

GENDER IDENTITY IN THE HOMOSEXUAL MALE:
IDENTIFYING AND TESTING TWO THEORIES OF OBJECT RELATIONS
WITHIN THE PERSONALITY

by

Kevin Franklin, B.Psych., Dip.Ed.

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This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other higher degree or graduate diploma in any tertiary institution and, to the best of this candidate's knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Kevin Franklin', is written over the printed name. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Kevin Franklin

ABSTRACT

Male homosexuality can be understood as an expression of the gender of the self. Three aspects of the self are proposed in a hypothetical model of the homosexual male and compared to the heterosexual male and female. One aspect is subjectivity and this study hypothesizes that the subjective experience of the gender of the self is associated with homosexuality and heterosexuality. The remaining two aspects are both objectivities. It is hypothesized that sexual preference is the objective expression of the gender of the subjective self. It is hypothesized that sexual preference is not related to biological sex (sexual identity).

The two objective attitudes are defined as the extremities of a continuum of spontaneity: from involved objectivity to detached objectivity. This difference in spontaneity within a homosexual group describes the differential development of homosexual identification: from a developed homosexual role to an under-developed or absent homosexual role. The absence or development of the homosexual role are differences in spontaneity and these differences are associated with measures of psycho- and socio-pathology.

Traditionally, homosexuality has been understood to be an outcome of a different sexuality. This study shows that

sexuality is not related to homosexuality as a subjective expression of self. Sexual preference is, however, the objective expression of that subjectivity.

Sex and gender are confounded in the literature. The confusion of the sex and gender literature, and the perplexity of the homosexuality literature, is partially resolved by the separation of two distinct but inter-related frames of reference. These are the sociological and the psychological frames of reference.

The results strongly support the conclusion that homosexuality is related to the subjective experience of the self and that homosexuality is an objective expression of that subjectivity as a sexual preference. Homosexuality is not synonymous with sexual preference or homosexual role, it also includes the psychological precursor of the subjective experience of gender, that is, gender identity.

There is empirical support for a proposed persons-grammar theory of personality that uses a psychological frame of reference. Overall the results support this theoretical development and models of homosexuality, anxiety, and psychosis utilizing this theoretical framework.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Statement of intent	ii
Abstract	iii
Acknowledgements	v
List of Tables	x
List of Figures	xiii

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	10
GENDER	13
(a) General review of gender studies	15
(b) Review of gender studies specific to homosexuality	20
SEX	24
(a) General review of social sex-role studies	24
(b) Social sex-role studies specific to homosexuality	28
Discussion of Gender and Sex Research	33
(a) Conceptual confusion of sex and gender	34
(b) Semantic confusion of sex and gender	38
Conclusions	41

3. THEORY	45
A Theory of Persons-grammar: a psychological frame of reference	50
A Psychology of Sexual Preferences	65
(i) Sexual preference and gender identity	66
(ii) The maleness or femaleness of homosexual gender identity	68
Personality models implicit in the literature	69
Proposed personality models	72
Rationales	77
(i) Study 1	77
(ii) Study 2	79
(iii) Study 3	82
4. METHODOLOGY	85
(i) Study 1	90
Subjects	90
Measures	92
Procedure	108
Design	108
(ii) Study 2	112
Subjects	114
Measures	114
Measures of anxiety	124
Procedure	135

Design	135
Hypotheses	141
(iii) Study 3	143
Subjects	143
Measures	143
Procedure	143
Design	143
Hypotheses	146
 5. RESULTS: Statistical and substantive	 148
Study 1	148
(a) Descriptive statistics	148
(b) Discriminant analysis	152
(c) A posteriori comparisons	158
Study 2	161
(a) Descriptive statistics	161
(b) Discriminant analysis	163
(c) A posteriori comparisons	171
(d) Partial cross-validation	175
Study 3	179
(a) Descriptive statistics	179
(b) Discriminant analysis	182
(c) A posteriori comparisons	188

6. CONCLUSIONS	195
Study 1	198
Study 2	202
Study 3	213
(i) Masculinity (so-called) of the social sex-role	219
(ii) Phobia	220
(iii) Psychoticism	224
An illustration: a case of paranoia	226
Summary of chapter 6	231
7. SUMMARY	235
Limits of the study	240
Implications of the research	244
(i) For homosexuals	244
(ii) For education and therapy	245
(iii) For science	246
(iv) For further research	251
APPENDIX 1	257
APPENDIX 2	259
APPENDIX 3	263
APPENDIX 4	271
REFERENCES	319

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		PAGE
1.	Meta-roles and meta-role relations of the psychological frame	52
2.	Identity in the implicit models of personality	70
3.	Identity in the proposed models of personality	73
4.	Affectivity of the FGI and MGI test items for males and females respectively ranked by the 'q' values of the items	97
5.	Alpha coefficient reliabilities of the Eysenck scales for males and females	106
6.	Descriptive statistics for the heterosexual male, heterosexual female, and homosexual male	149
7.	Pooled within-groups correlation matrix of variables entered into the discriminant analysis	153
8.	The standardized canonical discriminant function: coefficients and percent of variance	154
9.	Pooled within-groups correlations between the discriminating variables and the canonical discriminant functions	154
10.	Canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means	155
11.	Classification of subject (using priors) into predicted group membership	157

TABLE		PAGE
12.	Comparisons of those variables entered into the discriminant analysis	158
13.	Descriptive statistics for the heterosexual males, heterosexual females, and homosexual males	161
14.	Pooled within-groups correlation matrix of variables entered into the discriminant analysis	164
15.	The standardized canonical discriminant functions: coefficients and percent of variance	165
16.	Pooled within-groups correlations between the discriminating variables and the canonical discriminant functions	165
17.	Canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means	166
18.	Classification of subjects (using priors) into predicted group membership	168
19.	Three functions that discriminate the three groups	170
20.	A posteriori comparisons of those variables entered into the discriminant analysis	172
21.	Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients	176
22.	Classification of Study 2 subjects from Study 1 discriminant functions without priors	177

TABLE		PAGE
23.	Descriptive statistics for the low, middle, and high Cass groups	179
24.	Pooled within-groups correlation matrix of variables entered into the analysis	182
25.	The standardized canonical discriminant functions: coefficients and percent of variance	183
26.	Pooled within-groups correlations between the discriminating variables and the canonical discriminant functions	183
27.	Canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means	185
28.	Classification of subjects (with priors) into predicted group membership	187
29.	A posteriori comparisons of Study 3	189

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	PAGE
1. Two other persons in social interaction: the sociological frame of reference	47
2. Another person and myself in social interaction: the sociological frame of reference	48
3. The sociological and psychological frames of reference: the expansion of the self into three 'persons'	52
4. Expansion of the self to show the object ('second-person') in relationship with the subject ('first-person')	57
5. The 'third-person' taking the role of other to self	61
6. Canonical discriminant functions of Table 10 plotted as the group means	155
7. Canonical discriminant functions of Table 17 plotted as the group means	166
8. Canonical discriminant functions of Table 27 plotted as the group means	185
9. Generalized graphical depiction of the significant differences found between the three homosexual groups in a posteriori comparisons	218
10. An experimental design using a systems model	295
11. An experimental design for Study 3 using a systems model	297

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

No man, for any considerable period, can wear one face to himself, and another to the multitude, without finally getting bewildered as to which may be the true.

Nathaniel Hawthorne -
"The Scarlet Letter".

Psychological research in the 1970's and 1980's has seen a proliferation of studies in sexual preferences. This research has usually used hypotheses of different social experience to account for the differences in adult sexual preferences. A weakness of this research has been the lack of differences associated with different sexual preferences. Nonetheless, theories of differential socialization that purport to account for homosexuality dominate this area of research despite a lack of empirical support. This may be an example of the observation that a theory, even a bad one, is more acceptable than no theory (Kuhn, 1962).

Homosexuality has been perplexing, even disturbing, and there is no satisfactory theory of sexual preferences (nor of their development during childhood and adolescence) other than the assumption that it expresses a different sexuality though this has little empirical support. Paralleling this perplexity in homosexual research is a confusion in the sex and gender literature, a body of literature which is itself crucial to the

study of homosexuality.

Deaux (1985) extensively reviewed the sex and gender research literature and concluded that the literature was marked by a confusion which is more than just semantics. She found that sex is generally held to imply a biological difference and gender a sociological difference between men and women, and that the "resolution of these controversies is probably not imminent" (1985, p. 51). Sex and gender are confused in the psychological literature. This literature is central to an understanding of homosexuality. It seems likely therefore that the perplexity of homosexuality and the confusion of sex and gender are related. One aim of this thesis will be to resolve some of this confusion and perplexity. (See also Appendix 4 which discusses further this and other related theoretical issues).

Confusion may be defined as a cognitive confounding of two frames of reference. If sex and gender have different referents then this distinction may bring about some resolution to the conceptual confusion of sex and gender. If 'male' (and 'female') has a different referent and meaning in sex and in gender research then the conceptual distinction of sex and gender may also resolve some of the (implicit) semantic confusion of the term 'male' (and 'female') which is presently used as though 'male' (and 'female') has only one meaning since sex and gender appear to be conceptually synonymous.

In chapter 2 there is a review of the sex literature generally and also that specifically relevant to homosexuality. Biological sex is not an issue in this thesis: in the empirical studies of this thesis homosexual males and heterosexual males are assumed to be the same biologically and these males are assumed to be biologically different from heterosexual females.

Sex researchers identify differences between the sexes. While some of these anatomical, hormonal and similar differences are necessarily related to biology, some differences between the sexes are attitudinal and ideational and reflect differences in socialization of males and females. These bio-social characteristics that distinguish men and women have their referent in biological sex.

In chapter 2 there is also a review of the gender literature generally and that specifically relevant to homosexuality. Gender researchers identify differences between groups of subjects with the same sex, for example, between homosexual biological males and heterosexual biological males. This gender identity in homosexual males that is different from the gender identity of heterosexual males is the same as the gender identity in heterosexual females. This difference in gender identity of homosexual and heterosexual males is not related to differences in biology of these two groups. (There does remain the possibility of biological differences between these two male

groups. The literature which addresses this possible biological difference is not reviewed in this psychological study). These gender characteristics that distinguish the homosexual male and heterosexual male, but not the homosexual male and heterosexual female, have their referent in the different subjective experiences of homosexual and heterosexual biological males.

The conventional interpretation of these gender differences (between homosexual and heterosexual males for example) is that they arise from socialization differences in the parent-child relationships (psychoanalytic theory) and peer-group relationships (social learning theory). This interpretation in which homosexuality is an outcome of (deviant) social experience has gained little empirical support. There has been a presumption in the literature (noted by Deaux, 1985) that even gender identity is sociological rather than psychological in origin. The theoretical frames of sex and gender research which have been used to study homosexuality have been sociological rather than psychological. Those theories which use a sociological framework to explain sexual preferences have not gathered empirical support.

There is in the sex and gender literature an absence of a theory of personality which uses a psychological framework and which also identifies personality structure. There is needed a psychological theoretical framework which will allow the

comparison of the personality structure of the homosexual and heterosexual at the psychological, as well as the sociological, level. This comparison could then identify that psychological structure in the personality which is related to the development of sexual preferences. Without a personality theory which uses a psychological frame of reference there cannot be a theory of sexual preferences if sexual preferences are psychological rather than sociological in origin.

A personality theory which uses a psychological framework will be presented in chapter 3. This theory predicts a relationship between gender identity and homosexuality and a null relationship between sexual identity and homosexuality. Support for this hypothesis will support the conclusion that the observed difference in gender identity of homosexual and heterosexual males is not due to differences in socialization. Rather, it will be concluded that these observed differences in behaviour, attitudes and ideas between homosexual and heterosexual males are due to a psychological difference that exists prior to these sociological differences. Homosexuality - related to gender identity developed by the age of three years - would then be predictive of the crossed-sex gender traits typical of a homosexual's childhood. This leads to the conclusion that homosexuality is psychologically established very early in life, probably by the age of three years, and that this explains later social 'deviancy' in childhood and the

homo-sexual activity of adolescence and adulthood. In this psychological theory homosexuality explains, rather than is explained by, social 'deviancy'.

The terms sex and gender have different referents in biological sex and subjective gender respectively, and sex and gender research utilize different sociological and psychological frameworks respectively. This distinction is not articulated in the literature. Making this distinction supported by a theoretical personality structure in a psychological frame of reference may help resolve some of the conceptual confusion in the sex and gender literature. When applied in empirical test it will address the first substantive issue of this thesis, that sexual preference is related to gender identity (a psychological construct with a psychological referent) and not to sexual identity (a sociological construct with a biological referent).

Besides this conceptual confusion of the terms sex and gender there is also a semantic confusion. The first substantive issue of this thesis addresses the conceptual, but not the semantic, confusion. A psychological theory of personality structure is presented in chapter 3 (Theory). This in itself does not identify the 'male' or 'female' identity of that proposed psychological gender identity hypothesized to be responsible for the expression of homo- or hetero-sexual preference. If 'male' (and 'female') has a different referent in sex and in gender,

then there is likely to be considerable semantic confusion in the use of the term 'male' (and 'female') which has a different meaning in different contexts. This would be especially so if those different contexts appeared to be synonymous and therefore 'male' (and 'female') appeared to have only the one referent (in biological sex for example) and therefore only the one meaning. This is presently the case in the sex and gender literature.

Besides the socialization assumption which has confounded the different sociological and psychological frames of sex and gender research, there is another assumption in the literature. This is the assumption that sexual identity and gender identity are normally congruent. This assumption asserts that the biological male is gender-male. If the sociological and psychological distinction is also made, which is not the case in the literature, then it follows from this assumption of congruency that he is also sociologically and psychologically masculine. The converse of gender femininity for biological females is similarly asserted. To test this assumption of sex-gender congruency a theory of sexual preferences is presented in chapter 3 which predicts the 'male' and 'female' identity of the sex and gender identities in homosexuals and heterosexuals. The identification of the homosexual male as gender-male or as gender-female is the second substantive issue of this thesis.

This study is important in a number of ways. It is anticipated that the clarification and testing of the sociological and psychological frames of reference support the proposition that sexual preference is related to gender identity and not to sexual identity. Furthermore it is anticipated that the gender identity of the homosexual male and heterosexual female is (gender) male and that of the heterosexual male is (gender) female. The assumption of socialization as an appropriate frame of reference in gender studies will be challenged and with it the postulate common in literary and community belief that homosexuality is a form of deviant sexual behaviour which is psychologically aberrant compared to heterosexuality. It is not the intention to arrive at an alternative theory of sexual preference development: the theoretical framework of personality structure and the proposed psychology of sexual preferences (both discussed in chapter 3) use a creativity-spontaneity theory of learning. The psychological frame of reference is consistent with this theory which, like gender identity, has the subject as its referent.

The psychological frame is used to identify two different ways of thinking about reality. From this study it can be concluded that a dimension of spontaneity (as a way of thinking) is theoretically and empirically related to anxiety and to psychosis. Perhaps different from much previous research of this sort is the clarification of a socio- and psycho-pathological

dimension and its demonstrated separateness to homosexuality.

The content of this dissertation is in seven chapters. In Chapter 2 relevant literature and research will be reviewed. The review will be highly selective since there is a vast literature on many aspects of homosexuality: the selection criteria have been the relevance and currency of the work. Some of the sources of the conceptual and semantic confusion in this literature are discussed in this chapter. Chapter 3 outlines the general theoretical framework for the present study and the rationale for each of the three empirical studies. Chapter 4 discusses the methodology of the study and the general hypotheses of each of the three studies. The chapter continues with a description of each of the three studies including subjects, measures used, procedure, and design. A listing of the specific a priori hypotheses for each of the studies is given in appendices. Chapter 5 presents the results statistically and substantively. Chapter 6 is a discussion of the results. The results are discussed generally and then specifically for each of the three studies. Chapter 7 summarizes and discusses the limitations of the dissertation. The implications of this research are discussed - for persons who are homosexual, for education and therapy, for science, and for further research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Sexual preferences, and homosexuality in particular, have remained an enigma. The origins of sexual preferences within the homosexual and heterosexual personality remain unclear in the psychological literature; this literature has often sought to understand sexual preferences using the concepts of sex and gender. This literature is itself characterized by confusion (Kessler & McKenna, 1978; Money, 1980; Freimuth & Horstein, 1982; Ross, 1983a; Deaux, 1985).

If homosexuality is to not remain an enigma it seems likely that the confusion in the sex and gender literature needs to be resolved. It is the purpose of this thesis to relate sexual preferences to a personality structure using the concepts of sex and gender. To achieve this aim it is necessary to address the confusion in the literature. At least some of this confusion will be shown to arise from the confusion between sex and gender as concepts and, furthermore, that some semantic confusion arises from the incorrect use of the labels 'male' and 'female'.

Some resolution of this confusion, and therefore some resolution of the confusion which surrounds sexual preferences and especially homosexuality, may be found in better defining

sex and gender. Sex and gender will be shown to have different referents in observable biological sex and in subjectively experienced gender respectively. Not making this distinction explicit is to confuse sex and gender conceptually. The literature does not make this distinction explicit.

The referent of 'male' (and of 'female') to biological sex is different from the referent of 'male' (and of 'female') to subjective gender. Having different referents, the term 'male' (and 'female') is used to mean different things and this is semantically confusing.

An object - the biological sex of the person's body - is the referent of sex. The subject - the subjectivity of the person - is the referent of gender. Resolution of the confusion is in this thesis therefore dependent on the clarification of 'subject' and 'object' and the operationalization of these concepts in empirical studies. In Chapter 3 the referents of 'subject' and 'object' will be used to distinguish between two frames of reference which are confounded in the literature by the use of sex and gender as synonyms. This clarification is presented in Chapter 3 (Theory) and operationalized in the empirical studies that follow that Chapter.

This thesis examines homosexuality in the adult male. Because of this no attempt is made to relate this literature or this

study to the development of sexual preferences or of homosexuality. One effect of this is that the concept of androgyny with its implications of a developmental process is not directly an issue in this thesis. (Some aspects of androgyny are discussed however in Appendix 4).

The concepts of sex and gender have been used to examine sexual preferences and homosexuality. Besides sexual preferences which are commonly used to define homosexuality and heterosexuality, there are three generally recognized aspects of sex and gender considered relevant: these are 'biological sex', 'social sex-role', and 'gender identity' (Shively & DeCecco, 1977).

The literature that relates biological sex and homosexuality is not directly reviewed in this thesis. The hypothesis of an organic functional difference between homosexuals and heterosexuals which could explain sexual preferences is not examined in the empirical studies which follow. Although biological sex may be ambiguous at birth (and even later) it will be assumed that 'male' or 'female' are differentiated in adult homosexuals and heterosexuals. This means that biological 'male' and 'female' are assumed to be self-evident in this study. Homosexual males and heterosexual males are compared, and homosexual males and heterosexual females are compared, using variables with sociological and psychological (but not biological) frames of reference.

Unless otherwise stated in this thesis the term 'sexual identity' will refer to 'male' and 'female' of biological sex. This use of 'sexual identity' to refer specifically to the masculinity and femininity of biological sex is different to some other ways that it is used in the literature. Shively and DeCecco (1977), for example, recognize four components of what they call 'sexual identity': biological sex, gender identity, social sex-role, and sexual orientation. The use of sexual identity in this thesis is specific to the 'male' and 'female' of biological sex.

'Social sex-role' and 'gender identity' are now discussed. There is a review of the gender literature in general and of those gender studies which are specifically related to male homosexuality. Then there is a review of the sex literature in general and of those sex studies which are specifically related to male homosexuality.

GENDER

Gender is a more generic term than sex: biological sex is a specific and objective example of gender where the masculine and feminine of biological sex are 'male' and 'female'. Gender identity is the individual's belief in being 'male' or 'female'. This use of 'male' and 'female' is related to the belief of the

subject. The referent for 'gender identity' is the subject, and 'male' and 'female' when used in the context of gender do not refer to the objective 'male' or 'female' of biological sex. 'Male' and 'female' in gender identity and sexual identity have different referents, that is, to the subject and to the object respectively.

Gender also has sex as a colloquial meaning. Where sex and gender are not differentiated, the meaning of 'male' and 'female' which have different conceptual referents must be semantically confused. Without this distinction of conceptual reference in subject and object, the term 'male' used in both gender and sex research will appear synonymous (and so on for the term 'female'). If 'male' (and also 'female') is used in these different conceptual ways without regard to their different meanings, semantic confusion is the likely outcome of this colloquial use of the terms gender and sex.

There is a commonly held community belief that normally the person who is biologically male (for example) is also masculine (implying sociologically and psychologically). There is in this belief an assumption that because a person is male-bodied (the object), 'he' (the subject) is also male. In other words there is in this belief the expectation that the heterosexual male - a biological male - is also gender-male. Similarly the heterosexual female - a biological female - is also thought to

be gender-female. This expectation is also present in the literature where the gender identity of the homosexual male is labelled 'female'. There is an implicit assumption of a sex and gender congruency characterizing heterosexuality and a sex and gender incongruency characterizing homosexuality. This belief that the heterosexual male is gender-male, and the homosexual male is gender-female like the heterosexual female, remains an untested assumption.

The literature review will show that the identification of the 'male' or 'female' of gender identity beyond the untested assumption is largely ignored theoretically and empirically in the literature generally and also in studies of homosexuality and heterosexuality. Since 'gender identity in male homosexuality' is central to this thesis, the theoretical construct of gender identity, the relationship of gender identity to homosexuality and heterosexuality, the congruent or incongruent nature of the relationship between gender identity and sexual identity in homosexuality and heterosexuality are substantive issues.

a) General review of gender studies

Green (1974) defined gender identity as "the individual's basic conviction of being male or female". Gender identity is generally regarded as having developed by about 3 years of age

and attempts to alter this identity after this age are likely to have undesirable psychological consequences, particularly confusion. It is generally agreed that gender identity is the first psychological component of identity to develop and that gender identity is "part of the individual's self-identification" (Shively & DeCecco, 1977, p. 42).

Freund, Nagler, Langevin, Zajac, and Steiner (1974) devised the 'Feminine Gender Identity' (FGI) scale for measuring 'feminine' gender identity in homosexual males. These authors note that various sex-role scales have been used in the past (citing, for example, Terman and Miles in 1936) to measure 'femininity' in homosexual males but that currently used scales (such as the BSRI, PAQ, and PDQ discussed below) do not include items that are indicative of 'femininity' in homosexual males.

Gender identity is identified as a crossed-sex gender nonconformity. Gender identity scales are constructed by contrasting subjects of the same biological sex on a number of attributes shown by clinical experience to be related to gender nonconformity for one's own sex (usually) during childhood. These attributes include a preference for playing with toys of the female, feminine dressing, preference for girls' games and activities, and other indicators that in female-sexed children are taken as indicators of a gender identity congruent with biological sex. Gender identity scales for male-sexed subjects

measure attributes which are not usually associated with biological males but which are associated with biological females (and parallel scales for biological females).

The FGI and other gender identity scales use items that differentiate biological males from biological males (and not biological males from biological females as in the social sex-roles scales). The FGI scale is validated by its ability to differentiate heterosexual biological males from homosexual biological males. Gender identity scale construction identifies objectively observable behaviour (which may include affective and cognitive components) of biological males that distinguishes homosexual and heterosexual males. This behaviour which is independent of sexual identity since they are all biological males is labelled as 'gender identity' and the presence of this nonconforming behaviour infers that the subject has a gender identity that is different from the usual (heterosexual) biological male.

Freund et al. (1974) and Freund, Langevin, Satterberg, and Steiner (1977) used transsexual males rather than heterosexual females (as in social sex-role construction) as the reference group to construct the FGI scale (and its 1977 revised version). The higher a subject scores on this scale, the more that subject is described as having a 'feminine' gender identity, that is, a gender nonconformity or crossed-sex gender identity compared

with biological male norms. FGI is therefore the "degree of adoption of feminine gender identity ... measured as a departure from the usual male pattern toward the pattern typical of transsexual males" (1974, p. 250). FGI appears to measure a "strong single factor which is reliable and displays a substantial discriminant validity" (1974, p. 258). The theoretical significance and validity of this 'femininity' associated with males is not explained by Freund et al. (1974, 1977) though they regard gender identity as closely related to the "sets of traits measured by the masculinity-femininity tests" (1977, p. 508), that is, to social sex-roles.

This gender-difference is variously labelled: as "gender nonconformity" (Bell, Weinberg, & Hammersmith, 1981), as "crossed-sex gender identity", and as "feminine gender identity (FGI) in males" (Freund et al., 1974; Freund, Langevin, Satterberg, & Steiner, 1977). Harry (1983) labels this "cross-gender role preference". Bell et al. (1981) describe this same non-typical behaviour of homosexual males as gender nonconformity which while agreeing with the departure from the male norm does not label the difference as 'feminine'.

Measures of this gender nonconformity do not include items related to sexual preference. Homosexual and heterosexual preferences (sexual fantasies and acts) are not included in gender identity measures. The construct of gender identity

measured by these scales does not therefore also measure sexual preference. Gender identity is thus operationally defined by these measures separately from homosexuality and heterosexuality. The relationship between gender identity and homo- and hetero-sexuality is discussed in the next section which reviews gender identity in sexual preference studies.

In summary, gender identity scales differentiate gender conforming biological males from gender non-conforming biological males (and similarly for biological females). Gender identity is measured as a degree of preference of a subject with a biological sex for the attributes and behaviours of the other biological sex. The gender identity of homosexual biological males is the same as the gender identity of (heterosexual) biological females. This gender identity in homosexual males is usually labelled as 'feminine'.

There is an absence of theory in the literature that relates sexual preferences and gender identity. There is however some empirical support for the observation that sexual preferences and gender identity are related. In chapter 3 a theory is presented that defines gender identity (as the gender of the subject and not of the object, that is, not biological sex) and predicts a relationship between gender identity and sexual preferences.

b) Review of gender studies specific to homosexuality

The FGI (Feminine Gender Identity) scale was originally published in 1974 and was revised and lengthened before re-publication in 1977 to extend Part A of the scale that differentiates between heterosexual and homosexual males. The new scale was validated on two samples of subjects and it differentiated between the two groups in both samples.

The FGI scale has not been used extensively: the meaning of 'femininity' that distinguishes between male groups has been unclear. One study has used it to investigate paedophilia (Freund, Scher, Chan, & Ben-Aron, 1982) and found it was related to male homosexuality but not to paedophilia. Freund et al. concluded that FGI "should be studied in the context of homosexuality, rather than in that of pedophilia" (1982, p. 112).

Hooberman (1979) compared homosexual (n=37) and heterosexual (n=50) male college students on measures of social sex-role, self-esteem and FGI. He hypothesized that the FGI scores of homosexuals would be higher on average than those of heterosexuals. This hypothesis was confirmed. This is consistent with the Freund et al. studies previously described.

Whitam (1980) investigated the pre-homosexual child in three

different societies: the USA, Guatemala and Brazil. He investigated several indicators of male homosexuality that often emerge in childhood: "interest in toys of the opposite sex, cross-dressing, preference for girls' games and activities, preference for the company of women, being regarded as a sissy, and preference for boys in childhood sex play" (1980, p. 87). He concluded that these gender nonconforming behaviours did occur in pre-homosexual boys in these three societies and at about the same rate. Whitam concluded:

cross-gender behavior on the part of children does not appear to be superficially related to sexual orientation but appears to be integrally connected with the emergence of sexual orientation in childhood and its persistence in later life (1980, p. 88).

Harry (1983) investigated 'defeminization' in adult homosexual males. He used a questionnaire that included masculinity and femininity (sex-role) scales and also cross-gender scales for childhood and adulthood adapted from Whitam (1977) and from Freund et al. (1977). He found that "a large majority of gay men have a feminine gender role preference during childhood" (1983, p. 17). Some two thirds of those adults who were cross-gendered as children became defeminized by adulthood so that in adulthood they were virtually indistinguishable from conventional males. Thus, while most gay men apart from their homosexuality appear gender-conventional in adulthood, many have had an unconventional childhood.

Harry (1983) concluded that this 'defeminization' is imposed. Nonconforming males report being teased and this pressure to conform to the masculine norms appears to come from parents and peers. There is no direct theory to explain the 'defeminization' of the adult homosexual male.

By 1975 homosexuality research had proved so infertile that Bell (1975) recommended a fresh start unencumbered by the presuppositions that supposedly accounted for homosexuality. Subsequently, Bell, Weinburg and Hammersmith (1981) used a large sample of homosexuals (N=979) and heterosexuals (N=477) to explore the development of sexual preference - that is homosexuality and heterosexuality - in men and women. Their findings rejected many of the accepted notions about the development of homosexual sexual preference. Some of their findings are:

(i) Gender nonconformity is a powerful predictor of later homosexuality. Gender nonconformity is composed of three variables. These variables are "how much they disliked typical boys' activities, how much they enjoyed typical girls' activities" and "how 'masculine' or 'feminine' the respondents said they had been while they were growing up" (Bell et al., 1981, p76). Homosexuals reported more gender nonconformity during childhood, adolescence, and adulthood.

(ii) Social isolation does not appear to be a factor in the development of a homosexual preference. Homosexuality is not the result of a lack of development of social skills. Some gender nonconformity does apparently result in less peer involvement and acceptance but social isolation is not regarded as causing homosexuality.

(iii) Sexual preference seems to be established at least by adolescence though individuals may not be sexually active. Adult homosexuality appears to be a continuation of homosexual feelings and behaviours of childhood and adolescence that cannot be regarded as just a passing fancy. These childhood experiences seem part of the development of sexual preference - whether homosexual or heterosexual.

(iv) The homosexuals in the study were experienced in heterosexual behaviour in childhood and adolescence but found this ungratifying. This disinterest supports a conclusion that homosexual behaviour and interest is rewarding in itself and not just a reaction (fear of heterosexuality) as some have argued.

In this study, which included many facets of sexual preference, the authors concluded that a childhood gender nonconformity is common among adult subjects with a homosexual preference. This factor was identified from subjects' histories as the factor most strongly indicative of emergent

homosexuality. Adult homosexual preference was strongly related to childhood gender nonconformity while adult heterosexual preference was strongly related to childhood gender conformity.

SEX

A person is usually assigned a sex at birth by reason of their biology. This sexual identity as a male or female is usually obvious at birth. This organic functional distinction of biological sex is not at issue here. This objective expression of the male and female identities of biological sex is however the referent for much social behaviour. This class of social behaviours - bio-sociality (such as the social sex-roles) - refers to attributes that are differentially and culturally associated with biological males or with biological females.

a) General review of social sex-role studies

Social sex-role refers to characteristics differentially associated with males and females. Shively and DeCecco describe the social sex-role as

largely tied to characteristics of appearance, behavior, and personality. Based on cultural norms, individuals are 'expected' to behave in socially stereotypical ways that are associated with their biological sex. That is, males are expected to act in ways that will be seen as masculine and females in ways that will be seen as feminine. Behaviors that deviate from these stereotypes are viewed as inappropriate (1977, p.

43).

A number of social sex-role scales have been devised. By contrasting the responses of the different sexes on a number of items, items which are differentially endorsed by males and females are identified. Those items measuring personality and behavioural traits, and which show reliable differences between the sexes, are used to construct the sex-role scales of these questionnaires. The masculinity scales measure traits more commonly associated with males and not commonly associated with females. Similarly the femininity scales measure traits more commonly associated with females and not commonly associated with males. Those traits which are equally typical of biological males and females may be used to form social desirability scales. Groups of males and females tested with these social desirability scales should not differ from each other unless the groups are in some way unrepresentative of cultural norms. Groups of males and females tested with the masculinity and femininity scales should differ from each other unless the groups are in some way unrepresentative of cultural norms. Three of the more commonly used sex role scales are now described.

The Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI; Bem, 1974) consists of a masculinity and a femininity scale. The femininity scale is composed of 20 items measuring a personality trait rated as more desirable for women than for men. Conversely, the masculinity

scale is composed of 20 items measuring a personality trait rated as more desirable for men than for women. Two scores are reported for each subject on this inventory: a femininity and a masculinity score. These two scores may be used to classify subjects into one of four groups: androgynous - high on both scales, undifferentiated - low on both scales, sex-typed - high only on same-sex scale, and cross-sexed - high only on other-sex scale.

Like the BSRI, the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ; Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1975) also consists of items expressing socially desirable traits. A femininity and a masculinity score are reported for each subject on this questionnaire. Using these scores, subjects can again be classified into one of four groups: androgynous, undifferentiated, sex-typed, or cross-sexed.

Antill, Cunningham, Russell and Thompson (1981) devised an Australian social sex-role scale. There are six scores for each subject on the Personal Description Questionnaire (PDQ): masculine positive and negative, feminine positive and negative, and social desirability positive and negative. To construct the PDQ both negative and positive evaluations of typical characteristics of males and females were rated to identify the masculine and feminine items. Some items were evaluated negatively or positively but did not distinguish males and

females: these items were used to devise social desirability scales. This questionnaire, which is used in this study, is fully described in chapter 4.

According to Anastasi the "validity of a test concerns what the test measures and how well it does so" (1982, p. 131). The social sex-role scales are validated by their ability to differentiate male and female groups - the 'how well' of validation. While these scales are labelled 'masculine' and 'feminine' there is a lack of external validation to show 'what' these scales measure. The social sex-role scale is substantially unrelated to other classes of attributes and behaviours. Deaux concluded that

less convincing evidence has been offered to support the assumption that these trait measures are substantially related to other classes of gender-related attributes and behaviors associated with the broader concepts of masculinity and femininity (1985, p. 59).

Despite the general unrelatedness of the social sex-role scales to other attributes and behaviours some studies have supported the external validity of these scales. Bem and Lenny (1976), for example, found that sex-appropriate activities were preferred by sex-typed individuals even when barriers to cross-sexed activity had been removed. Also supporting the social sex-role construct of different cultural norms and expectations for male and females, Costrich, Feinstein, Kidder, and Pascale (1975) found that popularity and psychiatric

adjustment were threatened when an individual acts counter to a sex-role stereotype. Ross (1983b) found a hypothesized relationship between homosexual sex-role rigidity and a higher proportion of sex-typed individuals in a cross-cultural study and postulates that sex-role (which he labels gender-role) "has a strong societal component" (p. 287).

The social sex-role scales measure an outcome of social learning experience. These measures are generally agreed to be "socio-cultural" (Hooberman, 1979). The masculine and feminine traits of the social sex-role scales have their origins in enculturation, a process of learning the cultural norms and expectations associated with being male-sexed or female-sexed in a particular society.

The meaning of these masculine and feminine social sex-role terms is not clear: there is a lack of external validation of these scales. According to Bakan (1966) 'agency' is associated with masculinity and 'communion' is associated with femininity. According to Deaux (1985) a more masculine person is more 'dominant' and 'self-assertive' and a more feminine person is more 'nurturant' and 'interpersonally warm'.

b) Social sex-role studies specific to homosexuality

Heilbrun and Thompson (1977) compared homosexual and

heterosexual males, homosexual and heterosexual females, and college students on five measures. These measures were: a Masculinity - Femininity Scale derived from the ACL, a Heterosexuality Scale, an Identification Scale, a Parent Sex-Role Model Score, and Interpersonal Role Consistency. Chi-square comparisons between the homosexual females and heterosexual females showed significant differences in four of the measures. Compared to the heterosexual women in the study, the lesbians showed more masculine and lower feminine and undifferentiated sex-roles. Between the homosexual and heterosexual men however there were no significant differences on these measures.

Bernard and Epstein (1978) compared matched homosexual and heterosexual males on the BSRI. Half of each of the pairs were paid participants and the other half were volunteers. Overall the homosexual sample was androgynous and this applied to both the paid and volunteer subsamples. The heterosexual sample was not androgynous and was highly masculine sex-typed and this applied to both the paid and volunteer subsamples.

Hooberman (1979) compared social sex-role (BSRI), 'feminine' gender identity (FGI) and self-esteem in homosexual and heterosexual paid volunteer male students. Relatively more homosexuals were in the feminine and androgynous categories and more of the heterosexuals were in the masculine category. A

significant positive correlation was found between FGI and femininity for the heterosexual students but not for the homosexual students. The groups did not differ overall on the measure of self-esteem. Significant correlations were found for both groups between self-esteem and masculinity but not between self-esteem and femininity. FGI differences were found between the homosexuals and heterosexuals. Overall sexual preference was not predictive of sex-role to any great extent though it was of FGI.

Carlson and Baxter (1984) investigated social sex-role (BSRI), self-esteem (Self-Esteem Scale) and depression (Zung's Self-Rating Depression Scale) in Irish homosexuals and heterosexuals. The results showed homosexuals were more androgynous and did not differ from the heterosexuals in depression or self-esteem. Sex-role category was associated with these psychological health measures though sexual preference was not. Sex-role is more predictive of psychological health than is sexual preference.

Boyden, Carroll and Maier (1984) investigated sexual attraction in homosexual partner preferences using the BSRI. The results suggest that partner preference does not reflect any fundamental characteristic of sex-role. It seems that homosexual and heterosexual attraction are fundamentally similar. Because heterosexual male controls were not used this study does not

allow a comparison of homosexual - heterosexual levels of masculinity and femininity.

Storms (1980) reviewed the literature related to sex-roles and concluded that, as an area of research, it has provided little as an explanatory device of homosexuality. He measured social sex-role using the PAQ in response to a finding by Ward (cited by Storms) that a sample of homosexual men and women showed sex-role inversion compared to college students. Storms found no significant differences on the three subscales of the PAQ between the homosexuals, bisexuals, and heterosexuals. He says in examining his data that "very weak support could be claimed for the sex role hypothesis, but only with the dubious suspension of conventional statistical safeguards" (1980, p. 787).

Social sex-role research has failed to demonstrate any major reliable differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals. Social sex-role measures do not reliably differentiate homosexuals and heterosexuals: the homosexual male and heterosexual male are both typically masculine and both are typically different to the feminine heterosexual female. Of the five studies which compare homosexual and heterosexual males, three studies show homosexual males are more androgynous than heterosexuals. One of these studies shows that homosexual males may be more 'feminine'. The number of studies in the literature

using the sex-role methodology to investigate homosexuality is small. Overall, the social sex-role scales differentiate the sexes and not groups that differ in sexual preferences.

The rationale in the literature for testing homosexuals using social sex-role scales is poorly articulated. Current sex-role scales do not contain items that discriminate between homosexual males and heterosexual males (Freund, Nagler, Langevin, Zajac, & Steiner, 1974). Implicit in these studies is that in some way the homosexual male is sexually different - somehow more 'feminine' and/or less 'masculine' - and therefore the homosexual male should in some way be similar to the heterosexual female and different from the heterosexual male. That the homosexual male is in some way more feminine and less masculine - a sexual invert - is a popular belief. Perhaps the homosexual is expected to deviate from the social sex-role norms because he is often regarded as deviant and "behaviors that deviate from these stereotypes are viewed as inappropriate" (Shively & DeCecco, 1977, p. 43).

There is little empirical support for a hypothesis that states that the homosexual male is in some way 'sexually feminine' when this is measured by the social sex-role scale which has its referent in biological sex. There is, however, in the gender literature reviewed above quite substantial empirical support for the homosexual male being in some way 'gender

feminine'.

The heterosexual male typically regards himself, and is typically regarded by others, as being male. The sex and gender literature supports the heterosexual male being biologically male, gender male, and socially masculine. Similarly, female heterosexuals are typically female, that is, biologically female, gender female, and socially feminine. The homosexual male typically regards himself as male. The sex and gender literature supports the homosexual male being biologically male and socially masculine. The homosexual male's belief in being male is, however, at variance with a small but impressive body of empirical gender research showing the homosexual male being gender-different to the heterosexual male.

Discussion of Gender and Sex Research

In a recent 'Annual Review of Psychology' Deaux (1985) extensively reviewed the psychological literature related to sex and gender in a paper called 'Sex and Gender'. Deaux concluded from this extensive review that:

in general, more consistent use of terms would clarify many of the discussions in this area. The confusion, however, is not merely an issue of semantics. Frequently underlying the debate on the use of sex versus gender, for example, are assumptions about the determinants of differences between men and women, whereby sex often invokes biological causes while gender invokes explanations based on socialization (1985, p.

51).

Historically the assumed 'determinants of differences between men and women' have been sex and gender. Historically the assumed determinants of differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals have been sex, and more recently, gender. There are, however, no well established sex differences between homosexual and heterosexual males that also account for sexual preference differences. The homosexual male appears to be biologically male and socio-culturally masculine like the heterosexual male. Homosexual and heterosexual males do differ in their subjective experience and this difference in gender identity has been found to be associated with differences in adult sexual preferences.

Deaux (1985) draws attention to the biological and socializational assumptions that appear to underlie the assumed determinants of sex and gender differences and to the confusion in the literature that is 'not merely an issue of semantics'. It is this confusion, both conceptual and semantic, which is now addressed and the purpose of this discussion is to resolve, at least partially, this confusion and thereby to lead to an understanding of homosexuality.

a) Conceptual confusion of sex and gender

If sex and gender had the same referent then there would be no sensible distinction between them and conceptually they would be synonyms. It would also follow that 'male' (and also 'female') would have the same meaning in the sex and gender literature referring to the 'male' (and 'female') of biological sex. In this literature where there is no explicit conceptual distinction between sex and gender and where the biological male is necessarily male gendered, the proposition of a biological male who is female gendered must be confusing as this proposition contradicts the implicit rationale of biological and gender identity congruency (i.e., male bodied therefore male gender identity). This implicit rationale is however contradicted by empirical studies which support the proposition that the homosexual biological male is also gender-female.

A person who is both 'male' (sexed) and 'female' (gendered) is contrary to the assumption of sexual and gender identity congruency, and furthermore, contrary to a conceptual equivalence of sex and gender and a rationale implicit in the literature which equates 'male-sex' and 'male-gender' (and similarly 'female') in the same referent of biological sex. This proposition of homosexual 'femininity', when using this implicit rationale of sexual and gender congruency, must be confusing since there is no way of thinking about 'female' (or 'male')

that is separate to 'female' (and 'male') of biological sex. With this rationale it is not possible to conceptualize a biological male who is also gender-female.

The male and female of sex research - both biological research and social sex-role research - use the objectively observable male and female identities of biological sex, that is, sexual identity is their referent. The male and female of gender research uses the subjectively experienced gender identity as their referent, an experience which has an objectively observable expression in gender nonconformity. 'Male' (and 'female') has two different referents in sexual identity and in gender identity. With this distinction it is possible to conceptualize a biological male who is also female gendered but this rationale is poorly developed in the sex and gender literature. A theory is described in Chapter 3 which uses a psychological frame of reference and which identifies these two rationales as different ways of thinking.

Subjective is an adjective used to qualify nouns whose referent arises from one's own mind, and which do not correspond to, nor are caused by, external reality. The referent of male (or female) of gender identity is the mind of the subject. It can be inferred from gender identity studies that the homosexual and heterosexual male have different psychological experiences of themselves related to being gender-male or gender-female. The

reference for this male and female is in the mind of the subject and it may or may not correspond to the biological male and female of external reality.

Gender has usually invoked socializational explanations (Deaux, 1985). Since the socialization process has its origins in the external reality of social experience and does not arise primarily in the subject's own mind, the assumption of socialization as a causative agent in gender identity formation is probably erroneous. A theory will be proposed in Chapter 3 that describes an internal reality. This theory will use a psychological rather than a biological or sociological frame of reference.

Objective is an adjective used to qualify nouns whose reference relates to objects which exist independently of the mind. The masculine and feminine social sex-roles have their origin in socialization and their referent is in the objectively observable male and female identities of biological sex.

The male (and female) of sex and gender research has different referents and therefore the concept of male (and female) in the context of sex is different to the concept of male (and female) in the context of gender. The concept of male (and of female) has two different meanings since male has two different referents. It is not the purpose of this thesis to

elaborate the different meanings of male (or of female) in the sex and gender contexts. The purpose of this discussion is to show that sex and gender are conceptually distinct: male (and female) has a different meaning when used in the different contexts of sex and gender.

This conceptual distinction has not been made in the psychological literature. If this distinction is not made then the potential for semantic confusion is high when a term which appears to have only the one meaning has two different meanings. This has been the case in the psychological literature when male (and female) appears to refer to the biological meaning of male and not also to a psychological meaning of male (and of female). It is this semantic confusion in the literature that is now discussed.

b) Semantic confusion of sex and gender

The referent for gender identity is in the subjectivity or mind of the subject. According to gender research literature gender identity and sexual identity are generally congruent, that is for example, male-sexed and male-gendered. This congruent relationship between sex and gender is not always so. The gender research reviewed above shows that the homosexual male has a gender identity different to that of the heterosexual male. The relationship between sex and gender is not always

congruent as (some) transsexuality demonstrates. Shively and DeCecco found that gender identity is "not entirely contingent upon the individual's biological sex. Occasionally boys develop the conviction of being female and girls of being male" (1977, p. 41).

Because the term male (and female) has different referents the observation that a person is biologically male does not imply that this person is gender-male (and similarly for females). There is, however, an assumption in the literature that the biological male is also normally male gendered. This assumption is untested and this has had two effects. One effect is the labelling of the homosexual male as gender-female. Another effect is that the rationale implied by the making of this assumption has remained unchallenged in the literature. This rationale which has the referent for 'male' (and 'female') only in biological sex and not also in the mind of the subject has been discussed above.

It is assumed that the heterosexual male is biologically male and gender-male, that is, there is a congruency of biological sex and gender identity in male heterosexuality (and a similar congruency in female heterosexuality). The homosexual male is biologically male (and socially male) like the heterosexual male. The homosexual male is however distinguished by a 'gender nonconformity' which is strongly related to homosexuality.

Because this 'gender nonconformity' relates to behaviours typical of biological females this gender identity is labelled 'feminine' by Freund et al (1974, 1977). The datum for defining male and female is biological sex and the labelling of gender identity as male or female follows on from the assumption that heterosexuality is characterized by sex and gender congruency and homosexuality by sex and gender incongruency. There is no empirical evidence to support this assumption: the rationale that only uses biological sex as the referent for 'male' (and 'female') remains untested.

There are two points to be considered:

(i) A theory of a 'male' (and a 'female') identity that does not have its referent in biological sex would be contrary to the implicit rationale of the sex and gender literature. Empirical support for this theory which has the subject as its referent would indicate considerable semantic confusion in the literature of the sex and gender concepts of 'male' (and of 'female') and probably a similar confusion in society generally.

(ii) The referent for 'male' (and 'female') in social sex-roles is male (and female) biological sex. Gender identity and the gender differences of 'male' and 'female' reviewed in the literature are regarded as being due to socialization (Deaux, 1985). The frame of reference for social sex-roles and for gender identity research has been sociological, and the meaning

of 'male' (and 'female') in both areas of research comes from its implicit referent to 'male' (and 'female') of biological sex which is theoretically incorrect in gender identity. This implicit referent to biological sex comes from the sociological frame of reference used to interpret male and female gender sociologically instead of psychologically. There is an absence of theory in this literature which uses a psychological frame of reference and where the referent for 'male' (and 'female') is not biological but psychological, that is, in the mind of the subject. Empirical support for this psychological theory which has the subject as the referent would support the rationale of this theory and not support the rationale implicit in the literature.

While there is some empirical support that relates sexual preference to gender identity in the literature reviewed, there is an absence of a psychological theory that integrates sexual preferences and gender identity. Traditional theories of homosexuality - social learning theory and psychoanalytic theory - have emphasized socialization as explaining adult homosexuality but have not received substantial empirical support.

Conclusions

There are two dependent variables commonly used:

(a) social sex-role (and similar bio-social variables with their referent in biological sex),
and (b) gender (male and female gender identity).

There are two independent variables commonly used:

(a) biological sex,
and (b) sexual preference
(homosexuality and heterosexuality).

There is an absence of empirical relationship between sexual preference and social sex-role (and other bio-social variables). There is an empirical relationship between sexual preference and gender identity but theoretical support for this observation has not been forthcoming.

The meaning of 'male' (and of 'female') from social sex-role research and the meaning of 'male' (and of 'female') from gender identity research are semantically different since the concepts of sex and gender are conceptually different. The relationship in homosexuality and heterosexuality between the 'male' of sex and the 'male' of gender (and similarly for 'female') remains untested in the sex and gender literature. The assumption that, for example, the heterosexual male is gender-male remains an untested 'rule of thumb'. This is perhaps not surprising since the sex and gender literature is oriented in a sociological frame of reference. Sexual preferences may be oriented in a

psychological frame of reference.

Homosexuality has often been construed as a deviant sexual identity. This review of social sex-role literature thus contradicts this commonly held belief: homosexual and heterosexual males are generally masculine compared to heterosexual females who are characteristically feminine. There is some support for the proposition that the homosexual male is 'sexually feminine' since some three of five social sex-role studies show him to be more androgynous and one that he is more feminine. There is however no empirical support for a relationship between this 'femininity' and homosexuality. The meaning of this 'femininity' is probably communion or inter-personal warmth: there is no obvious reason why this characteristic should be theoretically explanatory of male homosexuality and female heterosexuality.

The literature does show that homosexuality is related to a nonconforming, or 'deviant', gender identity. Since 'sexuality' is oriented in the objectivity of biological sex and gender identity is oriented in the subjectivity of the mind, this thesis examines homosexuality from the different perspectives of subjectivity and objectivity. To meet this aim it is necessary that the following conditions be met.

First, that subject and object be defined and in such a way

that the two frames of reference are clearly identified.

Second, that the two frames of reference be integrated by some unifying theory that shows the relation of subject and object in some meaningful way that is not just semantic.

And third, that these definitions and frames of reference be operationalized and tested empirically with homosexual males (and heterosexual comparisons).

CHAPTER 3

THEORY

Homosexuality has remained an enigma. Perhaps some of this enigma may be resolved by untangling the confusion that surrounds homosexuality. This confusion appears to arise from an assumption in the gender literature of a sociological explanation of homosexuality and an absence of a psychological frame of reference. The dialectic of 'I' and 'Me' as an expression of the self in subjectivity and objectivity may be useful to the resolution of the confusion where 'male' (and 'female') has one referent in an object (the male of biological sex) and another referent in the subject (the male of gender identity).

The theory presented will be that personality, and therefore the homosexual male personality, is both subject and object and that he is oriented in both the sociological and the psychological frames of reference. The use of an explicit psychological frame of reference is a departure from the traditional sociologically oriented rationale of the sex and gender literature reviewed in Chapter 2. The 'I' and the 'Me' refers to myself as a subject and as an object respectively. There is in this dialectic a person who is both subject and object and yet a person who remains only the one person.

Confusion has arisen in the sex and gender literature when

sex and gender are regarded as synonyms, for example, when sexual identity and gender identity are supposed to be identical (male-sexed therefore male-gendered, and female-sexed therefore female-gendered) but the homosexual male appears to be a deviant (male-sexed but female-gendered). Clearly, if sex and gender are synonyms and there is no meaningful distinction between sex and gender (and therefore between sexual identity and gender identity) then homosexuality must remain enigmatic since the homosexual appears to be a confound of male (biologically and socially) and female (psychologically). Some of this confusion may be resolved, firstly, by developing a theory that differentiates the sociological and psychological frames of reference with their different referents and concepts of 'male' (and 'female'), and secondly, by testing that theory empirically.

Mead, according to Morris's introduction to the book "Mind, self, and society", sees man as a "role-taking animal" (Mead, 1934, p. xxi) where roletaking is 'taking the attitude of other to self'. Mead uses role as a set of internalized expectations. Mead sees the individual as taking an 'impersonal' 'non-affective' attitude toward self. He maintains that it is from this attitude that the 'I' and 'me' arises. He says that:

the 'I' reacts to the self which arises through the taking of the attitudes of others. Through taking those attitudes we have introduced the

and we react to it as an 'I' (Mead, 1934, p. 174).

Mead regards the 'me' as 'conventional' and 'adjusted' and the person with 'I' development as the person with 'personality'. For Mead the 'I' and the 'me' are 'two constantly appearing phases' in the self.

A relationship between two different people is an inter-personal relationship, for example, the enactment of sexual preference in a homo- or hetero-sexual relationship. It is the inter-personal relationship that is described in the sociological frame of reference. This sociological frame of reference is shown in the following diagram with two other persons in an inter-personal relation. The self is shown as the uninvolved observer, that is, the observer who does not participate. The self (e.g., myself) is here in a third-person attitude in relation to the two participants.




Figure 1.

Two other persons in social interaction: the sociological frame of reference.

Here the observer of this interaction is outside the field of the two participants: the observer does not interact with the participants. The observer is here taking a non-involved detached or impersonal third-person attitude (defined herein as meaning a spatial position as a point of view) towards the participants.

There is also the situation when one of the participants in the interaction is myself: a social interaction between myself and some other person. This is shown in the following figure.




Figure 2.

Another person and myself in social interaction: the sociological frame of reference.

Figure 2 shows an 'I-you' relationship between myself and some other person. This implies that 'I' am the subject and the other person is the object 'you'. Figure 2 also shows what may be described as a 'me-you' relationship between myself and some other person. This implies that both 'me' and the other person 'you' are objects. When two people are in interaction and one of those persons is myself, there is implied in the relationships of 'I-you' and 'me-you' a person (myself) who is both subject and object and yet a person who remains only the one person.

Whereas in Figure 1 the observer (myself) is outside the field of interaction, in Figure 2 the observer (myself) is inside the field as a participant-observer. The observer is here participating, that is, taking an involved attitude in the interaction with 'the two constantly appearing phases' (Mead, 1934) in myself of the subject 'I' and object 'Me'.

In these situations the frame of reference is sociological, that is as previously defined, the frame of reference is the inter-personal relationships of the external world between two separate persons. In the sociological frame of reference a person may take the subjective (1st person) and objective (2nd person) attitude of participant-observer in relation to some other person in involved interaction (Figure 2), and they may also take the objective (3rd person) attitude of detached observer towards others (Figure 1).

Mead asks this question: "How can an individual get outside himself in such a way as to become an object to himself?" (1934, p. 138). Mead recognized this as an essential psychological problem. He says:

The apparatus of reason would not be complete unless it swept itself into its own analysis of the field of experience; or unless the individual brought himself into the same experiential field as that of other individual selves in relation to whom he acts in any given social situation (1934, p. 138).

Mead's answer to his question is by 'taking the role of other to self'. The 'role of other' implies a social frame of reference whereas taking this role 'to self' implies a psychological frame of reference. Mead's theory describes a confound of both the sociological and psychological frames of reference.

A Theory of Persons-grammar: a psychological frame of reference

Whereas the sociological frame of reference has its referent in the inter-personal relationships of social activities, the psychological frame of reference has its referent in the intra-personal relationships within the individual. More specifically, these psychological relationships have their referent in the subjectivity of the self, that is, in the 'I' of the 'I-I', 'I-you', and 'I-he' (-she, -it) relationships of the first-, second-, and third-persons respectively. The dialectic

of 'I' and 'Me' (and the implied third-person self of Mead's theory), when examined from an inner individual perspective, establishes a psychological frame of reference with the subjective 'I' as its referent. It is this psychological frame of reference using the first-, second-, and third-persons of grammar, which is now discussed. The examination of homosexuality by the application of this psychological theoretical frame in empirical studies is then discussed in the 'Rationale' which follows the theory of persons-grammar and a psychology of sexual preferences.

The persons-grammar is an organization of 'persons' within the functioning whole or self (traditionally called a trinity). These 'persons' are structural principles, that is, meta-roles, providing organization to the personality through the functions that they perform. The function of the 'person' is shown by the relationships between the 'persons' within the personality. These functions and relationships are summarized in the following table. The term 'role' can refer to both the notion of 'function' and to the notion of 'expectation'. Herein 'role' is used in the functional sense which includes the enactment of social expectation (social role) as a functional form.

Table 1.

Meta-roles and meta-role relations of the psychological frame.

PERSON (META-ROLE)	META-ROLE RELATION	META-ROLE IN RELATION TO SELF ('I-')
1st	I - I	subject
2nd	I - you	object
3rd	I - he	object

(also -she, -it)

To avoid confusion the psychological meta-roles will be identified as 'persons' (not persons). This table is now shown in diagrammatic form to emphasize the distinction between the sociological and psychological frames of reference. The purpose of Figure 3 which follows is to identify and separate a psychological frame of reference implied but not explicit in Figures 1 and 2.




Figure 3.

The sociological and psychological frames of reference: the expansion of the self into the three 'persons'.

Each of these 'persons' and their relations is now discussed. Though each is discussed in order from first to third, this ordering should not be construed as implying any developmental sequence. This ordering is only a means to an end, that is, to eventually describe a personality structure of the adult which uses a psychological frame of reference and whose referent is in the subjective 'I'. As these 'persons' all have their referent in one's self they all share only the one sexual identity.

The 'first-person' in this psychological frame of reference is the subject in relation to the self. The 'I' is both self and subject and this is described by the 'I-I' relationship of the 'first-person' and the self. In Figure 3 the self is the subject in intra-personal relations because of the identity of self and subject in the 'I-I' relationship. In Figure 1, however, taking the uninvolved attitude the self takes the third-person attitude of the object: the self is an object to the other. The self takes two forms as subject and object, and this equivalence of contraries (subject and object appearing to be different and therefore contrary) may eventually explain some of the confusion that arises in the literature from the confusion of two frames of reference which have different referents in the subject and in the object.

It is the 'I' as subject - the meta-role of 'first-person' in

a psychological framework - that is now discussed, and not the self as an object in a sociological framework (as shown for example in Figure 1). This distinction between the sociological and psychological frames of reference is important to the theoretical development of this thesis.

It is axiomatic of this theory that the 'first-person' is the locus of creativity. The function of the subject is role-creating and implicit in each role is a construct.

I have a biological father who exists separately to me in a social context as a flesh-and-blood person. Separate to this flesh-and-blood father is another 'father' who is my idea or construction of 'father' and who exists as my thought of 'father' and is not my biological flesh-and-blood father. This 'father' is the product of my own thinking - a psychological construct (i.e., an abstract thought). It is the function of the subject to creatively produce roles, such as, 'my father' role (and also 'my mother', 'my sister', 'my brother', 'my cat', 'my house', 'my car', etc., roles). The role of 'my father' is a product of my own creativity and imagination that has a separate existence to my biological father: my thinking (in this case the construct of 'father') and my biological father are conceptually different. (In a circumstance where my biological father has died while I am an infant and there is no father substitute it may be difficult to form the thought of 'my father'. In this

circumstance however the distinction between biological father and the role of 'my father' as a psychological construct are more clearly and separately defined since the flesh-and-blood father had existence even if the role of 'my father' and its implicit construct 'father' does not).

The 'first-person' creates the role. The 'second-' and 'third-persons' are objects in relation (including null relation) to the role-creating 'first-person'. The theory of persons-grammar has two subject - object relationships, the relationship between the 'first-' and 'second-persons', and that between the 'first-' and 'third-persons'. These two psychological relationships and the meta-role functions of the 'second-' and 'third-persons' are crucial to this thesis (and empirical Studies). Both subject - object relationships and the functioning of the objective meta-roles (i.e., 'second-' and 'third-persons') are now discussed and examples given.

The 'second-person' is an object in relationship to the 'first-person' subject. The nature of this relationship is interactive: the 'I-you' relationship of these meta-roles is a meeting of two 'persons' - an involvement. An example is now given.

My biological father can be addressed directly in social interaction. I can however also, and separately, address 'my

father' role. I am in a room without my biological father present. I think about him and, in my inner self-talk, I begin to address him. I begin to tell him about the finished and unfinished events of days gone by, and then about those particular events of yesterday. I begin to speak to him out loud and address the place where I imagine him to be in this room. I address 'him' - 'my father'.

The role of 'my father' is created by the subject 'I'. In this example 'I' the subject have addressed, not my biological father, but my own construction of him as 'my father' role. Although the role of 'my father' is created in thought by the subject, the idea of 'my father' becomes separated (i.e., becomes objective) from the subject in this example just given. The idea of 'father' has become abstracted as the construct of my subjectively experienced role of 'my father'. This object of my thoughts, the abstract 'father', is addressed directly and is an example of the 'I-you' relationship. This intra-personal relationship is shown in the following figure.




Figure 4.

Expansion of the self to show the object ('second-person') in relationship with the subject ('first-person').

These psychological objects (such as 'my father') that exist in a relation to the subject are the meta-roles of the 'second-person'. In the example just given the 'my father' role is created by the subject and is addressed directly as an object. 'My father' is created in subjectivity and is manifested in thought as an object, that is, the 'second-person' meta-role. In this psychological framework the function of the 'first-person' is to create the role (e.g., 'my father') and the function of the 'second-person' is to take the role created. In the example given 'my father' is present as an object which is addressed. 'I' the subject have created this object and am able to address 'him', that is, to objectify (create thought which is

manifest as 'my father' in the given example). Generalizing from this example, the function of the 'second-person' is to take the subjectively created role, that is, to take one's own role and its implicit construct.

The 'third-person', like the 'second-person', is an object to the 'first-person' as subject. The nature of this relationship is not interactive: the 'I-he' relation ('-she', '-it') of these meta-roles describes an absence where 'he' (for example) is absent from the 'I'. This is a null-relationship since it indicates a detachment - an absence of encounter - of the two 'persons'. An example is now given.

My biological father can be addressed directly in social encounter. I am, however, in a room without my biological father present and I cannot speak to my flesh-and-blood father since he is not here. I imagine him and what I would like to say to him were he present in this room. I could tell him about the finished and unfinished events of days gone by, and then about those particular events of yesterday. I wish to speak out to him and address him but he is not really here. Perhaps I will be with him tomorrow and talk to him then. Then I will be able to speak to my father. I cannot now speak with him because he is not here.

In this example 'I' the subject in the room have addressed

'my absent father' and not 'my father'. My construction is that 'he' is absent. While it is factually correct that my flesh-and-blood father is not present, in this example it is as though 'my father' is absent and cannot be, and is not, addressed. The flesh-and-blood father of the sociological frame of reference is confounded with the construct of 'my father' of the psychological frame of reference. This object of my thoughts, the abstract 'my father', is absent and this is an example of the 'I-he' relationship. My flesh-and-blood father is absent in this example but this 'he' (flesh and blood father) is an object in a different (i.e., sociological) frame of reference: my biological father appears to be the referent and not 'he' of my own 'my father' role.

The role of 'my father' is created by the subject 'I'. In this example 'I' have not addressed 'my father' as the role of 'my father' appears to me in this 'third-person' attitude to be located in my flesh-and-blood father and not within myself. My thinking is confused: the role of 'my father' (a construct) is confounded with what appears to be my (biological) father. The role of 'my father', and therefore my thinking, is dissociated. This dissociated thinking is expressed as the null-relation of 'I' and 'he' ('she', 'it').

This theory has been described from the point of view of the 'first-person' since the referent for this theory is in the

subject 'I'. It may however be useful for the sake of some clarity (if one can have clarity about confusion) to examine this 'third-person' meta-role a little further. Mead describes the meta-role of the 'third-person'.

Mead considered how an individual can become an object to himself. The individual does so by roletaking, defined by Mead as 'taking the role of other to self'. The individual objectifies himself according to Mead by taking an 'impersonal', 'non-affective' attitude towards self. This attitude - where the observer is outside the field of interaction and does not interact with the participants - has been previously described and shown in Figure 1. Now, however, the participants are not other flesh-and-blood people but the 'first-' and 'second-persons' of the self. In 'taking the role of other to self' Mead says that the observer (role of other) is also observed (the self).

A central concern of this thesis is the concept of confusion arising from the confounding of two frames of reference. It is the purpose here to present the taking of this 'third-person' attitude as an example of confused thinking which arises from a confound of two frames of reference. This author appreciates that the following figure cannot occur in reality but to the extent that it does actually happen it identifies a confound and subsequent confusion (and departure from reality) in the

individual who thinks this way.




Figure 5.

The 'third-person' taking the role of other to the self.

By assuming an inter-personal relationship with one's self, the 'third-person' appears to be outside of the self. The 'third-person' takes an attitude to self that mimics the self observing the inter-personal relationships shown in Figure 1. In Figure 5 however the participants are one's self whereas in Figure 1 the participants are other people (not self). Taking the 'third-person' attitude - taking the role of other to self -

makes believe that I can have an inter-personal relationship with myself. To construe, as does the 'third-person', the 'I' and 'me' relationship as inter-personal and not intra-personal is to think of the self as an object in the uninvolved (Figure 1) sociological frame of reference and not as the subject in a psychological frame of reference. The 'third-person' uses an inappropriate frame of reference. The 'third-person' is an example of a confound: an individual who uses this way of thinking confounds two frames of reference.

The 'third-person' describes the taking of some role whose referent is external to the mind. The referent is sociological rather than psychological. The role whose referent is sociological is the social role. Generalizing from the example and the discussion, the function of the 'third-person' is to take, not one's own role, but to take the role of other, that is, to take the social role.

Within this persons-grammar psychological frame of reference there are two relationships (or ways of thinking about reality): the 'second-person' psychological relationship and the 'third-person' sociological relationship. The 'third-person' takes the social role (role of other) and is dissociated from the creativity of the self in the 'first-person'. There is no relationship between the 'first-' and 'third-persons': the referent for this meta-role is in the external reality of social

relationships. Because of this absence of meeting with the subject the 'third-person' describes a construct of detached objectivity.

To take the 'second-person' attitude is to take one's own role. The involved objectivity of the 'second-person' is integrated with the creativity of the self as the 'first-person'. Because of the reciprocity or meeting with the subject the 'second-person' describes a construct of involved objectivity.

A fourth relationship is implied as the 'you-he' or 'second-person' - 'third-person' relationship. The relationship between these two psychological 'persons' implies a scale of objectivity that has two polar extremes. At one polar extreme is the involved objectivity of the 'second-person' whose referent is in the creativity of the 'first-person'. At the other polar extreme is the detached objectivity of the 'third-person' whose referent is in the culture of the society. Between these two polarities there is implied a psychological continuum. At one extreme is the taking of one's own created role (involved objectivity) and at the other extreme is the taking of a social role (detached objectivity). The fourth relationship is a theoretical dimension of thinking from the involved objectivity (integrated thinking) of the 'second-person' to the detached objectivity (dissociation) of the 'third-person'.

The term spontaneity refers to one's own free will, that which is self-originated and which is without external cause. As the 'third-person' the individual acts out the social role. In taking the social role the person enacts the socio-cultural origins of the role in social conditioning. This role is not self-originated, it is of an external (i.e., social) cause, and it may not reflect the person's free will. As the 'second-person' the individual acts their own role. In taking their own role the person embodies the creative origins of this role in their self. This role is self-originated, it is without external cause and the full enactment of this role involves the individual's free will. This fourth relationship from 'you' ('second-') to 'he' ('third-person') describes a continuum of decreasing spontaneity associated with an increasing dissociation of thought.

The persons-grammar is a unified theory of reality that uses a psychological frame of reference. Within this unified theory is another theory of reality, that is, the socio-cultural thinking of the 'third-person' using a sociological frame of reference. The psychological framework provided by the persons-grammar dialectic integrates both of these ways of being as endpoints of a theoretical continuum of thinking and spontaneity. This general theory is now applied in a psychology of sexual preferences. (The Theory of Persons-grammar is

developed further in Appendix 4).

A Psychology of Sexual Preference

Homo- and hetero-sexual preference is an expression of the self ('I') towards another person (the object). Sexual preference has its origins in the individual's psychology though this preference is expressed to another, that is, socially. To define homosexuality (and heterosexuality) - which exists in a psychological frame - by sexual preference which is conventionally regarded as an inter-personal (social) phenomenon, may be to confuse the two (psychological and socio-cultural) relationships and therefore the psychological and sociological frames of reference.

There are two substantive issues addressed in this dissertation. The first is the origin of homosexuality (and heterosexuality) in the psychological theory of persons-grammar. The second concerns the male or female gender identity of the homosexual and heterosexual.

The psychology of sexual preference is discussed in two parts. The relationship between homosexuality and gender identity in the theory of persons-grammar is discussed first. Then the identification of gender identity as a male or female entity in homosexuals and heterosexuals is discussed.

(i) Sexual preference and gender identity

Homosexuality (and heterosexuality) is an expression of the gender of the self. It is part of the creating and taking of one's own self as the 'first-' and ''second-persons'. The self, and its gender, exists in a psychological frame of reference independent of the sociological frame of reference and therefore separately from sexual identity and constructs with their referent in biological sex.

Homosexuality is not therefore a taking of the role of other where this 'third-person' social role is the social learning (social sex-role for example) associated with biological sex. Sexual preference is therefore predicted from gender identity and not from social sex-role. Homosexuality (and therefore homosexual preference as an inter-personal phenomenon) has a psychological origin in the personality of the subject. This is the first substantive issue of this thesis - the relationship between homosexuality and gender identity and the predicted absence of relationship between homosexuality and social sex-role.

From this theory with its relationship of 'first-' and 'second-persons' it is predicted that homosexuality (and heterosexuality) should be empirically associated with

differences in gender identity since the 'second-person' takes his own role created by the 'first-person'. It is also predicted from this theory that when the individual takes the role of other, this role will have no relationship to the subject in the psychological frame of reference even though this social role will have some relationship to the self as object in the sociological frame of reference. The 'third-person' in the social role is dissociated from the self (as subject): the persons-grammar theory predicts that there is no relationship between the 'first-' and 'third-persons' and therefore in this psychology of sexual preferences there is no theoretical or statistical association predicted between social-sex role and homosexuality (and heterosexuality).

Empirical support for these hypotheses would therefore support the proposition that gender identity - the gender of the self as subject in the psychological frame of reference - is causative of adult homo- and hetero-sexuality. This empirical support would contradict the conventional theories of homosexuality which theorize that sexual identity and social sex-role are causative of adult homo- and hetero-sexuality. Socio-cultural variables related to the biological sex of the self as object do not predict homo- and hetero-sexuality.

(ii) The maleness or femaleness of homosexual gender identity

Empirical support for (i) above would demonstrate the theoretical relationship between homosexuality and gender identity. It would show that heterosexual females and homosexual males have the same gender identity that is different to the gender identity of heterosexual males.

Such empirical support would not however identify whether this gender identity is male or female (and vice versa in the heterosexual male). The gender of the 'first-person' (the subject) as male or female remains to be tested and identified in homosexuals and heterosexuals and not just assumed as is presently the case in the literature reviewed. This is the second substantive issue of this thesis: the identification of the gender identity of the homosexual male as male or female. This issue will be addressed (and tested empirically) by identifying whether the sex partner as an object to the subject ('I') takes the 'second-' or 'third-person' role in the subject's psychological frame of reference.

There is a commonly held belief in sex and gender congruency, that is for example, the heterosexual male is biologically and in other ways (sociologically and psychologically) male. Although this belief remains untested the gender identity of the homosexual male has been labelled female in the sex and gender

literature (for example, by Freund et al., 1974; 1977). The model of personality implicit in the literature assumes that the homosexual male is gender-female like the heterosexual female and unlike the heterosexual male who is assumed to be gender-male. In the model of homosexual personality proposed herein the homosexual male and heterosexual female are gender-male and the heterosexual male is gender-female. These models of personality structure are now discussed and verifiable hypotheses are proposed.

Personality models implicit in the literature

Implicit in community beliefs and in the literature is the theory that sex and gender congruency is normal and that sex and gender incongruency is deviant. Using this implicit theoretical position Freund et al. (1974; 1977) nominally define the gender identity of the homosexual male as female. The labelling of the homosexual and heterosexual identities in the following models of personality is implied by this assumption.

Table 2.

Identity in the implicit models of personality

	ASSUMED GENDER IDENTITY	OBSERVED SEXUAL IDENTITY	OBSERVED SEXUAL IDENTITY OF SEX PARTNER
Heterosexual male	male	male	female
Heterosexual female	female	female	male
Homosexual male	female	male	male

In the psychological frame of reference of the heterosexual male subject the 'first-person' ('I') is male and the sexual identity of the preferred sex partner is female. In this personality model with the subject as the frame of reference the heterosexual preference of this male-sexed subject is expressed as the 'I-she' relationship of the 'third-person'. The heterosexual preference of the female-sexed subject is expressed as the 'I-he' relationship of the 'third-person'. The homosexual male's sexual preference is also an expression of the 'I-he' relationship of the 'third-person' (same as heterosexual female). In these implicit models both heterosexual and homosexual sexual preferences are theoretically expressions of the 'third-person' relationship.

In the social frame of reference the heterosexual male is objectively male (sexual identity) and the objective sexual

identity of his preferred sex partner is female. The heterosexual female is objectively female (sexual identity) and the objective sexual identity of her preferred sex partner is male. In this inter-personal 'object - object' frame the homosexual male is objectively male (sexual identity) and the objective sexual identity of his preferred sex partner is male. In this implicit model which has labelled the homosexual male as gender feminine, homosexuality as a sexual preference for the same-sex partner is deviant to the opposite male and female relations of heterosexuality. This apparently deviant relationship has been used (socially, legally, etc) to imply a deviancy in homosexual preference. There is however, apart from this 'deviant relationship', scant evidence of any deviancy separate from this relationship itself and a nonconformist gender identity. This social frame theory (in which the homosexual is gender feminine) predicts that homosexual males should show deviancy compared with heterosexual controls.

Sexual preference in the psychological frame (and labelling as in Table 2) defines sexual preference as an expression of the 'third-person' relationship. In this frame the sexual identity of the sex partner is an object in the 'third-person' to the subject and there is no essential difference between homosexual and heterosexual preference. In this frame homosexuality is not deviant and increased deviancy (defined herein as socio- and psycho-pathology) associated with homosexuality is not expected.

The lack of empirical evidence in the literature to support a theory of homosexual deviancy argues against a social frame theory of sexual preference.

This implicit theory of sexual preferences which models (for example) a heterosexual male's sexual identity - gender identity congruency, predicts the homosexual male is gender-female. This theory asserts that sexual preferences are theoretically related in the psychological frame to the sex partner taking the role of other to self, that is, the subject manifesting the 'third-person' meta-role of detached objectivity. In this theory of sexual preferences the individual takes the 'third-person' meta-role of detached objectivity, that is, has the socio-cultural thinking of the 'third-person' relationship.

Proposed personality models

A theory of sexual preferences is proposed whereby the sexual partner takes the meta-role of the 'second-person' relative to the subject. This theory predicts models of personality in which heterosexuality is characterized by sex-gender incongruency and homosexuality by sex-gender congruency. These models of personality are shown in the following table.

Table 3.

Identity in the proposed models of personality

	PROPOSED GENDER IDENTITY	OBSERVED SEXUAL IDENTITY	OBSERVED SEXUAL IDENTITY OF PREFERRED SEX PARTNER
Heterosexual male	female	male	female
Heterosexual female	male	female	male
Homosexual male	male	male	male

In the psychological frame of reference of the heterosexual male subject the 'first-person' ('I') is female and the sexual identity of the preferred sex partner is also female. In this personality model with the subject as the frame of reference the heterosexual preference of this male-sexed subject is expressed as the 'I-you' relationship of the 'second-person'. The heterosexual preference of the female-sexed subject is also expressed as the 'I-you' relationship of the 'second-person'. The homosexual male's sexual preference is also an expression of the 'I-you' relationship of the 'second-person'. In this proposed theory of sexual preferences both the heterosexual and homosexual sexual preferences are expressions of the 'second-person' relationship. The sexual identity (male or female) of the sex partner is the same as the gender identity (male or female) of the subject in both homo- and hetero-sexual relationships: the sex partner takes the subject's own role in

terms of own subjective gender identity. The sexual identity of the preferred sex partner is a manifestation of the subject's gender.

In the social frame of reference the heterosexual male is objectively male (sexual identity) and the objective sexual identity of his preferred sex partner is female. The heterosexual female is objectively female and her preferred sex partner is male. The homosexual male is objectively male and his preferred sex partner is also male. In this inter-personal 'object - object' frame the homosexual male is, as in the implicit social frame, deviant to the opposites relationships of heterosexual sexual identities. In this proposed theory, as in the implicit theory, the social frame predicts the deviancy of homosexuality. This social frame theory (in which the homosexual is gender-male) predicts the homosexual male should show deviancy compared to heterosexual controls.

Sexual preference in the psychological frame (with the identities as labelled in Table 3) defines sexual preference as a manifestation of the 'second-person' relationship. In this frame the sexual identity of the sex partner is an object in the 'second-person' to the subject and there is no essential difference between homosexual and heterosexual preference. In this frame homosexuality is not deviant and increased pathology associated with homosexuality is not expected. The lack of

empirical evidence in the literature to support a theory of homosexual deviancy argues against a social frame theory of sexual preference.

This proposed theory of sexual preferences which models, for example, male heterosexuality as a sexual identity - gender identity incongruity, predicts that the homosexual male is gender-male. This theory asserts that sexual preferences are theoretically related in the psychological frame to the sex partner taking the subject's own role, that is, the subject manifesting the 'second-person' meta-role of involved objectivity. In this theory of sexual preferences the subject takes the 'second-person' meta-role of involved objectivity, that is, has the psychological thinking of the 'second-person' relationship.

In summary, the implicit theory and the proposed theory of sexual preference predict that the homosexual male is gender-feminine and gender-male, respectively. Both theories predict homosexual deviancy in the social frame of reference: when heterosexuality is defined as normal then homosexuality is by implication also defined as deviant. The lack of evidence in the literature to show a criterion-referenced deviancy in homosexuals does not support a social frame theory of sexual preferences. (The socio-cultural moral deviancy hypothesis has no criterion-referenced support: it remains a tautology that

what is different is per se deviant). Social frame theories of sexual preference based on sexual identity alone cannot predict the subjective gender identity of the subject (nor differences in gender identity which could then be empirically tested).

The persons-grammar is a unified theory which identifies an involved and a detached construct of reality - a psychological and a socio-cultural way of thinking respectively - within a psychological frame of reference. The involved construct of reality predicts that sexual preference manifests a 'second-person' relationship within the subject's psychological world. This construct of reality predicts that the homosexual male is gender-male (Table 3). The detached construct of reality predicts that sexual preference manifests a 'third-person' relationship within the subject's psychological world. This construct of reality predicts that the homosexual male is gender-female (Table 2). Validation of one of these constructs of reality would provide empirical support to that construct and therefore to one of the theories of sexual preference. Since these theories predict either reality of a male or female gender identity then the external validation of one theory also confirms the gender identity of the homosexual male and heterosexual female as a male or female (and vice versa for the heterosexual male).

Rationales

(i) Study 1.

Conventional theory predicts that homosexuality is related to a deviant 'sexual' identity, that is, the homosexual male is sexually feminine. This theory is not supported by empirical studies, and furthermore, empirical studies support a relationship between male homosexuality and a gender identity that is typical of biological females. There has been, however, an absence of 'gender theory' to support these empirical studies of gender in homosexuality. (An 'Androgynous Theory of Gender' is presented as part of Appendix 4).

If 'sexuality' explains homo- and hetero-sexuality then the homosexual male and heterosexual male should not have the same masculinity whose referent is sexual identity (biological sex). Similarly, the homosexual male and heterosexual female should have the same femininity whose referent is sexual identity. If 'sexuality' which has its referent in sexual identity predicts homo- and hetero-sexuality then sexual preference differences should not be related to gender identity which has its referent in the gender of the psychological self (i.e., self as subject).

If the gender of the psychological self explains homo- and

hetero-sexuality as predicted by the psychological theory of persons-grammar then the homosexual male and heterosexual male should not have the same gender identity with its subjective referent. Similarly, the homosexual male and heterosexual female should have the same gender identity. If gender identity is the psychological precursor of homosexuality (and heterosexuality) - and this is the first substantive issue of this thesis - then homo- and hetero-sexuality should not be related to sexual identity or to social sex-role or other sex-difference traits that have their referent in sexual identity.

Empirical support for the gender identity hypothesis of sexual preferences, over a hypothesis of deviant sexuality, would show that the homosexual male and heterosexual female have the same gender identity that is different to the gender identity of the heterosexual male, and that it is this identity of the self that is manifest in the subject's sexual preference. If these hypotheses can be tested and confirmed in one empirical test then this finding would also support the theory of persons-grammar that distinguishes sex and gender as having different bio-social and psychological referents. This result, however, would not in itself identify this gender identity in the homosexual male as male or female. Even though the reviewed literature claims this identity is 'feminine' there is no explicit theory and no empirical test to substantiate this claim.

(ii) Study 2.

The first substantive issue of this thesis is the theoretical and empirical relationship between homo- and hetero-sexuality and gender identity, and the theoretical and empirical null-relationship between homo- and hetero-sexuality and 'sexuality' (social sex-role and other sex-difference traits whose referent is biological sex). These conflicting hypotheses are substantially supported in the results of Study 1. Study 2 attempts to repeat this finding.

The second substantive issue of this thesis is the identification of the homosexual male's gender identity as male or female (and the gender identity of the heterosexual male and female). The model of personality implicit in the literature is that the homosexual male is gender-female (like the heterosexual female). The model proposed in this thesis is that the homosexual male and the heterosexual female are male gendered and that the heterosexual male is female gendered.

If homosexual males are deviant then a comparison of the homosexual male with heterosexual male and female comparisons should find evidence of increased deviancy in homosexual males in measures of socio- and psycho-pathology. Results which show differences in pathology in the expected direction between homo-

and hetero-sexuals would support the conventional socio-cultural belief of homosexual deviancy. Studies that test the socio-cultural belief of homosexual male deviancy have not produced empirical support that defend this belief (a way of thinking and constructing reality identified as the 'third-person' relationship).

The implicit and proposed psychologies of sexual preference (discussed above) predict that the homosexual male is gender-female and gender-male respectively; however, both psychologies predict a homosexual deviancy when using only the social frame of reference. A finding of significant pathological differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals would support a deviancy hypothesis and the social frame theory (i.e., 'third-person' socio-cultural thinking) that predicts it. A finding of no significant pathological differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals would discredit the social frame theories of homosexuality which theorize (use 'third-person' thinking) the origins of sexual preferences in 'sexuality' (bio-sociality).

The social frame prediction of homosexual deviancy is common to both the implicit and proposed psychologies of sexual preference. While a finding of no deviancy does not support the sociological frame hypothesis of 'sexuality' neither does it support or discredit either of the psychologies (implied or

proposed) which predict female or male gender identity (respectively) in homosexual males.

A finding of no significant difference in pathology between homosexual males and heterosexual comparisons would lead to two main conclusions. First, this finding could be interpreted to mean that homo- and hetero-sexuality is an outcome of gender identity as predicted and not of a deviant sexuality. This would mean that the community belief of heterosexual 'normality' and of homosexual 'deviancy' is untenable and that it is this belief (the 'third-person' socio-cultural thinking) that is deviant. The belief of homosexual deviancy 'predicted' by socio-cultural belief is tautological: the observation that a person is socially different (homosexual or heterosexual) is not evidence, per se, of deviancy unless heterosexuality remains defined as 'normal', that is, a socio-cultural morality. That the 'third-person' relationship is deviant thinking (and not homosexuality that is deviant) is tested in Study 3. In Study 3 it is predicted that socio-cultural thinking (the 'third-person' relationship) is 'deviant' (associated with socio- and psycho-pathology).

The second conclusion concerns the male or female gender identity of the homosexual male. The sociological frame theories of reality within both the implicit and proposed psychologies of sexual preference predict homosexual deviancy. The absence of

empirical support argues against a sociological understanding of homosexuality. A test of the two psychologies at the psychological level with their different predictions of female and male gender identity is required. This is discussed in Study 3.

(iii) Study 3.

The theory of persons-grammar is a unified theory of reality which integrates two psychological relationships: the 'first-' and 'second-person' construct of involved objectivity and the 'first-' and 'third-person' construct of detached objectivity. These relationships define the polar extremes of a continuum of spontaneity. The 'third-person' relationship is the theoretical absence of spontaneity associated with dissociated thinking whereas the 'second-person' relationship is the development of spontaneity associated with integrated thinking.

Detached objectivity describes a person's dissociation from their self as subject as they enact the culturally approved social role ('third-person' meta-role). Involved objectivity describes a person's involvement in the integration of the creativity of role-creation ('first-person') and the spontaneity of taking one's own role ('second-person'). If taking one's own role entails disapproval whereas taking the social role merits approval, then a person faced with this dilemma has a conflict

of individual versus social interest. The absence of spontaneity in detached objectivity should be associated with anxiety and the presence of spontaneity in involved objectivity should not be associated with anxiety. Deviancy - a deviation from spontaneity and creativity - is then related to detachment and not to involved objectivity, and this deviancy should be associated with anxiety.

The involved and detached objectivity constructs of psychological reality should have social manifestations. The homosexual male who takes his own role in relation to his gender identity enacts the socially disapproved, and often the legally and religiously constrained, role of the homosexual. The homosexual male who takes the approved role of passing as 'heterosexual' dissociates from his own gender role expressed in his homosexuality. Even though the former may receive opprobrium and the latter approval, the theory of persons-grammar predicts that the taker of the social role is less spontaneous, and therefore, more anxious.

In Study 3 homosexual males who take these different involved and detached attitudes to their homosexual-self are compared. It is hypothesized that the less spontaneous detached attitude is associated with more anxiety. Empirical support for this hypothesis would support the 'first-' and 'second-person' relationship as a description of psychological reality rather

than the 'first-' and 'third-person' null-relationship as a description of psychological reality. This finding would support that psychology of sexual preference which proposes that the sex partner takes the 'second-person' role in the psychological reality of the subject whose mind is imbued with creativity and spontaneity. This finding would also support the proposed psychology of sexual preference which uses the involved objectivity construct as a psychological reality and which predicts that the gender identity of the homosexual male is male.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this thesis is to show the relationship between gender identity and homo- and hetero-sexuality, and to show the non-relationship between homo- and hetero-sexuality and bio-social variables (such as social sex-role) which have their referent in biological sex. These two relationships are the first substantive issue. (The term bio-sociality includes social sex-role and other sex-difference traits which have their referent in the sexual identity of biological sex).

It is also intended to show that this psychological gender identity of the homosexual male and heterosexual female is male whereas that of the heterosexual male is female. This is the second substantive issue. There are three research studies.

Study 1 will consider gender identity within the homosexual male and the two heterosexual male and heterosexual female comparison groups. In Study 1 it is hypothesized that sexual preference is predictive of gender identity: the homosexual male should have a gender identity like the heterosexual female and different from the gender identity of the heterosexual male. It is also hypothesized that sexual preference is not predictive of bio-sociality (such as masculine or feminine social sex-role): the homosexual male should be bio-socially like the heterosexual

male (e.g., masculine social sex-role) and bio-socially different from the heterosexual female.

In Study 2 gender identity and bio-sociality are examined within the same three populations as Study 1. The purpose of Study 2 is threefold:

(i) It replicates the findings of Study 1: gender identity is predicted by sexual preference - male homosexuality is related to gender identity and not to bio-sociality.

(ii) Study 2 is a cross-validated study which shows that sexual preference is also predicted by gender identity. This finding shows the interrelation of gender identity and sexual preference rather than the singular finding of Study 1 that sexual preference predicts gender identity.

(iii) Study 2 proposes the null-hypothesis that there are no differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals apart from sexual preference and gender identity. Tested with a large number of variables related to pathology, such a finding supports the hypothesis that homosexuality is not, per se, pathological, and this finding discredits social frame theories which propose that homosexuality is a deviancy.

Studies 1 and 2 aim to show that the sexual preference

difference between homosexual and heterosexual is strongly related to the subjective experience of the gender of the self as subject and not to the biological sex of the self as object. This finding supports the theory of persons-grammar and the conclusion that homo- and hetero-sexuality are outcomes of the psychological (intra-personal) relationships within the self and are not outcomes of the sociological (inter-personal) relationships. Study 2 also shows that these differences between the homo- and hetero-sexual groups (gender identity and sexual preference) are not related to socio- and psycho-pathology.

The overall purpose of Study 3 is to identify the homosexual male as gender-male or gender-female. In Study 3 it is shown that there is a main variation within the homosexual group that is related to the homosexual male taking, and not taking, his own role. The proposed psychology of sexual preferences predicts that taking his own role (and where the homosexual male is gender-male) is empirically associated with spontaneity as a capacity for abstract thinking. This theory also predicts that not taking his own role (and where the homosexual male is gender-female) is empirically associated with loss of spontaneity and dissociation. The empirical association of socio- and psycho-pathology with not taking his own role supports the proposed psychology predicting the homosexual male is gender-male.

Only comparisons within the homosexual male group are made. Since there is no heterosexual equivalent to the Cass (1984) 'Homosexual identity formation' scale, no within-heterosexual group comparisons are made.

Study 3 compares three homosexual male groups which vary in degree of homosexual identity formation. Homosexual identification ('Homosexual identity formation'; Cass, 1984) is a variable degree of development of the sociodramatic homosexual role compared to an underdevelopment or even absence of this individuated role (for example, passing as though 'heterosexual'). This scale operationalizes the objective continuum from involved objectivity to detached objectivity. This means that subjects who take their own role (with respect to gender identity) and who therefore have an involved objectivity are expected to score higher on the Cass scale than subjects who do not take their own role and who have a detached objective relationship towards their subjective self's gender identity. In study 3 it is hypothesized that the degree of objective involvement of the person with his self as subject is inversely related to level of anxiety. There are three general hypotheses in Study 3:

(i) Homosexuality, measured by gender identity (FGI), is hypothesized to not vary between the three homosexual groups which do vary in level of enactment of the homosexual role

measured by 'Homosexual Identity Formation' (Cass 1984). If homosexuality is a (deviant) sexual identity as the literature generally supposes then more 'homosexual identity' should predict more (deviant) gender identity. The psychological theory of persons-grammar predicts that homosexuality is related to the gender of the subject, a relationship which is separate to the degree of identification with that gender. The experimental hypothesis therefore predicts no difference in gender identity between the homosexual male groups.

(ii) Studies 1, 2 and 3 all hypothesize the non-relationship of the psychological phenomenon of homosexuality with the sociological phenomenon of bio-sociality (such as social sex-role). It is scientifically sufficient to show a null relationship as that proposed between homosexuality and bio-sociality. It is, however, of some importance scientifically when this null-relationship is predicted by the proposed psychological theory of persons-grammar whereas conventional theories of homosexuality propose a theoretical relationship and therefore an empirical association.

(iii) In Study 3 only groups of homosexual males are compared to show that the thinking that uses the socio-cultural frame of reference (the 'third-person' relationship) is related to anxiety whereas the thinking that uses the psychological frame of reference (the 'second-person' relationship) is not related

to anxiety. This finding supports the psychology of sexual preference which uses the subject (e.g., gender identity) and not the object (e.g., sexual identity) as the frame of reference; a psychology of sexual preferences which nominally defines the identity of the homosexual male as gender-male. This result would identify a dimension of spontaneity related to thinking: deviancy (as pathology) would be shown to be linked to an absence of spontaneity as a style of thinking and not to homosexuality.

These three studies are now separately described.

STUDY 1

Subjects

Heterosexual males (n=41), heterosexual females (n=38), and homosexual males (n=36), 25 years or older, were recruited via friendship networks. Subjects less than that age were not included as their inclusion would possibly introduce a developmental component that could confound the study. Two subjects did not complete the questionnaires fully and in the analysis n=41, n=37, and n=35 respectively were used.

The biographical information required of subjects was sex, age, and years of education. Sex of subject and a modified Kinsey scale (Heterosexual - Homosexual rating scale: Kinsey,

Pomeroy & Martin, 1948) was used to classify subjects into one of the three groups. The age distribution of the three groups was matched. Responses to questionnaires on sexual themes probably differ with different educational backgrounds: years of education was used to ensure matching of the three groups. Age at first sexual intercourse was used as a dependent variable (after Eysenck, 1976): the groups were not matched on this variable. No significant difference was subsequently found on this variable.

The three matched groups were then compared using 22 variables: one of these variables is gender identity predicted to discriminate between homosexuals and heterosexuals. Of the remaining 21 (bio-social) variables a number show distinct male - female differences, such as the masculinity and femininity scales of the PDQ (Antill et al., 1981) and Eysenck's (1976) masculinity - femininity scale. These scales should discriminate between biological females and males and not between homosexual males and heterosexual males. Some of these 21 variables have been included as moderator variables, such as the social desirability scales of the PDQ and age at first intercourse, and should not show differences between the groups. It is predicted that the homosexual males will be differentiated from the heterosexuals by the homosexual's characteristic 'crossed-sex' gender identity and that males and females will be differentiated by characteristic bio-social differences (such as

social sex-role and sex-difference traits). There is only one measure of 'crossed-sex' gender identity readily available in questionnaire form, that is, the FGI (Freund et al., 1974, 1977). It is this measure that is hypothesized to differentiate homosexuals and heterosexuals. This measure of gender and the other variables are now discussed in detail. Then follows an outline of the procedure, the design of Study 1, and the specific hypotheses that are tested in Study 1.

Measures

The active variable of sexual preference was measured using a modified Heterosexual - Homosexual Rating Scale (Kinsey et al., 1948). The original Kinsey scale is a seven-point scale from 0 to 6 where 0 indicates exclusive heterosexuality and 6 indicates exclusive homosexuality. These ratings take both overt behaviour and psychological factors (thoughts and feelings) over the past 3 years into account. This scale was reported in "Sexual behavior in the human male" (Kinsey, et al., 1948).

The Kinsey scale was modified for use as a self-rating scale. The modified scale point 1 'exclusive heterosexuality' is given as an example:

Over the last three years I have not responded sexually in thought, feeling, or behaviour, to members of my own sex. I am exclusively heterosexual.

This uses both behavioural and psychological factors and restricts the subject to the last three years. In 1948 the terms homosexual and heterosexual were probably not in common usage: this modified scale is a simplified self-rating version of the original that assumes the terms homosexual and heterosexual are now in common usage.

Nearly all subjects were known to the experimenter. The sexual preference of the subjects was largely known beforehand. Since there was a questionnaire for each group - to take account of male and female, and homosexual and heterosexual, versions of the questionnaires - the classificatory accuracy of this scale could be checked: there were no discrepancies. There is no reason to doubt the utility of the modifications. Furthermore this scale is used here only to establish a dichotomy between heterosexual and homosexual whereas Kinsey et al. (1948) used the seven categories established by the scale.

This modified scale is a 7 point scale. Subjects self-classify using the numbered descriptors. Only those subjects who indicated exclusive or predominant heterosexuality (1 or 2), and predominant or exclusive homosexuality (6 or 7) were included for analysis. Subjects indicating intermediate scores (3, 4, or 5) were not included. One subject was thereby excluded.

In addition, three questionnaires were used. These are now described.

Part A of the FGI or 'Feminine Gender Identity Scale for Males' (Freund et al., 1977) is a 19-item questionnaire which was given to all the male subjects. Its parallel form, the MGI or 'Masculine Gender Identity in Females' (Blanchard & Freund, 1983), was given to all female subjects. The term 'cross-gender identity' is used to label that variable which accounts for female sex-typed behaviours observable within a population of anatomical males. The greatest degree of 'cross-gender' identity is expected in those transsexual homosexual individuals who experience a sense of being the opposite gender (i.e., 'female') in all but bodily appearances. In males a zero score indicates no FGI and successively higher FGI scores indicate more FGI. The construct validity of these scales is supported by the reliable discrimination of those three groups expected to show increasing amounts of 'crossed-sex' gender identity: heterosexuals, nontranssexual homosexuals, and transsexual homosexuals.

The FGI scale was originally published in 1974 and was revised before re-publication in 1977 to extend Part A of the scale that discriminates between heterosexuals and homosexuals. 19 of the original pool of 25 items were retained on the main criterion of a significant F value in discriminating between heterosexuals and homosexuals (transsexuals excluded). Item

validity was also evaluated by (i) a respondent response rate in excess of 80%, (ii) a part-remainder correlation less than 0.20, (iii) a factor loading less than 0.30 on the largest factor extracted, (iv) correlations greater than 0.30 with either the L Scale or K Scale of the MMPI (Freund et al., 1977). Two samples of subjects were used to cross-validate the scale. Discriminant function analysis gave 66.95% correct predictions of heterosexuals and homosexuals in sample 1, and 81.42% in sample 2. The discriminant validity is adequate.

The original scale was used (Freund, Langevin, Laws, & Serber, 1974) to investigate "femininity and preferred partner age in homosexual and heterosexual males". In this paper the authors cite a number of (early) studies which support the association of 'femininity' and homosexuality in males: usually based on prison populations and using masculinity - femininity scales such as the Mf of the MMPI. (Scales that do not measure masculinity and femininity independently). These authors observed in devising this scale that "the degree to which particular questions or clinical items represent feminine gender identity vs. another kind of femininity is unknown" (1974, p442). The results of the test supported the use of the FGI scale even though the 'type' of femininity demonstrated to be typical of homosexual males was unknown.

The items selected for the FGI (and MGI) were those that

discriminated among members of the same sex. In reviewing the use of the FGI, Blanchard and Freund summarize the available evidence as indicating "that the FGI is a better measure of gender identity in males than conventional masculinity - femininity scales, which are constructed (with slight variations) by selecting items differentially endorsed by anatomical males and females" (1983, p. 205). A 20th item was included in the MGI scale published after the FGI scale. Since this did not have a parallel in the FGI it has not been included in these studies.

Item analysis showing affectivity (traditionally, the difficulty) of the 19 items of the FGI (and MGI) is shown in Table 4. Item 13 is the most affective and 9 the least affective for males. Example are given after the table.

Table 4.

Affectivity of the FGI and MGI test items for males and females respectively ranked by the 'q' values of the items.

QUESTION			QUESTION		
MALES (FGI)			FEMALES (MGI)		
NUMBER	p	q	NUMBER	p	q
13	0.045	0.995	9	0.023	0.974
12	0.066	0.934	13	0.053	0.947
17	0.078	0.922	3	0.079	0.921
10	0.104	0.896	16	0.105	0.895
11	0.104	0.896	15	0.132	0.868
19	0.208	0.798	18	0.132	0.868
4	0.221	0.779	12	0.144	0.856
8	0.221	0.779	14	0.158	0.842
2	0.292	0.708	11	0.224	0.776
1	0.305	0.695	6	0.237	0.763
6	0.331	0.669	10	0.250	0.750
5	0.442	0.558	19	0.263	0.737
18	0.506	0.494	2	0.316	0.684
7	0.552	0.448	8	0.324	0.676
14	0.597	0.403	5	0.329	0.671
16	0.623	0.377	1	0.406	0.594
15	0.727	0.273	7	0.500	0.500
3	0.805	0.195	4	0.539	0.461
9	0.818	0.182	17	0.649	0.351

In the following examples of FGI test items the scoring key

is given for each of the possible subject responses. This key was originally based on clinical experience and then tested empirically with discriminant function analysis. The most affective items for homosexual males are questions 13 and 12 which follow.

Q13 Do you think your appearance is

- very masculine (0)
- masculine (0)
- a little feminine (1)
- very feminine (2)

Q12 Since the age of 17, have you wished you had been born a girl instead of a boy

- often (2)
- occasionally (1)
- never (0)

The least affective items for males are questions 3 and 9.

Q3 In childhood, were you very interested in the work of a garage mechanic? Was this

- prior to age 6 (0)
- aged between 6 and 12 (0)
- probably in both periods (0)
- do not remember that I was very interested in the work of a

garage mechanic (1)

Q9 In childhood or at puberty, did you like mechanics magazines?

Was this

- between ages 6 and 12 (0)
- between ages 12 and 14 (0)
- probably in both periods (0)
- do not remember that I liked mechanics magazines (1).

The next two questionnaires are composed of items differentially endorsed by biological males and females. These scales measure a different construct to the FGI (and MGI). The construct being measured is the differential endorsement of sex related differences, that is, bio-sociality.

The PDQ or "Personality Description Questionnaire" (Antill et al., 1981) measures subjects' sex-role attributes and is specifically designed for Australian use. Form A of the PDQ was used. The PDQ contains six subscales (total of 50 items): masculine positive (10 items) and negative (10 items), feminine positive (10 items) and negative (10 items), and social desirability positive (5 items) and negative (5 items). The masculine positive scale is composed of those items reported as significantly more typical of males than of females and reported as such by both males and females. The items are also seen as desirable by both males and females. The masculine negative

scale is similarly constructed except that the items are seen as significantly more undesirable by both males and females. The feminine positive and negative scales are similarly constructed excepting that the items are seen as feminine attributes.

The lack of external validation of these scales has been criticized (chapter 2). Masculinity and femininity are the constructs implied by the labelling of masculinity and femininity scales but dominance and nurturance may be the more appropriate labels.

Following a similar theoretical development with the PAQ by Spence, Helmreich and Holahan (cited by Antill et al. 1981) the PDQ was developed with positively valued and with negatively valued scales for masculinity, femininity, and social desirability. The positive and negative attributes of, for example, the masculinity scale may be antonyms, in which case there is only one scale of masculinity which consists of a balance of the positive and negative desirability of the items. Antill et al. (1981) argue that presumed opposites, giving masculinity and femininity as an example, may not be negatively correlated. In this case there are two scales of masculinity, one positive and the other negative (and so on for femininity, and for social desirability).

The distinction between positive and negative gives more

information than having a single scale of masculinity or femininity. Consider the following hypothetical circumstance:

Subject	Masculinity	Masculinity	Masculinity
	positive score	negative score	total score
1	75	25	100
2	50	50	100
3	25	75	100

While each subject has the same total masculinity score the quality of that masculinity is different in each of the three cases. Subject 1 is likely to be socially valued whereas subject 3 is likely to be socially devalued. Subject 2 is intermediate. This is the case if positive and negative attributes are not antonyms. Antill et al. comment that there "is a need for ... a variety of validation studies to be conducted" (1981, p. 169) with the PDQ. The meaning, and therefore the interpretation of results using these positive and negative qualifiers, remains somewhat obscure.

The 10 items of the social desirability scale are "neutral" with males and females responding equally to the items: 5 are seen as positive and 5 as negative. These 10 items serve to distract the subject from the purpose of the scale.

The PDQ was chosen because it is a social sex-role scale devised for Australian conditions. The PDQ measures masculinity and femininity as non-correlated variables with separate scores

for masculinity and for femininity. Current sex-role scales measure masculinity and femininity separately. This is in contrast to scales of masculinity - femininity (such as the Mf of the MMPI) which imply that persons lower on masculinity are therefore higher on femininity.

In developing the PDQ a total of 2,427 subjects rated 512 adjectives. Subjects were recruited from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds: university and high school students and various community and other general sources. The age range of the subjects was 15-81 years with a mean of 23.0 years.

The major source of adjectives were pre-existing American tests and/or their initial item pools: Bem's BSRI, Gough and Heilbrun's Adjective Check List, and the Rozenkrantz, Vogel, Bee, Broverman and Broverman Sex Role Stereotype Questionnaire (Antill et al., 1981). Some adjectives words were included that reflected Australian usage.

Subjects are given a list of personality characteristics and asked to use these characteristics to describe themselves indicating on a scale from 1 to 7 how true of themselves these characteristics are. Form A characteristics are:

MASCULINE:

<u>Positive</u>		<u>Negative</u>	
firm	skilled in business	bossy	mischievous
confident	strong	noisy	feels superior
competitive	carefree	show-off	boastful
casual	outspoken	aggressive	rude
forceful	pleasure-seeking	sarcastic	sees self
			running show.

FEMININE:

<u>Positive</u>		<u>Negative</u>	
loves children	responsible	dependent	weak
patient	emotional	needs approval	bashful
appreciative	loyal	nervous	shy
grateful	gentle	timid	anxious
devotes self to others		self-critical	worrying
sensitive to needs of others			

SOCIAL DESIRABILITY:

<u>Positive</u>	<u>Negative</u>
interesting	tense
self-sufficient	rash
logical	childlike
clear-thinking	absent-minded
resourceful	silly

The third questionnaire used is one devised by Eysenck and

reported in "Sex and Personality" (1976). Eysenck surveyed sexual attitudes using 427 males and 436 females aged 18 to 60 years with a mean age of about 30 years. Eysenck sought to establish the "major factors in people's attitudes to sex" with an analysis of responses to 135 questions. The same questions are given to males and females, however, different wording is necessary with some questions to make them applicable to the sex of the subject. 'Yes', 'no', or 'don't know' answers are required.

Kinsey started the "proper investigation of human sexuality" according to Eysenck (1976). Eysenck is, however, critical of the approach that collects interesting but not scientifically important 'facts' such as the average number of times a couple have sexual intercourse in a week. The purpose of "Sex and personality" is, according to Eysenck, to bring a scientific focus to the "very marked differences in human sexual behaviour". The results of the investigation are not used to produce demographic information: the concern is with the degree to which the questions in the questionnaire are correlated, the factors pertaining to sexual attitudes that they give rise to, and the correlations of these factors with personality factors. Eysenck's questionnaire is included as it provides an opportunity in discriminant analysis to show that homosexuality is strongly related to 'deviancy' of sexual attitudes and if this is so then discriminant analysis would reveal this

'deviancy' of the homosexual identity rather than the predicted relationship of homosexuality and gender identity. Homosexual male deviancy (compared to heterosexual male and to heterosexual female attitudes) would strongly argue against the experimental hypothesis and the theory from which it is derived.

Fourteen factors have been identified by Eysenck's questionnaire. The number of items in each of the eleven primary factors is shown in brackets: permissiveness (14), satisfaction (12), neurotic sex (13), impersonal sex (14), pornography (8), sexual shyness (6), prudishness (9), sexual disgust (6), sexual excitement (9), physical sex (10), and aggressive sex (6). There are two second order factors: sexual satisfaction (16) and sexual libido (36), and also a masculinity - femininity scale (50). The results of Eysenck's survey shows that male-sex means are higher than female-sex means on permissiveness, neurotic sex, impersonal sex, pornography, sexual shyness, sexual excitement, physical sex, libido (second order factor) and masculinity - femininity. Female-sex means are higher than male-sex means on satisfaction, prudishness, sexual disgust, aggressive sex and the second order factor sexual satisfaction. As expected, the female-sex mean is lower than the male-sex mean on masculinity - femininity. Some of these differences are observed to be quite small and probably not significant. Eysenck says:

the means of the various scales show interesting

sex-differences. Males clearly have higher scores on permissiveness, impersonal sex, pornography, excitement and physical sex; this is very much what popular wisdom (and previous studies) would have led one to expect. Women have higher scores on satisfaction, disgust, and prudishness; these too accord with previous work ... (1976, p. 104).

Table 5.

Alpha coefficient reliabililies of the Eysenck scales for males and females.

	SCALE	RELIABILITY	
		Males	Females
1	Permissiveness	0.84	0.83
2	Satisfaction	0.82	0.83
3	Neurotic sex	0.74	0.72
4	Impersonal sex	0.85	0.81
5	Pornography	0.78	0.78
6	Sexual shyness	0.72	0.66
7	Prudishness	0.58	0.61
8	Sexual disgust	0.54	0.65
9	Sexual excitement	0.66	0.77
10	Physical sex	0.65	0.61
11	Aggressive sex	0.47	0.51
12	Masculinity - femininity	0.80	0.80
13	Libido	0.90	0.89
14	Sexual satisfaction	0.82	0.81

Scales 1 to 6 and 12 to 14 have reliabilities in excess of 0.70

and are satisfactory. Scales 7 to 11 have low reliabilities and Eysenck does not recommend their use except for group comparisons (such as the studies of this dissertation).

The validity of these scales is not well documented in "Sex and personality". The factors and their means do however accord, as Eysenck says, with 'popular wisdom' and 'previous studies'. He also has used four personality scales (psychoticism, extraversion, neuroticism, and the Lie scale) and the correlations of the sexual attitudes factors amongst themselves and to these personality scales have consistency. Thus the question of psychological significance is of central importance in this study should one or more of these 'sexual attitudes' scales be important in the subsequent analysis. There does not appear to be published any report using these scales in a homosexual population, nor is Eysenck aware of any such studies (private correspondence).

Two questions of Eysenck's questionnaire could not be readily rewritten to be appropriate to homosexual subjects and so 133 questions were used. Of these, 50 questions are used in the masculinity - femininity scale. On this scale low scoring male or female subjects are 'feminine' and high scoring male or female subjects are 'masculine'. Since masculinity and femininity are not scored independently in this scale, subjects scoring high on this scale are regarded as masculine and not

feminine, and vice versa for low scorers. Subjects must therefore be masculine or feminine (or intermediate) as compared to the PDQ where the subject may be both masculine and feminine (or one, or neither).

Procedure

Subjects were asked to take part in a research project to compare the three groups on sexual attitudes and behaviour. The questionnaire was described briefly and the subjects assured of anonymity. Subjects were given a survey booklet and arrangements were made to collect it. Of the subjects approached for this study over 95% completed the questionnaire.

Design

Since sexual attitudes probably vary with age and years of education the groups were matched on these two variables. The results were analysed using discriminant analysis and a posteriori comparisons.

In discriminant analysis a set of variables is measured in two or more identifiable groups to produce linear combinations of those variables that maximally discriminate amongst the groups. As part of the discriminant analysis an ordering of the variables is obtained to the extent to which they best

discriminant amongst the groups. In this study with 22 attributional variables it is appreciated that with this number of dependent variables and an average cell size of 38 the analysis will lack statistical power as it could capitalize on chance. The integrity of the procedure is protected by the use of the Bonferroni correction which requires that alpha be set at 0.05 divided by the number of attributional variables. Variables were not entered into the stepwise discriminant analysis unless they survived this criterion. Because of the possibility of spurious results due to capitalization on chance, Study 2 will replicate the same results.

This discriminant analysis allows for the simultaneous discrimination of the three groups. A stepwise method was used to find the two discriminating functions: the maximum allowed with three groups. Discriminant analysis then uses these discriminating functions to predict the classification of each subject and gives a percentage measure of correct predictability. This predictability is a measure of the utility of the discriminant functions.

A posteriori comparisons are used to statistically distinguish the homosexual group from the two heterosexual groups. The homosexual group is compared separately to both of the heterosexual groups. Only those variables significant and therefore entered into the discriminant analysis are subject to

a posteriori comparisons.

It is hypothesized that there will be two attributional variables that will be explanatory in predicting the active variables of sexual preference and biological sex. The two attributional variables should be 'crossed-sex' gender identity and bio-sociality. Thus one discriminant function should be 'crossed-sex' gender identity and this should discriminate the homosexual group from the heterosexual groups. The other discriminant function should be bio-sociality and variables such as social sex-role and sex-difference traits should discriminate the biological males from the biological females (i.e., the sexes).

While this statistical analysis may be considered to lack power it is here appropriate. In this design, which tests alternative hypotheses of the origin of homo- and hetero-sexuality in the personality, gender identity (with a psychological frame of reference) has to compete with many other bio-social variables (with a sociological frame of reference) to be seen as statistically related to, and therefore explanatory of, sexual preference. Gender identity is the one variable theoretically predicted to discriminate the homo- and hetero-sexual groups: capitalization on chance with only the one predicted variable amongst 21 other variables (which in conventional theories are supposed to explain homosexuality) is

remote.

Furthermore, bio-sociality (and the thinking of the 'third-person' relationship that this implies) has often been used in an attempt to explain homosexuality. In this design it can be shown that bio-sociality is not related to sexual preference even when a large number of variables which show sex differences (such as social sex-role scales) are included, and this should also capitalize on chance to the detriment of the experimental hypothesis. The ability of the bio-social scale measures to discriminate the sexes and not sexual preference groups would be strong evidence that bio-sociality is not related to homosexuality and that the 'male' and 'female' of sexual identity is not related to the 'male' and 'female' of gender identity.

In summary, in Study 1 there are two active variables: sexual preference and biological sex. It is hypothesized that gender identity will be the main discriminator of the sexual preference groups and that bio-sociality will be the discriminator of biological sex groups. It is hypothesized that bio-social variables (social sex-role and other sex-difference scales) will not be discriminators of sexual preference groups. The hypothesized prediction for each variable is shown individually in Appendix 1.

STUDY 2

Study 2 uses the Cass (1984) scale of 'Homosexual identity formation' and the subject's sex to classify subjects into three groups: homosexual male, heterosexual male and heterosexual female. The measure of the active variable of sexual preference is changed from Study 1. The Kinsey Heterosexual - Homosexual scale is well known and used and divides subjects into seven groups. In the first study only the extremes of this scale were used and intermediate subjects (3, 4, and 5) were not included. Since developmentally homosexuals are typically socialized as heterosexual it seemed likely that the intermediate subjects on the Kinsey scale would also identify with some stage on the Cass scale. This was in fact found to be so. The intermediate subjects on the Kinsey scale are likely to be 'new homosexuals' making a change in their sexual preference enactment. In 'measures' (which follows) the Cass scale is discussed as a better device than the Kinsey scale to dichotomize homosexuals and heterosexuals.

This study attempts to repeat the results of study 1 and thereby confirm that gender identity is the major discriminator of sexual preference groups and that bio-sociality discriminates the sexes. This would again show no relationship between sexual preference and bio-sociality, or between sexual preference and sexual identity (biological sex). This would support the

theoretical relationship between sexual preference and the gender of the self as subject. This study also aims to test the prediction from social frame theory that homosexual males are (pathologically) deviant compared to heterosexual comparisons and, therefore, the conclusion that homosexual males (like heterosexual females) are gender-female.

Sexual preference and biological sex are again the active variables and these should be related to gender identity and to bio-sociality respectively. There are 28 attributional variables. Of these, 7 are repeated from Study 1 (Eysenck's masculinity - femininity scale, and the 6 scales of the PDQ). The positive and negative scores of the PDQ are totalled for masculinity and for femininity and used as variables. There are 18 other variables used which could be expected to relate to sexual preference if sexual preference is related to bio-sociality (with its referent in sexual identity) as commonly proposed.

Besides repeating the test to the same results of Study 1, an ancillary test of Study 2 is the predicted classification of subjects in Study 2 from the discriminant functions of Study 1. The discriminant analysis procedure compares this predicted classification to the observed classification and reports this as a measure of percentage correct predictability. The degree to which the predicted and observed classifications correspond is

thus an indication of the interrelatedness of sexual preference and gender identity.

Subjects

Heterosexual males (n=34), heterosexual females (n=33), and homosexual males (n=124) were recruited mainly through friendship networks though some homosexual males (n=7) and one heterosexual male were recruited by advertisements. Some of the subjects from Study 1 were retested in Study 2 - 27 (21.8%) of the homosexual males, 16 (47.1%) of the heterosexual males, and 17 (51.5%) of the heterosexual females. The time interval between study 1 and 2 was 10 months. As in Study 1 the three groups were matched for age distribution and years of education. The homosexual group was classified by a non-zero score on the Cass scale: the heterosexual subjects were classified by sex and a zero score on the Cass scale.

Measures

The active variable sexual preference was measured by both the modified Kinsey scale (as in Study 1) and the Cass scale. The modified Kinsey scale has been previously described in Study 1. The Kinsey scale was used in study 1 to classify subjects as heterosexuals or homosexuals. Intermediate subjects were not used and this eliminated one subject. Since no information was available in the literature to compare the Kinsey and Cass classifications, both were used in Study 2.

Kinsey et al. (1948) give little theoretical reasoning for the construction of the heterosexual - homosexual scale apart from pointing to a (supposedly) continuous masculine - feminine scale. Factually, Kinsey et al. (1948) found that the overwhelming majority of adult men are exclusively heterosexual, about 5% are exclusively homosexual, and a small percentage are intermediate. The huge percentage of exclusive adult heterosexuals speaks more of a discontinuity than a continuity with homosexuality (Barnhouse, 1977, p105).

The assumptions of the Kinsey scale requires some clarification. Psychometrically the scale is like the older masculinity - femininity scales, such as Eysenck's (1976), which were used before femininity and masculinity were shown to be independent. The subject who is both highly masculine and feminine is forced to make an either/or choice despite the scale's appearance of being continuous. Thus it seems that heterosexuals use the 0 of the Kinsey scale and the homosexuals use 1 to 6 (or equivalents on modified scales). This bears a strong similarity to the Cass scale where (intentionally) heterosexuals score 0 and homosexuals use stages 1 to 6. In other words, for the heterosexual there is no 'continuity' on either scale (only zero), while for the homosexual there is some dimension which can be meaningfully divided into a scale.

The Kinsey scale compares a man's sexual behaviour with others. This will be recognized as the same methodology of same-sex comparison as Freund et al. (1974, 1977) used to measure 'gender' as FGI. In practice however the heterosexual response is attenuated and the homosexuals (or bi-sexuals perhaps) use the remaining 6 points: remarkably like the Cass scale which is designed that way. The effect is twofold: to dichotomize the heterosexuals from the homosexuals and to allow within-group comparisons of the homosexuals as measured by points 1 to 6 of the scale. Again this is similar to the Cass scale.

The Kinsey scale, when used as in Study 1, dichotomizes homosexual and heterosexual males. When the full Kinsey scale is used two things appear to happen: there is dichotomization and assortment. There is a dichotomy between the heterosexuals and the homosexuals. Nearly all heterosexuals use the 'exclusively heterosexual' category. The homosexuals appear to assort over the remaining categories. These categories compare the homosexuals with each other (while retaining the dichotomy between heterosexuals). The Kinsey scale confounds two frames of reference: the homosexual - heterosexual comparison with its psychological frame of reference in gender identity, and the homosexual - homosexual comparison with its psychological frame of reference in the different 'second-' and 'third-person' relationships of the homosexual to that subjective gender

identity. The Cass scale, repeating the same dichotomy between homosexual and heterosexual and the assortment of homosexuals, contains the same psychological referents.

The Kinsey or Cass scale, when used with males only, is a between and a within design. It is a between design in that it separates the homosexual male group from the heterosexual male group. It is a within design in that it assort the homosexual males on a continuum and therefore into groups which are all characterized by homosexuality. The Cass scale intentionally creates a dichotomy and an assortment whereas these are confounded in the Kinsey scale. The Cass scale assumes a dichotomy between homosexual and heterosexual whereas the Kinsey scale assumes a continuum.

When the full range of the Kinsey scale is intended to be used the results are confounded by the lack of a clear distinction between the two implicit measures in the one scale (that is, type of sexual preference and identification with that sexual preference). Kinsey et al. (1948) erroneously assume that homosexuality and heterosexuality are continuous whereas the model of homosexuality proposed indicates a subjective dichotomy between homosexual males and heterosexual males (male or female gender identity).

The Cass scale intends to dichotomize heterosexuals

(pre-stage 0) from homosexuals (stages 1-6), which the Kinsey scale does by default of attenuation, and intentionally assort the homosexuals through 6 stages. Unlike the Kinsey scale, the results of the Cass scale are not intended to be used to compare heterosexuals and homosexuals. The Cass scale can be so used to dichotomize heterosexuals and homosexuals and this is done in this study. Used like this it implicitly dichotomizes the two male groups (homosexuals and heterosexuals) by their different gender identities.

By presenting two separate scales of masculinity and femininity the problem of attenuation in sex-role scales that used the masculinity - femininity continuum was resolved. Masculinity and femininity are shown to be independent. Similarly it appears that the (so-called) heterosexual - homosexual continuum can be similarly un-confounded. One of the implicit measures is that which identifies homosexual and heterosexual. Sexual preference is theoretically related to gender identity: the FGI scale should therefore measure this variable implicit in the Kinsey scale. The other implicit measure in the Kinsey scale is that which measures the degree of identification with that gender identity (and, therefore, with homo- or hetero-sexuality): the Cass scale should therefore measure this variable implicit in the Kinsey scale. (There is however no heterosexual equivalent of the Cass scale).

"Homosexual identity formation" (Cass, 1984) is a six-stage measure of homosexual development which also includes a pre-stage 1 category (herein labelled 'stage 0') that defines heterosexual preference. Using two measures of the independent variable (sexual preference) allowed a comparison of both scales. Study 1 showed that few subjects self-rated themselves as 3, 4, or 5 on the modified Kinsey scale. In comparing the results of these different scales it was apparent that subjects who scored 3 to 7 on the Kinsey scale, and some 2's (four subjects), also self-described as homosexual (non-zero score on the Cass scale). There is some antipathy to identifying as homosexual and so it appears likely that those subjects who do so on the Cass scale are genuinely homosexual whereas those subjects who describe themselves as heterosexual on the Kinsey scale (and possibly stage 0 on the Cass scale) may include some subjects who are psychologically homosexual but who do not make, or don't want to make, a homosexual identification.

The Cass scale is probably a better discriminator of homosexuals from heterosexuals because those subjects who identify as homosexual are positively identified by the Cass scale but not by the Kinsey scale. (It is plausible for some homosexuals to self-report as heterosexuals but it is most unlikely that heterosexuals would self-report as homosexual). Though the difference of four subjects between the two classificatory devices is perhaps small, the unambiguous

dichotomy and the separation of the two implicit but confounded constructs (of gender identity, and of identification) in the Kinsey scale appears to make the Cass scale a more valid classificatory device.

The Cass scale is used in Study 2 to distinguish homosexual and heterosexual subjects. Study 3 uses the Cass scale to distinguish the low, middle, and high homosexual identity groups as the independent variable. The stages of the Cass scale are differentiated by the cognitive, behavioural, and affective dimensions typical of those stages. A 210-item questionnaire was developed by Cass to measure the affective, cognitive and behavioural dimensions of the process of identity development. The model of development was used to predict how ideal individuals at each stage should respond. Each stage was therefore characterised by expected response patterns (profiles) on the questionnaire. The validity of the scale was established in three ways using 166 male and female homosexual subjects: by testing two hypotheses derived from this model and a discriminant analysis.

Firstly, according to an 'across-profiles' hypothesis the "actual response patterns of subjects nominated a priori to a particular stage would show greatest similarity (highest score) with the predicted profile of that stage, compared with the predicted profiles of all other stages" and that their scores

should diminish across the profiles (Cass, 1984, p. 153). Thus stage 1 subjects should score most highly on those items predicted from the questionnaire to be most typical of the stage 1 profile and their scores should diminish across the profiles from stage 2 to 6. Strong empirical support was given for stages 1, 5, and 6, while stages 2 and 4 were close to significance.

Secondly, according to an 'across-groups' hypothesis the "actual response patterns of the subjects nominated a priori to that stage would show greatest similarity (highest score) with the predicted profile when compared with those subjects at other stages" (Cass, 1984, p. 154) so that for the Stage 1 profile, Stage 1 subjects should obtain the highest score on this profile, with Stage 2 to 6 subjects showing progressively lesser scores. And similarly for each of the profiles. This hypothesis was well supported for all of the profiles though there was a reversal for subjects between Stages 2 and 3.

Thirdly, a discriminant analysis supported the allocation of subjects into six groups. The analysis correctly classifies 97.0% of the subjects.

Unlike the Kinsey scale the Cass scale is theory-based and is well described psychometrically. Cass observes that subjects seldom identify solely with one stage but often with two adjacent stages. This is not unexpected in a scale that measures

a developmental continuum. Thus while six stages can be recognized, for pragmatic reasons of subject numbers, collapsing these into three stages (low, middle, high) herein should not be theoretically problematic.

Some measures described and used in Study 1 are repeated in Study 2. Those measures repeated are: part A of the 'cross-gender' identity scale (FGI in males, Freund et al., 1977; MGI in females, Blanchard & Fruend, 1983); the 'masculinity - femininity' scale composed of 50 items taken from Eysenck's (1976) questionnaire on sexual attitudes and behaviours in adult populations; and the 'Personality Description Questionnaire' or PDQ, form A (Antill et al., 1981). Of particular interest is the 'feminine positive' scale of the PDQ shown to be significant in study 1.

The Reynold's (1982) Form C of the 'Social Desirability Scale' describes behaviours which are culturally approved but which are improbable - it uses the same rationale as the MMPI Lie Scale. This is a short (13-item) version of the original Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Form C was developed on the basis of 608 undergraduate student responses to the 33-item Marlowe-Crowne scale. Sex-differences on Form C were not found and nor were they expected based on previous findings.

Internal consistency of the Form C measured by the

Kuder-Richardson formula 20 is 0.76 (compared to 0.82 for the Marlowe-Crowne). The range of items-to-total-score correlations for Form C is 0.32 - 0.47 with a mean of 0.38 (compared to 0.13 - 0.49, and a mean of 0.32, for the Marlowe-Crowne). Both measures show satisfactory reliability.

The concurrent validity is shown by the product-moment correlations between Form C and the Marlowe-Crowne ($r = 0.93$, $p < 0.001$), and with the Edwards Social Desirability Scale ($r = 0.41$, $p < 0.001$). The lower but significant correlation of the Edwards-SDS and Form C are consistent with similar correlations of the Marlowe-Crowne and Edwards-SDS reported by Reynolds (1982):

The PDQ (fully described in Study 1) contains two five-item scales called 'social desirability positive' and 'social desirability negative'. These scale are composed of items which are equally and frequently endorsed by males and females. The Form C utilizes behaviours which while culturally approved are, however, infrequent. High scores on Form C therefore suggest a distortion or response bias ('lying'). Since 'response bias' is a potentially important determinant of subject responses it is included as a measure in Study 2 to preclude response bias accounting for results. Were this variable to reach significance it would cast doubt on the validity of the results of these studies.

Measures of anxiety:

The hypothesis of anxiety existing in the absence of spontaneity predicted by the persons-grammar theory does not specify any particular form of anxiety. The 'SCL-90-R' (Derogatis, 1983) is a 90-item self-report symptom inventory designed to assess psychological symptoms during the past week. It is a clinical and research instrument that gives both a global measure of psychological distress over the past week and indices of specific pathologies, including two measures of anxiety. The SCL-90-R is scored on 9 aspects of pathology (number of items shown in brackets): somatization (12), obsessive-compulsive (10), interpersonal sensitivity (9), depression (13), anxiety (10), hostility (6), phobic anxiety (7), paranoid ideation (6), and psychoticism (10). As well the GSI (Global Severity Index) is the summed total of all scores and "represents the best single indicator of the current level or depth of the disorder, and should be utilized in most instances where a single summary measure is required" (Derogatis, 1983, p. 11). The 90 items are rated by the subject on a 5 point scale from 0 ('not at all') to 4 ('extremely').

The inclusion of this instrument, which takes about 12 minutes to complete, allows for an identification of the type of anxiety but also, by including the non-anxiety scales, allows

also for the exclusion of variables such as depression which are not hypothesized (except as a null-hypothesis). The inclusion of anxiety and non-anxiety variables is intended to demonstrate both aspects of a test: if non-anxiety measures are not included they cannot be shown to be significant or explanatory. The inclusion of non-anxiety variables allows for the conclusion, for example, that depression is not related to spontaneity.

Reliability estimates for the SCL-90-R are of two types: internal consistency and test-retest. Coefficient alpha for the 9 dimensions varies between 0.77 and 0.90. Test-retest estimates vary between 0.78 and 0.86. Factorial invariance refers to constancy of the construct across subject parameters such as sex and class. The greater the invariance the more the construct is generalizable. The '90' shows high levels of invariance between males and females for 8 of the dimensions and a moderate level for the ninth (paranoid ideation).

Since its introduction in 1975 the '90' has been used extensively as a self report symptom inventory in a "very broad spectrum of clinical research" (Derogatis, 1983, p. 17). The '90' was contrasted with the MMPI to determine equivalence of the constructs. Results of this study reported by Derogatis (1983) show a high degree of convergence. A similar study correlated the symptom dimensions of the '90' and the Middlesex Hospital Questionnaire. The lowest correlation is phobic anxiety

($r = 0.36$; and for anxiety $r = 0.74$). A partial review of the uses of the '90' show it to be used clinically in sexual disorders, psychopharmacological research, stress syndromes and meditation, drug abuse, many medical contexts including anorexia nervosa, psychological sequelae of ileal bypass, oncology, chronic pain, sleep disturbances, and in psychiatric research. It has been used both as a screening device and as an outcomes measure.

Construct validation of the '90' was demonstrated by using the 83 items of the 9 symptom dimensions in a hypothesis matrix (9 dimensions by 83 items). The matrix was binary with each item loading '1' onto its postulated dimension and '0' on the remaining 8 dimensions. Data from 1002 psychiatric patients on the '90' were then intercorrelated resulting in an 83 by 83 correlation matrix. This was factor analyzed with principal components method. The factors were rotated and compared to the hypothesized structure of the '90'. (This data is summarized in Derogatis, 1983, p. 26). The empirical - theoretical match is excellent. There is however some overlap between Anxiety and Phobic Anxiety. This study demonstrates, together with the many convergent studies referred to above, that "the hypothetical symptom constructs of the SCL-90-R may be recovered from real clinical data, and further, that these empirical measures correlate well with established and accepted external criterion measures" (Derogatis, 1983, p. 27).

Derogatis notes that there is a "significant relationship between sex and levels of pathology" (1983, p. 13). Unfortunately, Derogatis does not specify which scales show sex-differences. Since sex-differences are being investigated in this study raw scores are used which do not mask this potential difference.

The 'Index of Homophobia' (IHP) measures the "response of fear, disgust, anger, discomfort, and aversion that individuals experience in dealing with gay people" (Hudson & Ricketts, 1980, p. 358). This definition of homophobia addresses a sense of dread of being in close proximity to homosexuals rather than the domain of general anti-gay sentiments called homonegativism. This scale measures "affective response to homosexual men and women" rather than the more general measures, such as, attitudes towards homosexuality (1980, p. 359). Hudson and Ricketts (1980) distinguish this measure from 'personal anxiety' seen as a more global measure which includes anxiety arising in situations not involving gay people. This scale measures a type of anxiety which arises as the result of proximity to, or interaction with, homosexual people. That 'homophobia' is fear or anxiety is a moot point. While this difference is perhaps debatable the use of the IHP scale itself is clearly relevant as a variable which may have explanatory power in male homosexuality and homosexual identity development.

The IHP scale is designed for use with heterosexual subjects. Since homosexuals are usually considered to have been taught heterosexuality - the Cass scale measures the change in identification from heterosexual conditioning to homosexuality - there is no reason why it cannot also be used with homosexuals. The interpretation of homosexual scores is not so clear however since homosexuals scoring high on this scale may be indicating a fear of homosexual others - the IHP's 'face validity' - but also perhaps a fear of one's homosexual self.

300 persons, with a mean age of 24.4 years, and with a variety of ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds were tested with the IHP to establish its reliability and validity. The coefficient alpha was 0.90. This high reliability gives this scale good measurement characteristics.

Construct validity was established in two ways. It was argued that homophobic persons are also more likely to be more conservative and a positive correlation was therefore predicted between the IHP and the Sexual Attitudes Scale (SAS: $r = 0.53$). Another method was to measure the IHP's relationship to 'clinically relevant dysfunctions' - a psychosocial screening questionnaire designed to specify the severity of 20 of an individual's problems. A measure of 'personal distress' from this screening device correlated with the IHP ($r = 0.16$). A

measure of 'interpersonal relationship disorder' (IRD) from the screen correlated with the IHP ($r = - 0.14$). The negative correlation was unexpected. An examination of the IRD items showed that only one of its eight items was significantly correlated with IHP scores: it was both significantly and negatively correlated. Given that the 'homophobia' construct has not had a clear definition nor measuring instrument, there are few established criteria for examining its construct validity. The findings presented so far argue that the IHP has good construct validity. The authors' suggestion to modify questions 12, 18, 19, 20 and 21 to improve the scale was herein followed.

The SAS and the IHP were further used in an investigation of the validity of the IHP: each item of the IHP should correlate more with the IHP-total than with SAS-total. All but one item of the IHP did so and most were statistically significant. All IHP items, except 21, correlated with IHP-total at 0.40 or better.

No significant sex-differences were found in this scale which appears to be a unidimensional measure of homophobia. The scale has 25 items, both positive and negative, and subjects self-rate on a five point scale.

Levenson's (1981) 'locus of control' has been included as a well documented and widely used construct with all three of its subscales related to anxiety. The subscales, each with 8 items

are: the Internal Scale (I), measuring a belief in an internal locus of control; the Powerful Others Scale (P), measuring a belief in control by others who are more powerful than self; and, the Chance Scale (C), measuring a belief that events are not controlled but are random. The subject responds using a six-point scale.

The I Scale is "consistently positively related to measures of sociability, while the C Scale is negatively related to the sense of well being and responsibility. ... the P Scale is related positively to suspiciousness" (Levenson, 1981). Both belief in 'powerful others' and in 'chance' are positively correlated with anxiety, while 'internality' is negatively correlated with depression and anxiety (Levenson, 1981). In the initial validating study male adults were found to have significantly higher P scale scores than adult females. No differences were found on the I or C scales. This finding has been replicated once. In three other same culture studies no differences were found.

The I, P, and C Scales originated in Levenson's reconceptualization of Rotter's I-E Scale. They are composed of items adapted from Rotter's scale and statements written for these three specific dimensions. The original 36 items were pretested with item analyses and correlations with the Marlowe-Crowne Desirability Scale. The scores on these scales

can be used as dependent variables (as in this study) though they can also be used as independent variables.

Internal consistency estimates are moderate. Kuder-Richardson reliabilities for a student sample ($N = 152$) were 0.64 for the I scale, 0.77 for the P scale, and 0.78 for the C scale. Using an adult sample ($N = 115$) showed similar results (0.51, 0.72, and 0.73 respectively). A psychiatric sample also showed similar results (0.67, 0.82, and 0.79).

Spearman-Brown split-half reliabilities are 0.62, 0.66, and 0.64 for the same scales. Test-retest reliabilities for a one-week period vary from 0.60 to 0.79 while a 7-week interval found comparable correlations of 0.66, 0.62, and 0.73).

329 undergraduates were tested with the three scales and the 24 items were principle components factor analysed. Seven factors accounted for 52% of the variance. The first factor was composed entirely of P scale items, the second entirely of I scale items, and the third entirely of C scale items. 17 of the 24 items loaded onto these first three factors. This empirical study supports the theoretical basis of this Locus of Control scale. Furthermore, using a psychiatric sample the same three factors were found in a factor analysis. Other studies have examined the relationships amongst the three scales of the Locus of Control, their relationship to Rotter's scale, to other

psychometric tests (CPI and 16PF), and demographic and cross-cultural effects. These studies have shown a pattern of "theoretically expected positive and negative relationships with other variables" (Levenson, 1981, p. 23).

Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975) argue that when attention is 'turned inward' a reason for anxiety may be found: that anxiety is a by-product of self-consciousness. The 'Self-Consciousness Scale' (Fenigstein et al., 1975) is a 23-item scale with three subscales: private self-consciousness, public self-consciousness, and social anxiety, the latter two being correlated. The trait 'self-consciousness' is defined as the "consistent tendency of persons to direct attention inward or outward" (1975, p. 522). It has two components - one private and one public. Both public and private self-consciousness "refer to a process of self-focussed attention" (1975, p. 523). Private self-consciousness is concerned with attending to one's own thoughts and feelings and is regarded by these authors as similar to Jung's introversion concept. Public self-consciousness is concerned with oneself as a social object having an effect on others and is regarded by these authors as similar to Mead's (1934) 'role of other' as reactions of others to self.

Prior to final completion of the scale it was given to nine samples with a total $n=1821$. The same three factors emerged

consistently. The final scale was given to 179 male and 253 female college students. The factor loadings and norms for males and females were similar and so combined. Factor analysis showed the expected three factors. To check the stability of the three factors and the norm's reliability the scale was then given to another 152 college undergraduates with similar results. 84 subjects also completed the scale twice with a test-retest interval of 2 weeks. Test-retest correlations for the total score were 0.80: private self-consciousness, 0.79; public self-consciousness, 0.84; and social anxiety, 0.73. No sex-differences were found.

The public self-consciousness subscale correlates moderately with social anxiety: in two samples $r=0.23$ and 0.26 , with $n=452$ and 152 respectively ($p<0.01$). Fenigstein (1979) gives an extreme example of public self-consciousness as the recently stigmatized person who is suddenly aware of other's reactions. This factor appears crucial in how others' evaluations affect ourselves (1979). It is significantly and positively correlated with general measures of anxiety (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). The 'Self-Consciousness Scale' is included since public self-consciousness is conceptualized as similar to Mead's concept of seeing oneself as a social object and can therefore be seen as a measure of detached objectivity ('third-person' relationship to self).

Private self-consciousness does not correlate with social anxiety and weakly to moderately with public self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheir & Buss, 1975; Fenigstein, 1979). Subjects high in this factor are expected to be more responsive to their changing affective states. Since subjects who are 'high' on the Cass scale can be construed as being responsive to themselves rather than to social expectations (re homosexuality), involved objectivity (high group) should be positively associated with private self-consciousness.

Both of the self-consciousness scales have been shown to be effective in social behaviour in laboratory contexts (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Women high in public self-consciousness were found to be more sensitive to rejection by peers, and in another experiment, subjects high in private self-consciousness were more responsive to their 'transient affective state' than were subjects low in private self-consciousness. This provides evidence of discriminant validity of the two measures.

The social anxiety subscale specifically measures anxiety arising in social contexts (Turner, Scheir, Carver & Ickes, 1978). Individuals experience social anxiety in that they intend to create a preferred impression but doubt that they will (Schenker & Leary, 1982). Since a 'new' homosexual is potentially alienated from friend and family, this should be measured as social anxiety since social anxiety is associated

with disaffiliation (Schlenker & Leary, 1982).

Procedure

Subjects were asked to take part in a research project to compare the three groups. Assurance was given that names would not be identified with individual protocols. Some subjects (n=7) were recruited via newspaper advertisements. The advertisements were designed to recruit subjects who were likely to identify as types 1 or 2 on the Cass scale. The homosexual's questionnaire return rate was 83.0%. The heterosexual's questionnaire return rate was 100%. The overall return rate was 90.1%.

Design

As in Study 1 the three groups were matched for age and years of education. The results are analysed using discriminant analysis and a posteriori comparisons. In discriminant analysis a set of dependent variables are measured in two or more identified groups and produce linear combinations of those dependent variables that maximally discriminate amongst the groups. As part of the discriminant analysis an ordering of the dependent variables is obtained to the extent to which they best discriminate amongst the groups. In this study with 28 dependent variables and with the smallest cell size of 33, it is appreciated that the analysis could lack statistical power.

There are reasons for using this design: some have been discussed in Design of Study 1. These other reasons are now discussed.

(i) In the discriminant analysis only those variables which survive the initial manova test and Bonferroni correction are entered into the stepwise discriminant analysis. Having a large number of variables from which the initial analysis is made to select entered variables may capitalize on chance. The integrity of the analysis is, however, protected by the Bonferroni correction which increases alpha to 0.05 divided by the number of dependent variables. Also a large number of dependent variables does not affect the discriminant analysis by producing spuriously high discriminant functions as would an equal number of variables as numbers of subjects in a multiple regression produce a perfect correlation. The argument of capitalizing on chance in this study is now further discussed.

(ii) An analogy is used to demonstrate the argument. The English system of justice requires that the defendant be proven guilty rather than it be incumbent on him to prove innocence. Also, the method to establish guilt is by reasoned arguments between prosecutor and defendant following the laws of evidence. Altman's (1972) "Homosexual: oppression and liberation", the restrictive homo-sexual practices acts in some Australian states, and the American experience reported by Teal (1971) in

"The gay militants" would lead one to believe, if one was to genuinely believe in the English justice system, that homosexuality is proven to be deviant, nay, even criminal.

One would expect, then, the evidence against homosexuality to be overwhelming to justify the oppression, including legal oppression, reported by Altman (1972) and Teal (1971) and which appears to have changed little in the fifteen years following those publications. Why? As anyone who has worked towards homosexual law reform or changing attitudes towards homosexuality in general will readily report, the task is not to prove guilt as English justice requires but to prove innocence. Proving innocence is problematic: how does anyone show that something is not something. In science this is the problem of the null hypothesis: it is not possible to prove the null hypothesis, a hypothesis can only be shown to be wrong.

The motivation for using so many dependent variables is, in essence, to show as in the analogy, 'lack of guilt'. Thus I have followed a 'law of evidence' - that the 'particulars' of the 'indictment' be specified. Study 1 uses many sex related variables to explore the possibility that one or some of these many variables may indict the 'deviancy' of homosexual subjectivity. Study 2 uses many variables of psychological pathology or correlates thereof to explore the possibility that one or some of these many variables may indict the 'deviancy' of

homosexuality. It is appropriate when testing null hypotheses to 'throw the book' to use a legal metaphor. This does not of course negate the argument that 'some mud sticks' - that some variables will show significance because of the increased chances of hitting the target with so much ammunition. 'Hits' can be tested to see if they are 'false hits' by repeating the test: this changes the status of the researcher (who is after all both the prosecutor and defendant) from having to prove 'innocence' to proving 'guilt'. Having changed the research design status, from testing a null hypothesis to testing a hypothesis, the social scientist can then proceed.

Replication is science's ultimate 'law of evidence'. Study 2 thus repeats the significant variables from Study 1. In homosexual research using the homosexual versus the heterosexual comparison the problem to this time has been to isolate an effect: despite research little is known psychologically (which is also empirically supported) about homosexuality. This argument uses a legal analogy to demonstrate a scientific principle: admissability of scientific evidence rests on the ability to repeat the same procedure to the same effect. The use of many dependent variables encourages 'deviancy' in the results, it can capitalize on chance and so doing this is antithetical to a null hypothesis. Using a large number of dependent variables to show no-effect strongly supports (but cannot prove) a null hypothesis. Chance is 'stacked against' the

null-hypothesis to support a finding of deviancy. If no statistical deviancy is found in the data this is evidence of no deviancy between the homosexuals and the heterosexuals.

(iii) Explorations by their very nature cast a wide net: the findings are then refined. The theory of persons-grammar which conceptually distinguishes sex and gender and which identifies a semantic confusion of male-sex and male-gender (and so on for 'female-') is new. The thinking, for example, that the heterosexual male is gender-female (and so on) is at least unconventional and probably radical. No new scales are devised and used herein and the method is traditional. What is radical is the testing of two different frames of reference that use the self as an object (biological sex) and as a subject (gender identity), and the explicit use of two different ways of thinking (integrated and dissociated) defined by these relationships of subject and object within the personality. The result is a radically different model of homosexuality to that historically proposed. Refinement is contra-indicated at the beginning of such an exploration: a data gathering approach driven by theory is appropriate. This design with a large number of dependent variables is consistent with a systems methodology (e.g., von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 55) that simultaneously seeks to prove a null-hypothesis of no relationship between dependent and independent variables (bio-sociality and sexual preference) and to show the hypothesized relationship of one dependent

variable (gender identity) and the independent variable (sexual preference).

With an overwhelming lack of knowledge (but many opinions) about homosexuality (and heterosexuality) the net needs - at first - to be widely cast. The meaning of traditional science comes from its ability to replicate effect. The statistical test does not in itself do this. The statistical test has become a short-cut method of showing scientific significance when in fact it can only show statistical significance measured as a probability. A necessary argument that statistical significance shows scientific significance is replication.

The results are analysed using a posteriori comparisons and discriminant analysis. Since the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable may be affected by the size of the sample, Omega squared values are given as an estimate of the strength of effect of the independent variable (Keppel, 1982). Omega squared values generally vary between 0 and 1: a 'large' effect in the behavioural sciences is a value of 0.15 or greater, while a 'medium' effect is 0.06, and a 'small' effect is 0.01 (Keppel, 1982).

The analyses are:-

(i) A stepwise discriminant analysis is used to find the two discriminant functions. The percentage of correct predictability is used to indicate the utility of the discriminant functions.

(ii) A posteriori comparisons of those variables repeated from Study 1 and entered into the discriminant analysis.

(iii) Discriminant analysis is used to predict the classification of subjects in Study 2 from the discriminant functions of Study 1. This procedure predicts the independent variable (the subjects' classification) from the dependent variables (the discriminating functions) and compares the prediction to the subjects' own classification. Some loss in predictive power is expected using this procedure.

Hypotheses

The substantive thesis is the theoretical relationship between gender identity and sexual preference and the identification of that gender as a male or a female. It is hypothesised that:

(i) The results of Study 1 will be repeated in this study, that is, sexual preference is predictive of gender identity; this is

interpreted as showing that the homosexual male and heterosexual female have the same gender identity which is opposite to that of the heterosexual male.

(ii) The results of Study 1 will be repeated in this study, that is, that bio-sociality is predictive of sexual identity; this is interpreted as showing that the homosexual and heterosexual male experience and learn the same enculturation, an enculturation that is (at least partially) different to that of the heterosexual female.

(iii) While sexual preference is hypothesized as being predictive of gender identity, it is also hypothesized that gender identity is also predictive of sexual preference. The interpretation of this partial cross-validation is that gender identity and sexual preference in homosexual males are interrelated as different aspects of homosexuality (i.e., the psychological intra- and sociological inter-personal aspects).

(iv) There are no significant differences in measures of pathology between the homosexual and heterosexual groups. Support for this hypothesis discredits the social frame theories of homosexuality which predict homosexual deviancy.

A hypothesis for each variable is stated in appendix 2.

STUDY 3

Subjects

The same homosexuals in Study 2 were classified into one of three groups based on their Cass scale score: low (scale scores 1, 2, and 3), middle (4, 5), and high (6). This was done as there were insufficient subjects in some categories and this classification is not contra-indicated by the psychometric properties of the Cass scale (1984). The group sizes were then $n=20$, $n=65$, and $n=39$ respectively. In the discriminant analysis six subjects were eliminated due to incomplete scores: the group sizes being $n=20$, $n=60$, and $n=38$ respectively.

Measures

All the measures used in Study 3 have been previously described in Study 1 or Study 2.

Procedure

Since Studies 2 and 3 were concurrent the procedure has been described in Study 2.

Design

Age and years of education were regarded as dependent rather than control variables and therefore there was no matching of the three homosexual groups. The results were analysed using discriminant analysis and a posteriori comparisons. Omega

squared values are used to show the strength of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variables without the effects of sample size.

In this discriminant analysis with 30 dependent variables (28 as in Study 2 plus age and years of education) and with a smallest cell size of 20 there is a lack of power. The reasons for tolerating a lack of power have already been discussed in Study 2. These same issues are also relevant in Study 3. (They are not discussed again here. Further reference is found in 'implications for science' in Chapter 7).

Of the 30 dependent variables, 18 can be said to be matching. There are not expected to be any differences between the three groups on these dependent variables: gender identity, PDQ (8 scales), Eysenck's masculinity - femininity, 7 scales of the SCL-90-R, and the Reynold's social desirability scale.

Of the remaining 12 variables, age and years of education are expected to vary as functions of the Cass scale. The 3 subscales of Levenson's (1981) 'locus of control', the 2 'self-consciousness' subscales, and the GSI (of the SCL-90-R) are not direct measures of anxiety but potentially provide a means of challenging the anxiety hypothesis by provoking the analysis with alternatives as measures known to be related to psychological pathology. Thus an analysis that showed homosexual

identity development to be strongly related to, for example, 'powerful others' of the locus of control construct, would be a strong argument against an anxiety hypothesis, and therefore against the theory developed in this thesis and the hypothesis that the homosexual male (and heterosexual female) is gender-male. These scales have been included because, in encouraging deviancy in the data, they make the support of the hypothesis more difficult.

The remaining four scales are measures of different constructs of anxiety: 'anxiety' and 'phobic anxiety' (agoraphobia) from the SCL-90-R, the 'social anxiety' subscale of 'self-consciousness', and 'homophobia' (IHP). The value of science is not restricted to showing positively what is. It is also valuable to show that something is not. In the social sciences this is probably so in the testing of commonly held but fallacious beliefs. This is analogous to establishing an alibi when the person is guilty at law until proven innocent. The design of this experiment has centred on the principle that provoking statistical deviancy would undermine the proposed model of homosexual identity. This is consistent with a principle of identity (in a system) that identity is not shown unless the entity is free to be different, deviant, free-willed, or spontaneous. In this design (e.g., that proposed by von Bertalanffy, 1968) variables that could be expected to be related to the null hypotheses and to the experimental

hypothesis are tested.

The Study 3 analyses are:-

(i) A stepwise discriminant analysis is used to find the two discriminant functions. The percent correct predictability is used to indicate the utility of the discriminant functions.

(ii) A posteriori comparisons of those variables entered into the stepwise discriminant analysis.

Hypotheses

There are two hypotheses:

(i) Homosexuality (gender identity of the subject) is not expected to vary with the independent variable of identification with self as subject (homosexual identity formation). Support for this hypothesis will be interpreted as showing the validity of a subjective psychological homosexuality ('being homosexual' related to gender identity) that is separate to the objective relationship (involved or detached) to this identity within the self. This would support the theory of persons-grammar which predicts the separateness of subjective function (role creating) and objective function (identification: taking own role and taking role of other) within the personality.

(ii) The independent variable of homosexual identity formation is expected to be predictive of anxiety. The relationship is predicted to be inverse: the more homosexual identity formation (taking own role or embodying the self) the less there is anxiety. This will be interpreted as support for the psychological theory of persons-grammar and for the proposed theory of sexual preferences. It would follow that pathology is strongly related to a 'third-person' relationship to oneself and not to homosexuality. Empirical support for this anxiety hypothesis is support for the theory of sexual preferences which theorizes the homosexual male being subjectively male (i.e., gender-male).

Hypotheses for each variable are stated in appendix 3.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS: Statistical and substantive.

The results are presented statistically and substantively. The results of each of the three studies are presented separately.

STUDY 1

These results are presented in the following order: (a) descriptive statistics, (b) discriminant analysis, and lastly, (c) a posteriori comparisons. In Study 1 the subject numbers are: $n=41$, $n=37$, and $n=35$ for heterosexual male, female, and homosexual male respectively.

(a) Descriptive statistics.

This section (a) is purely descriptive (tests of significance are below in section c). Higher scores on 'gender identity' (see Table 6, with a potential range from 0 to 19) indicate more 'crossed-sex' gender identity. Lower scores on 'crossed-sex' gender identity indicates an absence of this non-typical gender identity and (presumably) a typical gender identity. Heterosexual males and females are expected to have low scores on this variable: they are assumed (by the labelling of this variable in the literature) to have a gender identity congruent with their sex. The homosexuals are seen to score more highly on this variable than do either of the heterosexual groups: the homosexual group shows a higher level of 'crossed-sex' gender

identity, that is, a gender identity that is typical of heterosexual females.

Table 6.

Descriptive statistics for the heterosexual male (1), heterosexual female (2), and homosexual male (3).

SCALE	MEAN			STANDARD DEVIATION		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
<u>CROSSED-SEX GENDER IDENTITY:</u>						
gender identity	7.07	8.14	13.26	3.77	3.87	4.64
<u>PDO:</u>						
femimine positive	50.32	56.14	55.08	6.08	5.49	6.96
feminine negative	34.00	35.05	36.72	7.61	8.97	10.28
masculine positive	46.15	43.68	44.83	6.99	6.70	7.77
masculine negative	33.49	30.03	30.39	7.85	7.66	8.59
<u>soc. desirability:</u>						
positive	26.29	26.05	26.83	3.23	3.21	3.46
negative	16.46	16.38	16.11	4.30	3.62	5.03
<u>SEXUAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR:</u>						
permissiveness	36.76	37.11	38.61	4.22	2.74	3.69
satisfaction	27.49	28.08	28.33	5.35	5.56	5.77
neurotic sex	18.12	18.22	18.67	5.31	3.82	4.30
impersonal sex	24.27	20.08	27.78	5.93	3.95	6.16
pornography	21.61	18.57	22.94	3.10	4.07	2.46

continued over:

Table 6 continued.

SCALE	MEAN			STANDARD DEVIATION		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
sexual shyness	7.27	7.05	7.64	1.86	2.09	2.34
prudishness	9.59	10.51	9.64	1.47	2.04	1.51
sexual disgust	9.68	10.38	10.56	2.05	2.70	2.32
sex. excitement	18.68	16.05	18.28	2.92	4.38	2.85
physical sex	14.78	14.57	15.50	2.63	2.75	2.67
aggressive sex	10.27	9.97	9.53	2.60	2.07	2.59
age at first	18.29	18.68	17.69	3.02	2.84	5.32

intercourse

2nd order factors:-

sex. satisfaction	34.80	34.76	35.75	5.61	5.24	5.13
libido	84.51	76.86	90.83	12.08	8.72	7.58
masc. - fem.	111.66	98.27	116.50	9.10	9.70	9.40

The heterosexual male and female scores on the PDQ scales show the expected sex-differences: heterosexual males score more highly on masculine positive and negative, and heterosexual females score more highly on feminine positive and negative. The homosexual male scores are intermediate in feminine positive and both masculinity scales, while in feminine negative they score more highly than heterosexual females. In both PDQ measures of social desirability all three groups are similar.

Eysenck (1976) identified in adults 14 factors related to

sexual attitudes and behaviours, some of which showed sex-differences. The results show that four of these factors appear to fail to show the expected sex-difference. These are:- permissiveness, neurotic sex, aggressive sex and sexual satisfaction (2nd order factor).

Compared to the heterosexual comparisons, the means of the Eysenck factors show the homosexual male is less sexually aggressive. Those factors for which homosexual males are higher than both control groups are:- permissiveness, neurotic sex, satisfaction, sexual satisfaction, sexual disgust, impersonal sex, pornography, sexual shyness, physical sex, libido, and masculinity - femininity. Additionally, homosexual males were younger at first sexual intercourse. The homosexual male at first sexual intercourse has an average age of 17.69 years, the heterosexual male an average age of 18.29 years, and the heterosexual female 18.68 years. The homosexual male means are intermediate between those of the heterosexual males and females for prudishness and sexual excitement. Some of these differences are small. Also, while the factorial labels are descriptive of the identified factors it would probably be misleading to consider, for example, what was pornographic in 1976 as still so.

(b) Discriminant Analysis.

With 22 variables vis-a-vis the sample size there is a reduction in power. To ensure that chance results are kept to a minimum, the Bonferroni correction was applied and resulted in a criterion level of 0.0022. In discriminant analysis there is first a manova of the 22 variables. The variables entered into the discriminant analysis are selected according to criterion (Bonferroni correction = $0.05 / 22$). Only those variables which survived $\alpha < 0.0022$ are included in the stepwise discriminant analysis. Some variables may be correlated with each other and so the stepwise procedure may eliminate those correlated variables which do not further contribute to discrimination. Six variables are entered into this stepwise discriminant analysis. These are:- 'feminine positive', 'impersonal sex', 'pornography', 'libido', 'masculinity - femininity', and 'gender identity'. 'Impersonal sex' was eliminated in the discriminant analysis. The inter-correlation matrix of these six variables is shown in Table 7.

Table 7.

Pooled within-groups correlation matrix of variables entered into the discriminant analysis.

	FEM.	IMPER.	PORN.	LIB.	MASCL.	GENDER
	POS.	SEX			- FEM.	IDENT.
Fem. Positive	1.00					
Impersonal Sex	-0.23	1.00				
Pornography	0.03	0.29	1.00			
Libido	-0.16	0.75	0.65	1.00		
Masc. - Fem.	-0.13	0.76	0.54	0.81	1.00	
Gender Ident.	-0.01	0.04	-0.11	-0.07	0.00	1.00

The inter-correlation matrix of variables entered into the discriminant analysis shows that the variables impersonal sex, pornography, libido, and masculinity - femininity show considerable inter-correlations. Thus these Eysenck scales which measure predominantly masculine sex traits correlate amongst themselves but not with feminine positive or gender identity. The negative correlations of feminine positive with the masculine sex traits of impersonal sex, libido, and masculinity - femininity is therefore consistent. Neither feminine positive nor gender identity correlate highly with other variables. These variables are entered into the discriminant analysis and the results of this discriminant analysis are shown in Table 8.

Table 8.

The standardized canonical discriminant functions: coefficients and percent of variance.

	FUNCTION 1	FUNCTION 2
STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS:		
Feminine Positive	-0.05	0.63
Pornography	0.41	-0.27
Libido	-0.37	0.96
Masculinity - Femininity	0.89	-0.83
Gender Identity	0.51	0.65
PERCENT OF VARIANCE	65.55%	34.45%

Table 9.

Pooled within-groups correlations between the discriminating variables and the canonical discriminant functions.

	FUNCTION 1	FUNCTION 2
Masculinity - Femininity	0.81	-0.27
Libido	0.59	-0.03
Pornography	0.58	-0.14
Gender Identity	0.49	0.62
Feminine Positive	-0.09	0.57

Table 10.

Canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means.

GROUP	FUNCTION 1	FUNCTION 2
1 Heterosexual Males	0.05	-0.94
2 Heterosexual Females	-1.22	0.50
3 Homosexual Males	1.23	0.57




Figure 6.

Function 1

Canonical discriminant functions of Table 10 plotted as the group means.

The discriminant analysis produces two discriminant functions. The size and sign of the coefficients of function 1 show that masculinity - femininity, pornography and gender identity account for most of the predictability. Of the six variables entered into the analysis only feminine positive does not correlate positively with this function. Function 1 is the main discriminant function accounting for 65.55% of the variance: it discriminates the heterosexual females from the homosexual males with the heterosexual males intermediate. Overall, the main components of function 1 are ('crossed-sex') gender identity and masculinity.

The main variables contributing to function 2 are feminine positive, libido, gender identity, while masculinity - femininity contributes negatively. The main correlates with this function are gender identity and feminine positive and the negative (and therefore feminine) contribution of masculinity - femininity. Function 2 accounts for 34.45% of the variance: it discriminates the heterosexual males from the other two groups. Overall, the main components of function 2 are ('crossed-sex') gender identity and femininity.

Gender identity enters into both functions: the homosexual males are different from both heterosexual groups in having a 'crossed-sex' gender identity. They are also different to heterosexual males in having some 'feminine' qualities that are

also characteristic of heterosexual females. They are also different to heterosexual females in having some characteristic 'masculine' qualities that are also characteristic of heterosexual males. The heterosexual males are intermediate on function 1 - the homosexual males are more 'masculine' than the heterosexual males. In summary, function 1 discriminates the sexes and is the main discriminant function. Function 2 separates the heterosexual males from the homosexual males and heterosexual females.

Table 11.

Classification of subjects (using priors) into predicted group membership.

ACTUAL GROUP	No. of SUBJECTS	PRIOR PROB'S	PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP		
			1	2	3
1	41	0.36	27	8	6
Het. Males			65.9%	19.5%	14.6%
2	38	0.33	7	27	4
Het. Fem.			18.4%	71.1%	10.5%
3	35	0.31	6	2	27
Hom. Males			17.1%	5.7%	77.1%

Discriminant analysis is also used to predict group

membership and 77.1% of the homosexual males are correctly classified (with priors) using these discriminant functions. Overall, the analysis predicts the three groups with 71.05% accuracy compared to chance at approximately 33%.

(c) A Posteriori Comparisons.

A posteriori comparisons of those variables entered into the discriminant analysis were anticipated. Six variables were entered. Homosexual and heterosexual males are compared, as are homosexual males and heterosexual females. There are therefore 12 tests ($\alpha=0.0042$, $df=1,112$).

Table 12.

Comparisons of those variables entered into the discriminant analysis.

(A - comparison of homosexual males and heterosexual males,
B - comparison of homosexual males and heterosexual females.
* - significant differences).

	PLANNED COMPARISON			
	A		B	
	F	P	F	P
Gender Identity	43.44	0.000 *	28.21	0.000 *
Feminine Positive	11.35	0.001 *	0.70	0.409
Impersonal Sex	7.93	0.006	38.34	0.000 *
Pornography	3.13	0.076	34.64	0.000 *
Libido	7.73	0.007	39.61	0.000 *
Masculinity - Femininity	4.99	0.026	71.65	0.000 *

The six variables entered into the discriminant analysis were tested in statistical comparisons. The homosexual males are significantly different to both the heterosexual groups in 'crossed-sex' gender identity: the homosexual male has a higher level of 'crossed-sex' gender identity. The homosexual male is also different to the heterosexual male on the feminine positive variable. Compared to the heterosexual male, the homosexual male has significantly higher scores on two 'feminine' variables (gender identity, feminine positive). The homosexual male is also different to the heterosexual female on impersonal sex, pornography, libido, and masculinity - femininity. Homosexual males score more highly on these variables that are masculine sex traits and which reliably differentiate males and females. The homosexual male is discriminated from heterosexual females by higher levels of 'crossed-sex' gender identity, and also by masculine sex characteristics.

In summary, homosexual males are shown to be different to heterosexual males in 'crossed-sex' gender identity and in a measure of female bio-sociality ('feminine positive') but they are not different in masculine bio-sociality. The homosexual males are also shown to be different to heterosexual females in 'crossed-sex' gender identity and in masculine bio-social differences. Bio-socially the homosexual male, compared to the heterosexual female, is masculine and in some ways feminine, and, compared to the heterosexual male the homosexual male is

also bio-socially masculine and feminine. Compared to both heterosexual males and females the homosexual male is characterized by a higher 'crossed-sex' gender identity.

STUDY 2

These results are presented in the following order: (a) descriptive statistics, (b) discriminant analysis, (c) a posteriori comparisons, and last, (d) partial cross-validation. The subject numbers are: n=34 and n=33 for heterosexual males and females respectively and n=124 for homosexual males.

(a) Descriptive Statistics.

Table 13.

Descriptive statistics for the heterosexual males (1), heterosexual females (2), and homosexual males (3).

SCALE	MEAN			STANDARD DEVIATION		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Gender Identity	6.94	7.73	11.98	2.58	4.32	4.18
Masc. - Fem.	111.91	100.52	113.27	9.86	9.54	9.58
Feminine Positive	50.79	55.64	53.45	5.67	4.97	6.74
Feminine Negative	35.26	35.24	36.86	6.45	6.68	8.87
Feminine Total	86.06	90.79	90.31	8.36	9.26	10.95
Masculine Positive	44.00	43.76	43.35	5.98	5.87	7.84
Masculine Negative	31.85	30.27	29.52	7.09	6.82	7.95
Masculine Total	75.26	74.03	72.90	11.60	10.81	13.56

continued over:

Table 13 continued.

SCALE	MEAN			STANDARD DEVIATION		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Social Desirability:						
Positive	25.50	25.82	25.47	3.85	3.15	4.31
Negative	16.79	16.82	16.26	3.02	3.08	4.52
Social Desirability:						
Reynold's Form C	9.41	11.09	11.50	5.75	5.98	5.44
Somatization	40.18	29.06	44.85	33.74	31.42	35.67
Obsessive-Comp.	75.29	56.73	74.94	55.66	35.67	61.07
Interper. Sens.	62.65	64.55	73.73	49.42	54.05	71.33
Depression	61.71	64.85	73.88	49.58	52.97	65.76
Anxiety	36.18	38.00	49.02	45.53	50.37	55.87
Hostility	47.56	39.45	39.31	48.42	37.14	44.18
Phobic Anxiety	7.94	6.06	19.55	16.52	11.37	42.92
Paranoid Ideation	57.29	44.51	63.40	52.99	50.98	64.78
Psychoticism	22.65	22.27	40.82	26.21	30.11	51.59
GSI	47.00	44.06	55.93	34.31	32.28	48.75
Homophobia	65.97	60.03	46.40	14.93	11.69	13.42
Internality	35.41	34.76	35.39	4.48	4.32	6.22
Powerful Others	16.09	17.18	19.95	7.35	8.02	8.16
Chance	15.91	16.58	19.05	7.33	7.77	7.65
Priv. Self-consc.	22.74	23.79	22.23	6.52	7.00	5.89
Pub. Self-consc.	14.71	16.21	16.85	4.36	5.53	5.06
Social Anxiety	10.18	11.82	11.94	3.46	4.05	5.31

Some variables of Study 1 are repeated in Study 2. Statistically significant differences are presented in 'a posteriori comparisons' below. As in Study 1, homosexual males show a higher level of 'crossed-sex' gender identity and of masculinity - femininity (Table 13 above). As previously found, the homosexual males are higher than heterosexual males on feminine positive and negative. Different from Study 1 is the finding that homosexual males score lower than heterosexual females on masculine positive and negative. As previously found the scores on social desirability, both positive and negative are similar. Some of these observed differences are quite small.

Compared to the heterosexual comparisons, the homosexual males score lower on hostility, homophobia, and private self-consciousness and intermediate on internality and obsessive-compulsive. The homosexual males score higher on Reynold's Form C of social desirability, somatization, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, psychoticism, GSI, powerful others, chance, public self-consciousness and social anxiety.

(b) Discriminant Analysis.

The variables entered into the discriminant analysis are selected after an initial manova (Bonferroni criterion = 0.05 divided by 28). Only those three variables which survived alpha

< 0.0018 are entered into the stepwise discriminant analysis. These are:- 'gender identity', 'masculinity - femininity', and 'homophobia'. Feminine positive with $\alpha = 0.008$ failed to reach criterion and was therefore excluded. The inter-correlation matrix of these variables is shown in the following Table.

Table 14.

Pooled within-groups correlation matrix of variables entered into the discriminant analysis.

	Gend. Ident.	Masc. -Fem.	Homoph.
gender identity	1.00		
masculinity - femininity	-0.01	1.00	
homophobia	-0.07	-0.26	1.00

The inter-correlation matrix of variables entered into the discriminant analysis shows only one small and negative correlation ($r = -0.26$) between homophobia and masculinity - femininity. As in Study 1 there is little correlation between gender identity and other variables. (An absence of correlation between gender identity and other variables is also evident with other variables not included in the Table: the highest correlations are gender identity and feminine negative where $r = 0.18$, and with masculine positive where $r = -0.19$). These three variables were entered into the discriminant analysis and the

results of this analysis are presented in the following tables.

Table 15.

The standardized canonical discriminant functions: coefficients and percent of variance.

	FUNCTION 1	FUNCTION 2
STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS		
Gender identity	0.61	-0.05
Masculinity - Femininity	0.28	0.99
Homophobia	-0.64	0.53
PERCENT OF VARIANCE	79.04%	20.96%

Table 16.

Pooled within-groups correlations between the discriminating variables and the canonical discriminant functions.

	FUNCTION 1	FUNCTION 2
Gender Identity	0.65	-0.10
Masculinity - Femininity	0.44	0.86
Homophobia	-0.76	0.27

Table 17.

Canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means.

GROUP	FUNCTION 1	FUNCTION 2
1 Heterosexual Males	-1.16	0.70
2 Heterosexual Females	-1.09	-0.75
3 Homosexual Males	0.64	0.01




Figure 7.

Canonical discriminant functions of Table 17 plotted as the group means.

The discriminant analysis produces two discriminant functions. The size and sign of the coefficients of function 1 show that homophobia (negatively), gender identity and masculinity - femininity variables all contribute to this function which appears to measure predominantly homosexual male characteristics. All three variables correlate with function 1 with the expected sign. Function 1 is the main discriminant function accounting for 79.04% of the variance: it discriminates the homosexual from the heterosexual with the heterosexual female intermediate. Overall, the main components of function 1 are those which characterize male homosexuals: 'female' gender identity, lower homophobia, and 'masculinity' (masculinity - femininity).

The main variables contributing to function 2 are masculinity - femininity and homophobia. The main correlate with this function is masculinity - femininity. Homophobia is moderately ($r=0.27$) correlated with function 2 and gender identity has a low and negative ($r=-0.10$) correlation. Function 2 accounts for 20.96% of the variance: it discriminates between the sexes with the homosexual group intermediate. The main variable in function 2 is masculinity - femininity which distinguishes the sexes. (The homosexual males are in fact the most 'masculine' on this measure). This masculine - feminine function also has a contribution from homophobia which serves to separate the homosexual and heterosexual males such that the homosexual males

are intermediate. Overall, the homosexual males are discriminated from the heterosexual females largely by 'masculinity' (masculinity - femininity) and the heterosexual males from heterosexual females by both 'masculinity' and by homophobia.

Table 18.

Classification of subjects (using priors) into predicted group membership.

ACTUAL GROUP	No. SUBJECTS	PRIOR PROB'S	PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP		
			1	2	3
1	34	0.18	20	4	10
Het. Males			58.8%	11.8%	29.4%
2	33	0.18	6	17	10
Het. Females			18.2%	51.5%	30.3%
3	124	0.64	8	4	112
Hom. Males			6.5%	3.2%	90.3%

Discriminant analysis with priors predicts 90.3% (77.1% in Study 1) of the homosexual males, and without priors is 71.0%, which compares favourably to chance at 33%. Overall, the analysis predicts group membership with priors at 78.01% (71.05%

in Study 1) and without priors at 69.63% which also compares favourably to chance at 33%. In Study 1 the main discriminant variables were gender identity, masculinity - femininity, feminine positive, and to some extent libido. Discriminant predictability is improved in Study 2 with the inclusion of homophobia and the exclusion of feminine positive. The effect of libido was marginal in Study 1 and has not been included in Study 2.

This Study tests the thesis that sexual preference is related to gender identity and sexual identity to bio-sexuality, and therefore, that sexual identity and sexual preference are not related. If the homosexual is sexually deviant as conventional theories of sexual preferences postulate, then the homosexual group should in this discriminant function be predicted by variables related to an inverted bio-sociality and to psychopathology. Despite the inclusion of many variables which potentially should show the bio-social and psychological deviancy of the homosexual male, none of these results show such a deviancy. Those variables which should enter into the discriminant functions were this hypothesis correct do not do so. The discriminant functions of this Study are not related to sexual inversion and pathology.

Overall the homosexual male is shown to be characterized by a 'masculinity' (masculinity - femininity variable) and by a

'crossed-sex' gender identity. The masculine - feminine variable and the gender identity variable account for much of the predictive power of the discriminant analysis. The homophobia variable also contributes and serves to discriminate homosexual and heterosexual. With three groups there are theoretically three discriminating functions though discriminant analysis with three groups allows for only two. Three functions that should discriminate the groups are identified in Table 19.

Table 19.

Three functions that discriminate the three groups.

DISTINGUISHES FROM	FUNCTION
Het. males	Het. females (i) 'Male' (so-called)
	Hom. males gender identity
Het. females	Het. male (ii) 'feminine' (so-called)
	Hom. males bio-sociality
Hom. males	Het. males (iii) 'Crossed-sex' gender identity
	Het. females and variables specific to
	homosexual enculturation,
	e.g., homophobia.

There is no measure of 'male gender identity' in males included in this Study (none have been published). Function (ii) shows that the homosexual and heterosexual male are alike

bio-socially and different in this respect from heterosexual females. Function (iii) shows homosexual males are different from the other two groups. Both 'crossed-sex' gender identity (FGI) and homophobia are main components of this discriminating function.

(c) A Posteriori Comparisons.

Statistical comparisons of those variables entered into the discriminant analysis were anticipated. Three variables were entered. Homosexual and heterosexual males are compared as are homosexual males and heterosexual females. 6 tests are therefore planned ($\alpha=0.0083$, $df=1,189$).

Table 20.

A posteriori comparisons of those variables entered into the discriminant analysis.

(A - comparison of homosexual males and heterosexual males.
 B - comparison of homosexual males and heterosexual females.
 * - significant difference)

A POSTERIORI COMPARISONS					
	A		B		OMEGA
	F	P	F	P	SQUARED
Gender Identity	42.92	0.000 *	29.84	0.000 *	0.23
Masc. - Fem.	0.53	0.465	45.82	0.000 *	0.19
Homophobia	56.69	0.000 *	26.85	0.000 *	0.26

Those variables entered into the discriminant analysis were subject to statistical comparisons. The homosexual males are different from both heterosexual males and heterosexual females in homophobia and 'crossed-sex' gender identity. The homosexual male is less homophobic compared to the heterosexual. The finding of higher levels of 'crossed-sex' gender identity repeats the findings of Study 1: homosexual males have higher levels of 'female' (so-called) gender identity. Homosexual males are not different from the heterosexual males in 'masculinity' (masculinity - femininity). Compared to heterosexual females both the male groups are more 'masculine'.

Omega squared gives a relative measure of the strength of the independent variable and an effect in the behavioural and social

sciences equal to, or larger than, 0.15 is a 'large' effect (Keppel, 1982). Masculinity - femininity, gender identity and homophobia all have omega squared values of 0.19 or more indicating that the effect size is substantial and relatively independent of the sample size.

Both Studies 1 and 2 show that homosexual males are found to be different from heterosexual males in 'feminine' (so-called) gender identity but not different in 'masculinity' (bio-sociality). Study 1 also found that homosexual and heterosexual males are alike on the characteristically masculine sex attributes of impersonal sex, pornography and libido. Homosexual males are shown to be different from heterosexual females in masculinity - femininity and also in having high levels of 'crossed-sex' gender identity. As in Study 1 the homosexual male, compared to the heterosexual male and female, is characterized by a 'crossed-sex' gender identity. Feminine positive is statistically excluded in Study 2: this variable has a marginal significance in these two studies. Study 2 has also found that homosexual males are dissimilar to both heterosexual groups in having lower levels of homophobia.

In these two studies adult homosexual males have been contrasted with matched heterosexual male and female controls. These three groups have been contrasted on a large number and wide variety of variables. In all 42 different dependent

variables have been used. These variables are measures of gender identity, sex-differences, sexual attitudes and behaviours, social desirability or response biasing, psychological pathology, and of constructs related to psychological pathology. In both Studies male homosexuality is associated with a crossed-sex ('female') gender identity and with masculine bio-sociality. The results of Study 1 - the statistical association of sexual preference and gender identity and of biological sex and bio-sociality - are repeated in Study 2.

The overall classification of subjects using priors varies from 71.05% in Study 1 to 78.01% in Study 2. Classification of homosexual males with priors varies from 77.1% in Study 1 to 90.3% in Study 2. In Study 2 the overall predictability without priors is 69.63% while for homosexual males it is 71.0% compared to chance at 33%. This large percentage difference between chance and actual prediction is shown in both studies.

The reason for using a large number and variety of variables has been previously discussed. Despite the inclusion of a main and contradictory hypothesis provided by a large number of dependent variables related to sexual deviancy and pathology, only those variables related to gender identity and masculine attributes were successful in characterizing the homosexual male. It is clear from these results that homosexuality, per se, is not systematically related to psychological pathology nor to

indicators of pathology. The null hypothesis is however not supported since the heterosexual subjects report higher levels of homophobia and this is contrary to the null hypothesis of no-difference. These findings of predicted equivalences and no pathology in the homosexual male group is supportive of an origin for sexual preferences in the gender of the self as subject and not in bio-sociality where the self is object.

(d) Partial Cross-validation.

The discriminant functions of Study 1 are used to predict group category of the subjects in Study 2 and then this prediction is compared to the subject's self report of group category. Since all the variables of the discriminant functions from Study 1 have not been included in Study 2 this procedure is a partial cross-validation. The aim of this procedure is to measure the predictability of the discriminant functions in a similar group of subjects. To the extent that the discriminant functions are valid they should be predictive of the same categories in the independent group of subjects. Some loss of predictability is expected in this procedure when compared to the overall predictability of 69.63% reported in Table 18 above. The discriminant functions used to predict Study 2 subject classification is shown in Table 21.

Table 21.

Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients.

	FUNCTION 1	FUNCTION 2
Feminine Positive	0.11	0.67
Feminine Negative	0.28	0.15
Masculinity - Femininity	0.91	-0.32
Gender Identity	0.46	0.62
PERCENT OF VARIANCE	70.09%	29.91%

Study 1 discriminant functions, when used to predict subject classification of Study 2 subjects, predict without priors 59.0% of the homosexual males correctly, and overall, 63.07% (see Table 22 below). A drop in predictive power from 69.63% to 63.07% is not unusual. This procedure predicts Study 2 subjects at about 25% better than chance. The discriminant functions have good predictability across different studies in this cross-validation study.

Table 22.

Classification of study 2 subjects from Study 1 discriminant functions without priors.

ACTUAL	PREDICTED	PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP		
GROUP	CASES	1	2	3
1	38	28	4	6
Het. Males		73.7%	10.5%	15.8%
2	33	9	21	3
Het. Females		27.3%	63.6%	9.1%
3	105	24	19	62
Hom. Males		22.9%	18.1%	59.0%
Ungrouped	15	1	4	10
		6.7%	26.7%	66.7%

In summary, the homosexual males are shown to be different from heterosexual males in 'crossed-sex' gender identity and they are not different in 'masculine' bio-sociality. The homosexual males are also different from the heterosexual females in 'crossed-sex' gender identity and in 'masculinity'. Both the heterosexual males and females are more homophobic than the homosexual male. The results of Study 2 repeat the findings

of Study 1 that the homosexual male is characterized by a 'male' bio-sociality and he is also characterized, compared to heterosexual males and females, by a crossed-sex 'female' (so-called) gender identity.

STUDY 3

These results are presented in the following order: (a) descriptive statistics, (b) discriminant analysis, and (c), a posteriori comparisons. The subject numbers are: n=20, n=65, and n=39, for the low, middle, and high groups respectively.

(a) Descriptive Statistics.

Table 23.

Descriptive statistics for the low (1), middle (2), and high (3) Cass groups.

SCALE	MEAN			STANDARD DEVIATION		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Age	30.25	35.78	38.68	9.20	9.89	8.96
Years of education	14.25	15.18	15.45	2.90	3.01	3.40
Gender Identity	10.65	12.03	12.56	4.93	3.91	4.15
Masc - Fem.	118.80	113.12	114.28	10.80	9.01	9.98
Feminine Positive	52.95	53.29	53.97	6.78	7.02	6.37
Feminine Negative	37.70	38.37	33.92	10.42	8.45	8.18
Feminine Total	90.65	91.66	87.89	11.20	10.68	11.14
Masculine Positive	40.55	42.31	46.54	7.74	7.82	7.05
Masculine Negative	28.05	27.65	33.38	7.72	6.27	9.29
Masculine Total	68.70	69.95	79.97	12.12	11.48	14.96

continued over:

Table 23 continued:

SCALE	MEAN			STANDARD DEVIATION		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Social Desirability:						
Positive	23.55	25.74	26.00	5.38	4.10	3.85
Negative	17.30	15.42	17.13	5.99	3.92	4.43
Social Desirability:						
Reynold's Form C	13.10	11.08	11.41	6.24	5.65	4.58
Somatization	65.00	43.00	37.59	68.91	42.05	45.07
Obsessive - Comp.	85.00	81.57	58.72	79.31	61.14	47.25
Interpers. Sens.	106.15	76.03	53.26	94.29	74.22	41.86
Depression	108.50	72.88	57.79	91.59	65.22	41.71
Anxiety	83.00	50.12	29.77	93.81	48.57	27.17
Hostility	52.60	41.08	29.56	70.60	40.81	28.72
Phobic Anxiety	51.50	17.29	6.92	76.85	34.76	16.30
Paranoid Ideation	79.60	66.18	50.46	83.40	65.22	51.17
Psychoticism	78.00	41.11	21.28	84.70	44.54	23.86
GSI	82.95	56.86	40.51	76.61	44.47	28.23
Homophobia	59.15	45.35	41.62	9.05	12.53	12.92
Internality	35.55	35.15	35.69	5.51	6.68	5.89
Powerful Others	20.35	21.03	17.95	7.76	8.20	8.12
Chance	21.35	19.06	17.85	10.49	7.99	8.67
Priv. Self-consc.	23.80	21.98	21.82	6.89	5.57	5.90
Pub. Self-consc.	18.60	17.31	15.18	6.13	4.76	4.59
Social Anxiety	13.40	12.72	9.90	5.12	5.34	4.85

Observation of Table 23 (above) shows that some of the means (i) increase, (ii) stay the same, and (iii) decrease, across the low, middle and high categories on the Cass scale. (Tests of significance follow below in Section C). Some of these differences between means are 'small'.

(i) The variables whose means increase with the Cass scale are: age, years of education, gender identity, masculine positive, masculine negative, masculine total, and social desirability positive (PDQ).

(ii) The variables whose means show little variation across the Cass groups are: feminine positive, feminine negative, feminine total, social desirability negative (PDQ) and Reynold's Form C of social desirability.

(iii) Those variables which show higher means in the low Cass group and lower means in the high Cass groups are: masculinity - femininity, somatization, obsessive-compulsive, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, psychoticism, GSI, homophobia, powerful others, chance, public self-consciousness and social anxiety. Some of the means across these groups show 'large' differences. Comparing the score profiles of the high and low Cass scale categories shows an association of psychological pathology with the low Cass scale category.

(b) Discriminant Analysis.

Five variables which survived $\alpha < 0.0018$ were entered into the stepwise discriminant analysis. These are: 'masculine negative', 'masculine total', 'homophobia', 'psychoticism', and 'phobic anxiety'.

Table 24.

Pooled within-groups correlation matrix of variables entered into the analysis.

	MAS. NEG.	MAS. TOTAL	HOMOPH.	PSYCHOT.	PHOBIC ANXIETY
Masculine Negative	1.00				
Masculine Total	0.85	1.00			
Homophobia	0.12	0.00	1.00		
Psychoticism	-0.03	-0.17	0.18	1.00	
Phobic Anxiety	0.10	-0.02	0.20	0.64	1.00

There are two large correlations: between the two masculinity variables and between psychoticism and phobic anxiety. The correlations of homophobia with psychoticism and phobic anxiety are small. Other variables show negligible correlations.

Two variables, masculine total and psychoticism (which are correlated with masculine negative and phobic anxiety

respectively), were eliminated in the stepwise analysis. The three variables masculine negative, homophobia, and phobic anxiety remain in the discriminant functions. The discriminant analysis with three Cass scale groups produces two discriminant functions.

Table 25.

The standardized canonical discriminant functions: coefficients and percent of variance.

	FUNCTION 1	FUNCTION 2
STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS		
Homophobia	0.76	0.23
Phobic Anxiety	0.45	0.19
Masculine Negative	-0.46	0.90
PERCENT OF VARIANCE		
	84.11%	15.89%

Table 26.

Pooled within-groups correlations between the discriminating variables and the canonical discriminant functions.

	FUNCTION 1	FUNCTION 2
Homophobia	0.79	0.38
Phobic Anxiety	0.56	0.32
Masculine Negative	-0.32	0.95

The size and sign of the coefficients of function 1 show that

homophobia especially, but also phobic anxiety and a negative contribution of masculine negative, contribute to this function. Homophobia and phobic anxiety correlate positively with this function. Masculine negative is negatively correlated with function 1. Masculinity in sex-role scales is generally associated with agency or instrumentality and so the negative contribution of masculine negative (coefficient = -0.46) indicates less competence associated with higher levels of homophobia and phobic anxiety. Masculine negative is composed of items which are seen as masculine sex traits but which are negatively valued, for example, 'bossy', 'noisy', 'aggressive', 'sees self running show' and so masculine negative is probably a competence for 'standing on one's own'. It seems therefore to be a measure of 'independence' that includes some reactionary components. Function 1 indicates an absence of this 'independence' (competence) in the low Cass group associated also with homophobia and phobic anxiety.

Table 27.

Canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means.

CASS GROUPS	FUNCTION 1	FUNCTION 2
1 - Low	1.36	0.27
2 - Middle	-0.03	-0.29
3 - High	-0.67	0.31




Figure 8.

Canonical discriminant functions of Table 27 plotted as the group means.

Function 1 is the main discriminant function accounting for 84.11% of the variance: it orders the three Cass groups as high, middle, and low, with increasing levels of homophobia and phobic anxiety, and less 'masculine' competence in that order. Overall, the main components of function 1 are those which characterize a less developed identification (detached objectivity) with the self 'being homosexual'. This disembodied self is characterized by homophobia, phobic anxiety, and less masculine competence.

The main variable contributing to function 2 is masculine negative but there is also some positive contribution from homophobia and phobic anxiety. Masculine negative correlates strongly and homophobia and phobic anxiety have moderate correlations with function 2. Function 2 accounts for 15.89% of the variance: it discriminates the middle group from the low and high groups (the low group is intermediate). The main variable in function 2 is masculine negative (coefficient=0.90). An examination of the means of masculine negative shows that the middle group is lowest in masculine negative. Overall, function 2 distinguishes the three groups mainly on the masculine negative variable which seems to be some 'reactionary independent' characteristic. This function separates the less 'reactionary' and less 'independent' middle group from the other two (high and low) groups.

Variables that are highly correlated are eliminated in

discriminant analysis. Psychoticism and masculine total have been eliminated by this stepwise discriminant procedure. Psychoticism and phobic anxiety are correlated ($r=0.64$), and psychoticism correlates ($r=0.44$) with function 1. Masculine negative and masculine total are correlated ($r=0.85$), and masculine total correlates ($r=0.76$) with function 2. These two variables (and others) were tested and the results are described in (c) A Posteriori Comparisons (below).

Table 28.

Classification of subjects (with priors) into predicted group membership.

ACTUAL GROUP	No. of SUBJECTS	PRIOR PROB'S	PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP		
			1	2	3
1 - Low	20	0.17	8 40.0%	10 50.0%	2 10.0%
2 - Middle	65	0.51	7 10.8%	48 73.8%	10 15.4%
3 - High	39	0.32	0 0.0%	23 59.0%	16 41.0%

The discriminant analysis predicts group classification with priors at 58.06%. This predictability is satisfactory: 90.0% of

low subjects are predicted within the low-middle range, 73.8% of middle subjects are predicted as middle subjects, and 100.0% of high subjects are predicted within the middle-high range. In other words, predictability is poorest at the extremes of the Cass scale. Overall, however, with function 1 composed mainly of homophobia and phobic anxiety, its ordering of the low, middle, and high Cass groups, and in it accounting for 84.11% of the variance, the meaning of this discriminant function as phobic anxiety (i.e., both 'homo-phobia' and 'phobic anxiety') is clear.

(c) A Posteriori Comparisons.

Statistical comparisons of those variables entered into the discriminant analysis were anticipated. Five variables were entered. Low and middle homosexual groups are compared as are the low and high homosexual groups.

The subjects of the three groups are psychologically homosexual. This sexual preference is hypothesized (and empirically confirmed in Studies 1 and 2) to be theoretically related to a 'crossed-sex' gender identity which is separate to a person's identification with their being homosexual. Since they are all psychologically homosexual, hypothetically differing only in degree of identification, the three groups should have equivalence in degree of 'feminine' (so-called)

gender identity. A test of significance is therefore hypothesized to show no significant difference in gender identity between the three groups. Overall, there are 12 comparisons ($\alpha=0.004$)

Table 29.

A posteriori comparisons of Study 3.

(A - comparison of low and middle homosexuals,

B - comparison of low and high homosexuals.

* - significant variable).

A POSTERIORI COMPARISONS					
	A		B		OMEGA
	F	P	F	P	SQUARED
Masculine Negative	0.04	0.835	6.57	0.012	0.09
Masculine Total	0.15	0.702	10.30	0.002 *	0.11
Homophobia	19.63	0.000 *	27.42	0.000 *	0.17
Phobic Anxiety	10.85	0.001 *	15.93	0.000 *	0.10
Psychoticism	8.84	0.004 *	18.06	0.000 *	0.11
Gender Identity	1.68	0.197	2.67	0.097	0.01

Masculine negative, a contributing variable in the discriminant analysis, fails to reach significance. With the observed slight reversal, the maximum difference in means between groups is not between low and high Cass groups but a

contrast between the middle and high Cass groups. With $p < 0.0001$ the difference between the low and high groups is close to significance, as $p = 0.012$ suggests.

Masculine negative and masculine positive sum to masculine total and so there is a correlation ($r = 0.85$) between masculine negative and masculine total and it is not surprising that one is eliminated by the discriminant analysis. The difference in masculine total scores between the low and high Cass groups is significant, the high Cass group being the more 'masculine'. The comparison of low and middle Cass groups is not significant.

Compared to the group with low homosexual identity formation, the group with high homosexual identity formation is more 'masculine' in those characteristics measured by the masculine positive and negative scales of the PDQ. These two scales measure masculine sex characteristics that are socially valued (positive) and de-valued (negative). This shows that homosexual males with a developed homo-sexual identity are more 'masculine' (which probably is best understood as being more competent or instrumental) than those who are homosexual and whose social role or embodiment of their homosexual self is less developed. Both masculine negative and masculine total have Omega squared values in the medium to large range for behavioral and social sciences.

A priori interpretations were made based on possible outcomes, both for the sign (positive and negative) and for masculinity/femininity. (See Appendix 3: hypotheses H99 to H110). The positive and negative sign of these scales shows the valuing of those traits. Generally the development of homosexual identity (HIF) is here associated with increased positive and negative valuing of masculine traits. (This corresponds to H101 in Appendix 3). The a priori interpretation of this finding is that in the process of homosexual identity formation homosexual males socialize in ways that converge with generally accepted social values for male-sexed persons. Compared to the homosexual of the low (HIF) group, the homosexual who is more identified with his homosexual self is more likely to experience both social valuing (masculine positive) and social de-valuing (masculine negative). The objectively involved homosexual male asserts both the positive and negative aspects of the 'male' sex role.

The results of Study 2 reported above show no differences between heterosexual and homosexual males on these masculinity scales of the PDQ: this measure with its referent in sexual identity is not associated with sexual preference. In Study 3 'masculinity' is shown to be statistically associated with the development of the homosexual's identification with himself, that is, 'masculinity' (i.e., competence) is associated with 'more' homosexuality (identification) which contradicts

conventional assumptions of sexual inversion in homosexual males.

Homophobia, phobic anxiety, and psychoticism all show significant differences between the low and middle Cass groups, and between the low and high Cass groups. Two other variables, 'anxiety' and 'social anxiety', did not survive the criterion for entry into the discriminant analysis. Though excluded by the criterion these two variables show the same pattern of decreased anxiety with increased homosexual identity formation. This result shows a markedly consistent pattern with homophobia, phobic anxiety, and psychoticism diminishing with increasing levels of involved objectivity or spontaneity, that is, more integrated thinking and more freedom. Psychoticism and phobic anxiety have Omega squared values in the medium to large range, while that for homophobia is large.

The results of Study 2 reported above show no differences between heterosexual males, heterosexual females, and homosexual males on the phobic anxiety and psychoticism variables. Both heterosexual groups are more homophobic than the homosexual male group. Phobic anxiety and psychoticism varies inversely with an involved objectivity or spontaneity and not with psychological homosexuality. Homophobia is shown to be related to both the development of homosexual identity - the lower Cass groups being more homophobic, and to differences in sexual preferences -

heterosexuals are higher than homosexuals in homophobia. All three of these measures indicate that more anxiety is associated with the dissociated thinking and the dis-embodiment (mind-body split) of the 'third-person' relationship to self.

Overall, the results support the hypotheses postulated in this Study. On the Cass scale all subjects who have a non-zero score 'are homosexual'. What this scale measures is not 'degree of homosexuality' but degree of identification, an objective involvement or spontaneity with being psychologically homosexual. It has herein been argued that (psychological) homosexuality is related to the subjective experience of gender identity (self as subject) rather than to the objective experience of bio-sociality with its referent in sexual identity (self as object). It follows that all subjects in all groups of the Cass scale 'are homosexual' and that what makes them (psychologically) homosexual should be present in all three groups as 'feminine' (so-called) gender identity. This is supported by the a posteriori comparisons which show no differences in 'crossed-sex' gender identity between the groups. (Though there is no statistical comparison of the middle and high groups it is clear from the means that such a comparison would fail).

The Omega squared value of 'crossed-sex' gender identity is small: the independent variable of Homosexual Identity Formation

has little effect on this dependent variable. This finding is consistent with the results of Studies 1 and 2 which support a model of homosexuality that is both subjective and objective and oriented in a theory of objective relations that has the subject as the scientific frame of reference. The objective expression of self (thinking) in the 'I-you' relationship of the spontaneous self (integrated thinking) is shown to be strongly and inversely related to anxiety and psychoticism (and dissociated thinking).

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

This study identifies and then applies the different frames of reference implicit in gender and sex research to an understanding of psychological homosexuality in males. An analysis of the literature shows that gender and sex have different frames of reference and these psychological and sociological frameworks have been confounded in psychological and community thinking. Confounding is a source of conceptual and semantic confusion in the gender and sex literature and a probable source of perplexity in attempting to understand the applications of this research, for example, to homosexuality.

Gender and sex are constructs with implicitly different theories of subject-object relations and are applied in this research of male homosexuality. The model of the homosexual male in this thesis proposes a person with a male sexual identity and bio-sociality (self as object) and whose hypothesized psychological self (self as subject) is also male (though incorrectly labelled 'female' in the literature). Hypotheses were derived from this model: principally, that homosexuality is related to the self as subject (i.e., gender of self), and not to the self as object (i.e., sex of body). This hypothesis is at variance with a commonly held community opinion that homosexuality is a (deviant) variant of sexuality (i.e.,

homo-sexuality). If homosexuality is an aspect of sexual identity, then homosexual and heterosexual males should be bio-socially different. In this thesis there is no theoretical reason to suppose that they differ bio-socially. If, as proposed in this thesis, homosexuality is an aspect of gender identity - of being psychologically male or female - then the homosexual and heterosexual male should be different in this respect.

Discriminant analysis has allowed (in Studies 1 and 2) the testing of both the conflicting gender and sexual identity theories, and (in Study 3) the two conflicting theories of sexual preference. Discriminant analysis should show a statistical association between gender identity and sexual preference and between biological sex and bio-sociality. It was hypothesized that 'crossed-sex' gender identity is the main discriminating variable between heterosexuals and homosexuals (and hence the homosexual male and heterosexual female have the same gender identity), and that bio-sociality is the main discriminating variable between biological males (homo- and hetero-sexual) and females. It was the purpose of Study 1 to test this hypothesis and of Study 2 to repeat and confirm the finding.

While Studies 1 and 2 are sufficient in themselves for the purposes of this thesis, the evidence for the proposed model of the homosexual male is strengthened if the spontaneity

relationship between the 'second-' and 'third-persons' predicted by the persons-grammar theory is also tested. This has the added advantage of identifying the homosexual male as gender-male or gender-female by testing the different theories of sexual preference. It was the purpose of Study 3 to identify the identity of the homosexual male (and heterosexual female) as gender-male.

The Cass scale (HIF) in Study 3 was used to measure differences in identification with the psychological self (self as subject) and these differences are shown to operationalize two psychological relationships (ways of thinking) identified in the theory of persons-grammar and defining the extremes of a continuum of spontaneity. It was hypothesized that Cass scale differences in identification (identity formation) should not be related to gender identity if homosexuality is a function of the psychological frame - as persons-grammar theory proposes - and not a function of the sociological frame as sex-oriented theories postulate. Since these differences in the active variable operationalize a theoretical scale of spontaneity related inversely to anxiety it was hypothesized that these differences in identification would relate, not to homosexuality as a deviant sexuality, but to anxiety. This hypothesized finding would show that an absence of identification with self ('third-person' thinking and loss of spontaneity) and not homosexuality per se, is associated with pathology. This would

confirm the theory of persons-grammar as an appropriate psychological construct of reality and therefore the theory of sexual preferences used to define the homosexual male as psychologically (or gender-) male.

The conclusions drawn from these studies are now described in detail. Each study is presented separately.

STUDY 1

The results of Study 1 show that the sociological framework represented as scales that measure the bio-social male-female dimension do differentiate males from females as expected. The heterosexual male group is typically 'masculine' and the heterosexual female group is typically 'feminine'. The homosexual male group is typically 'masculine' on these same measures and perhaps even more so than the heterosexual males. On these bio-social measures the homosexual male is typically 'masculine' compared to the heterosexual males, and both male groups are typically 'masculine' compared to the feminine females. The homosexual male is also more 'feminine' than the heterosexual male suggesting that the homosexual male is more androgynous (as previous research suggests). There is however no relationship between bio-sociality of the sociological frame of reference and homosexuality.

The study also shows that the psychological framework represented as the scale that measures the male-male (and parallel female-female) dimension does differentiate the homosexual males from both of the heterosexual groups. This finding shows that the homosexual male does have a high level of 'crossed-sex' gender identity and that it is in this respect that the homosexual male is not typical compared to the two heterosexual control groups. The homosexual male (with his characteristic 'crossed-sex' gender identity) and the heterosexual female have the same gender identity that is different to the gender identity of the heterosexual male. There is a relationship between gender identity of the psychological frame of reference and homosexuality.

Homo-sexual preference has usually been postulated as deviant: homosexuality is supposed to be a departure from a 'normal' biologically based heterosexual preference and is therefore in some way abnormal. If this were so then in discriminant analysis it could be expected that the homosexuals would be differentiated from the male or female heterosexuals, or both, by scores showing abnormality. In Study 1 the found differences are those expected to predict (psychological) homosexuality and those 'masculine' and 'feminine' bio-social traits expected to predict sociometric homosexuality, that is, a cultural tendency for biological males and females to form separate social groups characterized by different norms (e.g.,

social sex-roles). The term 'sociometric homosexuality' is derived from Moreno's concept of 'sociometric cleavage' defined as

two groups of individuals in which self preference - that is preference for members of own group - rules out other-preference, that is, preference for members of out-group. It is the dynamic reason for the tendency of a group to breakup into subgroups (1978, p. 721).

Male- and female-sexed subgroups are formed when the criterion for forming subgroups is biological sex. Moreno (1978) identifies this process in children's groups as 'homosexual cleavage'. Sociometric homosexuality refers to the end-product of this process of enculturation which differentially socializes children according to their biological sex (i.e., sexism).

Using a large number of dependent variables to provoke a deviancy has not been successful in showing that the homosexuals are deviant except on two 'feminine' variables (one theoretically predictive of homosexuality and the other indicative of more 'communion' and 'inter-personal warmth'). The absence of deviancy supports the null hypothesis that psychological homosexuality is not per se abnormal. There is no support in Study 1 to suggest that 'crossed-sex' gender identity is in itself deviant. (Since about 1 in 20 male persons are exclusively homosexual, 'crossed-sex' gender identity is less common and so it is deviant in this statistical sense). Deviant in this context is in the sense of being abnormal, for which

there is no support.

These findings are consistent with the model of the homosexual male as a person who is psychologically the same as the heterosexual female in gender identity and who is the same as the heterosexual male in bio-social masculinity. All three groups show a bio-sociality predictable from a sociometric cleavage into male- and female-sexed (literally homo-sexual) groups though the psychologically homosexual males are also more feminine ('feminine positive') than the heterosexual males. This model has been tested by predicting no statistical association between sexual preference and bio-sociality and predicting an association between sexual preference and gender identity. Sexual preference is shown to be the objective expression of a subjectively experienced gender. Overall, the findings substantially support the predictions suggesting that these statistically significant findings are also psychologically significant. There is substantial support for the conclusion that psychological homosexuality in the male has its origins in the psychological identity of the self and not in a socially defined bio-sociality with its referent in sexual identity.

An unpredicted finding is that homosexual males are more 'feminine' than heterosexual males in the PDQ measure of 'feminine positive'. There is some support in the literature for homosexual males being more androgynous (and therefore more

'feminine') than heterosexual males and so this finding of more 'femininity', while perhaps unexpected, is not surprising. This 'femininity' is named after a statistical and sociological association between biological sex and 'communion' (whatever) and is not related to a psychological sense of being female. 'Femininity' in this context of the homosexual male is an ability to take the role of other (female social sex-role) and is indicative of less sociometric homosexuality (less sexism) than in heterosexual males, that is, more androgyny.

Overall, these results support the proposed theory of persons-grammar and the hypothesis that sexual preference has its origins in the gender identity of the subject. There is no support for a hypothesis that psychological homosexuality is associated with deviancy. There is no support for the antagonist hypothesis that psychological homosexuality in the male has its origin in a deviant bio-sociality with its referent in sexual identity.

STUDY 2

As in Study 1 the model proposes that the homosexual and heterosexual male are alike bio-socially ('male' social sex-role) and different to the heterosexual female bio-socially ('female' social sex-role), and that the homosexual male is characterized and differentiated from heterosexual males and

females by a psychological 'crossed-sex' gender identity. The purpose of Study 2 is to replicate the findings of Study 1 and thereby to nullify objections that the results of Study 1 are spurious. Study 2 also tests the implicit and proposed social frame theories of sexual preference which propose that the homosexual male should be pathologically deviant compared to heterosexual comparisons. It is hypothesized in this thesis that there is no difference in pathology and that this finding would confirm the inappropriateness of social frame theories of sexual preference.

Two of the three discriminating variables in Study 1 are shown to be discriminating variables in Study 2: the two main variables that demonstrate the homosexual male to be both psychologically 'feminine' (so-called FGI scale) and bio-socially 'masculine' (masculinity - femininity scale). The PDQ variable of feminine positive failed to reach significance in this Study: this is of no consequence since it is not a measure of 'femininity' as such despite its label to the contrary. (It is a measure of 'nurturance', 'inter-personal warmth', whatever - a socio-cultural conditioning of female sexed persons). The repetition of Study 1 findings in Study 2 strongly supports the proposed model of male homosexuality.

Study 2 included some new dependent variables. One of these, homophobia, also is an important discriminating variable

contributing markedly to the differentiation of homosexual and heterosexual. Moreno (1978) found evidence of a sociometric cleavage in children (homosexual cleavage) which can account for the differentiation of the male and female roles measured as social sex-roles and conceptualized in the reviewed literature as expressions of different sexual identities. Moreno does not record a sociometric cleavage between heterosexual and homosexual groups. The significantly higher homophobic scores of the heterosexual groups show that there is such a cleavage and that it is a 'heterosexist cleavage': the homosexual is the feared 'other' by the heterosexual. There is no equivalent 'heterophobia' scale to show that there is or is not also a 'homosexist cleavage'.

The democracy of groups that exclude the 'other' is dubious if entry to such groups and to its cooperative action is conditional on meeting the restricted entry criteria of that group. Historically, to take part in the cooperative action of the society in which he lives, the homosexual has been accepted conditionally - he has often only been accepted as long as he passes as being heterosexual. The evidence that heterosexuals exclude homosexuals is obvious in the long history of social, medical, and legal constraints which have discriminated against homosexuals and which continue to do so.

To provoke deviancy in the data, and to show that the

homosexual is deviant compared to the heterosexual groups, a large number of dependent variables were used. In both Studies 1 and 2, 42 different dependent variables were used: these are measures of gender identity, sex-differences, sexual attitudes and behaviours, social desirability, response biasing (lying), psychological pathology, and measures of constructs related to psychological pathology. As in the first study, sexual preference is associated with psychological gender and sexual identity with bio-sociality: these relationships seem robust and there is no support for a hypothesis that suggests that homosexuality is associated with pathology.

Contrary to this absence of pathological association in the homosexual male is the strong association of heterosexuality and homophobia. This heterosexual level of homophobia is not high ("low grade homophobic" by American norms; Hudson & Ricketts, 1980) compared to the homosexual males ("low grade non-homophobic"). The conclusion appears to be that the heterosexual has some resistance to taking the role of other when the other is homosexual. (This resistance in the homosexual male is the subject of Study 3 and is there shown to be related to anxiety).

Deviancy, in the sense of the abnormal, is not a characteristic of psychological homosexuality: 'crossed-sex' gender identity (so-called FGI) is itself not pathological since

it shows no association with these established measures of pathology. The view that 'crossed-sex' gender identity is a clinical syndrome indicative of psycho- or socio-pathology is not validated here by external criteria. The validity of 'feminine' gender identity in males as a diagnostic category by itself, or as an imputed disorder of the abnormal and dysfunctional (transsexuality), as in DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), is seriously questioned by these results.

The discriminant functions of Study 1 were used to predict the self-classification of subjects in Study 2 in a partial cross-validated study. Not only is 'female' (so-called) gender identity predicted from adult male homosexuality, 'female' (so-called) gender identity is also predictive of adult male homosexuality. This finding shows that sexual preference and gender identity are interrelated and supports the persons-grammar theory of object relations which has the subject as the frame of reference.

Freund et al. (1974) distinguished sexual preference from gender identity for research purposes. Homosexuality in the sexual identity literature has usually been equated with sexual preference rather than with both gender identity and sexual preference. Since sexual preference becomes apparent at adolescence, homosexuality is often seen to begin at

adolescence. These results show that homosexuality is not something that arises from nowhere at adolescence as a different sexual preference (and different sexual identity), but that gender identity and sexual preference are contiguous aspects of development. Bell et al. (1981) have also shown that homosexuality has a continuous developmental history and does not suddenly develop at adolescence. There is strong support for understanding psychological homosexuality and heterosexuality as having their origins in the subjective experience of the gender of the self. Since gender identity is usually considered to be established by 3 years of age, and probably much earlier, homosexual and heterosexual preference are theoretically likely to be the central and enduring aspects of the personality which they have been found to be.

This finding is contrary to the two main psychological theories of homosexuality. The psychoanalytic view construes homosexuality as a deviant reaction against an anxiety provoking heterosexuality since sex is symbolically associated with confusions, guilts and fears in the heterosexual parent - homosexual child relationship (West, 1977). Talbot (1985) cites studies from the 1950's and 1960's which contradict this formulation. The psychoanalytic view of homosexuality is predicated by sex. Studies 1 and 2 have shown the non-relationship between sex and homosexuality and the strong relationship between gender and homosexuality. That the

homosexual is an invert - having a reversed sex role or instinct - is not supported since homosexual males and heterosexual males have equivalence in their 'male' bio-sociality. (The 'instinctual' nature of sexual preference is not addressed. An alternative view to instinct is the proposed theory of sexual preferences in Chapter 3 which is supported by these results).

The psychoanalytic view suggests disturbed personality since homosexuality is purported to arise as a psychological disturbance in disturbing circumstances. That this is not so is attested to by many studies of homosexuals with null findings (West, 1977). This finding is repeated here in Studies 1 and 2. The evidence here is that heterosexuality is associated with homophobia, but there is no evidence of homosexual personality disturbance compared to the heterosexual comparisons. The findings of Studies 1 and 2 do accord with the psychoanalytic position that homosexual and heterosexual development occurs early in life.

Social learning theory construes heterosexuality as the result of direct processes of reward and punishment conditioning children into sexual conformity: emphasis is given to adolescence as a time when influences other than the parent may either reinforce or counteract previous learning (West, 1977). As with the psychoanalytic theory sex is the key developmental issue, however, gender and not sex is shown by Studies 1 and 2

to be important in the development of sexual preferences. If homosexuals do not conform, as social learning theory proposes, then the homosexual males and heterosexual males should be sexually different. This thesis proposes that the homosexual and heterosexual male have the same bio-social 'masculinity' with its referent in sex: they both exhibit a sociometric homosexuality (masculinity) that is different to the sociometric homosexuality (femininity) of the females. The homosexual male is not sexually deviant (compared to heterosexuals).

Because social learning theorists propose a latter acquisition of sexual preference when personality factors have already been largely determined, no personality disturbance in homosexuals is proposed. Gender identity is however established at least by 3 years of age and the demonstrated relationship between gender identity and homosexuality is contrary to the social learning theory of latter acquisition. The proposition from social learning theory that personality disturbance does not accompany homosexuality is however supported by these Studies.

Social learning theory proposes a developmental period, a period of 'sexual conformity', when homosexuality is supposed to develop. Moreno (1978) described this same sexual conformity period in 1934 as 'homosexual cleavage'. Social learning theorists appear to be describing the origins of sociometric

homosexuality and attributing this causally to the development of psychological homosexuality. Social learning theory apparently equates sociometric homo-sexual preference with psychological homosexuality, ignoring the earlier developmental history of homosexuality in gender identity by 3 years of age. Social learning theory confuses two different psychological and sociological homosexualities with their different referents in gender identity and sexual identity. Furthermore the higher levels of homophobia in the heterosexual comparisons is contrary to the social learning postulate of no personality disturbance.

Summarizing so far, Study 2 repeats Study 1 to similar results: that these consistent results arise due to a spurious capitalization on chance is highly improbable. These results support the hypothesized relationship between sexual preference and gender of the subjective self. Furthermore, there is no relationship between bio-sociality (with its referent in biological sex) and homosexuality as the main theories of homosexuality have predicted. There is no evidence of personality disturbance associated with psychological homosexuality. There were differences between Study 1 and 2. Study 2 did not show the homosexual males as more 'feminine' (nurturant) than the heterosexual males and Study 2 did show that heterosexuality is associated with homophobia.

Overall, the two studies support the systems theory of

persons-grammar with its unified theory of the self as the theoretical frame of reference. The persons-grammar theory of object relations (the 'second-person' and 'third-person' relations of integrated and dissociated thinking) which uses the subject as the frame of reference has utility in understanding the subject - object relationship that sexual behaviour implies.

Sexual identity has been defined herein as biological sex. Sexual identity in the literature is poorly defined - "... a clear delineation of the meaning of sexual identity has been lacking, and this has been a major factor in the confusion that presently exists in this area of psychology" (LaTorre, 1979, p. 6). It is clear that there has been a lack of delineation in the literature and that sexual identity has a conceptual pre-eminence it does not deserve. This lack of delineation is probably not the origin of confusion. LaTorre (1979) proceeds to define sexual identity as: gender identity, gender role adoption, gender role preference, and gender role ability. The definition of sex and gender in terms of each other (as LaTorre does) is common in the psychological literature. Since these are conceptually different the confounding of these concepts by using gender and sex synonymously, would seem a more probable source of a confusion that is conceptual and not just semantic.

The term bio-sexuality is useful to refer to the observed

socially induced differences between males and females, differences that in the literature appear to be described by the grab-bag term 'sexual identity'. The origin of bio-sociality in Moreno's 'sociometric homosexuality' is more meaningful than 'sexual identity' which is essentially a biological, and not a psychological, term.

The persons-grammar establishes a frame of reference which distinguishes two ways of thinking: the 'second-person' relationship of involved objectivity where the self is the subject, and the 'third-person' relationship of detached objectivity where the self is an object. These frames of reference are integrated in the trinity of the persons-grammar as a unified theory of reality. The self as subject and self as object each has a gender which have been identified as gender identity and sexual identity respectively. Studies 1 and 2 show the hypothesized relationship between psychological homosexuality and gender identity, and the null relationship between psychological homosexuality and sociometric homosexuality (i.e., bio-sociality).

The second purpose of Study 2 is to test the social frame theories of sexual preferences that predict homosexuality is deviant compared to heterosexuality. This hypothesis is not supported and these results are consistent with a literature which has not found much to distinguish the homosexual from the

heterosexual apart from 'crossed-sex' gender identity. These results do not support the implicit or the proposed social frame theories of sexual preferences both of which predict homosexual deviancy (discussed in Chapter 3). Social frame theories having their referent in biological sex are not supported by these Studies as appropriate theories of homo- and hetero-sexual origins.

STUDY 3

There are two theories of object relations implicit in the psychological literature and explicit in the persons-grammar as a unified theory. These theories are tested in Studies 1, 2 and 3. Homosexuality and heterosexuality have been discussed as different subject - object relations expressing different genders of the subject. Sexual preference has conventionally been understood as an expression of 'sexual identity' with its implicit sociological theory of inter-personal relations that uses biological sex as the referent. Studies 1 and 2 have shown that sexual preference is better understood as an expression of gender identity, that is, an expression of the self as subject. Studies 1 and 2 compare homosexuals and heterosexuals. In Study 3 homosexual males who enact these different theories of object relations ('second-' and 'third-person' relations) in their lives are compared. There is empirical support for that way of thinking ('second-person' relation) which uses the subjective

gender of the self as the frame of reference, and also for the proposed theory of sexual preferences which asserts that the homosexual male is psychologically male.

In this thesis psychological homosexuality is related to the gender of the subject; the 'second-person' relationship (involved objectivity) and the 'third-person' relationship (detached objectivity) are different attitudes to the self and identify a way of thinking (identification). Involved objectivity is related to more spontaneity compared to detached objectivity. In Study 3 it is hypothesized that degree of objective involvement or detachment ('Homosexual Identity Formation') should not predict differences in the subjective experience of being homosexual (FGI). Involvement (identification) should however predict anxiety with detached objectivity (dissociated thinking and less spontaneity) associated with more anxiety. This finding supports spontaneity as a theoretical dimension related to pathology and it supports the persons-grammar theory in which this dimension of spontaneity is situated. This finding also supports the proposed theory of sexual preferences which asserts the homosexual male and heterosexual female are psychologically male (gender-male) and that the heterosexual male is psychologically female (gender-female).

The same dependent variables used in the discriminant

analysis of Study 2 were used in Study 3: the active variable is spontaneity operationalized by the Cass scale (HIF). Homosexual males who report themselves to be homosexual identified their stage of identification with themselves as being homosexual. Subjects were classified into one of three groups varying in degree of spontaneity: the low group is low in identification (detached objectivity) and spontaneity. The high group is high in identification (involved objectivity) and spontaneity. The middle group is intermediate in identification and is intermediate in spontaneity between the low and the high groups. Spontaneity and anxiety have an inverse relationship in the persons-grammar theory. Involved objectivity (high Cass group) should be associated with less anxiety than detached objectivity (low Cass group).

Moreno attributes a "great deal of Man's psycho- and socio-pathology" to the underdevelopment of spontaneity (1978, p. 42). Operationalized as the Cass scale, spontaneity orders all of the groups scores on the SCL-90-R pathology scales, and that of 'social anxiety', in the expected direction such that dissociation of the homosexual from his psychologically homosexual self ('third-person' relationship) is associated with increased pathology. The spontaneity of the objectively involved group is least associated with pathology on all of the measures of pathology included as dependent variables. Loss of spontaneity is strongly related to a wide variety of measures of

pathology including four measures of anxiety.

Davison and Neale (1982, p. 44) list "free-floating anxiety", "phobia", and "panic reaction" as forms of "neurotic anxiety" in psychoanalytic theory. DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) classifies the "anxiety disorders" into "phobic disorders", "anxiety states" and "posttraumatic stress disorder". Phobia is a generally recognized form of anxiety. Phobia (homophobia and phobic anxiety) is the main form of anxiety that discriminates the homosexual groups.

Study 3 has shown that the more spontaneity of involved objectivity is related to less anxiety and the lesser spontaneity of detached objectivity is related to more anxiety. Loss of spontaneity is characterized by dissociated thinking ('third-person' relationship to self) and a phobic reaction. The results of Study 3 are quite conclusive: the distinction between the psychological and sociological frames of reference as different ways of thinking about reality has utility in identifying a theoretical dimension of pathology related to the absence of spontaneity. This result supports the proposed theory of sexual preference which uses the psychological frame of reference and which theorizes that the sexual partner takes the 'second-person' meta-role in the thinking of the subject who is spontaneous. This theory of sexual preferences supported by the empirical test of Study 3 identifies the identity of the

homosexual male as gender-male, that is, the homosexual male is psychologically male.

In Study 3 there are some findings which are perhaps subsidiary to the purpose of the thesis - but which nonetheless are relevant to the theory of this thesis - and which may have some significance in themselves. In discriminant analysis some correlated variables are likely to be eliminated. The variables that show significant differences between the three groups in a posteriori comparisons are now discussed. (Gender identity does not show any significant differences as predicted and has been discussed above. It will not be discussed further). These differences are summarized in Figure 9 which follows below.

KEY: Gender identity —————
 Homophobia - - - - -
 Phobic anxiety - - - - -
 Competence - - - - -




Figure 9.

Generalized graphical depiction of the significant differences found between the three homosexual groups in a posteriori comparisons.

(i) Masculinity (so-called) of the Social Sex-role.

The development of a homosexual identity (identification) is associated with increased 'masculinity'; differences in 'femininity' are not significant. A strict interpretation (which assumes no differences in PDQ femininity across the groups) leads to the conclusion that increased homosexual identification in males is associated with increasing 'masculinization' (i.e., competency), that is, with traits statistically associated with male sexed persons. Since these sex-role scales are not validated by 'external criteria' (Anastasi, 1982), but by their ability to differentiate the sexes, the meaning of 'masculinity' in social sex-roles remains (empirically) unknown. 'Masculinity' and 'femininity' are measures of sociometric homosexuality (the end-product of homo-sexual sociometric cleavage) and the development of homosexual male identification apparently affirms the social sex-role of 'male' (or vice versa) but not the social sex-role of 'female'. 'Masculinity' of the PDQ appears to measure competence in self-assertion.

Moreno defines spontaneity as "the adequate response to the present situation" (1978, p. 336). If masculinity in this context means competence, then the finding of an association between spontaneity (active variable) and masculinity (dependent variable) may not be very surprising since an adequate response and competence have some overlap in meaning. If the external

criterion is spontaneity, then masculinity as measured by the PDQ in the homosexual male is related to it and femininity as measured by the PDQ is not. If PDQ femininity is sentimentality (emotionality, nurturance, inter-personal warmth, whatever), then sentimentality is not associated with spontaneity.

(ii) Phobia.

There are significant differences between the groups in both homophobia and in phobic anxiety with detached objectivity associated with increased phobia. Homophobia is a measure of anxiety that arises as the result of proximity to, or interaction with, homosexual people. Derogatis defines phobic anxiety as:

a persistent fear response to a specific person, place, object, or situation, which is characterized as being irrational and disproportionate to the stimulus, and which leads to avoidance or escape behavior. The items of the present dimension focus on the more pathognomic and disruptive manifestations of phobic behavior. The actual structure of the dimension is in close agreement with the definition of "agoraphobia" (Marks, 1969), also termed "phobic anxiety depersonalization syndrome" by Roth (1959) (1983, p. 9).

Phobias are generally regarded as forms of the more general category of anxiety.

Goodwin (1986) in "Anxiety" associates a number of distressing external events which cause inner confusion,

alienation, uncertainty, and finally, "unattached" persons. The results found in Study 3 support the association of unattachedness and personal distress described here by Goodwin. Study 3 shows that anxiety is related to an inability to respond adequately to oneself by taking own role: an absence of spontaneity. These distressing external events may not therefore lead to anxiety but vice versa: an absence of spontaneity may be externalized as a distressing event. Since there is no involvement with the self the self cannot respond - the person is 'frozen' in omniscient inaction, a distressing event.

The theoretical and statistical association between a detached personality and anxiety is strong. An analysis of the circumstances in which people gain and lose spontaneity - and the application of this analysis to increase spontaneity in personal and community living - may have more utility than an absorption in external 'causes' of anxiety.

The pervasiveness and severity of anxiety is well-established (for example, Hallam, 1985). What it is and how it arises are less well understood. As to what anxiety is, Hallam (1985) says that it is a reification - a view which holds that anxiety is not a "phenomenon that expresses the natural workings of a universal and timeless human psychology or the derangement thereof by pathological processes" (1985, p. 1). Anxiety is not, according to Hallam (1985), an emotion, and nor is it the effect

of a pathological disorder.

In Study 3 anxiety is associated with a 'third-person' detached objectivity. Theoretically if something is not 'related' it is unknown. The 'third-person' meta-role is a dissociated, an 'as though', or non-existent, 'person' and is strongly associated with anxiety. Anxiety is a personal non-existence, a nothing. Moreno, correctly, does not define the reification but defines anxiety as the absence of spontaneity. As 'nothing' anxiety is something (supposedly as an emotion or pathological disorder). Anxiety has existence as a reification and is manifested in thought disorder that confuses existence and reality. (In the psychological construction of reality what exists may not be real). Anxiety as an absence of spontaneity, and therefore without a connotation of a real existence, is a more logical and real definition. The absence or loss of spontaneity has, however, real antecedents.

Because anxiety is a reification, Hallam (1985) emphasizes the role of antecedents. Of antecedents he says:

The antecedents are assumed to include events that can be defined at the biological, psychological, and sociological levels of analysis. All levels of analysis are necessary to develop an adequate model of the antecedents of reports of anxiety, but at the present time there are simply no scientific theories that can achieve this integration. This is not a failure of theorists of anxiety, but a feature of the current state of the biological and social sciences (1985, p. 2).

The persons-grammar is a unified theory of reality that includes the biological, sociological, and psychological levels of analysis. Study 3 shows that the co-ordinate of anxiety is an absence of spontaneity. A conclusion drawn is that the antecedent of anxiety is the loss of spontaneity.

This conclusion is also supported by other evidence. Study 3 has shown that the 'male' role (of the PDQ) is positively associated with spontaneity and that the 'female' role (of the PDQ) is not. The relative absence of the 'male' role (competence) in females is therefore likely to be associated with a relative absence of spontaneity in females who do not develop the 'male' role. By definition (in the differential scientific way of thinking) the 'male' role - and its form of spontaneity - is uncharacteristic of females. This situation of less spontaneity in females is predictive of higher levels of anxiety in females. The 'almost universal finding' (Hallam, 1985) of a higher incidence of anxiety reported by women than by men is explicable by differences in spontaneity. Sexist thinking in the differential enculturation of boys and girls appears to have profound and long-term consequences. Sexist thinking - and the 'third-person' relationship to self in general - may be an important and universal antecedent of loss of spontaneity and, therefore, an antecedent of anxiety.

The phobic individual does not respond with adequacy to the

new situation or with novelty to the old. Asch (1955) describes in "Opinions and social pressures" the power of the conserved role to conformity and of the improbability of the individual to change once he has conformed. Hallam (1985) has outlined the longevity of anxiety in the individual. Moreno says of conserves that "such adherence may gradually obliterate the ability of the organism and the talent of the actor to change" (1978, p. 722). Phobia is here a neurotic condition that describes anxiety as existing in the absence of spontaneity and whose psychological origin is in the 'third-person' meta-role of the personality.

(iii) Psychoticism.

Spontaneity is an adequate response to the novel situation and a new response to the old; it is also the ability to move between fantasy and reality (Moreno, 1978). Study 3 shows that spontaneity is also related to psychoticism: the less spontaneity the more there is psychoticism. Psychoticism is defined by Derogatis:

The psychoticism scale was developed in a fashion to represent the construct as a continuous dimension of human experience. Items indicative of a withdrawn, isolated, schizoid life style were included, as were first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia, such as hallucinations and thought-broadcasting. The psychoticism scale provides a graduated continuum from mild interpersonal alienation to dramatic evidence of psychosis. In this respect the present definition owes much to the work of Eysenck (1968) (1983, p. 10).

Before discussing 'psychoticism', Moreno's developmental theory and model of psychosis is outlined.

Moreno (1977, p. 61) hypothesizes in the infant a primary stage of "co-being, co-action, and co-experience" which he calls the "matrix of identity". It is, according to Moreno, that phase in which "playing the role of other" develops and several stages are outlined to this end (1977, p. 61). During this stage "identification is without meaning in this first world of the infant" as it implies, amongst other things, that the infant is able to experience himself in relation to another (1977, p. 63). This "matrix of identity" breaks up gradually as the infant develops more autonomy. This first universe ends when this infantile experience breaks up into fantasy and reality and the differentiation between real and imaginary things takes form. After this division between fantasy and reality is established the psychodramatic and social roles gradually differentiate.

Moreno postulates that in the child, after the division of fantasy and reality, there is a clustering of roles to form intermediary or partial selves. Two of these partial selves are the psyche oriented in fantasy and the socius oriented in reality. It is from the unification of the partial selves (physiological, psychological and social) that the self emerges. The division between fantasy and reality is illustrated by Moreno's discussion of a case of paranoia.

An illustration: A case of paranoia.

"The treatment of psychoses has been a challenge to the ingenuity of the psychiatrist ever since psychiatry became a special branch of medicine" wrote Moreno in 1944 (reprinted 1975, p. 181), and added that "the lack of any rationale must be laid to the absence of a consistent scientific theory of the origin of the psychosis". Since 1944 the advent of the major tranquillizers and psychoactive drugs have seen major changes in the treatment of the psychoses. The psychoses remain a major and chronic problem. The main treatment mode via drug regimes is consistent with a biochemical deficiency hypothesis and there is now some evidence of a relationship between neuroendocrinal brain chemistry and psychosis. There is however no compelling evidence of a causal relationship.

Moreno addressed the lack of a rationale in a paper called "A case of paranoia" where he outlined the psychodramatic concept of psychosis. He begins with his postulate: Man is

divided from early childhood on by the dimensions of reality and fantasy. Once this division has emerged in him, he never succeeds in breaching it. But in his social behavior he acts as if a breach between fantasy and reality has never taken place, or as if the two were fully integrated. He tries to give the world around him the illusion, if not of perfection, at least of individual unity (1975, p. 181).

The case involves Mary, a woman of 23. Three years before Mary

had very briefly meet a man called John. She has not mentioned this to anyone in the intervening three years and is now making a concerted effort to find John. She never meets John again since that initial and fleeting meeting except as an hallucination. John had returned to her mind during a bout of influenza. Mary's behaviour in searching for John had brought her to the attention of the police.

Early in the treatment the conclusion is reached that Mary

had a deep memory and clear vision of the products of her own imagination, such as John and kindred experiences, but a poor memory and a weak attachment to people she had actually met or lived with. ... She had always lived along two tracks of experience, but the world of imagination prevailed and pushed the world of actual events into the background (1975, p. 186).

Mary acts out her drama, her 'John-production'; she wants to bring John to realization wherever she is: even as an apparition. The division between Mary's fantasy world and her real world are now overt in her 'illness': she largely ignores the real world of actual people.

From this account it can be seen that Moreno's concept of psychosis rests not only on the division of fantasy and reality, which he postulates is the human condition, but particularly on the loss of spontaneity to integrate fantasy and reality. This 'breach' is not in itself predictive of psychosis. The division of fantasy and reality is common to all people but with the

absence of spontaneity to bridge the division - as found in the homosexuals with less homosexual identification - there is an inability to integrate fantasy (being psychologically homosexual) and reality (act the social role of homosexual). These results support Moreno's model of psychosis in general.

The theory of persons-grammar allows an intra-psychic analysis of the personality and therefore enables some clarification of the specifics of psychosis. The integration of creativity (creating own role) and spontaneity (taking own role) bridges the division between role of self as subject (Moreno's 'fantasy') and role of self as object (Moreno's 'reality'), an integration implicit in the 'second-person' relationship. (The meta-role of 'second-person' is largely absent from Moreno's theory in an explicit form). The results of Studies 1, 2 and 3 show that the division of fantasy (the creativity of the 'first-person') and reality (the spontaneity of the subject to enact and so make real that creativity) is meaningful and has utility in understanding male homosexuality. The results of Study 3 show that this division is related to psychosis as an inability to bridge this subject-object division within the individual psyche. This inability is theoretically and empirically related to the null 'third-person' relationship.

Psychoticism is indicative of psychosis-like symptoms and it should not be interpreted that any subjects in this study are

psychotic: it is only evident that the incidence of psychotic symptoms is more commonly associated with less spontaneity. As far as is known, no person who was actively psychotic was included in the research studies and nor were any excluded for this reason. The following description is therefore a model of psychosis derived from this study of statistically relatively normal people.

These results support a model of psychosis that shows the psychotic experience as a state wherein a person is conserved in the detached attitude, in whom is absent the interaction of the involved objective and subjective experience of self. In this model of psychosis there is an inability to integrate fantasy into reality: the psychotic is conserved in social functioning - the reified 'third-person' or persona is now the (depersonalized) 'self'. Instead of the self emerging consciously from the integration of the 'first-' and 'second-persons' ('second-person' relationship), the 'self' emerges in an altered state of consciousness (a dissociation of self) as the 'third-person' ('third-person' relationship). Where self is consciously the integrated 'I am-ness' of the 'second-person' relationship, in this psychosis the persona is now the 'self' and the real self has become the 'other' (as shown in Figure 5, Chapter 3). The psychotic self relates objectively (as the detached omniscient 'self') to his real self - of 'first-person' fantasy and absent 'second-person'

objectivity - as though it is reality. The real self appears to be 'other': the dissociation from self is evident as the hallucinated and unreal persona.

Moreno proposed five hypotheses for Mary's conception of John: the fourth posits that John is Mary and he asks "but how can Mary be a man?" (1975, p. 191). Moreno dismisses this hypothesis because of his inability to answer 'how?'. The question should however be taken seriously: there is no a priori reason for Moreno's, Freund et al's, transsexuals', and similar literal assumptions that the gender of biology should relate positively with the gender of the subjective entity. Moreno has here held to an expected belief rather than accept the evidence of his and Mary's investigation. Mary can be subjectively a 'man' (male) if that is the basis of female heterosexuality as proposed and tested in this thesis. It is however the inability of Mary to realize herself - to bring her psyche into objective reality - that is the basis of her 'realization paranoia'. Mary's psychosis is her inability to realize herself as subject, literally to make-real 'her' creation of self. This does not mean that Mary need correctly label that entity (this would be a semantic confusion and would not represent the profound confusion that Mary experiences). Mary conceptually confounds flesh-and-blood John of her external inter-personal world with her 'my John' internal intra-personal world that is self. Mary's thinking is conserved in the sociological frame of reference.

Summary of Chapter 6

The first substantive issue of this thesis that homosexuality is theoretically related to the gender of the self as subject is strongly supported. The second substantive issue of this thesis that the identity of the self as subject in the homosexual male is gender-male is also strongly supported. Homo- and hetero-sexual preferences are related to the gender identity of the self as subject and not to the sexual identity of the self as object. Homosexuality is not an expression of a 'different' or deviant sexual identity. Homosexuality and heterosexuality are shown to have an equivalence in subject - object relationships whereby the subject's gender identity and the sex partner's biological sex have the same identity. Homosexual and heterosexual preferences both express the same 'second-person' relationship of the creative and spontaneous self.

Homosexuality does not arise in adolescence as a sexual preference but has antecedents in childhood as 'crossed-sex' gender identity. The origins of homosexuality are therefore established in early childhood, probably by the age of 3 years. Psychopathology is not associated with subjective gender identity and is associated with differences in objective identification with that gender identity. That 'crossed-sex' gender identity is listed in DSM-III as gender identity disorder of childhood and as transsexualism is questionable. Sexual and

gender identity congruency (homosexuality) or incongruency (heterosexuality) is not by itself shown to be associated with psychopathology. Pathology is related to an absence of spontaneity as a way of thinking (relating to self as subject or object) and not to homosexuality or gender identity per se.

The thesis proposed and tested a theory of persons-grammar that explains homo- and hetero-sexuality. Subsidiary to this was the finding that provides empirical support for a model of anxiety and of psychosis. Both models (as does that of homosexual identification) use the interaction of creativity and spontaneity (embodied as the 'second-person') as the scientific frame of reference. While the intra-personal dimension is implicit in Moreno's work, the explicit absence of this psychological framework distinct from the sociological framework in his theoretical work has perhaps precluded the use of his theory as a unified and explicit theory of personality and model for the social sciences.

Moreno identifies spontaneity with roleplaying and its absence with roletaking, and he defines these as the polar extremes of his 'axiological scale of spontaneity'. The persons-grammar with its unified whole (i.e., self or trinity) provides a theoretical framework for Moreno's scale of spontaneity. This framework also identifies the meta-role of the second-person and the function of this 'person' as the

integrator of fantasy and reality. Apart from 'roleplaying', this meta-role is conceptually underdeveloped or absent in Moreno's theory. This absent role in Moreno's theory is the 'sociodramatic role' which is referred to as such only once (1977, p. 352). The sociodramatic role is an individuated social role.

Moreno's theory of personality underlies the models of anxiety and psychosis and is supported by the results of this research. Spontaneity is axiomatic to his theory. His axiological scale of spontaneity has been shown to be related to different ways of thinking and strongly related to psychopathology as he predicted. In this research study the creativity of the subject is axiomatic. This study identifies a theoretical basis for spontaneity and provides support for Moreno's spontaneity theory of learning.

Moreno devised a science with the spontaneity of the subject as its scientific frame of reference: spontaneity is axiomatic. What of creativity? Moreno notes this absence and its value. He says:

The fate of a culture is decided by the creativity of its carriers. But creativity as a scientific frame of reference has never been established and so a basis for a critique of deviations has been missing. If a disease of the creative functions has afflicted the primary group, the creative men of the human race, then it is of supreme importance that the principle of creativity be redefined and that its perverted forms be compared

with creativity in its original state (1978, p. 40).

In this thesis the scientific frame of reference has been the creativity of the subject. Creativity and spontaneity interact in the 'second-person' relationship: the self (trinity) emerges with the development of the 'first-' and 'second-person' meta-roles of persons-grammar. Homosexuality, compared to heterosexuality, is shown not to be a deviation of creativity. The 'disease of the creative functions' appears to be the loss of spontaneity to respond to the functioning of the rolecreating 'first-person', that is, an incapacity to take own role as the integrated 'second-person' meta-role.

CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY

The term homo-sexuality connotes a sexuality that is different to hetero-sexuality. The psychoanalytic, social learning, and biological theories of homosexual aetiology, have tried to account for male homosexuality as a difference in sexuality. Historically, the framework and language used to describe homosexuality (and heterosexuality) has been that of sex. There has been, however, a remarkable lack of empirical support for the proposition that homo-sexuality is related in a literal sense to sexual identity. It has become increasingly evident that the homosexual male and heterosexual female have the same gender identity that is different to that of the heterosexual male and that it is this identity of the subject that is associated with homo- and hetero-sexuality.

The theory of persons-grammar was developed to integrate both frames of reference implicit in the literature. This theory of personality with its two ways of thinking provided a unified theoretical framework for the psychological and sociological frames of reference that produce the different attitudes (meta-roles) of self, that is, thinking of the self as the subject and thinking of the self as the object. The first relationship ('I-I') of persons-grammar defined the identity of the 'first-person' (subject) in the personality as a subject who

has identity with the whole system (self or trinity). The second relationship ('I-you') defined objects in relationship with the subject. The third relationship ('I-he') defined objects absent from the subject (and whose referent is not in the subject).

The first substantive issue of this thesis addressed the origins of homosexuality in the personality. It was hypothesized that homosexuality was related to the gender of the self as subject and not to the gender of the self as object. It was predicted therefore that there should be a statistical association between homosexuality and gender identity and a null relationship between homosexuality and sexual identity. These two relationships, the 'second-person' ('I-you') and the 'third-person' ('I-he'), were tested empirically by comparing homosexuals with heterosexual groups. It was predicted that the homosexual males and heterosexual females would have the same gender identity that was different to that of the heterosexual males and that this preference was separate to the gender of the self as an object, that is, separate to sexual identity. Thus it can be said that homosexual males and heterosexual females have the same sexual preference (for males) even though they have different sexual identities.

The second substantive issue of this thesis addressed the gender identity of the subject in homosexual males. Studies 2 and 3 were concerned with whether male homosexuality was deviant

or spontaneous. It was hypothesized that male homosexuality per se was not deviant (Study 2) and that the person's response to their self as homosexual could be spontaneous (Study 3). The fourth relationship of persons-grammar ('you-he') is a theoretical dimension of spontaneity which related deviancy to a way of thinking that was separate to homosexuality or to heterosexuality. Deviancy, measured as pathology, was found to be associated, not with homosexuality (Study 2), but with adopting the 'third-person' relationship, that is, thinking about self as though self is an object. The psychology of sexual preferences supported by this finding hypothesized the spontaneous sexual relationship as the sexual partner taking the meta-role of the second-person in relation to the subject, that is, a subject whose sexual preference enacts the 'second-person' relationship. This psychology predicted the deviancy of the 'I-he' ('third-person') relationship and the absence of deviancy in the 'I-you' ('second-person') relationship. Deviancy is associated with a way of thinking about the self as an object. The psychology of sexual preferences which predicted that the identity of the subject of the homosexual male (and heterosexual female) is gender-male was supported. Thus it can be said that homosexual males and heterosexual females have the same psychological gender, a male gender mirrored in the male sexual identity of the preferred sex partner.

There has been no satisfactory model of homosexuality that

integrates the known facts. Concurrent with this, and probably underlying the perplexity of homosexuality research, is the confusion in the sex and gender research. At least some of this perplexity is due to the confounding of different frames of reference and the consequent semantic confusion of 'male' (and 'female') which has both a subjective and an objective referent. Homosexuality is understood to have both subjective (gender identity) and objective components (identification and thinking) and these components are theoretically related in the persons-grammar theory of object relations which has the subject as the frame of reference.

The theory of persons-grammar provided a unified theoretical framework that integrated both the psychological and sociological frames of reference with their different referents in gender identity and sexual identity respectively. Gender identity is the gender of the self as subject and has some expression as the person's conviction of being male or female (even if semantically confused). Bio-sociality refers to those traits differentially attributed to biological males and females and whose origin appears to be located within the enculturation process of learning separate male and female norms. The psychological frame of reference of gender identity and the sociological frame of reference of bio-sociality have not been conceptually well separated in the literature. They have also been confounded, for example, in the Kinsey et al. (1948)

heterosexual - homosexual scale.

The persons-grammar theory implies two different theories of constructing reality; an interactional and therefore open system characterized by the 'second-person' relationship (open mind) and oriented in the psychological frame of reference, and a non-interactional and therefore closed system characterized by the 'third-person' relationship (closed mind) and oriented in a sociological frame of reference (and specifically a socio-cultural way of thinking). Study 3 showed that the thinking of the closed mind is associated with psychological distress.

The 'second-person' relationship of involved objectivity and the 'third-person' relationship of detached objectivity are extremes of a continuum of spontaneity. Spontaneity has herein been linked to thinking, with integrated thinking related to spontaneity and dissociated thinking related to loss of spontaneity. Loss of spontaneity in the absent or underdeveloped sociodramatic role ('second-person') is strongly associated with pathology, notably anxiety and psychoticism. The 'third-person' relationship, associated with anxiety and psychoticism, is theoretically related to dissociated thinking as an altered state of consciousness. Consciousness is related to the 'second-person' relationship, a psychological frame of reference where the self is the subject.

The empirical results of this study support the persons-grammar theory that has creativity as its axiom and which identifies a continuum of spontaneity theoretically related to that creativity. These results also support Moreno's theory that has spontaneity as its axiom and the models of phobia and psychosis that are directly derived from his work. The findings of this study support Moreno's understanding that spontaneity provides a scientific frame of reference, particularly for the social sciences. Moreno did not investigate psychological homosexuality.

LIMITS OF THE STUDY

The homosexual and heterosexual subjects for the research study were mainly recruited via friendship networks. The homosexual sample is not representative as would be a random sample if it were possible. Neither is the homosexual sample drawn from institutions and homophile organizations. The sample of homosexual and heterosexual subjects in this research is probably fairly typical of mature-aged and well-educated persons. The sample sizes are usually adequate though in Study 3 the smallest of the three groups is only 20 subjects. The pattern of results for this smaller group is however consistent with the pattern of results of the two other larger groups.

The testing of the model has depended particularly on the operationalization of the two frames of reference using well-established scales and questionnaires of related constructs. Some criticism can be made of the operationalization of the 'male' and 'female' roles as the social sex-roles. That these 'sex' roles are artefacts of sexism is of no consequence to the need to measure the effects of the divisive forces that create sexist (racial, and other) barriers within society. The method of measuring these sex-roles as 'different from' rather than as 'attributes of' makes these scales difficult to interpret excepting that they highlight the difference between males and females. The highlighting of these socio-cultural differences between males and females with their origin in homo-sexual group cleavage in childhood (i.e., sociometric homosexuality) has been useful for the purposes of this study.

Only one measure of gender identity is available in questionnaire form and suitable for research of this type. Fortunately, the psychometric properties of this scale (FGI) are good even if the type of 'femininity' (i.e., being psychologically male) being measured by the scale, and its relations to other 'femininity', has not been well understood. In this thesis it has been argued that the 'femininity' of the social sex-roles is a misnomer for nurturance, emotionality or sentimentality and refers to social conditioning towards those (adjectival) 'feminine' norms and beliefs, and not to femaleness

(as a noun).

The method of collecting data by questionnaires which can be lost to the researcher was satisfactory. The return rate is usually a measure of adequacy and in this study the return rates have been quite high. This is due, in part, to the researcher's sociometric proximity to the subjects. This proximity could perhaps encourage subjects to give socially desirable responses: the results do not support this assertion. The non-response of some subjects may introduce a bias with those subjects least comfortable in responding to a questionnaire on sex, sexual preference, and various attitudes, being less likely to comply. The return rate is high and this is largely due to the willingness and co-operativeness of the persons approached to take part in the Study. The non-response rate is low.

A number of reasons have been given for the unusual inclusion of many dependent variables in the experimental design and discriminant analysis. Principally it has been argued that if the sociological frame of reference were important in homosexuality then by including many of these variables with their referent in biological sex, and only one variable (gender identity) representing the psychological frame of reference (with its referent in the subject), this should work against the acceptance of the proposed hypothesis. The repeating of the test of Study 1 to the same result in Study 2, and a different test

of the theory in Study 3, shows the improbability of the interpretation that these findings are spurious. Nevertheless, it could still perhaps be argued that this design has a lack of statistical power in the discriminant analysis. Furthermore, while the persons-grammar theory of homosexuality has been repeatedly tested in Studies 1, 2, and 3, the results of Study 3 have not been replicated. The results that have been used to draw subsidiary conclusions regarding phobia and psychosis have not been replicated in this Study.

Some of the limits are ethical rather than experimental. Moreno's Psychodrama theory - the unitary term to cover all of his theoretical work - has clearly been of major importance in helping to define the scientific frame of reference for this thesis. While this thesis provides a new and unified theory it nonetheless borrows heavily from Moreno's theoretical work. Probably most important is the distinction implicit in his theoretical work that the self is subject, and not object, and the profound implications for the development of thinking (as the 'second-person' of the trinity) that this implies.

Despite these limits the hypotheses derived from the theory of persons-grammar (and the psychology of sexual preferences) have been substantially supported in all of the three studies. The main tests have been repeated to the same result and the partial cross-validation is supportive. The association between

gender identity and sexual preference is such that each is strongly predictive of the other. Contrary to the main theories of homosexuality, there is no association between sexual identity/bio-sociality and homosexuality. The strength of these findings is confirming of the model of the homosexual male as a person who is biologically, socio-culturally, and psychologically male. It is the psychological masculinity of the homosexual male that is expressed in homosexual act preferences.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

(i) For Homosexuals.

The self is endowed with degrees of consciousness that emerge with the psychological growth and integration of the subject-object attitudes of the personality. For the purposes of this thesis the gender of the self as subject was defined by gender identity and the gender of the self as object was defined by sexual identity. The prior assumption to this operation is the existence of a self and the theory for this has been the persons-grammar, that is, the Trinity of the Christian God. Moreno discusses the developmental, educational, and therapeutic goal, as the 'I-god' (Moreno, 1971). This examination of homosexuality has not found any reason to believe that homosexuality is a developmental departure from that human educative and therapeutic goal - the 'I-god' - that Moreno uses

as his scientific frame of reference. Homosexuality is consistent with the developmental and evolutionary existentialist religious goal of 'I am-ness'. Prohibitions and discriminations against homosexuality are not justified by any of the findings of this research.

At its simplest, homosexuality and heterosexuality are self expressions of an absolute - the gender of the subject. This thesis (unlike Moreno's work) makes the 'second-person' of the trinity explicit as a 'person' spontaneously involved with the creativity of the 'first-person', that is, interactive with the subject. It is the self which emerges from this interaction (unlike the reified spectre or persona of the 'third-person') that has existence and is real.

(ii) For Education and Therapy.

This research supports Moreno's assertion that spontaneity and psycho- and socio-pathology are closely linked. He says that

as the training of spontaneity states and not the learning of contents is the objective, the attempt is made to loosen the fixed associations between states and contents as they have become established in the course of education by traditional methods. Emphasis upon contents results in the split of the individual into an act personality and a content personality (1978, p. 538).

The research model and results support Moreno's hypothesis of different personalities: a comparison was made (Study 3) between the personality of the spontaneous person and that of the less spontaneous person. The act personality (defined in this thesis as the 'second-person' relationship) of the high Cass scale subjects is different to the content personality (defined in this thesis as the 'third-person' relationship) of the low Cass scale subjects. The act personality is oriented in consciousness and the content personality is oriented in an altered state of consciousness. This difference is theoretically and empirically related to anxiety and to psychoticism. This implies that training for spontaneity - and the way of thinking that this implies - is a relevant educational and therapeutic goal.

(iii) For Science.

The formulation of objectivity as a continuum of spontaneity should help clarify the role of the social scientist as social investigator and social therapist (e.g., community psychologist). Moreno devised sociodrama as the model and method of investigation of the group, that is, the sociological dimension. This method explores inter-personal relationships within a group.

Moreno devised Psychodrama as the theoretical model and method of investigation of the individual. This method explores

the inter- and intra-personal relationships of an individual: it is concerned with both the sociological and psychological worlds of the individual. Moreno says that psychodrama 'deals with inter-personal relations and private worlds' (1978, p. 81). The identification in this thesis of an 'intra-personal' framework in a theory of object relations clarifies psychodrama as a science which deals with both the inter- and intra-personal relations of the self.

Moreno postulated creativity and spontaneity as interactional axioms of science and he developed a science (Psychodrama) that used spontaneity as the scientific frame of reference. In this research spontaneity (defined by the 'you-he' relationship of persons-grammar) was operationalized by the roleplaying and roletaking of involved and detached homosexual males (Study 3). In this research (in Studies 1 and 2) the presence of creativity (defined by the 'I-you' relationship of persons-grammar) was operationalized by the rolecreating - roleplaying relationship ('second-person' relationship) and compared to the absence of creativity operationalized by the rolecreating - roletaking null relationship ('third-person' relationship). The scientific relationship of spontaneity and creativity has been shown, at least in part, by this research. The value of spontaneity as a scientific frame of reference is demonstrated by this study. The theory of persons-grammar is proposed as a unified theory of reality in which creativity is the frame of reference.

Religion in its original meaning is to 'bind' - the idea of relation. The idea of the unconscious can perhaps be understood as that with which the individual has no relation: something cannot be known unless it is in relation. Creativity may therefore be found in those religious systems where a method of personification or embodiment is enacted: where a freedom of attitude to new relations allows the creative expansion of consciousness in the wilful (spontaneous) development of new and more adequate roles. With spontaneity as the catalyst of creativity, the individual learns new roles and more adequate role enactment. Moreno had arrived at the conclusion that the integration of fantasy and reality was the next step. The enactment of the idea (fantasy) in psychodrama is an operational definition of creativity. He says:

I arrived at the conclusion that the "next step" is the realization and concretization of the idea in the flesh rather than its further intellectual extension. Therefore I became a psychodramatist and roleplayer (1978, p. xvi).

Moreno's formulation of science has not been well accepted. Study 3 uses a scale of spontaneity and compares two different rationales: two rationales apparent in scientific thinking but confused (as are the psychological and sociological in psychology). There are two rationales underlying the scientific formulation of reality:

the model of the organism as an open system has

proved useful in the explanation and mathematical formulation of numerous life phenomena; it also leads, as is to be expected in a scientific working hypothesis, to further problems, partly of a fundamental nature. This implies that it is not only of scientific but also of 'meta-scientific' importance. The mechanistic concept of nature predominant so far emphasized the resolution of happenings into linear causal chains; In contrast to this, in the theory of open systems ... principles of multivariate interaction ... become apparent Therefore, these developments form part of a new formulation of the scientific world view (von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 161).

The persons-grammar unified theory of reality identifies these two rationales of the 'world view': the open system thinking of the 'second-person' relationship (mind as an open system) and the closed system thinking of the 'third-person' relationship (mind as a closed system). Moreno's axiological scale of spontaneity describes a theoretical continuum that links these two different scientific rationales.

There has been some resistance to the 'new' view.

... the Cartesian dualism between matter and mind, object outside and ego inside, brain and consciousness, and so forth, is incorrect both in the light of direct phenomenological experience and of modern research in various fields; it is a conceptualization stemming from seventeenth-century physics which, even though still prevailing in modern debates, is obsolete (von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 233).

The traditional scientific viewpoint is that of the third-person
- the scientist observer outside the field (Figure 1, Chapter

3). This is the world of Newtonian physics. The new scientific viewpoint is that of the integrated first- and second-persons - the scientist inside the field (Figure 2, Chapter 3). This is the world of the 'new physics' of Einstein and quantum mechanics. Modern physics has not been able to integrate these two world views - the 'time - space' continuum of old and new physics - into one scientific formulation of reality.

Study 3 has compared the outcomes of these rationales and found that the 'time' oriented thinking of the closed system rationale is empirically associated with deviancy whereas the 'space' oriented thinking of the open system rationale is empirically associated with spontaneity. This supports the theoretical viewpoint that it is the type of thinking that is itself deviant (that is, dissociated from creativity and spontaneity).

This finding also supports the argument that the design of this Study has been appropriate in a systems (open systems) way of thinking. The rationale argued for in this design has been that while using many variables may seem to produce a lack of statistical power and capitalization on chance, the use of many conventionally valid but theoretically unacceptable variables has worked against the spurious acceptance of chance findings. In this design and using discriminant analysis, not only does there have to be a statistical association between the active

and hypothesized dependent variable (main effect in a closed mathematical system: 'third-person' thinking), but this variable must also be a better predictor than other combinations of dependent variables (interactions of an open mathematical system: 'second-person' thinking).

(iv) For Further Research.

First, the implications discussed in (ii) and (iii) assume that the findings of Study 3 can be replicated. Given the apparent scientific, educational, and therapeutic implication of Moreno's axiological scale of spontaneity, replication is required.

Second, the defining and operationalization of an axiological scale of creativity may have scientific utility. The axiological scale of spontaneity has been implicated in a model of psychosis where the fantasy of the subject is not able to be integrated with the reality of the objective world: what Moreno describes as a "realization paranoia". The central feature of this psychosis is anxiety with the active psychotic symptoms of delusions (Mary thinks that she is not 'John') and hallucinations (detachment from self, i.e., 'John'). Whereas the axiological scale of spontaneity is linked with anxiety, a continuum of creativity is probably associated with depression: that is, depression could be defined as an absence of

creativity.

Clinically, depression seems to be associated with the lack of embodiment of creativity: the absence of experienced creativity (e.g., loss of ideas, thoughts, words). The absence of embodied creativity may also be associated with psychosis. This form of psychosis would be where the reality of the objective world is not able to be integrated with the fantasy of the subjective world: in essence the person lives in their own inner world and cannot create themselves in the outer world of objective existence (such as in thought). The central feature of this psychosis is depression, and since the person is living the fantasy there is no dissociation of the fantasy world into hallucination. Absorbed in fantasy there is the outward appearance of autism. The language of the objective world is relatively absent or directed to the fantasy world.

Haracz (1982) provides some evidence for two generalized types of psychosis. Crow (cited by Haracz, 1982) in 1980 had distinguished two schizophrenic syndromes - type I and type II - amongst schizophrenia patients based on clinical phenomena. This typology was extended by Haracz (1982) to include more than clinical symptoms. Haracz concluded:

The data reviewed ... suggest that schizophrenics with predominantly positive (type I) or negative (type II) symptoms also tend to differ in their: (1) clinical responses to DA agonists and antagonist, (2) regional cerebral blood flow

patterns, and (3) cerebral ventricular size. Thus Crow's type I/type II distinction could be a useful theoretical framework in the search for biologically homogeneous subgroups (1982, p. 444).

The positive symptoms of type I are hallucinations, delusions, and thought disorder. The negative symptoms of type II are affective flattening, social withdrawal, and poverty of speech. This typology is consistent with two different psychological models of psychosis postulated from two axioms of human progress: spontaneity and creativity.

Both types of psychoses are associated with an absence of the 'second-person' - involved objectivity - the person who acts spontaneously to take own role. Type I models a personality conserved in the 'third-person': the subjective self appears as hallucinations. The absence of involvement in the true self ('second-person' relationship) is apparent in delusion. This is the 'content' personality: an absorption in the contents of the outer world, a person whose referent is the object.

Type II models a personality conserved in the 'first-person': the person is absorbed in the subjective or inner world of fantasy. There is an absence of involved objectivity appearing as an autism. This is also a 'content' personality: an absorption in the contents of the inner world. Type II models the person who lacks creativity to bridge the division between

fantasy and reality: who cannot create himself by acting in the real world and integrating reality into fantasy. Type I models the person who lacks spontaneity to bridge the division between fantasy and reality: who cannot act their fantasy in the real world and bring fantasy to reality. Both models of psychosis have as their central feature the absence of the involved actor: the 'second-person' ('I-you') relationship.

Third, creativity cannot be defined by its absence. Moreno proposed two scales. One is the 'role playing - role taking' continuum that as the intra-personal relation between 'you' and 'he' is the axiological scale of spontaneity. The other is the 'role playing - role creating' scale (subject - object dichotomy) that describes the intra-personal relation between 'I' and 'you'. The 'second-person' relationship is the objectively observable expression of this relationship, and therefore, of creativity. (This necessarily implies the presence of spontaneity since the 'you' of the second-person is the spontaneous extreme of the spontaneity continuum. Creativity and spontaneity are interactive).

Moreno hypothesized the emergence of the self from the role, not the roles from the self. The trinity is a system of meta-roles: the self is the trinity as a whole and not its interdependent parts. In this system there cannot be a whole unless there are all the parts. The absence of an attitude (a

'person') implies the incompleteness of the self: an absence of creation. The sociodramatic role of the 2nd person - the involved other - is crucial to the creation and development of the self. Since there is apparently only the one reference to 'sociodramatic role' in Moreno's works, this construct is an inconsistency in his work, the construct is much underdeveloped, or there is an error of understanding involved. The development of social roles from sociodramatic roles with the subsequent loss of spontaneity is consistent with his spontaneity theory of learning that before roletaking there is roleplaying.

That the construct of involved objectivity (thinking) of the individuated sociodramatic role is underdeveloped in Moreno's work has some support. A tenet of Psychodrama is the changing of the research status of the person from researched (self as object) to researcher (self as subject). Moreno introduced the 'first-person' but not the 'second-person' into this theory. His psychodramatic method in changing the status of the person introduces the 'subject'. The subject, however, is not defined by Moreno's 'subjectivity' and 'inter-personal relations': these remain oriented in a 'third-person' observer role. It is the changing from the detached relationship of the social role to the involved relationship of the sociodramatic role that is the change in research status within the individual's personality and identified variously as the axiological scale of spontaneity and as different ways of thinking. It is the development of the

sociodramatic role in educational systems and the re-discovery of the sociodramatic role in therapeutic systems - the objective 'I am' - that is implied, but seldom stated, in Moreno's works.

In summary, the homosexual male has been examined in the context of a systems theory of personality. The hypothesized and empirically supported subsystems of the self are the 'persons' of the trinity. The 'second-' and 'third-persons' relationships are different ways of thinking about reality and are themselves integrated in this psychological theory of persons-grammar. This thesis proposes that the homosexual male is biologically, sociologically, and psychologically male. He is sociologically like the heterosexual male in having a way of thinking that distorts the human personality in sexist ways. He is psychologically like the heterosexual female in having a male gender identity and preferring male-sexed sexual partners. This model of the homosexual male is situated and tested within two theories of object relations - a theory of the self as object which uses a sociological frame of reference, and a theory of the self as subject which uses the unified psychological frame of reference. The theory of the self as subject is a psychology of health; it provides, in the theoretical interaction of creativity - spontaneity, an integrated scientific rationale oriented in health.

APPENDIX 1

HYPOTHESES OF STUDY 1

H1. The FGI mean of homosexual males is significantly higher than that of heterosexual males.

H2. The FGI mean of homosexual males is significantly higher than the MGI of heterosexual females.

Hypotheses H3 to H14 are tabulated. The mean of homosexual males (Hom) is compared to the mean of heterosexual males (Hem) and to heterosexual females (Fem). The expected results are as follows:

MEAN OF HOMOSEXUAL MALES COMPARED

TO MEANS OF:

	HETEROSEXUAL MALES	HETEROSEXUAL FEMALES
PDO SCALES:		
Masculine positive	Hom = Hem (H3)	Hom > Fem (H4)
Masculine negative	Hom = Hem (H5)	Hom > Fem (H6)
Feminine positive	Hom = Hem (H7)	Hom < Fem (H8)
Feminine negative	Hom = Hem (H9)	Hom < Fem (H10)
Social desirability:		
positive	Hom = Hem (H11)	Hom = Fem (H12)
negative	Hom = Hem (H13)	Hom = Fem (H14)

Hypotheses H15 to H42 are tabulated. The mean of homosexual males (Hom) is compared to the mean of heterosexual males (Hem) and to heterosexual females (Fem). The expected results are as follows:

MEAN OF HOMOSEXUAL MALES COMPARED
TO MEANS OF:

EYSENCK'S	HETEROSEXUAL	HETEROSEXUAL
primary scales:	MALES	FEMALES
Permissiveness	Hom = Hem (H15)	Hom > Fem (H16)
Impersonal sex	Hom = Hem (H17)	Hom > Fem (H18)
Pornography	Hom = Hem (H19)	Hom > Fem (H20)
Sexual excitement	Hom = Hem (H21)	Hom > Fem (H22)
Physical sex	Hom = Hem (H23)	Hom > Fem (H24)
Sex. satisfaction	Hom = Hem (H25)	Hom < Fem (H26)
Sexual disgust	Hom = Hem (H27)	Hom < Fem (H28)
Prudishness	Hom = Hem (H29)	Hom < Fem (H30)
Neurotic sex	Hom = Hem (H31)	Hom = Fem (H32)
Sexual shyness	Hom = Hem (H33)	Hom = Fem (H34)
Aggressive sex	Hom = Hem (H35)	Hom = Fem (H36)
superfactors:		
Libido	Hom = Hem (H37)	Hom > Fem (H38)
Satisfaction	Hom = Hem (H39)	Hom = Fem (H40)
Mas. - Fem.	Hom = Hem (H41)	Hom > Fem (H42)

APPENDIX 2

HYPOTHESES OF STUDY 2

H43. (Repeats H1). The FGI mean of homosexual males is significantly higher than that of heterosexual males.

H44. (Repeats H2). The FGI mean of homosexual males is significantly higher than the MGI of heterosexual females.

Hypotheses H45 to H56 are tabulated. (Repeats H3 to H6, and H9 to H14). The PDQ mean of homosexual males (Hom) is compared to the mean of heterosexual males (Hem) and to heterosexual females (Fem). The following table states the expected results. (H49 and H50 do not repeat hypotheses from Study 1 where 'feminine positive' was found to be significant).

MEAN OF HOMOSEXUAL MALES COMPARED

TO MEANS OF:

PDQ SCALES	HETEROSEXUAL MALES	HETEROSEXUAL FEMALES
Masculine positive	Hom = Hem (H45)	Hom > Fem (H46)
Masculine negative	Hom = Hem (H47)	Hom > Fem (H48)
Feminine positive	Hom > Hem (H49)	Hom = Fem (H50)
Feminine negative	Hom = Hem (H51)	Hom < Fem (H52)
Social desirability:		
positive	Hom = Hem (H53)	Hom = Fem (H54)
negative	Hom = Hem (H55)	Hom = Fem (H56)

H57. (Repeats H41). The masculinity - femininity mean of homosexual males is expected to be the same as that for heterosexual males.

H58. (Repeats H42). The masculinity - femininity mean of homosexual males is expected to be significantly higher than for heterosexual females.

H59, H60. The social desirability (Reynold's Form C) mean of homosexual males is expected to be the same as that of heterosexual males (H59) and also as that of heterosexual females (H60).

Hypotheses H61 to H80 are tabulated. The following table is incomplete as Derogatis (1983) does not indicate which scales show sex-differences. Inspection of the tables of norm indicates that females typically score higher on all scales and on GSI, except perhaps paranoid ideation where male and female means are similar. The means for homosexual males and heterosexual males are expected to be the same. Should differences between heterosexual males and heterosexual females occur the same differences in magnitude and direction should occur between homosexual males and heterosexual females.

MEAN OF HOMOSEXUAL MALES COMPARED
TO MEANS OF:

SCL-90-R SCALES	HETEROSEXUAL MALES	HETEROSEXUAL FEMALES
Somatization	Hom = Hem (H61)	Hom = Fem (H62)
Obsess-compuls	Hom = Hem (H63)	Hom = Fem (H64)
Interps. sensit.	Hom = Hem (H65)	Hom = Fem (H66)
Depression	Hom = Hem (H67)	Hom = Fem (H68)
Anxiety	Hom = Hem (H69)	Hom = Fem (H70)
Hostility	Hom = Hem (H71)	Hom = Fem (H72)
Phobic anxiety	Hom = Hem (H73)	Hom = Fem (H74)
Paranoid ideation	Hom = Hem (H75)	Hom = Fem (H76)
Psychoticism	Hom = Hem (H77)	Hom = Fem (H78)
Global severity	Hom = Hem (H79)	Hom = Fem (H80)
index (GSI)		

H81, H82. The homophobia mean of homosexual males is expected to be less than that of heterosexual males (H81) and also less than that of heterosexual females (H82).

H83, H84, H85. The means of the locus of control subscales - Internality (H83), Powerful Others (H84), and Chance (H85) - for homosexual males and heterosexual males are not expected to differ significantly.

H86, H87, H88. The means of the locus of control subscales -

Internality (H86), Powerful Others (H87), and Chance (H88) - for homosexual males and heterosexual females are not expected to differ significantly.

Hypotheses H89 to H94 are tabulated.

MEAN OF HOMOSEXUAL MALES COMPARED

TO MEANS OF:-

SELF-	HETEROSEXUAL	HETEROSEXUAL
CONSCIOUSNESS	MALES	FEMALES
Private	Hom = Hem (H89)	Hom = Fem (H90)
Public	Hom = Hem (H91)	Hom = Fem (H92)
Social anxiety	Hom = Hem (H93)	Hom = Fem (H94)

APPENDIX 3

HYPOTHESES OF STUDY 3

Hypotheses are stated only as they are predicted to apply to the low and high homosexual groups. The 'middle' Cass scale group is predicted to be intermediary between the 'low' and 'high' groups.

H95. The mean age of the low group is expected to be lower than the mean age of the high group.

H96. The mean years of education of the low group is expected to be lower than the mean years of education of the high group.

H97. The mean of gender identity of the low group is not expected to differ significantly from the same mean of the high group.

H98. The mean of masculinity - femininity of the low group is not expected to differ significantly from the same mean of the high group.

There is no previously reported research that investigates the relationship of the Cass scale and the PDQ. This relationship, if one exists, is probably complex rather than

simple and so to retain simplicity some of the possible relationships are proposed as models. From these predicted models an a priori interpretation is given. Models are proposed from both the 'sign' (i.e., negative or positive) and from the gender of sex (i.e., masculinity or femininity) of the PDQ scales.

There are five predicted models (plus unspecified composites) which predict the relationship of the Cass scale to the direction of valuing or 'sign' (i.e., positive or negative) of the PDQ scales. These five predictions are:

(i) H99. The means of 'positive' and 'negative' for both the low and high groups do not show any significant differences. (No relationship).

(ii) H100. The means of 'positive' and 'negative' are both higher for the low group than the high group. (Inverse relationship).

(iii) H101. The means of 'positive' and 'negative' are both lower for the low group than the high group. (Positive relationship).

The means of 'positive' and 'negative' scales show a cross-over effect:

(iv) H102. The means of 'positive' are significantly higher for the high group than the low group, and the means of

'negative' are significantly higher for the low group than the high group.

(v) H103. The means of 'positive' are significantly higher for the low group than the high group, and the means of 'negative' are significantly higher for the high group than the low group.

An a priori interpretation of the five models:

(i) Model H99 suggests no relationship between the Cass and PDQ scales: this would raise doubts about the validity and theoretical bases of one or both scales.

(ii) Model H100 suggests that homosexual identity formation socializes homosexuals in ways that diverge from generally accepted values (as shown by the PDQ).

(iii) Model H101 suggests that homosexual identity formation socializes homosexuals in ways that converge to generally accepted values (as shown by the PDQ).

(iv) Model H102 suggests that homosexual identity formation develops socially approved traits and diminishes socially disapproved traits.

(v) Model H103 suggests that homosexual identity formation develops socially disapproved traits and diminishes socially approved traits.

There are five models (plus unspecified composites) which

predict the relationship of the Cass scale and the masculinity and femininity of the PDQ scales. These five predictions are:

(i) H104. The means of 'masculine' and 'feminine' for both the low and high groups do not show any significant differences. (No relationship).

(ii) H105. The means of 'masculine' and 'feminine' are both higher for the low group than the high group. (Inverse relationship).

(iii) H106. The means of 'masculine' and 'feminine' are both lower for the low group than the high group. (Positive relationship).

The means of 'masculine' and 'feminine' show a cross-over effect.

(iv) H107. The means of 'masculine' are significantly higher for the high group than the low group, and the means of 'feminine' are significantly higher for the low group than the high group.

(v) H108. The means of 'masculine' are significantly higher for the low group than the high group, and the means of 'feminine' are significantly higher for the high group than the low group.

An a priori interpretation of the five models:

(i) Model H104 suggests no relationship between the Cass and

PDQ scales: this would raise doubts about the validity and theoretical bases of one or both scales, or, that the constructs measured are different. Since measures of gender identity should not vary over the three homosexual groups this is the model of choice for 'feminine positive' since Study 1 shows that this scale is associated with gender identity, even though 'feminine positive' is a sexual identity measure. An alternative interpretation is that this 'feminine' scale may confound sex and gender.

This finding from Study 1 is expressed as a specific hypothesis:

H104.1 The mean of 'feminine positive' for the low and high groups are not expected to show significant differences.

(ii) Model H105 suggests that homosexual identity formation is antithetical to development: it shows homosexuals become 'more undifferentiated' during homosexual development. An alternative would be that the PDQ is measuring stereotypy and that it is this that is decreasing with homosexual development.

(iii) Model H106 suggests that homosexual identity formation moves from undifferentiated to androgynous as the sex-role literature proposes. If the Cass scale does measure a developmental process this is the predicted model.

(iv) Model H107 suggests that homosexual development masculinizes and de-feminizes, that is, encourages sex role stereotypy. This would suggest that the female subjective self model of male homosexuality is not correct or that the PDQ fails

to capture and measure it. Since the PDQ is a measure of sexual identity or socialization, it is unlikely that it strongly captures the female gender identity of male bodied subjects. (The 'feminine' PDQ and FGI scales are different constructs of femininity and the scales are constructed in methodologically different ways. The FGI is the theoretical measure of feminine gender and the feminine scales of the PDQ are theoretically measures of socialized or sexual 'femininity').

(iv) Model H108 suggests that homosexual development femininizes and de-masculinizes. This says that homosexual identity formation develops crossed-sex sex role stereotypy. This would seem antithetical to the Cass developmental stages. Alternatively, the PDQ could be of questionable use. A finding that supports this model would probably support community 'myths' about male homosexuality.

H109. The mean of social desirability positive (PDQ) of the low and high groups are not expected to differ significantly.

H110. The mean of social desirability negative (PDQ) of the low and high groups are not expected to differ significantly.

H111. The mean of social desirability (Reynold's Form C, 1982) of the low and high groups are not expected to differ significantly.

H112 to H121 are tabulated.

SCL-90-R SCALES	MEANS OF:		
	LOW GROUP		HIGH GROUP
H112. Somatization	Low	=	High
H113. Obsessive-compulsive	Low	=	High
H114. Interpersonal sensitivity	Low	=	High
H115. Depression	Low	=	High
H116. Anxiety	Low	>	High
H117. Hostility	Low	=	High
H118. Phobic anxiety	Low	>	High
H119. Paranoid ideation	Low	=	High
H120. Psychoticism	Low	=	High
H121. Global severity index (GSI)	Low	>	High

H122. The homophobia mean of the low group is significantly higher than the same mean for the high group.

H123 to H125 of the 'locus of control' subscales are tabulated.

SUBSCALES	MEANS OF:		
	LOW GROUP		HIGH GROUP
H123. Internal scale	Low	<	High
H124. Powerful others scale	Low	>	High
H125. Chance scale	Low	>	High

H126 to H128 of the 'self-consciousness' subscales are tabulated.

MEANS OF:

SUBSCALES	LOW GROUP	HIGH GROUP
H126. Private self-consc.	Low <	High
H127. Public self-consc.	Low >	High
H128. Social anxiety	Low >	High

APPENDIX 4

The idea underlying role reversal is still little understood. First let us try to separate roleplaying from role reversal. If an individual takes the part of a doctor, a policeman or a salesman, the part of his father or of his mother in order to 'learn' how to function in these roles, that is roleplaying. But if he and his father or his mother 'change' parts, the father becoming the son and the son the father, this is role reversal.

J.L. Moreno (1975b, Vol. 2, p. 141)

The 'blackbox experiment' is a common classroom science roleplay. In this experiment students are given 'black' boxes with the question: "What's in the black box?". The students ('being scientists') have the task of discovering what is in the box by whatever means available - except by opening the box. Through an observational and deductive process the student-scientist comes to a conclusion as to what is in the box, such as lead, cotton-wool, a vacuum or air. Traditionally the box is never opened; it remains a 'black-box'.

In this roleplay the student and the box are separate: the student is the observer of the box and makes hypothetico-deductive statements about it. By this process he can not identify with certainty what is the content - only with certainty what the content is not. Knowledge of the content remains hypothetical and subject to further research.

A 'position', a 'point of consciousness from which we perceive' is called 'point of view' (Stanton, 1965). This roleplay epitomizes what is commonly called the 'objective' point of view. The student takes the outside-observer role in relation to the black-box: the objective attitude (point of view). As readers of this scene we have been put by the author into a specific point of view. The reader is also an outside-observer of the student with the black-box. (This 'objective' point of view is shown in Figure 1 as the uninvolved observer).

Other scenes are imagined. Suppose for example, a student is set the task of finding what is in the black-box when the black-box is another human being. This may just repeat the previous design, as for example, when the student investigates as though the other is a closed (black) biological system. Alternatively, he may investigate as though the other is an open (interactive) biological system by examining its imports and exports. He cannot do this, however, without altering the original paradigm or rule of the black-box. The a priori definition of the black-box changes from a closed to an open system.

At yet another level of investigation, this 'scientist' may examine the imports and exports of this other human being, not

by observing them as might a scientist measure air exchange, but by the other's imports and exports in relation to himself. Words spoken and heard by two persons in conversation are interactional. Generally, when I speak to him - I am the subject, when I listen to him - I am the object. When I listen to him, he is no longer the black-box, he is the subject: the status of the black-box has changed from object to subject. And vice versa. (Alternating between subject and object is the point of view shown in Figure 2). Being an object in relation to someone as subject is roleplaying. Taking the point of view whereby the other is object (not subject) is roletaking, that is, taking what is commonly called the 'objective' attitude. (In practice this 'objectivity' is akin to standardization. Anastasi (1982, p. 15), for example, discusses so-called 'objective tests' as 'standardized achievement tests').

In the examples given so far, the other is not myself: the black-box is some person or thing which has its own separate existence. (This is the interpersonal or social frame of reference). The student-scientist has not, however, exhausted the possibilities for black-box investigation. He is his own black-box: he is both subject and object. (This is the intrapersonal or psychological frame of reference). Moreno calls role reversal the alternation between the self as subject and as an object to that subject. These are points of view of self with their respective frames of reference. Existentially, no one can

role reverse with another person - no one can 'be' another person (Moreno, 1975b, p142). I can, however, roleplay him and vice versa, but I cannot role reverse with the other or vice versa (without the suspension of existential reality).

Man is in a curious position in this black-box universe. He not only can investigate other black-boxes but is himself a black-box. Mankind is in the curious position of being both subject and object and, it seems, this equivalence of opposites (being both subject and object) has great potential for confusion. This confusion seems to arise because of man's unwitting capacity to shift points of view - points of view which implicitly enter into observations and conclusions. These unwitting shifting attitudes may become uncontrolled variables as different frames of reference.

The student can roletake or roleplay with the black-box. If the black-box is the subject (the student becomes an object to the black-box) this by definition is roleplaying. If the black-box remains an object to the student, this by definition is roletaking (he takes the 'objective' attitude). The author in this description takes the 3rd person omniscient observer role - the standard 'objective' viewpoint. Subjectivity and objectivity are points of view: attitudes which affect how reality is constructed. Different frameworks of reality are constructed from these different points of view.

The purpose of these examples is to identify these two frameworks (originally as points of view) and the resulting confusion that is both conceptual and semantic and which arises from the unwitting alternation between points of view. One framework identifies observed ('subjective') and observer ('objective') roles: this difference creates a roletaking - roleplaying dimension, a 'between-person' or social framework. This is the traditional 'objective' scientific framework - a social construction of reality.

The two points of view of this social framework are operationalized in Moreno's sociodrama. Sociodrama operationalizes the dimension of self as roletaker in figure 1 to self as interactive participant in figure 2.

The other (psychological) framework identifies within a person both the subjective and the objective points of view, that is, the equivalence of opposites. This is a "within-a-person" or "person-as-subject" framework: 'role reversal' between subjective and objective attitudes (points of view) is central in this psychological framework. This is reality as constructed by the subject - this is the phenomenal framework - reality constructed by the individual. This is the framework that is structured by the persons grammar unified theory of reality.

The three points of view of this psychological framework are operationalized in Moreno's psychodrama. In the discussion which follows below, the roletaking - roleplaying dimension will be shown to operate within the person-as-subject as the person takes either the social role, i.e., 3rd 'person' roletaking, or the sociodramatic role, i.e., 2nd 'person' roleplaying).

It is the exposition and integration of both the 'objective' and 'phenomenal' frameworks into one unified theory of reality and the application of this theory in empirical test in the context of homosexuality that are the substantive issues of this thesis. With current theories sexual preferences remain enigmatic. These 'objective' theories could not explain me to myself because the 3rd 'person' point of view which they operationalize excludes my 2nd 'person' point of view. To operationalize both these 2nd and 3rd 'person' object relations requires a frame of reference oriented in the 1st person subject. This theoretical and empirical study is thus a framework of reality from within (e.g., an esoteric Christian tradition) and not a framework of reality from without (e.g., the Mosaic tradition). These are two different 'objective' frameworks. This duality is evident in the confusion of sex and gender generally (and gender identity and sexual identity specifically).

If the sex and gender literature is scientifically meaningful and applicable to sexual preferences, then this literature should explain me to myself. It did not do so. The persons grammar is how the subject structures reality from experientially different points of view. This should therefore help structure and bring meaning to terms such as sexual identity and gender identity.

There are two adult people - A and B: I am A, he is B. I have here attributed to B a male sexual identity. This is my attribution about him - this concept of male sexual identity is part of my psychological functioning (including my language). When I look at myself - in a mirror for example, I see a similar male sexed object - and attribute to myself a male sexual identity. This is my attribution about myself - I see myself as a sexed object. I attribute to B and to A a sexual identity. In this construction B may not in fact 'know' that B is male - 'he' may not have formed this (sexual) identity. 'Objectively' (in this 3rd person attitude) sexual identity is an attribution about someone else based on the objectively observable features of their biology. This includes 'myself in the mirror' - myself as an object.

This 'labelling' of others is pragmatic and remains an assumption on my part. This is part of a reality I create. If I see B with the appropriate male biological features it seems

reasonable to make this assumption. This 'working hypothesis' is pragmatic, for example, the same rationale is used to identify oranges, apple, cats, dogs, cars, buses, and other objects. It would be an unusual reality that relied completely on, for example, an orange 'knowing' that it is an orange before I could say it is an orange. When therefore, I say 'this is an orange', or 'he' (inferring a sexual identity), this is my construction of reality. This construction emphasizes my relation to these objects - my knowledge of identities.

The identification of 'boy' and 'girl' at birth is an assumption. These newborn have a biologically determined sex but they have not yet formed psychological knowledge (identity) about that sex. It is a convention that babies are referred to as 'he' or 'she'. This is a projection by the speaker. These projections are hypotheses I make about someone's reality. If this socially constructed reality is held to rigidly (such that this 'reality' becomes the 'Law') then there is little room for the individual to discover in a heuristic way (self-discovery) what 'his' identity is really. In effect, the person becomes a roletaker - taking the prescribed role of 'the male - boy' or of 'the female - girl'. Identity may then be confused with these social roles.

To know I am (biologically) male requires the enactment of a male sex role - such as standing and using a penis to urinate.

It is through doing these and other 'male' actions that a child learns 'he' is a male. (Moreno describes these roles associated with physiology and anatomy as psychosomatic roles. He regards these as preparatory to the formation of the psychological experience of body, in this case, 'male body'). Sexual identity is the experience of one's body being male (or female). A person who does not experience their body may intellectually know they are male or female and assume this knowing is their sexual identity. This is equivalent to the 'objective' point of view where sexual identity is assumed from a taught knowledge of biological sex.

Being a male requires during childhood the enactment of roles regarded as socially appropriate for boys (to be masculine). Historically, these roles have been different to roles which have been prescribed for females to become girls (feminine). In this conditioning social process the social role has its origin in the biological sex of the child. The child has masculinity and femininity (social sex-roles) in so far that the child conforms to the expected roles of 'boys/men' and 'girls/women'. Social sex-role is related to biological sex.

That biological sex identifies sexual identity is an inference. This inference is commonly made - in everyday conversation, in the sex literature, and in the body of the thesis. To make this inference - that biological sex identities

sexual identity - is pragmatic. This inference may be said to be generally correct but that this generalization does not necessarily apply to the individual. Thus an individual may be masculine (social sex-role), male bodied, and intellectually know they are an example of the male category (and which together could be called 'male identification'), and still have little male sexual identity - that is - have little heuristic experience of their own maleness. Clearly, social sex-role is related to biological sex, and, sexual identity is related to biological sex. This is an example when M and N appear to be correlated, but where M is related to O and N is related to O. Individually there are clearly limits to defining sexual identity by biological sex.

This pragmatic approach which parallels common social practice is used in this thesis. The results show a relationship between social sex-role and biological sex (which is not surprising given the method of constructing this measure). Sexual identity may not develop even given the prior existential facticity of biological sex. Pragmatically, given the number of subjects in each of the groups, it is assumed that biological sex does indicate a difference in sexual identity such that homosexual males and heterosexual males have a sexual identity and that heterosexual females have a different sexual identity. (If homosexuality and heterosexuality are themselves different sexual identities, or are systematically related to different

sexual identities, then sexual preference should be empirically related to biological sex. This thesis shows that this is a null relation: homosexuality and heterosexuality are not empirically related to biological sex, and therefore, not systematically related to sexual identity).

Gender is a grammatical term and refers to the classification of nouns into kinds (such as undifferentiated, male, female, and androgynous). Gender also has sex as a colloquial meaning in which case sex and gender are synonymous.

To know I am 'a person' (a self) requires during development the formation of a sense of self which is differentiated from the existence of other persons. This individuated self is that entity which is 'I and me', that is, 'myself'. This is the self (trinity) which emerges with the unification of the 1st and 2nd 'persons' of grammar and not the self-conscious 3rd 'person' observer self. The gender of this conscious entity - the self - is referred to as gender identity.

Conventionally a person (self) has been considered to be gendered in a way that is congruent with biological sex. This untested assumption is evident in the gender literature whereby the biological male is generally regarded as being male gendered (and so on for female). (This assumption of sex and gender congruency is extensively discussed in Study 3. If sexual

preferences are related to gender identity then homosexuality and heterosexuality should be empirically related to gender role, and by inference, to gender identity. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate this proposed relationship: the origins of sexual preferences are in gender identity. Study 3 identifies the nature of that gender identity in homosexuals and heterosexuals).

Sexual identity and gender identity are not the same as colloquial understanding would have one believe. Sexual identity is an experienced knowledge of being biologically male (for example) and has its origins in the biological segregation and differentiation of the sexes. Gender identity is an experienced knowledge of the gender of oneself and has its origins in the differentiation and integration of the self. (This difference between sex and gender is discussed in more detail below). These identities are measured in this thesis by the objectively observable expression of sex role and gender role from which appropriate inferences of identity are made. This apparent but unreal duality of sex and gender has been confusing. The enigma of homosexuality and heterosexuality is at least partially resolved by this conceptual clarification of sex and gender.

That man lives a duality is a common theme in religious and scientific literature. This theme is well stated by Kelsey (1972, p. 51):

The belief that man is in touch with spiritual reality can be held naively, and also by people who think about it with great care. Some people have held this belief who found, as in Hinduism and Buddhism, that the spiritual alone has reality, while the physical world is only illusive appearances or "maya". And some have discarded it, equally convinced, as in the nineteenth century, that only the physical is real and the spiritual is illusion. Once men have begun to think about the problem, it is very difficult for them to bear the tension of relating to two such different realms of experience.

The integration of this apparent duality of reality - of a spiritual-religious point of view and a physical-scientific point of view - into one unified theory of reality would be important scientifically and religiously. Kelsey does point out the essential difficulty of doing this - the 'tension of relating to two such different realms of experience'. It is this duality, and consequent confusion, which is herein addressed as the interpersonal ('objective') and intrapersonal (phenomenal) frameworks.

What and where is the origin of this confusion? The following history is in sketch form only. I claim no expertise in religious or scientific history.

A History of Duality

Uncommon in that part of the world at the time, the Jewish Mosaic tradition identifies them as a distinct culture.

Surrounding traditions are pantheistic. For the Jews there is only one God (Yahwah which has the literal translation of 'I-am-ness'). A person's relation to this God is like that of one person to another unknown but observing person. This God is outside of oneself and can only be reached through a correct and complex observance of the (religious) Law. This God takes the observer role in relation to the person (as does the uninvolved observer in Figure 1). This is the 3rd person 'objective' point of view.

The Mosaic relation between self and God, with its implicit construction of reality, was challenged by Jesus of Nazareth. This man, through the 'heresy' and 'blasphemy' that he teaches, identifies one of the most profound and long-lasting schisms in the human personality. His thinking and teaching mark a vast before and after difference. Boff (1986, p. 179) says:

The man Jesus of Nazareth revealed such greatness and profundity in his humanity that at the end of a long process of meditation the apostles and those who knew him had to say: only God himself could be so human. As of that moment, the apostles, who were Jews, left off being Jews in order to become Christians. The Jews held the absolute unity of God as a fundamental doctrine of their faith.

Jesus marks a dramatic change in man's thinking. In the Mosaic tradition man is observed by a unitary and remote God: God cannot be a man and a man cannot role reverse and become God because God is existentially another Being. With Jesus, God

appears divided because He is now part of (each) Man. Since however He is part of Jesus the man, Jesus can role reverse with Him (Father): thus "The Father and I are One" (John 10:30). Now, with Jesus, the subject and the object are different meta-roles within the one person. Role reversal - the interaction of subject (Father) and object (Son) - is fundamental to the Trinity of the Christian God.

This Trinity is paradoxical since there is simultaneously the systemic unified whole and the subsystems of three divine 'persons' (meta-roles). The Trinity of the Christian God unifies both the whole (the One in the Mosaic tradition) and the Three Divine 'Persons' in One. The Trinity has been a mystery, that is, confusing. This confusion seems to parallel the duality of the subject and object being the same and yet different, as happens in role reversal. This duality is evident in the relations between sexual identity and sex role, and between gender identity and gender role.

Moreno (1971) uses the term 'I-God'. This distinguishes an individual's whole personality (the 'I-God') from the universalized 'objective' God that is implied by our existence in this 'black-box' universe. The 'I-God' is herein called the 'self' and is inferred by the three attitudes of persons grammar to this self.

Jesus is historically in apposition to the (religious) Law. In his actions the Law with its frame of reference in the implied but remote universal God is brought into juxtaposition with a Christ whose frame of reference is in an internally present and experienced 'Abba' (Father). This frame of reference implies the point of view of the subject (Abba) and the point of view of the object (Son) who is experiencing and identifying with that subject. The term Son is used ambiguously to refer to Jesus who is a Son amongst people (interpersonal or social realm) and also to the 2nd 'person' of the Trinity which is a meta-role within the individuated personality (intrapersonal or psychological realm). This ambiguity between the social and the psychological is a recurrent dualistic - and confusing - theme.

Jesus marks a historical discontinuity in the construction of reality. His theory and teaching enables a unified construction of reality. His genius is not to supplant the Mosaic construction but to integrate this universal 'objective' social construct of reality into an individuated and even more encompassing and unifying psychological theory of reality - the Trinity.

Science

The 'objectivistic' paradigm (frame of reference) of the Mosaic tradition and the 'subjectivistic' paradigm personified

by Jesus are dual philosophical themes pre-dating Christianity. Man's duality as roletaker and roleplayer is paralleled here in this comment by von Bertalanffy (1968, p. 253):

It seems to be the most serious shortcoming of classical occidental philosophy, from Plato to Descartes and Kant, to consider man primarily as a spectator, as *ens cogitans*, while, for biological reasons, he has essentially to be a performer, an *ens agens* in the world he is thrown in.

Moreno's psychodrama (which includes roleplaying and roletaking) has its origins in the philosophy of Plato. Kelsey (1972, p. 57) links Christianity with Plato and says:

Plato's theory of how the two realms of reality interact, and how men come to know these two realms of reality, was clearly consistent with the experiences of both the Old and the New Testaments. Plato gave the clearest and most systematic account of this theory of man in contact with both spiritual and physical worlds,

These dual realities parallel dual scientific paradigms. In an overview of the new physics Zukav (1979, p. 55) says:

The concept of scientific objectivity rests on the assumption of an external world which is "out there" as opposed to an "I" which is "in here". (This way of perceiving, which puts other people "out there", makes it very lonely "in here"). According to this view, Nature, in all her diversity, is "out there" as objectively as possible. To observe something objectively means to see it as it would appear to an observer who has no prejudices about what he observes.

Zukav also attributes the problem of this objectivity to a 'prejudiced' attitude of the observer - the 'subjectivity' of

the observer. It is however the assumption of a particular point of view and the consequent construction of reality - the paradigm inherent in this 'God', 'Nature', or reality as an external phenomenon - that remains implicit and scientifically untested. These two paradigms are confounded in the sex and gender literature; they are tested in Studies 1, 2 and 3 using sex and gender concepts and measures.

Combs and Snygg (1959, p. 16) also recognize two broad frameworks in psychology:

Human behavior, may be observed from at least two very broad frames of reference: from the point of view of an outsider, or from the point of view of the behavior himself. This is the "objective," or "external," frame of reference. The second approach seeks to understand behavior by making its observations from the point of view of the behavior himself. ... This frame of reference has been called the "perceptual," "personal," or "phenomenological" frame of reference

According to Combs and Snygg (1959, p. vii) the phenomenal paradigm is new, however, its origin seems to be traceable to Plato and to the beginnings of Christianity, even if its meaning and relevance have been somewhat confused in the ensuing 2,000 years.

These same authors (Combs & Snygg, 1955) emphasize the phenomenological frame of reference as the 'point of view' of their book. This is both correct and false and this point has remained a stumbling block to the integration of religious and

scientific thinking. Combs and Snygg (1955), this author, or anyone else, cannot capture the phenomenological point of view by a 3rd person point of view - although it can be described - as Combs and Snygg (1955) do. This standardized description is however not the phenomenon itself - it is abstraction from it. Description of an experience is not the experience.

Jesus describes role reversal. He found that 'Father' (subject) and 'Son' (object) could reverse roles but that this 'act' - a way of thinking - is an interiority. This is the interior or psychological realm - a way of thinking - that He calls the Kingdom of God. In life ones interiority can only be directly experienced by oneself - no one can actually role reverse with another. (Inferences about another, about sexual identity for example, can however be made). It is the description of this 'action' which has been difficult and a point of contention in science and religion, arguably not because the phenomenon does not exist, but because the scientific 'point of view' precludes it except as a description. An abstract description is not the 'real' thing, just as the symbol 'tree' is not a tree. (Try, for example, describing the taste of an orange to a person who has had no taste of an orange, or of 'red' to a born-blind person). It is through the genius of Moreno's psychodrama method that role reversal is possible in an externalized 'objective' way and in a way that can be meaningfully experienced by others.

It may be useful at this point to summarize and clarify. There is no argument in the literature about the presence and nature of two broad frameworks: there are various names but 'objective' and 'phenomenal' are apt. There is some agreement that these frames of reference are usually kept separate - tension and confusion being the result for the unwary. Kelsey (1972, p. 36) asks: "Is there any real alternative to these two ways of thinking?". There is little doubt that Man lives a duality. The maintenance of this duality seems related to Man's failure to wittingly experience and understand role reversal.

The Trinity (persons grammar)

The Trinity is composed of four elements and four relations. The object - God, Trinity, or self - is one element. The Divine 'Persons' are three more elements - all objects. The Father, the 1st 'person' of grammar is an object - and the subject. This particular object has a specific and inalienable identity - the subject. The subject has an identity (Moreno's psychodramatic role). The 2nd and 3rd 'persons' (Moreno's sociodramatic role and social role respectively) are objects having specific meta-relations with the subject.

The first of the four relations is that between self and subject. In the Trinity this identifies the Father as one of the

identities of God (self). In the persons grammar this is the 'I-I' relation of self and first 'person' (subject). The subject is the personification of one of the identities of the self.

The second relation is that between the 1st 'person' (subject) and 2nd 'person' (object). In the Trinity this is the relation between Father and Son: the rolecreating subject and the roleplaying object. In the persons grammar this is the 'I-you' relationship of direct encounter: a meeting. In the mind (the Kingdom of God) the 'I' and the 'you' are of the same person and so role reversal is possible. The objective expression of this is a way of thinking (consciousness) that has its frame of reference in the subject. This relation defines the conscious experience of self, an experience which is abstracted to the 'phenomenal' frame of reference.

The third relation is that between the 1st 'person' (subject) and the 3rd 'person' (object). In the Trinity this is the relation between Father and the Holy Ghost (Spirit): the rolecreating subject and the roletaking object. In the persons grammar this is the 'I-he' null-relation of segregation. Within the mind the 'I' and the 'he' are of the same person: 'he' is as though an object separate to himself. He takes the 'objective' point of view towards himself: 'he' seems to be outside of himself just as God is outside of a person in the Mosaic tradition.

The fourth relation is that implied between the 2nd 'person' and the 3rd 'person'. In the Trinity this appears to be a relation between the 2nd 'Person' (Son) and the 3rd 'Person' (Holy Spirit). The relation is between two previously identified elements - the roleplaying 2nd 'person' ('you') and the roletaking 3rd 'person' ('he'). The roleplayer (who is in relation) and the roletaker (who is in null-relation) thus represent extremes of 'relatedness' which should differ as does a scale. Moreno (1971, p. 168) identifies this scale as an "axiological scale" of spontaneity where the "ideal exponent of one pole is a totally spontaneous creator, and the ideal exponent of the other, the total cultural conserve", that is, the most and the least spontaneity respectively. Spontaneity is the essence of the 2nd 'person' roleplayer and its absence the essence of the 3rd 'person' roletaker. The 'Holy Spirit' is a bond (as in 'religio' - to bind). Its fullest expression is the bond of the Son to manifest in roleplay the creativity of the Father.

Doyan (1986) in "Love before the law" says (p. 53):

It suffices that in his human consciousness he finally attributed his being and his human activity to that mysterious Subject within him whose identity remained unfathomable and which infinitely transcended all that he could manifest of it in his life. His deep conviction of the presence of God within him embraced the mystery of his Person, which for him coincided with the mystery of God.

Here Doyan identifies the subject as presence within the person and that, in Jesus, there is a manifestation of the subject which coincides with the mystery of God. Jesus experiences this subject interiorly: the locus of his identity is within him. He is both subject and object - he is one. A person who manifests this conscious integration of subject and object attracts the term Prophet, Buddha, or Christ, and so on. In Moreno's terms this model of Man is the 'creative genius'.

In summary, the persons grammar (Trinity) is a systemic model of human personality composed of elements and relations between those elements. The wholeness of the self-system integrates a duality: one way of thinking with its relatedness to the subject and objectified as roleplaying, and, another way of thinking with its dissociation from the subject and objectified as roletaking. Integration occurs with the increasing ability of the person to move between their subjective and objective functioning. This (internal) role reversal is a real 'phenomenon': it can be experienced and it can be described. Existential role reversal is not possible and because of this Moreno developed psychodrama method.

Except in psychodrama method where the protagonist is the subject, the subject has remained scientifically and religiously elusive. (Labelling people as 'subjects' in a scientific study

does not satisfy the objection that these people are performing in the scientist-observer's experiment and therefore the scientist is the true subject just as an actor playing Macbeth plays a part in Shakespeare's drama). The persons grammar (Trinity), a religious-scientific systems model, enables the interactive reciprocal relation of role reversal to be brought to an empirical test. This test utilizes an experimental systems design proposed by von Bertalanffy (1968).

A systems design

A system can be defined as a set of elements standing in interrelations. This means that elements, p , stand in relations, R , so that the behavior of an element p in R is different from its behavior in another relation, R' . If the behavior in R and R' are not different, there is no interaction, and the elements behave independently with respect to the relations R and R' (von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 55).

Central to this definition is 'interaction' which can be stated as a hypothesis: If --- there is interaction, then --- the elements behave differently. If the elements p_2 and p_3 (see Figure 10) behave differently in respect to p_1 , then this supports the theory that the subject (p_1) and object (p_2) have an interactive relationship and the theoretical viewpoint that the subject and object are the 'same' and 'different'. The same object is different and this difference is related to a systematic difference in position (point of view). (Just as a 'person' has gender identity and gender role is its objective expression). It is argued that this paradox is best understood

as a role reversal. An experimental design based on this definition is shown in the following diagram.




Figure 10.

An experimental design using a systems model.

This is the design used in Studies 1 and 2 of this thesis. The statistical analyses show that roleplaying (p2) is empirically related to sexual preference (p1) whereas roletaking (p3) is not. The elements p2 (gender role) and p3 (sex role) vary predictably in their behaviour with respect to p1 (homosexual, heterosexual). R' and R are shown to be different:

gender role is systematically related to sexual preference whereas sex role is not.

It is concluded that sexual preference is related to the gender identity of the subject. Homosexuality and heterosexuality are gender-role-playings (literally playing in gender role). Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that sexual preference is related to the gender identity of the subject and not to their biological sex, and by inference, not to their sexual identity.

For measurement purposes (by Fruend et al, 1974) sexual preference is not included in gender role. These Studies show that sexual preference is very much part of an adult gender role: it is an objective expression of the gender identity of the self.

While these two Studies address the origin of sexual preference, the nature of that (gender) identity remains untested. The pragmatic approach in the literature has been to assume congruency of sex and gender identity in heterosexuality and incongruency in homosexuality.

The design proposed by von Bertalanffy (1968) is also used in Study 3. Whereas in the previous studies variation in the elements is used to demonstrate the proposed relations, in Study

3 variation in the relations are shown to be predictably related to variation in the elements. In this study three levels of R are hypothesized to be systematically related to objective differences in p and not to a subjective difference in p. This design is shown in Figure 11.




Figure 11.

An experimental design for Study 3 using a systems model.

The relation between 'being homosexual' (p1: gender identity) and identifying with that 'being' (p2-p4: homosexual identification) is systematically varied. The relations R - R' -

R'' show increasing levels of interaction (relatedness).

There are two hypotheses. First, differences in homosexual identification should not be related to differences in 'being homosexual': there should not be variation in p1 (gender identity) between the three homosexual male groups.

Differences in level of homosexual identification (p2-p4) are theoretically related to the 'axiological scale' of spontaneity (discussed above). This scale is not unidimensional: it is a scale of interaction of spontaneity with creativity. Spontaneity is discussed in the main body of the thesis as an esoteric freedom. This freedom should be negatively related to anxiety. The second hypothesis states that increasing identification with self (relatedness) is associated with less anxiety. In Study 3 both hypotheses are tested across three groups of homosexual males who differ in degree of relatedness to self. Both hypotheses are empirically supported.

Studies 1 and 2 show that the homosexual male and heterosexual female have the same gender identity, an identity different to the heterosexual male. Study 3 identifies the nature of these gender identities.

This Study demonstrates that this identity is male in homosexual males and heterosexual females, and, female in

heterosexual males. Interpersonal sexual attraction mimics the subject-object relation within the self - the preferred sexual partner is shown to take the role of the 2nd 'person' in relation to self as subject. In this sexual roleplaying the sex of the preferred object mirrors the gender of the self as subject. In male homosexuality, the male as a sexed object mirrors the gender identity of the homosexual male subject. In heterosexuality the sexed object mirrors the gender identity of the subject. Overall then, these three Studies address the origin and nature of sexual preferences.

Homosexuality is the overt content of this thesis. The conclusions can go beyond this since the analysis also tests the dual frames of reference. These Studies put the "two great frames of reference" (Combs & Snygg, 1959, p. 10) to empirical test. This has been done in two ways: one by prediction of hypothesized relations from known elements (Studies 1 and 2), and also by the prediction of hypothesized elements from known relations (Study 3).

Moreno (1975b, p. 141) believed 'role reversal' to be little understood. A historically documented antecedent of role reversal is the 'Father and Son' of Jesus. Role reversal thus needs further elaboration in religious, educational, scientific and therapeutic systems, and the principle of role reversal - interaction - applied much more extensively.

These Studies demonstrate the change in the construction of reality proposed by Jesus. Socially - the 'objective' point of view - Jesus is (a) Christ. Within the personality of the human there is the 2nd 'person' ('Son'). These Studies show that developing this sociodramatic (2nd 'person') role within ourselves - that is, becoming roleplayers - is central in the development of the integrated self and in the bonds of social behaviour.

Much has been said in this thesis concerning meta-theory. The confusion evident in the gender and sex literature springs from the confounding of the 'two great frames of reference' and some clarification has been necessary before applying this to an integrated theory of gender. A theory of gender is proposed which follows on from the theory of persons grammar.

An Androgynous Theory of Gender

In "The kingdom within" Sanford (1970, p. 173) says:

It is inevitable that, in the growth of our personalities, much that potentially is part of us will not be developed. Our early identification with the mask effectively excludes a large portion of our total personality. Our identification with our masculinity, if we are men, or femininity, if we are women, will also exclude much of our potential.

Sigmund Freud's theories have attracted the criticism that they have been developed from the study of neurotic and not normal people. If Sanford is correct then to develop theories of human development based on 'normality' is also self defeating. A new model of Man is required.

Freud in 'On sexuality' plays with the idea of 'psychical hermaphroditism' (Strachey, 1977, p. 52) but found he could not demonstrate a relationship between this and anatomical hermaphroditism. He is also interested in bisexuality and says (p. 142):

Since I have become acquainted with the notion of bisexuality I have regarded it as the decisive factor, and without taking bisexuality into account I think it would scarcely be possible to arrive at an understanding of the sexual manifestations that are actually to be observed in men and women.

Freud's notion of bisexuality is originally invested in a biological framework; care must be taken in interpreting this statement. For him bisexuality is nearer to 'a biological hermaphroditism' than are current notions. Since Kinsey's et al (1948) 'continuum' bisexuality is generally regarded as intermediate between heterosexuality and homosexuality and not directly linked to biology. Jung (1964) is also interested in a psychical bisexuality and developed the concepts of 'anima' and 'animus'. The Eastern concepts of yin and yang are similar principles. There is much precedent for regarding the human mind

as being in some way psychologically 'bisexual'.

Sex refers to the biological self as a sexed object. The idea of sexual development as the biological segregation and subsequent differentiation of male and female sexes is not a useful concept applied to psychological growth occurring by a different (interactive) process. In other words, Freud's 'psychical hermaphroditism' may well be notionally correct but is expressed in biological rather than in psychological terms.

A segregated sex is generally observable in (though not yet experienced by) the newborn. In contrast to this sexual dimorphism gender identity is undifferentiated. A differentiated male or female gender identity is shown in this thesis to be explanatory of adult sexual preference. Implicit in this construction is the differentiation of gender identity as either a male or a female identity. (This construction seems to arise in a mechanistic ideology discussed below).

At birth the newborn is psychologically an undifferentiated universe - the self is unformed, there is an undifferentiated (hence androgynous) gender identity. In the course of development male and female identities emerge from this undifferentiated matrix giving the person their experience or sense of gender. This is the second universe. It is from the differentiation and subsequent integration of these identities

that the unified and androgynous self emerges. This is a third universe.

There are four categories of gender: undifferentiated (androgyny), male, female, and androgyny (integrated). The first universe of human development is characterized by an undifferentiated androgynous gender identity. The second universe is characterized by differentiation of male and female identities. The third universe is characterized by the integration of the differentiated male and female identities into an androgynous whole. Such a theory clearly implies that the third stage - of integration - cannot be accomplished without the prior differentiation of both the male and female identities. Consequently, the emergence of the androgynous self is contiguous with the successful differentiation of both the male and the female principles in the one individual and not on the segregated pattern evident in homo- and hetero-sexuality. It is in this sense that both homosexuality and heterosexuality are 'deviancies' (i.e, not deviancies in a normal sense but deviations from a teleological androgynous self).

The androgyny theory of the self is a teleological (developmental and evolutionary) theory of Man. The journey of the self is towards androgyny and departures, however 'normal', indicate a failure of interaction (creativity with spontaneity). That both homo- and hetero-sexuality are both equally 'normal'

(i.e., equally deviant) is shown in this thesis by the failure (also evident in the literature review) to show a significant difference in objective measures of pathology between the two preferences.

This theory is related to the 'kingdom' of the persons grammar (Trinity). Jesus spoke in parables of everyday events and addressed in his audience what he called the 'kingdom of God'. He intends by his parables to say something about this 'kingdom'. His teaching is esoteric (from the Greek 'eso', meaning 'within'). When asked by some Pharisees about the lawfulness of divorce Jesus addresses the esoteric integration of 'man' and 'woman' by literalist analogy to 'marriage' and 'divorce'. He makes his position clear on the differentiation and integration of male and female gender identity; he says "What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder" (Matthew, 20:6). Here the self (god) is both male and female - the self is androgynous. Jesus warns against the prevention of this integration.

In summary the androgynous theory of gender proposes an androgynous (and consequently) bisexual self, via undifferentiated, differentiated, and integrated stages. Homo- and hetero-sexuality, developing only one gender, are only partial expressions of the second differentiated universe. The absence (or underdevelopment) of a gender identity in

homosexuals and heterosexuals is indicative of an absence or loss of spontaneity. This may perhaps be attributed to a conditioning and identification with the 'mask' of biological sex which both creates and maintains a segregationist-sexist attitude. If so, it is important to identify and rectify this ideology so that the self can develop properly. (This ideology will be briefly addressed below in 'sex research' and 'gender research').

This ideology is identified and tested in the body of the thesis as the 3rd 'person' (i.e., roletaker). The roletaker has a null-relatedness to self and is associated with anxiety and psychoticism. In the semantics of psychology this is dissociation and in the semantics of religion this is sin. It is this ideology leading to the assumption of the 3rd 'person' attitude and how it leads to the segregation of male and female that is now addressed.

Knowledge

Roleplaying and roletaking implies two different theories of object relations, and therefore, dual systems of knowledge. Fundamental to knowledge from roleplaying is differentiation. To differentiate is to constitute a difference between, to render unlike, to discriminate, and to recognize a difference between. The development of the 'male' and 'female' (gender identities)

from the undifferentiated is such a process. In this process the 'male' is differentiated from the undifferentiated (chaos), and, the 'female' is differentiated from the undifferentiated (chaos). (In this process 'male' is not differentiated from 'female'). This process recognizes the relationship between the development of the identity and the initial (undifferentiated) chaos from which it develops. Knowledge in this process is the 'I-am-ness' of developing identity.

Fundamental to knowledge from roletaking is segregation. To segregate is to isolate, divide into separate groups, become isolated or separated. The development of male and female sexed objects is such a process. In this originally biological process the male is differentiated from an initial but segregated whole (zygote). (And similarly for the female). The sexes are already segregated by their characteristic sex chromosomes. Following this biological development, the psychological development of sexual identity develops from an already segregated and differentiated universe. Sexual identity involves a prior division (segregation) between male and female followed by separate development.

The concepts and semantics of sex and gender arise in fundamentally different processes of growth and invoke fundamentally different theories of knowledge. Fundamentally important conceptual issues are poorly recognized and

operationalized in the sex and gender literature.

It may be useful to emphasize some basic concepts. One is a distinction between closed and open systems, the other distinction is between living and non-living things.

The distinction between open and closed systems is fundamental to the persons of grammar theory: the self as an interaction of the 1st and 2nd 'persons' (i.e., within the field) is an open system, in contrast to the closed system of the 3rd 'person' (who is outside the field). This distinction is becoming more important in science generally says von Bertalanffy (1968, p. 161) in his conclusions:

The model of the organism as an open system has proved useful in the explanation and mathematical formulation of numerous life phenomena; it also leads, as is to be expected in a scientific working hypothesis, to further problems, partly of a fundamental nature. This implies that it is not only of scientific but also of 'meta-scientific' importance. The mechanistic concept of nature predominant so far emphasized the resolution of happenings into linear causal chains; a conception of the world as a result of chance events, and a physical and Darwinistic 'play of dice' (Einstein); the reduction of biological processes to laws known from inanimate nature. In contrast to this, in the theory of open systems (....), principles of multivariable interaction (....) become apparent, a dynamic organization of processes and a possible expansion of physical laws under consideration of the biological realm. Therefore, these developments form part of a new formulation of the scientific world view.

And (p. 165):

....., precisely that criterion which fundamentally distinguishes living systems from conventional ones is generally ignored or bypassed.

The use of a 'mechanistic' concept which ignores this distinction will be identified in 'sex- and gender-research' (below).

The distinction between living and non-living is a supposition related to apparent differences in organization:

As a rule, the organization of physical wholes, such as atoms, molecules, or crystals, results from the union of pre-existing elements. In contrast, the organization of biological wholes is built up by differentiation of an original whole which segregates into parts. (von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 68).

Growth in living and non-living systems are fundamentally different. The application of 'union' to living systems is inappropriate. This mechanistic concept should first be shown to be applicable before it is operationalized (explicitly or implicitly) in biological, social and psychological research.

In this construction the physical system has a particular organization of wholes built up from pre-existing parts whereas von Bertalanffy identifies the organization of living things with segregation. While I have discussed the relevance of segregation to the development of biological sex, and therefore to sexual identity, this thesis is primarily concerned with another organizational pattern of living things. This is

integration, a pattern characterized by interaction, whereby creativity is organized by spontaneity. There are then different organizations of living and non-living things, and within living things there are recognized fundamentally different growth processes of segregation and of integration.

Much of the confusion in the sex and gender literature, and the enigma of homo- and hetero-sexuality, is probably attributable to the inappropriate application of 'mechanistic' concepts. This construct implicitly construes to man a non-living status.

There also has been a failure to identify the development of sexual identity with prior biological sexual segregation. Instead, sexual identity has become identified with a social and psychological segregation of the biological sexes. It does not follow that these social and psychological differences, arising in early social segregation of the sexes (i.e., sexism), are related to sexual identity. This is a tautology: the differences arise, at least in part, because children are exposed to different learning environments based on their sex. This differential learning is not theoretically related to sexual identity. (These are associated however in the pragmatic assumption that sexual identity is defined by biological sex). It does follow however that the social and psychological personality traits of the individual help define the nature of

the self, including the gender of that self.

There also has been a failure to identify the development of gender identity with integration. Instead, gender identity has become identified with, and is expected to be congruent with, (one) biological sex. Here the self as a sexed object usurps the experience of the self as a subject: the self as an object repeats the Mosaic objective tradition where the contents of the 'black-box' (oneself) remain enigmatic. To be oneself requires the integration of those apparent opposites subject and object: those two objects 'I' and 'you' who may encounter each other within the personality. Here the personality is an open system and an open system which may develop a conscious sense (identity) of self, including own gender (and consequent sexual preference).

There also has been a failure to identify the relation between sexual identity and gender identity. Sexual preferences identify a relationship between gender identity and the biological sex of the preferred sex partner. (This relationship has been shown in this thesis to be congruent. To the extent that biological sex implies the development of one or other sexual identities there is no relationship between own sexual identity and the biological sex, or inferred sexual identity, of the preferred sex partner). Sexual identity is an identification with ones own body including its sex (and refers to

psychosomatic role development). Gender identity refers to the experience of oneself being gendered (and to the integration of psychodramatic and sociodramatic roles.

Sexual identity implies the previous development of a 'sexual role' (psychosomatic male or female role) and is part of the sense of 'body'. This identity is necessarily tied to sex. Gender identity is necessarily tied to the nature of the self: a self which integrates body, including sexual identity, within the whole (body, social, psychological) self. Gender identity is thus inclusive of sexual identity, just as gender is a more generic term than sex.

In summary, in an open system an identity is nominally defined by its essence so that male (for example) is defined by (or identified with) that which differentiates maleness from no-maleness. In a closed system, however, an identity is operationally defined by the differentiation of male from female. This operant measures the difference between males and females. This mechanistic attitude is evident in the sex and gender literature. The purpose of the following review is to identify more clearly that attitude.

Sex Research

Sex roles are operationally defined as a contrast of traits

between male- and female-sexed subjects. Consider the following hypothetical characteristics (X, Y, and Z).

	CHARACTERISTICS OF	
	MALES	FEMALES
BOTH MALES AND FEMALES	X	X
ONLY MALES	Y	-
ONLY FEMALES	-	Z

Maleness can be defined, first, by comparison to null-maleness, that is, by X and Y. Second, maleness can be operationally defined by comparison to femaleness, that is, by Y. Here it is argued that X and Y define maleness whereas Y, the operant used in the sex literature, identifies only a difference between maleness and femaleness. While Y is a characteristic of Male (and a null-characteristic of Female), it is erroneous to equate Male with Y.

In practice this second method has produced a situation in the literature whereby masculinity (Y) becomes instrumentality and femininity (Z) becomes interpersonal warmth. Masculinity and femininity cannot be equated with instrumentality and interpersonal warmth, as this method implies, without seriously distorting language. This conundrum is better interpreted as an artefact of an inappropriate mechanical methodology. (This method seems to follow from the assumption that a whole can be

divided into parts since, mechanically, parts can be summed to make a whole). The sex role literature is confusing and, it seems, little significance is attached to this important methodological reductionism. This method does not operationally define masculinity (or femininity) in an experientially meaningful way.

This method produces mutually exclusive categories and defines androgyny as Y plus Z. Since by definition Y and Z are mutually exclusive, this construction of androgyny is problematic. At best this view, as represented in the literature, construes androgyny as a balance between two mutually exclusive opposites. Prior segregation, followed by differentiation into either male or female, pre-empts a sexual androgyny. Androgyny and sexual identity are antithetical.

In humans there are two categories of sex (and of sexual identity) - male and female. In this literature there are however four categories: undifferentiated, male, female, and androgynous. This conceptual confusion arises as a consequence of an inappropriate methodology and theoretical framework. A new psychological framework of sex research is required and one in which segregation is prior to differentiation of different identities.

Gender research

Gender roles are operationally defined as a contrast of traits between similar sexed subjects. Consider the following hypothetical characteristics (A, B, and C).

	CHARACTERISTICS OF MALE	
	HETEROSEXUALS	HOMOSEXUALS
BOTH MALE GROUPS	A	A
ONLY HETEROSEXUAL MALES	B	-
ONLY HOMOSEXUAL MALES	-	C

In this example gender identity is heterosexually defined by A and B, and homosexually defined by A and C. Gender identity can be operationally defined as a difference-score, as B or as C.

The second method leads to the belief that the gender identity of heterosexual males is B and of homosexual males is C. In this construction gender identity is either B or C. This reductionist method ignores A in the construction of gender scales.

While sex has two categories, gender has four. Gender research, using this rationale, recognizes only two mutually exclusive categories - male and female. In this rationale a bisexual person (who is theoretically androgynous) cannot exist and this difference-score way of measuring gender identity

precludes their identification. This is similar to the earlier sex role construction of masculinity and femininity as opposites (as is Eysenck's masculinity - femininity scale used in this thesis) and where a person could be masculine or feminine, but not both. The possibility of androgyny is operationally excluded by the use of this rationale.

The results of this thesis show that homosexuality and heterosexuality are the expressions of male and female gender identities measured by this operant. In this study bisexuality was not an issue. Very few subjects identify as being bisexual. A loss of gender identity characterizes homosexuality and heterosexuality and this is not just an artefact. This loss of spontaneity is probably related to a sexist way of thinking operationalized in this method of gender role research.

This rationale does not define gender identity in an experientially meaningful way. To explore and identify the differences between an apple and an orange says very little of either the apple or orange. To do so says more (but in a null way) about their common label as fruit. To explore the differences between homosexual and heterosexual perhaps says less about these identities than it does about their common label of sexual preference (though again in a null way). Such a difference is however related to an equivalence in heterosexual females and it is this identity in both homosexual males and

heterosexual females that is shown to be explanatory of their equivalent preference for male-sexed partners.

Fruit is to apple-and-orange as androgyny is to male-and-female. To explore the differences between apple and orange is a difficult way of proceeding to fruit. It would be a difficult teaching and learning technique to approach the concept of fruit through the differences of (for example) an apple and an orange. The concept of fruit rest not on the differences between fruits but on their essential similarities. To approach fruit through its null definition (differences) does not lead to an experience of, or understanding of, fruit. The concept of fruit implies a commonality between objects which are at once objectively different and yet objectively similar. (And thus paralleling the subject/object relation of interaction and integration). The concept of fruit ignores the differences and identifies the relatedness amongst apples, orange, grapes, and other 'fruit'.

In this thesis the rationale used is that male gender and female gender may both develop from an undifferentiated (androgynous) universe and that both may subsequently be integrated into a differentiated (androgynous) universe. In this rationale the developmental absence of an identity or identities is therefore interpreted as an absence or loss of spontaneity to develop that identity. In other words, there is a failure of the

self to develop perfectly where 'perfect' has the meaning of wholeness. This failure, evident in homo- and hetero-sexual preferences, may have its origin in a 'sexist' attitude which divides the self, a priori, into mutually exclusive (segregated) parts.

A whole self which is differentiated into three 'persons' is an a priori assumption used in this thesis. The persons grammar (Trinity) provides a prior and unifying theory of reality. Relatedness is here important: just as apple and orange are both fruit because of their similarities and not because of their many differences. In this theory the whole is greater than the sum of the parts simply because the whole includes not only the explicit similarities but also the implicit differences.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this appendix is to supplement the empirical approach of the thesis with some elaboration of theory and to further link this work with its history and with similar though more current work (particularly Moreno). A unified systems theory of personality is proposed that has dual frames of reference. These dual frameworks are shown to have their origins as different points of view and are systematically related to dual psychological concepts of gender and sexual identity. An interactive experimental design (von Bertalanffy, 1968) has been

used to empirically test this theory and the hypotheses that are derived from it. In particular the hypothesis that sexual preferences are related to gender identity is strongly supported.

CONCLUSIONS

The role-reversal of subject and object as esoteric meta-roles is considered an example of interaction in contrast to the segregation of subject and object and the consequent dissociation measured as anxiety and psychoticism. It is concluded that interaction (including role-reversal as the psychological expression of this concept) is poorly understood. The psychological expression of this concept, in the psychodramatic interaction of creativity and spontaneity, warrants further interest. This concept has had utility in this thesis in the explanation of the origin and nature of sexual preferences. Furthermore, this concept is shown to be strongly related to psychopathology in general, and anxiety and psychoticism in particular, and so should be of major interest to those concerned with health.

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