

MODEL CHECKING AN OBJECT-ORIENTED DESIGN

Validation Led Development of Software

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Abstract: The object-oriented design methodologies have focused on methods, tools and representations to build classes taking advantage of inheritance and encapsulation properties. Modelling of the interaction among the objects often does not go beyond the method declarations stage until the programming phase. Efforts to include object constraints in the object-oriented design to embody the behavioural correctness have not reached the level assertions play in understanding the correctness of the traditional imperative programs. The paper describes use of a model checker to establish correctness of an object-oriented design.

1 INTRODUCTION

The program execution fundamentals of object-oriented systems are rooted in the imperative programming paradigm. The need for invariants and execution stages (Warmer, 1999; Dijkstra, 1976) remains important in establishing the correctness and other properties of the object-oriented programs and systems. The dominant developments in the object-oriented domain have focused on class construction; however, a design is not ready just because each class has been designed inheriting behaviour and code from appropriate super-classes. We need to also be sure that the class objects will interact with each other correctly.

A methodology exclusively focused on the object and class interfaces does not address some basic but important design needs: How do we know that all object classes have been defined? How do we know that all methods of interest have been found? How do we know that all behavioural details of interest have been captured in the specifications? Inconsistency in the specifications is another global property that escapes the confines of a single class interface. We need a methodology that can consider properties of individual classes as well as the properties of a group of classes and their objects.

Imperative languages use procedural abstraction as the central design methodology for understanding and comprehending software and development processes. Invariants and predicates (Dijkstra, 1976) are used to relate the points in the static text of a program with the (expected) state that would exist

when the *correct* program reaches those points during the execution.

More recently, Java – Java 1.4 onwards – has incorporated the traditional imperative language style assertions. Thus, through post-conditions programmers are able to express some, but not all, aspects of the contracts that object methods have to the objects invoking the methods. However, emphasis away from the functional and procedural paradigms makes it difficult to associate locations in the static text of an object-oriented program with the execution stages. It is not convenient to write assertions defining the system states at various points during the program execution. The Object Constraint Language, OCL (Warmer, 1999), has somewhat limited success in expressing constraints on the values (states) in programs.

In this paper, we suggest the use of model checking tools as a way to express and verify properties that encompass multiple objects and their classes. Specifically, we use Labelled Transition System (LTS) by Magee and Kramer (Magee, 1999) as the verification tool. The tool models a concurrent system of objects as a composition of Finite State Process (FSP).

A model is an abstract specification of the system. Each object is represented as a concurrent component. The invariant properties of the object-oriented model can be expressed as the safety properties over the LTS description. A deadlock or a liveness concern in the LTS model has interpretation in the object-oriented domain as underscoring an issue that has remained unaddressed.

Section 2 describes a software development process, the LTS specification language and its processing. In section 3, we give flavour of the kinds of outputs one receives from the LTS analyser. Section 4 presents some concluding remarks.

2 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT

We follow validation led software development process (Lakos, 2002). In brief, the object-oriented software development begins with a text description of the system. The objects and object classes are discerned from the text. For each class, some data members may become obvious at this point. Class hierarchies and other inter-class relationships are also represented explicitly to take advantage of the standard object-oriented modelling methodologies. To extract consistent and complete specifications, the methodology advocates the use of object lifecycle models.

For each significant object class, the text description provides an initial description of the object's lifecycle. For example, verbs provide clues to the existence of various states. The nature of these verbs may suggest various forms of transitions between the states of the system.

Text descriptions are notorious for their ambiguity and inconsistency. At the same time, much of the description is generally left unexpressed. One does not expect the initial lifecycle models of the object classes drawn from the text to be perfect models. A validation led process can be used to iteratively develop the lifecycles to their final refined levels.

In each iterative cycle of the validation led development, the lifecycles are matched against each other to identify inconsistencies and incompleteness. Each identified lacuna requires the lifecycles to be revised to correct the concern. The reported methodology, however, relied on a manual analysis




Figure 1: Initial finite state process for a lift passenger from a text description.

of the lifecycles to identify the lacunae. A tool to perform this analysis is a necessary step to improve the reliability and effectiveness of the methodology.

We address this need by using a model checker to identify the mismatches in the object lifecycle specifications. The emerging specification being formal delivers another potential benefit in the form of automating the task of program generation. This paper, however, does not pursue this avenue.

The examples used in this paper are based on the lift system as described in (Lakos, 2002). Figure 1 shows the lifecycle of a lift passenger as it becomes evident from the text description of the lift system. As the validation led process progresses, the specification gets developed. For example, a passenger arriving at the ground floor or the top floor of the building will have a lifecycle somewhat different from the lifecycles of those arriving at the other floors.

2.1 Labelled Transition System

Using Labelled Transition System (LTS) (Magee, 1999) we can model the lifecycles of the entities as Finite State Processes (FSP). The associated system analyser (LTSA) can analyse the processes for progress and safety violations. In this section, we give a brief flavour of FSP descriptions.

A Finite State Process consists of a sequence of actions. As an action occurs the system changes its state over a finite set. It is often helpful to define a finite process in terms of other finite processes. For example, process PASSENGER below models a lift passenger (see Stanton 2002 for further details)

```

const UP = 0
const DOWN = 1
set DIR = UP..DOWN
PASSENGER = {
  call_at_ground_level ->
    WAITING_FOR_LIFT[1] |
  call_at_top_floor ->
    WAITING_FOR_LIFT[MAX_FLR] |
  call_at_floor[f:2..MAX_FLR-1][d:DIR]
    -> WAITING_FOR_LIFT[f]
}
  
```

In this model, a passenger can follow one of three alternative sequences of actions based on the floor from which he calls the lift. In each alternative, an action of calling the lift is followed by a wait (process) for the lift. The passenger waits on the floor from which he called the lift.

```

Composition:
LP = p.1:PASSENGER || LIFT(btnUp,btnDown,dptCount) || btnUp.1:BUTTON ||
    btnUp.2:BUTTON || btnDown.2:BUTTON || btnDown.3:BUTTON || dptCount.1:BUTTON ||
    dptCount.2:BUTTON || dptCount.3:BUTTON
State Space:
22 * 882 * 3 * 3 * 3 * 3 * 3 * 3 * 3 = 2 ** 29
Analysing...
Depth 25 -- States: 217 Transitions: 445 Memory used: 4482K
Trace to DEADLOCK:
    p.1.arrival.1                // p.1 arrives a at level 1 of the building
    p.1.passenger.1              // wants to ride the lift from level 1
    p.1.call.1.1                 // calls the lift
    delay.1                      // waits – this lift is right there!
    door_is_open_i.1.1           // Lift door opens
    dptCount.1.seek_button.0      // Lift checks: the departure count at floor 1 is 0
    btnUp.1.seek_button.1        // Lift checks: the up button at floor 1 shows 1 person is waiting
    btnUp.1.off                  // Lift turns the first floor up button off
    p.1.enter_lift               // Passenger p.1 may board the lift
    p.1.entered_lift.1           // p.1 enters lift
    p.1.press_dest.1             // p.1 wants to go to floor 1 – same floor
    pause
    door_is_closed.1.1           // Lift door closes p.1 is inside
    dptCount.1.seek_button.1      // Lift determines that it needs to go to floor 1
    door_is_open_i.1.1           // Lift opens the door
    dptCount.1.seek_button.1      // Anyone getting down here?
    p.1.destination_reached.1    // p.1 is to be let off here
    p.1.left_lift.1              // p.1 leaves
    p.1.arrival.1                // p.1 is back on the level 1
    p.1.passenger.1              // wants to ride the lift from level 1. Again!
    dptCount.1.seek_button.0      // Lift checks: the departure count at floor 1 is 0
    btnUp.1.seek_button.0        // Lift checks: the up button at floor 1 shows 0 persons waiting
    btnDown.1.seek_button.1      // Lift checks: the down button at floor 1 shows 1 person is waiting
                                // btnDown.1 is defined by LIFT(btnUp,btnDown,dptCount)
    btnDown.1.off                // Lift turns the first floor down button off
Analysed in: 180ms

```

Figure 2: LTSA analysis report indicating a sequence of actions leading to a deadlock in a FSP model for a lift system. The comments have been added to provide interpretation for the readers of this paper.

2.2 LTS Analyser

The LTS analyser (LTSA) can verify a given model for two kinds of errors. A progress violation occurs when the system reaches a state from which it can not guarantee a future occurrence of any action from a set of actions. For example, a progress violation would have occurred if we can not assert, at all instances, that the lift will visit the ground floor again at some time in the future.

A safety property is a sequence of, not necessarily consecutive, actions that represent an acceptable behaviour. Any violation denotes an error. For example, a safety requirement may insist that each `door open` action is followed by a `door close` action before the lift moves.

Indeed, there is some leeway in modelling certain conditions: a safety requirement can be

specified as a guard and therefore manifests as a progress violation rather than as a safety violation.

A safety check involves exercising all possible sequences of the actions to ensure that no safety violation occurs. Similarly to ensure the absence of progress violation, the analyser checks all possible sequences of actions to find a sequence that does not guarantee a future occurrence of a desired action. Each safety or progress violation detected by the tool is reported by LTSA as an action sequence leading to the error state.

3 EXPERIENCES

This section reports our experiences in the use of the model checker for validation led development specifications of the lift problem. Our study (Stanton, 2002) was focused on the issues related to the movements of a lift in a multi-floor building. At

Table 1: State space volume for the modelled lift system and its growth with the floors and simultaneous users.

Number of simultaneous passengers in the model	Number of floors in the modelled building				
		3	5	7	10
1	Reachable states	1267	5067	12987	35952
	Potential state space	10^{24}	$\sim 10^{33}$	$\sim 10^{40}$	$\sim 10^{50}$
	Number of transitions	1327	5267	13407	36852
3	Reachable states	56664	697580	3580800	
	Potential state space	$\sim 10^{41}$	$\sim 10^{58}$	$\sim 10^{73}$	
	Number of transitions	68388	812408	4060332	
5	Reachable states	2966788			
	Potential state space	$\sim 10^{57}$			
	Number of transitions	4337180			

various points in its lifecycle, the lift model invokes algorithm *WALK* to determine its next action. Some points on the lift lifecycle at which the algorithm is invoked are: (1) when the lift door closes; (2) when the lift approaches the next floor level; and (3) by an idle lift when an on-floor button is pressed to call the lift.

Initially a rather rudimentary *WALK* algorithm was derived from the text and coded in the FSP model. The LTS analyser was then repeatedly used to report incompleteness and inconsistency errors in the model. As the errors were reported the *WALK* specifications were corrected. Figure 2 depicts an annotated LTSA report – we have added annotations to help the reader understand it.

The reader would notice that the description does not fit with the typical configuration of a real lift system. For example, there are buttons on the ground floor to call the lift to go up as well as to go down. Likewise, a passenger wishing to travel to the same floor may call the lift for either direction. Their presence is simply an indication of the still evolving state of the FSP model used in the figure. The example model is not the final model.

Table 1 provides an indication of the effort required to model-check the finite state process (FSP) model of the lift. These provide some interesting insights into the traditional testing-based software design and development methodologies.

A naïve black-box testing (Perry, 1995) would tend to show growth in the required number of test cases in proportion to the potential state-space size. The white-box testing (Perry, 1995) takes advantage of the implementation and design information. Thus, it will follow the growth trend shown as reachable state space and/or as the number of transitions. In both cases, it is clear that a pragmatic testing effort can cover only a small fraction of the test cases needed for a complete check. Besides being more comprehensive a model-checker catches the errors in an earlier phase than the testing – a cherished goal of every software engineer.

4 CONCLUSION

The model checking, notwithstanding its tedium, is a useful and effective tool in developing high-quality error-free software. Model checkers, such as LTSA, contribute to this process in many ways:

- The formal FSP descriptions that a model checker requires is directly associated with the objects in the system specifications.
- The FSP description of the objects is formal and is capable of interpretative execution.
- The verification process employed by a model checker is like a simultaneous execution of all animations – analysis provides an effective and efficient mean for identifying potential errors.
- The formal specifications can be automatically transformed into programs.

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