

The Use of Language Policy in the Management of Collective Mental State: Sri Lanka and South Africa

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Abstract—This paper will explore the idea that political leaders will attempt to control, shift and otherwise manage the collective mental state through various instruments including language policy. Several case studies focusing on Sri Lanka and pre- and post-majority rule South Africa, will show how this is carried out. The general conclusion can be reached that it is possible to influence collective mental states through language policy by using language to: firstly, define a collective boundary, secondly, identify a collectivity through its prevailing ontology, and thirdly, adjust feelings, particularly fears, doubts and uncertainties, for selected purposes. Whether a collective mental state has been calmed or disturbed will have implications for order or conflict, peace or war, and accommodation or genocide.

Keywords—Language policy; collective mental state; Sri Lanka; South Africa

I. HISTORICAL FORMULATIONS OF COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

The concept of collective consciousness implies more than just a sum of individual consciousnesses, which at any given time will have a collective mental state. The idea of similarity between individual consciousness and collective consciousness is very ancient. Thucydides in his account of the Peloponnesian Wars made generalised state of fear among the Spartans a central component of his explanation of war (Howard, 1983) [1]. Later, Marx proposed the concept of class consciousness and Marxists have developed the concept of false consciousness.

The concept of collective behaviour was proposed by Le Bon who theorised that in a crowd, the individual's psychology is subordinated to a collective mentality which radically transforms individual behaviour (Le Bon, 2009) [2].

Durkheim observed about the concept of collective consciousness that

“...it is something special and it must be designated by a special term, simply because the states which constitute it differ specifically from those which constitute the

individual consciousnesses" (Durkheim, 1964: 103) [3].

Jung also had a similar concept of collective unconscious, and both Durkheim and Jung had in common the idea of collective representations or archetypes which were typically expressed through religion (Greenwood, 1990: 1) [4].

The concept fell into disfavour, possibly because collective consciousness seemed to mean group mind, or the idea of a hypothetical collective transcendent consciousness or spirit which was assumed to characterise a group or community (Reber, 1995: 323) [5], but is now receiving strong interest (Tollefsen, 2002) [6], (Huebner, 2010) [7].

II. LANGUAGE AND COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

Language is an important component of collective consciousness --"Language expresses the collective experience of a group." (Herder in Smith, 1981: 45) [8]-- and is a collective right (Kymlicka, 1995) [9], (Breton, 1997:47) [10], while language grief has been discussed in relation to communities that have lost or anticipate the loss of their language (Bostock, 1997) [11].

A. Identity

In individuals a strong and unified sense of identity is seen by psychology as an important part of mental health. Identity can be defined as '...a person's essential, continuous self, the internal subjective concept of oneself as an individual.' (Reber, 1995: 355) [12]. Identity is formed by identification which Freud saw as the earliest expression of a tie with another person (Freud, 1955: 105) [13]. This position was developed by Erikson who saw a strong sense of identity as a necessary condition for a successfully functioning individual and for a society. Erikson saw a strong sense of identity as a generator of energy and a weak or confused sense of identity as a source of decline. As a crisis of identity develops, powerful negative identity factors are produced which "...arouse in man a hatred of "otherness." (Erikson, 1968: 62) [14].

Identification is thus a powerful two-way link between individual and collectivity, and it can be said that a collectivity can have a strong or weak sense of identity. If the sense of identity is weak or divided, it will have an effect on the collective mental state.

B. Mechanisms of Change in the Collective Consciousness

The means by which collective consciousness operates is reciprocity at the level of ideas: a process of representations being passed at an emotional level by a process called by Le Bon contagion (Le Bon, 2009) [15].

Another means of change in collective mental state is the result of collective trauma which works by changing the existing ties between survivors. At the collective level, it has been established that major traumatic events or continuing conditions of extreme stress such as civil war can produce a heightened incidence of suicide and other indicators of mental illness (Somasundaram, 2010 [16].

Yet another means is the feedback loop. In their study of an industrial plant, Voyer, Gould and Ford (1999) [17] found that many efforts to reduce organisational anxiety were counterproductive because of the presence of reinforcing feedback loops between the various elements of collectively held attitude and perception. They also found balancing feedback loops which had the effect of reducing anxiety and helped the organisation towards achieving equilibrium, that is, its position before a stressful event. The collective mental state of anxiety is therefore increased or decreased through the mechanism of feedback. Voyer, Gould and Ford referred to a Dutch study which showed that in one organisation, the leader's role was in fact the only balancing feedback loop, an early confirmation of the idea that leaders or rulers have an important part to play in controlling the dynamics of the collective mental state.

The common element in the various mechanisms of change in the collective mental State--reciprocity, contagion or feedback loop--is communication, and for this reason, it is possible to believe that language plays an indispensable role in bringing about changes in this state.

C. Management of Collective Mental State

The condition of the collective mental state can be hypothesised as having an essential role in the great questions of human society: order or conflict, peace or war, accommodation or genocide. The precise nature of the link between mental state and behaviour is an age-old philosophical as well as moral and psychological question, that of responsibility, which is likely to remain unresolved. Another way of looking at the same problem is to say that antisocial behaviour may not be a result of illness "... harm to society...should not be part of the definition of mental illness, because to include it would open the door to saying that, for example, all rapists and all those who oppose society's aims are mentally ill" (Collier, Longmore and Harvey, 1991: 314 [18]. However, it is obvious that large-scale violence does need large numbers of willing participants and therefore similarity of motivation, ontology, information supply and interpretation must be assumed.

Lake and Rothchild expanded on the theme of collective fear when they wrote

"As groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence...Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, build upon these fears of insecurity and polarise society." (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 1) [19].

Most studies of organised violence do not attribute all causality to leadership, as there must be a facilitating followship or at least acquiescent bystanders and very likely a situation where the 'raw materials' of collective grievances are present (Bostock, 1997) [20].

Borkenau relates the mental state to the effect of severe changes to the social and political milieu

"Once the carapace of custom is disrupted, the process acquires the characteristics of a chain reaction. Every rift opened by the devaluation of rules widens automatically and produces new rifts in other places....conduct becomes more and more irrational, the area of moral uncertainty is constantly widening, until the typical situation of the "dark ages," a situation of total insecurity and universal crime, is reached." (Borkenau, 1981: 385) [21].

In the light of this discussion, it is clear that individuals and groups may try to control, shift or otherwise manage the collective mental state through various techniques but especially language policy by using language to: firstly, define the boundaries of a collectivity, secondly, identify the collectivity through its prevailing ontology, and thirdly, adjust feelings, particularly fears, doubts and uncertainties, for their own purposes. As has been stated

"...authorities will often use propaganda and ideologies about language loyalty, patriotism, collective identity and the need for "correct and pure language" or "native language variety" as strategies for continuing their control and holding back the demands of these "others"". (Shohamy, 2006: 77) [22].

III. CASE STUDIES OF THE MANAGEMENT OF COLLECTIVE MENTAL STATE THROUGH LANGUAGE POLICY

A. Sri Lanka

The civil war in Sri Lanka began in 1983 and ended in 2009, after claiming a possible total of 110,000 lives (BBC, 2016) [23]. It has also caused a large population displacement, seen systematic sexual violence against women, and severe and widespread post-traumatic stress (Somasundaram, 2010) [24].

Clearly there is a disturbed collective mental state but to what extent is language implicated? Sri Lanka is a plural society where the majority group is the Sinhalese who came from Northern India in the 6th Century BCE and conquered the Veddas, the most ancient inhabitants. The Sinhalese speak Sinhala, are mostly Buddhist, and today number 15 million or 75 per cent of the population. The largest minority is the Tamils who today number 3 million and speak Tamil. They are mainly Hindu in religion and form two groups, the 'Sri Lankan Tamils' who are descendants of the Tamil-speaking groups who migrated from South India as long as 1000 years ago, and

the 'Indian Tamils' who are the descendants of the comparatively recent immigrants who came from India in the time of the British to work in the tea and other plantations. There are also Muslims, called 'Moors', and Christians of Sinhalese, Tamil and other origins. The Sinhalese introduced Buddhism from India in the 3rd Century BCE and the island became a major centre of Buddhist activity but more recent settlers were Arabic peoples, followed by the Portuguese, Dutch and British.

The transfer of power from the British to self-government was "smooth and peaceful" (de Silva, 1981:461) [25] but later events were to prove less than peaceful. From 1948 to 1956, for a brief period in 1960, and from 1965 to 1970 the country was ruled, in its own right or in coalition, by the United National Party (UNP) which was concerned to protect the rights of the Tamils. The socialist Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), created in 1951 by Solomon Bandaranaike, advocated national heritage but gained the support of groups advocating the recognition of Sinhala as sole official language and Buddhism as official religion. The SLFP won office in 1956 and stayed in power until 1965, except for a brief period in 1960, and in coalition with a minor party the Lanka Sama Samaj Party (LSSP) in 1964.

In 1978 some limited recognition was given to the Tamil language, but violence continued. In 1981 after a period of strikes and unrest an emergency was declared and the unrest of this period marks the beginning of the civil war. The government attempted to seal northern areas from contact with Tamil Nadu, the southern State of India from where the Tamil secessionists were being supplied, and in 1986, internecine fighting broke out between the two main Tamil groups, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, the latter group becoming dominant.

The election to office of President Kumaratunga in 1994, after a campaign based on a promise to end the civil war, was followed by a truce which broke down in 1995. It was a civil war of attempted resolution through power and characterised by a very high level of violence against civilians, both politicians and members of the public, often indiscriminately caught in bomb blasts thus generating widespread collective fear.

Frequent political assassination is a major manifestation of a condition that can be interpreted as evidence of a severely disturbed collective mental state. In Sri Lanka, political assassination has been a persistent mode of the operation of the system and many leaders have been killed, reflecting the intensity of the political process in this deadly theatre of politics,

Political violence through rioting and mass-killings indicative of a collective habituation to violence are a feature of Sri Lankan politics and this is spread throughout all levels of society. The 1983 ethnic violence against the Tamils of Colombo in which hundreds were killed was a particularly clear manifestation of the breakdown of the state. Government response was the frequent use of the State of Emergency, a situation in which normal democratic processes were suspended.

The movement of large numbers of people within a state and from a state can also be interpreted as another symptom of a disturbed collective mental state. Highly contagious and

realistically-based fear of endemic violence is the major causal factor, and it is possible to say that displaced people are ones whose psychic needs of security, dignity and fraternity, the normal functions of identification are not being supplied by the collective mental state. In addition, since 1983 between 500 000 and one million people have left Sri Lanka (CIA World Factbook, 2016) [26].

During the period of British rule, the population was more or less unified under an independence movement and there was a Swabhasha movement for Sri Lanka's 'own language' which embraced both Sinhala and Tamil (Edwards, 1985:179) [27]. After independence the communities drew further apart, divided on lines of language, religion, culture and economic position in which the Tamils had received favoured treatment under the British. From independence it would seem that a single Sri Lankan collective mental state was rather difficult to identify, and the situation has more likely become one of separate Sinhalese and Tamil collective mental states, founded on the respective languages."

It has been argued that

"(t)hough other factors also propelled Sri Lanka's descent into the maelstrom, language policy, and the effort to assert ethnic dominance that it epitomised, did the greatest harm of all". (Neier, 1996: 140) [28].

With regard to Sri Lanka's two major languages there is a difference of family. Sinhala is an Indo-Aryan language descended from Sanskrit. Its script is one of the many variants of the Indic system which is used throughout India (Devanagari, Malayalam, Tamil, etc.) and very widely in Southeast Asia. Its similarities of script with other languages notwithstanding, Sinhala is now geographically isolated. Long cut off from its distant relatives in Northern India, Sinhala is spoken by 14 million Sinhalese in Sri Lanka but is not in very wide use outside of the country.

In contrast, Tamil is one of the major languages of southern India and one of India's fifteen Schedule Languages or official languages. It is one of the oldest of the Dravidian languages and is spoken by over 60 million people in India, mainly in Tamil Nadu, and has a sizeable number of speakers in Malaysia, Singapore, Fiji, Mauritius, Trinidad, Guyana and East Africa (Katzner, 1977:199) [29], as well as its 3 million speakers in Sri Lanka.

Unlike the Sinhalese, for whom language and religion are inextricably bound, for the Tamils language is paramount while religion is not as central to ethnic identity (de Silva, 1986:216). Even so, it is necessary to bear in mind the complex internal dynamics of Tamil language maintenance (Canagarajah, 2008) [30].

The fact that Tamil nationalists in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu had actively resisted the efforts of the national government to introduce Hindi as India's national language (de Silva, 1986: 4) 31] was not lost on Sri Lanka's communities of Tamils. Many of these people saw themselves as being engaged in a similar struggle, and it is therefore possible to see collective Sinhalese language insecurity reacting to collective Tamil language insecurity and then escalating in a chain reaction of collective paranoia.

The feeling of isolation of their language is relevant to understanding the political imperative of the Sinhalese to safeguard and strengthen its position. As a writer of Sri Lanka Tamil origin has stated

"The Sinhala language ... was in danger of extinction - and with it the Sinhala people. Where else in the world was Sinhala spoken but in Ceylon?" (Sivanandan, 1990:217) [32].

It has also been reported that there is language insecurity related to religion among Sinhalese activists, one of whom stated

". . . if they didn't do something there would be no more Buddhism and no more Sinhalese - they'd all be Hindu priests, speaking in Tamil." (Horowitz, 1985:176) [33].

To complicate matters, language reinforced and was reinforced by religion: as de Silva observed

"Buddhism and the destiny of the Sinhala language were so closely intertwined that it was virtually impossible to treat either in isolation from the other". (de Silva, 1993:7) [34].

Thus the language issue came to dominate the process of politics since independence. The enactment of the Official Language Act in 1956 provoked the first of many language riots in which Tamils reacted against the installation of Sinhala as the sole official language. This act of language particularism, later described as the 'triumph of the language extremists', of whom the Prime Minister was prisoner', (de Silva, 1986:14-16) [35] set a tragic precedent severely prejudicing the possibility of inter-ethnic collaboration and, in denying legitimacy to the minority language, crystallising a fear about their language identity among Tamils speakers who resented Sinhala.

It is significant that an attempt to address the language issue was a feature of the Indo-Lankan Peace Accord signed between the governments of India and Sri Lanka in 1987 in that Tamil was at last given equal official status to Sinhala, but this belated step was not been sufficient to remove the underlying causes of the civil war.

The issue of language conflict also involves a conflict of cultural values. Kapferer (2012) [36] has argued that there are myths of Buddhist triumphalism propagated through the Sinhalese education system. Government attempts at creating ethnic quotas have further exacerbated the ethno-linguistic conflict.

Horowitz reports a study of cultural stereotypes, admittedly of several generations ago, but possibly still relevant today, in which Sinhalese saw themselves as 'kind, good and religious', but twice as lazy as the Tamils whom they saw as 'cruel and arrogant' as well as 'diligent and thrifty' (Horowitz, 1985:180). Even the historical existence of collective stereotypes is a factor undermining the chances of successfully constructing a single inclusive collective state identity.

Thus the proposition that Sri Lanka's 'descent into the maelstrom' was a product of language policy and a desire for ethnic dominance does appear to be supported, with the result of a still deeply disturbed and divided collective mental state.

B. South Africa

The African continent has huge sociolinguistic complexity: more than half the world's surviving languages are found there and over 5,000 language names have been identified in sub-Saharan Africa (Spencer, 1985; 387) [37]. South Africa has nine major African languages which are spoken by 67 per cent of the country's population of 50 million but not until the achievement of majority rule in 1994 did these languages have official status which had been reserved for Afrikaans and English, though they were very much the subject of policy.

With colonisation by Europeans, Dutch was implanted in southern Africa in 1652 and continued to have some official recognition after the takeover of the Cape Colony by the British in 1814 when English became official. When in 1910 the Union of South Africa was created as an independent dominion within the British Empire, Dutch was given equal status with English. Possibly as a result of its isolation from the Netherlands and its contact with African languages, Malay, English, French and Portuguese, the 17th century Dutch became transformed into the new language of Afrikaans, sometime between 1800 and 1850. At first looked down upon by both English and Dutch speakers, it gradually gained respectability. In 1875 a group of teachers and clerics in the Cape founded a Society of True Afrikaners to stand for 'our language, our nation, our land' and produced a newspaper written in Afrikaans and stressing the uniqueness of their God-given destiny (Worden, 1995: 88) [38]. In 1918 a secret society, the Afrikaner Broederbond, was established and by 1929 it was instrumental in creating the Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Associations with the purpose of unifying Afrikaners and propagating a strong sense of language, culture and race-based identity among them. In the meantime, Afrikaans had in 1925 replaced Dutch as equal official language of South Africa with English, a situation that was to remain until majority rule.

The period of minority rule can be seen as battle between races but also as one between Afrikaners and white South Africans of British background, with the languages of Dutch then Afrikaans and English as the subject of contestation as the vehicles of identity within their respective collective mental states. This was particularly meaningful for Afrikaners, "... (I)n nationalist thinking, the people's very existence was manifested in the 'living language' of Afrikaans" (Giliomee, 1997. 122) [39].

The period can also be interpreted as an interface between these two colonial languages and the vernaculars. Here two distinct approaches to colonial rule have been identified: that of the Latin-speaking Europeans (French, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish), and that of the Germanic speaking Europeans (British, Dutch, German), whereby the former tended to be culturally and linguistically arrogant and dismissive of 'native cultures' and indigenous languages while the latter tended to be more racially arrogant insisting on a segregation of the races but more tolerant of vernaculars (Mazrui, 1988; 89) [40]. Moreover, while tolerating African languages, the British were reluctant to spread English because of the political implication of possible mobilisations through the common medium of communication, and also a desire to "... maintain the linguistic distance between the Englishman and his coloured subject, as a way of maintaining the social distance between them ..." (Mazrui, 1988: 98) [41].

When the Afrikaners gained dominance through minority rule in South Africa in 1948, they used language policy as an important component in the total repertoire of policies designed to put a brake on the 'Westernisation' of the African population

"Language policy was part of this deceleration of the westernizing process. Afrikaners preferred "Bantu Education" as a device of keeping Africa "African" and while power supreme!" (Mazrui, 1988: 90) [42].

Bantu Education, the education policy of the Afrikaner dominated Nationalist Government, contained as a central feature a policy called Mother Tongue Education, which meant that education for Africans was required to be in the vernacular up to and including tertiary level (Bunting, 1969: 273) [43]. This policy caused much distress, and an official commission in 1963 received reports from an overwhelming majority of witnesses that '... the standard of English had declined considerably and was still deteriorating.' (Bunting, 1969: 273) [44]. Education policy did attempt to steer Africans towards Afrikaans in what appeared to be becoming more and more a choice between Afrikaans and English, where Afrikaans was seen as a symbol of white oppression and a language of racial claustrophobia whereas English was seen as a language of Pan-African communication (Mazrui, 1988: 90) [45]. It was the issue of the order for black school pupils to be taught in Afrikaans not English that triggered the explosive 1976 Soweto riots in which 600 people died. In addition, as the 'homelands' that had been created under the apartheid policy accepted 'selfgovernment, they one after another chose English and an indigenous language as their official languages (Giliomee, 1997: 123) [46].

As the future for Afrikaans started to appear insecure, a new ally was found in the mixed race people, a predominantly Afrikaans-speaking group almost as numerous as the Afrikaners themselves. In this way, after 36 years of excluding the mixed-race people from the Afrikaner collectivity, the ruling National Party changed its definitional criteria of an Afrikaner to include anyone who spoke Afrikaans (Schiff, 1996: 219) [47].

It is thus possible to interpret South African language policy under minority rule as an attempt to influence collective mental state by division into a multiplicity of separate collective mental states, with an overall aim of securing and enhancing the future of one group at the expense of the others, to a major or minor degree. For Blacks it sought through the 'mother tongue education' and the non-offering of English, to create a collective mental state of insecurity, depression, dampened sense of realism, exclusion and habituation to violence. For South Africans of British background it aimed to create some feelings of insecurity, depression, and some hint of the likelihood of violence, but offered the possibility of inclusion in the Afrikaner collectivity as a viable solution. Among Afrikaners, it sought to create a mental state of a secure future, and a mood of elation through the delusion of a God-given destiny based on an unrealistic belief in the sustainable viability of a policy of exclusion of Africans, underlain with a habituation to a putative ever present threat of violence.

The explanation of how South Africa went from minority to majority rule is the subject of much speculative analysis (Giliomee, 1997) [48], but it can be argued that language policy has played a substantial part.

The Constitution of the new South Africa was adopted in 1996 and Section 6 of Chapter 1 Founding Provisions laid down the principles of policy as to language. It recognised 11 official languages and stated that practical and positive measures must be taken to elevate the status and advance the use of the indigenous languages, while 'all official languages must enjoy parity of esteem and be treated equitably'. (South Africa, 1997: 1) [49].

Although all official languages are constitutionally equal, there is great difference in demography, written literature and international use. The estimated numbers of speakers of each language as a home language is

Afrikaans 6.8 million, English 4.8 m, IsiNdebele 1.0 m, IsiXhosa 8.1 m, IsiZulu 11.5 m, Sepedi 4.6 m, Sesotho 3.8 m, Setswana 4.0 m, SiSwati 1.2 m, Tshivenda 1.2 m, Xitsonga 2.2 m. (Statistics South Africa, Census, 2011) [50].

It is difficult to assess the impact of this new language policy, but two interesting questions arise: one, why did the Afrikaner-dominated minority government yield without a struggle to majority rule, or 'surrender without defeat' as Giliomee described it (1997), bearing in mind the likely effect on their language, and second, why did the ANC-led majority government adopt such a generous policy towards Afrikaans under the circumstances? In fact the answers are related and concern the management of collective mental states. Much has been written describing the collective mental state of the Afrikaners as one of collective fear of loss of identity through loss of language. As Giliomee described it

"... there was every prospect that a black government would elevate English to the status of being the sole official language, spelling the end of Afrikaans and the Afrikaner culture--and with it the demise of the Afrikaner people." (Giliomee, 1997: 123) [51].

The fact that newly-independent Namibia chose English as sole official language, though with recognition of educational rights in other languages, (Namibia, 1990) [52] was not lost on Afrikaners. In fact SWAPO had long made it clear that Afrikaans, the lingua franca of Namibia, would be replaced by English (Phillipson, Skutnabb-Kangas and Africa, 1986: 78) [53].

The ANC-led government may well have followed a policy of language retribution towards Afrikaans, destroying the language through the destruction of its status, but instead chose to follow a path of status enhancement for the nine indigenous languages, while offering to Afrikaans a continued place as an official language in the new South Africa. In other words, the choice for Afrikaners was between a policy of controlled status reduction or free fall into ultimate oblivion.

The post-apartheid position offered to Afrikaners was thus one of some security, limited depression, an end to delusion, some inclusion and a reduced prospect of violence, with language policy making a significant contribution to this, in other words, an offer far better than might have been expected.

An explanation of the highly complex political process called 'surrender without defeat' must include the role of the major players: de Klerk, Mandela and Tutu. De Klerk's role, after what has been described as his 'remarkable change of heart' (Lake and Rothchild, 1996:16) [54], was one of bringing to the Afrikaner mental state some acceptance of the reality of

an untenable situation, though he was not entirely successful in this. Mandela's contribution was to see the new South Africa as a larger collectivity through the inclusion of all groups in the new collective mental state where there would be a place and a role for even his former persecutors and their language. On this last point, one commentator has noted that (ex) President Mandela has been "...highly sensitive to the language issue" (Schiff, 1996: 221), and went on to cite as further evidence the opposition of Mandela to the elimination of the use of Afrikaans in the South African military (Schiff, 1996: 221) [55]. The third major player was Archbishop Tutu whose promotion of ubuntu, a traditional African communal practice of common humanity (Kamwangamalu, 1999) [56], as embodied in the proposed and later realised Truth and Reconciliation Commission, provided a mechanism for inclusion in the new collective mental state.

The future role of language policy in the political development of South Africa will be critical. There are fears that have been aroused by the ANC-led government refusal to grant approval to either exclusive mother-tongue education or single language schools and universities (Giliomee, 1997: 137) [57], have been one area of tension. Another cause of major concern is the effect of the 'all-mighty English language' on the survival of all other languages (Kamwangamalu, 1998: 122) [58], which might result in scepticism about the 'rainbow nation' (Beukes, 2004) [59].

In the light of the above discussion, one could say that the maintenance and development of the South African state depends upon the emergence of a new collective mental state, to which language policy can make a contribution by avoidance of linguistic exclusion.

IV. CONCLUSION: LANGUAGE POLICY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE MENTAL STATE

This paper has sought to establish that the many and varied collective attitudes, beliefs, feelings and practices, which can be together called a collective mental state, are a result of many factors but particularly language policy. Individuals and groups try to control, shift or otherwise manage the collective mental state through language policy by using language to: firstly, define and divide a collectivity, secondly, identify a collectivity through its prevailing ontology, and thirdly, adjust feelings, particularly fears, doubts and uncertainties, for their own purposes.

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