculine madness. Again paraphrasing Santner, the violence of masculinity grows out of a refusal or an inability on the part of the members of the monoculture to assume the vocation of mourner-survivor of what might be called the violence of the signifier (Santner 1993, p. 9).

This is the age of the crisis *and* narcissism – not just the age of anxiety. ‘The revolution will not be tweeted,’ quipped Malcolm Gladwell (2010). In other words, revolution requires reality, and irreality prevents it – and prevents reform. Reinvention replaces reform; shallow policy fills the monocultural vacuum of ideology. When the Berlin Wall came down and the Cold War ended, the left-right ideologies of Western politics vanished to be replaced by the politics of personality and celebrity, by masculine narcissism.

But what is the cost to the ‘human universal’? When the powerful elite are victorious, the vanquished are demasculinised and the victor is remasculinised in what Zillah Eisenstein calls ‘murderous misogyny’ (2007, p. 28). Remasculinisation is a regeneration of the concepts, constructions and definitions of masculinity in society and a restabilisation of the gender system within and for which it is formulated (Jeffords 1989, p. 51). As Freud reminded his readers in 1893, ‘as an English writer has wittily remarked, the man who first flung a word of abuse at his enemy instead of a spear was the founder of civilisation’ (Brunner 2001, p. 136). In the vast eternal present, however, monocultural men are dropping their words and taking up their spears in a remasculinising of society. To extend Freud’s quotation, remasculinisation leads to a reversal of civilisation – to de-civilisation. The situations and circumstances of Auschwitz, Uganda, Rwanda, Bosnia, Syria saw men dropping their words to take up weapons, and in remasculinising society, de-civilising it. Remember the conundrum of the genocide of Woman: that without gender there is no human

⁴² This phrase has been informed by Eric Santner (1993, p. 10).

condition – it is a fundamental ontological human pre-requisite. If Woman is annihilated where does that leave Man? There can be no Eden without Eve, no humankind without Woman. To destroy the creator is to destroy the created; to destroy Woman is to destroy life. The cost of remasculinisation is that it de-civilises the very humanity men require for survival. Remasculinisation threatens to destroy humanity.

Lucky were those times that had clear and visible forms of evil. Today, says Donskis, we no longer know what evils are and where they are (Bauman and Donskis 2013, p. 10). The swirling evil of the liquid present is the monocultural condition, the everyday malady of murderous misogyny, the potential for masculine madness flowing through men. How safe and comfortable, says Bauman, how cosy and friendly the world would feel if it were monsters and only monsters that perpetrated monstrous deeds (2003, p. 23). How secure would young women feel if Psellos' beast were visible under the lamplight of darkened streets? How comfortable would women feel on a first date if the man opposite revealed himself to be an ugly, deadly monster? Against monsters, Bauman says, we are fairly well protected. We know the harm they cause. 'We have psychologists to spot psychopaths and sociopaths, we have sociologists to tell us where they are likely to propagate and congregate, we have judges to condemn them to confinement and isolation, and police or psychiatrists to make sure they stay there' (2003, p. 23). Alas, says Bauman, good, ordinary, likeable lads – like Chip Frederick at Abu Ghraib – were neither monsters nor perverts (2003, p. 23).

There is nothing unnatural in today's monsters. As Richard says in the 1960s movie *A Lion in Winter*, 'Unnatural? You tell me, what's nature's way? If poison mushrooms grow, and babies come with crooked backs, if goitres thrive and dogs go mad, and wives kill husbands ... what's unnatural?' (Goldman 1968).

Sooner or later masculine madness, the monsters or beasts of our nature, will attempt to break the last taboos, those against paedophilia, cannibalism and incest. According to Donskis, these are not, however, what shake us down to our depths. Rather, he says, it is death and extinction that cause real terror in our hearts (Bauman and Donskis 2013, p. 198). Masculine madness will ensure that culture in the West follows the pattern of extinction. In biological terms, of all species that have ever existed, 99.9 per cent are extinct, and in cultural terms, the pattern of extinction is that we kill who and what we love, usually ourselves (Honeywill 2008, p. 49). Michel Houellebecq contends that Marxism was killed by the very country that had turned it

into a secular state religion (Russia), and that Islam will die where it was born, in the Middle East, permeated by the sexual revolution, women's emancipation and the cults of consumerism, youth, individual liberty, success and sensual pleasure (Houellebecq 2007, pp. 246-247). This extinction will occur in much the same way that nationalism and the quest for collective ideals and dreams will be sacrificed in the regions where once they were lively and strong: the small nations of Europe. The countries of the West are no longer unified by the ideological, theological, and philosophical dogmas and doctrines for which so many sacrificed themselves or, more often, killed others (Bauman and Donskis 2013, p. 198).

Wearing the false mask of religious dogma, secular ideology, nationalism, or simply envy, lust, greed or pride, masculine madness initiated over millennia the destruction of loved ones, neighbours, cultures, civilisations, and nations. Masculine madness, in waging a war against nature, is attacking the atmosphere, the climate, the oceans, the land – everything needed to sustain life. It is eating itself. According to Donskis, the effective use and abuse of oneself and others has become the sole strategy in life (Bauman and Donskis 2013, p. 200). Through its revolutions and wars, its killing of modernity and postmodernity, its critical damage to the Enlightenment lineage, masculine madness demonstrated its powerful potential for self-destruction. In the vast liquid present, masculine madness has reached a new level of self-annihilation, higher even than in the madness of late modernity. As we have seen, Beauvoir believed that in no other epoch had men manifested their grandeur more brilliantly, but that 'the more widespread their mastery of the world, the more they find themselves crushed by uncontrollable forces. Though they are the masters of the atomic bomb, yet it is created to destroy them' (1948, pp. 8-9). Now, instead of taking other lives and territories and inventively risking their own, men are destroying the support system for life itself. This is the true madness of men, a madness that exists without rationality or any reference for survival.

The Oedipal schismic shattering and loss of subjectivity is for Man intensified by the dread of non-existence in the space from which the subject is both produced and threatened with annihilation, the space of the subversion of the subject, the space in which the death drive emerges and threatens to engulf the subject, to reduce it to the inertia of non-existence. Donskis's sole strategy in life is now the strategy of death.

What hope is there? Awakening to the pattern of extinction is a starting point. Despite genetic predisposition, despite the potentiality, millions of men do not exhibit

masculine madness. Remember that *moral becoming* is a reproductive or evolutionary success strategy, that men can and do make choices about their attitudes and behaviour constantly and unconsciously. Hundreds of millions of men exhibit *moral becoming*, and consciously and unconsciously reject the *amoral becoming* of masculine madness. They are capable of keeping the beast at bay, invisible and asleep. The remainder, in the same way that Europe sleepwalked into Hitler's slaughterhouses, are sleepwalking through the cultural landscape towards annihilation.

According to Seidler, early feminist theory insisted on identifying masculinity as exclusively a relationship of power, that there were no ways that men could change, no way that masculinity could be redeemed – that masculinity was the problem and could be no part of a solution. He describes violence done by men as an abuse of their power (Seidler 2006, p. xx). Masculine power is, however, not essential, not universal. Men are not universally powerful or weak, good or bad, violent or peaceful.

The population, as it plunges towards annihilation, has not for a thousand years demonstrated positive signs of evolutionary change towards species survival. Modern medical innovations that make us live longer are useless if men, blind to life's fragility, destroy the environment in which we live. The question is: who will win the race – slow-moving evolution on a path to survival or fast-moving masculine madness declaring war against nature, fully intent on annihilation? The answer must be, both. Progressive social attitudes flooding the knowledge culture will eventually seep across the cultural divide to create an extended social morality, and as Baier said, this increase in knowledge and understanding will promote human flourishing. We are seeing the two faces of Enlightenment – one, a humanist pluralism filled with knowledge, optimism and hope, tolerance and democracy, and the other, a monocultural, narcissistic tide blind and deaf to the immeasurable danger of masculine madness.

Men, in denial and repression, fall silent in the wake of their own atrocities, but not in the wake of the atrocities of others. Men who reject masculine madness therefore have voice, have in outgrowing the pile of psychosocial wreckage, rising skyward under the gaze of the angel of history, the humanist voice to speak on behalf of all moral men, in favour of survival. Seidler believes that power reduces those without it to silence (Seidler 2006, p. xxiv). Witz and Marshall argued that women in modernity, cast as unable to fully transcend the bonds of tradition, were therefore incapable of becoming fully agentic, that within modernity Woman could not

participate in the masculine enterprise. In the endless sea of the present there are no bonds of tradition, of history, of ideology, no banished metanarratives, so women are capable of becoming fully agentic.

But what of the evil of masculine madness? What is needed, as the antidote to masculine madness, is a language of power within the population of men that exercise true, fully agentic morality. What Adorno called the socio-psychological relevance of the unmastered past must be transformed, flooded with reinvention, to create socio-psychological relevance of a mastered present. Without that antidote, the only voice we hear will say, 'Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.'

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