The Role of Friendship

In

Our

Development

As

Human Beings

David Treanor

DSW CQSW (UUJ), Grad Cert Arts (UNSW), M *Pub Admin* (UTAS).

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Tasmania

2012

Declaration

This dissertation contains no content that has been previously accepted for a degree or diploma awarded by the University of Tasmania or any other institution.

The material presented is original except where due acknowledgement is given

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David P Treanor

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Abstract

The development of community living programs for people with intellectual disabilities in western nations is now both policy rhetoric and a feature of the service system landscape. This change in policy and practice has helped change - the lives of people with intellectual disabilities and has honoured claims for everyone to be treated as equal citizens with the same rights. This thesis develops the argument that although individuals may differ in both their chronological age and cognitive abilities, they can form and maintain meaningful friendships of different types, which incorporate diversity and in which the parties involved remain distinct individuals, though unified through their shared emotional life. To defend this claim it will be necessary to refute the claims of those utilitarian thinkers who would deny full human status to people with intellectual disabilities. Furthermore, it is argued there is validity to prioritising a relational view to personhood. The method adopted is broadly phenomenological by using analysis of actual personal narratives in order to take account of the historical and existential factors that operate in the development of friendships.   Aristotle's theory that humans are social by nature, and that friendship is essential to human life is developed and applied in order to demonstrate that the interdependence of individuals and the enrichment that follows from human encounters enables us to realize our potential as human beings. This argument not only provides an ethical justification for people with intellectual disabilities to be treated as equal citizens and as having the same rights as other people, but it also provides us with a vision of human society and of our personal identity that can be realised and integrated through the experience of living and interacting together.

Acknowledgements

The central argument of this thesis is that we exist in a network of friendships (*philia)* that provides our lives with meaning. The very completion of my thesis is a testimony to this reality, and I am thankful to many people for both their technical and personal support to me over the last few years. Many people supported me with their specialised knowledge. My first debt of gratitude is to Dr Anna Alomes with whom I commenced my journey. My sincere thanks Anna, for your inspiration and encouragement. I met my current supervisor, Professor Wayne Hudson, through Anna. Wayne, I thank you for your guidance, assistance and encouragement along the way to my completing this work. The University of Tasmania provided me with grant to attend the 10th International Conference on the Study of Persons and I am very grateful for the opportunity this gave me to meet other personalist philosophers. At this time, I was also fortunate to meet Dr Alan Ford from the John Macmurray Fellowship and I am very grateful for his scholarship. Through my own financial resources, I was able to attend a conference hosted by the Centre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics in the United Kingdom on the philosophy of Martha Nussbaum. It was here I was fortunate to meet Professor Ruth Abbey who has provided me with much support and an introduction to Professor Ian Thompson. Ian, I am very thankful for your guidance, wisdom, encouragement and support for this was essential to the completion of this work; Ian, I cannot thank you enough except to say '*Go raibh maith agat mo anamchara'.*

There are of course many other *philoi* in my personal life that have supported, shared, listened and journeyed with me in both my frustrations and luminous explorations. I am especially thankful to each one of you and of course to my family, Cindy, Alex, Stella and Niamh for their support over the last few years.

My sincere thanks to everyone.

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Abbreviations

DeA   De Anima

FOJ   Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership

GPT   Greek Philosophy Terms: A Philosophical Lexicon

Meta Metaphysics

NE   Nicomachean Ethics

OCF   On Civic Friendship

PE   Practical Ethics

PR   Persons In Relation

A Note on Terminology

In this thesis I have chosen to use the term 'intellectual disability' to refer to the general condition associated with people who are assessed as having an impairment of intellectual functioning measured by contemporary psychometric tests. This term has greater international recognition although I acknowledge it is not the preferred term of self-advocates in the United Kingdom. The previous terms used in professional circles to identify this group of people include mental handicap and mental retardation to connote intellectual disability. People assigned to this category, most often, are deemed to have a communicate impairment.

If I am speaking about actual people I will use the term 'persons with intellectual disabilities' as opposed to other terms as this reflects a more respectful and professional approach to discussing real people and their lives.

Introduction

Background

This thesis offers a new approach to understanding friendship. Contemporary philosophers typically ignore friendships between people with and people without intellectual disabilities for the former are usually placed outside the criteria of moral personhood[1]. It is possible that an explanation for the exclusion of people with intellectual disabilities from this criterion results from the limited forms of personal engagement assumed to be possible between people with and people without intellectual disabilities. It is my belief that exploring real encounters between people with and people without intellectual disabilities will assist us to better understand the nature of human friendship and may also offer insight into the role friendship can have in our development as human beings or persons.

Friendship is described by Aristotle as an expression of mutual kindness, warmth and personal respect or regard for a friend for their sake without any expectation of self-interest. Is Aristotle's account of friendship satisfactory and is it satisfactory to reflect our actual experiences of inter-personal relationships? Are we justified to take his definition for granted as a premise for our argument?

This thesis explores friendship from a broadly Aristotelian perspective, analysing different forms of human relationships, and the possible emotional and motivational dispositions associated with these relationships. In real life, tension often occurs in relationships because the parties involved have different views about the nature of their relationship and different expectations of their 'friendship'. The strength of the tension is mostly influenced by the degree of psychological intimacy

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[1] What I suggest is that there are few actual examples in the writings of philosophers that detail the forms of friendships that might exist between people with and people without intellectual disabilities.

the individuals perceive they experience with each other, and this can easily intensify and develop into adverse relations when the expectations are not resolved.

In this dissertation, I argue or defend the thesis that *goodwill* is the most critical component of *philia* [2] and that an example of where this constituent is expressed and most fully realised as a way of living is in the *L'Arche* Communities. These are networks of people with and people without intellectual disabilities, who share life together in small households, and are bound, together by a network of friendships with other households from the local and wider community. *L'Arche* was founded in France in 1964 by Jean Vanier [3] and is an intentional [4]; faith- based [5] international association held together by adherence to the *Charter of L'Arche* [6], though each is legally incorporated in its own respective nation state. Vanier has written extensively [7] and what is of interest to this thesis is the notion in *L'Arche* of people with and without intellectual disabilities *'being with'* each other [8]. This notion

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[2] In this context I use the word *philia* to incorporate a range of interpersonal relationships including friendships.

[3] Jean Vanier's doctoral dissertation was on the principles of Aristotle's ethics. J Vanier *Le Bonheur principle et fin de la morale aristotelicienne,* (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1963). Prior to starting *L'Arche,* he taught at St. Michael's College in Toronto.

[4] By 'intention' is meant that people without intellectual disabilities who live and work in a community environment make a personal commitment to this way of life. This means they actively pursue personal friendships with people with intellectual disabilities who are also members of the community.

[5] *L'Arche* began in France with the support of Fr. Thomas Philippe, a Catholic Priest and mentor to Jean Vanier, and while faith acts as a central tenet to the organisation, *L'Arche* also operates in countries where other non-Catholic faith traditions are dominant. Each community is required to be respectful to the faith tradition of the people who come to the community and to support people to deepen their faith experience and values - whether these people locate themselves within a faith tradition or outside of it.

[6] For details see: http://www.larche.org.au/about-us/index.cfm?loadref=24 accessed and printed on 8/8/2010.

[7] For example, J. Vanier, *From Brokenness to Wholeness,* (New York: Paulist Press, 1972); J. Vanier, *Community & Growth*, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1979); J. Vanier, *Becoming Human*, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1998); J. Vanier, *Encountering 'the Other'*, (Dublin: Paulist Press, 2006); J. Vanier, *Befriending the Stranger,* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2007).

[8] This term '*being with'* is coined by Vanier and called such in *Letters of L'Arche*, no. 52, June 1987, p. 3. It is called 'Living with' by Sue Mosteller, S. Mosteller 'Living With' in *The Challenge of L'Arche*, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1982), (ed.),

is congruent with Aristotle's concept of a friend as a 'second self'[9], and indeed at the same end in the continuum of the family concept of a 'second self'[10]. For example, imagine placing people in your life along a continuum where at one end you place significant people and at the far end place people with whom, you have a 'matter of fact' or minimum personal relationship with. The end that has the significant people will include people who are related to you genetically (children, siblings, parents) and also people who you consider as emotionally and socially intimate friends who are not part of your biological family. As a group of people, you may place them together in one intimate sphere and this constitutes a type of kinship and intimate relation for you. This conception of friendship as integral to our selfhood and who we are as persons and it has been further developed in the writings of Belifore, Irwin and Stern-Gillet[11].

Considering people in this intimate friendship sphere brings vividly to mind a whole series of examples of personal, memories, experiences, crises, failures and successes in my own personal experiences. Indeed, this study arises directly from my lived experiences of relationships with people with intellectual disabilities and my membership of *L'Arche* communities. I undertook my research, because I wanted to articulate how important our intimate friendships are to our development as human beings including those people with intellectual disabilities. These fraternal [12] friendships are multi-dimensional and have a moral and educational component; they cause friends to share their lives together and create a milieu for each friend to

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J. Vanier, pp. 11-24 and on their international website and in other communication the term is labelled 'mutual relationships' for example see http://www.larche.org/a-l-arche-community-is-who-we-are.en-gb.21.0.news.htm accessed 8/8/2010.

[9] 1170b6, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* Second Edition, trans. Terence Irwin, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1999), and this Edition of the *Nicomachean Ethics* will be used unless otherwise stated. *NE* will be used as an abbreviation for this text.

[10] Ibid.

[11] For example: E. Belfiore, 'Family Friendships in Aristotle's Ethics' *Ancient Philosophy*, **21**, 1, 2001, pp. 113-131; T. Irwin 'The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle's Ethics' in Ameile Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) *Essays on Aristotle Ethics* (California, University of California Press, 1980), pp. 35-54. E. Stern-Gillet, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship,* (New York: New York University Press, 1995).

[12] I am using this term in a broadest sense to include friendships that shows each friend mutual support and value as a person.

experience personal growth. Prior to joining my first *L'Arche* community, I had worked in the world of commerce and found my life very unsatisfying, without a sense of belonging, purpose or meaning. What I discovered in *L'Arche* was a culture that gave priority to my *being in relationships with* people an intellectual disability, simply living the rhythm of the day, eating together, able to celebrate, to share the 'highs and lows' that we experience in our lives and to discover my own vulnerability and dignity as a person. After a few years, I left the community to further my education in social work after which I worked in non-government services. I eventually left this service sector because I found that the people with intellectual disabilities were expected to fit into the service structures, rather than these being adapted to their needs. Efficient organisation and productivity took priority over human growth. Cost/efficient financial management practices dominated rather than services being used to serve people, and authority was generally hierarchical, defensive, rigid and self-protective.

I began to realise this state of affairs has not developed in a vacuum and that a number of sources have contributed to the evolution of this model of social service provision. First, the reality is that people with and people without intellectual disabilities are often not personally involved in each other's lives. Second, the dominant ethical decision-making framework[13] was a utilitarian and consequentialist framework one. Although many people working in the non-government sector prove daily that, a shift can be worked with care, concern, compassion and a sense of relationship. Nevertheless, the service system does not promote quality relationships between those who care for and those who are cared for - because ultimately the whole system implicitly denies that the people being cared for are persons. Third, I found working in this system difficult, as I was required to adopt an impersonal and so called 'objective and impartial' approach, which meant that I has to make decisions with which I was morally uncomfortable and which risked comprising my core

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[13] I firmly believe this to the dominant moral paradigm in Australia.

beliefs. Fourth, I found that in self-styled modern secular society our sense of what contributes to 'meaning' to our lives tends to be skewed towards our own personal self-interest. For example when parents decided to have a child as part of a meaningful life; this rationale for having a child will most likely, not be a source of happiness, irrespective their cognitive abilities. Because it makes the child into an instrumental means to their happiness, rather than the parents seeing parenting as a dedicated and skilled activity and a means to celebrating life – they're own and their child's. Fifth, although the standard social policy paradigm offers caring an important aspect of any relationship, how are people with intellectual disabilities to experience *goodwill* – i.e., a relationship that is rewarding to the extent that they feel believed in, trusted and valued for who they are as a person in their own right. Sixth, if our society truly believes that each person has equal rights then this implies we must all share a common humanity. However, 'it will mean nothing as long as this imperative does not derive from respect for the miracle of Being[14]'. We need therefore to respect our differences and value the immediacy of our lived experiences. Seventh and finally, the standard paradigm tends to negate our personal character, because we are treated as completely conditioned by our behaviours rather than as persons who are continually changing in response to reflective activity arising from our activity and our personal relationships. The next section outlines how I structure the argument of my dissertation.

Structure of the Argument

In general the method used is broadly phenomenological using actual personal narratives to demonstrate what conditions are both necessary and sufficient to enable human beings to realise their potential, - however limited this may be; and to demonstrate the role of friendship in facilitating our human development. The

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[14] V. Havel, *The Art of the Impossible*, quoted in J. Sacks *The Dignity of Difference*, (London: Continuum, 2003), p. 45.

rationale for the use of this phenomenological approach is that purely speculative theories of human nature do not take account of the historical and existential factors that operate in the development of personal identity, and it is this deficiency which phenomenological analysis of human experience attempts to correct. The structure of the thesis is as follows:

- **Chapter 1** explores the role friendship plays in the lives of people with intellectual disabilities. Personal narratives are presented and analysed and which reveal symbiotic friendships can develop between people with and people without disabilities. These narratives suggest that although individuals may differ in both their chronological age and cognitive capabilities they can form and maintain different types of friendships.

- **Chapter 2** proceeds to a discussion of an objection raised by Bernard Williams to utilitarianism[15], which concerns the notion of integrity. I suggest the failure to act with integrity, is such that at one end of the continuum it offers humans the delusion of thinking that we can live flourishingly without engaging with other humans with mutual tolerance and a respect that acknowledges the diversity of cognitive and emotional capabilities. The other end of the continuum can also express a deficiency, in our emotions such as pity and hate which are directed outwards towards other humans, social structures, and that risks a distortion of others' experiences, fears and interests. Acting with integrity is difficult: it can support and uphold one or it can work against the *status quo*. According to this thesis, it is most fully expressed in actions that facilitate human *philia* to treat each human with respect. Therefore, when we act with integrity we establish social and psychological spheres for other people to live a life that enables their personal flourishing. The chapter also presents a narrative that reveals how the

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[15] J. J. Smart & B. Williams *Utilitarianism For and Against*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 107-118.

integrity of a young person was compromised and suggests how this instance is often replicated in the socio-political realm.

- **Chapter 3** examines and challenges Peter Singer's 'equal consideration of interest principle' as a fundamental premise in the argument that not all humans are equal.

- **Chapter 4** provides a selective overview of the scholarship that supports the central argument of this thesis and proposes a formulation of personal relationships to generate a more inclusive description of friendship. This is based on an appraisal of contemporary accounts of Aristotle's theory of friendships that reveal that humans are social by nature and that friendship is essential to human life. This interdependence of individuals and the personal value that flows to us from our personal encounters means that we are more able to realise our potential as human beings. *Philia* offers us a model of how our human identity can be realized and integrated through the experience of living and interacting together with other people. This chapter (and chapter 6), also offer personal narratives which reveal how symbiotic friendships can develop between people with and people without disabilities. These suggest that although individuals may differ in both their age and psychometric capabilities they can form and maintain different types of friendships.

- **Chapter 5** commences with a discussion of friendship as a complex and dynamic phenomenon and examines the Greek concept of *ousia* to suggest that changes or alternations have the potential to offer unity to an individual's life. Friendship is a voluntary association of mutually acknowledged friends and the reciprocal exchange of *goodwill* and affection that exists amongst friends who share an interest in each other on the basis of utility, pleasure or virtue. This continual exchange means change is ubiquitous in friendships and in a way that support friends to develop greater intimacy.

- **Chapter 6** examines and develops Martha Nussbaum's 'affiliation capability' to explain that although goodwill is not permanently set in any one stage in our development, it is nevertheless possible to observe it as a phenomenon represented in intimacy in friendships.

- **Chapter 7** continues the discussion by examining the nature and scope of human sociability and investigating its positive relationship with human dignity and dependency.

- **Chapter 8** elucidates two Greek concepts, *thymos* and *eros* to distinguish them as primal realities in human life and hence as significant factors in friendship. It is useful to understand *thymos* as the source and life force in emotions such as anger, courage, integrity and goodwill. Whereas, *eros* can be used as a explanatory analogy to illustrate the nature of a personal coming-to-be and the possibility of uniting and reconciling individual emotions in order to understand personal identity as unified harmonious and in equilibrium that is an unified whole.

Conclusion

The conclusion of this study is that a richer understanding of friendship not only contributes to improving our understanding of human nature, but also serves to demonstrate the deficiencies of analyses that depend on the standard individualistic and rationalistic model of human nature.

Chapter 1: A Context to Friendship

Introduction

This chapter highlights the limited forms of friendships experienced by people with and without intellectual disabilities and notes that this social domain is not given priority by services who support people with disabilities. It also outlines the school of philosophy known as personalism to defend the use of personal narratives in the thesis.

Friendship and Disability

The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was adopted in December 2006 and had the highest number of first day signatures in the history of the United Nations[16]. The Convention[17] embraces a broad classification of disability, is focused on human rights and designed as an apparatus to enable all persons with disabilities to enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms. Nevertheless, not all nation states and some individuals in the theoretical sphere universally accept the view that all people with disabilities, including people with severe intellectual disabilities, have the same rights and status as other persons. Since the 1960's, broadly speaking, the dominant service delivery paradigm in liberal democracies for people with all forms of disabilities is underpinned by the social model of disability, which contends that much of the disadvantage associated with disability is socially imposed, rather than inherent to the bodily or mental state of the person. Governments, from the 1960s through to the 2000s, in their political regimes introduced a policy of

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[16] The reference is: http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=150

[17] The Australian Government ratified the Convention in 2008 and then following public consultation, the Australian Government commenced a process (this is ongoing in 2011) to develop a National Disability Strategy to provide a holistic framework to implement the obligation under the Convention.

deinstitutionalisation which, in the majority of cases, enabled people with all forms of disability to live in the general society in a physical housing setting with the aim of enabling people to participate in the generic workforce and access local community resources. Although this theoretical construct has some impact on societies, Crowther[18] argues, there are new and significant challenges encountered by people with disabilities in the societies they live in. He argues that despite the incorporation of a disability rights agenda into the formal mechanisms of Government many people with disabilities remain amongst the most economically and socially disadvantaged in Britain, the focus of his research. Moreover, though some people with disabilities may be employed. Rigg's[19] study in Britain offers a cross section evidence to highlight the lower employment rates and earnings amongst people with disabilities and reveal that the latter are three times more likely to exit or withdraw from work than their peers.

Recently Clement and Bigby[20] completed a longitudinal study on the lives of people with intellectual disabilities who were living in a community setting following many years of institutional care in Australia. Their study describes the everyday life experiences of people who live in 'group homes' (these can be defined as: 'accommodation for four to six people where extensive or pervasive paid staff support is provided to residents, both in the home and when leaving it to use community-based settings')[21]. The book provides a comprehensive overview of people's life experiences reveal how people with an intellectual disability live in their local communities who are supported by generic Not-for-Profit-Service Providers. I exclude the *L'Arche* communities from this discussion, as their model is

[18] N. Crowther 'Nothing Without Us or Nothing About Us?' *Disability & Society,* **22**, 7, 2007, pp. 791-793.

[19] J. Rigg *Labour Market Disadvantage amongst disabled people: a longitudinal perspective*, The Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2005, Accessed and Printed 04/11/2010, http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case/_new/publications/abstract.asp?index=2280

[20] Clement & Bigby, 2010.

[21] Ibid, p. 15, emphasis in text.

fundamentally different to this rostered model of support. In chapter two[22], they describe the experiences of people who live in the group homes and contrast this with the notion of how one might live an everyday life. The author's note:

Some residents were making choices, were engaged in tasks but at levels that fall short of the aspirations envisioned in contemporary social policy documents. This is 'ordinary' as dull; lives characterised by prolonged periods of inactivity, disengagement and boredom[23].

Furthermore, the authors pay attention to the social, personal and physical characteristics that are needed to make a house a 'home'. The interpretation the reader is left with is that the authors do not believe they were in a person's home but in a residential unit because of the absence of a 'home experience' concept. Therefore, they recommend a model developed by Sixsmith[24] that conceives of a home across three dimensions:

The physical home encompasses the structural and architectural style of building, together with the space and amenities that are available. The social home is a place for:

Entertaining and enjoying the company of other people, especially friends and relatives, whilst the personal home is the emotional and physical reference point that is encapsulated by feelings of security, happiness and belonging[25].

The economic, physical and social barriers that people with intellectual disabilities experience identified by Crowther are not a unique feature of his society and are also the experiences of people in other societies. This can be found for example in education policy in Australia. This policy is based on a principle of inclusion – that is, the expectation is that all education personnel will be committed to ensuring the right of all children with a disability to equality of placement and opportunity when receiving his/her education in the classroom. However, a study by

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[22] Ibid, pp. 39-71.

[23] Ibid, p. 70.

[24] J. Sixsmith, 'The Meaning of Home: An exploratory study of environmental experience' *Journal of Environmental Psychology,* **6**, 4, 1986, pp. 281-298.

[25] Clement & Bigby, p. 73.

Forlin *et al*[26] reveals 'inclusion to be extremely stressful for regular class teachers'[27] which in practice leads teachers to be 'less committed...towards their students'[28]. This has a significant impact upon the children's ability to form and maintain robust relationships, be integrated into classroom activities and for the teachers to meet the educational needs of children with a disability.

A further practical example of the civic forms of disadvantage that people with disability can experience may be gathered through their experiences of their daily existence in their local communities. Australian local governments have for some time now been encouraged to develop Disability Action Plans (DAPs) to assist in eliminating barriers and constraints faced by people with disabilities. A study by McGrath [29] overwhelmingly found that local government's focus on eliminating barriers and constraints concerned the built environment and that other constraints faced by people with disabilities, such as the social or organisational aspects, were either briefly addressed or found to be non-existent. McGrath thus summarised that his findings reflect the macro neo-liberal, socio-political environment that supports government non-interventionist practices over and above providing direct services to particular groups in society. That is, local government intervention appears to occur only when there is a public demand and people with disabilities are not provided with sufficient resources to enable them to fully participate in their local communities.

Notwithstanding the educational, economic, physical and social barriers that people with disabilities experience, the central argument here, is that the most

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[26] C. Forlin, J Hattie & G Douglas 'Inclusion: Is it stressful for teachers?' *Journal of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities*, **21**, 3, 1996, pp. 199-218. In another study conducted by Folin in 2001 on potential stressors for Teachers in Queensland, he found that inclusion was not the most significant issue and the Teachers were concerned about their professional competence and the behaviour of the child. C. Folin 'Inclusion: Potential Stressors for Regular Class Teachers' *Educational Research,* **43**, 3, 2001, pp. 235-245. The paper makes recommendations that concern teacher training, ongoing professional development, and support.

[27] Forlin *et al,* p. 213.

[28] Ibid, pp. 213-214.

[29] R. McGrath, 'What do they say they are doing? Thematic analysis of local government' *Annals of Leisure Research*, **11**, 1-2, 2008, pp. 168-186.

confronting obstacles are the social and personal hindrances and the negative non-valuing communications that people with disabilities experience in their personal interactions with non-disabled people. These experiences are also represented through societal institutions and thus the 'person' is regarded only as a 'disabled' person or a 'person with a disability'. Thus systemically in western culture, societal institutions and norms combine to such an extent that they negatively indelibility blemish the dominant paradigm that maintains a personal relationship or *philia* divided world between people with and people without disabilities. This relationship division and non-valuing communication temperament emanates fundamentally from the concept that many people hold, and what our personal and cultural understanding is, of what it means to be a human person. The above this discourse does not provide a historical chronological account of intellectual disability, some reference points are required to offer a context to contemporary thought to this field of inquiry. Intellectual disability albeit the actual functional and/or physical impairment, is for the most part contingent on the use of language, knowledge and power. That is, intellectual disability only takes on meaning in the world of language, knowledge and power. Seymore and Davis observes that as a concept intellectual disability: 'both describes and judges interactions of an individual, a social context, and the culturally determined values, traditions and expectations that give shape and substance to that particular time'[30]. These processes combined enable members of a society to appraise, assess normality and assign social value to people with disabilities, with the least value being ascribed to people with severe intellectual disabilities. Thus the level of technology in society and people with intellectual limited ability to use conventional communication mediums, to command personal and institutional power, aggregate to reduce their functional status and level of respect accorded to them. Reinders[31] presents a concise

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[30] S. Seymour and J. Davis, *Educational Handicap, Public Policy and Social History: A Broadened Perspective on Mental Retardation*, (New York: Free Press, 1979), p. 17.
[31] Reinders, 2008, pp. 24- 28.

and accurate account of how within the domain of disability there is a sub-division that: 'assigns persons with intellectual disabilities in general, and with profound intellectual disabilities in particular, to its lowest ranks'[32].

Thus, in the majority, people with disabilities are powerless by generally being 'cast into devalued roles...under the guise of simply describing them'[33]. This devalued role of people with intellectual disabilities is not unique to contemporary society and can be traced as far back to classical Greek society. For example, Aristotle observes:

As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be law that no deformed child shall live, but that on the ground of an excess in the number of children, if the established customs of the state forbid this (for in our state population has a limit) no child is to be exposed, but when couples have children in excess, let abortion proceed before sense and life have began; what may or may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question of life and sensation[34]

Although this statement[35] will strike discord with the Principles of the UN Convention[36], for the most part, individuals in society do *not* consider people with severe intellectual disabilities, I suggest, as a 'real' human persons. For example, the prior treatment Elise received from the society she lived in did not enable her to live her life to the full. This occurs in spite of the reality, that intellectual disability, similar to any other aspect of humanity, does 'not take on meaning except in the world of language and ideas'[37]. Even with the negative general view of people towards those with severe intellectual disabilities, it is acknowledged that in Australia, contemporary conventions, legislation and public policy do deliver better outcomes for people with intellectual disabilities compared to the same group of people in

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[32] Ibid, p. 26.

[33] E. Cocks and M. Allen 'Discourses of Disability' in *Under Blue Skies,* E. Cocks, C. Fox, M. Brogan & M. Lee (eds.) (Perth, Western Australia: Optima Press, 1996), pp. 282-318, p. 282.

[34] 1335b18-27, *Pol*.

[35] Kittay notes that in Brazil '*infants who fail to thrive'* on their lean nutritive diet are permitted to die and this could be construed as a contemporary version of what Aristotle is arguing for. Eva Feder Kittay *Love's Labour,* 1999, p. 173.

[36] That is the 2006 Convention.

[37] Ibid, p. 283.

ancient Greek society. Though there is a positive shift of emphasis in treatment, there is still a 'continuance of many negative phenomena'[38] that excludes people with severe intellectual disabilities from participating in the life of their local community and society. This segregation emanates from numerous and composite variables that include socialisation processes that unwittingly define a person as a specific type of *being* which alienates and indeed prohibits individuals from developing mutually satisfying friendships. However, the contention here is that what essentially underlies this isolation is the model of a person as a logical entity, a human being whose value is strictly related to the possession of a set of normative attributes. Therefore, there is distinctive value to analysing this construct of a person to assess the wisdom, objectivity and validity of the claim of rationality for moral personhood.

The Rationale for the Use of Narratives

This section uses phenomenological methods to provide clarity on human experiences of surprise, gratitude, invitation, grief, longing wonder, delight, anger and goodwill. The use of philosophy is a resource focused on how it conceives of a human being as a 'person' rather than with the practice of philosophy as a 'theory that is arrived at in detachment from actual self-understandings'[39]. There is a nexus between the real problem encountered by practitioners in disability services and the validity of philosophical doctrine that can be strengthened and confirmed through defining the nature of personhood. It is thus apposite to claim that philosophy can offer a distinct value to including people with severe intellectual disabilities into the category of personhood. Specifically there are two dimensions of philosophy utilised to illuminate this claim that people with severe intellectual disabilities can be incorporated in the realm of personhood. The first dimension draws upon the theory

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[38] W. Wolfensberger 'Reflections on a Lifetime in Human Services and Mental Retardation', *Mental Retardation*, **29**, 1, pp. 1-15, 1991, p. 14.
[39] Nussbaum, 1990, p. 217.

of personalism, and the second dimension from retrieving Aristotle's concept of *philia*.

The school of philosophy known as personalism [40], though currently not prominent, can offer an understanding into the essential nature of a human being and as a treatise; personalism first acknowledges the human being is a mystery that may never be fully explained. Personalism can be divided into four branches –Idealistic, Realistic, Naturalistic and Ethical personalism. The form of personalism used here integrates and reformulates idealistic and ethical personalism to hold that reality is spiritual, mental and personal with prominence being ascribed to the dignity and value of persons in moral decision-making. This form of personalism still maintains the belief that the human being (or person) is the ontological and epistemological starting point for philosophical reflection. Therefore, this personalism is interested in the status and dignity of the human being as a person, which forms the foundational premises for philosophical analysis. Each person has an inherent value, which is derived from the ontological status of his or her *being* rather than one's personal skills and attributes or contribution to society. There are then multi-faceted aspects to each person, each of which accords an individual with personal dignity and these aspects include faculties of intelligence, creativity, freedom and relatedness. People with severe intellectual disabilities are included here they have, as Vanier notes in many different narratives [41], different facilities of intelligence, creatively freedom and relatedness. Personalism also focuses on the social character of human existence and indeed offers prominence to the human capacity to love. As well, for Macmurray[42] to be a person means I am in relation with another: 'their mutual relation to one another, therefore, constitutes persons. 'I' exist only as one element in the complex 'You' and

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[40] The personalist tradition has its roots in nineteenth century thought and can be found in most Western nation states. In Germany, Max Scheler and Martin Buber, in France, Emmanuel Mounier, Jacques Maritain, Emmanuel Levinas, and in Britain, John Macmurray, J. H. Oldham. In the US, George Howison, Mary Calkins, Borden Browne, Edgar Brightman and Josiah Royce promoted the use of personalism.

[41] Vanier, 1972; 1998; 2006; 2007.

[42] *PR*.

'I'[43]. A further aspect of personalism refers to how a person understands the world one lives in and how human dignity is represented. Consequently, each person is understood as an original and unique expression of human nature which in turn offers a *being* status of irreplaceable value and accordingly worthy of personal confirmation in our own right. By 'human nature', I mean our personal distinguishing concepts, including our way of thinking, feeling and acting, these attributes we have naturally through shared species membership. As John Paul II writes of the human person:

If we analyse man in the depth of his being, we see that he differs more from the world of nature than he resembles it. Also, anthropology and philosophy proceed in this direction, when they try and analyse and understand man's intelligence, freedom, conscience and spirituality[44].

Though Aristotle is often read as giving priority to one's rational nature, I will offer another reading of this priority in chapter 6. Here I will turn to his ethical treatises to develop an understanding of our human relational nature. In particular, it is the reading of Aristotle developed by Martha Nussbaum that this thesis follows for this account of a human being is 'thick' and 'not confined to the enumeration of all-purpose means to good living'[45]. Rather the richness of her concept is that it incorporates 'human ends across all areas of human life'[46]. Nussbaum claims that she follows Aristotle blueprint of a good life that has universal validity and moves a human being away from a simple biological entity. Thus the fundamental premise of: 'the thick theory is that we tell ourselves stories of the general outline or structure of life of a human being'[47], which then reveals how a human differs from 'the beasts and the gods'[48]. The narrative in chapter 6 of the relationship between Henri and Adam

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[43] Ibid, p. 24.

[44] John Paul II, *The Social Teachings of John Paul II: The Human Person and Social Structures*, vol II, *R*. Heckel SJ (ed), (Vatican City: Pontifical Commission, 1980).

[45] Martha C Nussbaum, 'Aristotelian Social Democracy' in *Liberalism and the Good*, (eds.) R. B. Douglas, G. M. Mara & H. R. Richardson, (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 203-252, p. 217.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid, p. 218.

[48] Ibid, p. 218.

tells the story of how Henri discovered Adam's humanity through living and caring for him. Indeed Nussbaum follows her construct to develop her first *'approximation ... about what seems to be part of any life that we count as a human life*[49] and notes that similar to other Aristotelian categories, it is not a *'systematic philosophical theory'* rather an 'approximation [that] direct(s) attention to areas of special importance'[50]. The argument that follows offers prominence, or 'special importance', to affiliation; that is, the capacity for human beings to feel connected and concern for other human beings. Therefore it is necessary to retrieve Aristotle's concept of *philia,* and in particular his concept of a *philos* (friend) as a 'second self'[51] to propose and, although this may be unorthodox, that this concept of friendship is constitutive of who we are as persons. In this thesis, Aristotle's ethical treatises[52] and *DeAnima* will receive careful examination to explore this notion of a friend as a second self that relies, first as we have noted earlier in the chapter, on Aristotle's view that *philia* offers individuals self-knowledge. Indeed the more intimate the *philia* the greater the degree of knowledge while also permitting the individuals to engage in virtuous activities. Consequently as Stern-Gillet argues there is a: *'prima facie* case for claiming that the relation of 'other' selfhood; is a source of cognitive, as well as moral, actualisation for those engaged in it'[53]. The claim is, from chapter 1 that, a person is an embodied *being* with the capacity to interpret, modify, transform and understand one's agency through one's personal or intimate experience of *philia*[54]. There are of course a diverse range of civic, social, kinship and personal relations that

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[49] Ibid, p. 219.

[50] Ibid, p. 219.

[51] 1170b6, *NE*.

[52] The *Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics* and *Magna Moralia* all refer to a friend as a 'second' or 'another self' in the most fully realised forms of friendship. *Magma Moralis*, trans. St. George Stock, in *The Works of Aristotle*, (eds) J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925).

[53] E. Stern-Gillet, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship,* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p.49, emphasis in text.

[54] Though I believe Aristotle presents this argument, I am ***not*** suggesting that he would support my conclusion.

have the capacity to influence human existence in numerous respects with both positive and negative corollaries. For example, Bowlby[55] argues that the first three years of a human life is a critical period to such an extent that it distinctively prepares a human being to form, maintain and secure intimate bonds with other humans. This thesis will draw upon and use examples from the object relation's theorists (of which Bowlby's theory is part) and the unique model of support provided by the L'Arche communities that enable persons to experience transformative *philia.*

As a theme of philosophical analysis, *philia* (take this term in this instance, to imply the modern concept of 'friendship') has been precariously examined and has received negligible attention from philosophers until recent times[56]. Pakaluk notes[57] that commencing with Plato each subsequent philosopher who wrote on friendship was influenced by prior traditions and writings, although developed in a philosophical tradition, were also aimed at a general audience. Indeed Pakaluk notes:

Aristotle's work is the only treatise; Telfer's the only professional article. Otherwise one finds dialogues (Plato, Cicero, and Aelred); letters of advice (Seneca); a lecture (Kant); a formalised public disputation (Aquinas); an exhortation (Kierkegaard); and essays of strikingly different kinds (Montaigne, Bacon, and Emerson)[58].

In retrieving the Aristotelian account of *philia*, it will be observed how Aristotle inquiries into whether man [*sic* person] is naturally sociable. Indeed, part of the affirmative argument is that it is through friendship that one can best judge the: 'true character and extent of our desire to live with others when that desire is shorn of all considerations of necessity and utility'[59]. Aristotle's arguments on what are the

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[55] J. Bowlby *Attachment and Loss: Vol 1 Attachment*, (Basic Books: New York, 1969).

[56] Since 1972 with Elizabeth Telfer's paper, the topic has received attention that is more rigorous and a treatise edited by Michael Pakaluk provides a historical synopsis of philosophical thought. Pakaluk, 1991.

[57] Ibid, p. vii-xiv.

[58] Ibid, p. vii.

[59] L. Smith-Pringle *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 4.

elements of a good life are, as Cooper[60] points out, friends; that is, one having friends is 'a necessary part constituent of a flourishing life'[61] and indeed:

One ought to arrange things so that he forms friendships –so that he becomes attached to certain people in ways that are characteristic of friendship, spends time with them, does them service out of unself-interested good will and so on[62].

Accordingly Aristotle's argument relies on the premise that one's concern for a *philos* is not fully influenced and prejudiced by one's positive sentience, rather it is also based on spending time together in order to determine the type of character our friend has.   Therefore, Aristotle argues that *philia* despite being grounded in reciprocal goodwill, requires us to structure relations that enable assessment to ascribe personal worth to a *philos* that gives 'the noblest expression to our sociability'[63].   That is, we need to create opportunities that allow us to show concern for our friend.   Indeed the theme of inquiry common to most philosophical debates on friendship is whether there is naturalness and selflessness in friendship and the relation between justice and friendship, and it will be argued that Aristotle's examination into these constituents offer insight and clarity.   Thus, Aristotle's account of *philia* in Books VIII and IX[64] and Book II[65] provide the reference and primary engagement to these themes of analysis.

Consequently, it is argued that it is *philia*, in all its diverse forms, that accords clarity and meaning to 'what is to be a human person'.   Recall there is three forms of *philia* for Aristotle, which he describes as relationships of utility, pleasure and complete friendship[66], defy precise prescription as to what attracts individuals to develop *philia*.   Moreover, Cooper comments that, our modern term 'friendship' is restricted and Aristotle discussion of *philia* includes:

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[60] Cooper, 1977a.

[61] Ibid, p. 291.

[62] Ibid, p. 291.

[63] Ibid, p.5.

[64] *NE*.

[65] *Rhet*.

[66] In the most general form at 1156a6-1157b4, *NE*.

Persons not bound together by near family ties. ... all sorts of family relationships (especially those of parents to children, children to parents, siblings to one another, and the marriage relationship itself); the word also has a natural and ordinary use to characterise what goes in English under the somewhat quaint-sounding name of 'civic friendship[67].

There was, as noted, a unique pattern to social relationships in Aristotelian society and this radically differs from a contemporary perspective. A comparative relationship configuration is difficult to offer as the modern notion of *philia* in society is relegated by a spectrum of institutions that encourage individuals, on the whole, to demonstrate a depersonalised disposition rather than sentimental actions of altruism. The difference in Aristotle's society compared to our western societies is the classification methodology we often use to assign individuals to different groups. In contemporary society, we have a range of classifications, for example, these include: 'friends', 'family', 'fellow citizens', 'strangers', 'enemies'. Admittedly there is a concern that though there are only two categories in Aristotle's society, 'friends' and 'enemies', they only apply to citizens and those in regal or legislative roles. Nevertheless, these 'friends' sphere represents a generous social universe with five fields of broad relations. These five fields are:

(i)   Real kinship;
(ii)   Ritual kinship;
(iii)   Ritualised kinship;
(iv)   Friendship ritualised; and
(v)   Adoptive friendship.

A representation[68] of this network is presented diagrammatically in Figure 2 overleaf. Underpinning these relations is the virtue of 'sociability' and in chapter 6, I discuss how this Aristotelian virtue is realised by an agent. The rationale for developing the Greek classification is that it permits a unified context to comprehend *philia* as a phenomenon: that is, as a reality experienced by the human senses rather as a role

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[67] Cooper, 1977a p. 602.

[68] Adapted from Pitt-Rivers. J. Pitt-Rivers 'The kith and the kin', *The Character of Kinship* J. Goody (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 89-105, p. 96.

or ritual technique that is mediated through a range of societal produced institutions. For Aristotle, *philia* as a concept incorporates the broader relations that exist between non-kin and complete strangers and the intimate relations associated with personal friends.

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                            ┌──────────────┐
                            │    Philia    │
                            └──────┬───────┘
              ┌────────────────────┴────────────────────┐
        ┌──────────┐                              ┌──────────────┐
        │ Kinship  │                              │  Friendship  │
        └────┬─────┘                              └──────┬───────┘
  ┌──────────────┐   ┌────────────────┐   ┌──────────────────┐   ┌─────────────────┐
  │ 'Real' Kinship│  │ Ritual Kinship │   │ Ritualised Kinship│  │   Friendship    │
  └──────────────┘   └────────────────┘   └──────────────────┘  │  Unritualised   │
                                                                 └─────────────────┘
  ┌────────────────────┐
  │ 'Adoptive' Friendship│
  └────────────────────┘
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Philia

Kinship

Friendship

'Real' Kinship

Ritual Kinship

Ritualised Kinship

Friendship Unritualised

'Adoptive' Friendship

Therefore as Aristotle uses the term *philia* is relevant to this inquiry since the way he uses the term incorporates caring, maternal and citizenship relations[69]. As Aristotle recognises on occasions, individuals with an analogous disposition may be mutually responsive to each other, and similarly individuals who differ in personal and other attributes may also be reciprocally attracted[70]. In essence, different degrees of practical and emotional bonds of mutual and equal *goodwill*, affection and pleasure define all these forms of personal relations or *philia*[71]. There is a matrix to friendship. Though meaning can be gleaned through the diverse forms of *philia*, the human agency in what Aristotle terms 'complete'[72] *philia* is what enables the most radical forms of transformation to occur. I read Aristotle as arguing that it is when we positively direct our motivations, desires and actions to our friend and our friendship that we will be most changed.

Conclusion

This chapter highlights that though in the theoretical sphere in western nations all adults are viewed as equal citizens and accorded equal status, people are not engaged in friendships with people without intellectual disabilities. The rational for using personal narratives was outlined and presented in the context of the philosophical theory of personalism. This field of thought supports the common western *endoxa* that all people are equal and modern interpretations (especially feminist) of Aristotles' account of *philia* can incorporate *philia* between people with and without intellectual disabilities. In the Introduction, I stated that the moral decision-making framework contributed to the absence of friendships and in the next chapter, I critique this moral

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[69] P. Bowden *Caring*: *Gender-Sensitive Ethics,* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 63; S. Schwarzenbach**,** *On Civic Friendship,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 37.

[70] 1155a33-1155b-16, *NE.*

[71] 1155b16-1156a5, *NE,* this generic definition is also offered by Badhwar 1987, p. 1, and Sherman, 1987, p. 589.

[72] 1156b7, *NE.*

code through for its failure to adequate incorporate how we act with integrity and compassion.

Chapter 2: Limitations of Utilitarianism anthropology

Introduction

This chapter briefly outlines the theory and value of utilitarianism although it's primary purpose is to critique the theory through the notion of integrity and compassion. Bernard Williams's[73] concern with the notion of integrity and how this may be construed when applied to practical relationship quandaries in the theory of utilitarianism has relevance to the analysis of friendship. Indeed, his objections have particular relevance to dilemmas relating to relationships and personal decisions that individuals have to make by virtue of living in society with other individuals particularity when conflict occurs. Another aspect of these difficulties is how compassion is linked with integrity. Moreover, though it is difficult to act consistently with both, integrity and compassion, these notions are most fully realised in actions that facilitate the kind of human *philia,* which treats each human being with respect.

Utilitarianism

Bertrand Russell offers an insightful reason into why ethics is necessary to human life: 'Ethics is necessary because men's desires conflict'[74]. He proposes that while this conflict may be internal to a person and emanate from their egotism with 'most people more interested in their own welfare than in that of other people'[75], nevertheless, as Russell notes, narcissistic motives may be subservient in 'social conflicts'[76]. What ethics has to offer, according to Russell, is a dual approach to this conflict resolution:

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[73] J. J. Smart and B. Williams, 1973, pp. 107-118.

[74] B. Russell *History of Western Philosophy*, (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1979), p. 745.

[75] Ibid, p. 745.

[76] Ibid, p. 745.

(a) the possibility of a standard to differentiate good and bad desires and (b) the means to affirm or sanction what promotes the good or deters bad desires.

Williams [77] (in developing a critique of utilitarianism) offers two brief narratives of a 'George' and 'Jim' to describe common difficulties that one may face when making an ethical or moral decision[78]. William's example is whether 'George' should sell his labour to an Employer with unscrupulous credentials. This, with slight modifications might apply to possible quandaries for some people in current western society. (For example, people might have reservation about seeking jobs with employers who may not care about reducing their carbon footprint, or purchase or source goods and services in nation states that do not conform to standards for internationally accredited workplaces, nor renumerate their labour according to minimally global sanctioned employment conditions). William's second example is of 'Jim', being offered the privilege of killing a rebel prisoner in order to keep the other prisoners alive. (This may also be similar to situations in current armed conflict. For instance, authorising personnel to torture prisoners, maybe to their death, to gain information relevant to threats od national security or with the potential to kill their citizens, allies and/or innocent people. These instructions directly imply are the belief that personnel are not morally or legally culpable if 'national' security concerns dictate such action)[79].

In his analysis of utilitarianism William suggests, though it is difficult to be prescriptive, one might argue that 'George' ought to work for an unscrupulous Employer as he will be more honourable than other candidates and in the long run, the results will be more beneficial. Similarly, Jim ought to kill one prisoner to save lives

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[77] Smart & Williams, 1973, pp. 97-100.

[78] My account of William's example is brief and suffices to say he provides more substantive details to present his case, which, I do not take exception to and indeed are needed to meet the purpose of clarifying the advantages of utilitarianism.

[79] http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/ Printed and Accessed 13/12/2010

of the rest of the prisoners[80]. This would seem to follow, William's argues, since most people immediately grasp the logic and relevance of the underlying principle of utility in the moral decision making processes.

The principles that direct the suggested course of actions to achieve the good in the above examples emanate from the ethical theory of utilitarianism. From the nineteenth century, there have been a number of forms to the theory but the central argument is that the morally right action is the action that generates the most good[81]. To assist an agent with evaluating whether an action is good, a criterion of utility can be applied either to a separate act (act-utilitarianism) or by formulating a general rule that applies to actions of certain types (rule-utilitarianism). Act-utilitarianism requires an agent to calculate whether the moral consequences of each particular act (and therefore the rightness or wrongness of the action is assessed by the balance of benefit over harm of this particular question). Rule-utilitarianism requires us to consider whether what we propose to do can be formulated as a general rule that will promote optimum happiness for the majority. The focus is on rule-observance and the agent must deliberate on the moral consequences of generally observing a rule. The ultimate answer to a moral dilemma depends upon whether as a general rule an action results in greater good than harm.

In its modern form, utilitarianism is more commonly referred to as consequentialism; the right or wrong action (or type of action) is determined completely by the beneficial or harmful consequences it produces. The theory is able to surmount the egotist challenge to which Russell[82] refers, by incorporating the rule that any action must maximise the *overall* good, that is, the good of other people *as well as* one's own good. Indeed, as is often noted Russell's godfather was John Stuart

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[80] Smart & Williams, 1973, p. 99.

[81] For example, Act Utilitarianism (Jeremy Bentham), Rule Utilitarianism (John Stuart Mill), Two Rule Utilitarianism (R. M. Hare) and Welfare Utilitarianism (Peter Singer). Peter Singer in Practical Ethics provides a good example of welfare utilitarianism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); this text will now be referred to as *PE*.

[82] Russell, 1979, p. 745.

Mill. Furthermore, utilitarianism is characterised by adoption of impartiality and agent-neutrality as a means to enable one to resolve moral conflicts. The theory endorses the view that everyone's happiness counts the same; when good is maximised, it is the good measured *impartially*: one's personal good is equivalent to any individual's good. Therefore, the maxim to promote the overall good applies to all individuals: the good is for everyone and thus everyone has a role to play in promoting its longevity.

The initial advocates of this theory introduced these radical concepts to their reform of 19th society and arguably paved the way for significant social change for a large proportion of people. Extending political representation to all citizens over the age of eighteen, offering women opportunities to participate politically and socially in society and the outlawing of slavery are instances where the theory has, as most people would argue, had a positive impact on western societies.

The theory's importance is still evident in contemporary western society with 'welfare utilitarianism' incorporating both 'act' and 'rule' utilitarianism in a manner that uses individual welfare as the basis for judging the state of society. Furthermore, 'welfare utilitarianism' promotes the satisfaction of the individual's long-term interests rather than mere preferences[83] and it receives, on the whole a favourable reception from political and academic audiences. Peter Singer's writings clearly demonstrate that everyone lives in a 'global community' [84] and this recognition challenges any egotist desires to withhold extending our concern beyond our own immediate community. He argues that it is: 'still quite wrong – for those in one country to think of themselves as owing no obligations, beyond that of non-interference, to people in another state'[85]. From his early writings Singer[86] offers

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[83] P. Singer, *A Companion to Ethics*, (Cornwall: Blackwall Publishing Co., 1991), p. 244.
[84] P. Singer, *One World: The Ethics of Globalisation,* (Melbourne: The Text Publishing Co., 2002), p. 215.
[85] Ibid, p. 215.

cogent arguments to support the view 'that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad'[87] and if it is within one's power 'to prevent something very bad from happening... we ought morally to do it'[88]. Singer applies what he writes about in his own life. For example, he donates considerable financial resources to people in developing countries whose economies are more dependent upon capital orientated market based economies. Furthermore, he has campaigned against the mal-treatment of non-human animals and enabled many people to implement a new approach to the way non-human animals are reared, used in experiments, and harnessed as a food source. Numerous people[89] attest to changing their eating habits and lifestyles following his description of the ill treatment of non-human animals. However, as Singer states his arguments and those of other moral thinkers, be they consequentialist or other, are by no means universalised for: 'reason alone [has] proved incapable of fully resolving the clash between self-interest and ethics, [and] it is unlikely that rational arguments will persuade every rational person to act ethically[90]. It could be for this reason that Singer argues that what is needed is for people to take an 'ethical attitude'[91] or approach to living their lives. This approach is fundamentally a move to live an unselfish life, that is, to act in such a personal way as to be: 'concerned for the welfare of our kin, members of our group, and those with whom we may enter into reciprocal relationships'[92]. This concern is, mostly aimed at all rational people who live on our planet, although some people might extent the group to include non-human animals. Many reasons may exist for people taking on this way of living that does not necessarily imply altruism and

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[86] P. Singer 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality' *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* **1**, 1972, pp. 229-243.
[87] Ibid, p. 230.
[88] Ibid, p. 230.
[89] P. Singer, *How are we to live? Ethics in an age of self-interest,* (Melbourne: The Text Publishing Co., 1994), pp. 189-191.
[90] Ibid, p. 278.
[91] Ibid, p. 279.
[92] Ibid, p. 198.

Singer[93] goes on to suggest that maybe Aristotle[94] was right in proposing that the practice of this belief in acting for others' good is what leads to its adoption as a way of living. This discussion, albeit brief, has hopefully offered some insight into the importance of utilitarianism as a persuasive ethical doctrine for assessing the rightness and wrongness of our actions and how we can and ought to contribute to the overall good and human happiness.

Nevertheless, the theory has a weakness, which contributes to prejudicial decision making about what it means to be a 'person', affecting people on the margins of society. This follows from its failure to adequately tackle the nature of human *relationally*. Utilitarianism can contradict its aim to enable individuals to be: 'concerned for the welfare of our kin, members of our group, and those with whom we may enter into reciprocal relationships'[95]. The argument of this thesis is that, the majority of people only create limited forms of friendships and personal relationships (*philia*): these relationships easily correspond to those described by Aristotle as based on utility or advantage[96] and accordingly the nature of their intimacy and activity is restricted. It is necessary to examine some aspects of friendship to elucidate the nature of human relationally and how this capacity for different types of relationships is essential to all human beings as persons. All human beings[97] have the potential to interpret, modify and change themselves and their attitudes through their experience of *philia* and their understanding of what it means to be a human being as a 'person-in-relation-to-other-persons'. These relational encounters can influence our human existence and accord clarity and meaning to what a person is or what 'personhood' means in practice.

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[93] Ibid, p. 200.
[94] 1103a15-1103b25, *NE.*
[95] Singer 1994, p. 198.
[96] 1156a6-1157b4, *NE.*
[97] Human being is used in this context as a generic term than encompasses all members of the *homo sapiens* species.

An analysis of relationality also generates a more diverse way of describing personal identity. I contend that personhood is less adequately defined by 'rationality' and 'intellectual prowess' than by our capacity to experience and to *be* in a relationship with other individuals. It follows that individuals are not bound within inflexible associations of dependence or independence, conformity or deviance. Rather does our personal identity rest primarily on a full realisation of our relational nature and capacity to change. This approach suggests a more inclusive view of our shared humanity by unlocking and exposing processes that are particularly useful to understanding our relationships with individuals who are marginalized, such as people with severe intellectual disabilities.

People with severe intellectual disabilities are often used, without their permission or giving them an opportunity to reply, as an example of a group to which the full meaning of personhood or personal rights do not apply. It is impossible to determine exactly 'how and why' individuals develop interpersonal relations but in reality, there is a wider diversity of such relations. As Aristotle recognises on occasions, individuals with similar dispositions may be mutually responsive to each other but individuals who differ in personal and other attributes may also be reciprocally attracted[98]. In essence, different degrees of practical involvement and emotional bonds of mutual and equal *goodwill*, affection and pleasure define all these forms of personal relations or *philia*[99]. Accordingly, some of the narratives that are used in this thesis set out to demonstrate that different degrees of practical involvement and emotional bonds of mutual and equal *goodwill* serve to define personal relations between people with and people without intellectual disabilities.

Nevertheless, there is wide variety in the nature and degree of human *goodwill* and these are distinguished from the egotist attitudes and actions described by Singer

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[98] 1155a33-1155b-16, *NE*.

[99] 1155b16-1156a5, Ibid, this generic definition is also offered by Neera Kapur Badhwar 'Friends as Ends in Themselves' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XLVIII, No.1, September 1987, pp. 1-23, p. 1, and Sherman, 1987, p. 589.

and Williams. As a person, one will need to develop and maintain a considerable number of utilities and pleasure based forms of *philia* and these are necessary conditions for different individuals to co-exist in society. A feature of our social life is the conglomeration of heterogeneous individuals in different societies and in distinct geographical areas and yet there is a solidarity that exists and is profoundly imprinted on individuals who share in a family or and natural grouping. However, this solidarity has the potential to be transformed by a number of variables and one key variable is mobility, (cultural, geographical, physical and social). Social mobility has the capacity to disconnect and stratify individuals by ethnicity, ideology, and philosophy. It is possible that the interpersonal detachment that occurs in the absence of familiar and natural groupings has a significant impact upon the personal relationships and friendships of individuals who inhabit any society - thus these forms of *philia* are appropriately understood as functional and meeting an individual's psychological needs[100]. However, these are not the only forms of relationships that exist, and many people also believe they also hold 'complete'[101] or 'primary'[102] friendship with another person that offers considerable meaning to their lives. Cooper[103] uses the term 'friendship of character'[104] to describe this form of *philia* and this expression accurately represents the type of relations being described:

Such friendships exists when two persons, having spent enough time together to know one another's character and to trust one another (1156b25-29), come to love one another because of their good human qualities[105].

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[100] Abraham Maslow, 'A Theory of Motivation' *Psychological Review,* 1943, **50**, 4, pp. 370-96, proposed a two-tier system of needs distinguished by higher and lower needs. The first tier is where our physical and physiological needs are met and the second or 'higher' tier is where our social and psychological needs are met. *Philia* would fall into this category.

[101] In the most general form at 1156a6-1157b4, *NE.*

[102] This is the term Stern-Gillet uses for Aristotle's most perfect or complete form of *philia*, Stern-Gillet, 1995, p. 37.

[103] Cooper, 1977b, pp. 290-315, and N. Sherman *The Fabric of Character*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 124-125.

[104] Sherman 1989, p. 629.

[105] Ibid.

The prevalence of these forms of foundational *philia* will by their very nature be limited. However, we live in a 'global community'[106] and, more frequently, we can and do develop less than perfect meaningful and emotional relationships with an array of people. Although friendships may be less than ideal, (i.e., perfect in terms of meeting all our needs, desires, and so forth at all times), this is no reason to act in a way that does not attribute intrinsic value to these friendships even if it is difficult to discern an ethical or moral in them.

The example used in this chapter describes circumstances where there are ethical quandaries about 'what one ought to do' that relate to the character or the agent (s), and about whom Singer believes there are 'those with whom we may enter into reciprocal relationships'[107]. Previously, the Introduction and chapters 1 have demonstrated we can enter into reciprocal friendships with people with intellectual disabilities. The interaction reveals that what is of greatest significance to an agent is their essential, identifying nature or character and whether this will be compromised, by considerations of mere utility. Williams pointed out this weakness in utilitarianism in the examples of 'Jim' and 'George' through the effect the theory has on personal human integrity through negative responsibility. That is: 'if I know that if I do X, O_1 will eventuate, and if I refrain from doing X, O_2 will, and that O_2 is worse than O_1, then I am responsible for O_2 if I refrain voluntarily from doing X'[108]. Williams uses his examples to take a particular approach to criticising utilitarianism: for example, in analysing Jim's decision he notes there are other forms of analysis that could be scrutinised. In his *Replies*[109], he responds to critics who object to his conclusion with regard to his second example as: 'downright unacceptable in George's case'[110]. He

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[106] Singer, *One World*, 2002, p. 215.

[107] Ibid, p. 198.

[108] Smart & Williams, 1973, p. 108.

[109] B. Williams, 'Replies' in *World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams,* (eds.) J. E. J. Altham and R. Harrison, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 185-219.

[110] Ibid. p. 211.

suggests that respondents have not 'heard'[111] another set of questions that follow from the narratives. Williams states these questions as:

1. What do you think?
2. Does it seem like that to you?
3. What if anything do you want to do with the notion of integrity?[112]

Williams maintains this weakness 'is in part my fault'[113] with the questions not being examined or considered in the right way. Scherkoske[114] notes that integrity has a nebulous nature; when exhibited by agents it is as often expressed as a 'loyalty-exhibited virtue'[115], however it might be more universally acclaimed as 'an important feature of agency'[116]. Scherkoske suggests Williams's sees, integrity is an agent acting congruently with what values, principles or commitments, they respect as essentially moral or ethical. However, for Williams this concept of integrity is *not* designed as a 'counter-example model'[117] as critics may have taken it to imply. Rather it is:

As a quality, that many people prize and admire. It is in such ways that people put the notion to ethical use. My claim was that if people do put it to ethical use, they cannot accept the picture of action and of moral motivation that directs utilitarianism requires- and here were two stories[118] to remind them, perhaps in different ways, of that truth[119].

Williams critique of utilitarianism through the concept of integrity is I suggest a valid criticism that has 'largely escaped attention'[120] and this plausibly follows from: (i) utilitarianism's difficulty in reconciling personal and aggregate interests that are incongruent, and (ii) integrity's central constituents: partiality, fidelity and loyalty. There are two means to understand this difficulty in reconciling interests:

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[111] Ibid.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Ibid.

[114] G. Scherkoske 'Integrity and Moral Danger' *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, **40**, 3, 2010, pp. 335-358.

[115] Ibid, p. 336.

[116] Ibid, p. 352.

[117] Williams, 'Replies', 1995, p. 211.

[118] This refers to the stories of 'George' and 'Jim'

[119] Ibid, p. 212.

[120] Scherkoske, p. 337.

First, personal or individual preferences are like a cul-de-sac: a situation in which further progress towards an agreed course of action always reverts to a single solution; though the preferred solution may be valid for the sake of everyone it ought to comprise and unite with other different preferences to satisfy the long term interest. Second, this builds on this approach and reveals that in some instances, though agents may have a long-term commitment to a project, there commitment may not be able to be incorporated in a societal project. As Williams's states:

But what if it [a different project][121] conflicts with some project of mine? This, the utilitarian will say, has already been dealt with: the satisfaction to you of fulfilling your project, and the order of your doing so, have already been through the calculating device and have been found inadequate[122].

Ultimately, this could have escaped scholar's attention following the lack of prominence offered to *philia* in human lives. A possible way of understanding (ii) integrity's central components of partiality, fidelity and loyalty is, I propose, through the notion of compassion[123].

Compassion

Compassion can and should be extended to anyone who is suffering, for acting with integrity as a human being, means a acting a means of acting with compassion. Although compassion is '*a ubiquitous human phenomenon*'[124], Nussbaum also indicates, that for many people compassion is an issue and may be imprecise because: '*from whose point of view does the person who has compassion make the assessment*

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[121] By 'projects' Williams means 'commitments' to principles, values and actions. Smart & Williams, p. 110-116.

[122] Ibid, p. 115-116.

[123] I will draw upon the work on compassion developed by Martha C Nussbaum, as I believe she provides an excellent academic overview of the philosophical sociological and psychological aspects of this emotion and though drawn from antiquity her account maintains currency. The works I use are: Martha C. Nussbaum *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), especially chapters 6-8; Martha C Nussbaum 'Compassion: The basic emotion' *Social Philosophy and Policy,* **13**, 1996, pp. 27-58; Martha C Nussbaum 'Compassion and Terror' *Daedalus*, **132**, 1, 2003, pp. 10-26.

[124] Nussbaum, 2001, p. 301.

of "size"?'[125]. Nevertheless, in utilitarianism, an agent is supposed to ignore personal interest for aggregate interests and, though easy to state, this principle may not be so easily realised for utilitarians. Because, showing partiality, fidelity and loyalty would conflict with their commitment to utilitarian principles. A utilitarian approach would suggest an agent's personal connection or partiality; fidelity and loyalty will always be marginal and linked to one's self-interest. However, this utilitarian account differs from portraits of human integrity, in which an agent's actions and words are congruent with their emotional and rational thoughts, and which consists of a love or respect for truth as the only faith worth having. This is not to imply that faith is the equivalent of certitude rather it gives endorsement to the agent who believes what they say and acts according to their beliefs, though this belief may be wrong[126]. Indeed more commonly, 'people with integrity' are often held to be champions that alter societal beliefs and preferences both within and across nation states. Consider for instance, most people would affirm the relationships formed and sustained by Jean Vanier and Henri Nouwen, amongst people with and people without intellectual disabilities. Many of these relationships provide examples of how much these men have developed their sense of integrity and compassion following their friendships with people with intellectual disabilities.

Russell argues: How can an agent dispense with a 'project or attitude round which he has built his life'[127], since the agent's personal history has contributed to this liking and preference for something or somebody? However, the people just mentioned demonstrate a commitment to a project that identifies them with particular preferences and accordingly with a particular lifestyle. This 'project' is a cohesive part of their entire life and unlike a tradable commodity, it is rather for the agent(s) a personal distinctiveness, and 'the point is that he is identifiable with his actions' that

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[125] Ibid, p. 308-309, parenthesis in original text.
[126] Consider the example of the fanatical Nazi that Williams discusses, Williams, 'Replies' 1995, pp. 212-213.
[127] Ibid, p. 116.

follows 'from projects and attitudes'[128]. Moreover, an agent(s): 'takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is about (or in some cases, this section of his life – seriousness in not necessarily the same as persistence)'[129]. Therefore, a specific agent(s) is committed to **this** project rather than any project and to:

Demand of such a man, when the sums come in from the utility network which the projects of other have in part determined that he should just step aside from his own projects and decisions and acknowledge the decision which the utilitarian calculation requires. It is to alienate him in a real sense from his action in his own convictions[130].

The request then for an agent to adopt the utilitarian's project neglects the agent's *raison d'être,* his own *being* and spiritedness in such a way that 'it is thus, in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity'[131].

This aspect of integrity as a form of compassion will now be given some attention for, as far as I am aware, it has not been provided with sufficient consideration and it may further support William's reservation about utilitarianism. As Williams indicates, the purpose for introducing integrity into the debate focuses it as a *'*quality that many people admire'[132]. Again, the three questions he proposes we consider when faced with a difficult ethical decision are:

1. What do you think?
2. Does it seem like that to you?
3. What if anything do you want to do with the notion of integrity'[133].

If we are to seriously consider these questions and put them to 'ethical use', this means that accordingly to Williams, we are unable to accept the truth of *'*the picture of action and of moral motivation that directs utilitarianism*'[134]*. While Williams uses two fictional stories to clarify the meaning of integrity, I now introduce a personal narrative which is in the public domain, to consider how the integrity of a specific

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[128] Ibid, p. 116, my brackets.

[129] Ibid, p. 116.

[130] Ibid, p. 116.

[131] Ibid, p. 117.

[132] Williams, 'Replies', 1995, p. 212

[133] Ibid p. 211.

[134] Ibid, p.212.

adolescent was compromised through what most likely was a utilitarian decision-making process[135]. The narrative is detailed as [136]: an adolescent boy was humiliated and tortured for 3 days by a group of young men cumulating with the aggressors being sentenced by the court to 80 hours unpaid work and a 3 month curfew[137].

I would argue the young man's integrity and dignity, and indeed possibly the court's integrity were violated - he is treated as an object, dehumanised by his captors who inflict physical and sexually 'grotesque'[138] acts on him. The court's lenient decision amounts to a display of *apatheia,* - the Stoic condition of non-feeling. The assault on the boy with a disability appears to be unprovoked with the youths offering 'boredom'[139] as the causal explanation for their actions. As the journalist also remarks, this may seem ludicrous – how could this occur? Indeed as one reads further commentaries one must wonder if this was fiction – surely in a liberal democratic society this form of behaviour warrants a more serious set of sanctions if for no other reason than to deter others from participating in such action? Apparently, not though there is an appeal to the Attorney General to review the case to re-apply the law in such a way that is fairer to the young boy who was assaulted by the youths. Of course, there are both multiple stakeholders and sets of complex and dynamic interactions which a court will determine its judgement. Indeed, it may be impossible to determine an exact explanation for the event or the reasoning behind their decision.

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[135] Determining the moral motivation of the Magistrate and jury is impossible. However, the offenders were sentenced under the 'Alternative to Custody' program. The primary aim of the program is to develop alternative sanctions for young adults who would normally receive a custodial sentence. The program supports the 'long-term' interest rather than immediate preferences and this can be argued to follow from a utilitarian approach. http://www.gm-probation.org.uk/what-we-do/intensive-alternative-to-custody.php Printed and Accessed 31 December 2010.

[136] http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/oct/16/crime-against-the-disabled Printed and Accessed 3/12/210.

[137] Ibid, p. 1.

[138] http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-stories/2010/10/12/thugs-who-tortured-an-autistic-boy-escape-jail-115875-22627314/, Printed and Accessed 31 December 2010.

[139] Ibid, p. 1.

Nevertheless, given the outcry from the adolescent's family and other people[140], this might suggest that the decision was an isolated aberration into the administration of justice. However, everyone does not share this view. Thus, it was argued that the youths' actions are not an isolated occurrence but rather part of a series of 'hate crimes', and labelled so by MENCAP[141], (the leading British Charity working with people with intellectual disabilities). MENCAP argues that such people are targeted and assaulted for no other reason than having a disability. For our purpose, we do not intend to explore MENCAP's or other organisations allegations here. Suffice to say that this type of crime occurs more frequently than one might imagine in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. It appears that each of the victims has their integrity and dignity as a person compromised, and in some extreme situation, the assaults have arguably caused the untimely death of some victims[142].

Given the need for compassion towards the young man with a disability, let us now return to the discussion of compassion. Philosophers have argued both for and against the salience of the emotions such as compassion in ethical decision-making. Let us now return to compassion[143]. Nussbaum, in one of her treatises on international justice, clearly articulates the dilemma for compassion:

Is compassion, with all its limits, our best hope as we try to educate citizens to think well about human relations both inside the nation and across national boundaries? Or is compassion a threat to good political thinking and the foundations of a truly just world community?[144]

I think her argument relating to compassion can be applied to the principles of goodwill in human relationships as well. If compassion fails to motivate personal,

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[140] Ibid, p. 1.

[141] http://www.mencap.org.uk/page.asp?id=1954, Printed and accessed 5/12/2010.

[142] From example: http://www.mencap.org.uk/news.asp?id=11929 Printed and accessed 5/1/2010.

[143] Though I draw upon the account developed by Martha Nussbaum, it is important to observe that she develops her argument from Aristotle's account of 'pity' in the *Rhet* (1385b13-). Nussbaum notes that though the term *eleos* is frequently translated as 'pity' she translate it as 'compassion' because in her view this is more appropriate. Martha C. Nussbaum, 2001, p. 306, notes 17.

[144] Nussbaum, 2003, p. 12.

social, political, legal, social morality, and is not honoured as: 'the emotion most frequently viewed with approval...and most frequently taken to provide a good foundation for rational deliberation and appropriate action'[145], then the most frequent response to the question 'what if anything do you want to do with the notion of integrity'?[146]. Our response will be little or nothing. For the demonstration of integrity is the main way, we are educated in one in the 'qualities that many people admire'[147]. Although one may sympathise or empathise with another's misfortune, sorrow or unhappiness, it will remain as a latent and inert affinity if it is not expressed in our personal integrity. However, it could be that we believe the contrary: that is through an emotional experience we can feel that we have done: 'something morally good... without having to take any of the steps *to change the* world that might involve them in real difficulties and sacrifice'[148]. Moreover, intense emotional states can affect the agent's character to such an extent that they are de-sensitised and depersonalised to another's plight:

[That] Does not mean that compassion by itself has bad tendencies; it means that people are frequently too weak to keep their attention fixed on a course of action, and that a momentary experience is frequently much easier for them than a sustained commitment[149].

Should we then support the critics of compassion and maintain that the emotional impediments to 'stable and lasting concern for humanity'[150] are insurmountable and therefore the Kantian notion of impartiality or the utilitarian ideal is more appropriate? Possibly not, the following analysis of the emotion of compassion may help address the difficulties raised by the antagonists of an ethic of compassion.

Compassion is first and foremost the expression of sympathy for the suffering of another person and often includes a desire to help alleviate that suffering. This

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[145] Nussbaum, 2001, p.299.
[146] Williams, 'Replies, 1995, p. 211.
[147] Ibid, p. 212
[148] Nussbaum, 2001, p. 399, emphasis in original.
[149] Ibid, p. 399.
[150] Nussbaum, 2002, p. 12.

'suffering' is not of the sort that occurs when for instance, one breaks a fingernail. Rather, it refers to the emotion experienced by one person when they judge another person to be in a reasonably grave and adverse circumstance. Compassion differs from sympathy in that it is defined as the ability to enter into or understand, or to share someone else's distress. It is distinguishable from empathy as the latter is the ability to identify with and understand someone else's feelings or difficulties. Nussbaum refers to this first aspect of compassion as 'the judgement of seriousness'[151]; compassion *is* to be directed to the person whose distress is judged to be serious. There is a two-fold dimension to seriousness: (i) the agent needs to give thoughtful and careful attention to the other's plight from their point of view; and (ii) they need to assess this personal perspective pragmatically. Nussbaum notes[152] that in the majority the cases the degree of seriousness relates to how long-lived the suffering is – e.g., in physical assault or the absence of supportive friends. The young boy in the narrative experienced intense physical assault over three day. However, the court's decision does not appear to have taken sufficient account of his plight according to this criterion of seriousness. It may of course be that the court determine that the 'seriousness' of the criminal's actions as less significant as if the actions was directed against a boy without a disability. Nussbaum's second constituent of compassion is discerning whether 'the judgment of nondesert'[153] applies, that is, does one believe the agent's suffering results from some unfortunate or personal irresponsibility? It would be generally agreed that the citizens of the region did, not cause the Earthquakes and tsunami that occurred in the South Pacific Ocean in 2002, and hence the devastation caused by the tsunami generated a global response of compassion towards those affected by the natural disaster. If agents believe that people are responsible for their own misfortunes then they are less likely to receive compassion for them and

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[151] Nussbaum, 2003, p. 14.
[152] Nussbaum, 2001, p. 307.
[153] Nussbaum, 2003, p. 15.

Nussbaum cites the work of Candace Clarke as evidence[154]. Clark conducted her studies in the United States and his research indicated that people typically only have compassion for events caused by bad luck or circumstances beyond the victim's control[155]. There is no reason to suggest the disabled boy caused the youths to attack and physically assault him and therefore it is surprising that this element of compassion was not offered to him by the court. Further there is no reason to believe the pain experienced by the boy was any less severe than if he was a boy without a disability.

Nussbaum makes an interesting observation namely that we can also feel compassion for an agent participating in criminal activity, if: 'we think circumstances beyond their control are at least in good measure responsible'[156] for what they do. Is this what the court in the narrative thought about the perpetrators, or do they not view the victim as they might view a boy without a disability? Maybe so. Nevertheless, the recorded response by the young men for their actions was 'boredom'[157]. Accordingly, this might be why the relatives of the victim and MENCAP felt they needed to appeal to the higher legal authority for a second opinion on the court's judgement in this case.

The third element to compassion for Nussbaum is 'the judgement of similar possibilities'[158]. This criterion emphasises that we all have the potential to experience the suffering of others through our common vulnerability. Nussbaum notes this criterion, may not be as important as the one previous discussed as this would contribute to our regarding the suffering of other beings only from an anthropocentric point-of-view. However, empathy or 'imagined similarity' does not have to be reliant

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[154] Ibid, p.15 referencing the work of C. Clarke *Misery and Company: Sympathy in Everyday Life* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997).

[155] Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 312-314.

[156] Ibid, p.15.

[157] http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/oct/16/crime-against-the-disabled Printed and Accessed 3/12/210.

[158] Nussbaum, 2003, p. 15.

on conceptualising species-specific sufferings. Rather most people do show compassion for nonhuman animals as the feedback to Singer suggests[159].

The final element [160] to compassion for Nussbaum is 'the eudemonistic judgement'[161]. This is based on the experience of the emotion and o*nly* occurs if the person(s) is: 'seen and valued as an important part of the mourner's life, her scheme of goals and projects'[162]. Nevertheless, the experience of the emotion may lead one to think this is another form of egoistic hedonism described by Singer[163] and Russell[164]. However Nussbaum denies this eudemonistic element *has* to occur. She proposes that while it is through this element that one 'recognises one's own related vulnerability'[165]. This enables one to transcend self-interest because: 'It is on the basis of our common vulnerability to pain, hunger and other types of suffering that we feel the emotion'[166]. Thus one is able to feel compassion for people in pain who are not directly part of our lives and indeed to cross species barriers on the understanding that all sentient beings' have the ability to feel pain. By way of summarising her approach to compassion, Nussbaum suggests that any emotion that concerns 'living beings' will in the majority of us, be influenced by the experience of 'wonder'[167]. For Nussbaum 'wonder' is the source of our ability to identify with another as a human being, to be curious and amazed at the beauty of life and for the very existence of other beings. Here she expresses the personalist notion of a human being an individual who is a mystery and not fully comprehensible.

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[159] Singer, *How are we to live?* 1994, pp. 189-191.
[160] Nussbaum notes that this does *not* follow from the tradition that she has presented and is rather related to our human experience of emotions.
[161] Nussbaum, 2003, p. 15.
[162] Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 318-319.
[163] Singer, 1994, p. 198.
[164] Russell, 1979, p. 745.
[165] Nussbaum, 2001, p. 319.
[166] Ibid, p. 319.
[167] Ibid, p. 321.

Nussbaum[168] notes the degree of compassion exhibited by any agent(s) can be in error and it will be useful to consider if any errors in compassion were made in our narrative and if so from where do these emanate? Errors may be made in relation to each of Nussbaum's criteria. In the first case an agent may misjudge the seriousness of the plight of the other and this may occur as an excessive or deficient reaction. Clearly the appeal by the families and MENCAP is based on the claim that the Judge did not take the assault seriously enough. Moreover, as is suggested, the perpetrators may have been offered compassion rather than the injured party. A general search was made, for cases similar assaults on young boys not resulting in death and executed by young men, but this could not be determined through the English court system. However, it is worth considering two other legal cases. The first is where a man murdered his servant after weeks of brutal assaults, which is of interest because of the differential power relation between the two men. The offender was a Middle Eastern Prince and the 'victim' his manservant.

While different from my example, it is important to note is that most people with intellectual disabilities stand in an unequal power relation to people without an intellectual disability even if they are not in an employee-employer relation. Sobsey's[169] account of abuse of people with disabilities provides us with personal examples of how they stand in a variety of unequal power relations in different life domains. He suggests guidelines for Service Professionals for methods of investigation and effective responses to allegations of abuse.

In the above case, of the Prince and his Servant, the Prince was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum of 20-year service. The Judge in his summary noted that: 'he was so completely subservient to you. [whom you] treated as a human

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[168] Nussbaum, 2003, p. 16.
[169] D. Sobsey *Violence and Abuse in the lives of People with Disabilities*, (Baltimore: Paul H. Brooks Publishing Co., 1994).

punching bag... [And] the injuries were so severe that they were beyond medical treatment'[170].

The second case involves a young black Englishman, who was murdered by a group of white youths, the young men were not charged with any crime and the matter was negatively highlighted to such an extent that an inquiry known as the 'Lawrence Inquiry' was held and conducted by Sir William MacPherson. McGhee's[171] analysis of the Inquiry proposes that it was 'a crucial event in the history of race relations in the UK'[172] and:

The hate crime that resulted in the murder of Stephen Lawrence, and the inquiry into the murder and police investigation of it, has resulted in the beginnings of a re-coding of race and a redrawing of the boundaries of toleration in British society, in which racism and racists rather than ethnic minority groups are increasingly being presented as social problems (or diseases) to be removed from society[173].

However, as in the case of the young boy with an intellectual disability, in the case of Stephen Lawrence, his family and friends and many other people believed that compassion was not exhibited. It is possible following these cases that errors of judgement followed from the third criterion of compassion ('the judgement of similar possibilities') and from our 'obtuseness about social justice'[174] and judges who are removed from robust forms of *philia* with people who hold influential positions in society. This group of people include those who are defined as people who live on the margins of society. It would appear that people with intellectual disabilities are, at the extreme end of this continuum - as their cognitive and communication skills are less developed than other people in society. There may be other people who meet this

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[170] R-v-Saud, Sentencing Remarks of Mr Justice Bean, 20th October 2010, Printed and Accessed on 3/1/2011.
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/saud-sentencing-remarks-20102010.pdf.
[171] D. McGhee *Intolerant Britain?: Hate, Citizenship and Difference*, (London: McGraw-Hill Education, 2005), pp. 15-40.
[172] Ibid, p. 15.
[173] Ibid, p. 15.
[174] Nussbaum, 2003, p. 16.

criterion: people with Alzheimer's disease and people in a coma, who may also not be cognitively in a position to represent themselves.

We generally undertake limited forms of engagement with other people and these relations exhibit, on the whole, advantage and pleasure. Indeed, when there are no obvious forms of mutual advantage to be gained between people then the relation will exhibit minima, if any, forms of goodwill between the parties. As a result, this is the form of relations that exists, on the whole, between people without and people with intellectual disabilities. Accordingly, it is difficult for the former to make well-founded decision(s) about the best form of social order and justice for the latter, and this also limits the extent of compassion shown to them.

In relation to Nussbaum's final criterion the 'eudemonistic judgement', if we, as individuals without an intellectual disability, are outside of 'complete'[175] or near 'complete'[176] *philia* with individuals with intellectual disabilities how can we offer real compassion or make pertinent decisions about their lifestyles? Although it is true we do not share the common vulnerability of an intellectual disability, we do share with all human beings the immediate common vulnerability of having the 'need for care in our ordinary dependency and vulnerability'[177] as Kittay describes it. This will be discussed further in chapter 6.

While Nussbaum's analysis of compassion has direct relevance for us as individuals, it also has critical salience to our public life and indeed it should be included as part of the vision for just distribution of benefit to society? Why do I argue this should be the case? The virtue of 'sociability' (discussed in chapter 6) is integral to all human relationships and community-life, as it concerns how we should present

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[175] 1156b32, *NE.*
[176] Ibid.
[177] Kittay, 2005, p. 118.

ourselves and treat other people and expect to be treated by others. This virtue[178] concerns the most fundamental aspect of human character and activity - the relational or social: this facilitates human association and 'to suzên'[179]; that is, to flourish as a community and to live well together so as to experience *eudaimonia*[180]. In expressing compassion we offers consolation and to offer consolation is one of the most important and demonstrative ways to validate our care for another living being. Life, as most humans know it, has different degrees of pain, sadness, and loneliness - such that one can often wonder what to do to alleviate the immense suffering in the world, as so often sensationally reported in the daily media. However, what is always possible is to maintain one's own personal disposition to offer consolation and thus compassion. We can and must console those in our immediate environment: the young person without robust *philia*; the family whose house burned down; the soldier who was wounded, the teenager who contemplates suicide; - and the lonely old man who wonders why he should stay alive. The offer of compassion will not always take away the pain but it can mitigate the adverse circumstance of life. It means to be available and to say, "You are not alone, and I am with you. It is together we can carry the burden. Therefore you do not need to be afraid for we share a common humanity and I am here with you for the duration"[181].

This is compassion and I suggest we all need to give it as well as, at times to receive it. By expressing it in our personal lives we act with integrity and enable compassion to be articulated in the public domain. This is integrity because is a demonstration of the possession of a firm set of principles and willingness to act on

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[178] I follow Gotlieb's argument that Aristotle intends this quality to be a virtue. P. Gottlieb, *The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 38- 51.

[179] That is, living together in such a way that this incorporates regular activity, which promotes and sustains an emotional and physical association.

[180] According to Aristotle, everyone agrees that happiness is living well but they may disagree about what constitutes happiness. 1095a18-20, NE.

[181] Or indeed, I want to share your life and although we may not reside in the same house, we are friends and will live together as in n.517. That is, 'to suzên'.

them. Accordingly, compassion is connected to sociability in such a way that it enables us to imagine the suffering, problems, pain and misfortune of other persons and this influences the development of our character and approach to the world and to other people who live and share this world with us. Although current education systems and other public institutions in western societies already seek to express a set of values and a vision of just distribution, it is purely an utilitarian approach to justice that directs us to act contrary to our personal feelings and convictions that all people are in need and deserve compassion. Ultimately, a just society must be expressed in personal and societal integrity. This is what I suggest was lacking and ought to have occurred for the young boy with a disability who was assaulted. The expression of real compassion is one means of acting with integrity.

Conclusion

While utilitarianism remains a dominant moral paradigm in western societies I have argued that it fails to adequately tackle our human relationally and what it means to be a human being in the real world of human inequalities. I have highlighted two potential limitations, when the theory is applied to human relationships by analysis and application of the concepts of integrity and compassion. This dominant moral paradigm appears to give preference to concepts of what is beneficial that reflect the interests of the privileged in society and its judicial processes and these discriminates in favour of the majority rather than people in disadvantaged groups. This precedence given to the criterion of utility, over the more general human consideration, [based on compassion and integrity] reduces our ability to exercise real understanding of disadvantaged people and those with intellectual disabilities. Compassion is a virtue that facilitates our ability to open ourselves to all humanity. While compassion makes sense amongst equals; it also accomplishes a kind of equality between the one who is suffering and the person who cares for them; and they become equal by sharing together in the suffering. In this sense, compassion is a matter of mutual respect. The

next chapter continues the challenge to utilitarian methodology and rebuts the

assertion that ends are priority over personal relationships.

Chapter 3: Critique of Singer's Account of Human Interests

Introduction

The present age is a time of great controversy about the human being, controversy about the very meaning of human existence, and thus about the nature and significance of the human being[182].

This chapter critically assesses the primary ethical principle used to determine whom counts as a person developed by Peter Singer, Jonathan Glover, and Jeff McMahon. Specifically it uses a phenomenological method to analyse an actual narratives used by Peter Singer, as a proponent of the dominant conception of personhood. This view or concept of a person is, as I will argue, inadequate.

Equal Consideration of Interest

Singer advocates 'equal consideration of interest' as ethical principle to be employed in decision making about other human beings. His criterion presupposes ethical consequentialism as its starting point and makes certain *a priori* assumptions about human beings as possessing a particular defined set of psychological attributes. Glover[183] argues that as a society 'we need general principles to show us how to act in specific cases'[184] and this is so because 'the specific cases also act as tests of the adequacy of our principles'.[185] Therefore, if the principle of equal consideration of interests is judicious it will demonstrate a robustness that enables individuals to determine problematical moral or ethical quandaries.

Singer proposes 'the application of this principle [equal consideration of interest] when lives are at stake are less clear'[186]. He and McMahon[187] both accept the

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[182] K. Wojtyla, http://www.thepersonalistproject.org/ Accessed and Printed on 21/12/2010.

[183] Glover, 1977.

[184] Ibid, p. 20.

[185] Ibid, p. 20.

[186] *PE*, p. 72.

principle and present an argument that endorses the attributes of rationality, autonomy and self-consciousness[188] as the defining feature of a person. The lives of such persons are of intrinsic value and therefore their desires warrant value, respect and consideration, accordingly they have a claim to life, justice and well-being[189].

In order to advance his view of a person, Peter Singer[190] first considers, and then rejects the notion that human life is sacred for all individuals. For example, an individual who takes a *being's* life often presents a protection argument to institutions and indeed professionals in societies accept that allowing a baby with an intellectual disability to die is a plausible justification to taking of this life.

Wolf Wolfensberger details some aspect of the life of man with an intellectual disability called Bill F[191]. Bill F died because of a series of neglects by medical personnel. Wolfensberger acknowledges that some people may argue that 'Bill's life was atypical'[192]. However, from his thirty year experience of working with people with disabilities, he knows these 'kinds of things that happened to him [Bill] happen to innumerable others, though there are also innumerable variations, and an infinite creativity, in the perpetration of [these] atrocities[193]. Moreover, for some disability academics like Wolfensberger, this is an act that he terms 'deathmaking' – this refers to 'actions or pattern of actions which either directly or indirectly bring about, or hasten, the death of a person or group'[194].

Singer offers a two-tier classification of humans – the first is a biological species: *Homo sapiens,* the second category: *persons.* Membership of the *homo sapiens* is to be defined by distinct scientific criteria and includes all humans,

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[187] McMahon, 2002, pp. 145-165.

[188] For example, Singer, 1979 p. 131.

[189] Ibid, p. 82. McMahon also provides an argument in J. McMahon, 1996, pp. 3-35.

[190] I am using the concept of a person he develops in *PE*, 1979, pp. 72-92.

[191] W. Wolfensberger 'Bill F.: Signs of the Times Read From the Life of One Mentally Retarded Man' *Mental Retardation*, **27**, 6, 1989, pp. 369-373.

[192] Ibid, p. 371.

[193] Ibid, my brackets.

[194] W. Wolfensberger, 'A Most Critical Issue: life of death' *Changes: An International Journal of Psychology & Psychotherapy,* **8,** I, 1990, pp. 63-73, p. 63.

including foetal life, young children, people with severe intellectual disabilities and adults. However, only individuals in the second tier are *persons* – who are defined (following John Locke) as 'a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places'[195].

Singer then presents a set of attributes, derived from Joseph Fletcher[196], that reflect how 'a real human being' demonstrates 'truly human qualities'[197]. The eight characteristics that Singer utilizes are:

(i)   Self-awareness;
(ii)   Self-control;
(iii)   A sense of the future;
(iv)   A sense of the past;
(v)   The capacity to relate to others;
(vi)   Concern for others;
(vii)   Communication and
(viii) Curiosity[198].

There are other characteristics omitted by Singer, are:

(ix) Minimal intelligence;
(x) A sense of time;
(xi) Control of existence;
(xii) Change and changeability;
(xiii) Balance of rationality and feeling;
(xiv) Idiosyncrasy and
(xv) Neo-cortical function.

The full section of this text from Locke[199] also supports many of the attributes described by Fletcher and is therefore congruent with his understanding of a person. Nevertheless, at the core of a person for Singer is 'a rational and self-conscious being'[200]. In this line of argument, a human infant is not a person.

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[195] J. Locke *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, (ed) A. D. Woozley, Fifth Edition, (Glasgow: Collins, 1976), p. 211.
[196] J. Fletcher 'Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man' *The Hastings Centre Report*, **2**, 5, 1972, pp. 1-4.
[197] Ibid, p 75
[198] *PE*, p. 75.
[199] Ibid, Chapter XXVII, section 9.
[200] *PE*, p. 76.

Based on Locke's notion of a person, McMahon develops his 'Time-Relative Interest Account of the Wrongness of Killing' to clarify the wrongness of killing individuals who are conscious but not autonomous. According to this account, the wrongness of such killing depends on the individual's interest in one's future, and this interest, in turn, depends on two considerations: first whether these are goods that would have accrued to the individual in the future; and second the strength of the prudential relations obtaining between the individual at the time of the killing and at the time these goods would have accrued to the individual. In particular the Time Relative Interest account argues then when assessing this interest, future goods should be discounted to reflect reductions in the strength of such relations. In other words, McMahon's account of the badness of death evaluates death in terms of the effect that it has on the person time relative interests *rather than* on the value of the person's life as whole. Kittay[201] criticises to McMahon's Time Relative Interest by suggesting two possible errors in this methodology. First the wrongness of killing humans 'yields serious counterintuitive conclusions'[202]. Plainly speaking, one will experience less remorse at killing an animal than a human being. Second, the account ignores 'the role [of] social relations in the constitution of identity'[203] with the social relations being:

[a] Matrix of relationships embedded in social practices through which relations acquire meanings. It is by virtue of the meanings that the relationship acquire in social practices that duties are delineated, ways we enter and exit relationships are determined, emotional responses are deemed appropriate and so forth[204].

There are two plausible limitations to principle of equal consideration of interest as it refers to their view of a person. The fist criticism is that if we are to be completely impartial, than any individual can be substituted for another, for the

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[201] Kittay, 2005, pp. 100-260.

[202] Ibid, p. 105.

[203] Ibid, p. 110.

[204] Ibid, p. 111.

purposes of the argument[205] and to give 'equal consideration to the welfare of our family and the welfare of strangers'[206]. The second criticism suggests that this concept of the person fails to adequately address the relational nature and human 'sociability'[207] of persons. [The following chapters will take up this theme to suggest that goodwill and sociability; the desire and ability of humans to personally engage with each other, is equally omnipresent in human nature as rationality].

Returning to the first criticism of Singer's *et al,* ignoring the relational nature of our specifically human interactions may mean that we fail to exhibit the 'reciprocated goodwill'[208] or 'doing kindness'[209], characteristic of the intimate *philia* described by Aristotle – his nameless virtue that governs universal personal relations[210]. Moreover, the principle of equal consideration of interest fails to give satisfactory consideration to first the nature of emotional attachment in personal relations, and second the ethic of care - in particular, relations developed through experience of caring for vulnerability people[211].Singer's forms of *philia* pay insufficient attention to the ethical and human dimension of all Aristotle's forms of *philia*[212] and omit the human faculty to augment personal need, animal inclination, and to love others as ends in a generous way.[213].

There are four dimensions that characterise the equal consideration of interest principle and the first section of this chapter explores the nature of partiality as a

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[205] What I mean by this term is to be unduly influenced and to give preference to an individual. Some Philosophers use the term "impersonal" (S. Darwall *Impartial Reason,* New York: Cornwall University Press, 1984), or "objective" (T. Nagel *The view From Nowhere*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) to imply the same sense. Rawls (J. Rawls *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) is amongst the Philosophers who use the term impartial.

[206] *PE.* p. 23.

[207] Nussbaum argues this concept is equally prominent as rationally as a sufficient condition of personhood. *FOJ*, p. 159.

[208] 1155b34, *NE*, Ibid. This phrase completes the sentence where Aristotle states that: '*Friendship is said to be reciprocated goodwill'*.

[209] 1381b35, Ibid.

[210] 1126b10-1127a15.

[211] Kitty, 1999, pp. 21-109.

[212] 1155b1-10, *NE*.

[213] *FOJ*, 2006, p. 159.

challenge to the principle. The second section analyses the notion of *philia* from a unique dependency perspective. The third section considers a dimension of the mother-child relation, and finally, the fourth section builds upon the arguments in the prior sections and suggests considering particular family relations as one dimension to a 'second self' continuum.

The Four Dimensions

Singer suggests that what is central to ethical decision-making is the 'universal point of view'[214]*,* and the notion of impartiality. He argues that one ought to appeal to independent moral reason(s), and *not give particular and exclusive* emphasis to one's own desires and interests in ethical decision-making. Singer does offer practical guidance and support to our moral problem solving[215]. Singer suggests four important dimensions to the principle of equal consideration of interests that warrant analysis[216].

1. 'we give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our actions'[217].

2. The principle prohibits making our readiness to consider the interests of others depend upon their abilities or other characteristics, apart from the characteristic of having interests[218].

3. The principle: 'may be a defensible form of the principle that all humans are equal'[219].

4. The principle is a: 'minimal principle of equality in the sense that it does not dictate equal treatment'[220].

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[214] *PE*, p. 12.
[215] Ibid, p. 19.
[216] Ibid pp. 14-47.
[217] Ibid, p. 19.
[218] Ibid, p. 20.
[219] Ibid, p. 21.
[220] Ibid, p. 21.

As previously mentioned the principle of equal consideration of interest emanates from consequentialist theory[221] that assesses or judges an action as morally right or wrong depending upon their consequences. The consequences are empirically verifiable and in making moral decisions we are required to judge actions by the net amount of pleasure or happiness that they produce for the outcomes should contribute to the common good. This requires:

The elimination of purely individual reference to persons, nations, and so on, and hence the denial of moral privilege for an individual moral speaker or for what he belongs to'[222]

This could suggest individuals are inter-changeable, lack personal integrity and one is to emotionally limit personal attachment bonds. That is, our friends and their preferences are replaceable and to be assessed regularly for adherence to the equal consideration of interest principle. Indeed this is how we act with integrity; loyalty and personal commitment is less important attributes than consistency with impartial considerations.

The rationale for this consequentialist approach, and its claimed value, is that it suggests a neutral and honoured position from which to make moral decisions from basic principles. Individuals will not be unduly influenced by their own preferences, desires, emotions, or passions when one is required to make a difficult moral decision. Nevertheless, respect for Singer's 'the universal law'[223], does not necessarily imply that it is inappropriate to demonstrate personal commitment to other people. While it is valid to argue that moral principles must apply equally to all individuals, this does **not** necessarily lead to the impartiality thesis. As Cottingham[224] notes this 'is no more than a principle of consistency' rather than 'the automatic starting point for

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[221] I note here that deontology also has an underlying commitment to impartiality, that is, to the claim that all people are equally worthy of concern.

[222] J. Mackie *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (London: Penguin, 1987), p. 152.

[223] *PE,* p.11.

[224] J. Cottingham 'Ethics and Impartiality' *Philosophical Studies* **43,** 1983, pp. 83-99.

contemporary ethics'[225]. As a 'principle' Singer's 'principle of equal consideration of interest' is a starting point for philosophical reflection rather than a prescription for action. Cottingham also notes that one could choose any moral principle (he uses the example of 'egoistical principles') to enable universal ethical decision-making[226]. Moreover, Singer's proposed methodology might not be actually achieved by any individual as one is 'to begin with, biased'[227]. For example, Rachel[228] makes the point that this notion of interacting in an impartial manner can be traced to Mo Tzu in China who contentiously argued that an 'all-embracing love'[229] that rebuffs personal and intimate attachment should regulate human relationships.

The evidence from human psychology is that the instinct of a parent to care for his or her own child is 'hard wired' into our species (and also most animals). Typically[230], as individuals, we do not live in an isolated vacuum; rather we live and connect with an many individuals, and though economically[231] it may be costly for an individual, the individual may actually have 'enhance [their] social and community relationships'[232] through their single status. Adherence to the principle of equal consideration of interest may enable: 'people quite reasonably reach their conception

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[225] *PE* , pp. 84-85.

[226] Cottingham, 1983.

[227] M. Friedman *What Are Friends For: Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and Moral Theory*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 10.

[228] J. Rachels 'Morality, Parents, and Children' in *Person to Person* (eds.) George Graham and Hugh LaFollette, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), pp. 46-63.

[229] Ibid, p. 46.

[230] I do not mean to imply that Individuals who live in separate dwellings are isolated; one may or may not be. What I am arguing is that Individuals are and need to be connected to their immediate community, environment and economy. There are a number of individuals, for diverse reasons, who will limit their participation and engagement in society.

[231] D. deVaus & S Richardson 'Living Alone in Australia: trends in Sole Living of Those Who Live Alone, Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, 2009, permanent URl http://www.apo.org.au/node/19708.

[232] M. Lewis, *Unilever Family Report: Home Alone?* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2005), p. 7.

of the good, i.e. of happiness, from the lives [they lead]'[233]. There is a cost and this is, for some individuals disturbing[234]. The cost is that individuals are inter-changeable:

A world in which I accorded everyone at large the same sort of consideration which I accord to myself, my children and my friends would not be 'one big happy family'; it would be a world in which affection no longer existed because the sense 'specialness' has been eliminated[235].

First Dimension

The intuitive and most compelling argument that opposes the equal consideration of interest principle is our personal history and relations with other individuals and especially individuals where one shares a family or intimate relation. However, are these claims subjective and trivial 'agent-relative' demands and to be treated as 'agent-neutral' claims with other 'equally worthy, aims with which one shares no history?'[236]. I will argue that particular aims can and indeed are personally aligned, and yet valuable if we are motivated to act on them in a positive manner[237]. Moreover, if we have a personal history with the particular aim, then we have an even more important reason to act in another person best interest. Consequently, we have a reason to care about this aim more than others might have and this occurs because:

One has reason to respond to a history of pursuing some aim with a concern for that aim, and one's pursuit of it, that is similar to the response that one has reason to give that aim apart from such a history, but that reflect the distinctive importance of a personal history[238].

This argument of Kolodny's might be accepted as being valid for individuals with a personal history but what of family relationships amongst children and parents and in

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[233] 1095b14, *NE.*

[234] There are a number of people who present a critique of this principle, for example, M. Friedman,1993; J. Cottingham, 1983.

[235] Cottinghman, Ibid, p. 90.

[236] These terms are used by Niko Kolodny in his article 'Which Relationships Justify Partiality? The Case of Parents and Children' *Philosophy & Public Affairs* **38**, 1, 2010, pp. 37-75, p. 45.

[237] See also, ibid.

[238] Ibid, p. 46.

particular with infants and their parents? Laing essay [239] establishes a credible rationale to understand family, kinship and human identity relations as comprising a layered set of ingredients that place significant weight on human beings who:'indeed bear on their very definition as sons and daughters, siblings, kin, on their race, appearance, and medical inheritance'[240]. Though Laing's paper is a study of midlife chronologically aged adults and their desire for kinship relations, there is merit to her claim that identity arguments cannot be easily dismissed as immaterial relations to one's personal history and identity. The biological relations we had with our mothers and fathers at birth are important to us, who they were as persons and their personal histories can be of great importance to us during the course of our own lives. Laing's article presents results from a number of studies to support the conclusion that 'biological connections matter to human beings, and bear on their very identity'[241].

First, she cites the studies from Sants[242] in the United Kingdom that detailed the loss experienced by adopted children prior to this cohort being able to access their birth information. Second, Laing notes the importance placed on blood relatedness in both literature and art, and quotes Vellman's paper[243], that further argues that human beings ascribe importance to one's biological ties to the extent that it offers one a life meaning. Third, the United Nations convention on the rights of the child also recognises the need of children to know their parents of origin. Laing notes that this universal recognition has facilitated legislation in some liberal-democratic societies (e.g. United Kingdom), to enable individuals to restore 'social bonds' or indeed to 'repair lost relationships'[244],[245].

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[239] J. Laing 'Artificial Reproduction, Blood Relatedness, And Human Identity' *The Monist,* **89**, 4, 2006, pp. 548-566.
[240] Ibid, p. 548.
[241] Ibid, p. 562.
[242] H. Sants 'Genealogical Bewilderment in Children and Substitute Parents' *British Journal of Medical Psychology,* 37, 1964, pp.131-141.
[243] Laing, 2006 p. 550.
[244] Ibid, p. 551.

It might be useful here to consider an example of how the equal consideration of interest principle is applied to decision making and might 'give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our actions'[246].

Singer[247] in discussing the value of human life quotes a case study from a medical journal[248] about a mother and her infant daughter with Down's syndrome, which he uses to serve as an example of poor decision making according to equal consideration of interests. The first point to observe is that the case study is one of eight presented by Shaw and centres on who has the right to "consent" to medical treatment for infants with severe intellectual disabilities. Shaw believes that 'parents must participate in any decision about treatment'[249]. However, it is possible to argue that the impression the reader is left with at the end of the article is that the decision should rest with the medical profession. Shaw[250] and Singer[251] both refer to Fletcher[252] as a relevant source to understand what the term 'human person' means, a standard that the infant does not meet. The case details are:

This infant, with Downs's syndrome, intestinal obstruction and congenital heart disease, was born in her mother's car on the way to hospital. The mother thought that the retarded infant would be impossible for her to care for and would have a destructive effect on her already shaky marriage. She therefore refused to sign permission for intestinal surgery but a local child-abuse agency, invoking a statue was able to obtain a court order directing surgery to be performed. After a complicated course and thousands of dollars' worth of care, the infant was returned to the mother. The baby's continued growth and development remained markedly retarded because

[245] This reunion was strikingly portrayed in the motion picture 'Oranges and Sunshine' which details the personal histories of men and women who were sent to Australia from Great Britain in the 1960/70s. In many instances the children and mothers were misinformed by legal authorities about their concern for each other and the narratives reveal how emotionally attached the families remained to each other despite thinking they either were not cared about or the other party was dead. Oranges and Sunshine, See-Saw Films, released October 2011.

[246] *PE*, p. 19

[247] Ibid, p.73.

[248] A. Shaw 'Dilemmas of "Informed Consent" in Children' *The New England Journal of Medicine*, **289**,17, October 1973, pp. 885-893.

[249] Ibid, p. 890.

[250] Ibid, p. 889.

[251] *PE*, pp. 74-75.

[252] Fletcher ,1972, pp. 1-4.

of her severe cardiac disease. A year and a half after the birth, the mother felt more than ever that she had been done a severe injustice[253].

Singer's[254] notes a number of points without elaboration: First the baby life was maintained contrary to her mother's wishes; second there was a large financial cost; and third the child could not live an 'independent life, or to think and talk as normal humans do'[255]. Though Singer does not state here[256] that the child does not have right to life, he could be interpreted as implying this in the rest of his argument.

Does Singer's argument adequately address the equal consideration of interest principle? This could be doubted, for a more complete consideration of interests would include further possibilities and concerns[257].

First, we might ask: did the mother and father know their child had Down's syndrome prior to her birth? If yes, then what form of counselling and/or support or information was provided to the parents? Typically parents are shocked when they realise their child will have a disability and family members require a level of sensitivity if their interests are given due regard. It is most commonly recognised that receiving the news that one's child will have a disability will be a traumatic experience for the parents. It may indeed precipitate a crisis reaction that can be defined as: a temporary state of disorganization characterised by individuals' inability to cope with the situation using customary methods of problem solving, and the potential for a radically positive outcome[258]. Researchers, for some time, in the field of disability have been interested in the phenomenon of disclosing a child's diagnosis in an attempt to elucidate the role of aetiology in parental adaptation, stress and

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[253] Shaw, 1973, p. 887.

[254] *PE*, p. 73.

[255] Ibid, p. 73.

[256] I am unsure if he uses this example and makes any comments on the moral decision of keeping the baby alive in any of his other works.

[257] This could be my error and Professor Singer might have considered these points in further studies or lectures, however I have been unable to find any reference to this case study.

[258] J. Ormerod & E. Huebner 'Crisis Intervention: Facilitating parental acceptance of a child's handicap' *Psychology in Schools*, **25**, 4, 1988, pp. 422-428, p. 423.

satisfaction[259]. Indeed, evidence suggests that the means used to inform parents about their child's condition affects both their approach to the situation and also their early interactions with the child[260].

Second, having a baby in a car is most likely be a traumatic event for which both parents and the infant will most probably require some treatment that is higher than what parents receive when their child is born under normal circumstances. I say this because most women's expectations in western societies is that she will have a child in a hospital, or in environment where she will be with competent medical personnel who will support her to give birth to her child with as much ease as possible.

Third, the case study, used by Singer, is from the United States and in 1972 individuals with disabilities were primarily housed in institutional care. Indeed, the 'normalisation principle', as developed by Bengt Nirje[261], that was to internationally dominate the philosophical basis of service provision was yet to exercise a significant influence on the structure of service delivery. Finally, it will be useful to remember there are a number of different power relations always operating for individuals in relationships. It is possible for the mother, the primary carer in this relation, to experience 'emotional vulnerability'[262]. This can be described for the mother as experiencing an intense insecurity in her intimate relationship with the birth of her daughter: it's likely she was experiencing shame and embarrassment with the birth of her daughter, anxiety about her economic circumstances and worry over her capacity

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[259] C. Drillien and E Wilkinson 'Mongolism – When Should Parents be Told' *British Medical Journal*, **542**, 2, 1964, pp. 1302-1320.

[260] L. Quine & J. Pahl '1st Diagnosis of Severe Handicap – A Study of Parental Reactions' Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology, **29,** 2, 1987, pp. 232-242.

[261] B. Nirje 'A Scandinavian Visitor looks at U.S. Institutions in R. Kugel & W. Wolfensberger (eds) *Changing Patterns in Residential Services for the Mentally Retarded*, (Washington: President's Committee on Mental Retardation, 1969), pp. 51-57.

[262] I take this term from an article by Ty Landrum. T. Landrum 'Persons as Objects of Love' *Journal of Moral Philosophy,* **6,** 2009, pp. 417-439, p. 424.

to afford medical treatment for her daughter[263]. The above considerations are directed to the mother (the key person mentioned in the case study) and a fuller discussion will also include issues directed to the father and other interested parties.

Singer appears to suggest the principle is applied to this life decision-making process as for him the baby should have been allowed to die. However, the above discussion implies that the application of his principle of equal consideration of interests fails 'when lives are at stake'[264]. Accordingly, the principle may fail the principle's first dimension of 'equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our actions'[265].

Second Dimension

The second dimension of the principle suggests that one: 'prohibits making our readiness to consider the interests of others depend upon their abilities or other characteristics, apart from the characteristic of having interests'[266].

This element of the principle provides a significant challenge to one's personal relations with other human beings. Nevertheless what follows criticizes the dimension from a personal relations perspective with the notion that on occasion(s) one will be in a 'unique dependence'[267] relationship with another human being. If the principle of equal consideration of interests applies to moral decision-making, then how this impacts on human beings needs to be sufficiently robust to explain why one should ignore 'our readiness… and… other characteristics[268]'.

We proceed to a consideration of a particular aspect of our personal relations with other people. James's concept of 'unique dependency' is the notion that there are

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[263] I suggest this concern given, that health care in the United States is and always has been privatized and it is an expensive commodity.

[264] *PE,* p. 72.

[265] Ibid, p.19.

[266] Ibid, p.20.

[267] This term is taken from Scott James in S. James 'Good Samaritans, Good Humanitarians' *Journal of Applied Philosophy* **24,** 3, 2007, pp. 238-254, p. 254.

[268] *PE,* p. 72.

instances where a specific individual will depend on another individual, and only this *being*, for help. James explains the relation as follows:

Someone X is uniquely dependent on someone Y just in case Y's refusal to aid X practically assures X's imminent or continued suffering. In a situation in which X is uniquely dependent on Y and Y, aware of this fact, refuses to aid X when doing so is within Y's power, then Y plays a crucial role in any adequate explanation of why X suffered when he did[269].

James notes that a continuum exists in the dependency relation that can range from a utility dependency relation (e.g. a need for transport) through to a psychologically dependent relation (e.g. a need for emotional support)[270]. The article explores the different relations between a Good Samaritan and a Good Humanitarian using the example of someone proposing to donate valuable vintage boots to charity[271]. James argues the concept of 'unique dependency'[272] offers the Good Samaritan a stronger and additional rigid motivation to act over a motivation or justification to donate to humanitarian relief efforts.

James's account gives priority to a moral belief; that for human beings, 'unique dependency'[273] is of such significant value that it is indelibly linked to: 'our belief in the dignity of persons, and by extension, our relationship to other persons'[274]. James's examples return to his vintage boots narrative where the individual is reliant on the Agent as the *only* individual who can assist, and he illustrates his argument by describing and developing the work of Joseph Raz[275]. Here James suggests that

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[269] James, 2007, p. 240.

[270] Ibid, p. 251.

[271] The narrative is: an individual decides to give a pair of vintage shoes that are of high monetary value to humanitarian relief, and on his journey to realise the value of the boots, he meets a child who will drown unless one rescues the child from the water which in turn will wreck the boots, Ibid, p. 239.

[272] Ibid, p. 240.

[273] Ibid, p. 240.

[274] Ibid, p. 243.

[275] Ibid pp. 243-245.

precedence for 'unique dependency'[276] is derived from three tiers to human existence: incommensurability, dignity and dependency.[277]

At one extreme end of the continuum when one is dependent upon an individual for life, saving support then the notion of distinctive reliance makes 'moral common sense'[278]; this is opposed to moral decisions concerning 'readiness' and 'characteristics'[279]. Another implication of this example, which appeals to essential 'facts about human relationships'[280], is the aspect of 'incommensurability', namely that: 'the proper appreciation [of] one's relationship to another person involves a general reluctance to see that relationship as open to exchange'[281]. Accordingly, if P and P1 have this type of relation (for example, parenthood, intimate friendship) then neither will want to replace the other. This may occur as a result of the appreciation one places in one's relationship and the belief that the individual is of inestimable value[282] and of has special significance for us as persons.

Vanier provides an example of one of his *philia* with one of the people he lived with called Eric in the 1980s, which could fall into Aristotle's perfect friendship category. He observes how, while he provided personal care to Eric, there were:

Occasion[s] when a deep communion could be established; when we would touch his body with gentleness, respect and love. In hot water, Eric relaxes; he likes it. Water refreshes and cleanses. He has a feeling of being enveloped in warmth. Through water and the touch of the body, there was a deep communion that was created between Eric and myself. It was good to be together. And because Eric relaxed, it made me feel more relaxed. He has complete trust in the person who gives him a bath. He is completely abandoned. He no longer defends himself. He feels secure because he senses he is respected and loved. The way he welcomed me, the way he trusted me, called forth trust in me. Yes, Eric called me forth to greater gentleness and respect for his body and being. He called forth in me all that is best, his weakness, his littleness; his yearning to be loved touched my heart and awakened in me unsuspected forces of love and tenderness. I gave him life; he also gave me life[283].

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[276] Ibid, p. 240.

[277] Ibid, pp. 243-248.

[278] Ibid, p. 243.

[279] *PE*, p. 72.

[280] James, 2007, p. 244.

[281] Ibid, p. 244.

[282] Furthermore, it is not possible to place a monetary value on personal relation; they are utterly different to commodities that can be traded.

[283] Spink, 1990, pp. 101-102.

James[284] describes the value of human dignity in reference to Kant's notion of individuals interacting with people as an end in one's own right and on the basis of shared species membership. Thus, for Kant a rational person has intrinsic worth and dignity:

What is related to general human inclinations and needs has a market price; that which, even without presupposing a need, conforms with a certain taste, that is with a delight in the mere purposeless play of our mental powers, has a fancy price; but that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is dignity[285].

His argument can be used to support the incommensurability argument: if particular relationships are unique, then it is argued ones more particular relationships are incomparable as they are an essential feature of who the person is. Furthermore, it is through one's personal relations that one experiences fidelity, trust and a share in membership with a moral community to reveal not only one's own personal worth but also the inimitable value of each other person. Dependency is also a critical concept in this argument and can be expressed as:

If we begin our thinking not with persons as they are individuated not with the properties that pertain to them as individuals, their rationality and their interests, but with persons as they are in connections of care and concern, we consider commonalities that characterize this relatedness…the question [then becomes]: What are my responsibilities to one with whom I stand in specific relations and what are the responsibilities of others to me, so that I can be well cared for and have my needs addressed even as I care for and respond to the needs of those who depend upon me?[286].

James[287] argues that it thus follows that unique dependency has a particular and meaningful moral role in human lives. This he describes as one individual, in relationship to others, and as having the capacity to view oneself as the:

Fulcrum of another's survival, and to refuse to appreciate this fact is to treat this person as simply one value among others. And given your relationship to her, she is not one value among others[288].

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[284] James, 2007, pp. 245-247.

[285] I. Kant *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* trans. M. Gregor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4:435, p. 42, emphasis in original.

[286] Kittay 1999, pp. 27-28.

[287] James, 2007, p. 247.

Next, we must explore the 'unique dependency'[289], as it applies to the principle of equal consideration through analysis of the case study presented by Shaw[290] and Singer[291]. The most common 'unique dependency relation' is that of the mother and child, which must account for, 'the most obvious fact about the human infant is his total helplessness'[292]. Nevertheless, in spite of this helplessness, s/he commences life with biological and social experiences of connection. Indeed, the nature of the infant's social relationships changes dramatically as one develops personal connections, social skills and co-ordinates their physical activities.

There are several theorists of psychological developmental who would argue that the most significant social relationship to human development is that of the mother-child relationship. For example, Freud[293] maintains that a stable mother-child relationship is essential for normal personality development. Erickson would also support this opinion for he states:

The infant's first social achievement, then, is his willingness to let his mother out of sight without undue anxiety or rage, because she has become an inner certainty as well as an outer predictability[294].

John Bowlby[295], an ethological theorist, argues that all mother or caregiver-infant relationship acts as a "working model" for the intimate relationships that one develops in later life. Thus, the infant who acquires positive experiences with caregivers (that one is loveable and trustworthy) will emulate these experiences into future relationships. Similarly the converse can occur: infants who are neglected by the

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[288] Ibid, p. 245, emphasis in original text.

[289] Ibid, p. 240.

[290] Shaw, 1973, p. 887.

[291] *PE*, p. 73.

[292] *PR,* p. 47.

[293] S. Freud *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, (New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1930).

[294] E. Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, Second Edition, (New York: Norton & Co., 1963), p. 247.

[295] Bowlby, 1969; J Bowlby *Attachment & Loss Vol 2: Separation*, (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

caregivers, rejected or treated in an inconsistent manner can develop a disposition that is either aloof, over-dependent, insecure in relationships and unable to form an intimate relationship. Macmurray also considers the mother-child relationship as intrinsically important and for him human emotions are more important than the intellect in determining the quality of an individual's life. For example, he states:

What we feel and how we feel is far more important than what we think and how we think. Feeling is the stuff of which our consciousness is made, the atmosphere in which all our thinking and all our conduct is bathed. All motives, which govern and drive our daily lives, are emotional. Love and hate, anger and fear, curiosity and joy are the springs of all that is most noble and most detestable in the history of men and nations.[296]

By contrast, Singer would insist that his principle prohibits us from 'making our readiness to consider the interests of others depend upon their abilities or other characteristics, apart from the characteristic of having interests'[297]. This implies that significant moral decisions affecting the child and mother should concentrate and 'treat the interests ... as of equal weight'[298]. This could mean the infant, with Down's syndrome should only be considered as an infant rather than having particular interests, that is, needs related to her disability. Notwithstanding the needs an infant with Down's syndrome may have and granting the child is a child *per se*[299], then there must be some emphasis placed on the child as having interests and being in a 'unique dependent' relationship with a caregiver. The mother, who one suspects, will act as the primary caregiver also has interests that are valid. However, how is one to reconcile these interests if they are in conflict?

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[296] J. Macmurray, *Freedom in the Modern World* Second Edition, (London: Faber, 1933), p. 146.

[297] *PE*, p. 20.

[298] Many of Singer, Glover and McMahon writings draw upon the works of R. M. Hare. Prof Hare supports this equal consideration of interest principle and considers an example of a mother/child conflict of interests. R. M. Hare 'The Abnormal Child: Moral Dilemmas of Doctors and Parents' *Documentation in Medical Ethics*, (1974) pp. 365-369, and p. 366.

[299] That is, a member of a class of children.

Singer *et al*[300] might want to argue that a common feature that will permeate the child and mother's life is pain if the former continues to live. Therefore, a more humane solution is to provide care through pain relief *albeit* providing necessary life saving medical intervention even if this means the infant will die. However, it is arguable whether the mother's and infant life will exhibit pain to such a degree of intensity that their lives lack dignity and happiness. For instance, in contrast Reinders mentions the view of a mother with a child with primordial dwarfism, whose life by our standards may appear repellent, nevertheless for her 'having this child makes every day of her life a joy'[301].

Indeed, at an empirical level, there is a restricted amount of research about the lives and struggles of parents with a child with disability. Castle's work is one of the innovative studies that places emphasis on people with disabilities as social and emotional person and provides an insightful account of the similarity of human emotions[302]. Moreover, studies tend to present an aggregate view of a range of factors that can affect all families: for example, parental stress[303] costs of caring for children[304], and child/parent interactions[305]. If more personal narratives are analysed then the lives of parents can be framed as adjusting to a range of life stages who experience what can colloquially be termed as a series of 'highs and lows' in

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[300] Singer, 2009, pp.567–581; McMahon 1996 and 2002.

[301] Reinders ,2008, p. 131.

[302] E. Castles '*We're People First'* (Westport Connecticut: Praeger, 1996). Castles discusses personal friendships on pp. 66-86.

[303] L. L. Dyson 'Families of young children with handicaps; Parental stress and family functioning' *American Journal on Mental Retardation*, **95**, 6, 1991, pp. 623-629.

[304] S. Rees & A, Emerson 'The costs of caring for disabled children at home' *Australian Rehabilitation Review*, **7**, 3, 1083, pp. 26-31.

[305] R. G. Wahler 'Who is driving the interactions? A Commentary on "Child and parent effects in boys conduct disorder" *Developmental Psychology*, **26** 1990, pp. 702-704.

parenthood. Furthermore, though the need of the child with disability can be paramount, many families can judge there is quality to their lives[306].

Then too, the voices of people with disabilities do not echo the opinions that their lives lack quality. For example, Worth describes his greatest personal tragedy as being a person who is 'denied the human right to be loved'[307] by being labelled by society, denied access, excluded and generally considered uninteresting. Wendell, a lady living with disabilities, states:

I cannot wish that I had never contracted me [myalgia encephalomyelitis], because it has made me a different person, a person I am glad to be, would not want to have missed being, and could not imagine relinquishing even if I were "cured"[308]

Goggin & Newell argue that a prevailing attitude in contemporary society is the concept of normality, and since people with disability do not fit with this concept then Australians with a disability 'will continue to live as people apart'[309] from mainstream society. In describing his own experience and his family's experience of people with intellectual disabilities as people first, the Philosopher, Richard Kearney, notes how 'humour [became] the operative mood'. Indeed, as the relationships developed his family and father 'began to relax and enjoy' the personal interactions as 'discretion and decorum flew out the window and unbridled affection rushed in the door'[310]. Dorsett[311] conducted a study with people who had just sustained a spinal cord injury and resulting in a severe disability to assess their adjustment. The central finding of the study reveals that *hope* is an essential factor that helped the individual to adjust to

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[306] For example, N. Miller, S. Burmeister, D. Callahan, J. Dieterle & S. Niedermeyer *Nobody's Perfect: Living & Growing with Children who have Special Needs*, (Baltimore: Paul H. Brooks, 1994).

[307] P. Worth 'The Importance of Speaking for Yourself' *TASH Newsletter*, May 1989, p. 2.

[308] S. Wendell *The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability*, (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 83.

[309] G. Goggin & C. Newell *Disability in Australia: Exposing a Social Apartheid* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2005), p. 44.

[310] R. Kearney 'Come and have Breakfast' in T. Kearney (ed) *A Prophetic Cry*, (Dublin: Veritas, 2000), p. 39.

[311] P. Dorsett 'The Importance of Hope in Coping with Severe Acquired Disability' *Australian Social Work*, **63**, 1, 2010, pp. 83-102.

their new lifestyle following the injury. Indeed, there is strong 'theoretical and research evidence to confirm the importance'[312] implementing affective and cognitive hope strategies. This form of intervention can address the social and environmental spheres that may negatively impact upon an individual leading a satisfying quality of life.

We have argued that in all decision making frameworks one gives priority to some interest over another interest and the dilemma is deciding which interest to choose. Singer *et al*, give priority to two sets of interests: first, the interest in not having pain permeate the lives of the individuals with disabilities, and second the interest in not incurring the significant financial costs needed to keep the infant alive. People with intellectual disabilities and those who have meaningful relationship with them do not accept this premise. For though pain may be pervasive in their lives, people still want to lead *their* lives as this aspect of their life also defines who one is.

This implies, that the 'characteristic of having interests'[313] which is of greater priority, and is the experience of the caregiver being in a unique dependency relationship with another *being*. Particularly in this form of relation, care giving is of such an emotional, personal and concrete undertaking that care givers will advocate for the financial resources to keep their infant alive. For many individuals the diagnosis of their new born infant being critically ill will bring forth, an intense emotional response of such magnitude that it yearns for an instantaneous medical and psycho-social solution. It may be impossible for caregivers to attach a financial cost to the life of their child, for besides being emotional traumatic, this also requires them to make an arithmetic calculations in which the child is treated as a commodity. Human life and monetary value are incommensurate. Each human life is unique and has irreplaceable value, whereas currency is merely a material good (or commodity) that can be acquired, traded, held by more than one person, and appreciates and

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[312] Ibid, p. 96.
[313] *PE*, p. 20.

depreciates in value. From this follows that all human life has equal value – it is of unique value because it is a human life, connected to human and other forms of life, and deserving of all opportunities that will bring about the flourishing of each individual. The conclusion is based on the assumption that social relations permeate our human lives, and though relations may be transient, humans develop, and maintain relations that offer the possibility of acting as:

Fulcrum of another's survival, and to refuse to appreciate this fact is to treat this person as simply one value among others. And given your relationship to her, she is not one value among others[314].

Consequently, I propose the second dimension of the principle fails its own aim that if: 'prohibits making our readiness to consider the interests of others depend upon their abilities or other characteristics, apart from the characteristic of having interests' fails to do justice to our experience of being-human-in-relation-to-other-human beings[315].

Third Dimension

This refers to the aspect of 'equality'. However the term 'equality' is incomplete as an abstract concept and necessarily generates the question: equal in what respect? In mathematics, 'equality' refers to objects that correspond with size, shape, in quantity or degree, in society it refers to having the same vale, rank, wealth, power or ability. Equality in general refers to relationships of equivalency, parity, sameness and correspondence; while in society it means having the same political rights or social and economic rights.

Equality is therefore a multifaceted concept and it is useful, as Singer presents, to think of the idea of equality implicitly as an issue of social justice, not as a single principle, but as a complex group of principles forming the basic core of today's egalitarianism.

[314] Ibid, p. 245, emphasis in original text.
[315] Ibid, p. 20.

Singer's third dimension of the equal consideration of interest's principle argues that it 'may be a defensible form of the principle that all humans are equal'[316], i.e. we are equal to each other in respect to the fact we are members of the same species. He offers an example to distinguish equal treatment from taking account of interests. He imagines a person with only two measures of morphine, meeting two injured persons following an earthquake, one in considerable pain and one in minimal pain. Equal treatment would endorse a single allocation of each shot of morphine to both persons, however this treatment will provide little relief to one victim although it will relive the other's pain. Singer[317] argues that applying the equal consideration of interest principle means that the person in considerable pain will receive a double dose of morphine with the net result of both 'people in slight pain'[318]. Though the action delivers unequal treatment, the 'equality' of the situation is that it produces similarity rather than sameness in the same outcome for each victim.

There are two points that I now want to direct attention to. The first concerns the examples used by Singer on the need to alleviate pain (and indeed the view that pain is significant harm) and second the concept of marginal utility.

Although pain is different for different people, there is a kind of 'equality' to pain, as most individuals will at some time in their lives experience some kind of pain. Moreover, perhaps the most important part of 'pain' is pain perception, that is, the ability to tolerate pain once it is felt, and though this is a highly subjective experience, it is a universal phenomenon albeit personally differentiated. It might be useful to note that it is unlikely for any person to live a life without a pain perception experience. For instance, Harkins' *et al*[319] study includes analysing the effects of painful heats of different temperatures on adults of different ages. The findings reveal

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[316] Ibid, p. 21.

[317] Ibid.

[318] Ibid, p. 22.

[319] S. Harkins, D. Price & M. Martelli, 'Effects of age on pain perception; thermonciception' *Journal of Gerontology*, **41**, 1986, pp. 58-63.

that middle aged (45-60 years) and older adults (65-85 years) judged the least intense heats to be less hot than the young adults (20-36 years) suggesting insensitively to weak pain stimuli. Indeed, all groups tended to judge the hottest of the stimuli to be exceptionally hot, which the researchers proposed indicating they definitely experienced highly painful stimuli as intensive. Furthermore, the judgements between the different age groups as to the unpleasantness of the stimuli barely differed and thus the study concludes with the premise that there are *more* similarities than differences between age groups in the experience of pain.

Another research study[320] that compares the use of pain coping strategies among older, middle-aged, and younger adults living with chronic pain sought to determine whether the relationship between pain severity and coping is moderated by age. The findings reveal that after controlling for clinical and demographic variables, older adults (older than 60) reported a wider range of frequently used strategies and significantly more frequent engagement in activity pacing, seeking social support, and use of coping self-statements than did younger or middle-aged adults. Moderation analyses suggest that, for younger adults, efforts at coping generally increased with greater pain severity, whereas this relationship did not exist for older adults. Therefore the data suggest differences in the quantity and quality of pain coping among age groups. What could be suggested, as a useful summary is that humans remain sensitive to pain across their life span if for no other reason than it protects them from external harm. A further example may suffice. A young infant who cries will call a caregiver to respond; an adult will seek pain relief when they intensely experience physiological malfunction and an older person who feels pain is more likely to stop lifting heavy boxes. Notwithstanding the limitations of controlled research experiments, it is plausible to suggest that most people will have experience

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[320] I. Molron, M. Jensen, D. Ehde, G Carter, G Krafy & D Cardenas, 'Coping With Chronic Pain Among Younger, Middle-Aged, and Older Adults Living With Neurological Injury and Disease' *Journal of Ageing and Health*, **20** (8), pp. 972-996.

of pain[321] perception in their lives. This is a significant feature of human living, though people in the majority will not choose actions that contribute to a life of pain.

I think Davis makes an important response on perceptions of quality of life[322] to a proposed bill on the treatment of babies with a severe intellectual disability. This bill was drafted by legal practitioners, Diana and Malcolm Brahams[323] and wants to permit doctors to withhold treatment from newborns with certain intellectual disabilities. Davis states she 'is 28 years old'[324] and has a physical disability and was born with myelomeningocele spina bifida and would have her life terminated if this legislation was implemented. Davis states that in spite of her pain, she attended local schools, graduated with an honours degree in sociology, and are now employed as a full time advocate; she is married and has travelled extensively overseas. Davis also states she lives a 'happy life'[325] and though a medical practitioner might want to act in good faith and prepare families for the future that might not eventuate. So in providing medical advice, this does *not* mean the advice will be correct and it should be seen as one perspective to be taken into account in decision-making regarding new born children labelled as 'defective'.

Singer seems to imply, in the case study of the lady giving birth to the child with Downs syndrome, that applying the equal consideration interests of interest principle entails the mother choosing not to continue with medical treatment for the infant. This follows for two reasons: (a) both mother and child will experience pain throughout their lives; and (b) the mother/child will never have an equal relationship.

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[321] The prior discussion has concentrated on physical pain and I would now like to include other sources of discomfort that includes emotional and social distress.

[322] A. Davis 'Right to Life of Handicapped' *Journal of Medical Ethics,* **9**, 1983, p. 181.

[323] D. Brahams & M. Brahams, 'The Arthur case- a proposal for Legislation', *Journal of Medical Ethics*, **9**, 1983, pp. 12-16.

[324] Davis, 1983, *op cit.*

[325] Ibid.

I have tried to show that throughout a human life, one will experience a range of pain sensations. These experiences will be personalised to who the individuals are and to how their quality and coping mechanisms are unique for the individual. Nevertheless, to make the decision on the basis of pain is a radical decision, for pain sensation is something all individuals will experience and to different degrees and to knowingly decide to shield an individual from pain would mean, in the first instance, choosing not to procreate this individual. Holder-Fran's experience of being with new parents whose child is diagnosed with an intellectual disability suggests that it is parent's lack of resources to know what to do, that is, how to care for their child that is more significant than their desire to reject a child with disabilities on the basis of pain[326]. I agree with Singer that it is most probable that most mother-child relations will never have an 'equal' relationship. However, his principle discusses 'equal consideration of interest'. In his example of pain relief Singer states: 'we can make this more concrete by considering a particular interest'[327] and the next section will address this point of the particular interests of parents to children.

Fourth dimension

The fourth dimension of the principle of equal consideration of interests requires a 'minimal principle of equality in the sense that it does not dictate equal treatment'[328], and differs from the third dimension as it focuses on 'equal treatment'. Singer uses two further examples of pain relief to argue this premise and proposes how one is to act when confronted by victims from a natural disaster. How, he asks might we act if we were to meet two people with different injuries, after a natural disaster, one severe and one minor, and both needing some pain relief? He argues we should act unequally by administering the pain relief to the most injured individual and hence

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[326] M. Holder-Franz 'Life As Being in Relationship: Moving beyond a Deficiency-orientated' in *Theology, Disability And The New Genetics*, (eds.) J. Swinton & B. Brock, (London: Continuum, 2007), pp. 57-67.
[327] Ibid, p. 19.
[328] Ibid, p. 21.

causing 'less difference in the degree of suffering'[329]. He argues this course of action would be consistent with the equalitarian principle for it considers the different interest of each party rather than necessitating exact conduct. Singer applies the economic term, '*marginal utility*' to support his argument that the equal consideration of interest principle has an application that 'may force us to abandon some other views we hold'[330]. Moreover, these 'views' refer to our common intuitions regarding what we hold to be of value. As a concept, marginal utility implies that one secures an additional utility or advantage from a single additional use of a product or service, providing naturally that one's tastes and preferences do not change. However, it does not follow that this advantage will continue to increase through repeated or continued use of the product or service. This results when we are 'saturated' by advantage to the point of apathy for the product or service. Economists refer to the law of diminishing marginal utility to explain this behaviour.

Singer then applies this diminishing marginal utility principle and modifies one of his prior examples of the two earthquake victims to argue the principle does not hold and indeed can 'in special cases, widen rather than narrow the gap'[331] between people in need of benefit and/or resources. Moreover, Singer acknowledges that the principle can appear 'too demanding' in certain circumstances although he suggests: 'it does not force us to abandon the principle, although the principle may force us to abandon other views we hold'[332].

In what follows, we offer arguments that challenge his dimension that his principle 'assists ... in discussing some of the controversial issues'[333]. We maintain rather that it supports a position that differentiates between human beings, dividing then into two classes: persons and non-persons. By reinforcing an impartial approach

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[329] Ibid, p. 22.
[330] Ibid p. 23.
[331] Ibid, p. 23.
[332] Ibid, p. 23.
[333] Ibid, p. 21.

to inter-personal relations, we are led to the conclusion that people are atomistic individuals who primarily engage with each other for utility or advantage reasons. This favours a standard that is a-moral at least, and perhaps immoral.

The 'equal considerations of interests' principle is critically analysed from a *philia* perspective to offer prominence to the nature of human personal relations and discusses the example used previously of the mother and the child with Down's syndrome. The criticism follows a contemporary Aristotelian *philia* perspective and is developed from the scholarly works put forward by Belfiore[334], Liu[335], Macmurray[336], Schwarzenbauch[337] and Stern-Gillet[338] that conceive of parent-child relationships as one dimension of an 'other selves' continuum. We use Aristotle's influential work[339] on *philia* because it retains relevance in spite its ahistorical distance from our culture. However there is looseness to his account of family *philia*[340]. It is possible to characterise how a child could be a 'second self'[341] within 'complete' *philia* in mother-child relation. Though the word 'friendship' is at times ambiguous, Bowden suggests it 'does not apply to a unified class of relationships'[342] and can describe different human sentiments structured in formal contexts like the family and state, and also in the intimate domain of personal relations. Of particular interest in this section is both the distinguishing emotional and spatial temporal relations individuals hold to each by virtue of their developmental status and/or socially ascribed or filial roles. It is these two dimensions – the emotional and spatio-temporal relations of *philia* - that require particular attention if the fourth dimension of Singer's equal consideration of interest principle analyses is valid. It could be that the example Singer uses is valid

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[334] Belfiore, 2001.

[335] I. Liu, 'Love, Life: Aristotle on Living Together with Friends' *Inquiry,* **53**, 6, 2011, pp. 579-601.

[336] *PR*, especially pp.44-64.

[337] *OCF,* 2009.

[338] Stern-Gillet 1995.

[339] Books VIII and IX , *NE*.

[340] Belfiore, 2001, p. 113.

[341] 1166a31, *NE*.

[342] Bowden, 1997, p. 62.

when one happens to meet two people whom one has not met before and who are in need of pain relief.

While different accounts of friendship are debatable and specific aspects are culturally sensitive to his era, for the most part Aristotle's concept of *philia* holds a plausible solution to the possibility of selflessness in friendship. In this section, we explore this aspect of *philia* and its nature by examining Aristotle's account of family relationships; and finally offer a plausible explanation of family members as virtuous friends. In the course of this discussion, we will discuss Aristotle's concept of *psyche,* and his view of substance, form and matter before considering the argument for a family member as a 'second self'.

In Aristotle's seminal ethical treatises, he emphasises the importance of *philia* to human life[343] and critically examines how a person is to conduct interpersonal relations with another individual. Throughout his discussion, Aristotle employs the term *philia* though it is a difficult word to attribute precise meaning to. Clearly, Aristotle uses the word to express 'friendship' amongst individuals. However, this term is too narrow for in other passages, he appears to use the word to imply 'relationships' between individuals who 'get on well' with, or individuals who 'like each other'. It is possible to understand that he means all forms of personal relations from the most generic or 'acquaintance' type, to a *philia* that has immense personal significance, to an individual. As Cooper notes, our modern term 'friendship' is restricted and Aristotle discussion of *philia* includes:

Persons not bound together by near family ties. ... all sorts of family relationships (especially those of parents to children, children to parents, siblings to one another, and the marriage relationship itself);the word also has a natural and ordinary use to characterise what goes in English under the somewhat quaint-sounding name of 'civic friendship'[344].

Aristotle includes in his category of *philia* five critical components that unanimously acknowledge any instance of *philia*[345]. A friend first 'wishes and does goods or

[343] For example, 1155a5-9; and 1155a23-28; *NE.*
[344] Cooper, 1977a, p. 602.

apparent goods'[346] to his friend, also a friend will 'wish the friend to be and to live'[347]; indeed this interpretation might be read as my friend loving and caring for me and wanting my life to continue. A third factor of *philia* is revealed in friends spending time together. The fourth element is that friends will make the same choices, and friends share in each other's distress and enjoyment'[348]. It is possible, as Schwarzenbauch[349] suggests, to interpret Aristotle as implying these five features are most clearly exemplified by mothers in their caring role of children and the components are then extended to *philia*[350].

Therefore, Aristotle's classification of *philia* is diverse and incorporates 'the complexity and contingency of the various types'[351] of relations that one holds and this includes *philia* that he terms 'unequal' friendships[352]. Aristotle and Singer would include family relationships in this category. Aristotle notes though there is a difference in the basis of the relation – 'there are different causes of love'[353]. There is however as Bowden argues an 'interdependence'[354] that is of significance to persons in a dependent and caring relation. It is this interdependence that Singer and other adherents of moral interpersonal impartiality fail to address. Bowden notes that:

Thus, insofar as it endorses the distinction between 'unequal' and 'equal' relations, Aristotle's expansion of *philia* to include both these types of caring attachments provides positive evidence to the current investigation of the complexity of the difference and similarities of caring relationships[355].

This makes sense providing the relation is grounded in caring (reciprocal goodwill); sharing in activity and personal familiarity, otherwise there is no relation as in a

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[345] 1166a1-1166b29, *NE,*

[346] 1166a3, Ibid.

[347] 11bba3, Ibid.

[348] 1166a8, Ibid.

[349] *OCF*, 2009.

[350] 1166a9-10, Ibid.

[351] Bowden 1997, p. 65.

[352] 1158b-1159a14; 1163a25-1163b34, *NE.*

[353] 1158b19, Ibid.

[354] Bowden, 1997, p. 74.

[355] Ibid, p. 74, emphasis in text.

meaningful connection or association, between persons. Thus, one might end up with unrequited *philia* if these features were absent in a relationship. Therefore what Bowden is arguing suggests that in spite of the different social roles and positions the *philoi* are placed in, it is possible for a relation to endure and this aspect can most clearly be exemplified through family relationships.

Nevertheless, how can Aristotle assertion that *philia* dissolves when *philoi* 'come to be separated by some wide gap in virtue, vice, wealth, or something else'[356] be explained? People differ according to their personal and biological history and thus there will always be degrees of separation. Classically for people to acknowledge each other as *philoi* they must participate in activities share a personal history and commit to being in relation with one another[357]. While *philoi* may be 'unequal' to each other in different aspects of their lives, Friedman's[358] work demonstrates how friends can foster each other's personal and moral growth through personal history and sharing:

Friendship can open up the very possibility of growth in our deepest moral values, rules, and principles and not simply their fuller articulation. In this sense, friendship gives us a point of view that may well external to the principled moral commitments we already hold[359].

While at face value Aristotle's account of *philia* suggests that persons with immense degrees of dissimilarity are unable to create a personal relation, this may not hold in practice. Vanier's account of his friendship with Eric[360], and his account of Claudia's relationship with Nadine[361] are examples of where this apparent inequality does not hold. Two criticisms to this argument that follow each other come from Smith-Pringle[362] then Irwin[363]. Smith-Pringle argues that Aristotle presents honour as the

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[356] 1158b34, *NE.*
[357] 1155a9-16, *NE.*
[358] Friedman 1993.
[359] Ibid, p. 201.
[360] Spink, 1990, pp. 101-102.
[361] Vanier, 1998, pp. 22-31.
[362] Smith-Pringle, 2000, p. 130.
[363] *NE,* p. 280, this reference is in the note the translator provides to 1159a17-18.

'appropriate medium for equalising unequal friendship'[364] and results from 'friendship seek[ing] what is possible, not what accords with worth'[365]. If honour is judged within the individual parameters of a personal relation with the *philoi* having a strong moral character and strength then 'equal' has a personal qualitative focus that may be recognisable only by the friends.

Irwin observes that to understand Aristotle's *Ethics*, one needs to 'look outside' it, first to his discussions of *psyche,* and then to his view of substance, form and matter[366]. Aristotle discusses his view of *psyche* briefly in the *Ethics* and more substantially in his *Peri Psyches,* better known as *De Anima.* For Aristotle, the *Psyche* is inseparable from an individual living entity and therefore denotes a kind of life not simply a psychology. Peters[367] uses the words 'breath of life', 'vital principle' 'soul' to characterize the meaning of the term. Aristotle distinguishes between living and non-living objects and offers *psyche* as a cluster of capabilities that can nourish, develop, preserve, display adaptive behaviours, and use the environment to meet the needs of living things. A possible criticism by non-theists in Aristotle's definition is that he also argues that heavenly bodies and the Unmoved Mover are 'alive'. However, notwithstanding this question, the primary point here is to explore his concept of nutrition, growth and reproduction, as these are interdependent and necessary for both our physical and emotional survival.

Aristotle divides the *psyche* into two parts[368], the rational and irrational, and argues that humans are the only organisms with the capacity for rational principle (*logon echein*[369]). The irrational has two capabilities, the *threpikon*, (nutritive and reproductive) which is common to all living creatures and *aisthetikon* (desiring and sensitive) common to all animals. Though irrational, the *aisthetikon* appears to share

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[364] Pringle, 2000, p. 130.
[365] 1163b16, *NE.*
[366] Irwin, 1980,p, 36.
[367] *GPT*, p. 166.
[368] 1102a26, *NE.*
[369] 1102a26, Ibid.

in reason insomuch as humans modify their agency following feedback from other humans:

With appetite and in general desires shares in reason in a way, insofar as it both listens to reason and obeys it. This is the way in which we are said to 'listen to reason' from father or friends[370]

Therefore it is more accurate to refer to this part of the *psyche* as rational. On two occasions Aristotle states that the *threpikon* is deficient in human intelligence qualities and therefore (a) requires no further analysis and (b) has no role to play in ethics or politics. Nevertheless in what follows, I will argue that the *threpikon* is of greater importance than the account Aristotle offers in the *Ethics*. Furthermore, one immediate response to Aristotle's argument in the *Ethics* that the *threpikon* functions while one sleeps and therefore has no value, is, I suggest, to apply this argument to other parts of the *psyche*. For example, thinking[371], also occurs in sleep so is Aristotle suggesting this part of the *psyche* is irrational? Indeed, while this might be so on some occasions, most individuals believe that in exercising their cognitive skills one is acting rationally.

Aristotle offers his reader a theory of *psyche* that concludes with his hypothesis that it is substance, form and actuality[372]. To comprehend his theory he first draws upon the tripartite distinction he makes of substance in the *Metaphysics*[373]; that is, substance can be (a) matter; or (b) form; or (c) compound of matter and form. First, Aristotle presents his argument that *psyche* is not the physical form of the human animal, though it is related to the body and similarly it is not matter, though it exists in the matter. Thus for Aristotle *psyche* is actuality while body and matter are only

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[370] 1102b30-31,Ibid. The Editor makes a note about the meaning of 'desires', see p. 192.

[371] It is difficult to know what Aristotle believed about what occurs for humans when they sleep, however he does state: '*[In dreams] too, we think something else, over and above the dream presentation, just as we do in waking moments when we perceive. So too, in sleep we sometimes have thoughts other than mere phantasms immediately before our eyes*'. 485b15-19, Aristotle, *De Somnis*, trans, J. I. Beare in McKeon, (ed.), 2001, pp. 618-626.

[372] 412a1-415a44, DeA.

[373] For example, 1036b21-26 *Meta.*

potentiality[374], and thus he rejects the propositions that substance can be (a) matter (b) form or (c) a compound of matter and form. He states: 'it must be the case that soul is substance as form of a natural body which potentially has life, and since this substance is actually, soul will be the actuality of such a body'[375]. *Psyche* is that 'vital principle' of the living, which Irwin phrases succinctly as 'its goal-directed pattern of activity'[376]. Furthermore, *psyche* is also the form of a specific type of body that could be alive. However, the *psyche* exists only when the body lives, thus it is a sort of actuality, an achievement of a potential form of life. Aristotle's view is referred to as *hylemorphism* and takes a non-Platonic and Cartesian view of living things; where the latter is a complex unity that warrants analysis according to its matter and its form. Moreover, Aristotle's first and second philosophy dictates that matter and form are inseparable in reality for living entities, as both possess matter and form. Thus, for Aristotle *psyche* is substance, meaning that it has a *being* in itself rather than reducible to a single entity that self-exists. Indeed, added to the connectedness of *psyche,* as substance is *psyche* as the form of a natural body as both are required for the complex unity of living matter, and therefore *psyche* acts as the specific strategy, shape and capabilities of a body. A possible metaphor that I suggest to explain how Aristotle understands *psyche* is '*psyche* is to the human person what salt is to seawater'. Therefore, if the salt is removed from the seawater then it is no longer seawater, similarly if the *psyche* is removed then the person loses their essence.

Aristotle elucidates his view of *psyche* as actuality by distinguishing two sorts of actuality (*entelecheia*). The first kind of actuality (*hexis*) is the presence of a capability that is not being used to achieve its purpose, and he uses knowledge as an example. The second type of actuality (*energia*) is implementing the capability, that is, when a living thing is using one of its capabilities, then the capability is second actuality. By way of example, Aristotle uses contemplation and therefore, he argues

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[374] 412a9, *DeA*.
[375] 412a20-22, Ibid, emphasis in the translation.
[376] Irwin, 1980, p. 41.

the second actuality of *psyche* is exercised by contemplation while the first actuality of knowledge is as a possession without necessarily using it. Thus, according to this characteristic, *psyche* is first actuality and its presence depends upon particular capabilities and these do not have to be realized by the living entity. Vella[377] articulates a suitable analysis that explains Aristotle's account of *psyche:*

Table 1: Aristotle's Conception of *Psyche*

Compound of Matter and Form	Axe	Eye	Animal
Matter	Wood/Metal	Pupil	Body with organs
Form/*Psyche*	Capacity to cut	Capacity to see	First Actuality: Inactivity of capacities to Nourish, Reproduce, Perceive and Move.
	Cutting	Seeing	Second Actuality: Activity of capacities to Nourish, Reproduce, Perceive and Move.

This examination reveals the *psyche* is a unified entity with a compilation of capabilities to achieve 'its goal-directed pattern of activity'[378] and if the entity does not have these capabilities then it is not part of this group of things.

As noted earlier, one of Aristotle's inquiries is, what is the most excellent or good life that humans can aspire to live? The good life certainly consists of *eudaimonia* – 'activity of the soul in accord with virtue'[379]; this term has numerous English translations[380] though Aristotle defines it as 'living well' (or having a good

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[377] J. Vella *Aristotle: A Guide for the Perplexed*, (London: Continuum, 2008), p. 95.
[378] Irwin 1980, p. 41.
[379] 1098a19, *NE.*
[380] For example, 'flourishing', E. Anscombe 'Modern Moral Philosophy', *Philosophy*, **33**, 124, 1958, pp. 18-19.

life) and doing ('acting well' or 'faring well')[381], thus suggesting, as Irwin observers, that *eudaimonia* engages one's entire life and includes action[382]. Importantly, *eudaimonia* is not simply pleasure, though he does acknowledge the advantage of pleasure[383], as elsewhere he dissuades his reader from participating in non-rationally deliberated activities[384]. Moreover this *eudaimonia* or goodness is not a form in itself as Plato argues[385]. It is in Aristotle's discussion of the *ergon,* or function of human activity, that he rejects the importance of *threptikon* and promotes the rational principle (*logon echein*) as the distinguishing feature of a human life[386].

Not all scholars agree that this is Aristotle's final view and the discussion of what constitutes 'the good life' rests on the inclusive/exclusive distinction[387]. I understand the exclusive view[388] as incorporating the claim that Aristotle believes there is just **one** ultimate activity that makes life worthwhile. This claim highlights human intellectual abilities. This contrasts directly with the inclusive view that maintains that there are in fact packages of activities that make life worthwhile[389]. I take this view (that is, inclusive), as not only does it fit better with the numerous texts of Aristotle; it is also a sensible and pragmatic view. Indeed, Kenny[390] and Broadie both argue that a proper understanding of *theoria* necessarily includes the exercise of political theory and *philia* because a contrary reading will render his ethical theory incoherent. A possible reason why Aristotle marginalises the *threptikon* and

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[381] 1095a19, *NE*.

[382] Ibid, p.175.

[383] 1172a20-1176b30, Ibid.

[384] 1109b30-1115a5, Ibid.

[385] 1096a11-1097a15, Ibid.

[386] 1097b33-1098a6, Ibid.

[387] Hardie introduced this term. W. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 23.

[388] For example, R. Kraut, *Aristotle on the Human Good*, (New York: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 197-167.

[389] Nussbaum presents a superior argument for this line of reasoning. Martha C Nussbaum 'Aristotle, on Human Nature and the Foundation of Ethics', in J. Altham and R. Harrison, *World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Philosophy of Bernard Williams* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), see pp. 110-121.

[390] Kenny, 1992; Broadie, 1991.

aisthetikon activities as characteristic of a human life simply is, as Schwarzenbach[391],

argues the undesirability of placing these activities as priority life activities. Indeed,

Aristotle may treat the actions of nutrition and reproduction as inseparable as they are

connected with an action. For instance, when one nourishes oneself, s/he

'reproduce[s] ourselves numerically'[392] to the extent one continues to exist as a

numerical entity. In the act of biological reproduction an individual 'reproduces

ourselves specifically'[393], one creates a numerically distinct individual, so the

similarity of reproduction is an identity albeit this differs numerically.

It is also possible to present a contrary argument to the school of thought

which reasons that what might be more significant for Aristotle is enabling his

audience to lead a life influenced by *phronesis* and theoretical *nous*[394]. For the

moment, for Aristotle if an entity has a function then its good must consistent in doing

the activity well[395] and so the *logon echein* will function with *eudaimonia* by

infiltrating the *aisthetikon* activities in such a way they respond to reason.

Schwarzenbach[396] argues that *threptikon* and *aisthetikon* activities are an essential part

of human life and if one is to experience them positively they must adhere to

phronesis. Similarly, the influence of *logon echein* on the *threptikon* activities offers

these functions inherent value and they remain essential to human good and

Schwarzenbach offers evidence from Aristotle to support this view[397].

My claim is that the *logon echein* is capable of informing the other parts of the

psyche and this needs further attention. This can be addressed by analyzing what

Aristotle may have meant by *threptikon*, for as mentioned above, a number of separate

activities that are integrated as a whole action and though there are similarities, the

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[391]*OCF*, p. 32.

[392] Aristotle *On Generation and Corruption,* trans Harold Hoachim, in McKeon, 2001)

[393] Ibid.

[394] In chapter 7, I will consider *phronesis* in greater detail.

[395] 1098b25-28, *NE*.

[396]*OCF,* p. 32.

[397] Ibid, note 12, p. 294.

range of pursuits differs for each activity. I am interested in exploring what are the activities of *threptikon,* one of the irrational parts of the *psyche* when humans undertake these functions.

Although Aristotle does give priority to the life of contemplation, there are three other types of activities that Aristotle offers to distinguish human life from other forms of life and why a human is 'a political animal'[398].

(a) First, though all animals share a life where 'something one and common becomes work of all'[399], the focus for humans is living a good life with leisure activities. Indeed in the *Politics*[400], he defines the *polis* as a form of human association where the good life is common work; thus reinforcing his view that these activities are more than activities aimed at mere survival.

(b) Second, Aristotle notes that in general humans do not abandon their young and indeed develop permanent partnering arrangements with other humans. According to Aristotle, this 'permanent coupling' (*synduaskik*on) [401] contributes to a natural cooperation and a series of associations commencing with couples, to kinship groups, villages, communities and nations. One might want to argue that the current high divorce rate in nations like Australia contradicts his premise. However, what I am arguing (and Aristotle might agree) is that though the divorce rate is high, people do commit to different types of partner arrangements (or 'to suzên' or 'living together') that raise families. Also, recall the earlier argument from Laing[402] that suggests natural family and kinship bonding is important for people.

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[398] 1253a1, *Pol*, pp. 1127-1324.
[399] 488a8, Aristotle, *History of Animals*, trans. D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, in McKeon, 2001.
[400] 1252b28-31, *Pol.*
[401] 589a1-2, *History of Animals*
[402] Laing, 2006, pp. 548-566.

(c) Finally, Aristotle argues that humans have the power of speech (in contemporary society this might extend to communication) and reason that enables one to understand what is right, just and virtuous. Schwarzenbach[403] argues that Aristotle's belief is that it is this 'reason' that equips humans with the ability to concern themselves with the long term care of other humans.

Accordingly when combined, these three explanations offer humans a self-sufficient lifestyle when it is lived within a wider community context rather than as a solitary life[404]. I explore this concept of the '*synduaskikon*' activities of *threptikon* in a *philia* as it is connected to my approach to the importance of *philia* in our human lives. In drawing upon '*synduaskikon*', I do not mean the biological act of reproduction, nor the legal contract of marriage, rather the *philia* one experiences at the centre of their caring relations and that occurs 'for a longer period'[405] or have longevity. I have mentioned the *L'Arche* communities and many of the personal networks in these communities are instances of where *synduaskikon philia* are lived. The evidence of these forms of *philia* in such communities reveals how both rational and emotional factors combine in seeking to care for the needs of the other human beings. Individuals in such communities participate in frequent (even daily) processes over an extended time interval that serves to sustain the *philia*.

The concept is defined by Schwarzenbauch[406] as: 'those rational and moral activities which aim at "reproducing" a concrete set of human relationships – in the best case, relationships as pure ends in themselves'. This, I argue, refers to form of pedagogy, the art of teaching, which is a means to 'personal' knowledge, and a manner of caring that addresses the *being* of the individual and the relational actions

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[403] S. Schwarzenbach, *On Civic Friendship,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 37. This text will now be referred to as *OCF*.
[404] 1167b17-19, *NE*.
[405] 589a2, *History of Animals,*
[406] Ibid, p. p35-36.

of our *being* as persons[407]. I refer to it as *philology.* This is most clearly exemplified in understanding and training other in primary caregiving relationships, though it can also be extended to other caring relationships.

In order to explain Aristotle's account of these relations, we need to clarify his distinction between moral and productive actions, that is *poises and praxis*[408]. Aristotle's arguments are not always clearly articulated and this is true of his discussion of *'*the reproduction of offspring'[409]. Schwarzenbach notes[410], he uses both term 'genesis' and 'poisis*'* separately to differentiate 'permanent coupling and reproduction' from 'common work and production', but in other contexts, he uses them interchangeably - as if to imply no distinction. The tasks or labour required to discharge these functions are obviously not identical and Schwarzenbach adopts a contemporary reading of these terms. Peter[411] notes the term *poiesin* incorporates 'to act' and 'action' and though the latter is one of Aristotle's categories, the term has two meanings: *poisein* implies production or mechanical production, the end of this action is the product, and from *prattein*, as in a practical action, *praxis*, that has its own end. Knight[412] traces the translation history of the two terms and notes the debate that scholars[413] have engaged in as to whether there is a distinction. I suggest there is a

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[407] Schwarzenbach defines this terms as 'ethical reproduction' *OCF,* p. 340.

[408] I have profited from J. L. Arkill, Terence Irwin, L Kosman and Sibyl Schwarzenbach readings of Aristotle and draw upon their scholarly analysis to develop my approach. The treatises that I draw upon in this section include: J. L. Arckill 'Aristotle on Action' pp. 93-102; T. Irwin, pp. 35-54; T. Irwin, pp.116-156; K. A. Kosman 'Being Properly Affected: Virtue and Feeling in Aristotle's Ethics' pp. 103-116, all four articles in Ameile Oksenberg Rorty (ed) *Essays on Aristotle Ethics*. S. Schwarzenbach 'A Political Reading of the Reproductive Soul in Aristotle' *History of Philosophy Quarterly,* **9**, 3, 1992, pp. 243- and 'Democracy and Friendship' *Journal of Social Philosophy*, **36**, 2, 2005, pp. 243-264.

[409] *OCF,* p. 38.

[410] Ibid.

[411] *GPT*, p. 162.

[412] K. Knight *Aristotelian Philosophy*: *Ethics and Politics from Aristotle to MacIntryre*, (London: Polity Press, 2007), pp. 19-22.

[413] For example, J. L. Ackrill's critical analysis of Aristotle's multiple variable distinction of *energeia*, from *poiesis, kenesis* and *genesis* differs from David Charles's single account of the praxis/production distinction albeit the actions can *'co-occur'*. J. L. Ackrill 'Aristotle on Action' in Ackrill (ed.) *Essays on Plato and Aristotle*,

difference between the action types. For example *poiesis* the act of producing, say, a house can be for a variety of reasons, a place to live, for comfort, warmth, security, and each activity is distinct from other types of activity. This form of activity is dissimilar from moral activity of (say) one visiting their elderly Aunt Mable weekly out of 'respect' or 'love' for who she is rather than to ensure one is part of her inheritance. The latter activity is underpinned by one's character that necessarily expresses the virtue of integrity.

A number of other activities associated with this category of *philiaology* include the following: infant development; child rearing; developing the self in adolescence[414]; forming and maintaining diverse relations; '*synduaskikon*'; 'being in relation with others'; 'having an advantage, pleasurable or complete relation' and in our capacity to care'[415] for people generally and for people with 'irreversible senile dementia or in a permanent vegetative condition*'* and 'severely damaged infants'[416].

In each of these forms of *philia*, the caring relation offers the human being cared for respect for who they are as a unique and valuable person and *'*the simple reproduction of flourishing relations between persons'[417]. *Philia* can incorporate *poiesis* that aims to meet individual physical, social, emotional and development needs. However, it is the *praxis* that portrays or represents the human as an end in himself or herself - as a person, a valued member of our species. This form of relation can extend beyond family and kinship *philia*, includes all persons who model and form other people in philia, and in the most 'perfect' instances, stretches further than mere advantage and pleasure. Accordingly, what I am arguing is that the process of

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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 212-221. David Charles *Aristotle's Philosophy of Action*, (London: Duckworth, 1984), p. 62.

[414] Alasdair MacIntryre makes the point that we only become moral practical reasoners after a period of dependency. A. MacIntryre *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues,* (Chicago: Open Court, 2002), p. 82.

[415] Kittay, 2005, p.111.

[416] Ibid, p. 228.

[417] *OCF*, p. 39.

accompanying and caring for all human beings who are persons, through *philia*, is way of *being* and this relation reveals a person who is 'another self'[418].

It does not matter whether an individual is biologically related to me, we are all numerically distinct from each other however, my *philos* may be the most 'perfect' illustration of a virtue and if I demonstrate virtue in other attributes he or she will share in 'the moral continuance in existence of another like myself'[419]. The nature of the relation does not have to perfect rather the persons in relation are committed to each other on a long term basis, to promoting the others' good and to sharing in joint activities. Aristotle consistently uses the term: 'second self' in his ethical treatises[420], and though this notion of autonomy may strike discord with neo-Kantians, I want to suggest his concept articulates, that this person or friend promotes the other's good in a manner that is reverential of his/her friends cogent action[421].

Philiaology or a proper account of friendship in all its forms must be able to account for the developmental process that normally commences in infancy with the need for emotional, physical attachment and intelligent care, nevertheless most physical stages of development occurs, with or without *poiesis* being applied. Moreover, character and emotional development will occur even if loving and education or learned principles are not available. Here, *phusis* (nature) has a role to play in development, pertinent development only exists when one or more persons provide thought, love and acumen. Therefore, *philiaology* is located in the *praxis* category; it is action that is completed for its own sake. Nevertheless, though the role of intentional agency requires examination[422], what Aristotle appears to be claiming is that the child who develops as a person is not the sum total of the deliberate agency of his/her caregivers as s/he has a uniquely personal and vigorous characteristic

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[418] 1166a31, *NE.*
[419] *OCF*, p. 43.
[420] 1213a13, *Magna Moralia.*
[421] Sherman, 1989, pp. 138-144.
[422] *OCF,* pp. 40-41.

ingredient. Thus this differentiation between generation by nature and character, I hope, offers greater clarity to *philiaology* as a form of *praxis*.

Nevertheless, within each form of *philia* there are degrees of intimacy that give rise to different types of *philia*. According to Spenser and Pahl[423], there are two important dimensions that articulate this calculus: the first concerns whether the *philia* are 'given or chosen'[424]. Given *philia* are those relations that are credited by reason of age, sex, ethnic or family background or some other variable outside the control of the person. Chosen *philia* are those relations that are formed when no natural relation might occur and therefore require the intimacy to be formed and developed. Spencer and Pahl note the different parameters within these dimensions that assist with explaining and exploring people's *philia*. The authors argue than when these dimensions are combined, then a characteristic set of *philia* emerges as the following Table illustrates:

Table 2: Intimacy in *Philia*[425]

	High Commitment	Low Commitment
Given	Solid/foundational	Nominal
Given-as-Chosen	Bonus	Neglected/abandoned
Chosen-as-Given	Adopted	Heart sink
Chosen	Forged	Liquid

Aristotle appear to argue that, the friends in these different types of 'complete'[426] *philia* share in a unity that enables one to communicate with another's consciousness while remaining a distinct being. This follows from the sensation one experiences

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[423] L. Spencer & R. Pahl, *Rethinking Friendship: Hidden Solidarities Today,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
[424] Ibid, p. 41.
[425] Ibid, p. 42.
[426] Cooper, 1977, p. 300.

when one is alive and from the pleasure one secures through activity, so to in our

philia, we understand a friend is alive and exists. Our friend is another self, Aristotle

states:

The excellent person is related to his friend in the same way as he is related to himself, since a friend is another himself. Therefore, just as his own being is choice worthy for him, his friend's being is choice worthy for him in the same and similar way. We agreed that someone's own being is choice worthy because he perceives that he is good, and this sort of perception is pleasant in itself. He must, then, perceive his friend's being together [with his own], and he will do this when they live together and share conversation and thought. For in the case of human beings what seems to count, as living together is this sharing of conversation and thought, not sharing the same pasture, as in the case of grazing animals[427].

How this refers to family *philia* is that a child is the natural other self of a

parent, as Belfiore argues: 'the child is the biological, social and ethical product of the

parent'[428]. Accordingly, family *philia* holds unique status between people who are

unequal in virtue. Belfiore[429] argues the uniqueness of family *philia* is constituted by:

1. *Philoi* in family typical *philia* interactions reveal virtuous actions, which this begins with *philesis,* the intense emotion of love that family members have for each other;
2. *Philoi* in family *philia* 'provides habituation in virtuous behaviour'[430] and this encourages *philoi* in developing other forms of 'complet*e' philia*;
3. Family *philia* also exhibit forms of pleasant and usefulness *philia*[431];
4. When children develop chronologically they can have a virtuous and enduring *philia*[432];
5. Family *philia* are other selves;
6. Belfiore[433] notes mothers exhibit all the five characteristics mentioned earlier on page 69;

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427 1170b5-14, *NE.*
428 Belfiore, 2004, p. 122.
429 Ibid.
430 Ibid, p. 126.
431 1162a7-9, *NE.*
432 1158b21-23, Ibid.
433 Belifore, 2004, pp. 127-128.

7. Though family *philia* may always remain unequal and this may be negated by the *Philoi* sharing a goodness that could manifest itself differently in each *Philo*s and

8. Family *philia* contribute to the development of the *'intellectual aspects'*[434] of *philia* through *Philoi* being engaging in perception and thought.

A central component of our nature is 'to suzên' or 'living together'[435] which she argues occurs 'in a biological, social or ethical sense'[436]. Therefore, a child is the realisation of our human potentialities, and belongs to a family genetically and ethically as a family has reared the child. It is for these reasons that a baby, child or young person can be viewed as a *'second self'*.

To return to the example[437] used by Singer[438] in discussing the fourth dimension. This suggests that the life of the young girl is terminated because it will be filled with pain for both the child and the mother, he argues this decision is acceptable because: 'it does not force us to abandon the principle, although the principle may force us to abandon other views we hold[439]'. His decision, in this case, does not properly account for the parent-child relation and the concept of our child being a 'second self' to oneself. If a child is a 'second self' to the parent then for a parent to allow a child to die would mean a betrayal of themselves, because the implicit bond to such *philia* is deeper and more significant than almost any other bond or anything else. Moreover, it follows the nucleus of the *philia* is the expectation that it will simply endure injuries done or suffered, and on different occasions *philoi* will support each other through them.

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[434] Ibid, p. 130.
[435] 1159a27-28, *NE*.
[436] Belifore, 2004, p. 130.
[437] *PE*, p. 73
[438] Ibid, p. 23.
[439] Ibid, p. 23.

Conclusion

This chapter applied a phenomenological method to analyse actual narratives used, by Singer to investigate one of his central conditions of personhood. This exploration reveals limitations in enabling human beings to realise their potential, however limited this may be. This outcome suggests that Singer's theories of human nature do not take account of the historical and existential factors that operate in the development of personal identity. Therefore, his account fails to fully account for some of our everyday human experiences of friendship and relationships, neither does it recognise the central role these play in a meaningful and happy life. The next chapter seeks to supply these deficiencies by demonstrating how sociability is fundamental to human nature and defines the nature of our being as persons.

Chapter 4: The Nature of Friendship

Introduction

This chapter explores scholarship from a number of historical sources and proposes a contemporary, and more inclusive description of friendship (*philia*) relevant to the argument of this thesis. It offers a reading of contemporary accounts of Aristotle's theory of friendship to reveal that humans are social by nature and that friendship is essential to human life. This necessary interdependence of individuals, and the enhancement of life that flows from these human encounters imply, that we cannot realise our potential as human beings without friendship(s). This analysis justifies us in arguing that human identity can only be realized and integrated through the experience of people living and inter-acting together.

The Importance of Friendship

A renaissance of interest[440] in the nature of 'friendship'[441] has developed over the last forty years, changing the role it occupies in contemporary moral theory. Philosophers from the early classical epoch through to our contemporary period have all recognised that friendship plays a significant role in our lives. In his *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle's articulates a thoughtful and fertile discussion on the nature of friendship (Φιλια) that is an important starting point for our argument in this chapter. However, his account of friendship requires a vigorous analysis if his premise, that 'complete friendship'[442] is necessary to a fully human life is to be justified and if we are to understand ourselves as both emotional and rational beings, with both being essential to realise our virtues and achieve happiness in our lives. This chapter sets out to

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[440] The interest appears to have commenced with Elizabeth Telfer's article, 1970-71 pp. 223-241.

[441] The word 'Friendship' as discussed in this thesis is used as a concept and not a particular occurrence unless otherwise stated. All further references will not use inverted commas with the word.

[442] *NE.*

explore this notion of friendship, and its relevance to friendships between people with and people without intellectual disabilities. From this Aristotelian perspective, we are led to the conclusion that such a relational model has the ability to positively transform how we think about humanity in all its forms.

The basic premise of this discourse is the recognition of mutual human sociability and inter- dependence is essential to our human nature. I will argue, with Aristotle, that the most characteristic activity of friendship is *'to suzên'* or 'living together'[443]. This 'living together' means more than physical proximity, it is people sharing a common world of social, emotional and intellectual interests that act as a focus point for those involved and what is important in their lives. An attempt is made to clarify and set out some implications of our desire for *philoi* (friend) arising out of our fundamental human need for our lives-as-a-whole to be taken into account. This reading of friendship retrieves the more inclusive meaning of the Greek notion of *philia,* one that understands humans to be bonded through a web of intrinsic and interdependent relationships that offers mutuality in moral relationships. It describes an alternative vision of what constitutes a 'complete' human being and suggests that *philia* manifests such a basic structure to personhood that there is merit in according it the status of an essential requirement for human identity.

Prior to his discussion of friendship in the *Ethics*, Aristotle presents his view on what it is for an individual[444] to live a fulfilled life, what virtues the individual needs to develop for this purpose and how an individual makes good moral judgements. Aristotle's discussion of friendship occurs in this context and from his perspective:

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[443] 1159a27-28, *NE*.

[444] For Aristotle, only men and of them only men who are free and well-born are capable of perfect happiness. Women and slaves can experience happiness relative to their status and purpose of serving their family in life. This is of course a significant shortcoming in Aristotelian ethics that I do not endorse; by 'individual', I mean males and females.

Now life is good and pleasant in itself; for it has definite order, which is proper to the nature of what is good. What is good by nature is also good for the decent person; that is why life would seem to be pleasant for everyone[445].

John M. Cooper [446] elucidates Aristotle's concept of friendship through two arguments: first, in living well we need to know the goodness of our life and through interaction with a friend from whom we can receive comment on our lifestyle. Second friends will share and engage in moral, emotional, intellectual and practical activities that enable them to live well – with pleasure and stimulation, and this will contribute to a *eudaimonic* lifestyle.

A textual analysis of the *Ethics* reveals that almost a fifth of the volume is used to discuss the nature of friendship. Aristotle's primary argument is that individuals need friendships or relationships of various forms, for example he states:

Presumably, it is also absurd to make the blessed person solitary. For no one would choose to have all [other] goods and yet be alone, since a human being is a political [animal], tending by nature to live together with others[447].

The notion of human friendship implies we can physically identify a particular human being as a friend as well as have sufficient awareness of our friend's interests, preferences and values, to feel affection and concern for them[448]. The basis for this 'affection and concern' is contestable: some[449] might agree with one version of Plato's

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[445] 1169b20-23, *NE.*

[446] Cooper , 1977b, pp. 290-315.

[447] 1169b16-20, *NE,* translator's brackets.

[448] Friendship is a difficult relationship to define and this statement by no means attempts to offer a definite description of this phenomenon. One of the surprises I discovered in researching this thesis is the remarkable influence that the ancient views of Aristotle and Cicero had on friendship until the eighteen-century, notwithstanding Christianity concentrating on specific aspects of these authors' thoughts. I situate my discourse on friendship within this classical idea because their comprehension of friendship articulates what friendship looks like, what they are based on and who may count as a genuine friend. This follows from the competing theories of the nature of men, women, society and God, which are questions that maintain contemporary currency. Aristotle *NE,* Cicero *Laelius* trans. M. Arnold (London: Cassell & Co., 1928), pp. 255-317.

[449] For example: D. Bolotin *Plato's Dialogue on Friendship: An Interpretation of the* Lysis, *with a new translation*, (Ithaca: Cornwall University Press, 1979), pp. 176-177.

view that human friendship and love is dominated by 'neediness'. Others[450] take the

view that a friend can be the fulcrum of one's life, while still others take an

intermediate position. As I hope it becomes apparent through the narratives in this

thesis, the long-term members of the *L'Arche* communities support the former

position through their friendships. For instance, Kant's argues in his lecture on

friendship that it is a means to reconcile two conflicting emotions in us, that is,

between self-love and love of humanity[451]. Nevertheless, whatever the motive for

friendship, friends are friends because they want to be friends, enjoys each other's

company and wish goodwill to one another for the others' sake. I agree with

Aristotle's foundational claim that humans are social by nature and that *philia* is built

into the very structure of human life itself and that our being human is realised and

integrated through living together because this accords with my own experience of life

and my living and working with people. My experience shows it is *philia*, in all its

diverse forms, that accords clarity and meaning to 'what it is to be a human person'

and this is directly linked to the notion of a 'personal universe' – a collection of

necessary personal ties which influence people and permeates their 'living together'.

This term – 'personal universe' comes from John Macmurray who:

[I] was convinced that we live and move and have our being in… a universe with
obvious physical and organic dimensions [however] it is brought into being, sustained
in its existence, and drawn forward to its completion by knowledge and a personal
love[452].

Moreover, it is through the recognition of this 'personal universe' that different

patterns of commitment to friends and family can be empirically observed. While

sociological literature concentrates on analysis of alienated and fractured families, and

argues for the demise of a sense of community, it is possible to identify, even in such

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[450] The friendship Montaigne describes he has with his friend Etienne de La Boetie.
M. De Montaigne *On Friendship,* trans. M. A. Screech, (Suffolk: Penguin, 1991).

[451] I. Kant 'Lecture on Friendship' in Pakaluk, 1991. M., Pakaluk, (ed.) *Other Selves:
Philosophers on Friendship* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1991), pp. 208-218.

[452] J. Costello *John Macmurray: A Biography* (Bristol: Floris Books, 2002), p. 12,
emphasis in text, my brackets.

situations, examples of *philia* where people are well rooted in flexible, supportive and robust personal communities. The *L'Arche* communities seek to establish such networks of *philia* specifically for vulnerable people and their families. *L'Arche* is an international federation of organisations where people with and people without intellectual disabilities can and do share life together[453]. If these communities of *philia* have merit as paradigmatic communities of shared living between people of disparate status then this gives empirical support to the contention that people with and people without disabilities have common status as persons and should enjoy the same human rights.

Nevertheless, there are instances where the primary argument of Plato's *Lysis,* that human friendship and love is dominated by 'neediness' can be validated (cf. Vlastos[454], Versenyi[455]). For instance, modern works of fiction tend to depict friendships as 'an atmosphere of ambivalence'[456] or where close friendships lead to macabre and destructive rivalry[457]. However, Gadamer[458] presents an alternative reading and argues that in true *philia* we can and do love others for their own sake, and in a way that is not driven by any personal need. Sheffield[459], a contemporary classical scholar argues that Plato presents his account of *philia* in the *Phaedrus.* In this dialogue, Sheffield argues, Plato outlines three forms of *philia* that are comparable to the Aristotelian typology in each of the three speeches that occupy the dialogue. The three types of friendship Sheffield identifies are: '(i) pleasure–based friendship, (ii) friendship based on some kind of exchange of pledges, and (iii)

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[453] A full history of the development of L'Arche can be found in K. Spink, *Jean Vanier & L'Arche* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1990).

[454] G. Vlastos *Platonic Studies,* (Princeton N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 6-11.

[455] L. Versenyi 'Plato's Lysis' *Phronesis* **20**, 1975, pp. 185-198.

[456] J. Block *Friendship* (Gretna, LA: Wellness Institute, 1980), p. 84.

[457] For example the, movie from Ian McEwen Amsterdam.

[458] H. Gadamer *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Friendship,* trans. P. Christopher Smith, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 17-18.

[459] F. Sheffield, 'Beyond *Eros:* Friendship in the *Phaedrus*', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* **CXI,** 2, 2011, pp. 251-274.

friendship based on the recognition of good character'[460]. Moreover, the underlying assumption in each form of friendship differs from Aristotle in that:

The motivational structure of the agents concerned (their dominant *eros*) determines whether they will enter into an association of kind (i), (ii) or (iii), and for how long they are able to respond to the other, how consistently and for how long, and to what extent they are capable of showing the other party goodwill[461].

In Aristotle's account of the objects of friendship[462], he clearly distinguishes his view from that of Socrates' debate with Menexenus in the Lysis and Phaedrus, on the correct purpose of love. Aristotle plainly articulates two positions. The first position is that friendship *must* be reciprocal, that is, our *goodwill* is directed to other human beings and their interests and this *goodwill* is also directed by our *philos* to us:

For it would presumably be ridiculous to wish good things to wine, the most you wish is its preservation so that you can have it. To a friend, however, it is said; you must wish goods for his own sake[463].

Aristotle here contradicts the different views of Plato's position by arguing that if one party to a relationship does not experience affection and believes their friendly relations are not reciprocated, then what one expresses is *goodwill* rather than *philia*. Thus for Aristotle the mark of perfect *philia* is that when we look for and select a friend, one seeks the good and we will value another human if and so long as they seem good. Moreover humans count another as a 'friend' if both parties wish each other good separately not merely because they seek good for themselves individually. Or as Annas says: 'our lives would be significantly less full given the universal demise of friendship'[464].

The second position builds upon the first, and offers an initial definition of friendship as: 'Friends are aware of the reciprocated goodwill'[465]; and 'wish goods

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[460] Ibid, p. 258.

[461] Ibid, p. 259.

[462] 1155b16-1156a5, *NE*.

[463] 1155b29-31, Ibid.

[464] J. Annas, 'The Meaning, Value and Duties of Friendship' *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1987, **24**, pp. 349-356.

[465] 1155b35, Ibid.

and be aware of it from one of the causes mentioned above'[466] but this alone does not provide a clear definition of *philia*. For example, why is Aristotle adamant that reciprocal *goodwill* is indicative of 'real' *philia*? Of course, any *philia* is a continuing relationship between two or more people, but does friendship always rely on a reciprocal and shared goodwill? Could there be instances where one party is unable to reciprocate goodwill? Can one maintain a friendship if one does not feel loved by the other? And if so, for how long (with respect to time) can we sustain not feeling loved by a long-term friend? Furthermore, what is the relation between goodwill and affection that emanates from 'the causes' or lovable qualities? These lovable qualities are objects that are loved as the good, the pleasant and the useful. So does *goodwill* imply an appeal to 'friendly feeling'[467] for another or does our desire and need for other humans generate *goodwill*? Indeed, both could develop for other reasons. Other scholars have noticed this *goodwill* conundrum[468], and a possible solution is that there is one distinct realm of reciprocal *goodwill* – love based on the good, with the other's lovable qualities being secondary instances of attraction and thus inferior expressions of goodwill.

In his *Ethica Eudemia*[469], Aristotle accords a similar significance to 'goodwill' and 'friendly feeling' in his discussion of friendship. This first appears in an earlier work, the *Rhetoric*[470] where he describes friendship as a:

[a]…Friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about. A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in

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[466] 1156a5, Ibid..

[467] 1380b35, *Rhet.*

[468] For example, J Stewart *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics*, 2 volumes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), vol 2, p. 274.

[469] The *Eudemian Ethics* is considered by a number of scholars as a treatise that Aristotle wrote prior to the *NE*. Anthony Kenny is of a different view and in *Aristotle on the Perfect Life*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 113-142, he outlines an alternative position. Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* trans J. Solomon, in J. A. Smith and W. D Ross (eds.), 1915.

[470] 1380b35-1381a6, Aristotle, *Rhetorica,* trans. W. R. Roberts, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* (ed.) R. McKeon, (New York: The Modern Library, 2001). This text will now be referred to a *Rhet.*

return: those who think they feel towards each other think themselves friends, this being assumed it follows that your friend is the sort of man who shares your pleasures in what is good and your pain in what is unpleasant, for your sake and for no other reason.

In understanding friendship in Aristotle's ethics, this central notion of a friend as an individual who acts admirably towards another individual for their benefit, good or welfare and not purely out of concern for themselves is the basis of Aristotle's exposition. He clearly articulates the importance of friendship in the life of an individual when he says: 'no one would choose to live without friends, even if he had all other goods'[471]. Aristotle is adamant that an individual will experience *eudaimonia* through virtue or perfect friendship. Contemporary writers follow this line of thought with Telfer[472] and Blum[473] arguing that friendship is a form of moral excellence - specifically because if it promotes individuals to act in the interests of others. Indeed Blum examines friendship as a moral phenomenon in its own right. However, Cocking & Kennett[474] oppose this argument and observe that one may indeed be a perfect or best friend insomuch as your friend meets your personal requirements albeit an immoral friend. They argue that the good attributed by philosophical accounts of friendship 'seem false' and the pursuit of the welfare of our friend may lead us to 'miss much of the good of friendship'[475]. Moreover, in practice this may lead an individual to act in a manner that breaches legal or social norms by following their concern for a friend's interests. Aristotle may not of course support this notion, as he would not allow either friend to act against the wider interests of other individuals or by acting against the interest of their common society. Friedman[476] notes that one value of friendship to society can be in offering credence to forward-thinking values

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[471] 1155a2, *NE.*

[472] Telfer, pp. 223-241.

[473] L. Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality*, (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1980).

[474] D. Cocking and J. Kennett, 'Friendship and Moral Danger' *Journal of Philosophy*, 2000, **97**, pp. 278-296.

[475] Ibid, p. 296.

[476] M. Friedman, 'Friendship and Moral Growth' *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 1989, **23**, pp. 3-13.

that encourages and enables moral progress in society. Friendship manages to achieve this purpose by first offering models of 'particularized person-based commitment'[477]. In the first instance, this is a commitment to another unique person. This commitment permits us to understand another's personal history, needs, wants and so forth. That is, a friend supports us in practical and personal decision-making before we need to commit to abstract or more universal moral norms.

The Meaning of Friendship

The word used by Aristotle is *philia* and whilst our language translates it as friendship, it is, however, as Hughes[478] notes, a word derived from the verb *philein* and this is translated as 'to get on well with' or 'to like'. This is the sense that Hughes argues Aristotle ascribes to friendship; as one individual, we can naturally expect to 'get on well with' every individual we meet and interact with. Aristotle's concept is broader and more generic as he indicates that friendship is natural and:

Members of the same species and human beings most of all, have a natural friendship for each; that is why we praise friends of humanity. And in our travels, we can see how every human being is akin and beloved to a human being[479]

Thus, the two distinctions between the terms can be summarised as the modern notion of 'a term selectively used and applied by choice' as opposed to 'a natural attribute existing in all situations'. This thesis follows the classical view – 'a natural attribute existing in all situations'. In his discussion, Aristotle means to include personal relationships between individuals who are not related by kinship and a variety of kinship relationships between parents and children, sibling relationships and marriage partners. Aristotle also suggests that friendship is essential to an individual life irrespective of their financial status. He argues that we need friends both when we are financially solvent and have valued status as an individual and when we are poor:

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[477] Ibid, p.5.
[478] G. Hughes, *Aristotle on Ethics*, (London: Rutledge, 2001), p. 168.
[479] 1155a20—25, *NE.*

Indeed rich people and holders of powerful positions even more than other people, seem to need friends. For how would one benefit from such prosperity if one had no opportunity for beneficence, which is most often displayed, and most highly praised, in relation to friends? And how would one guard and protect prosperity without friends, when it is all the more precarious the greater it is? But in poverty also, and in the other misfortunes, people think friends are the only refuge[480]

Further, throughout a number of sections in Books VIII and IX, Aristotle mentions a number of different types of friendship-these include business relationships, public associations, political parties and what are viewed in our contemporary culture as 'civic' relationships[481].

Friendship as described by Aristotle is an expression of mutual kindness, warmth and friendly respect or regard for a friend for their sake without any expectation of self-interest. Aristotle's representation of friendship, to include such a varied group of people, can be considered contradictory unless friendship is understood within his moral theory as a whole, and as an essential requirement for leading a flourishing life filled with happiness. This friendship should naturally include family members, but of course not only them, and a clear example of how positive concern for family members can be exhibited and lead all members to flourish is described by de Vinck. De Vinck's account of his own and his family's life with his brother Oliver, a man with an intellectual disability, describe how reciprocal mutual kindness, warmth and friendly respect was exhibited towards and reciprocated by Oliver[482]. De Vinck clearly wants his reader to understand that Oliver contributed to his family leading a flourishing life and one where they *all* shared in happiness. Similarly, Aristotle is suggesting that in order to have good living, happiness or

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[480] 1155a6-12, *NE*.

[481] Aristotle includes the following individuals – young lovers (1156b2), lifelong friends (1156b12), cities with each other (1157a26), political or business contacts (1158a28), fellow voyagers and fellow soldiers (1159b28), members of the same religious society, or the same dinner club (1160a19) or the same clan (1161b14), and a tradesperson (cobbler) and his customer (1163b35). He would not include friendships between people with and people without an intellectual disability as he would consider these people outside of his scope.

[482] C. de Vinck, *The Power of Powerless: A Brother's Legacy of Love,* (New York: Doubleday, 1990).

eudaimonia [483] individual happiness inevitably implies shared happiness. An individual can have a range of friendships. Two individuals may experience, from each other physically and psychologically close, personal relations that develop their lives and facilitate their personal flourishing. In the wider sense, citizen type friendships that do not involve direct personal relationships can be linked or connected by a liking for each other and by wishing well to each other. The disability rights movement that began in Western Nations from the 1960's, starts with this premise. The movement emphasises that 'disability' is a negative label and that we should rather focus on what people can do and how we may all one day be dependent – on others for recognition of our mutual human connectedness, if we should become seriously ill or disabled. Our connection as humans is based on: 'the belief that the happy person lives well and goes well also with our account, since we have virtually said that the end is a sort of living and doing well'[484].

It will be useful to move from these broader-based societal notions to examine friendship at an individual level in order to test component parts of the relationship. Aristotle testifies that friendship is present when friends share their life together, share emotional intimacy and participate in joint activities. We propose to use narratives of friendships between people with and people without intellectual disabilities, from a variety of sources, to examine their experiences of sharing their lives together. Aristotle claims that individuals cannot understand each other without having spent time in each other's company:

They need time as well, to grow accustomed to each other, for, as the proverb says, they cannot know each other before they have shared their salt as it says, and they cannot accept each other or be friends until each person appears lovable to the other and gains the other's confidence[485].

Accordingly, Aristotle understands 'close' friends having such a relationship. Moreover, this implies, that friends do not have to keep each other's company at all

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[483] 1098a3-18, *NE.*
[484] 1098b22-23, *NE.*
[485] 1156b30-31, *NE.*

times or in all activities and indeed he also suggests that we not need to have character-friendships with many individuals. He raises the question: 'of excellent people, however, should we have as many as possible friends or is there some proper measure of their number, as of the number of a city?'[486]. He does not answer this question precisely or with direct reference to specific number rather in terms of general principles. Aristotle answers the question in this way as he views friendship as a 'natural quality'. This follows from the earlier discussion of the etymology of '*philia*', which emphasise the presence of shared goodwill. The goodwill amongst 'close' friends is a commitment to sharing meaningful information with one another that is of a personal and significant psychological nature. Thus, he maintains:

> Presumably, then, it is good not to seek as many friends as possible, and good to have no more than enough for living together; indeed it even seems impossible to be extremely close to many people. That is why it also seems impossible to be passionate in love with many people, since passionately erotic love tends to be an excess of friendship, and one has this for one person; hence, also one has extremely close friendship for a few people. This would seem to be borne out in what people do. For the friendship of companions is not found in groups of many people, and the friendships celebrated in song are always between two people[487].

If friends have goodwill for each other does, this goodwill interferes with individual autonomy? Thomas[488] argues that friends can have a low degree of intimacy in their friendship, that is, friends may minimally reveal their interior experiences to each other and spend a negligible amount of time together. His view is in contrast with Sherman[489] who argues for a high level of familiarity between friends. This occurs because the friends share values, decision-making, thought, emotions, and spend time with each other. Both views imply that individuals retain individual autonomy though in different ways.

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[486] 1170b30-31, *NE.*

[487] 1171a7-16, *NE.*

[488] L. Thomas, 'Friendship' *Synthese*, 1987, 72, 217-236; L. Thomas, 'Friends and Lovers' in G. Graham & H. LaFollette (eds.), *Person to Person,* (Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 1989), pp. 182-198; L. Thomas, 'Friendship and Other Loves' in Neera Kapur, Badhwar (ed) *Friendship; A Philosophical Reader*, (Ithaca: Cornwall University Press, 1993,) pp. 48-64.

[489] Sherman, 1989, pp. 118-156.

Notably, the features of society the Athenian inhabited over 2,300 years ago can offer us some understanding of what this vision may and been and the place that friendship occupied in it for him. First Athens was a city-state with an estimated population of about 30-40,000 people, with a basic form of participatory democracy as its political system. Athenian society gave primacy to social order-based on the view that every individual had a pre-determined role and a place in it. The dominant relational paradigm in Aristotle's society concerns to what we might regard as 'pre-political groups'[490], where people are linked together in extensive networks of private partnerships. Indeed, Herman[491] notes the emerging metropolitan structure of the city-state overlaid and yet failed to dispense with this dense web of interpersonal relationships. He maintains that there are three sets[492] of complex yet co-existing relations to this archaic society: (a) *xenos, idioxenos* and *doryxenos*[493]*;* (b) *philos, hetairos, epitedeois, anankaios* and *oikeios;* and (c) *syngenes* and *euergetes*[494].

The critical feature of each form of relation is: 'a bond of solidarity manifesting itself in an exchange of goods and services between individuals originating from separate social units'[495]. Aristotle's discussion of *philia* occurs in this context and most probably his discussion in the *Ethics* refers to the most personal forms of relations that: 'imply special relations of friendships, trust, loyalty, reciprocity and mutual aid between the people they characterize'[496]. The society as it regulated the population appears to parallel the caste system that may be found, for example, in ancient India. Friendship, for Aristotle is one of the summits of human life, it is a product of virtuous living and in its most perfect form is a relationship of openness, directness, mutuality and presence. In addition, he recapitulates the

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[490] G. Herman *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 6.
[491] Ibid, p. 6.
[492] Ibid, p. 10.
[493] These relations refer to individuals to originate from different social units.
[494] These relations refer to individuals of the same or different social origin.
[495] Herman, 1987, p. 10.
[496] Ibid, p.11.

importance of friends as individuals who care for each other and have mutual interactions as: 'people [can] have goodwill to each other, since they wish goods and give help in time of need'[497]. Further, if friends are to have mutual concern for each other, they will also have 'deeper' or more intimate relationships with each other than with other individuals towards whom they might also have *goodwill.*

'Intimacy' here as a philosophical concept is worthy of a full discussion in its own right but for our purposes, I take Aristotle to mean that: 'it is a hard business for this condition[498] to be fulfilled with a large number of people. He suggest too that it is difficult, to rejoice and grieve in an intimate way with many people'[499]. Thus 'intimacy' in the context of Aristotle's view of friendship is attained when a person expresses emotional or psychological understanding when their friend is experiencing happiness or grief. He argues that a friend is a 'separate self'[500]; is like a mirror for that person as they share a similarity of character and, given our limited understanding of ourselves, we can better discern our strengths and weakness by knowing a friend who reflects our character. Aristotle's view of friendship as a mirror, that is, your friend being a reflection of yourself, is criticised by Cocking & Kennett[501] for two reasons – firstly friends are be different and secondly, this metaphor gives a sense of passivity to friendship. There is of course more than the goodwill and attachment that friends share, and friends may have very different character and on occasions may be inert. These aspects do not fully account for the unity that friends can feel about their personal relation, and to which Aristotle may be referring. Telfer's view of accord is comparable to Aristotle's view that friends hold up a mirror when she states: 'the bond

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[497] 1158a7, *NE,* my brackets.
[498] Previously Aristotle has discussed friends spending time together and the 'condition' refers to friends spending time together
[499] 1171a5-7, *NE.*
[500] 1170b7, *NE.*
[501] D. Cocking & J. Kennett, 'Friendship & the Self' *Ethics*, 1998, **108**, 502-27

may be…a similar style of mind or way thinking which makes for a high degree of empathy'[502].

Aristotle's use of the metaphor a 'second self'[503] to represent a friend naturally gives rise to the question: Is there a self? The kernel of this thought is that a friend is separate from you; yet they promotes our good in a way that is respectful of our agency; we also of course promote their good in this way. Nonetheless, our friend is similar to who we are and we will realizes particular virtues, to different degrees, and finally gain in self-knowledge through our relationship. Modern philosophers such as Anscombe[504], Dennett[505] and Kenny[506] question whether there is a valid concept of the self. Indeed, Kenny argues the term 'self' is a grammatical fiction arising from our use of terms like, 'my house'; 'my car';' and myself' presupposing that the 'self' is an entity similar to a car or a house. Nevertheless, the concept of the self had a different significance in Aristotle's society[507], based on the assumption that individuals are *instances* [or exemplars] of 'types' to which they belong. Though there are a number of views of the 'self' in Greek thought, Sorabji argues that this notion of the 'self' develops from our human inability to live in the world without understanding phenomena from an 'I' perspective and that this is logically connected to the words, phrases and ideas that guide action and emotion[508]. While this may sound like an egocentric analysis, Sorabji's point in mentioning the 'I' perspective is that it represents *only* one embodied human with numerous characteristics, thus this person is one:

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[502] Telfer, 1970-1971.

[503] For example, 1166a33, *NE.*

[504] E. Anscombe 'The first person' in *Collected Philosophical Papers*, vol 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[505] D. Dennett *Consciousness Explained*, (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1991).

[506] A. Kenny 'Body, Soul and Intellect in Aquinas' in James Crabbe, (ed.) *From Soul to Self*, (Routledge, London 1999).

[507] Charles Taylor traces a history of the self in *Sources of the Self,* (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 111-127.

[508] R. Sorabji *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, (New York: University Press, 1983), chapter 3.

Who has psychological states and does things, by a 'thinker' someone who has thoughts. This having and doing can be summed up by saying that a person owns psychological states and actions. He or she also owns a body and bodily characteristics. A person is not just a stream of experiences and actions, but the owner of experiences and actions.[509].

Indeed this reading of a person is congruent with Taylor's view that 'the identity of the autonomous, self-determining individual requires a social matrix'[510] and it is on to this 'social matrix' that I now focus.

There are other occasions where Aristotle uses similar terms about the nature of the relationship a friend has to oneself. At first glance this resonates with the common view that we know of no better way to treat another person than the way we want to be treated. Nevertheless how suitable is this idea of self-reference, for clearly in his other works Aristotle distinguishes individuals as numerically different beings? Like the metaphor of the mirror, the Golden Rule is also ambiguous for it is not clear whether Aristotle wants one to love a friend as a reflection of oneself or as an extension of oneself-albeit a separate being with different qualities and perhaps different needs? Further, should a friend be loved as a part of oneself or as an independent end-in-themselves (cf. Kant)?

Considering how the metaphor is used in the other contexts it will be useful to seek some clarification here.

First, Aristotle uses 'second self' term to state: 'a parent, then, loves his children as [he loves] himself. For what has come from him is a sort of other himself [it is other because] it is separate from him'[511]. Aristotle appears to say that children are to be loved as discrete and unique beings for a number of reasons that include the fact they are related biologically to their parents and that they may carry the memory

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[509] R. Sorabji *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 21.

[510] C. Taylor, *The Explanation of Behaviour*, (London: Routledge, 1964), p. 209.

[511] 1161b27-29, *NE.*

of their parent's lives after their death[512]. The second occasion in the *Ethics* where Aristotle uses the term 'second self' follows his discussion of the different attributes of *philia* and where he argues that they are 'psychologically intelligible and rationally defensible'[513] for virtuous people. In the text where he states a friend is 'related...to himself, since the friend is another self'[514] Irwin argues this text is important for it demonstrates that:

(1) Self-love is sometimes good, since the virtuous person has it (iX 8). (2) The friend is an another self (1161b28; 1166a31), insofar as we treat him as we treat ourselves. (3) We can justify friendship if we can justify treating other people as other selves (ix 7,9)[515].

In the final passage[516] to analyze, Aristotle seems to claim that it is only in 'complete' *philia* that one gains in self-knowledge and I follow Irwin[517], Sherman[518] & Cooper's[519] contributions to this topic. To paraphrase: a good life compels exceptional activity and if perception or understanding is what defines human life, then to live this life to the full will entail we have self-insight relating to that activity. Furthermore, this admirable activity though pleasurable and intrinsically good, is improved through the congenial awareness of it. Friends are part of this life and it is through our *philia* we can learn about ourselves when we perceive that the actions of another person are similar to own. For example, Aristotle states, a reason why one needs a virtuous friend is: 'given that he decides to observe virtuous actions that are

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[512] Aristotle earlier in *De Anima* dismisses this desire for immortality as a uniquely distinct desire as he argues many animals may have this desire and thus it is more readily classified as an animal activity. For example, he writes that animals and plants reproduce '*in order that they may have a share in the immortal and divine n the only way they can; for every creature strives for this*'. 415b3-6 Aristotle, *De Anima*, trans. J. A. Smith in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, (ed) R. McKeon, (New York: The Modern Library, 2001). This text will now be referred to as *DeA*.

[513] Irwin, 1999, p. 291.

[514] 1166a31, *NE*.

[515] Ibid, p. 291.

[516] 1169b30-1170b14, *NE*.

[517] Ibid.

[518] Sherman 1989, pp. 138-144.

[519] Cooper, 1977, pp. 298-302.

his own, the actions of a virtuous friend are of this sort'[520]. It is through another person that we can understand ourselves from 'a point of view outside ourselves'[521] and this differs from a man considering himself, and his own decisions from his own point of view, therefore a 'friend [is] choice worthy'[522] to help us to be more objective. Self-knowledge is then a branch of knowledge and requires individuals to discern what is unique to their own character and their life, if this is not the case then: 'to overlook differences is ultimately to obscure an awareness of self[523]. Cooper[524] replies to the two obvious and immediate objections that self-knowledge is a 'precarious accomplishment'[525]. He argues first, that it is plausible that one can secure greater impartiality about a friend than neutrality about ourselves, and second, the friend in question is not limited to kinship, and therefore it is sensible to have belief and confidence in our own trusted feelings, which follow from our historical experience and continuity.

In summary then, in my earlier exposition of Cooper's argument (pp. 109-116 and at beginning of thesis, pp. 28-31), it was argued that within each rubric of *philia* there are possibly different degrees or a matrices to intimacy that permits several different types of 'complete'[526] *philia*. I believe Aristotle is arguing that, the friends who stand in these different degrees of 'complete'[527] *philia* share in a unity that enables them to share in one another's consciousness while remaining distinct beings. This follows from the feelings related to our experiences when alive and from the pleasure we secure through activity, so to in our *philia*, we understand a friend is alive

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[520] 1170a4, *NE.*
[521] Sherman, 1989, p. 143.
[522] 1170b18, *NE.*
[523] Sherman, 1989, p. 144.
[524] Cooper 1977b, pp. 298-302.
[525] Ibid, p. 300.
[526] 1156b7, *NE*.
[527] Ibid.

and exists through our mutual shared life and experiences. I propose then our friend

is another self, as Aristotle states:

The excellent person is related to his friend in the same way as he is related to himself, since a friend is another himself. Therefore, just as his own being is choice-worthy for him, his friend's being is choice worthy for him in the same and similar way. We agreed that someone's own being is choice worthy because he perceives that he is good, and this sort of perception is pleasant in itself. He must, then, perceive his friend's being together [with his own], and he will do this when they live together and share conversation and thought. For in the case of human beings what seems to count, as living together is this sharing of conversation and thought, not sharing the same pasture, as in the case of grazing animals[528].

This form of *philia* is congruent with a personalist philosophy. At its core, personalism promotes human persons; it promotes authentic and intimate communication amongst human beings as persons. For Mounier, 'the personal mode of existing is the highest form of existence'[529] with the personal mode being that way we humans interact with other persons, nature and the universe. Personalism will them emphasise the value of humans developing and sustaining character-types of personal relationships. These types of *philia* are consistent with two separate embodied beings that are interconnected by joint activities that serve to offer personal reward in a way that each friend shares in the other's *eudaimonia*. As noted earlier[530], for Aristotle the number of personal *philia* that one will have is limited.

The final important characteristic to an individual friendship is the notion of friends engaged in shared activities. Aristotle states:

For friendship is a partnership, and as a man is to himself, so he is to his friend; now in his own case the consciousness of his being desirable, and so therefore is the consciousness of his friend's being, and the activity of this consciousness is produced when they live together, so that it is natural that they aim at this. And whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for whose the sake they value life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with their friends; and so some drink together others dice together, others join in athletic exercises and hunting, or in study of philosophy, each class spending their days together in whatever they love most in life[531].

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[528] 1170b5-14, *NE.*

[529] E. Mounier, *Personalism* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, trans. P. Mairet, 1952), p. xviii.

[530] 1171a10-13, *NE.*

[531] 1171b32-1172a7, *NE.*

Accordingly, Aristotle's friends are involved in or connected to each other through activities. Contemporary writers debate the extent of the emotional connection between friends. As mentioned with 'intimacy', Thomas[532] argues that the 'joint activities' can be minimal and thus the friends will have a nominal level of activity to their friendship. Schoeman[533] claims that friendship has value in itself and its activities occur in a 'unique community'[534]. Sherman[535] argues for friendship to be understood as two individuals being in agreement or harmony in terms of shared values, deliberation and thought. This form of friendship signifies friends as having a strong degree of activity and intimacy. Thus, individuals who share a level of intimacy within a friendship will also have shared activities and a shared lifestyle to a greater or lesser extent.

Types of Friendships

Aristotle proposes there are three forms of friendship[536] depending upon what actually draws the individuals together in the first instance and which then connects or binds the individuals during the course of their friendship. Two important considerations are preliminaries to his discussion: The first is that friendship does not occur between 'soulless objects'[537] (Aristotle offers the example of an individual 'wishing good'[538] to his wine and explains this cannot be, because wine cannot offer you goodwill nor can the relationship be mutual). The second component is Aristotle's view of goodwill that endorses the definition in the *Rhetoric* when he states that friendship exists only when you wish good to the other individual for his sake and this well-meaning is given in return:

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[532] Thomas, 1987 and 1993.

[533] F. Schoeman, 'Aristotle on the Good of Friendship' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy,* 1985, **63,** pp. 269-282.

[534] Ibid, p. 280

[535] Sherman, 1993, pp. 91-108.

[536] 1157a7–b4, *NE.*

[537] 1155b29, *NE.*

[538] 155b30, *NE.*

To a friend, however, it is said you must wish good things for his own sake. If you wish good things in this way, but the same wish is not returned by the other, you would be said to have [only] goodwill for the other. For friendship is said to be *reciprocated* goodwill[539].

John Cooper[540] notes that this view of Aristotle is significant as it occurs prior to his discussion on friendship in his *Ethics*. Thus, Aristotle holds the view that irrespective of the form of friendship, the notion of reciprocal goodwill or 'wishing the other good' is essential to his concept of friendship.

To reiterate Aristotle's three forms of friendship are: friendship based on pleasure; those based on utility and friendship that is complete and based on moral goodness. I now consider these forms of friendship. Aristotle suggests that friendships based on pleasure and utility are 'incidental'[541] in so much as such friendships are maintained between the people involved as long as it meets their needs. Further, it is Aristotle's view that all forms of friendship do have these common characteristics though the third sort has the unique characteristic that it focuses on the approbation of the qualities of the friend's character[542]. We can identify a three-fold explanation as to why Aristotle suggests his third sort of friendship as 'complete'[543]. The *first* characteristic is that the nature of such friendship relates to the inherent or essential qualities of the individual and does not depend on exterior qualities like physical attributes, social status and so forth. A *second* feature of complete friendship is demonstrated by the capacity of the friends to sustain their friendship. This is more probable when it arises from their character or intrinsic characteristics rather than pleasure or utility. When a friendship based on utility, pleasure ceases to provide pleasure, or utility to one of the individuals involved then the friendship will be terminated. However, if an alternative utility or pleasure exists or develops between the friends, then the friendship might continue. For

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[539] 1155b31-35, *NE,* brackets and emphasis in text.
[540] Cooper, 1977a, p. 625.
[541] 1156a18, *NE*
[542] Hughes, 2001, p. 170.
[543] 1156b8, *NE.*

example, John and Fred may both enjoy maintaining the nature strip beside their houses and once they have cleared the site and organised a roster to maintain the garden area their friendship dissolves. However, if in clearing the nature strip, they discover a shared interest and pleasure in attending the local cricket team matches, and then they could now develop a friendship that involves attending the local cricket team matches. By contrast, complete friendship is sustainable because the virtues that give rise to the friendship will continue to demonstrate the same admirable qualities in all of their interactions – for 'virtue' by definition is a fixed disposition of character. Does this mean that, if my friend changes his evaluative outlook due to my interactions with him, then am I becoming responsible for sustaining these new virtues and their further development? This is true for Milligram[544] who explains Aristotle's claim that a friend is 'another self'[545] because one comes to love the other as oneself and this is why friendship is permanent. In the previous chapter, Risse noted that deepening her friendship with Elise enabled her to make a long-term commitment to their relationship

Thirdly, complete friendship is commendable 'without qualification'[546]. Because friendship is 'not for any incidental reason'[547], friends desire and want good things for each other; the friends also spend time together; they are pleasant and beneficial to each other and both friends judge as good the actions of the other. Nate Hajdu's poem about his friend, Charlie Swenson, a man with a severe intellectual disability may offer an understanding of how a friend is 'another self' and a friend 'without qualification'. In his poem, Hajdu articulates how despite Charlie and his

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[544] E. Millgram, 'Aristotle on Making Other Selves' *Canadian Journal of Philosophy,* 1987, **17**, pp. 361-376.
[545] 1166a3, *NE.*
[546] 1156b17, *NE.*
[547] 1156b13, *NE.*

different characters, he has come to understand what it means to be human in a fully comprehensive manner through their relationship[548]. He states:

His availability: Feeds my desire to be needed
I keep his secrets: He keeps mine
     We have an arrangement
His lack of self-consciousness: Leads to my tolerance
His constant need for stimulation: Leads to my patience
His discomfort: Sharpens my sensitivity
His unhappiness: Is my challenge
His presence: Eases my isolation
His loyalty: Leads to my loyalty
Which leads to mutual appreciation[549].

In Hughes[550] discussion of Aristotle's view of friendship, he questions as to whether Aristotle is an ethical egotist for presenting friendship in terms of one seeking self-affirmation thorough one's friends. By clarifying 'egotism' and 'altruism' and he concludes that the argument is false[551]. Nevertheless, is it appropriate to show higher regard for a friend than another person with whom you are not as well acquainted? Friendship is ultimately connected to ethics and must be able to justify an individual's preferential actions towards a friend. Stocker[552], Blum[553], Cocking and Oakley[554], arguments derived deontological and consquentionalist ethics to reject Aristotle's account of friendship. Deontologists and consequentialists argue that our special duties to our friends should not outweigh (morally speaking) our moral duties to others, because we ought to exercise moral impartiality in our actions towards all individuals. Stocker's view[555] is that a consequentialist and deontological analysis implies that Aristotle's view leads to a kind of 'moral schizophrenia'[556], where, a split

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[548] Reinders, 2008, pp. 380-381.

[549] Ibid, p. 380.

[550] Hughes, 2001, pp. 172-79.

[551] Ibid.

[552] M. Stocker, 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories' *Journal of Philosophy*, 1976, 73, 453-466 & M. Stocker, 'Values and Purposes: The limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship' *Journal of Philosophy*. 1981, **78**, pp. 747-765.

[553] Blum, 1980.

[554] D. Cocking & J. Oakley, 'Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship and the Problem of Alienation' *Ethics*, 1995, **106**, pp. 86-111.

[555] Stocker, 1976, p. 454.

[556] Ibid.

develops between a person's moral reasons for acting towards a friend on the one hand and our general moral motives to other people on the other hand. Stoker notes:

One can, of course, act for the sake of friendship. Here the friendship is part of the act's goal. But as I shall argue, to act for such a goal is, as such, to do a different act and an act with a different sort of value than is done when one acts out of friendship. Indeed, when one acts out of friendship, friendship is not, as such, a goal, but rather it plays both sensitivity and a sine qua non role[557].

This can produce a discord that affects an individual's ability to sustain or develop friendships with others. Blum[558] and Friedman[559] both take issue with the ideal of impartiality in consequentialism and deontology – where partiality is the concern for a specific friend for their sake. They understand deontology and consequentialism as implying that all relationships are equivalent. If this were the case, this would require us to show partiality to all individuals and be essentially biased in each case, something that would be intrinsically immoral. Therefore, Blum[560] suggests that the only care a consquentionalist or deontologist ought show to a friend is that which derives from a general concern for him 'as a human being'. This has to follow in spite of any psychological or emotional attachment developed through shared activity or shared interior experiences and activities with other people. The conclusion is that deontology and consequentialism are unable to develop a coherent theory of moral value in friendship because they cannot adequately account for shared liking and the personal positive views we hold of our friends. The next chapter considers in detail the challenge integrity poses to utilitarianism. Cooper[561] defends Aristotle's view of friendship because he understands its complex nature and distinguishes between the three different kinds of friendship. This reinforces our need for discriminating between degrees of intimacy in the three different kinds of friendships.

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[557] Stoker, 1981, p. 760.
[558] Blum, 1980.
[559] Friedman, 1980.
[560] Blum, 1980, p. 206
[561] Cooper, 1977a, pp. 626-629.

Finally, Aristotle completes his definition of *philia* by distinguishing five essential criteria components of *philia*[562].

1. A friend 'wishes and does goods or apparent goods'[563] to his friend;

2. A friend will 'wish the friend to be and to live'[564]. (Indeed this interpretation might be read as my friend loving and caring for me and wanting my life to continue).

3. *Philia* is revealed in friends spending time together.

4. Friends will make the same choices.

5. Friends share in each other's 'distress and enjoyment'[565].

I note that it is possible to interpret Aristotle as suggesting that these five features are most clearly exemplified by mothers in their caring role in relation to children and the components are then extended to *philia*[566], Although Aristotle does not make this claim. While Aristotle seems to refer to the most perfect interactions as those between a mother and child, there are instances where the relationship is abusive. However, the relationship between a mother and child is generally appropriate to illustrate how friendship helps the dependent child to develop and mature to adulthood.

Matrices of Friendship

Aristotle suggests friendships are initiated when one individual admires and is attracted to the properties or characteristics of another, which the other reciprocates. Put more simply, the kinds of friendship are defined by the outlook or purpose the individuals have towards each other. It is possible to understand individuals developing either pleasure-centred or utility-centred friendships, because of the

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[562] 1166a1-1166b29, *NE.*
[563] 1166a3, Ibid.
[564] 11bba3, Ibid.
[565] 1166a8, Ibid.
[566] 1166a9-10, Ibid.

perceived advantage or pleasure each individual believes they will achieve through the friendship. For instance, I might develop an advantage-relationship when I actively cultivate a friendship with John, my immediate Supervisor at my workplace, as I know he will decide who will be succeed him when he retires from the workforce next month. Thus, friendship can be a means for people to achieve certain benefits. For example, John may be my friend as we both enjoy fishing and drinking beer together. However, I may not invite him into my house or introduce him to my other friends as I judge his verbal communication offensive in general social situations. Thus, we can distinguish a range and type of excellence within each of the forms of friendships. Each form of friendship is necessarily linked to the particular type of connection between the individuals even if the attachment is based on incomplete scrutiny of the individual. In other words, it is not possible to evaluate an individual friendship if and only if one of the primary attributes or connections is taken into account. Friendships in reality are multi-dimensional. They can be fragile, delicate, and magical - often defying exact explanation. They are complex and need to be understood within the context of the particular environment in which they occur and from a number of different perspectives. It is not solely the activity that needs to be considered but also the emotions behind the attraction as these can also be equally important to the friendship between individuals.

While Aristotle describes virtue friendship as 'perfect', there is no reason to assume that he did not recognise varying degrees of perfection within this form. Perfect friendship by definition will be faultless – the individuals will have mutual good will towards each other and recognise, respect and admire each other's use of the virtues in all instances. Indeed, if perfect then our friend might be a God with the relation being one of a human to a non-human'[567]. A friend may recognise a specific instance of virtuous activity in another friend, whilst acknowledging their character or

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[567] cf 1159a8-10, this is where Aristotle suggests we do not wish the 'greatest good' for our friend, if we do then they become a God and no longer our friend.

total actions are deficient. For example, my friend may demonstrate temperance in experiencing bodily pleasure and pain and generosity in giving and retaining money. However, my friend may also demonstrate impulsiveness in new ventures and is daunted by public speaking. Indeed, I may have traits that they both admire and find perplexing Therefore our friendship may contain elements of the perfect-type friendship, because we mutually recognise our performances of virtuous activities even though we do not yet have a perfectly virtuous character. This is equivalent to friends maintaining a friendship based on the probability of obtaining partial, though not complete, utility or pleasure from the friendship. The difference in perfect friendship is the *raison d'etre* of the relationship. What attracts and cements perfect friendship is the mutual expression of reciprocal goodwill, based on the qualities of one another's characters, their ability to demonstrate virtuous behaviour while each friend seeks the good for the other's sake. This is part of the degrees of perfect friendship even if the degree of virtue or perfection is limited and has elements of poor personal characteristics.

There are varieties of virtue friendship in Aristotle's discussion of what he considers unequal friendships. Indeed, whilst he gives priority to perfect friendship[568], he observes that unequal friendships exists:

There are three kinds of friendship as we said in the beginning and within each type some friendships rest on equality, others are in accord with superiority. For equally good people can be friends, but also a better or worse person; and the same is true of friends for pleasure and utility, since they may be either equal or unequal in their benefits.[569].

As a former member of Plato's Academy, Aristotle was aware of his emphasis on the Forms and it is reasonable to suggest that he views 'perfect' friendship as an ideal form. Aristotle follows Plato in taking the virtues to be central to a well-lived life and to an appreciation of friendship, as these goods will assist an individual in living well. However, for Aristotle there will not be 'one' perfect 'form' of friendship rather in

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[568] 1128b30-33, *NE.*
[569] 1162a35-b3, *NE.*

each form there will be diverse permutations of forms. So, in all types of friendship, one may experience a greater amount of advantage, pleasure or virtue than the other individual whilst continuing to maintain the association on this basis.

Aristotle gives a number of examples of virtue friendship that are unequal, these include: 'of father towards his son, for instance, and in general of an older person towards a younger, of a man to woman, and of any sort of ruler towards the one, he rules'[570]. Friendship amongst the above groups (indeed any unequal group) will never be quite the same. Aristotle says: 'for each of these friends has a different virtue and a different function, and there are different causes of love. Hence, the ways of loving are different and so are the friendships'[571]. In noting the power differential in some relationships, Aristotle states that unequal-type friendships can never be the same as friendships between people in equivalent societal roles. The friends, by virtue of their status are unequal - even if they are the most virtuous of their particular sort.

For example, Aristotle argues that men are morally superior to women, so a friendship between the most excellent man and most excellent woman will never be equal, as the former is superior to the latter. Whether men and women are 'identical' is a scientific question and whether they are 'equal' is a moral or political matter. Indeed, the caste-based societies in which Aristotle lived will have influenced his view that men are superior to women. Therein of course lies one of the shortcomings of his ethics.

Aristotle's notion is that no matter how excellent an individual is, their given status determines their maximum capacity to exhibit the virtues proper to that status, and this will always be different (and hence) unequal amongst the individuals of different rank. However, no matter how archaic and patronising Aristotle's views may appear, he does offer a further example of the differential power relations in friendship. Aristotle discusses what occurs when circumstances change in a

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[570] 1158b11-14, *NE.*
[571] 1158b17-20, *NE.*

friendship[572]. Aristotle states that the 'better person' should remain friends with the less virtuous person providing the changed circumstance is not a result of the other party's 'excessive wickedness'

'Unequal' relationships were explored more recently in the writings of Michel Foucault. The value of the contemporary French Philosopher's treatises is in his study of differential power relations and the effect these have on the interpersonal dynamics between individuals and institutions in a society. Aristotle does argue that[573] 'precision' is more difficult to determine in the field of ethics than in the physical sciences. Whilst Foucault[574] supports this view and he further argues that economics, medicines and the human sciences are also inexact and rely on a 'truth' that is less stable and difficult to control. The troubling reality is that the power afforded to experts with knowledge of these sciences gives them authority and ability to control people to influence human potential, human endeavours and to shape the future of the human life in general.

The actions of individuals occur in complex and stratified webs of relationships that can be difficult to untangle and to discern the exact nature of different friendships. Nowhere is this more evident than in the relations between people with and people without intellectual disabilities. I propose our technocratic society supports the maintenance of unequal power relations, and this positions people with an intellectual disability as secondary agents. This follows from the priority given in most societies to rationality, verbal skills and intelligence as the primary means of living well in society. Inevitably, in this context of this reality, people with intellectual disabilities are marginalised and it is difficult for such individuals to form and sustain character friendships. Indeed other groups of people are also accorded a secondary place in this hierarchical matrix. Nonetheless, 'character' relationships are

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[572] 165a36-1165b35, *NE.*
[573] 1094b12-27, *NE.*
[574] M. Foucault, 'Politics and the Study of Discourse' *Ideology and Consciousness* **3**, 1978, pp. 7-26.

possible and people like Gonxha Bojaxhiu, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, the Dalai Lama, Aung San Suu Kyi, and Jean Vanier point a way forward. These people possess a: 'virtue, a heroic and divine kind of nature'[575] through their life long commitment to and engagement in the quest for the divine and social justice on earth.

Aristotle clearly says the view that the superlative form of friendship is virtue or perfect friendship[576] amongst individuals who are identical in virtue and are excellent in character. As noted, Cooper[577] translates Aristotle's 'friendship of the good' as 'character friendship' and argues that it is a more appropriate term. Cooper's rationale is that the latter term more precisely describes the meaning that Aristotle ascribes to friendship insofar as it is a person's 'character' - personal qualities and good deeds that attract the individuals. This attraction exists even if a friend exhibits imperfect actions. Nancy Sherman[578] concurs with this view of 'character friendship' and further states that it is through this form or type of friendship that an individual is provided with emotional and rational self-knowledge, and is enabled to comprehend virtue and attain happiness. It is likely that Aristotle believes that for the majority, these perfect friendships are unattainable and limited. Therefore, if friendships are valuable because they contribute to a life of *eudaimonia* for me, I am unable to replace these friends with other friends even if the latter provide me with equivalent *eudaimonia?* Brink[579] argues that historical continuity is a significant variable in real friendship and Sherman[580] will share this account of friendship and accordingly also refute the notion of fungiblity in friendships.

This section explored friendship from an Aristotelian perspective by analysing different forms of relationships, the possible emotional and motivational dispositions

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[575] 1145a20, *NE.*

[576] 156b6-36, *NE.*

[577] Cooper, 1977a, p. 629.

[578] Sherman, 1989

[579] D. O. Brink, 'Eudaimonia, Love and Friendship and Political Community, *Social Philosophy & Policy*, **16,** 1999, pp. 252-289.

[580] Sherman, 1989.

associated with these relationships in order to develop an approach which can do justice to our relationships with people with intellectual disabilities. If friendship as described by Aristotle is an expression of mutual kindness, warmth and friendly respect or regard for a friend for one's sake without any expectation of self-interest, then it becomes applicable to a wider variety of relationships between people of different abilities and potential. Contemporary philosophers typically ignore friendships between people with and without intellectual disabilities for them the latter are usually placed outside the criteria of moral personhood. It is possible that an explanation for their exclusion of people with intellectual disabilities from the status of moral persons is due to the limited forms of personal engagement in relationships most of us have with people with intellectual disabilities.

Conclusion

It is my belief this analysis of the nature of this wider interpretation of friendship will assist in understanding relationships with people with intellectual disabilities and may offer a degree of explanation for alienation between people to general and even general interpersonal conflict between individuals. Obviously, tension can occur because one of the parties in a dispute is of the opinion that their relationship is different from the expectations of the other party in a 'friendship'. The strength of the tension is influenced by the degree of psychological intimacy the individuals have experienced with each other and can easily intensify and develop into adverse relations when the expectations differ widely and their differences are not resolved.

This chapter explored friendship from an Aristotelian perspective by analysing different forms of relationships, the possible emotional and motivational dispositions associated with these relationships in order to develop an approach which can do justice to our relationships with people with intellectual disabilities. The next chapter continues in an Aristotelian theme and considers change and decision making as essential components to our being.

Chapter 5: Ousia and Friendship

Introduction

Because I believe we have established that a human being is a person who exists in and through a web of dependent and interdependent *philia* and this chapter argues that, the classical concept of Οὐσία (now referred to as *ousia*) can assist us in understanding individual personal identity.

Ousia

Our account of *philia* suggests that the nature if a human being [its *ousia*] is realised in the act of 'coming into being' and thus implies an alternative standard, a vibrant ontology that comprehends change as an essential characteristic of the personal identity of human beings[581]. This could be referred to as perdurantism – as discussed by McKinnon[582]; that is a four dimensional being who has a past and a future with many temporal parts with differentiated phases in its existence. Analysis of Aristotle's use of *energeia, dynamis* and *entelecheia*[583]reveals a dynamic nature to *ousia* and understanding individual personal identity in terms of interdependent forms of *philia* must respects the role of change and differentiation in human life. Hence, personal identity shows consideration for the historical experiences of sensible beings and the alterations that occur in the special longevity of the being itself are integrated and have the potential to offer unity to an individual's life. Further, my account of

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[581] C. P. Long, 'Towards a Dynamic Conception of *ousia:* Rethinking an Aristotelian Legacy' located at http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anci/AnciLong.htm. 2008, the second reference is: Edel, 1982. Professor Edel's work is detailed and lucid and Chapter 2 (pp. 39-136) is of particular significance to this discussion of *ousia.* A. Edel, *Aristotle and His Philosophy,* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

[582] N. McKinnon, 2002, 'The Endurance/Perdurance Distinction' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy,* 80, 3, pp. 288-306 highlights the definitional difficulties associated with 'perdurantism ' and for the sake of brevity propose understating perdurantism as a philosophical theory of persistence and identity as being the claim that objects have distinct spatial and temporal parts.

[583] Aristotle discusses these concepts in Books Z, H, & Θ (VII, VIII & IX), *Meta.*

personal identity must be able to account for the historical experiences of sensible beings and the alterations that occur in them over their life span. It must be able to explain how these are integrated and have the potential to offer a developing unity to an individual's life. For example, in our everyday friendships, we doe not completely enter into social relations with others; typically, we limit our actions, activities and indeed intimate sentiments, dispositions and judgements.

However, my argument is that an individual can 'come into being', and their true nature be revealed through an experience of '*complete*'[584] *philia*. This form of *philia* is a transformative experience that leads an individual to act, judge, experience emotions and change their attitude and behaviour towards another individual. The individual overcomes their self-imposed restraints and communicates with their friend in a new way. By 'coming into being' in such a way, we understand our friend's and ourselves differently. I recognise my friend as an emotional and rational being who can assist me to realise my virtues and live a fulfilled life, descried by Aristotle as *eudaimonia*[585]. This experience can occur immediately when the relation is first established or it may be discovered through time. Janice Risse[586] writes of an account of personal transformation that occurred to her and one of the women who was welcomed into a L'Arche home in North America:

Elise came to us quite anguished. She is a beautiful young woman, tall, and well built, with the hands of a queen. She gestures slowly and elegantly with her long, slender fingers. They are almost translucent, flaccid from disuse. She has been described as profoundly retarded and catatonic. When she came, she had been cut off from contact with other people for over ten years. Being cut off was probably a gradual choice of her own. It may have began after some brain damage left her less capable than she might have been, but it was a choice from which it seemed she was eventually unable to return. Locked in a tightly enclosed world of her, own she spoke only in "crazy talk" and screams, engaged herself constantly with pacing in circles and hallucinating. Nearly every technical means of dealing with her illness or its resultant problems to others had been tried: shock treatments, years of confinement in a mental hospital, drugs and surgery[587].

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[584] 1156b32.

[585] There are a number of different translations to this term; the predominant translation is 'happiness'. For example, Irwin in *NE*, 1999, p. 326. *GPT,* p. 66

[586] J. Risse, 'A Witness in the North American Culture' in Vanier, 1982, pp. 154-169.

[587] Ibid, p. 164.

The story continues with Elise coming to the l'Arche community and describes her interactions with professionals, some more positive for Elise than others:

This was several years ago and we did not go back [to a Doctor Elise shouted "I hate you" to]. With a little additional outside help we found the courage as a community to live with Elise in our way. She is still very fragile and awkward but peaceful now, clearly a gentle soul. She no longer paces and her hallucinations disappeared gradually. She now lives in the present, although perhaps a little more ordinary and less queenly manner in her manner. She does not initiate much but she responds verbally and her clear eyes and lovely smile remain enigmatic. She can do simple tasks, shows an interest in things and is quick to laugh at foolishness amongst us…She has found the security of a home and a community that accepts her and affords her safe and permanent relationships[588].

Risse's belief is that through their relationship of 'being together'[589], both she and Elise came to accept their own personal limitations to discover their identity and their commitment to each other. This illustrates how, an individual's personal identity can describe as developing and gives precise meaning to her *ousia* (or 'coming into being') through an experience of *'complete '[590] philia.*

In his *Metaphysics,* Aristotle undertakes a serious investigation of reality and to this end seeks to answer three fundamental questions:

1. What is being and what are the things that are?
2. How can the things that are, undergo the changes that we see all around us in nature?
3. And, How can the world be understood?

His full response to these questions extends into his treatises on both the theoretical and practical sciences. The former provide for knowledge of universal necessary truths and the latter specify sufficient conditions for understanding particular cases where, a near infinite number of possible alternatives may exist and an exact definition is difficult to achieve through application of general principles[591]. For example, the knowledge of what courage is may well be a type of psychological knowledge. However, to know what kind of courage is required in a particular

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[588] Ibid, pp. 165-6.

[589] Ibid, p. 100.

[590] *NE.*

[591] This point is simply put by C D Reeve in the *Introduction*, R McKeon, p xvii

situation one needs discipline, reason, sensibility and steadfastness[592]. Although courage is often viewed as, a virtue that is only demonstrated on a grand scale it is often required in our daily lives in relation to lesser challenges. Indeed as many people with disabilities attest there are 'times 'when to live' 'is itself an act of courage''[593] as Seneca put it in a letter to Lucilius.

Aristotle's practical sciences seek to accounts for the kinds of human interactions and which excludes exact, methodical and predictable response. For example, in the technical sciences experiments can be performed to demonstrate that a particular course of action will result in a particular set of consequences and argue that the hypotheses on which a theory is based are correct[594]. However, these human interactions arise from a complex sets of dynamics, in the practical sciences[595] 'virtue' as the pinnacle of human achievement eludes accurate, systematic and knowable definition because in reality an individual's 'states of character'[596] fluctuate in different circumstances.

Aristotle's customary practice is to review what historical and contemporary theorists advocate on a particular subject and then he goes on to refute or accept their arguments. He quotes Heraclitus' observation that everything is in a state of flux; everything is impermanent, and change is the normal state of things in the realm of nature and in the cosmos. It is this assumption that Aristotle wishes to explore in his question, 'what is being and what are the things that are?' This leads to a set of further questions - At what point is something stable? How is one to grasp things if

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[592] The virtue 'courage' is discussed in the context of bravery from 1115a6-1117b19 in *NE*.

[593] A. C. Grayling *The Meaning of Things,* (London: Phoenix, 2001), p. 21.

[594] 1103a-21-1103a25, *NE*. For example, Aristotle uses the law of gravity to explain the interrelationship or 'by nature' relations of a stone that will always move in a downward motion when thrown.

[595] In an Aristotelian context, subjects such as ethics, psychology and politics represent the practical sciences.

[596] 1103b31, *NE*, translator W. D Ross. I am using the Ross translation, as I believe that this translator makes reference to an earlier passage 1103a-1103b25 that is significant for the translation to 'states of character'. This passage discusses the need to educate an individual to train one's emotional response to different situations.

they are always simultaneously themselves and other than themselves - in this continual movement from beginning to disintegration? How are we to understand, what it is that makes things what they are? Aristotle's response to these questions is found in a number of his works: the key sources are *Metaphysics* (Books Z, H, & Θ), *Categories*[597]*, Physics*[598], and *NE.* In these works, he offers an answer to the question 'what is being and what are the things that are'. This is provided comes through an analysis that emphases on the concept of *ousia* and its relation to 'reality'.

First and foremost, *ousia* refers to and represents the quest for the decisive and principal foundation of being. The priority that Aristotle ascribes to the term *ousia* is of such importance that it is inseparable from the absolute *arche, energeia, dynamis* and *entelecheia* of all things. The terms *arche* and *ousia* have a rich etymology that requires investigation.

Aristotle's account of *to ti en einai* has two vital components that have significance for his contemporary society. First, Aristotle acknowledges that it was Socrates, who first posed the question *ti esti* (what is it?) of things and replied with the apposite *ti en einai* (what it is for something to be). Aristotle's reference to Socrates typically directs the reader to distinguish Socrates' view from Plato's, although they share some similarities. Socrates[599] is described as follows:

Two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates- inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are concerned with the starting point of science: but Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart; they (the

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[597] Aristotle, *Categorie,* trans E. M. Edghill, in McKeon (2001).

[598] Aristotle, *Physics,* trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in R. McKeon**, (ed.), *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* (New York, The Modern Library, 2001).

[599] 1087b29-32, Aristotle *Metaphysics*. The translation I use is from the text of W. D. Ross, and the translation was first published by Oxford University Press from the early nineteen twenties. Random House later republished it under the editorship of Richard McKeon. It is my view that Ross presents a clear and accurate translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* that maintains the flow of thought and is not imbued with the contemporary language that authors that are more recent have chosen to include. Thus, Ross's commentary and notes give detailed guidance to these texts, in which Aristotle sets out what he takes to be the main problems of metaphysics, or 'first philosophy' and assesses possible solutions. This text will now be referred to as *Meta.* I have also benefited from Ross's commentary of the *Meta* in Ross, D., *Aristotle* (London: Methuen & Co., Fifth Edition 1971), and pp. 154-177.

Platonists), however, gave them separate existence, and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas[600].

Aristotle observes:

Obviously then the form also [the Editor notes that this also includes matter], or whatever we ought to call the shape present in the sensible thing, is not produced, nor is there any production of it, nor is the essence produced; for this is that which is made to be in something else either by art or by nature or by some faculty[601].

Aristotle articulates that form and matter co-exist in real things and in combination serve to define the *ousia* of particular things:

And so to reduce all things thus to forms and to eliminate the matter is useless labour; for some things surely are a particular form in a particular matter, or particular things in a particular state. And the comparison which Socrates the younger used to make in the case of 'animal' is not sound; or it leads away from the truth, and makes one suppose that man can possibly exist without his parts, as the circle can without the bronze[602].

The ontological identity of sensible *ousiai* is defined by, the inseparable relation of form and matter in existing things. Matter on its own opposes integration: it is unique, referring only to possible potentialities, not to these existing in actuality. Hence, matter resists the dominating influence of the absolute *eidos*. His *hyomorphic* account of identity overcomes the tension between form and matter in a profound way. It gives a robust personal identity to a particular sensible being like Socrates or Barack Obama.

Aristotle considers the identity of a human individual in Book H when he speculates:

What, then, is it that makes a man one; why is he one and not many e.g. animal + biped, especially if there are, as some say, an animal-itself and a biped-itself? Why are those Forms themselves the man, so that men would exist by participation not in man, not in one Form, but in two, animal and biped, and in general man would be not one but more than one thing, animal and biped?[603].

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[600] It is useful to observe that at 1095a26 in the *NE* Aristotle mentions the Platonic creed in a universal and separated Form. Aristotle assesses the Platonic view at 1096a11-1097a14, that goodness is a single property as if this is so then what is good for a being will eventually rely on a wisdom of a single type of goodness located through the whole universe.

[601] 1033b5-9, Ibid.

[602] 1036b21-26, Ibid.

[603] 1045a14-19, Ibid.

He gives a new account of the form and matter of living things in terms of their potential power of being or *dynamis*[604] and realised or actual power in being or *energeia*[605] if the *ti en einai* of each individual human being is agreed to be the cause of its identity then it must combine all these elements. He gives the following explanation:

What, then, causes this- that which was potentially to be actually- except, in the cases of things, which are generated, the agent? For there is no other, cause of the potential sphere's becoming actually a sphere, but this was the essence of either. Of matter some is intelligible, some perceptible and in a formula there is always an element of matter as well as one of actuality; e.g. the circle is 'a plane figure[606].

Aristotle justifies his view by declaring the unitary nature of potentiality in actuality:

People look for a unifying formula, and a difference between potency and complete reality. But as has been said[607], the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially and the other actually. Therefore it is like asking what in general is the cause of unity and of a thing's being one; for each thing is a unity, and the potential and actual are somehow one. Therefore, there is no other cause here unless there is something, which caused the movement from potency into actuality[608].

Aristotle explains the nature of this identity throughout Book Θ where he explains *ousia* as a dynamic identity that is linked to the actual relations of *energeia* and *dynamis* or form and matter in living beings. As a means to account for and explain his distinctive concept of *ousia*, Aristotle differentiates *kinesis* or motion from *energeia, entelechetia* or activity. First[609], he shows that the composition of *kinesis* affords a comparison by reasoning the unity of form and matter. Thus, for Aristotle, painting a picture, exercising, studying for an exam are forms of *kinesis* that are incomplete for the motion is a means to its end:

For one kind of potency of being acted on, i.e. the originative source, in the very thing acted on, of its being passively changed by another thing or by itself qua other; and another kind is a state of insusceptibility to change for the worse and to destruction by another thing or by the thing itself qua other by virtue of an originative source of

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[604] In this context, 'Potentiality', Ibid, p. 42.

[605] In this context, 'Actuality', *GPT,* 1967, pp. 55-56.

[606] 1045a30-35, *Meta.*

[607] Editor notes the earlier passage, 1045a23-33,

[608] 1045b16-22, *Meta.*

[609] 1046a11-146a2, Ibid.

change. In all these definition is implied the formula of potency in the primary sense- And again these so-called potencies are potencies either of merely acting or being acted on, or of acting or being acted on well, so that even in the formulae of the latter the formulae of the prior kinds of potency of are somehow implied. Obviously, then, in a sense the potency of acting and of being acted on is one.

Therefore, if identity is established and defined by *kenisis* then it is completed when it ceases to be and when the motion concludes. Consequently, the *arche* (beginning) and *telos* (end) of the series of actions determine the intentionality or direction of ant givens *kenisis* in potentiality and actuality prior or during the series of actions that are directed to a specific aim. This concept of *kinesis* illustrates a possible negative form of a utility-centred *philia* when the [action or] *kenisis* in personal relations are directed: 'not insofar as the [friend] beloved is, but insofar as he is useful or pleasant'[610]. However, actions designated by the terms *engergeia, entelecheia* and *prais* are distinguishable from *kinesis* for the intentionality of their movement or pursuit is discernable in the end (*telos*) and in beginning (*arche*) of the activity itself:

Since of the actions, which have a limit, none is an end but all are relative to the end, e.g. the removing of fat….this is not an action or at least not a complete one (for it is not an end); but that movement in which the end is present is an action. e.g. at the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood…we are living well and have lived well…if not, the process would have had sometime to cease…but as things are, it does not cease, we are living *and have lived*[611].

To explain the difference is thus to understand *kinesis* as a movement towards an external end: the picture is painted, exam is completed, however the activity or *energeia, entelecheia*, for example, of living, is only discernable in the *arche* (beginning) and the *telos* (end). Therefore, Aristotle unifies *arche* and *telos* through the notion of *prais* (action) an idea he also explores in the *NE*[612] when differentiating '*prais*' and '*poiesis*'. This latter term is an end as is a 'product' of activity and '*prais*' is 'not production, and production ('poiesis') is not action'[613]. Peter's[614] notes that the

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[610] 1156a16 *NE.*

[611] 1048b16-28, *Meta.*

[612] 1140a1-24, *NE.*

[613] 1140a5, *NE.*

term *poiein* incorporates 'to act' and 'action' and though the latter is one of Aristotle's categories the term has two meanings: *poiein* implies production or mechanical production, the end of this action is the product; and *prattein*, as in a practical action *praxis*, that has its own end. Knight[615] notes the debate that scholars[616] have engaged in as to whether there is a real distinction between the terms.

I would argue there is a difference between the two action types. For example, the act of producing, say, a meal, this *poiesis* can be for a variety of reasons, to share with friends, to sell, to eat for nourishment and each activity is distinct from other types of activity. This is the form of activity in which Risse engages with in the home she shares with people with a range of abilities and disabilities and her action [out of respect and love] springs from whom she is and who they are. This kind of activity is underpinned by one's character and necessarily expresses one's virtue. So, this translation of '*praxis*' gives us a theory of being which defines identity with reference to activity that is connected both in matter and form. Likewise, Aristotle uses the term *entelecheia* to establish the identity of *ousia* through its association with *praxis*, and as being the active identity of beings with matter and form or *energeia* and *dynamis*.

Long suggests that Aristotle purposefully uses the perfect tense of the verb 'to live viz. 'has lived') as a means to assert the importance of the 'historical element' [617] in the working lives of human beings. Indeed, the identification of the perfect form with the present tense of the verb indicates the unity of the past and present in the identity of the life of the sensible beings. This serves to emphasise that to be is to

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[614] F. E. Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon,* (New York: New York University Press, 1967), p. 162.
[615] K. Knight, *Aristotelian Philosophy*: *Ethics and Politics from Aristotle to MacIntryre*, (London: Polity Press, 2007), pp.19-22.
[616] For example as mentioned on p144. Ackrill's critical analysis of Aristotle's multiple variable distinction of *energeia*, from *poiesis, kenesis* and *genesis,* differs from David Charles single account of the praxis/production distinction albeit the actions can 'co-occur'. Ackrill, 1997, pp. 212-221; D. Charles*, Aristotle's Philosophy of Action,* (London: Duckworth, 1984), p. 62.
[617] Long, 2008, p. 6.

exist with a past and present identity and, that an individual *is* influenced and not limited by their past. Risse's account of her relationship with Elise implies that both she and Elise were influenced by their past and present identity. When shared activity occurs on a continual basis, this contributes to our identity formation and enriches our personal history, leading us to value and believe in the possibility of an alternative future that has a dimension of openness and freedom compared to our present state.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that Aristotle does not himself suggest, this reading of *ousia* but my reading is compatible views in this era. Peters[618] traces the evolution of the Hellenic word *ousia* and shows how it is derived from the phrase 'coming into being'[619]. Thus, Peters[620] compares Plato's use of the word with its reference to the Aristotelian usage of 'essence'. I use *ousia* in this latter sense, and propose a theory of *ousia* and argue that if offers a plausible explanation of a whole range of human experiences in personal relations.

Phronēsis[621]

This section of the chapter aims to analyse *phronēsis* and incorporates Aristotle's analysis of deliberate choice to further endorse our reading of *ousia* as active existence. *Phronēsis* is the virtue or ability to discern from our knowledge and experience how we choose to live with others and thus live a life filled with εὐδαιμονία (*eudaimonia*)[622]. I have propose a framework for *ousia* that enables an individual to experience a continual 'coming into being' through living together or 'to suzen'. Prior to presenting the argument that *phronēsis* is a unique and defining

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[618] *GPT,* pp. 149-150.

[619] Ibid, p. 149

[620] Ibid, pp. 149-150

[621] *W D Ross in the NE translates Phronēsis as 'practical wisdom'.* Terence Irwin translates the term as 'prudence' in *NE,* 1999, p. 345. I will use the Greek word in my text because I am of the opinion that neither translation has greater meritorious value.

[622] This term is translated into English in a number of different ways, notably happiness; living well; flourishing; well-being. Roger Crisp offers a phrase that I think captures what Aristotle wants the reader to understand by the term, namely 'whatever makes a human life good for the person living it' Aristotle, *NE,* translator Crisp, 2000, p. 206.

characteristic of the human species and a means for an individual 'coming into being', I offer some critical reflections on the nature of *phronēsis* [623] and how it is interconnected with the *orthos logos* [624] and the *ergon* [625] argument. The *Ethics* [626] offers an account of good human functioning albeit an outline [627] and though imperfectly described in this section, if the complete treatise is considered [628], it is possible to conclude that *phronesis* refers to the capabilities that enable an individual to establish their identity as a human being. Nussbaum [629] offer a capability framework that enables an individual to attain a 'life worthy of dignity' and this is consistent with an Aristotelian conception of 'truly human functioning'. While there are ten capabilities described by Nussbaum [630], the core capability of practical reasoning listed by Nussbaum is now presented. I will discuss her affiliation capability in chapter 6.

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[623] Classical Scholars frequently debate the exact nature of *phronēsis* and my account is selective in concentrating on Aristotle's view that it consists of (a) an individual exercising a rational choice; and (b) a balanced emotional sensitivity as necessary condition to good moral decision-making. Terence Irwin provides an excellent bibliography on a range of articles and books dedicated to the analyses of *phronēsis*, in Aristotle, *NE*, Irwin, 1999, pp. 359-360. Sarah Broadie offers a comprehensive set of notes and recommendations in her chapter titled 'Practical Wisdom' (Broadie, 1991, pp. 260-265) that is also an excellent reference for source material on the debate concerning the nature of *phronēsis.*

[624] 1138b19, 'Right Reason' translated by L. H. G. Greenwood in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics,* Book Six, (New York: Arno Press, 1973), p. 89.

[625] 1097a15-1098b9, this is also known as the human function argument and it is the passage in which Aristotle outlines the general method by which an individual discovers what offers *eudaimonia* to life, Aristotle, *NE,* Ibid.

[626] 1098a7-1098b5, *NE.* Other Aristotelian scholars also suggest that the passage 1098a23-1098a26 is what Aristotle intends, cf. Stephen R. L. Clarke *Aristotle's Man: Speculations upon Aristotelian Anthropology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); and Martha C Nussbaum, 'Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defence of Aristotelian Essentialism' *Political Theory'*, **20**, 19, 1992 pp. 202-246.

[627] 1098a20, *NE.*

[628] The translator also makes this note, see pp. 185-186.

[629] Nussbaum presents her framework in a number of treatises. The quotations are from Martha C Nussbaum *Frontiers Of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership,* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2006, pp. 69-81, the quotations are from page 74.

[630] Ibid

Aristotle provides his most complete account of *philia* in Books VIII and IX[631] where he is adamant that the common disposition of individuals is to 'have goodwill to each other'[632] and to 'wish goods'[633] to a friend for one's welfare and certainly personal health. Nevertheless, Aristotle suggests that a friend's intentions are limited:

Do friends really wish their friend to have the greatest good, to be a god, for instance? For [if he becomes a god], he will no longer have friends[634].

Indeed, if the affiliation is genuine, one wishes benefit to an individual as the other as a human being: 'hence it is to the other {person} as a human being that a friend will wish the greatest goods'[635], and for the friend to continue to be:

For being is a good for the good person, and each person wishes for goods for himself. And no one chooses to become another person even if that other will have every good when he has come into being for, as it is, the god has good [but no one chooses to be replaced by a god]. Rather [each of us choose goods] on condition that he remains whatever he is; and each person would seem to be the understanding part, or that most of all[636].

These passages[637] convey to the reader a number of issues that are central to contemporary philosophical discussion of personal identity questions. From Aristotle's point of view, these include: How is it possible to desire a *philos* (friend) to live a good life and maintain a mutually shared existence?[638] Indeed, under what circumstances does my *philos* continue to exist? And can the proposed good life incorporate the characteristics that one believes are essential to one's own identity?

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[631] 1098a20, *NE*.

[632] 1156a2, *NE* though it is important to note as the translator mentions in a later passage that this goodwill may be limited to the goal or purpose of the personal relations and thus may be of limited nature, Irwin in *NE*, 1999, p. 275. A full discussion of the nature and types of goodwill occurs in section 3 of this chapter.

[633] 1156a5, *NE*.

[634] 1159a7, *NE*, { } indicates my brackets.

[635] 1159a11, *NE*, { } indicates my brackets.

[636] 1166ba20-23, *NE* Translators brackets.

[637] Nussbaum highlights this detail and she provides an insightful and dense discourse on pp. 90-95. Nussbaum, *1995*, pp. 86-131. Edel also notes the points made by Nussbaum, 1982, p. 313.

[638] Recall for Aristotle the *philia* relation extends to a greater number of people than the current usage of the term.

I suggest a contemporary understanding, sensitive to the concerns of ancient Athenian society, and which do justice to the force and magnitude of personal identity questions. The social life of individuals occurs within human systems that are defined as societies, and as a general maxim society refers to individuals participating in a complete set of social arrangements characterised by self-sufficiency, autonomy, inclusivity, the self-recruitment of members and continuity in time. A feature of human social life is also the conglomeration of heterogeneous individuals in distinct geographical areas. It is possible that the unity that is unconsciously imprinted on individuals by their belonging to a familiar and natural grouping has the potential to be transformed by a number of variables. Gaita states[639]:

Our sense of preciousness of other people is connected with their power to affect us in ways we cannot fathom and in ways against which we can protect ourselves only at the cost of becoming shallow. There is nothing reasonable in the fact that another person's absence can make our lives seem empty.

One key variable is identity – cultural, geographic, social and personal - and this has the capacity to separate and stratify individuals by ethnicity, ideology, and philosophy. It is possible that the interpersonal detachment that occurs in the absence of familiar and natural groupings has a significant impact upon the personal relations of some people in society. Experience of detachment make individuals question (1) what are the necessary and sufficient conditions of my continuing to exist as a human being? and (2) what are the necessary and sufficient conditions of my continuing to exist as myself?

The first and second passages quoted earlier[640] relate to the first question: what is it for a human to exist, and what excludes human beings from being a member of a different (or indeed alternative) species. Aristotle argues that if the human identity conditions are unable to be satisfied, what is meant by personal identity is transformed with a loss to the meaning of membership of our species. For Aristotle

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[639] Gaita, 1999, pp. 26-27.
[640] 1159a7, *NE.*

sustained existence within one's species is a necessary condition for continued species membership and though an individual decays over time, they may want to discover if there is a condition that supersedes this process of human decomposition process after death. The third passage mentioned[641] refers to the second question: is there a characteristic or quality, state, stage, form or activity that connects one human to another which supports individuals in creating a valuable and attainable form of life that is necessary and sufficient for a human being? While *phronēsis* is given a valued status in this section, the reader will be aware of Nussbaum's argument that:

Rationality as simply one aspect of the animal, and, at that, not the only one that is pertinent to a notion of truly human functioning. More generally, the capabilities approach sees the world as containing many different types of animal dignity all of which deserve respect and even awe[642].

This question is a recurring theme[643] in Aristotle's *Ethics*, for elsewhere in contrasting human lives and the lives of beasts and gods, he states:

For indeed, just as a beast has neither virtue nor vice, so neither does a god, but the god's state is more honourable than virtue and the beast's belong to some kind different from vice[644].

The text is significant for it follows Aristotle's discussion[645] on the virtues of thought and in particular, *phronēsis*, which I suggest performs a significant role in understanding and distinguishing complex sense data. Thus, an individual with *phronēsis* has the capacity to have social and political concerns and to make ethical assessments that orientate their being to a life with *eudaimonia* together with others in the society they inhabit.

Succinctly[646], Aristotle describes *phronēsis* as a twofold-integrated capability:

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[641] 1166a20-23, Ibid.

[642] *FOJ*, p 159.

[643] Nussbaum also notes the question extends to the *Pol,* Nussbaum, 1995, p. 92.

[644] 1145a25-27, *NE.*

[645] 1138b19-11445a15, *NE.*

[646] My analysis of phronēsis acknowledges the extensive debate and scholarship in the area and pays tribute to the work of Sarah Broadie. I develop my argument from her contention on the structure of practical wisdom. S. Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.179-250

A state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human being. For production has its end in something other than itself, but action does not, since its end is acting well itself [647].

Therefore, *phronēsis* is defined as being good at reasoning in a practical way and the development of thinking or reflection by which rational choices are shaped [648]. Aristotle uses the term *phronēsis* intentionally to emphasise that deliberation aims at achieving a reasoned choice and that a rational choice is only reached through deliberation. The first part of Aristotle's definition of deliberation aims at reasoned choice and is acceptable premise, though the latter part is more debateable and is subject to how 'deliberation' is characterized. The explanation provided by Aristotle [649] and in his preliminary discussion of the virtues [650] leads Broadie [651] to interpret 'deliberation' as a product of reasoning and hence a rational choice - *C* (Choice) *is of D* (Decision) *for the sake of R* (Reason)[652]. Thus, both features of the definition are indispensable to an understanding of *phronēsis* and though complex, it is possible to evaluate *D* and *R* as independent variables. Consequently, one can examine whether *R* is an appropriate end and indeed further calculate if *D* is an appropriate means.

Aristotle [653] compares choice [654] with different forms of 'appetites' and to understands choice as the act of selecting something from a wide variety of possibilities[655]. Making a choice is not merely based on desire for that is a shared quality with animals, nor is it passion for this lacks deliberation. Indeed, choice is not

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[647] 1140b5-8, *NE*.

[648] Broadie,1991, p. 179.

[649] 1140b5-8, *NE*.

[650] 1112a1-1115a5, *NE*.

[651] Broadie, 1991, p. 179.

[652] Broadie refers to a second Aristotelian text 1227b36 of the *Ethica Eudemia*.

[653] I am concentrating on the explanation of choice offered by Edel as he provides excellent reasons and discussion that offers clarity. Edel, 1982, pp. 272-280.

[654] W D Ross notes the difficulty of translating the Greek word and states 'sometimes 'intention', 'will', or 'purpose', would bring about a better meaning…the etymological meaning is 'preferential choice'. Ross gives this clarification in his note to 1111b5 *NE*, translator W. D Ross.

[655] 1111b10, *NE*.

simply a wish for 'there is no natural object of wish'[656], and opinion fails as the criterion for it 'is distinguished by its falsity or truth'[657] rather than being like choices that are either good or bad. Choice is in the category of voluntary actions for reason and the thought are central to Aristotle's definition:

Then perhaps what is decided is what has been previous deliberated. For decision involves reason and thought and even the name itself would seem to indicate that [what is decided prohaireton] is chosen [haireton] before [pro] other things[658].

Choice and deliberation are equivalent in purpose except when we actually make a decision:

What we deliberate about is the same as what we decide to do, except that by the time we decide to do it, it is definite; for what we decide to do is what we have judged [to be right] as a result of deliberation. For each of us inquiring how to act as soon as he traces the principles to himself, and within himself to the guiding part; for this is the part that decides[659].

His actual description of choice is: 'choice will be deliberative desire of things in our own power; for when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation'[660]. This definition of choice makes no distinction between the speculative act of choosing and deliberation, but an actual decision commits us to action in the real world. An individual does not deliberate in isolation and then connect this to an act of choice; it appears that Aristotle is arguing that the process of deliberation influences our choices and is thus a 'fusion of appetite and thought'[661] that 'permeates the whole process'[662] to such a degree that 'it seems almost to be that of matter and form'[663].

For an individual to make a choice according to Aristotle's analysis needs these needs to be:

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[656] 1113a21, *NE*, translator W. D. Ross.
[657] 1111b33, *NE*, Ibid.
[658] 1112a15-16, *NE*., Ibid.
[659] 1113a4-6, *NE*, translator's brackets.
[660] 1113a10-12, *NE*, translator W. D. Ross.
[661] Edel, 1982, p. 279.
[662] Ibid, p. 280
[663] Ibid..

(i)   Individual;

(ii)   A 'fusion of appetite and thought'[664] and

(iii)   An explanation for the decisive aspect of *phronēsis*.

Thus, he now builds a three-tiered system comprised of interrelated parts that function together as an orderly whole. The first tier is the individual, the second is what one chooses and the third is what one chooses. He develops this as a set of unified components absolutely necessary for the success of *phronēsis*. This can be applied to *philia* between people with and people without intellectual disabilities. For example, how might one decide to accord rights, justice and dignity to a person with an intellectual disability? Michael Bérubé in speaking about his son he states:

Almost as a form of emotional exercise, I have tried, on occasion, to step back and see him as others might see him, as an instance of a category, one item on the long list of human subgroups. This is a child with Down syndrome, I might say to myself. This is a child with a developmental disability. It never works: Jamie [son] remains Jamie to me. I have tried to imagine him, as he would have been in other eras, other places: This is a retarded child. And even: This is a Mongoloid child. This makes for unbearable cognitive dissonance[665].

Bérubé is a man, he is choosing a relationship with his son, in spite of the labels accorded to Jamie and he chooses the relationship because to do otherwise would be to ignore his own and his son's humanity.

Aristotle's typology builds an argument that holds when both his premises are true, and fails when the first is true and the second false. Thus, if one states what it is for the sake of which one chooses as one does, then one's relationship with an individual provides the grounds for and justification for of one's choice. Broadie[666] sums up the argument by stating:

The choice's direction is a codeterminant of its identity, and what is chosen as leading in that direction is the other codeterminant. It is the same if, instead of saying 'for the sake of Y' we say 'because I desire Y' or 'because I intend Y'. The clause following 'because' does not invoke some factor (e.g., a desire for Y) extraneous to the choosing of X, as if X were itself a complete entity. Rather, the logical form of the whole is 'I (he), desirous of (intending)… choose(s)...'

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[664] Ibid.

[665] Michael Bérubé, quoted in L. Carlson *The Faces of Intellectual Disability: Philosophical Reflections,* (Indianapolis:Indiana University Press, 2009), p. 197.

[666] Broadie, 1991, p. 180.

Accordingly, then, when one declares one's desire it explains one's choice and ability to make decisions and judgements about *what* or *what sort of* choice it is. Clearly, motivation is an integral and functioning component of rational choice rather than a curious phenomenon associated with the choice. In the above example, Bérubé's desire to be in relation with his son is the motivation. There are a number of passages from the works[667] of Aristotle that can be used to substantiate the importance of choice in decision making for 'decision seems to be most proper to virtue, and to distinguish characters from one another better than actions do[668].

If this decision-making framework is truly robust and characterises the processes of coming to conclude, determine and qualify an event then it must be able to account for the following: a so-called simple decision *D* that is independently completed, and, where is it possible for *D* to be *any action* an individual carries out for the purpose (reason) of *R*? If *D* is unable to be a simple decision, so that an unspecified prior action is completed to arrange for *D* to occur, does it imply that *D* is both an end, in the latter example, and a means in relation to *R?*[669]. An explanation of how we are to understand any *D* and *R* in *phronēsis* occurs in Aristotle's discussion of ethics training that is aimed at an audience of young men[670] who are being educated prior to a leadership career in politics and the public service or in knowledge and understanding (that is, philosophy)[671]. Indeed as stated earlier, a further aim of *phronēsis* is to improve our quality of life and to enable us to live a life with

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[667] For example, 1228a-11-17, *Ethica Eudemia*. Aristotle, *Eudainon Ethics* trans. J. Solomon, in J. A. Smith & W. D. Ross, (eds.) 1915, *The Works of Aristotle,* vol IX, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

[668] 1111b5-6, *NE.*

[669] There is of course a scholarly debate that analyses if one deliberates about ends or the things in relation to ends. Edel provides an overview of the issues and excellent reference sources, Edel, 1982, pp. 277-278 and p. 447.

[670] The Greek society of 2,500 years ago offered women a separate social position to men that was regulated and controlled by a collection of conducts and responsibilities. Women were excluded from educational institutions.

[671] For a discussion of this aspect of Aristotle, see D. S. Hutchinson, 'Ethics' in *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, (ed) Jonathan Barnes, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 195-232.

eudaimonia and in a society with other individuals. Notwithstanding Aristotle's aim to persuade his audience to use *phronēsis* and thus to choose to act virtuously for sound practical reasons, it is possible his experience in teaching made him more pragmatic in his recognition of the limits to *phronēsis*. Consequently, in determining decision, *D*, in one of the above circumstances, Aristotle argues that a reasoned rather than a *phronēsis* choice is made.

Consider the following: as Clement & Bigby[672] suggest the motivations, for providing community living for people with intellectual disabilities is based on considerations of justice and respect for their rights. However, other dynamics come into operation with consequences that do not necessarily act in the best interests of people with intellectual disability. While we may act, - and indeed act with purpose, sensibility and reason - to achieve this social justice goal in reality the outcome may not be consistent with this purpose. The actual implementation of what appears to be a reasoned decision for the actions taken these may be explained and justified as a means to attain that end. Nevertheless, because the choice lacks *phronēsis* [viz. *D* is for the sake of *R* applies to the pursuit of my goal], the fundamental aspect of *phronesis* as both correct desire for social justice (that is, *kat' aretēn)*[673] and sound judgement is absent.

The *kat' aretēn* does not evolve in a vacuum: moral decisions involve choices made for reasons, and for Aristotle individual develop by learning to function well with regard to their emotions and desires. Aristotle's definition of human beings as rational beings gives then a status as an intermediate between 'Gods' and 'brutes'[674] because humans desire to act rationally and with *kat' aretēn*. This also implies that an

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[672] T. Clement & C. Bigby, 2010, *Group Homes for People with Intellectual Disabilities,* (London: Jessica Kingsley).

[673] Typically this phrase is translated as 'in accordance with virtue; Irwin, 1999, p. 317 and p. 336, *NE.*

[674] 1145a15-1145b1, *NE.* The passage introduces the discussion about the three states to be avoided (vice, incontinence and brutishness) and that the 'good' man is the one who has control over impulse and is able to moderate his actions and temperaments to the immediate environment.

array of human decisions may not chosen for virtue, for if all decisions were of virtue, then we would be a 'God'; and similarly if our decisions are unrestrained[675] then one is a 'Brute'. Thus, when we reach a conclusion or determination, if the action is self-indulgent, then it is not a rational choice even though the action may deliberately force something to occur. Indeed, the desire to act in itself may be a reason, however, how is one to possess the necessary knowledge to 'know' actually what we should do? Aristotle's response is that we have *orthos logos*[676]*;* although at first glance this reply appears nebulous for he states:

To say this is admittedly true, but it is not all clear. For in other pursuits directed by science, it is equally true that we must labour and be idle neither too much nor too little, but the intermediate amount prescribed by correct reason. But knowing only this, we would be none the wiser about, for instance, the medicines to be applied to body, if we were told we must apply the ones medical science prescribes and in the way that medical science applies them. That is why our account of the states of the soul, in the same way must not only be true as far as it has gone, but we must also determine what the correct reason is, that is to say, what its definition is[677].

Nevertheless, making a rational choice is difficult and an individual needs some specific ability to act with *kat' aretēn* and *orthos logos* so as to integrate our emotions, feelings and intellectual activity. This 'ability' needs an 'object of knowledge'[678] that is responsive to an individual as their emotions and actions may be highly sensitive to the complex set of internal and external phenomenon that exists in their *philia* and environment.

Aristotle habitually presents and uses a number of technical terms in a methodical manner to build up his theory where these: 'reach over to the others and only gradually become(s) intelligible as their relations to the others and their

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[675] I refer to this expression to suggest that Aristotle is referring to an individual who is unable to maintain a level of self-control, or restraint and thus exhibits actions that lack self control and are aimed at pursuing one's own pleasures and satisfaction. It could also be termed as incontinent though it extends throughout all domains of life rather than purely sexual matters.

[676] 1138b19, 'Right Reason', Greenwood, 1973, p. 89.

[677] 1138b25-34, *NE.*

[678] 1138b26, *NE.*

grounding in existing phenomena are revealed'[679]. Edel names this kind of association as a 'conceptual network'[680]. He suggests that Aristotle develops a network by commencing with a set of basic concepts that are ordered, intelligible and linked together. Each connection links concepts by elucidating a principle and then directs the reader's attention to other similar ideas and establishing a unity by joining the notions to the fullest extent necessary for clarification. Edel argues that even though: 'the connections themselves may be of various sorts, sometimes tight, sometimes loose[681]. They are correlations designed to work together to examine the particular concept being analysed.

In many instances, Aristotle's chosen concepts will relate to and 'have experiential reference'[682]; that is, what occurs to concepts in the one part of the philosophical network will impact upon other parts and is thus responsive to change and historical continuity. However, Aristotle does not provide exact clarity, explicit rules, nor gives a greater role or primacy to one philosophical concept over another. Instead, he develops a group of concepts as a system of ideas that contribute to thinking well about practical matters by explaining their links to theoretical reflection, to the practical skill of the artisan and to the moral virtues and even to the practical skill of the artisan.

The reference Aristotle makes to an artisan is perplexing for it is difficult to discern what context or meaning he wants the reader to understand. It is possible Aristotle uses a 'craftsman' as an archetype of practical rationality - alternatively, Aristotle may be suggesting that an individual who uses their knowledge and reason is like an artisan who uses instruments and manipulates material or objects, so as to choose the right means. Indeed, he has previously differentiated acting with virtue from acting with skill when he states:

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[679] Edel, 1982, p. 38.
[680] Ibid, p 41.
[681] Ibid, p. 41.
[682] Ibid.

The case of the arts and that of the excellences are not similar; for the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they should have a certain character once they have been produced; but if the acts that are in accordance with the excellences have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. The Agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts and choose them because of themselves and thirdly his actions must proceed from a firm and unchangeable state. These are not reckoned in as conditions of the possessions of the arts, except the bare knowledge; but as a condition of the possession of the excellences, knowledge has little or no weight, while the other conditions count for as little but for everything, i.e. the very conditions which result from doing just and temperate acts[683].

As noted earlier in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, Aristotle uses the distinction between 'form' and 'matter' to elucidate his concept of substance or individual beings. Thus physical substances are relatively autonomous beings that:

Differ from things, which are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or a growth and decrease, or by way of alteration)[684].

Therefore, manufactured objects are not complete substances in the above sense as they are motionless until a physical substance moves the object; indeed the objects are unintelligible in isolation and also dependent upon an agent for their structure and operations. It is possible to interpret Aristotle's concept of rational choice as having (i) an exceptional application and (ii) of being unable to be determined from customary knowledge.[685] Aristotle's purpose in using technical skills as an analogy for to rational choice is that it serves his purpose of demonstrating the relationship between the mechanical decision-making processes and being able to act with effective skill or virtue[686]. Indeed, the particular procedure or skill used to make a decision is similar in any action in that it includes a steps of actions directed toward a particular aim. However, decisions differ from other choices in what each aims for and so the former are only available and limited to a specific individual, group or

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[683] 1105a26-1105b5, *NE,* translator W D Ross.

[684] 192b14-16, *Physics*, emphasis in text.

[685] Broadie, 1991, p. 182, discusses this concept of rational choice.

[686] That is *eudaimonia*, though the latter is not a product of the actions of the individual, happiness or fulfilment in life is not something over and above an individual's actions or outcomes, which those actions produce.

organization. Broadie[687] concludes that Aristotle's use of the craft analogy for rational choice is based on this '*one* signification' of the concepts as homonymous. In contrast, Aristotle defines the concepts as a specific genus with 'hierarchies of signification' that indicates alternative understanding through 'philosophical reflection' rather than in 'ordinary language'. For example, in the *Metaphysics,* Aristotle argues that substantial being is the most important meaning of 'being' and that the other categories are derivate. The most prominent feature of 'substance' is its *ousia* and this applies to any specific individual.

Aristotle argues in his ethical treatises[688] that *eudaimonia* is the ultimate goal of individual action, for example:

What [in other words] is the highest of all goods achievable in action? As far as the name goes, most people virtually agree; for both he many and cultivated call it happiness and they suppose that living and doing well are the same as being happy[689].

I suggest the examples used by Aristotle of the artisan (sculptor) and musician (aulos-player)[690] are intended to denote the skilled excellence of these individuals when they is performing to the best of their abilities. Therefore, if P (P-ing) is the *purpose* of the musician then to be a good musician is to be doing P well. Consequently, if one begins with a description of what P constitutes then it will be possible to understand what the good activity is for a musician or artisan. Simply put, the individual's ability to discharge or perform well the activity or role that is assigned as characteristic to a given pursuit, it is its virtue. The *ergon* of the musician is playing the instrument in tune, with the correct rhythm and so forth; similarly, with the artisan, if the product is of superior standard, it will be desired by buyers and so forth. Thus, the good for any activity must exist within the limits of the action itself.

By establishing the good activity for individuals in defined roles, Aristotle now turns to good activity for being human and argues that it must begin with an

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[687] The following quotations are taken from Broadie, *op cit* p. 182.

[688] 1184a9-20, *Magna Moralia*; and 1219a40-1219b24, *Ethica Eudemia*.

[689] 1095a16-19, *NE,* Translators brackets.

[690] 1097b25-28, Ibid.

explanation of human functioning[691]. If the life of a being (or individual) is to be defined as good it must include reference to those activities that are essential to its nature and it should be recognizable when these are performed to the highest standard required for any individual member of its species. However, we must ask the question whether a human person as such has a function like the artisan and musician[692]; what individual functions intrinsic or essential nature of their personhood? There are two possible alternative explanations[693] in Aristotle's text[694]:

What, then could this be? For living is apparently shared with plants, but what we are looking for is the special function of a human being; hence we should set aside the life of nutrition and growth. The life next in order is some sort of life of sense perception; but this too is apparently shared with horse, ox, and every animal. The remaining possibility, then, is some sort of life of action of the [part of the soul] that has reason. One [part] of it has reason as obeying reason; the other has it as itself having reason and thinking. Moreover, life is also spoken of in two ways [capacity and as activity], and we must take [a human being's special function to be] life as activity, since this seems to be called life more fully. We have found then the human function is activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason.[695].

Aristotle continues this passage by reminding the reader of what makes a 'good lyre player'[696] and thus concludes with: 'and so the human good proves to be activity of the

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[691] I am drawing heavily on the argument of Nussbaum in these paragraphs. Martha C Nussbaum, 'Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundation of Ethics' in *World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams,* (eds.) J. E. J. Altham and R. Harrison, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 110-121.

[692] 1097a29, *NE*, Aristotle asks in what I read as a tongue-in-cheek manner 'Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain function or activities, and has man none?'

[693] Hardie coins the terms 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' in Hardie, 1968, p. 23. W. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).
The debate continues and an example of who represents the first account is Professor Cooper in J. Cooper, 1977b, pp. 160-168; J. A. Cooper, 'Friendship and the Good in Aristotle', *Philosophical Review*, 86, pp. 290–315. A supporter of the second account is Irwin, 1980, pp. 35-54 and in particular pp. 48-50. T. Irwin, 'The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle's Ethics' in A. E. Rorty, (ed.) *Essays on Aristotle Ethics* (California, University of California Press, 1980), pp. 35-54

[694] Aristotle offers a similar division of function when he discusses the *psyche* in 412a-416b30 *DeA*. For the *psyche,* there are three large groups: the nutritive *psyche*; the sensitive *psyche*; and the rational *psyche.*

[695] 1097b33-1098a7, *NE.*

[696] 1097a9, Ibid.

soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the best and most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one[697].

I suggest the second account of function or purpose, the P-ing of human activity more accurately describes:

Human excellences achieving an end worthy of itself under circumstances that harbour no reason why the agent, later, should unwish his excellence or success, or why those who love him should regret that, he deserved their congratulations[698].

The first account suggests that none of the common abilities[699] of other beings, plants, animals are important as defining characteristics of a human being and thus we can live well in a good fashion without full or significant regard to our physiological needs[700]. Many individuals will not accept this premise to be true[701]. The second account of P-ing comprehends life as centred on P and inclusive of unique characteristics that credits specific attributes as a defining features of human beings. This account includes other activities: for example say, L and Q and what identifies P-ing as P (in contrast to L or Q) relates to the character or nature of P as the primary source of certainty; thus L and Q are noteworthy events or activities that are planned, organized, informed and make sense following the objective P. In the previous example, Bérubé's desire to be in relation with his son becomes something that is planned, organized and makes sense and as inclusive of other events in his life.

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[697] 1098a16, Ibid.

[698] Broadie, 1991, p. 53

[699] That is, nutrition, perception and so forth.

[700] John Macmurray also acknowledges a tripartite division of attributes of life. The division is the material (matter); the organic (life) and the personal (personality) and each division include the previous category and argue that the combined spheres are characteristic of human activity, J. Macmurray, *Persons In Relation,* (London: Faber & Faber, 1961), pp. 64-85. This text will now be referred to as *PR.*

[701] Aristotle may well have in mind the belief of the Greek Philosopher Sextus Empricus that 'in a person burdened by hunger and thirst, it is impossible to produce by argument the conviction that he is not so burdened' quoted Nussbaum, 2001, p. 155. For a more complete argument for the need to account for our nutritional needs across the life cycle see M. J. Tanner *Fetus into Man: Physical growth from Conception to Maturity,* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1978).

In Nussbaum's [702] discussion of *phronesis,* she presents four rigorous academic arguments in support of the merits of the second account compared to the first account. Any attempt to paraphrase her argument could mislead and offer a disservice to her lucid and scholarly interpretation of an 'inclusive' approach to discerning *eudaimonia.* Nonetheless, I would like to offer a further reason for adopting the second account of purpose or P-ing. The central points of ethical significance in Aristotle's account is that he gives specific attention to (i) *phronēsis;* (ii) virtues or the states of character that comprise the genus of virtue[703]; and (iii) *philia* as an other relational activity that extends beyond an individual orientation to the group or social life. Ackrill[704] notes a statement that Aristotle makes at the outset of the *NE*[705] then a further argument emerges. For clarity, I quote the passage: 'hence it does not matter whether the ends of the actions are the activities themselves, or something apart from them, as in the sciences we have mentioned'[706]. Clearly, in this passage, Aristotle argues we can treat one activity as less important than another and/or allow another activity to dominate or take priority. He may mean here the means-end distinction in general is not as significant to his view of ethics as the direction of our actions towards *eudaimonia*. Therefore, Aristotle presents the reader with a reflective human system of morals to live by and to be prepared to discover from one's actions and interaction with other individuals while striving for *eudaimonia*. Aristotle does not put forward a lifeless system of doctrines rather his treatises attempt to give a coherent, systematic and practical account of all the branches of knowledge that are applicable to our being human in the world with others.

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[702] Nussbaum, 1995, pp. 114-116. In particular, see the endnotes she provides to further support the argument that the second account is indeed the more accurate interpretation.

[703] Edel, 1982, pp. 266-272.

[704] J. L. Ackrill, 'Aristotle on *Eudaimonia*' in A. E. Rorty, A. E. (ed.), 1980. 1980, pp.15-34, p. 18.

[705] 1094a16-18, *NE.*

[706] 1094a16-18, *NE.*

Earlier in this chapter, I referred to Plato's use of *ousia* in the *Philebus* as a 'coming into being'. I now return to *ousia* and will discuss the argument that Philebus and Protarchus participate in with Socrates on the role of pleasure and reason in life[707]. This particular discourse occurs just prior to the argument on 'coming into being' and this text suggest how making decisions and choosing to realise alternative personal goals is a 'coming into being'. In the early part of the dialogue, Protarchus notes that Socrates has: 'denied Philebus assertion that pleasure, delight, enjoyment and so on are the greatest good'[708]. Instead, he argues in favour of a life of good: 'better than pleasure is intellect, knowledge, understanding and science, not to mention all their cognates'[709]. However, the younger men are not convinced by the argument presented so far and their dialogue continues with an agreement that a good human life must be: 'complete' (*teleon);* 'all-sufficing' *(hikanon)* and one that individuals wish to 'pursue' *(haireton)*[710]. With these characteristics agreed Socrates then asks Protarchus to imagine actually living a life full of great pleasures and completely devoid of good sense and intelligence. Socrates emphasizes to Protarchus that he wants *him* to conceive of and form an imagination of himself living this type of lifestyle[711]. Naturally as a supporter of Philebus, (though maybe naïve), he accepts the hypothetical scenario and in reply to Socrates question 'would you think you were still lacking anything*?*[712], Protarchus answers 'if I had pleasure, I would, presumably, have all I needed'[713] for he believes the necessary conditions are satisfied for the good life. The Protagonist then reminds Protarchus that if he neglects reason from his life the

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[707] Nussbaum also analyses this section of the *Philebus* and though I share part of her, line of thought my incorporation of *ousia* as a 'coming into being' differentiates our text. Nussbaum, 1995, pp. 98-102.

[708] 19c, Plato *Philebus*, trans Robin Waterfield, (London: Penguin, 1982).

[709] 19d, Ibid.

[710] 20d, Plato, *Philebus and Epinomis,* translator A. E. Taylor, (Kent: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1972).

[711] 21a, '*would you personally Protarchus, consent to spend a whole lifetime in the experience of the intensest pleasure'* Plato, Ibid.

[712] 21a, *Philebus*, 1982.

[713] 21b, Ibid.

ultimate consequence is that he excludes his own capacity to be confident that he is enjoying himself, the recollection of pleasure and the skill to estimate for potential pleasure[714]. Indeed, what Socrates is then able to argue with confidence is that this 'life' is not characteristic of 'the life of a human being'[715]rather a 'physical entity' in this form of life will be 'a companion of oysters'[716]. Thus, Socrates demonstrates that practical reason is more important than pleasure and rejects pleasure as the exceptional quality of a life.

This short passage is dense and it offers a considerable advance to a reader in how to judge the quality of one's life. Socrates works with Protarchus' philosophical creed to present its limitations and then have him admit and acknowledge that any good life for a human being must include pleasure and reason. An innovative aspect of the argument is Socrates' success in treating one aspect of the persistent problem[717] of the personal identity question by establishing Protarchus as the decision maker who lives a life of pleasure. Socrates' demonstrates that the life of pure pleasure is a folly and unsuitable for it lacks a proper sense of pride, integrity and self-respect and thus is suitable only for lower order animals rather than human beings. This type of lifestyle must be unsuitable and not one that Protarchus will truly choose if what he desires is a life containing or including practical reasoning as a necessary element, for even if a Protarchus lives a life filled with pleasure alone, he will never realize this if he has no capacity for reasoned thought or memory. Consequently, Socrates' request to Protarchus stimulates in him an inherent and yet latent conviction that is elicited when Socrates challenges his choice of a life of pleasure. Protarchus now agrees that the qualities, which identify him as a human being, are practical reason and pleasure.

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[714] 21b6-21c, Ibid.

[715] 21c, Ibid.

[716] 21d, Ibid.

[717] I refer to the physical continuity question, from my reading of Socrates, I understand him to be asking Protarchus to be an individual he is now and imagine he will be physically or spatio-continuous with a future individual living a life of continuous pleasure.

Socrates does not ridicule Protarchus' belief system and offer an external source as a reference to an alternative (albeit supposedly superior) set of principles. Rather Socrates helps him to reject his false opinions and to adjust his understanding of personal identity and species membership. This, dialogue illustrates the nature of *ousia* as a 'coming into being' related to the nature of their interaction rather than discussion of abstract ideas.

Socrates' reasoning and point of view succeeds in transforming Protarchus beliefs and how he relates to, examines and judges what is important in his life. Nevertheless, this does not have to occur. Following the discussion with Socrates, there is no barrier other than Protarchus himself to return to a life of pleasure. Protarchus may not have the ability to surmount his own prejudices and evaluative judgments and these could inhibit him from appreciating the value of any life other than his own conception of the good; as a life of pleasurable experiences. Protarchus may believe that the life of reason appears dull, devoid of sentience and indeed priggish and therefore not human and identical with his aspirations and to follow a lower form of life. Socrates' question: 'would you personally… consent to spend a whole lifetime in the experience of incessant pleasures?'[718], this may indeed be answered in the affirmative or in the negative. It is possible that many individuals view their current lives as satisfactory though to many other individuals their lives are impoverished and consequently devoid of meaning. For example, an individual may by accident, or design be offered the alternative of a life of *eudaimonia* that provokes us to change our ingrained beliefs, from ego-centred compulsions based on our inner prejudices. However, we may be unable to choose a different way of living, as the change required demands *phronēsis*, which may beyond our capability. Thus, an individual may not realize that change is possible or that they have the potential to develop the ability to effect change to realize this alternative way of life.

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[718] *21a,* Taylor, 1972.

I suggest my reading of *phron*ēsis - a three-tiered system that functions as an orderly whole – gives us a set of relational properties that offers an individual the means to the kind of life described by Aristotle as *eudaimonia*. Emphasis on *phron*ēsis is not to serve as a basis for discriminating against 'lesser mortals' (like some pernicious forms of racism, or nationalism) rather it is the ability of any individual to form a conception of the good about the ultimate end and arrangement of their life to achieve it. What I suggest is that Aristotle wants to encourage his readers is to think with their heads and feel with their hearts[719] to enable them to make choices to lead to a 'truly human functioning'[720] life. Most individuals can acquire this capability and I wish to draw upon and extend the work of Nussbaum's practical reason framework to demonstrate that each individual has by virtue of being human the basic capability of *phron*ēsis.

My focus on the capability of practical reasoning as integral to a personal assessment of an individual because it enables us to focus on 'what are the important things in human living'[721], and on 'to suzên. ' Thus it is both internal and evaluative. It is evaluative as Aristotle encourages people to make life-choices and it is based on examination and judgment of what an individual values and gives importance in their way of life. Thus, these elements illuminate the functions necessary to live a fulfilled human life and the outcome of evaluation reveals what conditions we consider necessary our personal identity and continuity.

Aristotle's emphasis on personal evaluation may be criticised because it seems to be partial and subjective and is of little value as a foundational requirement

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[719] Thus, judgement in ethical decision-making is also concerned with perception (aisthēsis). This is an ability to distinguish that is concerned with grasping the importance of concrete particulars rather than universals, thus Aristotle states that: 'still, we are not blamed if we deviate a little in excess or deficiency from doing well, but only if we deviate a long way, since we are easily noticed. But how great and how serious a deviation receives blame is not easy to define in an account, for nothing else perceptible is easily defined either. Such things, are among particulars and the judgment depends upon perception' 1098b18-23, *NE*.

[720] Martha C Nussbaum attributes this quotation to Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,* 1844, in *FOJ*, p. 74.

[721] Nussbaum,1995, p. 94.

of personal identity. To defend his position we may point out that Aristotle opens his *Metaphysics* with 'All men by nature desire to know'[722] and as many scholars have observed[723] an individual is naturally inclined to principled analysis as part of living in society with other individuals. Thus, for the most part, it matters to us what we think of ourselves, the life we live, how we are perceived by other individuals and what are the opportunities available in our lives. Therefore, we can accept that while self-respect is an internal phenomenon that advances beyond this through an individual's familiarity with collective living and reasoning together in close proximity with others. Second, as Edel[724] notes, the reader should not attribute to Aristotle with 'an assertion that egoistic concern is the essence of all species'[725]. Edel's argument is that *phronēsis* as practical wisdom is being compared with political wisdom, as both the individual and state level: *phronēsis* or practical wisdom is being applied to different spheres of life. Further 'wisdom' per se implies *phronēsis* - this is the practical wisdom that concerns the individual knowing the good for themselves as just one of many practical wisdoms. As mentioned in the Introduction, our understanding of what is good for people with intellectual disabilities may be limited and this follows from the limited forms of primary *philia* that we create and sustain with people.

Most individuals believe in our inherent capacity to make choices and decisions that in turn affect our actions. By capacity, I mean the potential ability or characteristic that can be used to make choices and decisions about the type of life we wish to lead. Nussbaum[726] accurately describes this capability as: 'traits of intellect and character and body such that, under appropriate circumstances {we} will be in a position to choose well and act well.' If I do not believe that my efforts in thinking do affect my actions then it will be difficult to have confidence in my thoughts and

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[722] 980a, *Meta*.
[723] For one example, Williams, 1985, pp. 47-48.
[724] Edel, 1982, p. 310
[725] Ibid.
[726] Nussbaum, 1988, pp. 145-184, p. 160.

reasoning. Consequently, an individual has primary sensible abilities that enable them to understand and act to find solutions to their circumstances and these combine a set of related feelings and ideas that influence our thoughts and actions. Aristotle suggests:

It is apparent that prudence is not scientific knowledge; for, as we said, it concerns the last thing [i.e., the particular], since this is what is achievable in action. Hence, it is opposite to understanding. For understanding is about the [first] terms, [those] which have no account of them; but prudence is about the last thing, an object of perception, not of scientific knowledge. This is not the perception of special objects, but the sort by which we perceive that the last among mathematical objects is a triangle; for it will stop there too[727].

Therefore, what is at least a necessary condition in Aristotle's personal identity criteria is the existence of a being that by nature is capable of *phronesis*. This latent capability itself may or may not be realised but for most individuals with the virtue of *phronesis*, it will be most developed. It is this capability for *phronesis* that defines membership of the human species for individuals. Indeed this condition is also necessary to lead an individual self-realisation to a 'coming into being'. This form of capability is emphasised by Aristotle in a variety of contexts as we have shown[728]. Examples from the *Ethics* are:

That is why these states are thought to be natural endowments -why, while no one is thought to be a philosopher by nature; People are thought to have by nature judgment, understanding and intuitive reasoning. This is shown by the fact that we think our powers correspond to our time in life, and that a particular age brings with it intuitive reason and judgment; this implies that nature is the cause[729].

Nonetheless, an important question arises from this emphasis on capability that refers to people with intellectual disabilities and is aptly expressed by Reinders as: 'how can human beings be human when their condition actually defies the development of

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[727] 1142a25-30, *NE*.

[728] For example in the *Pol,* Aristotle defines citizenship in terms of capability, *'the authorisation to share in judicial and deliberative functioning'* 1275b18-20, *Politics.* Aristotle 1995, *Politics* , trans. Earnest Barker, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

[729] 1143b6-9, Aristotle, *NE*, translator W. D Ross. I am using the Ross's translation, as I believe that this translator makes reference to an earlier passage 1103a-1103b25 that is significant for the translation to 'states of character' and this is central to the concept of all individuals' inherent capability.

natural endowments that supposedly make their lives properly human?[730]. I suggest that the response to this question is the evidence of what can be achieved by *philia*. This is a good or at least I am proposing it is a good of such magnitude that it is 'most necessary for our life' and *'*no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other goods'[731]. This implies that *philia* expresses what is most desirable in being human, whatever our state or condition. *Philia* relates to an internal motivation and, but it lies at the heart of our humanity because 'it is universally desirable, given a particular understanding of what our humanity is'[732].

Aristotle argues that the virtues are not incidental to nor can they exist in isolation from our being rather as individuals for: 'we are by nature able to acquire them'[733]. Thus as individuals, we have the capability to exercise *phronēsis*. Although this may be a dormant capability, or what Nussbaum identifies as basic-capability (or B-capability) and described as: 'as person is B-capable of function A if and only if the person has as individual constitution organised so as to A, given the provision of suitable training, time and other instrumental necessary conditions[734]. Though it is a basic capability, it may be dormant or underdeveloped and may need direct action from other individuals and institutions in society to develop normally under suitable conditions. Nussbaum[735] provides, in a complex and detailed analysis, across a range of issues, a progressive and challenging perspective on how this capability may be developed and who has primary responsibility to develop it. Finally, I suggest this basic capability fits well with Aristotle's *ergon* argument for the interpretation of the

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[730] H. Reinders, *Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theology Anthropology and Ethics*, (Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2008), p. 121.
[731] 1155a5, *NE*.
[732] Reinders, 2008, p. 150.
[733] 1103a25, *NE*.
[734] Nussbaum,1988, pp. 145-184, p166.
[735] In a number of articles, Nussbaum develops her argument though for *phronesis*, this is developed in the reference listed above.

nature of man[736]. For Aristotle, attention to happiness (*eudaimonia*) is the first and necessary step to approach ethics for an individual's desire and reflection is necessary with respect to our view of our own definitive good (viz. happiness)[737]. Aristotle questions this account by analysing the *ergon*[738] as the characteristic activity, which is essential to human being. The examination reveals that a purely nutritive life is only a feature of plant life. A life that exists merely for sense perception and desire, while common to all living beings is of greater importance to a 'beast' or animal. Thus the most basic element of a life for a human being is a life guided by *prohairoumenoi*[739] ('choosing') or practical reason.

Conclusion

In concluding this chapter, I would like to summarise my view of *ousia* and *phronēsis*. *Ousia* is existence that incorporates and comprehends an array of experiences in human relationships. Realising and orientating ourselves to live a life of *eudaimonia* requires each individual to make choices. Deliberate choice, or intention, is central to Aristotelian ethics. Intention affects the behaviour (or action) of my body, for if this were false then our common convictions of the effectiveness of our intentions will be illusionary and it would make no sense to our minds that something is true, or real. So Aristotle confidently asserts:

What we deliberate about is the same as what we decide to do, except that by the time we decide to do it, it is definite; for what we decide to do is what we have judged [to be right] as a result of deliberation[740].

Therefore, an action that is chosen by an individual is one that emanates from a unity or fusion of appetites, desires and reason[741]. Thus, for Aristotle, an individual

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[736] I use this term only in the generic sense and for the purpose of fluency, my own inclination is to use the term human being.
[737] Vanier, 1965, pp. 97-146
[738] 1097a15-1098a20, Aristotle, *NE*.
[739] Nussbaum, 1995, p. 110.
[740] 11113a4-6, *NE*
[741] I refer to Edel's argument, Edel, 1982, p 279.

constructs and acts through the choices they make which affect their personality to such an extent that they contribute to their *eudaimonia* to a 'life worthy of dignity' and ultimately to a shared human identity conditions. Consequently, *phronēsis* is not just an intellectual technique that follows to a strict offset of rules, for practical skills are easy to acquire as both Macmurray [742] and Aristotle [743] suggest, such as, for woodworking or sculpturing skills. *Phronēsis* however, is associated with thinking and applying the knowledge and experience that we acquire to make sensible decisions and judgements about how to live our lives. Aristotle is aware that a 'veil of innocence'[744] does not surround us and we do not live in isolation from others on a planet that is non-aligned and free of cultural influences. So, as an individual one is a 'being' that completely understands their own personal identity through a web of interdependent and intentional relations that is fully realised by *phronēsis*. The nature of *phronēsis* is such that it incorporates *ousia* as existence by facilitating our capacity to exercise deliberate choice in determining one's lifestyles.

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[742] John Macmurray 'Reason and Religion' in *Reason and Emotion* Third Edition, (London: Faber & Faber, 1938), p. 138.
[743] 1141a10 *NE.*
[744] *FOJ*, p. 12.

Chapter 6: Goodwill within Human Nature

Introduction

My aim in this chapter is to explore the Aristotelian concept of *goodwill* and to link it this with one of Nussbaum's capabilities - *affiliation* in order to elucidate how this operates within the spectrum of friendships with differing degrees of intimacy. These involves, first an account an analysis of goodwill within the different forms of Aristotelian philia, and then discuss a narrative of Friedrich Schiller to explore what implications this might have for the complex relations of personal attachment and intra-personal emotional conflict.

Goodwill and Friendship

As a means to understand and provide a solution, to social justice issues, Nussbaum[745] has developed the capabilities approach following the work of Amartya Sen. Nussbaum argues that her approach clarifies the central requirements for a human life with dignity. This is because it is derived from the 'Aristotelian/Marxist conception of the human being as a social and political being, who finds fulfilment in relations with others'[746]. Nussbaum identifies 10 capabilities:

(i)   Life;
(ii)   Bodily Health;
(iii)   Bodily Integrity;
(iv)   Senses, Imagination and Thought;
(v)   Emotions;
(vi)   Practical Reason;
(vii)   Affiliation;
(viii) Other species;
(ix)   Play; and
(x)   Control over One's Environment.

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[745] Nussbaum states her capability approach 'is not intended to provide a complete account of social justice' *FOJ,* p. 75.
[746] *FOJ*, p. 85.

Nussbaum's essential argument is that each capability contributes to a life of human dignity and 'builds an important place for the norm of respect for pluralism'[747].

Nussbaum[748] describes her affiliation capability as:

Affiliation
  A. Being able to live with and towards others, to recognise and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting freedom of assembly and political speech).
  B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; Being able to be treated as a dignified human being whose worth is equal to be treated with that of others. This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, and national origin.

Importantly Nussbaum's approach builds upon Rawls' distributive justice framework while adding to it the valued *philia* dimension of well-being; that is, enhancing personal well-being and supporting people to meet their personal needs. Her emphasis on affiliation capability is aimed at extending social justice measures beyond meeting basic requirements at that threshold level to capabilities that make it possible to live in a fully human way. Aristotle's *goodwill* is relational and affiliation capability makes possible the emotional bonds or ties that connect individuals to each other. However, there will be varying degrees of affiliation from low to intensive associations, as Aristotle states:

Goodwill would seem to be a feature of friendship, but still it is not friendships. For it arises even toward people we do not know, and without there noticing it[749].

His discussion of *goodwill* occurs in this context and extends the view in Greek society that *philia* offers pleasure and is:

Carried out in a joyous, relaxed atmosphere. These include the public confessions of one's faults, mutual correction, carried out in a fraternal spirit; and examining one's conscience. Above all, friendship itself was, as it were, the spiritual exercise par excellence[750].

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[747] Ibid, p. 78.

[748] Ibid, p. 77.

[749] 1166b30-31, *NE.*

[750] P. Hadot, *Philosophy As a Way of Life,* (ed.) Arnold I. Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), p. 89.

I also suggest that this capability is social and naturally occurring attribute of individuals.

As we have seen, Aristotle emphasises the importance of Φιλια (or *philia*) to human life[751] and thus a primary purpose of his ethical scrutiny is to show how one is to conduct interpersonal relations with other people. *Philia,* as noted earlier is a difficult word to attribute precise meaning. Clearly, Aristotle uses the word generally to express 'friendship' amongst individuals. The distinguishing sentiment for Aristotle in friendship is *goodwill* with the most valued forms of relations exhibiting reciprocal *goodwil*l. Aristotle plainly articulates two positions. That friendship *must* be reciprocal, and that is must involve reciprocated *goodwill*, goodwill towards other human beings. First, he states:

For it would presumably be ridiculous to wish good things to wine, the most you wish is its preservation so that you can have it. To a friend, however, it is said; you must wish goods for his own sake[752]

Aristotle argues that if one party to a relation does not experience affection and believes their friendly relations are not reciprocated, and then what they express is *goodwill* rather than a need for *philia*. Thus for Aristotle the mark of *philia* is when we seek out a person as a friend, we seeks their good and we will value the other human if and so long as they seems good. Moreover such people are only counted as 'friends' if both parties wish each other good separately from what is good for them. The second position builds upon the first, and offers an initial definition of friendship as: 'friends are aware of the reciprocated goodwill[753]; and wish goods to one another and are aware of it for one of the causes mentioned above[754]. This definition of *philia* is not very clearly articulated. For example, why is Aristotle adamant that reciprocal goodwill is essential to 'real' *philia*? Of course, any *philia* is a continuing relationship between two or more people, but does the relationship always rely on reciprocated and

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[751] For example, 1155a5-9; and 1155a23-28; *NE.*
[752] 1155b29-31, Ibid.
[753] 1155b35, Ibid.
[754] 1156a5, Ibid.

shared *goodwill*? Could there be instances where one party is unable to exhibit reciprocate *goodwill* to another? Can one maintain a friendship if one does not feel loved by the other? Furthermore, what is the relation between goodwill and affection that emanates from 'the causes' or lovable qualities? These lovable qualities are objects that are loved as the good, the pleasant and the useful. So does goodwill generate an appeal to 'friendly feeling'[755] for another or does our desire and need for other humans produce *goodwill*? Indeed, both [friendly feeling and *goodwill*] could develop for other reasons. Other scholars have noticed this conundrum[756]. A possible solution is that there are two poles distinct kinds of relationships – the first ones of reciprocal *goodwill* – love based on the good, and the second where other lovable qualities represent secondary instances of attraction that are thus inferior to expressions of *goodwill*[757].

Because Aristotle's aim in writing his *Ethics* is to provide an account of how a good individual is to live, how to attain *eudaimonia* and how to understand our interpersonal interactions. Aristotle was aware of the complex set of relations that influence the nature of individual actions and communication. And his discussion of *goodwill* acknowledges a range of emotions that express degrees of friendly disposition that we show to others in pleasure and utility centred *philia*. In Books VIII and IX[758], he argues that each form of *philia* has the potential for an individual to demonstrate *goodwill* that promotes the friend's wellbeing. However, the degree to which it promotes the other's well-being potential will be determined by the nature of the relation. Aristotle provides an example of the universality of *goodwill* in chapter 2, Book VIII where he discusses the object of *philia*. Having explained the three causes of 'love'[759] (or friendship), he argues that: 'to a friend, however, it is said, you

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[755] 1380b35, *Rhet*.
[756] Stewart,1982, p. 274.
[757] 1156b6-1158b10, *NE.*
[758] *NE.*
[759] 1155b27, *NE.*

must wish goods for his own sake'[760]. Aristotle however is also attentive to the

shortcomings of forms of *philia* when they serve our own interests or are focused on

means and outcomes. For example:

For a recipient of a benefit does what is just when he returns goodwill for what he has received. But those who wish for another's welfare because they hope to enrich themselves through him would seem to have goodwill to themselves, rather than to him[761].

And again:

Friendship for utility, however, is liable to accusations, for these friends deal with each other in the expectation of gaining benefits. Hence they always require more, thinking they have got less than is fitting; and they reproach the other because they get less than they require and deserve. And those who confer benefits cannot supply as much as the recipients require[762].

Aristotle concludes in friendships of character or virtue, *philoi* do not 'keep score,' so

to speak, of the benefits they offer each other because the aim of the relation is based

on virtue rather than advantage or pleasure. Aristotle appears to be saying that though

fair exchange of goods is important in character friendships, the basis for determining

fair exchange is different.

He clarifies what he means by *goodwill* and specifically states that *goodwill*:

Lacks intensity and desire, which are implied by loving. Moreover, loving requires familiarity, but goodwill can also arise in a moment, as it arises, for instance (in a spectator) for contestants. For (the spectator) acquires goodwill for them, and wants what they want, but would not cooperate with them in any action, for as we have said, his goodwill arises in a moment and his fondness is superficial[763].

Thus, *goodwill* represents the primary stage in the development of *philia* of pleasure,

for an individual supposes another individual to have 'some virtue and decency' and

'apparently fine or brave or something similar'[764]. The example Aristotle uses is that

of admiring an athlete, and although this may be superficial as is focuses on pleasure

we may derive from watching the athlete perform. The initial pleasure derived from

the experience can inspire both parties to continue to undertake joint activities and to

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[760] 1155b30, *NE.*

[761] 1167a15-18, *NE.*

[762] 1162b16-20, *NE*

[763] 116633-1167a3, *NE.*

[764] 1167a19-20, *NE.*

devote time together in mutual company. These joint activities in turn will enable the 'friends' to appreciate and receive pleasure from each other's character. The attraction force of *goodwill* is linked to the desirability of the *virtue* in the other person and this is ultimately what evokes pleasure and what sustains the affection of *goodwill* and the sense of concord or benevolence in the relationship. For example, when Montaigne observed the artist Etienne de La Boétie at work he had a desire to emulate his excellence [765]. This soon after develops in him an affinity to the artist leading him to understand his friendship as the:

Perfect friendship which I am talking about is indivisible; each gives himself so entirely to his friend that he has nothing left to share with another; on the contrary, he grieves that he is not two-fold three-fold or four-fold and that he does not have several souls, several wills, so that he could give them all to the one he loves[766].

Further, Aristotle also maintains that *goodwill* is the:

Beginning of friendship, just as pleasure coming through sight is the beginning of erotic passion. For no one has erotic passion for another without previous pleasures in his appearance. But still enjoyment of his appearance does not imply erotic passion for him; passion consists also in longing for him in his absence and in an appetite for his presence. Similarly, though people cannot be friends without previous goodwill, goodwill does not imply friendship; for when they have goodwill, people only wish goods to the other, and not to cooperate with him in any action, or go to trouble for him[767].

In addition to individuals, sharing affable dispositions and benevolence the most 'complete'[768] form of *philia* for Aristotle also has as the feature that the above virtues are 'reciprocated'[769] and 'recognized'[770]. Thus:

To a friend, however, it is said; you must wish goods for his own sake. If you wish good things in this way, but the same is not returned by the other, you would be said to have (only) goodwill for the other. For friendship is said to be reciprocated goodwill. But perhaps we should add that friends are aware of the reciprocated goodwill. For many a one has goodwill to people whom he has not seen but supposes to be decent or useful, and one of these might have the same goodwill towards him. These people, then, apparently have goodwill to each other, but how could we call them friends given they are unaware of their attitude to each other?[771].

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[765] DeMontaigne, 1991.

[766] Ibid, p. 15.

[767] 1167a3-10, *NE*.

[768] 1156b5, *NE*.

[769] 1156b32, *NE*.

[770] Ibid.

[771] 1155b32-1156a3, *NE*.

Grunebaum[772] claims that utility centred friendships are 'unjustly undervalued',[773] by philosophers, and maintains that this form of *philia* has merit precisely as a result of being distinct from 'complete'[774] friendship. He proposes two forms of *goodwill*. The first is an unrestricted form of *goodwill* to a friendship that 'is aimed at a friend's complete overall well-being'[775]. This degree of intimacy is most fully expressed in 'complete'[776] *philia* where an individual will promote a friend's wellbeing in all spheres of their life. The second usual form of *goodwill* for Grunebaum is the restricted form that he defines as: 'aimed at the only portion of well-being relevant to the mutually beneficial relationship of the friends'[777].

The unrestricted form of *goodwill* is not intended to imply that individuals exhibit selfishness, exploitative actions or indifference to the other in such relationships, but rather that the *goodwill* is focused on the form (i.e., purpose) of friendship and concentrates effort and attention on a range of actions and emotions that contribute to their common *philia*. In this context, unrestricted *goodwill* is of the form described by Aristotle as 'complete'[778]. Grunebaum's unrestricted friendship does exist and in our contemporary society the relationships of individuals such as Jean Vanier and Henri Nouwen and many of the people who are part of the l'Arche communities exemplify individuals who are not blinded or, limited by cultural or societal imposed boundaries. In particular, in some of the relationships described by Vanier of people with an intellectual disability he has been in relationship with, have for him, demonstrated forms of 'complete'[779] friendship.

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[772] Grunebaum, 2005, pp. 203-214

[773] Ibid, p. 204.

[774] 1156a32, *NE.*

[775] Ibid, p 208

[776] 1156b, *NE.*

[777] Grunebaum, 2005, p. 208.

[778] 1156b, *NE.*

[779] Ibid, 1156b.

The distinction between restricted and unrestricted forms of *goodwill* to a restricted is consistent with a distinction that Badhwar[780] makes between friendships as 'ends' and 'instrumental' friendships. The *instrumental* form of friendship is motivated by one's own independently defined goals, where the other individual is party to the friendship because they help meet one's own goal(s). The *end* form of friendship is where an individual cares for and loves another because of who they are and for their common pursuit of *eudaimonia*. Accordingly, the basis of the *philia* is the nature of the individual – their character traits, moral, intellectual and aesthetic qualities and how that individual uniquely perceives and lives in the society they inhabit. A final influence for *philia* is the active involvement of the parties in the activity of friendship and the degree of affective self-exposure by the individuals. Consequently, it is through our personal relations experiences, from shared activity and historical continuity of the friendship, that one experiences cognitive, emotional and personal *goodwill*. Indeed, one can experience *goodwill* on the one hand and also provide *goodwill* to a friend in a manner that is unique and irreplaceable.

The Narrative[781]

Friedrich von Schiller was a leading German dramatist who wrote poetry and essays, including *Ode to Joy*, which was later used by Ludwig van Beethoven in his *Ninth Symphony*. Schiller composed several philosophical papers on ethics and aesthetics and he fused the thought of Immanuel Kant with the thought of Karl Reinhold. A key aspect to Schiller's philosophy is his concept of the *beautiful soul*. Schiller, as for Aristotle, a good person is a human being whose emotions have been educated by our reason, so that our sense of duty and inclination are no longer in conflict with one another. Hence, 'beauty', is not merely a sensual experience, but a moral one as well:

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[780] Badhwar, 1985.

[781] F. Schiller, 'Kallias or Concerning Beauty: Letters to Gottfried Komer, in (ed.) J. M. Bernstein *Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 157-160. I have abbreviated the narrative here, so I am not using the actual page numbers for each of the short extracts that I use in my text.

the Good is the Beautiful. Schiller presents the actions of the last person in the following narrative as a beautiful action (and of course, moral too). We will analyse the narrative to demonstrate how the individuals express *goodwill* he describes are pertinent to understanding our present personal relations and those between people with and people without intellectual disabilities. The narrative also demonstrates that although the *goodwill* capability is present in all interactions between individuals, it varies to different degrees and commences. This is his illustration:

A man happened upon some robbers who have undressed him and have thrown him onto the street in the bitter cold. A traveller passes by to whom he complains of his lot and whom he begs for help. "I suffer with you" says the traveller "and I will gladly give you what I have only one request that you do not ask any of my services, since your appearance revolts me. Here come some people, give them this purse and they will help you".

So what can we learn from this interaction? At first glance, the traveller appears to extend 'friendly feeling'[782] aid of support to the injured individual because the latter's physical need for assistance. Nevertheless, the victim's plea is not really met by the passing traveller, because his action appears to be impetuous and motivated to a desire to liberate himself from a visually abhorrent visual individual. The traveller responds by offering money rather than showing an emotional awareness of the victim's needs that require 'a little violence'[783] to one's senses. The traveller's actions appear to express a basic level of *goodwill* described as occurring naturally and spontaneously. This is like Aristotle's – 'goodwill… toward people we do not know'[784]. The traveller wanted to help the victim, though his response was limited as it is 'neither useful, morally generous nor beautiful'[785]. The traveller's actions emanate from his own desires and needs and may reflect a: 'wish for another's welfare because they hope to enrich themselves through him'[786]. So, this appears to have a basic form of *goodwill*.

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[782] 1380b35, Aristotle *Rhetoric* trans W. R. Roberts in McKeon, 2001, this text will now be referred to as *Rhet.*
[783] Schiller, 2003, p. 157.
[784] 1166b31, *NE.*
[785] Op cit.
[786] 1150b50, *NE.*

This minimum form of *goodwill* may also be present in the care services for people with intellectual disabilities. Reinders[787] notes that professional caregivers play a significant role in the lives of people with an intellectual disability. However for the most part, as noted earlier by Clement & Bigby, these relationships are more a matter of a 'contractual matter'[788]. Nevertheless though these 'professional' relationships are important for people with intellectual disabilities, I suggest, from my own experiences that in the majority, they reflect only a naturally occurring and basic level of *goodwill* that is 'neither… morally generous, nor beautiful'[789].

In the narrative, the injured individual meets another individual.

A second traveller appears and the wounded man renews his plea. This second man does not want to part with his money but still wants to fulfil his duty to humanity. "I will lose making a guilder if I spend time with you." He says "If you will compensate me for the time I spend with you, I will load you onto my shoulders and carry you to a monastery which is only an hour away."

Again, this reaction is a classic utility response – the assistance offered is useful for both parties and serves as an opportunity for the 2nd traveller to be useful for something. The help he offers suggest hat his senses are not disgusted by the state of the victim's injury and his motivation appears follow from his social and moral obligations. It is his duty and being a citizen in society that drives his action. The action of the traveller also demonstrates a minimum form of friendly feeling. The initial concern of the traveller is monetary; of losing income and how he is to be recompensed for his loss of income, while at the same time fulfilling his moral obligations. There appears to be a lack of freedom in the second traveller, and the absence of even a minimum willingness to give money or assistance to another individual. The traveller appears to see his 'duty' as a series of socially prescribed tasks, similar to chores allocated to individuals in an employment setting. This is in stark contrast to understanding oneself as an individual who shares in a common

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[787] Reinders, 2008, p. 5.
[788] Ibid.
[789] Schiller, 2003, p. 157.

humanity with others based on the underlying view that individuals are unique and irreplaceable[790].

Aristotle's view of utility *philia* is that it: 'is liable to accusations. These friends deal with each other in the expectation of gaining benefits. Hence they always require more'[791]. In western nations disability rights campaigners have supported public policy in such a way that the emphasis has been on changing the environment so that people with an intellectual disability, have equal access to public spaces and opportunities, seen as a means to gaining more control over their own lives rather than focusing on their rights to fulfilling relationships. The way this emphasis on disability rights works in practice may in fact excuse people without intellectual disabilities from entering into personal relationships with people with intellectual disabilities. The efforts in caring services tend to focus on environment and systems issues, 'personal spaces', for people of all abilities to form and sustain personal relationships. Indeed the response of the victim in Schiller's story reflects his perception of the utility nature of the interaction when he says: 'a courier over there who will give me the help for free that you wanted a guilder for'[792].

Nevertheless, all is not lost, for the wounded individual meets a third traveller.

The third traveller stands silently as the wounded man repeats the story of his misfortune. After the story has been told the man stands there contemplatively and battling with himself. "It will be difficult for me" he says at last "to separate myself from my coat, which is the only protection for my sick body, and to leave you my horse since my powers are at an end. But duty commands that I serve you. Get onto my horse and wrap yourself in my coat and I will lead you to a place where you will find help".

I suggest that this action of the traveller is a higher form of friendly feeling toward the wounded individual. Aristotle's view is that 'friendly feelings'[793] is the primary stage of development in *philia* and aims at enabling an individual to live and receive a

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[790] R. Gaita *A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love & Truth & Justice,* (Melbourne: Text Publishing Co., 1999). Gaita makes this point in several of his chapters in this manuscript.
[791] 1167a15, *NE.*
[792] Schiller, 2003, p.157
[793] 1380b35, *Rhet.*

eudaimonia life. He defines 'friendly feeling' as: 'wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about'[794]. The 3rd traveller is able to recognise the need of the victim and to act in such a manner that he can bring relief to the individual who has a greater need than him. Schiller proposes that the 3rd traveller action is 'purely moral'[795] as it occurs within his self-imposed or personal moral standards. What this implies is that although his actions fall within the gambit of goodwill, it is his personal code of conduct that drives his action.

An Aristotelian account would anticipate the response of the victim to the sign of 'friendly feeling'[796] and is a response of *goodwill* from the wounded individual by his response: "but you shall not suffer on my behalf since you yourself are in need. Over there I see two strong men who will provide the help that you could not readily furnish"[797]. The can be compared to the actions of the social workers in the narrative in chapter 4 that led to medical intervention, whereas his response may be judged as this higher form of *goodwill* and friendly feeling. This could be shown in a court deciding that a baby with Downs syndrome has a right to a life ('good in itself') and ('being inclined') rules that medical intervention need to occur ('bring about these things')[798].

However, the wounded man is still on the road unassisted and he notices the two men.

Now the two men approach the wounded man and start asking him about his misfortune. No sooner has he opened his mouth than both shout with surprise: "It's him! It's the one we are looking for." The wounded man recognises them and becomes afraid. It is revealed that both recognise in him a sworn enemy and the originator of their own misfortunes, and have travelled after him to revenge themselves on him violently. "So satisfy your hatred and take your revenge" the wounded man says, "I expect only death and not help from you". "No" responds one of them, "So that you see who we are and who you are, take these clothes and cover

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[794] Ibid, 1380b35-1381a1.

[795] Schiller, 2003, p. 158.

[796] 1380b35, *Rhet.*

[797] Schiller, 2003, p. 158.

[798] 1380b35- 1381a1, *Rhet.*

yourself. We will pull you between us and take you to a place where you will find help".

This is a dense passage. First, the historical relationship of these individuals reveals a degree of animosity in their preceding interactions. However, the two offended traveller's actions may not be in accord with their negative past association with the victim. Schiller wants his reader to understand that the travellers communicate verbally and through their actions 'friendly feelings'[799], of *concord* and indeed *goodwill* to the wounded individual. The 'friendly feelings'[800] are expressed in different forms. First, the travellers do not punish the wounded individual for their previous injuries. Second, they offer material assistance by way of giving clothes and transport to their enemy. Finally, the language of the travellers suggests that their actions are motivated to share in civility, mutual tolerance and respect for another individual as a person like themselves with whom they share a common humanity. Thus the actions of the travellers are in Aristotle's words: 'wishing for him what (they) believe to be good things, not for (their) sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as (they) can, to bring these things about'[801]. Indeed, I suggest that the combined actions exhibit concord or benevolence of the two travellers towards the wounded individual.

How one acquires this perception, belief and knowledge of the 'preciousness of other people'[802] is difficult to comprehend and explain. The influence of one individual and their ability to affect another party is beyond ordinary reason, because such moral principles can cause offence to some individuals who believe everyone should live and act as they do and practice cultural and/or moral beliefs consistent with their own world-view. Such an approach would only permit individuals to live in a way that enables them to flourish or experience *eudaimonia* if their mode of living

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[799] 1380b35, *Rhet.*
[800] Ibid.
[801] Ibid,1380b35-1381a1, my brackets
[802] Gaita 1999, p. 26.

and actions do not harm to other individuals. In *L'Arche* communities we can find examples of situations where individuals are permitted to live a personal lifestyle that enables them to flourish and where they can express forgiveness for the times where they have caused each other personal hurts. Vanier's[803] account of *goodwill* is illustrated in the relationship of Claudia and Nadine and how they, through their living together, are able to enter into a relationship of reciprocal goodwill *philia* regardless of the personal hurts they cause each other. I listed these in the Introduction as:

(i)   Revealing to your friend that they are of personal value to you;
(ii)   Understanding who your friend is and their actions;
(iii) Communicating to each other with emotional and cognitive reasoning;
(iv)   Celebrating through activities the everydayness of life;
(v)   Helping your friend to discover who she is and experience *eudaimonia* (happiness);
(vi)   Trusting your friend and believing that you are friends together – 'through 'thick' and 'thin'; and
(vii) Forgiving your friends when they do not live up to your expectations.

Claudia was a lady welcomed into the L'Arche community in Honduras after being abandoned there as a child. At first, Claudia was reluctant to engage with her caregivers. However, through her experience of various expressions of *goodwill*, in sentiments and actions, Claudia gained confidence in which she is and can now reciprocate goodwill.

While at some point in time, the wounded individual's actions, in Schiller's story, caused offence to the two travellers who nevertheless have overcome their own self-interest and demonstrate *goodwill* towards their 'sworn enemy'[804]. *Goodwill* is an absolutely necessary, essential feature of individual personal relations. However, it alone is not a sufficient condition for an intimate friendship, nor is it 'loving, since it lacks intensity and desire'[805]. Schiller wants to demonstrate that the travellers'

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[803] Vanier, 1998, pp. 22-31.
[804] Schiller, 2003, p. 158.
[805] 1166b34, *NE.*

goodwill emanates from their 'virtue and decency' [806]; they want the wounded individual to 'see who we are and who you are' [807]. By contrast, the *goodwill* demonstrated by the individuals of the restricted form mentioned earlier, *goodwill* that is: 'aimed at the only portion of well-being relevant to the flourishing of the mutually beneficial relationship'[808]. The travellers had met the wounded man in the distant past and there remained a spirit of animosity following their initial interaction. Nonetheless, they are able to provide material support to assist the wellbeing of the wounded individual. The wounded individual requests a further extension to this *goodwill* – forgiveness for the previous injury. The two travellers cannot offer clemency and thus the *goodwill* while mutually expressed in action fails to extend to engage their compassion and thus is not reciprocated.

The wounded individual meets yet another traveller.

As he gets up and tries to move away, he sees a fifth traveller who is carrying a heavy load approaching. "I have been deceived so many times", he thinks to himself, "and this one does not seem like someone who would help me. I will let him pass." As soon as the Wanderer sees him, he lays down his load. "I see" he says of his own accord, "that you are wounded and tired. The next village is far and you will bleed to death ere you arrive there. Climb onto my back and I will take you there".

Schiller presents this last action as 'beautiful'[809] and indeed I argue that it is the most virtuous, as it characterises the central features of *goodwill*.

The wounded individual does not make a request for assistance from the traveller who acts of his own accord. His offer to assist the individual, who requires medical assistance and has no means of transport himself, is thus more than an expression of 'friendly feeling' as Aristotle defines it[810]. It is also an expression of benevolence: it appears as if the traveller, without prompting, recognises from his own experiences that the wounded individual will need help and is conscious of the seriousness of his situation from a number of perspectives. First - the practical; the

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[806] Ibid,1167a19-20.
[807] Schiller, 2003, p. 158.
[808] Grunebaum, 2005, p. 208.
[809] Schiller, 2003, p. 158.
[810] 1380b35-1381a1, *Rhet.*

fifth traveller is aware of the physical pain the wounded individual is experiencing and his dire need for medical treatment. Second, his senses inform him of the degree of trauma the wounded individual is enduring through his physical condition. Thus, at both levels the traveller meets or 'sees' the wounded man, a fellow human being someone comparable to himself, maybe because of the injury, maybe not. However, the consequences flowing from this inter-personal encounter are the sharing of psychological, emotional and human intimacy. Third – inter-personally, the one who acts in this way will speak with words and nonverbally communicate to the victim both kindness and generosity. Is this acting with integrity? It does appear to meet the criterion.

The final traveller appears to act with *goodwill* to the wounded individual in a way that does not account for his own financial well-being; he is willing to give up his load for a stranger who he considers more important than the monetary value of the goods he is transporting. He does indeed present to the wounded individual as a friend for he *'wish (es) goods for his own sake'* [811]. This would be considered a one sided friendship unless the *goodwill* is 'reciprocated' [812] and 'recognized' [813] as Aristotle's definition of complete friendship requires. It would appear that the wounded man's response expresses reciprocity: "But what will become of your load which you leave here on the open road?'[814] To which the 5th Traveller responds: "that I don't know and it concerns me little … I do know, however, that you need help and I am obliged to give it to you'[815]. It is my view that this verbal exchange and the actions that follow are superior examples of the form of 'complete'[816] friendship that Aristotle recommends to his readers. The integrity of the traveller is on display and this is revealed through his self-less actions.

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[811] 1155b30, *NE.*
[812] 1156b32, *NE.*
[813] Ibid.
[814] Schiller, 2003, p.158.
[815] Ibid
[816] 1156b, *NE.*

This analysis is given because it illustrates the highest form of affiliation that one individual can express to another individual. The encounter between the individuals is a chance meeting and Aristotle might argue that the friendship is not of the 'complete'[817] form according to his typology for his typology. First, the individuals participate in one activity rather than in a voluntary association with frequent permanent positive experiences of mutually 'reciprocated'[818] and 'recognized'[819] *goodwill* that is alone generated from historical continuity in a friendship. Secondly, the individuals have limited personal knowledge of one another and their current interrelationship is unable to explain the unique constituent parts of each individual's life that creates their individual history. Third, it would appear that the individuals would not have the opportunity to recognise, over an extended period 'some virtue and decency'[820] in each other. Indeed, for most individuals, the action of the 5th traveller would be considered morally good or, righteous and conforming to the accepted standards of moral action. It may be sufficiently magnanimous to enable the individuals to further develop their personal relations to form a 'complete'[821] *philia*. Fourthly, the individuals lack an alliance or stable emotional bonds that will maintain this degree of expressed intimacy unless this action leads to further actions and the individuals determine to share their lives in solidarity with one another in a way that is pertinent to their private circumstances.

Aristotle's discussion of how friendship occurs in communities is developed in two separate parts of Book VIII. He first notes in chapter 1 that: 'if people are friends, they have no need of justice, but if they are just they need friendship in addition; and the justice that is more just seems to belong to friendship'[822]. In this instance, Aristotle typically commences with a maxim, that if all individuals are

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[817] 1156b, *NE.*
[818] 1156b32, *NE.*
[819] Ibid.
[820] 1167a19-20, *NE.*
[821] 1156b, *NE.*
[822] 1155a26-29, *NE.*

friends then there will be no need to have a formal or informal system that arbitrates

disputes. This is because friends will have a seamless union where each will dispense

with any sense of 'mine or thine'; 'giving' and 'receiving' and 'keeping accounts'. In

chapters 2 to 8,[823] he provides a deeper of analysis of personal relations and suggests a

scale of *goodwill* that is expressed as we have noted, by varying degrees of intimacy

depending upon the particular form of *philia* involved. Thus, he demonstrates that the

ideal of *philia* as a faultless unity of individuals with the unlimited expression of

goodwill in each form is a chimera. Finally, in chapter 9[824] after the full discussion of

goodwill, Aristotle provides a more practical account of the interrelationship of

friendship and justice, he states:

Friendship and justice would seem to be about the same things and to be found in the
same people. For in every community there seems to be some sort of justice, and
some type of friendship also. At any rate, fellow voyagers and fellow soldiers are
called friends, and so are members of other communities. And the extent of their
community is the extent of their friendship, since it is also the extent of the justice
found there.[825]

Schiller[826] notes that each of the travellers wanted to help and indeed the individual

methods described would be sufficient to enable them to realise their goal but in some

instances, this will cost the individuals. Thus, it is possible to conclude that many of

the travellers were unable to overcome their own self-interest and demonstrate

compassion to the wounded individual. By contrast, the 5th traveller demonstrates

both illustrates integrity and compassion and it appears that his *goodwill* is informed

by his thoughts by a sense of the preciousness of other individuals. This reinforces

Weil's view that compassion for the afflicted is: 'a more astounding miracle than

walking on water, healing the sick or raising the dead'[827]. The action of the fifth

traveller is more than 'miracle' described by Weil terms because he views the event in

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[823] Ibid.

[824] *NE.*

[825] 1159b25-30, NE.

[826] Schiller, 2003, p. 159.

[827] S. Weil 'The Love of God and Affliction' in *Science, Necessity and the Love of God*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 81.

a particular way; Aristotle might define this as *phronesis*. In this context, I use the term *phronesis* to indicate the integration of the Traveller's understanding shown in an action that demonstrates integrity, compassion and is without a trace of condescension. This is the form of *goodwill* that we can expect an individual to exercise in 'complete [828] *philia*.

Conclusion

This chapter explored Aristotle's concept of goodwill and noted the prominence he accords to it in all forms of human relationships. Schiller's narrative is used to illustrate the different degrees of *goodwill* that can operate in human relationships. A possible implication of the prominence of *goodwill* in Aristotle's account is that it justifies prioritising a relational view of personhood. Moreover, contemporary Aristotelian's such as Nussbaum make this point by describing affiliation as a central capability. Therefore, in the next chapter we will continue this discussion of *goodwill* and demonstrate it's importance in human relationships.

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[828] 1156b5, *NE*.

Chapter 7 Sociability and Human Dignity

Introduction

This chapter continues this theme of *goodwill* to deal with a neglected aspect of human activity. It explores Aristotle's dictum that man is 'born for citizenship'[829] and defends Nussbaum's premise that Affiliation ('Sociability') is a uniform or consistent and ubiquitous phenomenon in human lives that warrants it being given equal importance to rationality as an indicator of personhood. The critical theoretical root of this argument is relies in 'the relationships that we bear to one another'[830]. We also investigates a nameless Aristotelian social relations virtue [831] that Irwin [832] calls 'Friendliness', I believe the term 'Sociability' is more appropriate as this suggests a mean to explain our inter-personal interactions.

Sociability

In this first section, we explore what Aristotle's means by saying that man is 'naturally political'[833] and defend Nussbaum's premise that affiliation is a uniform and ubiquitous phenomenon in human lives and this warrants it being given equal importance to rationality as a defining characteristic of human beings. This she argues

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[829] 1097b11, Aristotle *NE* trans. W. D. Ross.

[830] Eva Feder Kittay 'Equality, Dignity and Disability', *Perspectives on Equality: The Second Seamus Heaney Lectures*, (Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2005), pp. 95-122, p. 111.

[831] For example see 1126b10-1127a15, *NE*.

[832] Ibid.

[833] 1097b11, *NE*. The translator notes an important point here when he suggests that Aristotle 'in saying that the highest good must be sufficient for other people as well as the individual happy person, Aristotle implies that a person's good is social not only in the weak sense that (i) requires some contribution by other people, but also in the strong sense that (ii) includes the happiness of other people' p. 182.

is demonstrated in 'the relationships that we bear to one another'[834] and in the centrality of affiliation to our human dignity and way of *being* in *philia.*

The next section explores an Aristotelian social relations virtue[835] and suggests this offers us a model for understanding generic personal interactions. This, generic affective mode to personal relations, may serve to validate Nussbaum's claim that 'the need for care'[836] is a natural attribute of rationality and Sociability and is thus an expression of our dignity as human beings.

The following section presents a narrative describing the friendship one man developed with another man with an intellectual disability to highlight the former's progression from a civic to a character-type *philia.*

In the final section, we develop Nussbaum's concept of a person[837] to align it more congruently with her notion of humans both as 'capable and needy'[838] and hence human dignity being defined by our capacity to affiliate, care for and relate to other human beings.

Affiliation is described by Nussbaum in her key texts[839], as a two dimensional capability – the ability to personally engage with other human beings and to be treated with dignity as a human being[840]. Nussbaum develops an exposition of Aristotle that is fundamental to the Capability Approach, which she offers as a 'social-minimum approach albeit 'partial theory'[841] to address three difficult social justice issues[842] - disability, nationality and species membership.

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[834] Kittay 2005, p. 111.

[835] For example see 1126b10-1127a15, *NE.*

[836] *FOJ* p.160.

[837] Nussbaum 1992, pp. 216-223.

[838] Ibid, p. 216.

[839] Nussbaum, 1988, pp. 145-184; 1990 pp. 242-269; 1992, pp. 202-246; Martha C Nussbaum 'Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach' in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds.), *The Quality of Life*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) pp. 242-269; Nussbaum, 1995, pp. 86-132; Nussbaum, 2000; FOJ.

[840] *FOJ,* p. 77.

[841] Nussbaum, 2009, p. 332.

In this chapter the term 'human being' and individual', will be contrasted with the minimalist view that emanates from philosophers such as Locke or Hume. This chapter's use of the term, 'human being', draws upon the ancient Greek notion (previously discussed), which varies according to different purposes and contexts, and which can refer to radically different aspects of the same being in one sentence[843]. This implied concept of a human being is dynamic – a complex biological organism that interprets and modifies it's agency through a developing understanding of itself.

Nussbaum's account of the basic human functions has had a global influence and has made an invaluable contribution to the kind of well-being measures now take account of a capability measures[844]. Her view is underpinned by an uncomplicated perception of individual dignity, worth and agency that is commonly associated with the Kantian notion of 'the inviolability and dignity of the person'[845]. While it is possible to respect and admire this theoretical and practical response, it may not adequately address one difficult social justice issue that it purports to confront; that of providing justice to all human beings. Nussbaum argues 'Affiliation' is a 'part of any life we will count as a human life'[846]; this paper argues it is so omnipresent in human life that 'our need for care, in our dependency and vulnerability'[847] is so essential to human life and to our dignity in our ordinary human associations. There are of course many forms of association and we argue that sociability makes possible all social interactions.

The yearning to know 'how is one to live?' has led many individuals, including philosophers, to offer particular theories of how we are to conduct ourselves

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[842] The three issues are: first offering justice to people with physical and intellectual disabilities; second, expanding justice to all individual global citizens; and third treating non-human animals with justice.

[843] Richard Sorabji provides an informative account of the ancient Greek view. R. Sorabji, 2006, pp. 34-37.

[844] United Nations 1993-1999 *Human Development Reports,* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2000).

[845] Nussbaum, 2000, p. 73.

[846] Nussbaum 1992, p. 216.

[847] Kittay 2005, p.118.

and what is of value in human life. Aristotle argues that the best life is filled with

eudaimonia and this form of life is *autàrkeia*:

The same solution [that happiness is complete] also appears to follow from self-sufficiency ... what we count as self-sufficient is not what suffices for the solitary man by himself but what suffices also for parents, children, wife, and in general for friends and fellow citizens, since a human being is naturally political [animal][848].

As Nussbaum notes[849], for Aristotle, this fact of human nature suggests that

individuals should prefer a shared life in company with other individuals rather than a

solitary life. Edel also makes the point that human beings participate in a range of

relations that 'vary inversely as [a] ladder of friendship'[850] and notes Aristotles

comment that: 'no one would choose to have all [other] goods and yet be alone since a

human being is a political [animal], tending by nature to live together with others'[851].

Even if true that human beings need to live in some sort of relationship with other

human beings, does it follow that this is essential to our nature and part of whom we

are as human beings? If it is true, as we argue, then it specific imperatives and

normative implications follow that broaden our concept of 'person' and understanding

of human dignity.

Nussbaum[852] defends her claim sociability is an inherent part of human nature

by analysing Aristotle's discussion of *philia* and how he describes, in Book 1 of the

Politics[853], concerning the naturalness of political life. Nussbaum[854] reminds her

reader that Aristotle's metaphysics and biology of nature do not claim to give an

exhaustive account of things and are concerned with trying to give 'an intelligent

account'[855] of the experiences of human beings. Nussbaum uses Aristotle's early

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[848] 1097b6-11, *NE*, brackets are the translators.
[849] Nussbaum, 1995, p. 81.
[850] Edel, 1982, p. 145.
[851] 1167b17-20, *NE*.
[852] Nussbaum, 1995, pp.102-110.
[853] In particular, 1252a-1252b35, Aristotle, *Politics,* trans. E. Barker, (Oxford University Press, 1995). This text will now be referred to as *Pol*.
[854] Nussbaum, 1995, p. 102.
[855] Ibid, p. 102.

descriptions of *philia* in Books VIII of the *Ethics*[856] to justify her argument, which principally relies on Aristotle's view that 'no one would choose to live without friends'[857]. This emphasis draws on human beings 'interpersonal responsiveness' as a 'necessary and natural part of human life'[858]. These conclusions realities of these are derived from ēndoxon or general beliefs of human beings and despite some individuals choosing to live a reclusive life, primarily our human animality is considered primarily as 'the ability to recognise and respond to the humanness of every other human'[859].

Aristotle's argument in the *Politics*, Nussbaum argues, is more obscure. He confirms his argument and develops two further dimensions to it in the *Ethics*[860]. He reiterates that humans are 'naturally political'[861] and first justifies this assertion by an appeal to credible historical figures like Homer who confirm his notion of a human being[862]. In order to further substantiate the central place of Sociability in the lives of human beings, Aristotle notes that they use language 'equipped to express ethical conceptions'[863] and this serves as evidence 'to the importance of the social in our lives'[864]. Nussbaum points out the argument may have limited force depending upon on how a reader regards language. Nevertheless, if Aristotle's view is credible then it is of: 'deep importance [to] interpersonal and social concerns: the two go together, they are "made for" each other'[865].

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[856] *NE.*

[857] 1155a5, Ibid.

[858] Nussbaum, 1995, p. 104.

[859] Ibid, p. 104.

[860] 1097b6-11, *NE.*

[861] 1253a1, *Pol.*

[862] Indeed, Homer comments on Achilles disregard for the Cyclops who have no sense of sociability, Homer, *The Iliad*, trans Robert Fagles, (ed) B. Knox, (New York: Viking, 1990), 9. 63-64.

[863] Nussbaum 1995, p107.

[864] Ibid, p. 108.

[865] Ibid, p108.

Notwithstanding these critical arguments, Nussbaum claims that affiliation capability warrants equal importance to rationality as an indicator of humanhood. There are two components to this, first Aristotle observes:

Further, a parent would seem to have a natural friendship for a child, and a child for a parent, not only among human beings but also among birds and most kinds of animals. Members of the same species and human beings most of all, have a natural friendship for each other; that is why we praise friends of humanity. And in our travels, we can see how every human being is akin and beloved to a human being[866].

And secondly, he says:

The man who is isolated, who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or has no need to share because he is already self-sufficient, is no part of the city, and must therefore be either a beast or god. There is therefore a natural impulse in all men towards an association of this sort.[867]

Thus for Aristotle a 'natural impulse'[868] is internal to our nature so we must explain: first how it occurs and develops in early infancy; then how a possible continuum to interpersonal relations is formed; and how 'Sociability' (Friendliness) as a *modus operandi* in society.

First and foremost, no matter how an infant is constituted, one 'comes from the belly of another human creature'[869] and as an individual, commences life with biological and social experiences of connection. Bowlby[870], has conducted in-depth research on the development of infants, which suggests that the primary need of human beings from infancy onwards is for supportive and rewarding relationships with other human beings. This 'natural impulse'[871] is for an attachment relationship that extends and is separate from sexual fulfilment. Generally, 'connection' or 'attachment' in psychological theory refers to the union or, bond that develops in the parent/caregiver relationship and is typically an enduring relationship that involves a

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[866] 1155a16-23, *NE*.

[867] 1253a27-29, *Pol*.

[868] 1252a29, Ibid.

[869] M. Frayn, *Constructions*, (London: Wildwood House, 1964), p. 108.

[870] Bowlby, 1969.

[871] 1252a29, *Pol*.

specific person(s) who provides soothing, comfort, pleasure and safety[872]. These

experiences can assist us in developing a positive and/or negative connection with

human beings and indeed influence all humans with the same given instincts.

Macmurray provides a succinct modern view in his claim that:

The nexus of relations, which unites us in human society, is not organic but personal.
Human behaviour cannot be understood but only caricatured, if it is represented as an
adaptation to environment; and there is no such process as social evolution but
instead, a history which reveals a precious development and possibilities both of
progression and retrogression[873].

Macmurray defines these instincts as a 'specific adaptation to environment which does

not require to be learned'[874]. Instincts are then an inclination or tendency to act in a

particular fashion and can be traced to a core set of attributes that are unique to a class

of species. Therefore, instincts interact within an individual and their experiences, to

form a system that guides actions in a variety of situations. Indeed, Macmurray also

notes the presence of instincts from infancy, thus a:

Baby is not an animal organism, but a person, or in traditional terms, a rational being.
The reason is that his life, and even his bodily survival, depends upon intentional
activity and therefore knowledge, if nobody intends his survival and acts with
intention to secure it, he cannot survive that he cannot act intentionally, that he cannot
even think of himself and has no knowledge by which to live is true, and is of first
importance. It does not signify, however, that he is merely an animal organism; if it
did, it would mean that he could live by the satisfaction of organic impulses, by
reaction to stimulus, by instinctive adaptation to his natural environment. But this is
untrue. He cannot live at all by any initiative, whether personal or organic, of his
own. He can live only through other people and in dynamic relation with them. In
virtue of this fact he is a person, for the personal is constituted by the relation of
persons[875].

Macmurray's essential claim here is that from our infancy we do not, and indeed

cannot afford to view ourselves as separate and as mere spectators of our world.

Macmurray contrasts Aristotle's with Suttie's biological view that the 'human infant is

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[872] B. D Perry, 'Bonding and attachment in maltreated children: Consequences of emotional neglect in childhood' Retrieved February 2, 2009 from http://www.childtrauma.org/CTAMATERIALS/Attach_ca.asp

[873] *PR,* p. 46.

[874] Ibid, p. 48.

[875] Ibid, p. 51.

less like an animal than the human adult'[876] and argues both are inaccurate as they start from the wrong place. Macmurray argues that we need to start from the field of the personal and if we follow this strategy we can observe how 'the baby differs from the young of all animals'[877]. Moreover, infants are aware of their own *person* as conscious when one is in relation with another *person*. From this, he argues, that we develop personal relationships as our mode of living and as being a members of the society in which we find ourselves. While, Macmurray does not provide detailed empirical evidence in his works to support his claim, he does describe how infants act from birth and states:

This is evidence that the infant has a need, which is not simply biological but personal, a need to be in touch with the mother, and in conscious perceptual relation with her.[878]

Indeed, Aristotle also does not detail nor chart a possible progression to an individual's 'natural impulse'[879], although he does refer to the 'child' as imperfect[880] and this is generally taken to mean that children lack the capacity to fully reason. However, there are some recent studies that offer empirical support for this view.

Clearly, the experience of infancy differs from society to society. According to studies by Wolff[881], newborns average 70% of their time asleep and up to 30% of their time in 'alert inactivity'. This 'alert inactivity' is described as infants scanning their environment with interest, head, trunk and lip movements may occur and their breathing is fast and regular. This is the state in which infants are most susceptible to learning. Thus from birth, and this extends for six to nine months, the infant is aware of itself as a material object in relation to which other material objects are seen or felt. For example, one can imagine a baby coming up against a range of stimuli, (such as

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[876] *PR,* p. 45.

[877] Ibid, p. 47.

[878] Ibid, p. 49.

[879] 1253a29, *Pol*.

[880] 1259a39-1259b19, Ibid.

[881] P. H. Wolff, 'The causes, controls, and organization of behavior in the neonate' *Psychological Issues,* **5,** 1, 1966, whole of number 17

stubbing a toe on the side of the cot, human persons or cuddling them for warmth); to gradually learn to use their limbs and to exercise control over their movements. After six to nine months the infant becomes aware of itself as a *being* with mental properties, which might appear to contradict various theories/perspectives on what it is one can know. For example, for Descartes[882] my knowledge may not be determined if I look:

Out of the window, and see men walking in the street; now I say in ordinary language that I 'see' them, just as I 'see' the wax; but what can I 'see' besides hats and coats, which may cover automata?[883].

However, the data of Hamlin *et al* and Bowlby suggest Macmurray's and Nussbaum's interpretation of Aristotle's account of personal relations may be valid.

Hamlin *et al*[884] devised experiments to test whether infants at six and ten months could evaluate the behaviour of others. The results revealed: 'infants prefer an individual who helps another to one, who hinders another, prefer a helping individual to a neutral individual, and prefer a neutral individual to a hindering individual'[885]. Bowlby showed that infants develop specific attachments to other persons from nine months of age and this is evidenced by numerous different actions including infants protesting if handed over to a stranger and clinging to familiar adults. Indeed Bowlby, and Macmurray both argue that personal relations are of central importance to a person's life[886]. This is shown when an infant discovers deviation between their own attention and their carer's attention.

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[882] 'Second Meditation', R. Descartes *Philosophical Writings* trans. & edited E. Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach, (Hong Kong: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1954), pp. 66-75, p. 73.

[883] Ibid, p. 73.

[884] J. Hamlin, K. Wynn & P. Bloom 'Social evaluation by preverbal infants' *Nature* **450**, November 2007, pp. 557-559.

[885] Ibid, p. 557

[886] For example, Bowlby states: 'Intimate attachments to other human beings are the hub around which a person's life revolves, not only when he is an infant or a toddler or a schoolchild but throughout his adolescence and his years of maturity as well as old age. From these intimate attachments a person draws his strength and enjoyment of life and, through what he contributes, he gives strength and enjoyment to others'. J.

This may be compared with the first steps in the imitation stages of self-development described by Mead[887] and this process may be unique to the human animal as a person rather than the animal species.

For example[888], young chimpanzees can follow a gaze, and this includes spaces that are behind their line of sight without any shift of gaze. However, there is evidence to suggest that chimpanzees do not distinguish an individual's gaze as a symbol of attention. There are two important considerations here. First, it is possible to argue there are other indicators that may minimise their differences between them and us; and second similar studies have yet to be conducted on chimpanzees in their natural habitats and these may reveal similar patterns to the human studies. However, there would appear to be significance to the different chimpanzees and humans.

Human infants at a further stage of development appear to intentionally and influence a situation so that their carer will engage his or her gaze with his or their own gaze. Their mutual gaze and mutual recognition will bring personal delight to the infant and often leads the infant to repeat this action in further developed games which increases the infant's sense of its own mental states and intensifies the pleasures experienced as part of mutual interactions. I tentatively propose to offer this as empirical evidence that confirms Aristotle's view that there is a 'natural impulse in all men'[889] to association.

Aristotle's discussion of *philia* in the *Ethics*[890] might also be described as offering a 'rubric of friendship'[891], that includes three categories to reciprocal human *philia* – utility, pleasure and perfect. Indeed, it might be that *philia* 'constitute the

Bowlby, *Loss, Sadness and Depression: Attachment & Loss III*, (New York: Basic Books, 1980) p. 18.
[887] G. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, (ed) C. W. Morris, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962), pp. 152-163.
[888] D. J .Povinelli & T. J. Eddy, 'Specificity of gaze-following in young chimpanzees' *British Journal of Developmental Psychology*, **15**, 1997, pp. 213-222.
[889] 1253a29, *Pol.*
[890] Book VIII & IX, *NE.*
[891] *GPT*, p. 65.

very fabric of our daily lives'[892]. However these relations also reveal numerous sets of generic, possibly remote and/or detached personal interactions, and as Kant argues: in ordinary social intercourse and associations, we do not enter completely into the social relation[893]. Pakaluk[894] suggests that Aristotle was aware of these diverse social practices and hence his discussion of *philia* in the *Rhetoric*[895] introduces examples of various kinds of secondary relations in which humans participate.

In what follows, it is argued that Aristotle's nameless virtue refers to the virtuous and most appropriate way of humans interacting with other humans. Thus, Diagram 1 below seeks to illustrate Aristotle's implied continuum of *philia* that adds to Aristotle's three forms of *philia* outlined in the *Ethics,* and s his description of *philia* in the *Rhetoric*. On the right hand side appears 'utility', 'pleasure' and 'complete'[896] *philia* and this is no surprise. The other types listed are a 'first-cut' attempt to describe the connected yet diverse, complex, irregular or transient, dutiful and indeed communal relations that are a feature in our lives. However, a caveat must be noted, namely that we are here not concerned with whether these relations are hetero or homosexual but rather evokes the spirit of Emerson who takes the gender of friends as irrelevant[897]. Second, this characterisation of degrees of intimacy in relations not designed to be a definite typology even when taken as a whole. It is probable there exists, in reality such a diverse range and variety of interpersonal relations that an exact or even a careful approximation to it may be impossible.

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[892] M. Pakaluk *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 257.
[893] Kant in Pakaluk, 1991, p. 214.
[894] Ibid, pp. 70-71.
[895] 1380b35-1382a18, *Rhet*.
[896] 1156a10-1156b10, *NE*.
[897] R. Emerson 'Friendship' in Pakaluk, 1991, pp. 218-232.

Figure 2: A Possible Continuum to *Philia* relations

Philia

For many individuals, personal relationships are characterized by different degrees of intimacy and these may form a continuum of intimacy. This is something most philosophers on friendship will agree. We often hear people describe other individuals as their 'friends' but when these relations are explored, they reveal ambiguous, highly elastic, and emotionally blurred and culturally diverse kinds of relations. These different of relations may more accurately be represented by their instrumentality and intention. The relation is instrumental insofar as it plays an important part in enabling human beings to live and to achieve the many necessary tasks, and activities they undertakes as part of 'living'. The relations can be evaluated by the extent they contribute to higher degrees of familiarity and confidence in our relationships. This is the rationale for grouping of these forms of *philia* into four types and placing them on the left hand side of the continuum. The types are named as Sentient, Comrade, Interest and Civic. These are distinguished from Aristotle's classification of types of friendship in the *Ethics,* as they aim to describe our more usual way of connecting with other individuals. It is possible that these four types of relations could progress, and develop into these more intimate type of relationship that is featured in the *Ethics.* Aristotle hints at the nature of these relations when he mentions the following patterns of social engagement, e.g., a sentient *philia* may be described as 'your friend is the sort of man who shares your pleasure in what is good and your pain in what is unpleasant[898]. A 'comrade' *philia* might be illustrated by: 'those with whom it is pleasant to live and spend our days'[899]. An interest *philia* by: 'those, then, are friends to whom the same things are good or evil; and those who are, moreover, friendly or unfriendly to the same people'[900]. Civic[901] *philia* are those broader based relations we have such as: 'those who are willing to treat us well where money or our personal safety is concerned; and therefore we value those who are liberal, brave or just'[902].

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[898] 1381a4-5, *Rhet*.
[899] 1381a29, Ibid.
[900] 1381a8-10, Ibid.
[901] I should state here that I take 'civic' to include a type of relation that goes beyond the legal realm to include a social sphere.
[902] 1381a20-22, *Rhet*.

What follows is a *very* rough and broad outline that describes characteristics of these types of *philia* in relation to which a number of points that need to be made. First the use of the term 'friend' can be misleading if it is applied to all types of relations, for it implies the presence of universal traits in all the relationships of people which bear this label. Though 'interaction' and 'activity' are the common denominators, the similarly ends there. The degree of emotional involvement of individuals differs from type to type. The use of common term 'friend' can mislead us to think that individuals are more intimately connected that they actually are. The individuals with whom we interact in these generic relationships would be more accurately described as companions. Thus, a 'Companion' is an individual who acts as one's associate for a period of time and who shares in common associations and/or social experiences. Second, that a condition of each of these types of *philia* is that they are not necessarily concerned with developing personal intimacy nor will they automatically progress with constancy and over time. Third, that the emotional bond which connects the individuals is that of a friendly feeling, and this is described as: 'wishing for [a companion] what you believe to be good things not for your own sake, but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about'[903]. Fourth, the reasons given for the association or connection differ from *philia* in the *Ethics*[904], for where the nature of the alliance consists of: 'doing kindness; doing them unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are done, which shows that they were done for their own sake and not for some other reason'[905].

There are two further points to make about Aristotle's 'Companion' that relates to 'how' the association occurs and how the individuals act. Aristotle appears to suggest[906] that these relationships develop from a diverse range of circumstances in the community one inhabits rather than being due the individual necessarily choosing each relationship. The relationship arises as a result of where one finds oneself. It is more accidental, functional and

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[903] 1379b35-1381a1, *Rhet*, my Brackets.
[904] 1156a10-1156b10, *NE*.
[905] 1381b35, *NE*.
[906] 1381a10-11; 1381a19-20, 1381a32-43, Ibid.

casual rather than due to the purposeful intent of individuals to form mutual relations grounded in 'reciprocated goodwill'[907]. This does not involve making a moral judgment about these types of *philia*; the task is to clarify how different types form an integral and necessary part of our daily experiences. Finally, 'Companions' will 'do things' with each [908] other and I believe the social parameters or boundaries that govern these interaction are, to be found in the 'nameless virtue' of the *Ethics*. A summary of the argument so far is that all types of *philia* include the harmonization of the interests of two or more human beings and some types of *philia* occur independently of close personal attachment.

The second continuum can be developed from Aristotle's[909] account of the virtues and which is translated by Crisp[910], Irwin[911] and Ross[912] as 'Friendliness' but now termed 'Sociability'. This discussion of 'sociability' occurs in Aristotle's analysis of the virtues of social intercourse, viz. 'truthfulness'[913] and 'ready wit'[914]; following his discussion of anger and the quasi virtue of shame or disgrace as it relates to how humans act. For Aristotle, 'character-related' virtues are those attributes that 'share(s) in reason in a way, insofar as it both listens and obeys it'[915]. The second continuum is visualised in Diagram 2. Here, Sociability as a virtue can act as a central paradigm for our general *philia*, for it equips human beings with the capability to draw conclusions about interacting appropriately or inappropriately. Therefore, Sociability is a *via media*, or a middle course between a range of possibilities, it indicates to us 'how to' engage with other humans in order to:

a) Allow us to interact in a virtuous way;
b) Express our emotions in a way that reveals we are both psychologically vulnerable and in need of care; and
c) Treat another individual as an end in himself or herself.

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[907] 1155b34, Ibid. This phrase completes the sentence where Aristotle states that: 'Friendship is said to be reciprocated goodwill'.
[908] 1381a1, *Rhet*.
[909] 1126b11-1127a14, *NE*.
[910] *NE* trans. R. Crisp, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2000), p. xviii.
[911] *NE*, p. 62.
[912] *NE* trans. Ross.
[913] 1127a15-1127b32, *NE*.
[914] 1128a1-1128b9, Ibid.
[915] 1102b31, Ibid.

Figure 3: Generic Forms of Communication

No Name Virtue
Friendliness / Sociability

Ingratiating/Sycophantic   Cantankerous/Bad Tempered

⬅————————————————————————————————————➡

(A human being is praised   (A human being is self centred
as a form of pleasing and in   and insensitive to others)
order to gain advantage)

Applies to

   (i)   Meeting people;
   (ii)   Living together; and
(iii)   Common dealings in conversation and actions.
Intermediate State = Friendliness or Sociability

a) Praiseworthy: a human being accepts or objects to things in the right way;
b) Differs from friendship because it requires no 'special feeling' nor fondness for other human beings;
c) Human beings interact in a social way, that is appropriate and fitting to the human being in the context they are located in;
d) Avoid causing pain;
e) Willing to share in fine and benefit action;
f) Reflects on the 'pleasures and pains of social life' and will avoid participating in painful and dishonourable activities;
g) Interacts with human beings with valued status with respect and congruency with their role; and
h) Interacts with human beings accordingly to degree of knowledge and sentience.

In the first instance, it will be useful to distinguish Sociability from politeness. Politeness is certainly of value and is a useful foundation for our initial contacts and moral development but it differs from a virtue as it:

Does not always produce kindness of heart, justice, complacency, or gratitude; but it gives to man at least the appearance of it, and makes him seem externally what he should be[916].

It is more accurate to consider politeness as being a precursor to virtue[917] and acting as a simulacrum to virtuous actions. Thus, it creates the conditions that pave the way for friendship by an amicable display of social skills - respectful, kindly and everyday manners – and how to acquire them. Politeness also represents a series of respectful actions, or behaviours, whereas 'virtue' incorporates actions that are 'a state [of character] {that} results [from the repetition of] similar activities'[918]. So, politeness is more like a form of courtesy or good gestures that can be insincere forms of self-expression, which may display the ingratiating action that Aristotle mentions[919]. Furthermore, there are times when we will need to object to human actions or forms of social intercourse, because they displease u and politeness may not be appropriate in these circumstances. Finally, politeness can lack authenticity by being preoccupation with exhibiting the 'right actions', by simply observing customs, language and general propriety, rather than showing real concern for other people.

If sociability has a key role, equivalent to rationality in determining our nature as human beings then it must significantly contribute to how the human society functions; that is, it must enable humans to live with amity, peace, toleration and respect for each other, and also facilitate humans to express and develop their own

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[916] J de la Bruyere, *The Characters of Jean de la Bruyere,* trans. Henri van Laun (Paris: Brentano's, 1929), p. 114.
[917] See Andre Comte-Sponville who argues this case. A Comte-Sponville *A Short History on the Great Virtues: The Use of Philosophy in Everyday Life,* trans. Catherine Temerson, (London: Vintage Books, 2003), pp. 7-16.
[918] 1103b21, *NE*, these [ ] indicate they are part of the Translators text and these { } are my brackets.
[919] 1126b11-12, Ibid.

unique identity within a pluralist society. Sociability is essential to enabling us to achieve this end it must surpass politeness, social and cultural norms, etiquette, by 'doing kindness'[920] or exhibiting care for others. Thus, sociability facilitates *philia* enabling us to connect with other humans with consideration for their needs and who they are. Sociability also offers humans freedom to live their own lives and to make decisions about who will share in their social world. Sociability can act as a model for understanding interpersonal relations with a *Companion*[921], as well as our human 'need for care'[922] as natural aspects of our human functioning. AS Aristotle observed, the notion that of justice in *philia*[923] is innate and based in affection and loyalty[924] and this stands in direct contrast to our contemporary notions of 'affective neutrality' and impartiality' in personal relations or to avoid 'getting involved' with others. Rawls, for example argues that principles of justice are to apply to all people[925] in all their social interrelationships and are not to rely on 'extensive ties of natural sentiment'[926].

Aristotle offers advice on how to conduct us in the social world by giving Sociability an intermediate role in developing deeper personal interactions; and where general calculations are inappropriate and individual's responses will differ according to their particular character traits. Albeit brief, Aristotle's advice on how one is to conduct oneself in general social intercourse is illuminating. First, he says if a human being accepts or objects to things in the right way then they are praiseworthy[927] and the 'right way' in this context means a course of action that enables them to live a

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[920] 1156a10, Ibid.

[921] This account is different from John Cooper provides a detailed analysis of the different forms of Aristotelian *philia*. Cooper 1976, pp. 619-648.

[922] *FOJ,* p.160.

[923] 1155a24-30, *NE*.

[924] Horst Hutter explores a comprehensive account of justice and its relation to friendship. H. Hutter *Politics as Friendship,* (Waterloo, Ont: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1978).

[925] It is important to acknowledge that Rawls uses a different criterion of 'person' than Nussbaum and therefore 'all people' only refers to the individuals who are members of his category.

[926] Rawls, 1971, p. 129.

[927] 1126b18-19, *NE*.

eudaimonic lifestyle. This differs from *philia* because it requires the individuals involved to have neither special feeling nor fondness for each other[928]. They will however, always interact in a social way; that is appropriate and fitting to the context in which they are located[929]. This echoes what Nussbaum describes as: 'giving people what they need in order to be capable of functioning in all of this human way'[930].

Aristotle might be making a similar point when he argues that individuals will avoid causing one another pain[931] and should be willing to share in fine and beneficial actions[932]. A capacity for Sociability also enables us to reflect upon a *Companion's* pleasures and pains and indeed permits individuals to avoid participating in painful and dishonourable activities[933]. Nussbaum suggests this occurs even in casual acquaintance 'in a minimal way… [to] making it possible for citizens to function well'[934]. Interacting with individuals by exercising sociability as a virtue also equips us to interact with others according to their status and with respect for the roles one occupies in society[935]. And finally, individuals will also interact according to the degree of personal knowledge and sentience achieved in their relationship[936]. Sociable individuals will have an optimistic psychological outlook and presence interacting in a way that builds positive connections. Their presence confirms and strengthens the others character and expresses their awareness that other people's lives matter and that the extent to which they matter is determined neither by proximity or intimacy. In concluding that 'practical reason [is] an essential necessary condition of humanness',

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[928] 1126b23, Ibid.
[929] 1126b25-27, Ibid.
[930] Nussbaum 1992, p. 214.
[931] 1126b28, *NE.*
[932] 1126b29, Ibid.
[933] 1126b30-35, Ibid.
[934] Nussbaum, 1992, p. 214.
[935] 1126b35-1127a3, *NE.*
[936] 1127a4-6, Ibid.

Nussbaum[937] uses a quotation that is also applies to sociability. She states: "Assume man to be man" wrote Marx "and his relationship to the world to be a human one: then you can exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc.". Aristotle would agree'[938].

Adam and Henri[939]

Henri Nouwen joined a Canadian L'Arche community as their pastor and the community asked him to support Adam in his morning personal care routine. This required Henri to wake Adam up in the morning, to bath him, to shave him, brush his teeth, dress him, feed him his breakfast and place him in his wheelchair prior to Adam leaving his home for his daily activities. This was a very new role for Henri as he had no formal training in providing personal support whereas for Adam, Henri was just one of the carers, although the number had reduced since he moved into his permanent home. In his account of his experiences, Henri clearly acknowledges his fears of making mistakes that would cause him to make a fool of himself: 'I didn't want to be a source of embarrassment'[940]. He describes how, though he was generally sociable towards Adam, however, in this interactions with Adam, he was detached (as in Figure 2) and had more of a civic relationship with him. He says 'in those early days I saw him as someone who was very different from me. I did not have any expectations that we would communicate because he [Adam] did not talk[941]. The experience Henri had of Adam as being 'very different' troubled him greatly and when he sought a rationale

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[937] Nussbaum, 1995, pp.118-119.

[938] Ibid, p.119.

[939] H. Nouwen, *Adam: God's Beloved,* (NY: Orbis Books, 1997). Henri Nouwen left his professorial role at Harvard University to join an L'Arche Community in Canada after contact with Jean Vanier over a number or years. This book was finalised and published posthumously by a member of the Daybreak Community, as Nouwen died seven months after his friend Adam died. He has detailed how important this transition to community was for him in a number of other books however; this text specifies how Adam became his closest friend. His other text that details his spiritual or religious journey or decision to join an L'Arche community is: H. Nouwen *The Road to Daybreak,* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1988).

[940] Nouwen, 1997, p. 42.

[941] Ibid, p 43, my brackets.

for his role as a personal carer to him, the only explanation provided was that he could 'get to know Adam'[942] better this way. This rationalisation did not help Henri as he continued to perceive Adam in an impersonal and detached way.

The first change in Henri came after a period of time when he started to become more conscious of providing intimate support to Adam and his own critical reflections on how he lived his life prior to living at Adam's house. Previously, Henri had ben engaged in a world of ideas, lectures and papers. Now however, this 'very different' individual was confronting him by his sheer presence, Nouwen writes: 'being close to Adam's body brought me close to Adam. I was slowly getting to know him[943]. He realised this most starkly in moments of tension, when Adam asserted himself and resisted Henri rushing though his routine. At these times when Henri was more focused on what he had to do later in the day, he soon discovered: 'Adam could communicate! He let me know that I wasn't being really present to him and was more concerned about my own schedule than his'[944]. It is was through these experiences that Henri saw that Adam was communicating with him and it was as if Adam was constantly asking him to be more leisurely and tender in his caring role. This began to have a profound effect on Henri and moved him into the personal sphere (Figure 2) as he began to find himself understanding a new form of communicating what he terms 'Adam's language'[945]. Indeed, Henri found the intermediate state of friendliness, or sociability (Figure 3) enabled him to engage with Adam by valuing him as a person. Henri's time every morning with Adam now changed, he looked forward to their time together, he communicated with him: Henri revealed to him his personal thoughts, his struggles as well as the more mundane chatter of his daily routine. He states:

I thought of him as a silent peaceful presence in the centre of my life. Sometimes when I was anxious, irritated, or frustrated about something that wasn't happening

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[942] Ibid, p. 44.
[943] Ibid, p. 46.
[944] Ibid, p. 47.
[945] Ibid, p. 47.

well enough or fast enough, Adam came to mind and seemed to call me back to stillness at the eye of the cyclone[946].

A decisive moment for Henri was his insight into how profound his relationship with Adam had become. This occurred when a friend of Henri's visited him in the *L'Arche* community. Henri's friend scolded him about his presence in the community and claimed that Henri was frittering his time away and energy by staying with the *L'Arche* community and said his life would have more value if he returned to his academic career. At this time Henri began to realise how people with an intellectual disability can remain hidden, as a person Adam had been hidden from him, when they first met.

This commonly occurs because in our first encounter it is the disability that we apprehend. It is the person's disability rather than the person that engages our attention. However, by living together, Henri's daily caring activities had transformed him: 'my relationship with Adam was giving me new eyes to see and new ears to hear. I was being changed much more than I ever anticipated'[947]. According to Henri, Adam initially remained more constant in their relationship and because Adam: 'simply lived and by his life invited me to receive his unique gift, wrapped in weakness [or dependence] but given for my transformation'[948]. It was through these experiences that Henri realised that everything that he desired wanted out of life - love, friendship and a sense of community - he finds through his relationship with Adam:

I am convinced that somewhere deep down Adam "knew" he was loved. He knew it in his very soul. Adam was not able to reflect on love, on the heart as our centre of our being, the core of our humanity where we give and receive love…. He could explain nothing to me in words, but his heart was there, totally alive, full of love, which he could give and receive, Adam's heart made him fully alive[949].

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[946] Ibid, p. 48.
[947] Ibid, p. 53-54.
[948] Ibid, p. 56, my brackets.
[949] Ibid, pp. 49-50.

Henri thus believed he had an intimate and character friendship with Adam because of their new way of living, indeed, he says: 'Adam's humanity was not diminished by his disabilities. Adam's humanity was a full humanity, in which the fullness of love becomes visible for me and for the others who grow to love him'[950].

The slow process of Adam and Henri getting to know each other was beneficial for many reasons, the most important being that it enabled both people to deepen their friendship; to 'grow' or develop and to understand and addresses each other in respectful ways. The creation of long-term friendships reveal that different people have vastly different needs and limitations, which can otherwise obstruct our understanding of a person's true value and worth. David Ford terms this the radical particularity of its practice: 'each person cries in his or her own voice, and each responds in his or her own way'[951]. The person is given priority in such a way that he or she is guided slowly through embodied relationships in an environment that fosters personal growth. This does not detract from the value of contemporary physiological and psychiatric resources in the care of people with intellectual disabilities. Rather it uses these disciplines to assist us with and support practice of its fundamental philosophy that we all need to be in personal relationships with each other.

Human Dignity

Here we explore the meaning of human dignity and though this account diverges from, Nussbaum's concept of a person, it aims to argument hers by following through the implications of our discussion of sociability and the *philia* we display to one another. The Capabilities Approach acknowledges the centrality of affiliation. However, if our capacity for *philia* springs from our sociability then this warrants being giver a greater significance in accounting for the nature of the virtue *and* the relationships of

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[950] Ibid, pp. 50-51.
[951] D. Ford, *Christian Wisdom: Desiring God and Learning in Love,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 357.

individuals. We have argued that sociability reveals an individual's distinct moral capacity to care and this capacity sufficiently assures *philia* to those who share in a common humanity with personal dignity. Although it is also possible to argue that Nussbaum's capabilities offers us human dignity on account of our sharing the same group membership[952], nevertheless her capability Approach would exclude some human beings[953]. She says it comprise:

An account of the most important functions of a human being, in terms of which human life is defined' and notes 'the normative character of the list'*[954]*.

In other words, those beings that lack the actual or potential capability of the 'most important functions'[955] are 'non-persons'[956]. This could result from 'human dignity' being seen as a quality, property, or characteristic of individual beings, and this would stand in direct contrast to the nature of sociability as the harmonisation of interests of two or more human beings and as intrinsic to 'the relationships we bear to one another'[957]. Here, 'interests' refers to a broad spectrum of incentives implied in *philia* to connect with other by positive consideration of interests and by 'doing kindness'[958], or through *'reciprocated goodwill'*[959].

Nussbaum notes that while we begin life as both 'capable and needy'[960] - as dependent and requiring others to attend to our needs and cultivate our capabilities after a time interval, we develop practical reasoning skills that necessarily depend on our ability to interact with others. MacIntryre argues to: 'become an effective independent practical reasoner is an achievement, but it is always one to which others

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[952] Kittay 2005, p.109.
[953] Nussbaum 1992, pp. 221-229.
[954] Ibid, p. 214.
[955] Ibid, p. 214.
[956] Ibid, p. 228.
[957] Kittay 2005, p. 111.
[958] 1156a10, *NE*.
[959] 1155b34, Ibid.
[960] Nussbaum '1992, p. 216.

have made essential contributions'[961]. Nussbaum observes that: 'people vary greatly in their needs for resources and care…and this diversity was one of the strengths that initially commended it [the Capabilities Approach] over other approaches'[962]. However, the emphasis the Capabilities Approach places on our need for care demands greater attention and priority than it receives. This is important because recognition of one another's needs is presented as 'the source of political principles for a liberal pluralistic society'[963]. She argues that people respond instinctively to our needs, desires, and wants; and this is relevant to our different notions of what is 'good'.

Can we provide an alternative account of how human dignity can be defined with reference to our capacity for sociability with other human beings? The sociability virtue and Aristotle's discussion of *philia* both aim to explain the diverse nature of our emotional life in personal relations. Fundamentally, relations extend from minimum degrees of partiality to a 'loving and friendship'*,* 'at their best'[964]. This ability to care for others emanates from our natural human moral capacity where: 'this person takes each thing in the right way because that is his character, not because he is a friend or an enemy'[965]. This emphasis on rational moral autonomy shares with other ethical theories. Even minimal personal involvement as in civic *philia*, can expresses our unique human capacity to provide care for others 'as a matter of course' that surpasses 'convenient biological justifications'[966]. This might be the kind of *goodwill* Aristotle meant when he staid: 'it [goodwill] arises even toward people we do not know'[967]

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[961] MacIntryre, 2002, p. 82.
[962] *FOJ,* p. 88, my brackets.
[963] Ibid, p. 70.
[964] 1156b23, *NE*.
[965] 1126b24, Ibid.
[966] Ibid, p.112.
[967] 1166b31, *NE.*

Thus, human dignity rests on our belief that *all* human beings are 'irreplaceable and [of] distinctive worth' and on 'the non-fungible nature of our relationships'[968]. Sociability then becomes the medium through which we humans to experience our dignity with others in which we also recognise our own inherent worth. Thus, one's dignity is not latent rather demonstrated by *philia* that expresses itself through the care, joint activities and experiences we share in everyday living. This interpretation of sociability reinforces:

The three central facts about human being … are the dignity of the human being as an ethical being, a dignity that is fully equal no matter where humans are placed; human sociability, which means that part of life with human dignity is a common life with others organized so as to respect that equal dignity; and the multiple facts of human need, which suggest that this common life must do something for us all, fulfilling needs up to a point at which human dignity is not undermined by hunger, or violent assault, or unequal treatment in the political realm[969].

If, sociability reveals an individual's distinct moral capacity to care, then it can explain how it could share a common regard for one another's humanity and personal dignity and thus include humans that might be excluded by Nussbaum's criterion[970]. These individuals include people with 'irreversible senile dementia or in a permanent vegetative condition' *and* 'severely damaged infants'[971]. Inevitably, these people will need a particular type of care to meet their current needs. Nevertheless, as each continues to live a life though together they may not be able to predict with certainly what this will become in the future but they are committed to each other's good. Furthermore, the relations each person had prior to entering this state of existing could still hold; they can continue in a caring *philia*, caring for and about one another, as 'conduits of worth'[972]. This caring relationship offers the individual being cared for respect for their being as a person; for their needs, history, *philia*; and portrays or represents them as persons in their own right and as valued member of our species.

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[968] Kittay, 2005, p. 113.

[969] *FOJ,* p. 274.

[970] Nussbaum, 1992, p. 228.

[971] Ibid, p. 228.

[972] Kittay, 2005, p. 117.

Ubuntu

Finally, while I used the expression *philiaology* earlier in the thesis to represent the pervasiveness of our human sociability and connections with other humans, I suggest this concept is an ancient concept and can be found in different cultures. For instance, *Ubuntu*[973] is a Xhosa word which has a more profound meaning than the non-African words, 'tend and befriend' used to describe its meaning. The word *Ubuntu*[974], is at the base of the African philosophy of life and forms of community life, to the extent that it represents people's daily-lived experiences. Indeed, when it is attributed to a human then this person's character is seen as exhibiting generosity, hospitability, and friendliness, caring and compassionate for other human beings. Moreover, the philosophy of ubuntu is practical in that it is applied on a daily basis to settle disputes and conflicts at different levels in African society and is central to the notion of reconciliation. It is of such depth in our nature that it inextricably linked with our humanity expressed by the phrase; 'I am because we are'. This concept of 'ubuntu' concisely summarises my core thesis, namely that, as individuals we are all connected and cannot be ourselves without being part of the human community with whom we live. Desmond Tutu expresses it as follows:

We belong in a bundle of life. We say, 'a person is a person through other people'. It is not 'I think therefore I am'. It says rather: 'I am human because I belong'. I participate, I share. A person with ubuntu is open to and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are[975].

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[973] D. Tutu & M. Tutu *Made for Goodness* (London: Rider & Co.,, 2010), p. 15.

[974] This term is also consistent with the African *Weltanschauung* or world-view, emanates in the Nguni group of languages from South Africa, and is a very difficult term to offer a single word translation as it articulates the very essence of what it means to be human. D. Tutu *No Future Without Forgiveness*, (London: Rider, 1999), pp. 32-36.

[975] Ibid, p. 35, emphasis in original.

Tutu describes how *ubuntu* was and was not expressed in many nations in Africa and finds it difficult to explain why this philosophy is not always lived by humans[976]. One possible reason for this is, the limited forms of *philia* developed and sustained by people in different cultures, religious traditions, and lack insight that discourages and inhibits people from '*to suzên*'[977]. Nevertheless, *ubuntu* manifests itself in all people sharing in a common humanity – bonded through species membership - live a live of dignity. Our human lives all share common features; birth, adolescence, old age and death, and within these passages are the shared experiences of illness, accidents, grief, and pain. These changes are the essence of our lives and though they may be beyond our control, they are the constant movement in our life. This means of living with a certain degree of insecurity as each moment brings new experiences in such a way that our understanding the past is continually influenced by the present and the present past, where we must let the process guide one how to live in the future. This approach does not mean we advocate a relativist, or proportional agenda. Rather, it is taking from our experience that our essential values are and reflecting how to live them in the present. I propose these values are expressed in true *philia* and include goodwill, forgiveness, sociability, celebrating, understanding and our spiritual nature, which is realised through dialogue offers us a sense of belonging and sharing in a continually evolving human journey.

Conclusion

While Nussbaum's Capability Approach offers a critical response to the political utilitarian doctrine of considering the aggregate rather than the individual and despite the claim that it can be pursued for each and every individual, this approach tends to exclude certain individuals on the basis of what are defined as 'especially important

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[976] Ibid, p. 36.
[977] That is, 'living together'.

functions in human life'[978]. We argue that this occurs follows from the low emphasis attributed to humans in the 'capable and needy'[979] dimension of human *philia*. An alternative account of affiliation is offered that places greater emphasis on the complete range of *philia* and how individuals of all kinds can connect with each other. It may be possible, with further refinement and correction, to show this form of affiliation can include as 'persons' those who are in a state of: 'irreversible senile dementia or in a permanent vegetative condition' as well as 'severely damaged infant's[980].

A final example may assist in conceptualising dignity through sociability and its link to affiliation. A triad in musical theory is a group of three notes having a specific construction and relationships to one another. They are constructed on three consecutive lines or three consecutive spaces. Each member of the triad is separated by an interval of a third and is composed of a root, third and fifth. In the first musical note, the root, dignity is first experienced in our dependent and needy infant relationships and where one learns the significance of attachment. Indeed, it appears as if this desire for engagement with caregivers, family and their extended social network occurs in our early infancy. It is through this sociability that one learns to place one's trust in the other and participate in the social arrangements and customs of society. The second note proceeds as we chronically age within our personal and social relationships; the former may exhibit much trust and hope, and the latter may appear at times to have the power to choke our possibilities for communion by restricting the exercise of our human dignity. However, though *philia* omits to degrees of attachment with distortions and constraints, sociability offers the Agents a dignity that permits a means to separate, or instil further purpose and commitment. The final note, the fifth, is the most pervasive and permeates our being, as it is our innate yearning for sincere relationship and just social arrangements. This desire may

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[978] Nussbaum 1992, p. 214.
[979] Ibid, p. 216.
[980] Kittay, 2005, p. 228.

be shaken with rejection and separation however it continues to operate and search for earnest attachment and affiliation.

Chapter 8: Identity Thresholds

Introduction

In this chapter, I present another two concepts, *θνμοξ* (thymos) and *ἒρως* (eros) and elucidate their various meanings to distinguish them as primal realities and hence argue that they are important conditions for *personhood*. I also discuss a paradox in the meaning of 'what is a person' through an analysis of the photograph captured by Kevin Carter. I will first provide the image and then present an account of the 1994 Pulitzer Prize for Feature Photography. Then, through an analysis of the early Greek concept of ψυχή (*psyche*) I will consider how *θνμοξ* and *ἒρως* might suffice to justify counting as people, rather than as non-persons, those who are at 'the margins of moral personhood'[981]. I will also consider the role emotions play in this process.

Pulitzer Prize Photo

Here we return to the concept of a person offered by perdurantism. Some Philosophers argue the psychological capabilities of memory, rationality and autonomy are requisites for consideration of *personhood* [982]. Accordingly, this means that, if and only if, an individual's psychometric abilities are sufficient to qualify for membership of this normative category, do they have a claim to justice, equal respect, dignity and a good quality of life.

In Greek, *θνμοξ* and *ἒρως*, refer to the life force and emotions such as anger, courage, integrity and goodwill respectively and drawing upon Hesoid's[983] use of *ἒρως* as one of the original powers in coming-to-be, I will suggest, at the cosmic level these can be used to describe the nature of a personal 'coming-to-be'. Thus, *eros* holds open the possibility of uniting and reconciling different emotions to understand

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[981] Kittay, 2005.

[982] Examples of Philosophers such as Peter Singer who support this thesis have been provided.

[983] West, 1966.

personal identity as unified; that is, as harmonious and in equilibrium and therefore, *θνμοξ* and *ἔρως* can be argued as sufficient conditions for personhood. Furthermore, I will present a role for *praxis* in this process in the final section of this chapter. I have chosen an illustrative example an interaction between an adult and a child. Though they differ in both their chronological age and psychometric capabilities, they are each individual with needs and thus 'are inevitably dependent and interdependent'. Nonetheless their 'dignity may be found through relations of dependency'[984].

This photograph was captured by Kevin Carter, a Photojournalist in 1993 and first appeared in the New York Times on 26 March 1993. Kevin Carter was born in 1960s and his family lived in the 'white' suburbs of Johannesburg though from an early age it appears that he openly questioned the system of apartheid in which he lived, conscripted to the South African Defence Force he 'went absent without leave'[985] but eventually completed his military service. Shortly afterwards he embarked upon a career in photojournalism. By the early 1990s, Carter was working with a group of

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[984] *FOJ*, pp. 201-218.

[985] Scott MacLeod 'The Life and Death of Kevin Carter' 15 March 2009, Retrieved http://www.thisisyesteray.com/ints/KCarter.html p. 2.

other photographers known as the 'Bang Bang Club'[986], known for their ability to capture the violence occurring in the 'black' African townships in South Africa.

In March 1993, Carter, travelled to Sudan to document the on going civil war that had first eruption in the early 1980s and which was only interrupted in 1989 following a horrendous famine caused by drought and conflict. It was here that Carter witnessed many individual's experiences of the impact of famine. He was so repulsed by what he saw that he attempted to capture through his photography the atrocious circumstances of the people[987]. Amongst the images is this picture of a starving young girl, who appears to have collapsed in the bush while a nearby vulture seemly waits for her to die.

The narrative surrounding[988] the image is that when Carter arrived in Ayod, Sudan, he immediately captured images of the widespread material plight of the Sudanese community. Carter was so taken aback by these ghastly sights he encountered that he sought refuge in the immediate bushland and this is where he observed the girl, collapsed from hunger as she struggled to reach the United Nations Relief Centre. Moeller[989] states that Carter heard the child 'making a soft, high-pitched whimpering' noise and positioned himself to obtain the image, when a vulture appeared. The Photographer waited 20 minutes to see if the vulture would spread its wings to offer a visually dramatic impression. However, after securing a number of images, Carter harassed the predator to flee and watched the girl continue her great effort to reach the Centre. On his return to Johannesburg, Carter sold the photograph

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[986] A group of international photographers who travelled to armed combat regions to shoot extreme images for the western media.

[987] It is estimated that during Carter's visit that 20 people were dying per hour, Susan Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue: How the Media sell Disease, Famine, War and Death,* (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 147.

[988] I am relying on 2 sources for this narrative: Susan Moeller 1999, pp. 39-40 and 147-148; and Charles Paul Freund 'The Atrocity Exhibition: A War Fuelled by Imagery,' *Reason Magazine*, Print Edition of June 1999, also available. http://www.reason.com/news/show/31036.htmh Accessed 21 December 2008.

[989] Moeller, 1999, p. 147,

to *The New York Times*[990] who used the image as part of a story on Sudan by Donatella Lorch. The vivid picture attracted immediate interest, both positive and negative. Initially individuals were concerned about the young girls plight and what happened to her, and that was explained through an editorial comment on March 30 1993. Carter was both praised for representing the horror of famine and condemned for not aiding the child. The photographer was unable to offer his critics a morally acceptable explanation for not assisting the child. His explanation that she was one ravenous child of among hundred in the city on that day, was considered inadequate. In May 1994, *The New York Times* flew Kevin Carter to Columbia University to receive the Pulitzer Prize for the Feature Photograph Award. In June, the same year Carter committed suicide.

What are the salient features of this story? The first point is that the photographer, the 'I', who captured the image and who as an individual is one who is connected with another individual, of his species in a common environment. As individuals, they share a physical proximity and each has a history but their individual situations differ profoundly. Both would admit to their biological and social dependency on the outside world. Each is a composite being, who is shaped by and out of the natural world and is wholly dependent upon it. In the first instance of observing the child, the photographer makes a psychological and emotional connection with the child and determines to communicate this unity to other individuals through the medium of a shocking photograph. After a time interval of 20 minutes,[991] a member of another animal species arrives and occupies a space in the immediate vicinity of the individuals. All three beings are members of a species that share the same environment and are completely reliant upon it for survival.

The next observation is that individuals primarily characterise sociality as a fundamental feature to their being and thus do not live in isolation from other beings,

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[990] The media source used the image in their publication on Friday, March 26, 1993.
[991] Moeller, 1993, p 147.

other species or their environment. Therefore, I support Macmurray's proposal to understand an individual as a person if: 'that personal existence is constituted by the relations of persons' 'A person' as such 'is a logical abstraction, and can exist only as a community of personal agents [992]. Macmurray challenges the central tenet of personal identity as egocentric. Thus, Macmurray suggests replacing 'I think' with "I do' which establishes the primacy of action through four propositions in the process of self-realisation. The propositions are:

(1) The Self is Agent and exists only as agent;
(2) The Self is Subject but cannot exist as subject. It can be Subject only because it is Agent;
(3) The Self is subject in and for the Self as Agent; and
(4) The Self can be Agent only by being also Subject[993].

The Photographer may, in the first instance characterise the girl and the situation as a utility-centred opportunity, or more simply an opportunity for a good picture. However, after meeting his purpose, Carter removes the predator from the environment by 'chasing the bird away and watched the little girl resume her struggle'[994]. Kevin Carter and the girl may commence their lives without previous acquaintance or knowledge but they are still connected as human beings

Every human child 'comes from the belly of another human creature'[995] and as an individual, commences life with biological and social experiences of connection. Generally speaking, connection or attachment in psychological theory refers to the bond that develops in the parent/caregiver relationship and is typically an enduring relationship that involves a specific person(s) to include soothing, comfort, pleasure and safety[996]. These experiences can assist in developing a positive and/or negative connection to other beings and indeed influence all human beings with particular instincts.

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[992] Macmurray 1957, p. 12.
[993] Ibid, pp. 84-103.
[994] Moeller, 1993, p. 148.
[995] Frayn, 1964, p. 108
[996] Perry ,2001.

Macmurray expresses a similar view to Aristotelian in his claim:

The nexus of relations, which unites us in human society, is not organic but personal. Human behaviour cannot be understood, but only caricatured, if it is represented as an adaptation to environment; and there is no such process as social evolution but, instead, a history which reveals a precious development and possibilities both of progression and retrogression[997].

Thus, Macmurray defines these instincts as: 'a specific adaptation to environment, which does not require to be learned[998]. Instincts are then an inclination or tendency to act in a particular fashion and can be traced to a causal set of attributes that are unique to a class of species. Therefore, instincts interact with our experiences to guide our actions in a variety of situations. Indeed, Midgley distinguishes between closed and open instincts, with the former:

'[Closed] behaviour patterns {that are} fixed genetically in every detail' and open instincts are: 'programs with a gap. Parts of the behaviour pattern are innately determined, but others are left to be filled in by experience[999].

Indeed, as Aristotle notes, if and only if, actions are voluntary, they 'receive praise or blame'[1000] relative to one another's judgement of the action as being morally good or righteous. He observes that 'if the principle of actions is in him {the decision maker, then}, it is also up to him to do them or not to do them'[1001]. And 'so actions resulting from spirit {θνμοξ} or appetite are also proper to a human being'[1002].

The final point of interest to note is that the 'girl' is a composite being with a social nature, which potentially will develop a personality through her experiences of physical and intellectual maturation[1003]. Nevertheless, all individuals are individuals

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[997] *PR,* p. 46.

[998] Ibid, p. 48.

[999] M. Midgley *Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature,* Revised Edition, (London: Routledge Classics, 2002), pp. 50-51. I am also relying on another work of Mary Midgley: Mary Midgley, *Science and Poetry,* (London: Routledge Classics, 2006).

[1000] 1109b30, *NE.*

[1001] 1115a18, *NE,* my brackets.

[1002] 1111b34, *NE,* my brackets.

[1003] In strict Aristotelian terms, an infant or child is *potentially* and not *actually* a rational being, Meta.

who exist as Agents 'only in dynamic relation'[1004] to other individuals. Therefore, I suggest, individuals are constituted by their mutual relationships that are 'necessarily personal'[1005]. The term 'personal' refers to: 'that quality or set of characteristics in virtue of which a person is a person; a property therefore which all persons share[1006]. This 'property' is part of a process of development from infancy that where we can experience dignity through dependence[1007]. Indeed, having a need and being dependent does not preclude an individual from living a happy life. Malpas[1008] notes that autonomy has a bearing on 'understanding of [who is a] human being'[1009]. However, an over reliance on this notion 'threatens to deliver a distorted picture'[1010] of what constitutes a human being. Therefore Malpas argues, who and what one is: [is] 'intertwined with the being of those others in relation to whom our lives are shaped, as well as the wider world in which our lives are played out'[1011]. As noted, Macmurray presents this in another manner[1012].

What I believe Carter's image demonstrates is the nature of our physical and social connection as individuals to each other and our surrounding world. Moreover, this represents is a confident, optimistic view of individuals, who though mortal and having the capacity on occasions to be insensitive and cowardly, are nevertheless inter-dependent beings. Individuals can and do act as Agents in an environment that often extends beyond their individual control and failure to act appropriately may simply reveal our lack of character rather than or lack of rational capabilities. Consequently, I suggest that emphasising attributes such as autonomy and rationality

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[1004] *PR,* p. 16
[1005] Ibid.
[1006] Ibid, p. 25.
[1007] *FOJ*, p 218.
[1008] J. Malpas 'Human Dignity and Human Being' in (eds) J. Malpas & N. Lickiss, *Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation,* (The Netherlands: Springer, 2007), pp. 19-26.
[1009] Ibid, p. 20.
[1010] Ibid.
[1011] Ibid.
[1012] *PR*, p. 51.

as basic criteria for personal identity neglects, other required or essential principles that relate to and typically involve human beings. It omits the attribute of our human relationality. Moreover, the application of these principles will expose human beings as having imperfections, weaknesses and limitations that are characteristic of a particular individual rather than their essential nature.

Identity Thresholds

I maintain that human beings are highly complex and composite beings that incorporate stratified physiological, psychological, emotional and intellectual arrangements constituted through a living organism. [1013] I do not distinguish human beings from persons. Sacks, attests that:

Our very dignity as persons is rooted in the fact that none of us – not even identical twins – is exactly like any other. Therefore none of us is replaceable, substitutable, a mere instance of a type. That is what makes us person, not merely organisms or machines[1014].

In the Introduction I stated my commitment to the philosophy of personalism. This has a number of streams, which have as a common core emphasis the status of the person by human relationships. The key assumptions they share are: first, Personalists are keen to understand and explore how people should live; second, Personalists do not support the view that individuals, as human beings are just simply members of the another animal species and that the species rather than individual is important and human individuals have a soul or *psyche*; third, Personalists affirm that being human is a morally significant fact and have absolute respect for human life.

[1013] I have modified and expanded a reference to human beings that Dean Brackley makes in *The Call to Discernment in Troubled Times*, (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 2004), p. 53. Brackley makes the observation that individuals are biological, psychological and includes emotions in his intellectual category, I specifically use emotions as a separate dimension as they are intelligent however, they admit to a specific type of intelligence that can be overlooked and neglected.

[1014] J. Sacks, *The Dignity of Difference: Exorcising Plato's Ghost,* (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 47.

The particular school of personalism that most influences my approach is that known as 'realistic idealism'[1015] that holds that reality is spiritual, mental and personal, and nature is neither intrinsically mental nor personal. This naturally raises a problem for unity and plurality, that is, how can a being be individual and discrete and yet a specimen of a group of things of the same kind? The personalist response is to distinguish what an object or thing is (that is, its nature or essence that it shares with things of the same kind), from the fact that it is, (that is, it has its own act of existing). Therefore in analyzing the nature and unity of sensible beings (i.e., persons) a distinction is to be made between the form and the matter of being in question, its nature or essence reflects its form and its individuality is determined by the matter[1016].

An analogy, which may illuminate my concept of *personhood,* comes from the Russian tradition, namely a Matryoshka doll. A Matryoshka doll is a set of dolls of diminishing sizes located one inside the other; the set consists of a wooden figure, which is pulled apart to expose another figure of the same sort inside. Typically there are five dolls in each set and the dolls are mostly cylindrical, rounded at the tip for the head and tapered towards the bottom with a minimum decoration.

What I argue is that *personhood* is not a univocal term referring to only one dimension of an individual's being. What is needed for a human being to count as a person is the simultaneous presence of different sorts of attributes and each characteristic has a varying degree of potential for development. However though the characteristics are separate elements they are inter-dependent and as a whole share in way that unites them in harmony. The five aspects[1017] of *personhood* are: (i) a corporal

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[1015] There are a number of people who express this form of personalism, these people include Jacques Maritain, Emmanuel Mounier in France; John Macmurray in Great Britain; Martin Burber, Max Scheler in Germany; and W. Norris Clarke and John F. Crosby in America.

[1016] J. Maritain, *The Person and The Common Good,* (London: Geoffrey Bless, 1948), pp. 23-34.

[1017] My view is different from Michael Polanyi. Polanyi presents a five tiered 'hierarchy of levels found in living beings' and builds them from lower to higher forms of life. Polanyi's hierarchy is (a) human shape; (b) vegetative function; (c)

structure with varying shapes, sizes and constituents; (ii) a spiritual life that relates to other living organisms; (iii) a psychological being with the capacity for consciousness and mental experience; (iv) an emotional being with the capacity to feel agitation, disturbance, delight and so forth, about other individuals, actions and/or events; and (v) an intellectual being with the capacity albeit limited to relate or consider ideas and make judgments.

To comprehend how the Matryoshka works, we do not pick out a single doll and decide that this is the 'fundamental, necessary or essential *one* doll'. Accordingly, we consider the doll from a number of different perspectives and relate each as a constituent part in a way that shows why they do not contradict each other and how when considered as a whole they represent alternative relations in a united plurality. Each constituent part represents a capability, a characteristic that has the potential for development.

Thus, I take an Aristotelian approach that conceives of a human being as a moral, political being in animal form and whose life span, is described by Nussbaum as:

Human begins as needy babies, grow up slowly, and require lots of care as they grow. In the prime of life they have the "normal" needs that the social contract model typically incorporates, but they may also have other needs, stemming from accidents or illness that out them in a position of asymmetrical dependency for a shorter or longer time. If they live to old age, they typically need a great deal of care again and are likely to encounter disabilities, either physical or mental or both…many human beings are atypically disabled all through their lives[1018]

Thymos

Peters[1019] does not provide an exact definition of *θνμοξ*. Rather he refers to '*spirit, animus*' and he suggests the reader consults three other concepts – '*nous, psyche and kardia*', to understand the term. I believe that this is an accurate description because

sentience; (d) conscious behaviour and intellectual action; and (e) moral sense. M. Polanyi *The Tacit Dimension*, (London: Routledge, & Keegan Paul, 1967), pp. 36-37.
[1018] *FOJ,* pp. 87-88.
[1019] *GPT* p. 196.

in reading ancient Greek works we find the terms are used together. It is difficult, if not impossible to provide a single definition of a word that has the potential to influence, mediate and motivate individual desire and action. *θνμοξ* refers to an aspect of an individual's psychology that was first described by the Greek poet Homer[1020]. Homer suggests that *thymos* is the source and the life force behind emotions such as anger, courage, zeal and goodwill, thus it is an affective state that conveys hope and even encourages an individual to action.   In the tradition of epic poetry the three chief divisions of the ψνχή (or soul) are the *thymos, menos* and *nous[1021]*.   Indeed, *thymos* is the most frequent form presented and is only active when individuals are awake and has the capacity to urge one to action[1022].

Therefore, the first sense or perception of *thymos* is as 'spiritedness', a vital force that exemplifies an individual as a living being and has the potential to confer unique psychological attributes to a person. This 'spiritedness' is the source of such emotions as anger, courage, zeal, and goodwill. Accordingly, this quality or trait of an individual's personality is unique to the individual for it relates only to our corporal experiences. Homer provides a number of examples in the Iliad[1023] where *thymos* serves two primary functions; first is the source of emotions such as anger, joy and fear, second it urges an individual to action and second. A few examples might assist here:

Seeing Paris, Hector raked his brother with insults, stinging taunts: 'What on earth are you doing? Oh how wrong it is, this anger you keep smoldering in your heart (θνμοξ)! Look, your people are dying around the city, the steep walls, dying in arms- and all for you, the battle cries and the fighting flaring up around the citadel. You'd be the first to lash out at another- anywhere- you saw hanging back from this, this hateful war[1024].

[1020] J. Bremmer, *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 54-56.

[1021] A. Hultkrantz, *Conceptions of the Soul*, (Stockholm: Ethnographical Museum of Sweden Monograph No. 1: 545, 1953), p. 220.

[1022] Homer, 1997, pp. 450 – '*Strong vow- and they bore straight down on the Argives full force. Shaking their spears, their hearts fired with hopes of dragging Patroclus' body out from Ajax*'. The translator in this instance uses the expression 'their hearts fired with hope' for *θνμοξ.*

[1023] Ibid.

[1024] Ibid, p. 206.

And again:

But Meriones, taking aim at Deiphobus, hurled his flashing spear and stuck- no miss! - Right at in the bull's-hide boss but the spear did not ram through, far from it, the long shaft snapped at the spearhead's socket- the Trojan had thrust his shield at arm's length shrinking (θνμοξ) before the expert marksman's lance[1025].

The concept of *thymos* is still powerful enough to influence Plato who includes *thymos* as one division of his tri-part soul; this is his part of the soul concerned with emotions and the will[1026]. While Aristotle, differentiates his concept of the soul from Plato's, he gives priority to *thymos* as one of the three diverse kinds of ψνχή (soul)[1027]. Guthrie[1028] notes that in man Plato's *θνμοξ* is: 'the same spiritual source that he feels righteous anger when he sees what appears to him a wrong … and it may be described generally as the spirited part of human character[1029]. And again: 'the t*hymos* will give a man courage to follow out in action what reason tells him is the best course[1030]. In Aristotelian terminology *thymos* is part of his 'sensitive' ψνχή, and he suggests this is where the power and capacity for perception, locomotion and desire is located. In my earlier discussion I argued that it is integral to my concept of a person. The ψνχή[1031] for Aristotle is a collection of capabilities with particular qualities that apply to the each different species of living things. He therefore arranges, orders and ranks capabilities for all living organisms from those that are indispensable to all forms of life to those unique to human beings. Aristotle states that:

[1025] Ibid, pp. 346-347.

[1026] J. M. Cooper, *Plato's Complete Works*, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997). In particular the Dialogues, *Charmides* & *Gorgias*.

[1027] 413b30-415a14, *DeA*.

[1028] W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Greek Philosophers: From Thales to Aristotle*, (London: Methuen & Co., 1972).

[1029] Ibid, p. 112.

[1030] Ibid, p. 113.

[1031] There are many scholars who have provided excellent accounts of Aristotle's ψνχή, as mentioned on (*insert page*), the person I am using for my reference is John Vella who articulates an accurate and contemporary account of ψνχή. Vella, 2008, pp. 87-105.

It follows that first of all we must treat of nutrition and reproduction for the nutritive soul is found along with all the others and is the most primitive and widely distributed power of soul, being indeed that one in virtue of which all are said to have life[1032].

Therefore the ability of living being to provide sustenance for themselves is the most fundamental capability that all living beings require to maintain their status as living organisms. It is through a supply of nutrition that a living thing is enabled to grow and indeed decay – 'nothing grows or decays naturally {i.e. of itself} except what feeds itself' [1033]. The next capability that is linked to the first and hence part of the 'nutritive' ψυχή, is the competence living organisms have to reproduce themselves. If a living organism is able to access a source of nourishment and reproduce another living being the same kind through either a sexual or asexual process it will contribute to the continuation of its species. There is a crucial link in the order of these capabilities – living organisms need to be able to secure and manage an adequate diet to grow and survive. However, if a living being is to develop as a representative specimen of its species, it will need to reproduce itself. Aristotle uses plants to illustrate this capability.

The second set of capabilities is peculiar to living organisms is the ability to move about [i.e. have a capability for locomotion] and have responsive sense organs:

But it is the possession of sensation that leads us for the first time to speak of living things as animals; for even those beings which possess no power of local movement but do possess the power of sensation we call animals and not merely living things[1034].

And: 'certain kinds of animals possess in addition the power of locomotion [1035]. Animals thus have the ability to act and change their spatiotemporal location, to experience sensation, perception and to react emotionally to a range of stimuli. This is traditionally referred to as the 'sensitive soul (ψυχή)' with the power or capacity for sensation, locomotion and appetite that characterises animals. These capabilities

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[1032] 415a23-24, *DeA*.
[1033] 415b25, Ibid, Editor's brackets.
[1034] 413b1-4, Ibid.
[1035] 414b19, Ibid.

overlap and interpenetrate one another, though each capability is clearly distinguishable and may contain a sub-set of faculties. For example, in discussing sensation, Aristotle states:

If any order of living things has the sensory, it must also have the appetitive; for appetite is the genus of which desire, passion, and wish are the species; now all animals have one sense at least, viz. touch, and whatever has a sense has the capacity for pleasure and pain and therefore has pleasant and painful objects present to it[1036].

Appropriately for Aristotle, this is where *thymos* is located in and it is associated with the *kardia* or the heart, (considered as the centre of will and emotion). Indeed the *kardia* is representative of a metaphorical heart, a capacity to enter into relations with other individuals where we can identify and be in solidarity with them. Or the contrary may occur. One may develop an aggressive response towards an individual and refuse a relationship with them for multiple and complex reasons[1037]. However, in contemporary Hellenistic usage *kardia* refers to 'the seat of the soul'[1038] and Aristotle follows this usage and calls the heart the *arche;* that is, the source or ultimate principle of life, of movement and sensation. For example, Aristotle states: 'moreover, the motions of pain and pleasure, and generally of all sensation, plainly have their source in the heart, and find it in their ultimate termination[1039].

It is important to understand Greek traditions with respect to emotions to and their relationship to *thymos.* In Nussbaum's work she presents a powerful case for considering emotions as, *'*intelligent responses to the perception of value*'[1040]*. Indeed, Aristotle appears to support Nussbaum's view in that he describes emotions as helping us make practical, wise and exact judgments by considering the particularity of a

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[1036] 414b1-4, Ibid.

[1037] Vanier, 1999, pp. 85-88, Vanier suggests that when individuals open themselves to individuals who differ from them and those shunned by society then one achieves true personal and societal freedom. Vanier argues that it is through the heart that one develops one's capacity for compassion '*to change, to evolve, and to become more human'*, p. 88.

[1038] *GPT*, p. 96.

[1039] 666a11, Aristotle, *De Partibus. Animalium,* McKeon, 2001.

[1040] Nussbaum, 2001, p. 1. I will use this comprehensive body of knowledge as my primary reference.

given circumstance. However, emotions can also have the opposite effect, as they can bias our judgment towards partiality and override justice. For example, he states:

If we consider the majority of them {emotions}, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence[1041].

The emotions are the faculty by which an individual distinguishes sensible particulars but on most occasions it is difficult to discern whether our emotional issue in wise and exact or biased and partial judgments and actions. As I suggested earlier *praxis*[1042] is the means of realising a decision though *phronesis* by actually making decisions that integrates our thoughts and feelings. Nevertheless the emotions play a central role in the process, and indeed in Aristotle's whole practical philosophy.

I will now explore the role of emotions in this Greek way to interpret the actions of Carter? What was the basis for his decision to chase the vulture away? After his images were published he received both praise and condemnation, including one critic comparing him to a scavenger: 'the man adjusting his lens to take just the right frame of her suffering might just as well be a predator, another vulture on the scene'[1043]. Nevertheless, according to Aristotle, Carter's decision needs to be related to him as an Agent, his immediate environment and the practical situation in which he was placed - though one might consider this approach as nebulous and of no value. However, I will consider Carter's decision in context and analyze it from a cognitive/evaluative framework to reveal an alternative explanation. In Aristotle's *Rhetoric* an alternative and more directed strategy also emerges: to exclude the irrelevant passions, to unite and integrate emotions into a decision. The analysis of the role of the passions in the *Rhetoric* develops and represents the practical association between receptivity and activity.

[1041] 403a5-9, *DeA*.

[1042] Also see 1113b4-1115a, *NE,* where he states that actions that follow a deliberate choice can be judged moral and immoral and this occurs in retrospect to the decision,

[1043] MacLeod, 2009.

Nussbaum suggests that her view of emotions is 'best explained by, a modified version of the ancient Greek stoic view' [1044] and names it as a cognitive/evaluative approach. There are four critical elements that Nussbaum argues destroy the myth that emotions are 'thoughtless natural energies' [1045]. Rather, emotions provide an actual context from which one examines and judges the value, quality or importance of something or some person for one's own personal development, thus emotions are 'acknowledgments of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency' [1046]. First, emotions concern or connect something: they focus and aim our attention on some thing or an event. The image of the young girl focused Carter's attention for 20 minutes and afterwards he thought of his daughter Megan [1047]. Nussbaum states that the 'object is an intentional object' [1048]; the individual with the emotion has their attention deliberately focused for it represents and has qualities that are significant to the individual. Indeed the attention provides a means by which an individual can illustrate and express and give form to something abstract. Did Carter experience fear, hope, or grief? Who knows for sure? From all accounts [1049], the experience did connect with his emotions and his *thymos* was stirred to action and further to a concern for his daughter (*goodwill*). The second part of the cognitive/evaluative account of emotions is the claim that 'the object is an intentional object' [1050]. Nussbaum argues that emotions are not simply something responding to an inanimate object; more exactly emotions express a value to the person experiencing the emotion. This value is typically expressed and includes a psychological, 'spiritedness' and even a possible physiological response in a personal way to an individual. Thus, as Nussbaum states the:

[1044] Nussbaum, 2001, p. 22.

[1045] Ibid, p. 27.

[1046] Ibid, p. 27.

[1047] Moeller, 1999, p. 147.

[1048] Nussbaum, 2001, p. 27.

[1049] Moeller, 1999; Scott MacLeod, 2009.

[1050] Nussbaum, 2001, p. 27.

Aboutness is part of the emotion's identity. What distinguishes fear from hope, fear from grief, love from hate –is not so much the identity of the object, which might not change, but the way in which the object is seen[1051].

It is impossible to know Carter's exact emotional experience at the time, nevertheless the child famine victim had a purpose for him that include thoughts, desires and again his *thymos* was aroused to the extent that he 'chase the bird away and watched the little girl resume her struggle'[1052]. Given Carter's self-report of crying and needing to be alone I suggest that these reactions are strong psychological responses to the situation he was in and an expression of his emotional state of being[1053].

The third aspect of emotions in Nussbaum's framework is the notion that emotions also incorporate a set of beliefs and that these beliefs are multidimensional. Frequently a belief is conceived of as a particular state of mind whereby an individual adopts an attitude, e.g., holding a proposition *p* to be true where there is some evidence, though not irrefutable proof, for the truth of *p*. Carter demonstrates at least the conviction the girl has greater importance over than the vulture and appears to adopt the personalist view that the child, as person or human being is more than just another member of the animal species. Whether he is aware of her as a person in her own right and therefore of unique importance might be doubted. Nussbaum refers to Aristotle's treatment of anger in the *Rhetoric* to reinforce her point that thought needs to be incorporated into 'the emotion itself'[1054]. I suggest that the image of the young girl could have evoked in Carter two sets of emotions, goodwill and anger, in addition to the thought processes associated with these emotions. Carter was in a Catch-22 situation with regard to the expression of his emotions, and this could have reflected in his thinking about the situation, if he had acted on the thought of his daughter and for the safety of the child. However, stimulated by his *thymos,* he experienced uncertainty as to how for he may have realized that he could not act with virtue. We might even

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[1051] Ibid, p. 28.
[1052] Moeller, p 147.
[1053] Ibid, p. 148.
[1054] Nussbaum, 2001, p. 30

want to say that his integrity as a person was compromised as he could well have being considering the same questions Williams suggests some individuals face when confronted with moral dilemmas[1055].   In this situation the Photographer is acutely aware of his predicament and his inability to act in a manner that the situation requires. For to act with virtue, his action would have been:

In accord with the virtues to be done temperately or justly it does not suffice that they themselves have the right qualities. Rather the agent must also be in the right state when he does them. First, he must know [that he is doing virtuous actions]; second, he must decide on them, and decide on them for themselves; and third he must do them from a firm and unchanging state[1056].

Finally, for Nussbaum's cognitive/evaluative view of emotions 'intentional perception' and 'beliefs' provides a link or association because they represent a 'value'[1057], the intentional object has value to the individual with the emotion.

Carter appears to consider the girl as intrinsically important because she is another human person *per se*. In the immediate environment Carter is more than aware of the child's situation and condition that needs to change, and indeed he acts for the common good taking the photograph, but he does show some concern for the girl by removing the vulture. Nevertheless, it is possible that his sense of integrity might have been such that he acted to help the girl and so express his common humanity with the child. This unity would be one that transcends the evident differences in their individual *personhood*: Carter is a male, the child a female; have intellectual capabilities; and they come from different cultural and socio-economic backgrounds. The effect this experience had on him was immense and he mentions[1058] his emotional responses for some time after the event to his colleagues. By all accounts his expressions revealed a passionate grief that had an enormous significance for him and some commentators suggest it was his reason for suicide.

[1055] Williams, 'Replies', 1995, p. 211.

[1056] 1105a29-35, *NE*.

[1057] Nussbaum, 2001, p. 30. Nussbaum notes the difficult and somewhat nebulous meaning to *value* and provides a context to her meaning in her footnote on the same page.

[1058] Moeller, 1999, p. 148.

In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle provides his most positive treatment of *thymos* and the emotions, which I will now explore[1059]. The *Rhetoric* has a number of features that differs from the *Ethics*. First, he argues that oratory is a necessary activity as rules and laws are unable to provide exact guidance to action and therefore, rhetoric is a method for contact and interaction with individuals and organizations in a sphere that extends beyond technique. As noted earlier, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of the habits of good character and *nous* to accomplish and practice *phronesis*. However, his primary treatises do not account for the role of emotions. In *Rhetoric* Aristotle considers the emotions that inform the principles of our practical choices. Therefore, he argues a judgment that is unable to be determined by individuals using perception will be able to be determined with *praxis* and *phronesis* though using different faculties. Second, the *Rhetoric* reveals that emotions are continually at work in good decisions, for example:

It may be said that every individual man and all men in common aim at a certain end which determines what they choose and what they avoid. This end, to sum up briefly, is happiness and its constituents. Let us, then, by way of illustration only, ascertain what is in general the nature of happiness, and what are the elements of its constituent parts. For all advice to do things or not to do them is concerned with happiness and with the things that make for or against it; whatever makes or increases happiness or some part of happiness, we ought to do; whatever destroys or hampers happiness, or gives rise to its opposite, we ought not to do[1060].

Third, the emotions that Aristotle discusses in Book, II, and chapters 2-11[1061] are the emotions of individuals. They are expressions of *thymos* and I argue they demonstrate how *thymos* is indispensable to personal identity. The emotions constitute a fundamental association between *thymos* and *eunoia*, (goodwill) these emotions are civic and therefore belong to persons or human beings. Fourthly, the *Ethics* presents an argument that individuals make choices and act through the influence of passions

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[1059] Eugene Garver has developed Aristotle use of θυμοξ as an art of character and I am indebted to his exposition, as I have developed my notion of θυμοξ after a careful analysis of Garver work. E. Garver *Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
[1060] 1360b4-12, *Rhet.*
[1061] Ibid,

and desires. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle further elaborates on the need of individuals to experience appropriate emotions in order to perform ethical actions rationally and with the right feelings. Thus actions are responsive to circumstances and to emotions an individual is a person with personal history, character, thoughts, emotions and capacity for *praxis*. Thus, I am defined by what I do, as well as by my feelings.

Aristotle notes that the unity-in-plurality of sense faculties supports an individual to develop a single, consistent and objective world:

It might be asked why we have more senses than one. Is it to prevent failure to apprehend the common sensibles, e.g. movement, magnitude, and number, which go Along with the special sensibles? Had we no sense but sight, and that sense no object but white, they would have tended to escape our notice and everything would have merged for us into an indistinguishable identity because of the concomitance of color and magnitude. As it is, the fact that the common sensibles are given in the objects of more than one sense reveals their distinction from each and all of the special sensibles[1062].

Furthermore the multiple senses do more and less than this. For the variety of senses enable one to visualize and comprehend a unified world; the different emotions enables individuals to perceive other individuals with a unified character and life. Indeed, the various senses provide individuals with the ability to understand the world as united through scientific universals. Moreover, each particular object of sense is either an instance of these universals or accidents and the plurality of feeling and emotions provide information to individuals enabling them to make an integrated character response relative to the particulars of *praxis*. The need to correlate the different emotions demonstrates how the unities of life and character go beyond, and also fall short of, the unity of nature. Our varied senses reveal common, correct as well as superfluous information for us to discern and judge by understanding. Nevertheless, the numerous emotions add a more robust dimension by allowing us to consider the particular as well as general reasons to form integrated vision of the good life. The very persistence of the emotions and their power to act upon an individual makes them more than an accident and this is the difference between practical and

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[1062] 425b4-10, *DeA*.

theoretical particulars. Consequently, the emotions are unlike the senses, the latter are forms of engagement in a neutral, external world whereas the former are responsive to a practical world represented by complex relations with other individuals and thus unable to be simplified.

Thymos has a broad and narrow meaning, the former includes what inspires friendliness and aggression and the latter reflects one's response to personal insults. This interpretation of *thymos* may explain why, in the *Ethics*[1063] Aristotle states that one should treat friends and enemies differently, and indeed enemies with anger for in the *Politics* he states:

Some {editor note that this is a reference to Plato} say the guardians should be friendly towards those whom they do not know. Now passion is the quality of the soul which begets friendship and enables us to love; notably the spirit (θνμοξ) within us is more stirred against our friends and acquaintances than against those who are unknown to us, when we think that we are despised by them; for which reason Archilochus, complaining of his friends, very naturally addresses his soul in these words, 'For surely thou art plagued on account of friends'. The power to command and the love of freedom are in all men based upon this quality (θνμοξ), the passion is commanding and invincible [1064].

Thus with *thymos*, one has the ability to demonstrate goodwill (*eunoia*) and participate in the social life of the community one inhabits as it provides a distinction between what belongs to or relates to a specific individual rather than other individuals or wider community. If *thymos* is fully developed by communities it then becomes an emotion that individuals can share with each other in relationship. Similarly, the emotion *thymos* that makes one friendly and well disposed towards an individual is the same *thymos* that provokes one to extreme action against other individuals. For example, *θνμοξ* also has the capacity to demonstrate goodwill: 'others take a friend to be one who spends time with his friend, and makes the same choices; or one who shares his friend's distress and enjoyment.[1065]. However, *thymos* can also express anger:

[1063] 1126b11-1127a13, *NE.*
[1064] 132b39-1328a7, *Pol* where the translator has used *θνμοξ* I have inserted brackets to indicate the translated term.
[1065] 1166a7-9, *NE.*

Again we feel anger with friends if they do not speak well of us or treat us well; and still more, if they do the contrary; or if they do not perceive our needs, which is why Plexippus is angry with Meleager in Antiphon's play; for this want of perception shows that they are slighting us[1066].

I suggest that these and the following passage are good examples of how universal the presence of *thymos* is in individuals even if the individual is not a being whom one wishes to associate. For example:

Those who live in a cold climate and in Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they retain comparative freedom, but have no political organization, and are incapable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but are wanting in spirit, and the Hellenic race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and also intelligent[1067].

Thymos is first and foremost the capacity for 'spirit'. However, when overt it is the motivation to act on one's judgments. According to Aristotle, the Europeans and Asians have the capability though it is flawed from its absence of *eunoia*, which in turn prohibits the exercise of *phronesis*. Consequently, individuals without *thymos* and individuals who rely on *thymos* alone make ideal slaves.

Eros

The 'sensitive' ψυχή is where one will find ἒρως and Peters[1068] provides a concise historical account of the etymology of ἒρως. Though Peters translates the word as 'desire, love'[1069] he notes that ἒρως is force and it is this meaning as a concept that is typically represented in the pre-philosophical Greek cosmogonies. It is when Zeus wants to create that he changes to ἒρως and becomes 'a motive force on a sexual model'[1070] which is then used to explain the cause of historical cosmological phenomenon. Though Peters concentrates on Plato's use of ἒρως, he does mention the Orphic use of the term and it is this application that I wish to explore. Just as Aristotle

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[1066] 1379b13-1179b16, *Rhet*.
[1067] 1327b24-1327b30, *Pol.*
[1068] *GPT,* 1967 pp. 62-66.
[1069] Ibid, p. 62.
[1070] Ibid, p. 62.

acknowledges[1071] the prior contributions in Hellenistic philosophy of ἔρως 'opposing powers'[1072] what I suggest is that it is ἔρως that unites θνμοξ through desire and passion. This holds open the possibility of shared physiological, psychological, emotional and intellectual parity in all human beings[1073]. There will naturally be varying degrees of disparity in each individual's capacity to each of these constituents. While, some individuals may argue that it is possible for some individuals to share a common parity. I would argue that people do share common capacities even if these do not amount to exact similarities. What I conclude is that it is ἔρως, as a personal coming-to-be, that acts as a mediator between the extreme of anger and goodwill found in θνμοξ. Consequently ἔρως is the primal actuality in all aspects of its performance as: illuminator, cultivator of being, source of pleasure and the power that acts for consistency and accord. This description of ἔρως is, explained by Hesiod's account of ἔρως in *Theogony*[1074] that places ἔρως as one of the earliest powers in coming-to-be. This view influences later Hellenistic philosophical and religious theories on ἔρως in cosmogony and cosmology. Mooney[1075] also and argues that for Hesiod as having this view of ἔρως as a coming-to-be and therefore describes the: 'productivity of eros {ἔρως} in the human and animal spheres and the cosmic level, which can be used as an explanatory device in depicting the nature of coming-to-be'[1076]. Hesiod describes the origin of coming-to-be[1077] as:

[1071] For example, 984b-985a *Meta*, Aristotle discusses the account of earlier Philosophers of material and efficient causes.

[1072] *GPT*, 1967, p. 63.

[1073] Aristotle does not state this position. I am drawing my inferences from 984b, 985a, 1075b *Meta,* 1102a26-1103a3, NE, and 427b28-429a9; 433a10-434a20, DeA.

[1074] Hesiod, *Theogony and Works and Days,* trans. M West, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[1075] T. B. Mooney, *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Love and Friendship in Ancient Greece: Homer to Plato*, Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, School of Humanities, Department of Philosophy, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, May 1992.

[1076] Ibid, p. 7, my brackets.

[1077] There are a number of different translations available, for example, Hesiod, 1998; G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven & M. Schofield *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History With a Selection of Texts*, Second Edition, (New York: Cambridge University

Verily first of all did Chaos come into being, and then broad-bosomed Gaia [earth], a firm seat of all things for ever, and misty Tartaros in a recess of broad-wayed earth, and Eros, who is fairest among immortal gods, looser of limbs, and subdues in their breasts the mind and thoughtful counsel of all gods and all men[1078].

A number of scholars[1079] question this interpretation of '*chaos*'. However, I support

the Aristotelian notion of 'chaos' as 'place', for Aristotle states:

These considerations then would lead us to suppose that place is something distinct from bodies, and that every sensible body is in place. Hesiod too might be held to have given a correct account of it when he made chaos first[1080].

I suggest, for chaos to be judged, as 'place' it needs some form of delineation that will

explain how it relates to space. It is the first stage or form of 'place' for space. It is a

preliminary instant in which or through which spatial existences like Earth, Sky or

Mountains come-to-be. Hesiod, as many academics acknowledge[1081], never questions

the source or *arche* of becoming but this does not affect my argument for the

originating power of ἔρως.

Notwithstanding the limited evidence for Mooney's interpretation of Hesiod's

account of the cosmogonic and cosmological ἔρως, he[1082] that it was present in Orphic

literature and that this role of ἔρως represents an original philosophical idea. The

cosmogonic ἔρως is presented as 'fairest among immortal gods, looser of limbs'[1083]

and recommended as the finest of the gods. This is implied in the activities ascribed

to ἔρως as a force that unifies and creates, for as Mooney notes, ἔρως is:

A structural principle absolutely necessary to the genealogical model. He is the force of combination that unites the generative pairs, and there can be no theogony, properly speaking, until he is present[1084].

Press, 1983). In this instance I am using the latter source for reference as it more accurately reflects the notion of come-in-being

[1078] G. S.Kirk *et al*, 1983, p. 35.

[1079] For a complete discussion, the reader is referred to Mooney who presents an account of the debate. Mooney, 1992, p. 9.

[1080] 208b27-30 *Physics*.

[1081] I acknowledge the work of G. S. Kirk *et al* 1983 and Mooney 1992, who provide a critical analysis of this argument.

[1082] Mooney, Ibid, 1992 pp. 12-13

[1083] G. S. Kirk, *et al* 1983, p. 35, the line is actually Line120 in Hesiod, 1998.

[1084] Mooney, 1992, p. 13, quoting Lamberton

I suggest that the meaning of the description of ἔρως by Hesiod as one who 'subdues in their breasts the mind and thoughtful counsel of all gods and men'[1085] is one that represents ἔρως as a coming together and formation. Consequently, ἔρως brings about synchronization and understanding. What I suggest is that ἔρως (as a coming-to-be) gives dynamic meaning to *personhood*. It is a necessary condition for personal identity rooted in our belonging to one another for ἔρως acts as the mediating centre for θνμοξ. ἔρως liberates our *thymos* from the tentacles transforms this expression of living in opposition with an individual to a spirit of inclusion. The abyss that separates the individuals is now negated and our *thymos* now acts to include another in our presence and sphere of importance. This change leads us to become more compassionate, trustful and understanding of other individuals and their belief systems. In belonging one individual discovers the intrinsic value of another individual when our *thymos* is aroused to act with goodwill as Carter possibly did for the young girl.

For many members of the *L'Arche* communities, developing their relationships can show how dissimilar levels of intellectual functioning can reveal to them how intrinsically valuable they are to each other. For Carter, the ἔρως may have occurred when he realized he shared a common humanity with the starving girl. Indeed this ἔρως may also have been the cause of his anguish when later he grasped the horrific nature of the actual circumstances in which he found himself, and in what he did or failed to do[1086]. Here 'belonging' in the sense that an individual feels comfortable with and accepted for who they are by another is of crucial importance in our lives as persons.

In the cosmological sphere *Gaia* (Earth) is 'a firm seat of all things forever'[1087] and is associated with the metaphysical notion of prime matter. *Gaia* has the capacity to cause the *Ouranos* (sky or heaven) - that encircles everything including

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[1085] Kirk *et al,* 1983, p. 35.

[1086] Moller, reports that following his time in Sudan, Cater reports that he experienced great emotional distress about his experiences there, 1999, p. 148.

[1087] Kirk, *et al,* 1983, p. 35.

the substances and necessary processes of the familiar components of the Earth (for example, lakes, forests) - to be identifiable. Thus, the role of *Gaia* in the sphere of our *personhood* is 'belonging' for it is a place where we discover the elements that constitute our identity. Indeed, belonging is what we may or may not first experience in their relations with our birth mother and family - something Macmurray and Bowlby would accept. Therefore the core of belonging is that as an individual, one's existence follows from the actions of other individuals. Thus in order to continue to experience and lead a genuine life we needs to develop as an individual physically, and I contend psychologically and in relations with other individuals[1088]. Jacques Maritain makes the same point:

Man…does not exist only in a physical manner. He has spiritual super-existence through knowledge and love; he is in a way, a universe in himself, a microcosm, in which the great universe in its entirety can be encompassed through knowledge; and through love he can give himself completely to beings who are to him, as it were, other selves, a relation for which no equivalent can be found in the physical world[1089].

Why is it that we need to belong to another person? Is it a way of managing our personal psychological insecurities? Or it is a way of ensuring that as individuals we meet others personal needs or desires? I believe an individual's desire to belong [like *Gaia*] that it fosters our discovery of who we are through authentic mutually dependent relationships. This agrees with the view on a number of other scholars[1090].

For example Nussbaum's claims:

Concept of a human being… at a very general level: we want to find some at least provisionally nonnegotiable points in our judgments, so that we can see how various theories treat them. I suggest that we find such provisional fixed points in the idea that both practical reason and sociability are extremely important aspects of an existence that is truly human, permeating and organizing its many functions[1091].

[1088] Again I use John Macmurray as a source here and note in his first Gifford Lecture he outlines the threat to the personal life posed by the functionalist view, (pp. 29-31) and then proceeds to note the unity of the self as a '*personal unity';* J. Macmurray, *The Self As Agent,* (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), p. 98.
[1089] J. Maritain *The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain*, Selected readings, (eds) Joseph W. Evans & Leo R. Ward, (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1956), p. 32.
[1090] *PR.*
[1091] Nussbaum 2000, pp. 102-140; p. 120.

These types of relations of mutually dependency are typically experienced in the form of a ἔρως type relation. Despite their differences of age, gender, ethnicity, culture and language, Kevin Carter's appears to achieve a particular relationship link that transcends their differences enabling them to recognize their mutual identity as persons.

There may of course be a deficiency in the degree of synchronicity between an individual and other people in society. An individual's life is characterised by complex phenomena, e.g. conforming to complex social and cultural norms that are demanded by the way their society is structured. Indeed, it is these social structures commonly cause that commonly conflict for groups who live in other social networks. Three possible causes for inter-group conflict are[1092]: first, because individuals in one group are of the opinion that they are morally superior: second, that individuals in a group find it difficult to acknowledge that they might hold incorrect beliefs, opinions or can act misguidedly; and thirdly, an individual may deny that any other individual or group has alternative views of human experience that have any value. Nevertheless, an individual in one group may have occasion to reflect, question their opinions and beliefs following an event that reveals other ways of living. How or why this exactly occurs may be impossible to explain so it is difficult to apply a universal formula to ensure unanimity. However, what does occur can result in a weakening of our certainty and a change of mind concerning our identity thoughts, feelings and opinions. On these occasions it is possible for ἔρως to balance or harmonies different original realities and so transform *'dark'* realities and produce positive results. Thus, in our experience of inter-personal relations, we can be moved from being in conflict with someone to having goodwill for them. Again in Hesiod I can suggest that he was aware of this view, for example: 'out of Chaos, Erebos and Black night came into being; and from night, again, came Aither and Day, whom she conceived and bore

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[1092] Vanier, 2003, pp. 35-69.

after mingling in love with Erebos[1093]. It is ἔρως's role to balance and create positive outcomes in the Orphic literature and I consider it is as a source of our individual intentions, shared meaning and existential import, instead of being simply a physiological species of event that is a facet of human action.

Finally I argue that ἔρως is not something that can be regulated by or imposed on us by law or regulation as, it is a free flowing attitude or expression of t*hymos*. It will not be possible for an individual to transform their *thymos* unless they view themselves as part of a common humanity. This means - in the practical sphere - that we should not think or understand ourselves as being superior to the other individuals. The Photographer while recognising his own inherent nature as a composite being, it is through his psychological and emotional connection with the child that he comes to appreciate she is also as composite being. Carter may even have seen that what they shared transcended their different capabilities race, religion, culture and capabilities. As persons, they shared a common need to belong to someone else, a need to develop their personal skills and capabilities, and to discover their place in their immediate group, society and the world. The pity was that Carter did not perceive what this really entailed for him morally, i.e., to actively help the child to reach the Centre safely.

Conclusion

In conclusion my aim in this chapter was to present a clear and comprehensive introduction to *thymos* and ἔρως and how they might influence *personhood*.   In so doing, I have indicated the way classical western philosophy has contributed to our understanding of personal identity. My approach places less emphasis on the individual lives of persons and more on how typically in our daily communication with one another sensitivity, intuition and the capacity to listen should be valued above rationality in explaining human attachment.

[1093] Kirk *et al*, 1983, p. 35.

Synopsis

Introduction

My interpretation of Aristotle's views on *philia* may be vulnerable to the criticism that it simply reflects my own vision and personal values. I could indeed have misread and therefore misrepresented what message he wished to convey to his reader. Nonetheless, what I have attempted to explore his notion *philia* within his ethical framework and to show by the analysis of contemporary examples how it may have relevance to our modern society. This synopsis considers both the possible value and limitations of this study.

The Value of this Study

Aristotelian Virtue Ethics gives prominence to the development of our virtue character traits as potentialities that enable us to make decisions where virtues are the means by which we discriminate between the good and bad actions and justify our ethical rules. In general, a virtue means developing a pattern of behaviour and feeling, a tendency to act desire and feel in particular ways in appropriate situations. Our response or the way we interact with others will attempt to strike a balance between the two extremes at each end of the continuum of what is bad and what is good. This is unlike the dichotomous distinction between what is 'right' and what is 'wrong' (in accordance with rules), what is 'good' and 'bad' admits to degrees of comparison based on our actual experience. A virtue includes an informed judgment about the relevant response required by a given and specific situation. A virtuous character is acquired by 'habit' and 'practice'. It develops and become part of who we are much like other forms of skill we develop in life. It may be that we will not respond to others in a virtuous way in every encounter. Nonetheless, through repetition and exposure to new interactions, we can develop our character and develop personal standards for our future interactions.

Virtue then is a way of being; it is an acquired and lasting way of being: it is what we become and what are, and therefore determines what we can do. Here our motivation for action is important for virtue ethics [as it is for Duty-based Ethics]– for the theory is concerned with *how* we act and *why,* viz. our psychological motivation for action. This motivational structure has three important dimensions, namely how an individual is (i) disposed to do what is right; (ii) intends to act; and (iii) acts. However, we are not simply rule followers. Rather an individual whose *character* is generous, caring, trusting, compassionate, sympathetic should be our model to emulate. Virtue ethics therefore is about supporting individuals to develop their virtues or integrity to become people who are courageous, just, temperate, prudent and who do what is right because it is right and honourable. It is within this framework that Aristotle presents his account of *philia.* Therefore, I argue that his virtue ethics, will treat each person as unique, and honours, respects and encourages connections with other people through their network of relationships and values, and doing so will affect them and support the throughout their lives. This implies that we must change the focus of our interactions from 'what ought we to do' to 'what do as we do to develop another individual's happiness'.

If however, our societies globally were to affirm and give prominence to this view that people and their interpersonal relationships are important, (e.g. as in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights), then our moral focus will alter. This approach appreciates every person and our consciousness will focus on leading lives together that exhibit actions which confirm our belief that[1094]:

- All individuals, regardless of limitation, race, or creed are important and valuable and are to be respected;
- The greatest tragedy for an individual is to experience the contempt of another person as this can lead to domination and repression of human life; and
- If we are serious about living life in such a way as to reach fullness, then at some time or in the future all individuals will need each other and this demands that we examine our personal interactions and motives.

[1094] Vanier, 2001, pp. 179-199; J. Teichman, *Social Ethics,* (Oxford: Blackwall, 1996), pp. 29-61.

I have argued in chapter 4 that the emphasis placed by utilitarians on the 'equal considerations of interest' principle is unsatisfactory and is inadequate to define human personhood. My argument rests on the principle's failure to adequately explain or to take account of the historical and existential factors that operate in the development of our actual relationships and friendships. Indeed their emphasis places less importance on the individual lives of persons and how typically in our daily communication sensitivity, intuition and listening skills are more important than rationality in forming attachment. I have presented, through a phenomenological analysis a number of narratives that act as paradigms or reference points to demonstrate that we are all members of the same human race and that another person's life is as precious as my own. Therefore, how we interact and develop friendships as individuals does matter despite the fact that relationships arise in different circumstances and occur from a range of different motivations and across a wide spectrum of intimacies. Nonetheless, it is through our capacity for human inter-relationships that we discover what it means to be a person. This will occur if *goodwill* defines the spirit (*thymos*) and essence of the *philia* involved since this means the human person is *not* defined by simply their psychological and/or physical abilities but rather by their availability for, openness to and presence for inter-relationships and it is this that accord profound value and meaning to our encounters. This accessibility for relationships permits personhood to be sustained between friends with disparate cognitive status and between parents and children who hold differential power relations. Moreover, this enables us to account for the different levels of relationships we have and how we can improve our perception of one another and how we can develop our personal resources to establish what at first glance might appear, unusual and unattainable forms of intimate *philia.* Vanier[1095] tells the story of how one of the *L'Arche* communities in Africa offered a young boy who had been raised by animals, a home and while in first years it was difficult to recognise him as a human, Robert today can walk upright unassisted and has developed meaningful and happy relationships with many other persons. He therefore argues that any one with human parents is a person:

[1095] Vanier, Ibid, p. 182.

Even if their deepest identity remains concealed beneath serious disturbances and depravity the possibility always exists for any person to awaken to a life of relationships, however minimal, provided he or she is surrounded by respect and love[1096].

Being a friend and demonstrating by our actions and through living together does not simply mean doing things for another person or acting on their behalf no matter what a friend's limitations are. It is much more profound. To be a friend of someone is to show to them, their own exquisiteness, their self-worth and their importance to you. It is to comprehend who they are, to understand their sorrows, desires and limitations and their body language; it is to delight in their presence, spend time in their company and to communicate with them. In this form of *goodwill* friends live a heart-to-heart relationship with another, giving to and receiving from each other to such an extent that they needs few other people with whom to communicate because of the level of intimacy shared.

Limitations of the Thesis

The thesis has some limitations and poses questions that highlight the need for further research. For example, by my using personalism it could be argued that my central argument appears to give priority to human beings. Does this imply only humans matter? It is correct to note particular ethical significance attributed to human persons throughout the thesis. No apologies are made for this argument. Rather the following rationale underpins my approach: first and foremost, the uniqueness of the human species is that it is *our* species; second, no theory operates in a vacuum and moral philosophy is a *human activity* that ascribes value to what *humans decide* is valuable; and third, sentience and intelligence are but two elements that we value as human beings what is being argued here is that *philia* is of infinitely greater significance in defining who and what we are. Moreover, my use of personalism is designed to stand in direct contrast to the contemporary paradigm of human nature that gives value only to a set of extrinsic principles. Personalism that asserts that human life is of precious value in and of itself, that our emotional states of pleasure; happiness, misery and pain have

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[1096] Ibid.

greater value in human life; and the belief all beings albeit with different degrees of cognitive functioning and self-awareness have a right to life.

The second criticism that can legitimately be directed against my adoption of Aristotle's model of *philia* is that he clearly discriminates against women, slaves and 'deformed children'[1097]'? This is certainly a shortcoming of his moral vision and it has undertones that exhibit a degree of racism and elitism. However, I argue that this might not be the complete story. There are a number of contemporary scholars who provide a gender sensitive reading of his ethics which, warrants careful consideration, for example Schwarzenbach's[1098] offers a reading of Aristotle's nutritive and reproductive *psyche*[1099], which attributes immense value to the role women practice in rearing children and '*ethical reproduction*'[1100]. Schwarzenbach concludes that the essential task of a legislator is 'to cultivate unanimity, friendship and a rough equality between citizens'[1101] and this is more sensitive to the historical role of women's participation in society and their contribution to our development as human beings.

One of the often-overlooked aspects of human nature is what it is that motivates us to seek *philia* and how this affects how we engage with other humans and understand our identity. I have argued that if we return to early Greek philosophy there may be some evidence to ascribe a prominent role for *thymos* and ἔρως in understanding our motives for *philia* and understanding those human characteristics, which belong to our species and constitute our personhood. Consequently, without further in-depth research, it is difficult to approve a central role to these factors as sufficient conditions for *personhood.* This study therefore needs to be further supplemented before the claims can be corroborated and validated.

[1097] 1335b19, Pol.
[1098] *OCF,* 2009.
[1099] Ibid, pp. 27-43.
[1100] Ibid, pp. 27- 58.
[1101] Ibid, p. 56.

Conclusion

A précis then of this thesis is that it confirms Aristotle's theory that humans are social by nature and friendship is essential to human life. It develops his notion of *philia* and applied it to friendships between people with and people without intellectual disabilities in order to demonstrate that the interdependence of individuals and the enrichment that flows from these encounters enables us to realize our potential as human beings. The implications of this argument are not only that it provides an ethical justification for people with intellectual disabilities being treated as equal citizens, having the same rights as other people, but also provides us with a vision of human society and identity as realized and integrate through the experience of people living and inter acting together.

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