

THE CONCEPT OF URBAN RENEWAL IN METROPOLITAN MANILA:

An Analysis

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Villareal

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


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ABSTRACT

A distinctive feature of the urban renewal effort in Metropolitan Manila is the policy requiring the minimum displacement of families *vis-a-vis* the provision of the basic needs of man or of a human settlement. To carry out this policy, a comprehensive upgrading and improvement *in situ* that integrates social service improvements and physical improvements was undertaken. The scheme called for the participation of a host of government agencies to overcome, among others, financial constraints and jurisdictional limitation. This led to the interaction, interrelationship, and coordination among various departments and offices involved in the solution of a problem.

This effort to make Metropolitan Manila livable and pleasant includes Tondo. It is the largest squatter slum in Manila. Tondo-related activities have a formative impact on the government urban renewal program because it is the first comprehensive slum upgrading project ever undertaken. For all intents and purposes, therefore, the Tondo project is a prototype of city renewal in the Philippines.

Experiences gained in the Tondo project implementation period will help strengthen the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC). Particularly, NHA and its parent agency, the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) are expected to increase significantly its capacity to plan and implement similar slum upgrading and sites and services projects in other parts of Metropolitan Manila and in other cities in the Philippines. The project would also help the government to develop institutions, reexamine existing policies and programs and formulate new ones to deal with the problems of urban growth.

One of the existing policies which this study suggests government should examine is its budgetary orientation re securing first the foundation

infrastructures before the direct provision of services. Such partiality to public buildings and edifices, roads, and drainage and sewerage systems leads to an incrementalist and palliative attention to the other basic needs. Although the poor may enjoy to a certain extent the benefits derived from these physical facilities, they may remain as poor as ever because they now have to worry, for instance, about rentals which did not bother them at all when they were living in makeshift dwellings built in squatter areas.

Indeed, city renewal must fulfil several objectives: social, physical, economic, educational. Moreover, it must aim at the spiritual needs of the individual and the community. These goals must be pursued to avoid paying lip-service to providing the basic needs which the government has espoused and committed itself so very vocally. Serious consideration of this four-point objective would also mean a departure from the traditional response of the Philippine government to the problem of slum and squatter areas, i.e., a series of *ad hoc*, crisis-oriented projects generally involving pre-fabricated homes and major relocations to distant sites, which have not been very successful. Principal difficulties have been a lack of nearby employment opportunities and inadequate services, especially transportation. In fact, there was no distribution of social infrastructure. The most important aspect of social infrastructure is the quality of human resources, meaning, the capacity of labour to enjoy the benefits of growth and to contribute to productivity itself.

By placing the discussion within the time frame, 1975-1980, the circumstances shaping the urban renewal effort are sequentially presented. It was in these years that decisions to upgrade and improve Metropolitan Manila became bolder: for example, foreign loans to finance social rather than economic infrastructure whose investment returns will not be readily quantified in terms of cash.

Chapter I describes the background of the effort. In a more or less historical perspective, this scenario gives account of the events that moulded Metropolitan Manila into its present form, i.e., urban blight and subhuman living conditions in its squatter slum areas, specifically, Tondo. Chapter II analyses the conceptual framework of the effort. This is followed by the two chapters dealing with the application of the concept. Chapter III discusses the city renewal activities in the entire Metropolitan Manila composed of four cities and thirteen municipalities, and Chapter IV deals with the slum clearance and improvement of Tondo itself. Chapter V concludes with a cautionary note on the need to review the government policy allocating the major bulk of its meagre resources to infrastructures and physical facilities to the detriment of the other basic necessities not only of the individual citizen but also of the larger community.

INTRODUCTION

The study will illustrate the urban renewal effort in Metropolitan Manila. An analysis of the way people conceptualize a problem rather than the efficacy of the particular solution, it will attempt to examine the coordinated approach towards a comprehensive upgrading and improvement *in situ* that integrates health, education, and hygiene and environmental sanitation and other social service improvements in, among others, transportation and housing.

Scope, Methodology, and Limitations of the Study

The study does not mean to offer the example of the Metropolitan Manila as a panacea. Far from it. Nor should it be construed, in a global sense, as an endorsement of the urban upgrading and improvement effort for replication *in toto* in other regions, cities, and blighted areas in the Philippines. The scope and type of the social service improvements and the physical improvements identified for integration may not be exhaustive or may even prove inadequate *vis-a-vis* the uniqueness and peculiarity of other cities and blighted areas. The perception of the level and type of the social services and physical improvements vary from person to person, from community to community, depending on individual and community values and perceptions that are endemic to a particular place. Moreover such need-perceptions change over time in accordance with change in the socio-political environment and the economic standard of living. Consequently a consensus on the level and type of the social services and the physical improvements to be provided and integrated is achieved only after a considerable discussion involving wide citizen participation and difficult political choices.

It is in this respect that the limitation of the study becomes clear. Any discussion on the multi-faceted issue of whether to accept the upgrading

and improvement of Metropolitan Manila and its blighted areas as a given task, to accept, challenge or reject its potential for ascertaining individual and community preferences, is absent. Clearly there are many other such undiscussed issues: the political and resource feasibility; the method by which either the effort or the participants, were invested with power and legitimacy to undertake the upgrading and improvement activities; intellectual mastery, knowledge and information base of the participants; the intensity of dissatisfaction with what is and what is to be; organizational stability or imbalance; the qualities of available leadership; and a host of similar concerns. To the extent that the case presented here is based on research using empirical data which the author has acquired through his work in the Office of Budget and Management, the issue and the other related ones can be discussed and accorded due relevance. However the objective of this study is more modest. As a step in the assessment of an on-going government effort which reflects the limitation of the market to meet, adequately or totally, the need and demand for social goods and services, the study is concerned primarily, as earlier mentioned, with an analysis of the way people conceptualize a problem rather than the efficacy of the particular solution.

A departure from this safe and secure viewpoint may enmesh the author in the unresolved issues re the relationship between social science and social purposes.¹ He is unwilling to tread into academic and professional grounds in which, as a student of social policy, he possesses no credentials, special or otherwise. Further, he feels diffident in venturing into such unknown territories, due to the absence of a framework to study social policy as a whole, independent of economics, history, philosophy, sociology, political science and other disciplines. Each discipline frames its own special questions and exploits its unique methodology that sets different directions

to the study of social policy and the answer to the age-old question of how fact and value affect each other.

This predicament of the author brings to mind Arthur Seldon's comments on Richard Titmuss' book, *Commitment to Welfare*:

What is less clear is the analytical framework of 'social administration' [the English term for social policy] within which the varied subjects - ... medical care, housing, education, the difficulty of reaching people 'in need' - are examined. The nature of 'social administration', its characteristic methods or principles, its differences from public administration and business administration are not clearly defined. Is it a science or an art? Is it social science or social work? Is it really an intellectual discipline with distinguishing characteristics?²

Under these circumstances, particularly, in a study as heavily value-laden as this one, it was important to self-consciously employ efforts to reduce the risk of inventing, wilfully or otherwise, an interesting reality that would, upon keen scrutiny, prove to be only a fantasy.

To avoid such probable pitfall, the author relied heavily on budget documents and accountability reports required by the Office of Budget and Management of the participants and agencies involved in the physical planning and urban renewal of Metropolitan Manila. In his work in that Office, the author has to check interpretations of the submitted documents and reports against what seems to be going on in the real world. Interviews were conducted with people directly involved or whose credibility made them important sources. These face-to-face contacts were semi-structured, questions being directed to matters appropriate to the respondent, e.g., a project beneficiary, and to the author's developing understanding of the on-going efforts in Metropolitan Manila. Some people were interviewed more than once over the three years stint of the author in that Office, which was interrupted by a one-year study grant in the University of Tasmania, Australia. Although

the results of the interviews and the contents of the budget documents and accountability reports appear compatible, the likelihood of reality-inventing was only reduced in this way. There was still the possibility that the author may have chosen the people to be interviewed, or heard what they have to say, or asked questions, in a manner that elicited answers compatible with his cognitive and emotional biases. Therefore, he cannot overemphasize that overriding the research cited here, the study is offered in the spirit of hypotheses. Postulates, speculations, and conjectures, in the interests of style, were not presented in the form of questions or as "if-then" statements awaiting testing. But, candidly, that is what they are.

It remains for later studies to make focused and detailed comparisons of the Metropolitan Manila experience with other alternative approaches to the upgrading and improvement of the conditions in an urban area.

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CHAPTER I

METROPOLITAN MANILA: A SCENARIO

A Historical Perspective

Covering roughly 636 square kilometres, Manila has been the premier settlement of the Philippines since the early 1500s. The site of a flourishing Muslim principality along Manila de Bay, it was the place where the Spanish *conquistadores* built their Oriental capital and ruled the country for almost 400 years. The Malacanan Palace, which was the official residence of the Spanish Governor-General, has always served the same purposes for the succession of American Governor-Generals and Filipino Presidents. To this day, Manila remains the seat of the Philippine national government.

A remote outpost of a colonial empire, Manila grew under the Spanish administration as a cosmopolitan Oriental city. For 250 years it linked the Far East to the New World through the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade. When Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States after the 1898 triumph of Admiral Dewey over the Spanish Armada in Manila de Bay, the city became an American imperial outpost. It continued to be a cosmopolitan Asian capital.

In the closing days of World War II, the American and Japanese armies levelled the city to the ground. American bombs did not even spare Intramuros, the Spanish-built Walled City of Manila, which was the nerve-centre of the Japanese intelligence during the hostilities.

When the Philippines regained its independence from the United States on 4 July 1946, the Filipinos had to start from scratch to build a republic and rebuild a shattered economy. Manila, though in ruins, attracted an exodus of migrants from the provinces, in ever increasing numbers, for which the city was not prepared. Planning was hardly possible within the context of survival as the primary concern. Its government struggled simply to make do.

Not just Manila but also its adjoining cities and municipalities, which together comprise the Greater Manila Area, became victims of unplanned growth and uncontrolled urban blight.

The Greater Manila Area population grew from 993,000 in 1939 to 1,596,000 in 1948. Population count was near 4,000,000 in 1970; near 6,000,000 with an annual growth rate of 4.58% in 1975. It is common knowledge that the quality of life for the great majority was substandard and deteriorated daily.

Sometime in 1972 after the launching of the New Society movement and the City of Man concept, the national government organized a Housing and Urban Development Team (HUDT), whose basic task may have been patterned, at least, to a lesser extent, from that of the United States federal department called the Housing and Urban Development.³ The HUDT was commissioned to undertake a study on how to rationalize the management and administration of Manila, which was and still is the Philippine primate city. Nearby cities and municipalities comprising the Greater Manila Area, i.e., the national capital region, were included. The HUDT effort culminated in the adoption of the manager-commission type of urban government for the area.

In a referendum on 27 February 1975, the residents of Greater Manila authorized the national government to integrate the four cities and thirteen municipalities in what is presently known as Metropolitan Manila. They opted for a manager-commission government headed by a Governor to be appointed by the President.

On 7 November 1975 the national government created Metropolitan Manila through Presidential Decree 824, and the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) to administer it. Political wranglings, innuendoes, and mudslinging were the post-birth pains of the MMC. Everybody who was somebody wanted to be

Governor. The mayors of the seventeen cities and municipalities claimed the right and the privilege to choose from among themselves the Governor. Nobody contested their claim yet they could not agree. Had they not compromised on someone who, although, not coming from their rank, was acceptable to them, it would appear that the MMC was being nipped in the bud because of political reasons. The mayors petitioned Malacanan Palace for the appointment of the First Lady, Imelda Marcos, as MMC head. Malacanan declined the offer several times. Later it accepted for what seems to be an attempt to insulate MMC from immediate and foreseen administrative and political problems which may have negative repercussions on the working relationship not only among the local chief executives concerned but also between the MMC and the national government.

A Shift in Departmental Responsibilities

A feature of government under the MMC is its avowed commitment to immediate and long-range measures to make Metropolitan Manila, particularly, its most critical areas, livable and pleasant. The measures include: staging concerts in the park and outdoor theatre presentations; fielding of mobile medical clinics and markets; cleaning and dredging of inland waterways; development of parks, playgrounds, public libraries and reading centres; construction of hospitals, health and nutrition centres, schoolbuildings, multi-purpose halls and low-cost dwelling units; introduction of basic services like roads, water, power and drainage, communal bathrooms and toilet facilities, industrial-commercial estates, cottage industries and manpower training programs; rationalization of land tenure; restoration of historical sites and edifices; and establishment of public enterprises that cater to the home and small-scale financing and transportation needs of Metropolitan Manila residents. Observers are apt to comment that MMC considers

everything a priority. It seems to do so many things at once, in many directions.

Inasmuch as MMC alone cannot implement most of the measures mentioned above due, in part, to financial constraints but more especially to jurisdictional limitations, it mobilized a host of government agencies at the national level. For example, MMC tapped the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) for the construction of hospitals, multi-purpose halls, reading centres, etc; the Ministry of Transportation and Communication for road construction and telephone line expansion; the Ministry of Public Information for information campaigns; the National Historical Commission and the MPW for the restoration of historical sites and edifices; and various other departments or ministries in charge of specific functional and sectoral areas. The MMC mobilized these different government instrumentalities, particularly, to reconcile into an integrated upgrading and improvement effort the area-wide disparities and the characteristic differences among the four cities and thirteen municipalities. It was able to create interaction, interrelationship, and coordination among all the agencies involved in the solution of a problem. In this connection, it might be observed, the MMC paved the way for the shift in departmental responsibilities from the concept of "exclusive responsibility" to one of "primary responsibility" (hence, the corollary - the "lead agency"). This shift led the departments to be less disposed to act independently or autonomously. Instead they became ever ready to take into account the views or positions of other departments whose activities may be affected by their operations. At least, in the national capital region, the era when one could say, "This is my turf, that is your turf, no trespassing is done," does not exist anymore. Almost anything one does, if one is a department head, affects other departments,

and if one is smart or prudent, one will ensure that there is a consultation or coordination process.

Thus, in contrast to previous government programs on city renewal, MMC efforts may be said to use a coordinated approach towards a comprehensive upgrading and improvement *in situ* that integrates social service improvements with physical improvements. The approach seems to follow a pattern: defining a basic problem, evolving from that the basic objective, determining the institutional manpower and capital requirements, and devising a system of managing these resources. The combined effect of the resources is a product that is bigger than its parts. The implication is that, institutionally, the upgrading and improvement of Metropolitan Manila calls for interaction, interrelationship and coordination among all the agencies responsible for the solution of a problem. The approach, therefore, underscores the locational dimension in plan formulation, the urgency of synchronizing a multitude of government activities at both national and local levels, the application of multi-disciplinary skills, and the challenge of ensuring a proper balance of expenditures relative to other resource demands. In brief, the planning process in the upgrading and improvement of Metropolitan Manila required:

- "a variety of preliminary explorations, including efforts to clarify the right to plan, to create a planning unit or coalition, to define scope and leverage, etc.;
- definition of the planning task, both following upon and leading to reality assessments and inventories, value analysis and choosing;
- policy formulation on the basis of empirical exploration; further value probing and choice; definition of the system; consideration of relevant functions; choice of boundaries; assessment of potential opportunity costs and social costs; consideration of some of the policy options available in the light of historical experience, goal hierarchies, and the foregoing considerations;
- programming, as growing out of policy formulation and resource assessment and as including a wide range of issues from

administrative structuring and manpower assignment to budgeting and time-phasing, and including feedback for policy review in the light of programming realities; and

-a system of reporting, evaluation, and feedback."⁴

Local vs National Needs

It might be relevant to mention that one or two years after its inception in 1975, the MMC realized that resuscitating Metropolitan Manila alone was not doing the area nor the country, in general, any good. Every MMC effort attracted a new wave of migration which exacerbated extant problems and spawned and created new ones. It was felt that to halt rural-to-urban migration, efforts must not only be concentrated at the national capital region but be dispersed, as well, to other parts of the country. Informed of this observation, the national government responded by instituting an organizational change involving the creation of the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS). The First Lady, Imelda Marcos, Governor of Metropolitan Manila, was appointed MHS Minister. Thus, the MMC and the MHS were working closely together. Whether this close working relationship ranged from a situation of direct supervision and control to a very loose coordinative arrangement seemed unimportant. What needed attention was the fact that through the MHS an advantage was gained. All components of the improvement and upgrading effort - local, regional, and national - was viewed from a more global, aggregative perspective and their implications examined rather than compartmentalized.

The MHS identified the following: water, power, food, shelter, economic base or livelihood, medical services, education and technology, ecological balance, sports and recreation, clothing and cottage industry, and mobility not only as the eleven basic needs of a human settlement but also

of man. Since these basic needs practically involve all aspects of life, the MHS operations entailed working with all the other ministries and agencies of the Philippine government. Here, again, the MHS, just like the MMC, was able to create interaction, interrelationship and coordination among the agencies involved in the solution of a problem.

Nonetheless, while on the short-term basis the move to create a new department may have alleviated the situation and the problem sought to be solved, on the long term, however, the MHS has contributed to the maintenance of a complex and enlarged administrative machinery that tends to dissipate the limited resources of the government. Moreover, the various instrumentalities, agencies, and offices of the Philippine government are so organized that each, supported directly by bureaus, services, and other satellite units or attached agencies,⁵ takes care of any one of the eleven basic needs. Clearly, therefore, in the face of limited resources requiring extraordinary husbanding in order to meet government goals, the MHS illustrates an incidence of proliferation of government agencies that give rise to organizational problems oftentimes characterized by overlaps and duplication of functions. It may be well to remember that administrators must be concerned not only with the attainment of goals (effectiveness) but also with the best allocation of scarce resources (efficiency).⁶

To do its task, the MHS is supported by attached agencies such as the Human Settlements Development Corporation and the Regulatory Commission, for land development, regulation and use; the National Housing Authority, Home Financing Commission, National Housing Corporation, and the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation for implementing its shelter program; the National Environmental Protection Council, and the National Pollution Control Commission for environmental management and protection; and the Technology Resource Centre, for technology preparation, development and transfer.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF URBAN RENEWAL IN METROPOLITAN MANILA

A Humanist Orientation

In a fundamental sense, there are people who question whether city renewal *vis-a-vis* clearing slums and blighted areas and rehousing resident families is aimed at the right targets. Charles Abrams comments:

Urban renewal puts the cart before the horse. If cities could have better schools, recreation and environments, if they could provide their needed improvements..., and if they could be made pleasanter, safer, more interesting and more convenient places in which to live and work, the demand for city living and housing would appear automatically in many areas... Urban renewal could then become a more constructive tool for assembling land, replanning obsolete layouts, and providing recreation, schools, housing and other amenities to new, well-planned neighbourhoods.⁷

The message is clear. Renewal of the city involves the apportioning of resources for proportionate social and economic benefits and the provision of a physical environment that is conducive to living and all its varied functions with the end in view to providing the desired socio-economic balance in the communities. As such, it is a multi-disciplinary and multi-dimensional process which must weigh the merits and demerits of all aspects of upgrading and improvement concerns, both economic and non-economic; hence, the call for comprehensiveness.

A comprehensive urban renewal reflects the complexity both of the city and urban life. Melvin M. Webber observes:

We are coming to comprehend the city as an extremely complex social system, only some aspects of which are expressed as physical buildings or as locational arrangements. As the parallel, we are coming to understand that each aspect lies in a reciprocal causal relation to all others, such that each is defined by, and has meaning only in respect to, its relations to all others.

As one result of this broadened conception of the city system, we can no longer speak of the physical city or the political

city or the intellectual city... if distinguishable at all, the distinction is that of constituent component, as with metals comprising an alloy.⁸

In short, urban renewal must fulfil objectives of social, economic, educational, and physical well-being, considering both immediate needs and those of the foreseeable future. It is social because it assigns the goals determined in areas like health, transportation, social welfare, economic development, or housing - to a higher category, meaning their impact and influence on the needs of people and their particular role in evolving a more livable city. It is economic in the sense that while it attempts to qualify human resources, i.e., the capacity of labour to enjoy the benefits of growth, it still contributes to development: growth implying not only more output, but also more inputs and more efficiency; development going beyond the meaning of growth to imply changes in the structures of outputs and in the allocation of inputs to various sectoral interests.⁹ It is educational in the sense that it concerns itself with assisting the individual to attain his potential as a human being, with helping him to acquire skills for his development into a productive and versatile citizen. And finally, urban renewal is physical in the sense that through its utilization of space as the medium for integration, it coordinates sectoral investments with physical infrastructures, and relates them to all policies concerning land use, population distribution, ecological balance, and community facilities. This four-point objective of urban renewal becomes unavoidable when the following observation is viewed seriously:

...the original inhabitants have largely been banished. Only a few members of the plant kingdom represent the original members of the limited ecology. The rivers are foul; the atmosphere is polluted; the original configuration of the land is only rarely in evidence... Floods alternate with draught... The epidemiologist speaks of neuroses, lung cancer, heart and renal disease, ulcers, the stress disease, as the badges of urban conditions...¹⁰

Moreover, urban renewal, aside from being social, economic, educational, and physical may be also spiritual in the sense that it urges the humanization of the city environment and it addresses itself to the effective pursuit of the ideal function of the city as "a complex receptacle for maximizing the possibilities of human intercourse and passing on the contents of civilization."¹¹ This line of thought is captured by the perspective on the New Society movement offered by Imelda Marcos:

In the New Society, a humanist society, man is the center, not the abstraction, of our concern; man is the end, not just the means, of our labor. We are committed to the total development of the Filipino to his fullest potential.¹²

Such statement can be easily dismissed as mere rhetoric. Yet, it finds support in the perception of Lewis Mumford:

The task of the coming city... is to put the highest concern of man at the center of all his activities; to unite the scattered fragments of the human personality, turning artificially dismembered men... into complete human beings...¹³

Social Rather than Economic Infrastructure

Apparently guided by the aforementioned perceptions, the Philippine government embarked in 1976 on an urban renewal project for Metropolitan Manila. In an unprecedented move, it sought in the same year foreign loan financing for the upgrading and improvement of the Tondo squatter slum in Manila - purportedly, a project for social rather than economic infrastructure whose investment return will not be readily achieved nor easily quantified in terms of cash.

The US\$32 million loan for the Tondo on-site urban renewal project, which includes the development of a nearby resettlement area called Dagat-Dagatan, constitutes the first urban renewal loan to the Philippine government by the World Bank. It is commonly referred to as Urban I. Besides

its on-site slum upgrading and improvement component, Urban I seeks to aid the MMC in obtaining a more rational and integrated approach in planning in the national capital region, i.e., Metropolitan Manila.

Of the US\$32 million Urban I loan, \$22 million was lent on regular terms at 8.58% interest per annum, for a period of 22 years, including a 5-year grace period. The remaining \$10 million is a so-called Third Window loan lent at easier terms.

As noted previously, the experience of MMC through Urban I was that resuscitating Metropolitan Manila alone was not benefiting it or the country in general. Urban I-oriented upgrading and improvement efforts do not fail to attract new waves of migration. It seems that every effort to make the national capital region a pleasant place to live was a beacon for impoverished rural folks to come to Metropolitan Manila in the hope of finding a better stake in life. The MMC was helpless. In desperation, it presented the problem to the national government which responded by:

- undertaking urban renewal simultaneously in all parts of the country;
- creating the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) to undertake the provision of the eleven basic needs to the people, other than the residents of Metropolitan Manila; and
- seeking a second urban renewal loan.

In January 1979 the World Bank extended a second urban renewal loan of US\$32 million to the Philippine government for development not only of Dagat-Dagatan Phase II in Metropolitan Manila's Tondo but also the sites and services upgrading of eight major slums in Cebu, Davao, and Cagayan de Oro cities. This loan, otherwise known as Urban II, points out the incrementalist character of the urban renewal program undertaken by the Philippine government. It manifests a gradualism which, as Lindbloom has suggested, "involves the

slow movement away from social ills as contrasted with fundamental change seeking to restructure basic policy as it moves toward known and clearly defined goals."¹⁴ The philosophy on which this approach to gradualism is premised leads to the development of social remedial programs based, as Titmuss has noted, on "separate laws for the poor (by which) administrators, psychiatrists, and social workers can help and counsel the ... poor to abandon the 'culture of poverty'."¹⁵ Thus, inasmuch as the effects of Urban I to depressed and poor areas in the Philippines, other than those in Metropolitan Manila, were apparently overlooked or, even, ill-considered, Urban II was intended, therefore, to rectify program inadequacies. As will be observed, this second urban renewal loan now concerns itself not only with Metropolitan Manila but other Philippine cities as well. This spatial expansion can be traced, as earlier mentioned, to the MMC experience wherein Urban I related efforts attracted a steady stream of migrants. The efforts instead of eliminating, or at least, alleviating the substandard living conditions in the national capital region aggravated existing problems and gave rise to new ones. Therefore, it was thought proper to resuscitate, through Urban II, not only Metropolitan Manila but also the other parts of the country.

The Urban II loan which was matched by a Philippine counterpart was to be paid back within 20 years, including a 5-year grace period, at an interest rate of 7.35% annually. As with Urban I the National Housing Authority, with the MMC Governor and MHS Minister as *ex-officio* chairman, was the lead agency in all phases of Urban II-related activities. The Human Settlements Commission, an MHS agency responsible for physical planning nationwide, participated.

The viability of Urban I and Urban II prompted the Philippine government to seek a third urban renewal loan. It is reported that Urban III complemented the efforts in Urban I and Urban II by acquiring lands for resettlement of low-income families; promoting and expanding employment and productivity through an integrated program of technology utilization, resource management and marketing; and by strengthening the administrative and management machinery of the MMC, including its local government units.

Claimed to address itself more directly to the provision of the eleven basic needs, the Urban III loan of US\$72 million is payable in 20 years, including a 5-year grace period, with an annual interest rate of 8.25%.

Noticeably, the aforementioned three urban renewal loans all target on Metropolitan Manila. Nonetheless, it is the MHS, through the National Housing Authority (NHA), which is the lead agency, not the MMC. The MHS, being a national government agency, exercises direct supervision and control over the MMC, which, although an aggregation of local government units, still takes a subordinate position. Moreover, the charter creating the MMC expressly provides that it shall undertake projects related to the garbage collection and disposal, flood control, traffic management, and beautification and cleanliness of Metropolitan Manila. Upgrading and improvement efforts, although touching on the areas assigned to the MMC, address themselves more heavily on the provision of shelter, resettlement sites, and other major physical infrastructures which do not fall within the ambit of MMC functional jurisdiction. At any rate, the subordinate role of the MMC in the administration of the urban renewal projects would not really cause much debate inasmuch as both agencies, the MMC and the MHS, are headed by the same person.

CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPT APPLIED IN METROPOLITAN MANILA'S 17 CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES

Bagong Lipunan Sites and Services

As earlier mentioned, the MMC soon realized that resuscitating Metropolitan Manila alone was not proving a success. Every upgrading effort, in terms of social and physical improvements, merely encouraged a new wave of migration which exacerbated extant problems and spawned and created new ones. It was felt that to halt rural-to-urban migration, efforts must not only be concentrated in Metropolitan Manila's four cities and thirteen municipalities but also be dispersed in other parts of the country. To do this, a new agency was established. The Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) was created to undertake the nationwide provision of the eleven basic needs. These are: water, power, food, shelter, livelihood or economic base, medical services, education and technology, ecological balance, sports and recreation, clothing and cottage industry, and mobility. These basic needs point out the fact that although there are many who have recognized the city as an "ecological regression"¹⁶ *vis-a-vis* the social problems perceived and suffered by the great mass of city residents, still it is assumed that urbanism will remain the way of life and will be a dominant feature of the Filipino culture in the future.

BLISS, the acronym for the multi-level Bagong Lipunan (New Society) Improvement of Sites and Services, an MHS activity, is carrying out the provision of the eleven basic needs. Aimed at building self-reliant and self-sufficient human settlements, the BLISS project is classified into three levels. The first level refers to neighbourhood communities of 50-100 families living on 2.5 hectares. The second level refers to agro-industrial

communities of 100-500 families living on 50-200 hectares; the third level refers to watershed-based ecological communities of at least 500 families situated in watershed areas of at least 500 hectares.

BLISS is intended to be all-encompassing. It is a project dedicated to the proposition that: "Problems of the physical environment must be seen as a social problem."¹⁷ This is the nature of the rural BLISS. It is involved in providing shelter, including the other MHS-identified basic needs like water, electricity, mini-markets, and roads that connect the housing clusters to the town centre and, very importantly, the livelihood activities for the development of self-reliant human settlements. Accordingly, the rural BLISS has been pursued to arrest migration to Metropolitan Manila. Yet, there has been no serious attempt to determine the effects of the project on, e.g., the decline in the number of migrants and/or alteration in the migration pattern, or the willingness of squatter slum residents to go back to their respective provinces.

MHS claims that, nationwide, 200 BLISS sites have been completed or are in the process of completion in 1980. Such accomplishment, notwithstanding, the record is still far from satisfactory. Assuming that there must be at least one BLISS site for the twelve administrative regions and for the 1,500 cities and municipalities in the Philippines, 200 completed or near completed sites would not really have much influence in halting migration. In fact, the record becomes most inadequate when the assumption is based on the 47,000 *barangays* - the smallest political units - which definitely require the urgent provision of the basic needs.

A separate type of improvement of sites and services, the urban BLISS, is adapted to the physical and human conditions in Metropolitan Manila. Urban BLISS takes the form of medium-rise apartment buildings, as compared to

the sanitary-core units¹⁸ of the rural BLISS. This is so because of land scarcity in densely populated and blighted parts of urban areas like Metropolitan Manila. The buildings are erected on government land. Measuring 50 square metres, the individual apartment units are rented out at P150-P300 monthly (roughly equivalent to \$A15 and \$A30, respectively) to low- and middle-income families.

A Partiality to Physical Infrastructure

To strengthen the livelihood or economic base of the urban BLISS sites in Metropolitan Manila, a National Job Creation Program has been launched. Special attention is given to the development of industries which are labour-intensive and have a high degree of replication or industries that spur the development of ancillary industries. But this project component just remains on the drawing table. It does not really take off the ground due to financial constraints. The proceeds of the loans, i.e. Urbans I, II, and III and the funds of local government units and those of government-owned or controlled corporations form part of the national government budget. This is primarily allocated for capital outlays and infrastructures. The large proportion of expenditure for capital outlays is in conformity with the basic Philippine budget orientation of first providing the foundation infrastructures and facilities before the direct provision of services. To illustrate the point: the expenditure program of the national government for Calendar Year (CY) 1979 was P34.3 million. Of this amount, 1/3 or P11,704 million was for the support of the basic needs program. Table I shows that P8,088 million or 69% of the P11,704 million was spent for capital outlays and infrastructures, particularly for power, transportation and communication, and water.

Among the eleven concerns, the relatively large amount appropriated for ecological balance (P960 million) is notable. This substantiates serious

efforts, albeit delayed, to remedy past neglect of the country's environment and natural resources. Budgetary expenditures for clothing/cottage industry appear to be relatively low. Thus, although there appears to be widespread claim that the eleven basic needs are being pursued relentlessly, a close look at the effort reveals that the government is much too partial to physical facilities.

TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURES ON BASIC NEEDS
CY 1979
(In Million Pesos)

Concern	Percentage Distribution of Total Expenditures	Grand Total	Appropriations Act		Capital Outlays in Public Works Bill: MPH&MPWTC
			COE	CO	
All concern	100.00	11,703.9	3,615.8	3,333.7	4,754.4
Water	12.9	1,510.5	28.5	375.0	1,107.0
Power	13.9	1,629.1	29.1	1,600.0	-
Food	3.4	394.8	394.8	-	-
Shelter	2.6	300.0	-	300.0	-
Economic Base	3.0	358.2	256.2	102.0	-
Medical Services	10.7	1,250.1	1,081.7	128.4	40.0
Education, Culture & Technology	5.3	617.0	271.7	70.4	275.0
Ecological Balance	8.2	960.6	408.6	9.1	342.9
Sports & Recreation	1.1	134.5	126.1	8.4	-
Clothing/ Cottage Industry	1.3	149.3	47.8	101.5	-
Mobility	37.6	4,399.7	971.3	638.9	2,789.5

Sources: General Appropriations Act, 1979: Public Works Bill, 1979

*Ministry of Public Highways

**Ministry of Public Works, Transportation & Communication

A widely publicized pursuit of the eleven basic needs should not rob the Philippine government of the courage to accept its limited - its too limited - capacity to provide for what could be insatiable social demands. Finances necessary to operationalize the livelihood component of the urban BLISS, particularly in Metropolitan Manila are simply non-existent in the face of a worsening financial status re balance of payments and overseas borrowings (more than \$US13 billion currently).¹⁹ Trade deficits for 1981 alone are said to go close to \$US3 billion.²⁰ On top of this, the government is bailing out large corporations in financial difficulties. The absence of capital from both the government and private sectors has brought to a standstill the economic activity in the urban BLISS sites. Thus, although the BLISS homes are being leased at rates easily within the reach of low-income families, still these families are unable to pay because the scheme was based on the livelihood component of the project which implementation was arrested by financial constraints. Needless to mention, BLISS families are hard-up more than ever because they now have to worry about rentals which did not bother them at all when they were still squatters living in makeshift dwellings.

A Social Necessity and a Private Good

Not only the low-income families but also the middle-income ones find it difficult to own their houses in Metropolitan Manila, despite urban BLISS. Rising costs of construction materials and real estate have much to do with this difficulty. Traditionally, middle-income families are assisted by the Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), commercial banks, and other private institutions. The SSS and the GSIS operate on practically the same basis of providing housing loans to their members, i.e. the former to private employees; the latter to government employees.

Both the SSS and the GSIS are engaged in individual and group housing. The individual housing program puts a 6% compound interest rate for the first P50,000 loan and a 9% compound interest rate in excess of P50,000. These individual loans are used as collaterals in the form of the proposed SSS or GSIS financed house itself and lot. One added requirement here is that the lot area should conform to that prescribed by the zoning ordinances or regulations or, in their absence, should not be less than 120 square metres with a frontage of not less than 8 metres. The loanable amount is up to 90% of the appraised value of the collaterals. Amortization periods are 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 years, but in no case should exceed the applicant's age at 75 years. Credit capacity of the borrower is determined by his paying capacity, credit character, capital assets, and other pertinent factors. Paying capacity is approximately set at 20% of the borrower's monthly income. As a safety valve against the indiscriminate use of funds, releases on the proceeds of the approved loan are done according to the progress of the construction at the site.

The group housing programs of both agencies are mainly undertaken on the turn-key basis. On this basis, the owner-developer develops his own land and construct housing units through his own financing either from his personal funds or from loans from financing institutions other than the SSS or the GSIS. The SSS or the GSIS commit to extend housing loans to individuals whose applications are pre-processed by the owner-developer. These individual loans are not granted until the housing units are actually ready for occupancy. Moreover, these loans made on account of the individual borrower are released upon the transfer of the necessary documents to individuals. The SSS or the GSIS charges the owner-developer a commitment fee of 1%.

These individual loans are secured. If the buyer is able to put up 20% of the value of house and lot, then the property is mortgaged in favour of the SSS or the GSIS, with the title registered in the name of the buyer-borrower. If he is not able to meet this requirement, he signs a deed of conditional sale which is kept in the SSS or the GSIS. The title to the individual property is also transferred in the name of any one of the two agencies. The individual then amortizes his loan with the SSS or the GSIS. Once the 20% requirement is met, the deed of conditional sale is converted into an absolute sale with mortgage.

Aside from the traditional schemes by which middle-income families are assisted to provide themselves with homes, the government sometimes innovates. In 1979 the MHS, still in an effort to help further middle-income families residing in Metropolitan Manila, introduced the *Biglang-Bahay* (Instant House) Bond project. It is a lottery and fund-raiser at the same time. The bonds are priced at P10 each (roughly equivalent to \$A1.10). Their holders can construct a house or buy one with the prize money, if their bonds are drawn (there are monthly draws) or pay off existing mortgages, improve or repair a wing of a house or spend on a house under construction. Often a house and a lot combined is the lottery prize. Bond buyers can acquire as many bonds as they can afford and exchange them for the same value in any bank, at any time.

The *Biglang-Bahay* bonds beyond providing windfalls for lottery winners, generate funds from bond flotation to support the government housing program. Indeed, financial support for housing is a challenging issue. Its nature is ambivalent because housing may be considered both as a social necessity and as a private good. To quote T.H. Marshall:

Modern governments accept certain responsibilities concerning the quality of the commodity (a dwelling) and its availability

to the individual consumer, in the discharge of which they intervene in, or interfere with, the operation of the market, in a manner characteristic of social services. But these responsibilities are not precisely defined in terms which would give the citizen a legally enforceable right to be housed.²¹

Thus, if housing is a social need, it is logical to finance it with taxes or with the proceeds of government borrowings; in other words, with "public" resources. If it is private, then it should be financed by the owner either through his own resources or his borrowing; in other words, by "private" resources. Apparently looking at the issue in both ways, the Philippine government has been giving housing an increasing share of the national budget. Based on a 5-year trend, from 1975-1979, the percentage trend is as follows: 0.7% in 1975; 0.5% in 1976; 1.3% in 1977; 2.7% in 1978; and 3.0% in 1979. (Please see Table 2).

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF HOUSING IN THE NATIONAL BUDGET
(In Million Pesos)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
National Budget	19,049	22,331	22,553	33,951	34,289
Housing Expenditure	128	114	288	933	1,029
Percentage to Budget	0.7%	0.5%	1.3%	2.7%	3.0%

Source: General Appropriations Act, 1975-1979

A Minimal Budgetary Allocation to Housing

Although allocation to housing reached a new plateau in 1978, as shown in Table 2, government allocation to housing, however, remained very minimal. This is so, notwithstanding the urban renewal loans. As earlier noted, the three urban renewal loans were primarily spent for capital outlays and physical infrastructure, i.e. public buildings and edifices, roads, and

drainage and sewerage systems. To use the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) assumption placing at 3% of the Gross National Product (GNP) government allocation to housing, in absolute amounts the figures should total: (in million pesos) P3,430.7 in 1975; P3,939.2 in 1976; P4,821.5 in 1977; P5,222.3 in 1978; and P6,005.9 in 1979. (Please see Table 3).

Correspondingly, the percentages of estimated housing requirements which have been met were: 4% in 1975; 3% in 1976; 6% in 1977; 18% in 1978; and 17% in 1979. These figures imply that more than 83% of housing requirements is still unattended. NEDA claims that Metropolitan Manila accounts for 65% of the national housing need.

The trend of housing requirements based on the percentage of the GNP and the participation of government in the total housing effort is reflected in Table 3.

TABLE 3
HOUSING REQUIREMENTS AND GOVERNMENT ALLOCATIONS
(In Million Pesos)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
(1) GNP at current prices	114,356	131,306	160,718	174,076	200,198
(2) Estimated housing requirements (3% of GNP)	3,430	3,939	4,821	5,222	6,005
(3) Government expenditure on housing	128	114	288	933	1,029
(4) Percentage of government expenditures to housing requirements (3) (2)	4%	3%	6%	18%	17%

Source: National Economic and Development Authority Manila, Phils., 1979

Spatial Expansion of Metropolitan Manila

The MMC seems to work through the mayors as its executive officers in each of Metropolitan Manila's 17 cities and municipalities. It has mobilized an action staff responsible for ten major sectors: administration and operations, planning, finance, housing and urban development, health, infrastructure, public safety, transport, traffic, and education. In each case, the heads or deputies of national agencies double as MMC action officers. This ensured close coordination of Metropolitan Manila activities with the national effort. Here, an observation may be made. Had Imelda Marcos not headed the MMC, perhaps that organization will find it most difficult to marshal the support of the majority of national government agencies. This observation may be viewed as a tell-tale sign that organization does not really guarantee performance. It is merely a prerequisite for good performance. By itself it cannot work miracles. It is, so it seems, not the organization that counts; it is the man heading that organization. Yet, organization is a critical prerequisite. Indeed, if a large scale organization like the government is to accomplish its goals and to coordinate its extremely complex interrelationship then it has to set out deliberately the ways in which the cooperative activities of groups and organizations are actually arranged; how the cooperation would be made more effective and satisfying; what the requirements are for the continuance of the cooperative activity.²²

Thus, the support and the cooperation of different agencies - local and national - has encouraged the MMC to see far into the future. So, while it tackles garbage collection and disposal, public transport, and flood control - to ensure first of all the physical survival of the City of Manila - it envisions a city that cannot be contained within its present 636 square kilometres. It seems to be clamouring for a Manila whose centre will shift

from its historic but disaster-prone cradle to a more logically situated, rationally planned metropolis farther inland, up in the still-virgin Sierra Madre foothills east of Manila de Bay. In fact, MMC plans to extend Metropolitan Manila south and east of its present boundaries - as far south as Tagaytay City, incorporating the urbanized towns of Cavite and Laguna. In this way, it can establish direct control over the vast Laguna Lake, now endangered by the pollutant discharges of more than a score of lakeside towns. Apparently, judging from the official statements MMC issued, the boundaries of Metropolitan Manila are likely to be expanded, even as far east as the Pacific Ocean coast of largely undeveloped Quezon Province.

Presently, Metropolitan Manila is being expanded through reclamation. West of the area is Manila de Bay, from which some 500 hectares are being reclaimed in the north to accommodate the Tondo urban renewal project being funded by the World Bank. (This is discussed in a separate chapter.) Another 1,500 hectares in the south to allow an extension to Cavite of coastal Roxas Boulevard is also being reclaimed to widen its congested neck - the narrowest portion between Manila de Bay and Laguna Lake - across which the domestic and international airports are located and through which run Metropolitan Manila's only access roads to the south. This reclamation is being done all the way south-westward toward Sangley Point, a historic port since colonial times and to date the site of a major US naval airbase. This seems to be an indication that the Manila International Airport is being planned to be transferred to Sangley Point, only 12 kilometres away, to be connected to Manila by means of an expressway.

Such radial reclamation would mean an additional 3,000 hectares, some portions of which are being planned by MMC to be devoted to open spaces and recreation areas, i.e. public beaches and parks with amusement centres, eating places, and museums.

Already within the present boundaries of Metropolitan Manila, the MHS through its Human Settlements Commission, which is responsible for physical planning nationwide, has instituted controls on land use and development.

More MMC Buses and Taxicabs

The Metropolitan Manila Transit Corporation of the MMC is proving to be a viable enterprise. Starting with 200 buses, it had 700 buses and 300 taxicabs in 1980, which were fully paid after a couple of years since purchase. MMC public transport vehicles have been provided not only to augment those of the private sector but also to give new standards in efficiency, cleanliness and personal courtesy. But these MMC vehicles still constitute less than a quarter of Metropolitan Manila's commuter buses and an insignificant percentage of its taxicabs. Indeed, demand far exceeds current capacity.

An interesting feature of administering MMC taxicabs is the eventual ownership of the unit by the cab driver. His daily remittances to the MMC form part of the purchase price, if he decides to buy the unit. In this way, while it helps private entrepreneurship, MMC ensures that the drivers will take care of the units as their own.

MMC also has air-conditioned buses, each called a Love Bus, to cater to the middle-class who are being courted to forego use of private vehicles, as far as practicable. Needless to say, Metropolitan Manila streets, although cemented, are practically relics of the distant past; hence they are too narrow to accommodate too much vehicular traffic.

Clean-Up of Major Streets and Public Areas

Taking a clue from the success of Rizal Park which people have kept clean of their own volition since it was improved, the MMC in 1976 recruited

and fielded more than 4,000 men and women to clean-up the major streets and public areas of Metropolitan Manila. This coincided with the integration of the cleanliness services of the seventeen cities and municipalities into the Environmental Services Centre of the MMC.

Besides cleaning-up, these men and women also plant and tend trees, ornamental plants and lawns in public places in line with the MMC project: "Greening Metropolitan Manila". They also whitewash curbs, gutters, public fences and walls regularly; they assist local governments in cleaning public markets once a week; and they maintain public parks and playgrounds. There are in 1980 some 12,000 of these men and women. Thus, the scheme also functions as an employment service.

Reactivation of the Barangays

Of course, MMC street cleaners cannot clean all Metropolitan Manila by themselves. But their example is filtering down to the *barangay*, neighbourhoods of 500 families which constitute the country's basic political unit today. Under the MMC's efforts to effect social service and physical improvements, it has reactivated the *barangays* by setting-up six different kinds of community brigades: a work group for impact and emergency undertakings, a night patrol brigade, a traffic auxiliary brigade to augment police manpower at peak hours in their respective localities, a disaster relief brigade trained for rescue and relief operations, a ladies' auxiliary and sports brigade.

The *barangay*, a pre-Hispanic institution revived in the modern context, is largely limited to the masses as yet. The privileged classes still feel above it and limit themselves to token participation-voting when there is a referendum, or paying what nominal dues the community agrees to pay for some

project or other. To break through this insulation, the MMC is creating citizen committees, in which the leading members of the community would be requested to exercise leadership in providing, maintaining and upgrading environmental, recreational, and public service facilities in Metropolitan Manila.

An Environment that Inspires and Stimulates

In the words of Imelda Marcos, "the spirit cannot be starved while we minister to the body."²³ A beautiful environment inspires and stimulates, so her cleanliness drive has reasons other than hygienic. "The man in the street," she says, "yearns for something more transcendent than a paycheck - for the true, the good, the beautiful."²⁴ So the MMC hires weekly the Manila Symphony Orchestra to bring music to the masses - in parks, schoolhouses and open air auditoriums, and in makeshift halls. It launched *Kulay Anyong Lahi* (*kulay* means colour; *lahi*, race). This is an art movement in which leading Filipino artists contribute their designs for murals in public places. The movement somehow erased the "elitist" stigma branded by the critics to the pursuit of the arts in Metropolitan Manila.

An example of the MMC effort in the pursuit of the arts is the restoration of the Metropolitan Manila Theatre. This Theatre, an Art Nouveau architecture which was the centre of Manila's cultural life for fourteen years, was inaugurated on December 1931 when Manila was still under the American regime. But the American bombs in the battle for Manila in 1945 did not spare the Met. After the war, only the shell remained of the building, a wreck built-up eventually into a slum warren of seedy establishments.

In 1976 the City of Manila repossessed the premises from a lapsed lease, and the way was open for the theatre's restoration. Undertaking the

restoration, the MMC worked on the original plans of the building. The exterior was kept as close as possible to the original, but changes were made in the interior to adapt it to the needs of modern theatre and provide for other functional areas. In its first season, the Met's 1,500 seat theatre has sustained a line-up of stage productions while providing schools and civic groups with suitable venues for their presentations. Besides its theatre, the restored Met also houses the Museum of Philippine Costumes which was inaugurated in time for the Manila Arts Festival. Other features of the Met's interior: a grand ballroom and dining hall, rehearsal halls, and galleries for painting and sculpture.

An on-going restoration project of the MMC is Intramuros, the Walled City of Spanish Manila. It took shape in the late 16th century, within a few decades after Spain made it the capital of the Philippine colony. The Chinese pirate Limahong's sneak attack in 1574 shocked the Spaniards into putting up defences stronger than a wooden palisade.

In 1589 the King of Spain ordered his Governor-General in Manila to enclose the city within stone and construct a port in places deemed best. Spanish military engineers came to supervise the construction and assist in town planning. The Jesuits brought the art of building in stone, aided by Chinese labourers and ceramic makers of brick and tile.

Historical records, particularly those of the Spanish historian Pigafetta, give account of an Intramuros as a beautiful and magnificent city. The cost of making it so was defrayed from the profits of the Galleon Trade which brought a Golden Age to Spanish Manila. With its 15 foot stone walls, its numerous bastions, gates, ravelins, moats and other fortifications, Intramuros was a fortified city. The British breached these fortifications in 1762 and occupied Manila for one and a half years.

The Walled City itself, judging from what an onlooker sees of the structures that remain to the present day, is solidly built and sombrely elegant. The streets are straight and wide, paved with cobblestones, bordered with sidewalks of granite slabs and are drained. But it seems that the glory of the Walled City was in its numerous churches, chapels, convents, priories, colleges and orphanages. Each of the major religious orders had its own church. Not to be outdone, the government officials built also their residences and buildings.

Intramuros was physically a small city, only 7 longitudinal streets crossed by 8 or 9 shorter ones. It was the seat of the Spanish government, seat of the archbishopric, and headquarters of the religious orders whose missionaries were deployed throughout the islands. On it, the Spanish Crown conferred the title, "The Noble and Ever Loyal City".

Since the war, the Archdiocese of Manila has rebuilt the Metropolitan Cathedral and the San Augustin Church; the Parks Development Commission has developed Plaza Roma and Fort Santiago; and private groups have restored five of the seven gates. At one time, the Spanish government offered a restoration plan patterned after their own efforts in Barcelona, but the plan lay idle. Meanwhile, Intramuros became a jumble of open warehouses for cargo vans. This is so, notwithstanding initial restoration efforts.

In December 1978 the MMC urged for the eviction of the cargo terminals, and in April 1979 the Philippine government created the Intramuros Administration, headed by the MMC Governor as Chairman and the Minister of the Budget as Executive Director. Besides restoring all structures that can be restored and put to new use, the Administration intends to develop the Walled City into a mixed-density district for residential, commercial and institutional use, provided that all buildings and the district's general

appearance shall conform to its architecture and town plan in the 16th to the 19th century.

Indeed, true to its commitment that gives the man in the street something more than a paycheque, the MMC, aside from its restoration projects, has pursued activities at the Cultural Centre of the Philippines (CCP). The Centre built on a reclaimed land along Roxas Boulevard was initially funded by private business and industry, a US\$3.5 million special education loan fund from the United States, a P1.5 million raised by Imelda Marcos, and a US\$7 million from various foreign sources. Through the Centre, renowned artists from all over the world have come for a performance in Manila: Grand Ballet Classique of France, London Philharmonic Orchestra, pianists Eugene Istomin, Klaus Hellwig, Mindru Katz and Van Cliburn, to name a few; the New Sydney Woodwind Quintet, Bolshoi Ballet, Monseratt Caballe, Margot Fonteyn and Rudolf Nureyev, and many more.

The initial CCP trust fund of P15.5 million has grown to P200 million thus enabling the Centre to invest in major facilities: CCP Museum and Galleries; Folk Arts Theatre; Philippine Centre for International Trade and Expositions; Philippine Plaza Hotel; a Fast Foods Centre; Manila Muslim Mosque; Museum of Philippine Traditional Cultures and the Philippine International Convention Centre.

The CCP sells tickets at discounted rates to students, teachers and government employees. The latter usually buy their tickets from the cultural group of their respective offices. Groups are also given discounts. This scheme puts the CCP several steps away from opening its door wider to the general public. Nonetheless, CCP shows, by and large, are for the privileged minority.

Dispersal of Educational Facilities

Metropolitan Manila is the centre of education in the Philippines. In it are concentrated educational facilities and services. This urban concentration has perverse cumulative consequences, particularly social in character, that have been the bane of Metropolitan Manila. Concentration of educational facilities not only aggravates social conditions but creates transport and people movement problems. This has made it difficult to sustain an efficient educational service. It has also resulted in the relative deprivation of tertiary education services in other areas of the country. A program of educational dispersion, or conversely, of decongesting Metropolitan Manila has been initiated by the MMC in cooperation with the MHS, the Ministry of Education and Culture, and the private group. Much of the success of the effort depends on the response of the private education sector which accounts for the bulk of enrolment in the tertiary level. But again, just like the other components of the urban renewal effort in Metropolitan Manila, this felt-need physical dispersion of educational services remains on the drawing table. The reason is obvious. There is simply no money to back it up.

At this point, it might be relevant to mention the establishment of the *Pamantaasan ng Bagong Lipunan* (*pamantaasan* means university; *bagong lipunan*, new society). As earlier noted, the city renewal effort in Metropolitan Manila, a comprehensive one, reflects a four-point objective: social, economic, educational, physical. A recognition of the complexity both of the city and urban life, this objective poses the corollary goal of permitting "spontaneous self-diversification", enriched living and mutual stimulation.²⁵ Such can be taken care of by assisting, through education, the individual to attain his potential as a human being, with helping him to acquire skills for his

development into a productive and versatile citizen. Seemingly aware of this issue, and in consonance with the eleven basic needs, the MMC in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and Culture, Development Academy of the Philippines, University of the Philippines, MHS, and the Asian Institute of Management established the *Pamantaasan ng Bagong Lipunan* as part of the city renewal effort in Metropolitan Manila.

The *Pamantaasan*, apparently an experimental educational institution, is located in an eleven hectare lot in Pasig, one of the thirteen municipalities comprising Metropolitan Manila. The location is near residential, commercial, and industrial places. Open to all citizens of the country, the university admits an applicant who is not less than eighteen years old, a high school graduate, and as much as possible a government employee. Applicants must also be willing to be employed, after completion of studies, as a community development inducer. The university charges no fees. Boarding and lodging accommodation in the school dormitories is for free.

Students spend two years in the *Pamantaasan*. They receive formal and informal instructions in the Human Development and Community Program, which has three parts. The first is the Orientation wherein students are made to acquaint themselves with the objectives and philosophy of the university. This lasts for six months in which time the students become familiar, too, with their immediate environment. The second part consists of helping the students acquire an analytical perspective re the national situation, the New Society, and the socioeconomic and the political structures of the country. This lasts for eleven months. The third part requires each student who represents each of the country's administrative regions to conduct a study of the problems of his region. On the basis of regional

problems he perceives, he is required to design a project. An important feature of the project design is the foreseen use of endemic resources and citizen participation.

Lectures at the *Pamantaasan* also include philosophy, the humanities, and studies on the MHS-identified eleven basic needs of man/human settlements.

CHAPTER IV
THE CONCEPT APPLIED IN METROPOLITAN MANILA'S LARGEST
SQUATTER SLUM

The Tondo Problem

In 1940 the Philippine Commonwealth Government reclaimed more than a hundred hectares from Manila de Bay to be developed as part of Manila's port complex, consisting of an international port, an inter-island port, and a fish port. Located on the northeastern shore of the Bay, the reclaimed site is bounded by Manila's inter-island port called North Harbour, by private lands, and by the rivers Pasig and Vitas.

Right after the Second World War, migrants from the provinces found the reclamation area, though it was completely unserviced and unfit for settlement, as a convenient toehold in the city. Its proximity to the piers, transport terminals and markets, which were sources of casual employment, attracted war-impooverished families to allot for themselves portions of the reclaimed land where they built illegally their shanties.

In 1946 and throughout the 1950s, because the fledgling Philippine Republic could not afford to develop the proposed port complex and did not have the foresight to police the area, the site rapidly became a squatter's haven, although it lacked roads and any of the essential public services. By late 1960, it had grown to an overcrowded squatter slum of some 27,000 families or approximately 180,000 people squeezed into 137 hectares of land. That means 2,000 of them had to live in just one hectare. As much as three or four families doubled up in one shanty, or used about twelve square metres of space.

Indeed, Tondo is a community of the disadvantaged. Congested and filthy, it was branded as Southeast Asia's largest squatter slum colony where all-out

unemployment, poverty and malnutrition bred crime, violence, disease and death, and moral and spiritual decay. The place was a despicable labyrinth, where fugitives darted into dark, muddy alleyways; where gang wars erupted under the heat of the noonday sun; where women of ill-repute nonchalantly plied their trade in the neighbourhood. The stench of life in every nook and corner of Tondo was a sordid reminder of what it means to live under deprived, sub-human conditions. No accident of birth, nor circumstance of life can ever justify the kind of existence of the families in Tondo where there was hardly any room to breathe, much less to think and dare dream of a better way of life.

In 1960 the Philippine national and the Manila city governments began to confront the problem of the Tondo squatter slum. Few squatter families were willing to go back to their respective provinces, although the government, in partnership with domestic shipping companies, was giving free transportation fares. The national government also opened a resettlement site outside Manila to accommodate those who were willing to be evicted. Critics and observers complained bitterly about the injustices of relocation and especially about the distance from job sources and the absence of basic services in the resettlement site. There were court cases and sporadic armed clashes between police authorities and Tondo residents. This resulted in loss of life and physical injuries. Most evicted families found their way back to the city - to Tondo which successfully aborted its development. The whole episode was considered a monumental failure.

By 1974 the Tondo families had given rise to a second generation who, on marrying, generally lived on in the area, setting up new structures wherever there was any room to do so. They were tolerated by government officials and politicians. Unemployed and non-tax paying, they were exploited

for votes. They received empty promises and token gestures during election campaigns. At the same time, of course, the government, both national and local, was hard-pressed enough coping with essential services for legitimate, tax-paying city residents.

Left by themselves for more than two decades, the Tondo squatter slum had by 1975 developed into a strange mix reflecting the various ethnic origins of the migrants, who came mostly from the backward provinces of the Philippines. This mix of different ethnic origins is discernible even in the way shanties are grouped together, say, a group of shanties for the Visayans, another group for the Kapampangans, another group for the Ilokanos. Even the gangs that are in constant violent wars against each other reflect such ethnic origins.

A Dilemma

The growth and the ever increasing number of Tondo squatter families may be traced to several reasons. Foremost, squatters and slum dealers consider their present life better than their former situation. To people who grew up with dust roads, primitive hygiene, makeshift homes renewable every season, away from power sources or piped water, a city slum like Tondo, with its alleys and lanes instead of roads, its open ditches for waste disposal, its few public faucets and its access to electricity, is still an improvement. Congestion and lack of urban services can be tolerated and relatively unimportant to people who have simply carried over their rural lifestyles to the city, and therefore do not miss what they did not have in the provinces anyway. The discomforts of the slum can be tolerated for the advantages that city life can bring in terms of access to opportunities for jobs, education, entertainment and other conveniences which are always within reach to whoever can afford them.

Indeed squatters find the slum conditions acceptable as compared to their former condition of life in the rural areas. Although they see living conditions as hard, they seem to accept them and consider them temporary. They consider the patch of land they illegally occupy as their own stake in the city, on which they do not have to pay rent or taxes; hence, their reluctance to leave the area. Such reluctance often leads to the commission of a crime if only to obstruct government efforts to evict them.

The government has to make a decision.

Tondo Endangers Metropolitan Manila

Tondo aggravates certain social and economic problems of Metropolitan Manila. It contributes to the increasing percentage of housing lag in the area. Magnifying this lack of housing units is the fact that low-income groups, who, unlike the squatters of the Tondo slum, are legitimate taxpayers, still comprise the largest percentage of the metropolitan population. This situation, involving the non-taxpaying squatters and the low-income legitimate taxpayers, is compounded by the high rate of rural migration, with an average growth of five percent annually. Added to this, is the already exorbitant and still spiralling costs of construction materials which discourage the private sector to undertake housing constructions and to initiate low-cost housing schemes.

There is also the direct contribution of the Tondo squatter slum to the constant floods in Manila. Floods disrupt the economy, endanger lives, exact heavy damage on property, cause the spread of diseases, and create discomforts and inconveniences like traffic congestion and suspension of classes.

Older people remember when the Spanish-built *esteros* of Manila ran fresh and free. There used to be 35 or more of these tidal estuaries, inland arms of Manila de Bay, which ebbed and rose with the tides. They were natural waterways draining the swampy delta of the Pasig River over which the City of Manila had grown through the centuries. Trees and flowers once bloomed along the banks of these tributaries, and fishes flourished and frolicked in their waters. *Esteros* were also for bathing, for washing, for navigation and commerce. Boats travelled from Laguna Lake to the Pasig River, down to the *esteros* to the markets of Manila, most of them situated along an *estero* or the Pasig itself.

The Second World War changed all that. Portions of some *esteros* were bombed over and clogged with debris. After the war, when provincial folk started migrating to Manila, many built their dwellings illegally along and over those levelled portions, and increasing numbers of squatters settled along unoccupied banks, or over narrow and shallow portions. Soon most *esteros*, those in Tondo included, became the haven of squatters who are ever ready to settle on any vacant space, the more so if the space is right in the middle of things - and what better, more convenient location than those *esteros* cutting across Manila's busiest sections?

The illegal conversion of the *esteros* into residential areas has not only contributed to the constant flooding of Metropolitan Manila but also hindered refuse collection and disposal, community beautification and the institution of pollution control measures, necessary for ecological balance.

Still the Tondo slum has stopped the government from developing that area into Manila's port complex, consisting of an international port, and a fish port - the original intention of the Philippping Commonwealth Government that undertook the reclamation project in 1940. Moreover, the alleviation of

the worsening urban transport problem of Manila is hampered because the expansion of a road network that would divert traffic from their present heavily congested routes in the central business district cannot be started. The construction of this road network is blocked by the shanties of the squatter families of the Tondo slum. It is expected that this road network would enhance the efficiency of the existing roads through improvements in the capacity of key junctions and also through provision of important links in the circumferential/radial road network in Manila that diverts port-related traffic away from the heavily congested urban centre.

On-Site Upgrading and Improvement Project

Faced with a three-pronged problem, i.e., squatters finding the slum condition acceptable, the aggravating effects of Tondo to the socioeconomic ills of Metropolitan Manila, and the impediments that squatter slum poses to the implementation of public infrastructure projects, the Philippine government, in a dramatic display of compassion and benevolence, chose a comprehensive on-site upgrading and improvement scheme that integrates health, nutrition, education and other social service improvements with physical improvements in transportation, sewerage and drainage, and housing. The underlying policy of the scheme stressed the minimum displacement of families from the project site. This was the alternative to massive relocation of the squatters.

Guided by the policy, the Philippine government identified the following major and sub-components of the Tondo project, *to wit*:

- 1.0 Tondo Foreshore Upgrading. Upgrading a 180 hectare area, with a population after development of about 160,000 persons living in 15,000 structures, by providing basic urban infrastructure and housing units and health, education

and other welfare services, materials for house improvements and cottage industry loans, about 1,000 new serviced lots and core units on vacant land, and about fifteen hectares of land for industrial and commercial use.

- 1.1 cottage industries. Cottage industries identified and developed in the area are shellcraft and scrap recycling. The Ministry of Trade assists in identifying marketing outlets.
- 1.2 vocational skills training. Manpower skills training which focuses on short vocational courses such as carpentry, plumbing, house-wiring, and hollow-blocks making is provided. Besides those mentioned, it also includes training in dressmaking, tailoring, steno-typing, office machine repair, electronics, refrigeration, auto-trouble shooting motor rewinding. Training for these activities is administered by the Tondo School of Arts and Trades in cooperation with other government agencies like the National Manpower and Youth Training Council.
- 1.3 cooperative formation. Four types of cooperatives have been organized in the Tondo Foreshore: the Fishermen's Marketing Cooperative, Consumers' Cooperative, Credit Cooperative, and Producers' Cooperative. Trained cooperatives workers are pursuing education and information campaigns in the area.

1.4 small-scale businesses. The National Housing Authority promotes the development of small-scale businesses by providing financial assistance through its Small Business Program. In collaboration with the Development Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank, the Authority makes available to small business entrepreneurs loans for the acquisition/repair of capital assets and for operating capital. Examples of these small-scale businesses are tailoring and dress shops, beauty parlors, corner stores and auto repair shops.

1.5 job placement service. Tondo residents are also assisted by the Authority in terms of job placements.

2.0 Dagat-Dagatan. Development of a residential community for about 20,000 persons after development on about 40 hectares, by providing basic infrastructure and health, education, and other welfare services, materials for house improvements and cottage industry loans, residential lots numbering 2,000 and simple sanitary core housing units for lease with option to purchase by families displaced and/or relocated from adjoining Tondo, and about 3.5 hectares of land for commercial/industrial use.

2.1 commercial/industrial estates. There are in 1980 three companies operating in Dagat-Dagatan Industrial Estate 1. These are: Western Garments, Inc., Toyo Apparel Corp., and St Martha Mfg. Corporation. The development of Dagat-Dagatan Industrial Estate II was on-going in 1979.

- 3.0 Offsite Infrastructure. Rehabilitation of the existing Tondo sewerage pumping station and construction of a new outfall sewer to replace the existing sewer, which has deteriorated to the point that it is inadequate for the efficient and sanitary discharge of existing or anticipated sewage flows from the Tondo area.
- 4.0 Major Roads. Construction of roads in Tondo and in the adjoining Dagat-Dagatan resettlement site to provide access to the two areas and to facilitate traffic movement out of the International Port area.
- 5.0 Traffic Improvement. Construction of junction improvement, road markings and footpaths, and bus shelters; and improvement of signals, signal-linking equipment and mobile radios to improve the use of existing infrastructure.
- 6.0 Technical Assistance. Trained experts from foreign countries came to the Philippines to help strengthen the National Housing Authority and the Metropolitan Manila Commission by providing technical assistance in metropolitan-wide management and cadastral information. This would have a formative impact on the national government's urban renewal program because the Tondo project is the first comprehensive slum upgrading and improvement effort undertaken in the Philippines. Moreover, in the implementation period, the National Housing Authority is expected to increase significantly its capacity to plan and implement similar upgrading and site-and-services projects in Metropolitan Manila and other parts of the country.

Extent of People and Community Involvement

Along with the determination of the major project components, including the sub-components, the upgrading and improvement of Tondo was the decision of the Philippine government. Such appears inevitable, due as mentioned earlier, to the acceptance and tolerance by the squatters of their living conditions which not only help spawn and aggravate certain social problems of Metropolitan Manila but also obstruct government development effort. Concerned only with sheer day-to-day survival, the squatters could not see beyond the confines of their immediate personal and family needs. But, although the government took the initiative of directly making the decision to upgrade and improve Tondo, nonetheless the squatter residents and the slum community became participants in the undertaking. Harnessing their cooperation and support for the project was necessary in effectively organizing and implementing renewal activities.

As an initial step, the government fielded a team of architects, engineers, economists, community relations specialists, sociologists, and socio-economic workers to the project site. They were to conduct information campaigns and dialogues with the squatter residents of the Tondo slum area. Primarily, the purposes and contents of these face-to-face contacts between government personnel and the squatters were geared, so it seems, towards the acceptance by the latter of the yet-to-be started project, if only to avoid physical violence that characterized abortive past attempts to upgrade and improve Tondo. True to expectations, the realignment of houses, provision of roads, open spaces and other physical infrastructures did not spark any violence at all. Even right at the start of project implementation, civilian government employees freely ventured into the project site, which was a most hostile and dangerous place prior to Urban I.

The peace that greeted the commencement of the Tondo project, otherwise known as Urban I, may be also attributed to the revival of the *barangays*. After the election of *barangay* officials, different *barangay* service brigades were organized in Tondo that ushered people participation, though a limited one, in activities at the community level. Conceived by the MMC, the Barangay Service Brigades (BSBs) correspond to each of the MHS-identified eleven basic needs. There was a water brigade, power brigade, and others. The BSBs underscore the importance of self-help organizations as tools for developing the community. By donating free or cheap labour, they facilitate the delivery of primary requirements in the community through the initiation of *barangay*-based projects.

The MMC memorandum circular creating the BSBs provides that the elected members of the *barangay* councils shall screen prospective members, and after deliberations shall pass on their recommendation to the MMC, through the Metropolitan Manila Barangay Operations Centre (MMBOC). The MMC issues appointments for BSB members. Qualifications for membership are simple. Candidates must be between the ages of 18 to 60, of sound body and mind, morally reputable, and are interested to serve the community. For executive officers and members of the economic base brigade, education and technology brigade, clothing and cottage industry brigade and medical services brigade, a complete high school education is preferred, although this may be waived by the *barangay* council with an appropriate resolution.

Organizationally, the BSBs are the implementing arms of the *barangays*. The *barangay* captain, being the political authority of the community, acts as the overall leader of all the brigades. The brigade structure follows simple command-line functions. The respective brigade leader exercises overall supervision and control of his officers and members. The executive

officer is responsible for supervising, coordinating and controlling the activities of the brigade. The last man in the chain of command is the team leader, charged with maintaining proper conduct and performance of the members.

To equip the BSB executive officers with basic leadership skills, the Metropolitan Manila Barangay Operations Centre (MMBOC) conducts training and live-in seminars and lectures.

The MMBOC, the office of the MMC concerned with the creation and development of the brigades, maintains close liaison with the brigade members and officers. Its field personnel conduct meetings and house visitations, aside from supervising local projects and coordinating with local government officials on logistical requirements for the brigades.

One component of Urban I wherein Tondo barangay service brigades participated actively was in the rehabilitation and cleaning of the clogged in-land waterways. This community-based activity was in line with the MMC flood control project. With MMCs Refuse and Environmental Sanitation Agency (RESA) in the lead, the activity was carried out in coordination with the Ministries of Public Works and of Human Settlements, as well as with the Philippine Constabulary Metropolitan Command, and the Metropolitan Police Force.

The participating brigades worked at a pay rate previously agreed upon. Instead of a minimum daily wage of P13, most of the brigades opted for the "pakyaw" deal, whereby the groups are paid on the basis of the number of cubic metres they have excavated. The clean-up thus became a summer job for vacationing and out-of-school youth, as well as other jobless residents who wished to take the opportunity.

After the initial efforts to rehabilitate and clean these in-land waterways, the barangay councils in coordination with the MMC have devised a system by which order and discipline could be maintained along the *esteros*. Certain households living along the *esteros* have been designated as monitors to police improper use of the *estero*, and recompensated for the job. Also the residents have agreed on sorting and marketing the recyclable garbage recovered from the *estero* (later from their homes before dumping) to the nearest "Pera Sa Basura" (money in garbage) redemption centre set up by the Ministry of Human Settlements. This garbage is brought to designated places where organic household wastes are converted into compost for fertilizer, and where mud and silt excavated from the *esteros* are manufactured into building blocks or dried for garden soil. The barangays have been provided technical assistance and loaned out tools by the Ministry of Human Settlements to facilitate such livelihood ventures. They were also paid wages for the initial clean-up, and provided heavy equipment and tools like spades, carts and others by the Ministry of Public Works. Their jobs have been secured against violators and hard-headed *estero* dwellers by the Philippine Constabulary Metropolitan Command and Metropolitan Police Force. They were provided technical and material assistance by the local government of Manila, under the overall coordination and supervision of the Metropolitan Manila Commission. The Ministry of Public Works undertook the job on any problem *estero* segment that were either too difficult for the barangays to pursue on their own, or for which the barangay is unable to recruit enough workers.

The barangay work groups have not only agreed to dump whatever they have excavated to previously designated points from which trucks of the Ministry of Public Works or the RESA may haul the material away but also

used some of the materials to fill up and level the clear banks of the *esteros* to be planted with ornamental plants.

Another sub-project component in which the Tondo barangays actively participated is in public health. Their participation is guided by a comprehensive approach towards health, recognizing the interrelationship among the basic needs of man; hence, the coordinated and collaborative action of government, the individual and community.

In the Tondo upgrading and improvement project, the health plan of the Tondo Health Operations Centre target on both the individual and the environment. The environmental services component sets and maintains standards for food, water, physical facilities and solid/liquid waster disposal in food establishments, commercial/industrial firms, individual homes and their surroundings. Here it can be said, that although the lead agency is the Ministry of Health, nonetheless other government agencies are also involved: MHS, MMC, National Housing Authority, National Pollution Control Commission, National Economic and Development Authority, and others.

To facilitate the delivery of health services, resident volunteers have been trained. These volunteers became the barangay health workers who are serving equal time at assigned health centres and doing home visitations. Primarily, they are engaged in disseminating information about what health services are available and where they can be obtained.

Complementing the work of the Tondo barangay volunteer workers is an information campaign using films, slides, and pamphlets on health education. The volunteers and other health personnel also conduct group meetings and home visitations. Immunizations are given by professional medical officers.

To assist in the delivery of nutrition services, nutrition aides recruited from the Tondo barangays are trained and are made members of the medical services brigade, just like the barangay health workers. These aides help implement food assistance to malnourished children and nutrition education to lactating mothers. They assist in deworming children and in giving free milk and other food supplements.

CONCLUSION

Integration, e.g. of the police, fire and refuse and environmental sanitation services, has led to the gradual transformation of the outlook of the people involved in the delivery of these services. Specifically, police officers and personnel in the fire departments can no longer hide under the cloak of that hackneyed "out of our jurisdiction" phrase. Of course, even before integration, the police can still pursue his quarry outside his territorial jurisdiction, but only after due and often times rigorous coordination and consultation with the police authorities of the place where the criminal has fled. This old set up has proven to be cumbersome and in many cases had been the cause of friction and irritation in the relationship among the cities or municipalities involved. Thus, a felon may commit a crime in Pasay City and he only has to transfer to Makati and already feels a sense of security. In cases of fire, before integration, outside help from fire departments of neighbouring cities or towns were purely on a voluntary basis, depending on the relationship of the affected locality with its neighbouring place, or depending on the mayor's persuasive powers with them, or depending on how much "goodwill" the city or the municipality or the fire victim can offer the "imported" assistance in combating the conflagration.

Integration of aforementioned services has also led to a more professional and efficient dispensation of said services. For instance, salaries have been standardized in Metropolitan Manila's four cities and thirteen municipalities, the ratio of police services to the population has been improved, and through the same process of integration, i.e., centralization of functions, funding, planning, and organization, the resultant expediency and efficiency has generated greater savings for all the cities and municipalities comprising Metropolitan Manila.

Notwithstanding certain benefits that have been derived from the integration of some services in Metropolitan Manila, there are grumblings, however from several quarters about the lack of a truly representative and participatory body to enact laws and ordinances. Perhaps, this can be solved by pushing through with the plan to create the *Sangguniang Kalakhang Maynila*, a Metropolitan Manila Council.

Presently, communications between the local officials and the MMC are sporadic and only from time to time, depending on the hour and need. In fact, it will be observed that in the urban renewal of Metropolitan Manila, the local governments, including the officials, seem to have been totally disregarded. It has to be remembered that these officials, having been elected to their offices, are the representatives of the people. A regular dialogue meeting between the mayors and vice-mayors on one hand, and the MMC officials, especially the MMC action officers, on the other hand, should be very fruitful and constructive.

Moreover, there is the question of a clear-cut direction and definition of the functions, duties and responsibilities of the various agencies, instrumentalities, and administrative subdivisions of the MMC and those of the local government units. A case in point is the office of the MMC municipal barangay coordinator whose functions, duties, and responsibilities are in parallel with those of the community relations officer of local government units, and in certain instances with those of the vice-mayor. Overlapping and duplication leads to dissipation of scarce government resources and to friction and differences detrimental to public service and interest.

Another possible area of misunderstanding is in the question of to whom is the MMC officer or employee assigned in a local government unit responsible or answerable? To the mayor, or to the MMC higher-ups? This question could

be ticklish and must be resolved by the MMC or by any other proper authority. It seems that local MMC officials seem to edge-out the mayor insofar as functions, duties and responsibilities and rights and privileges are concerned. This should not be so; the mayor should be the chief executive not only in name but also in practice because he is after all directly responsible to the people, his position being elective, not appointive.

There is also the question of staffing the agencies and offices of the MMC with full time officials and employees, and forego the practice of utilizing officials who are holding other vital government offices, since this leads to a clash of interests.

Furthermore, the MMC should start educating the residents of Metropolitan Manila on the concept of integration. This would involve change in people's attitude towards local government administration. The people still think that the mayors have supervision and control over most of the departments in the local government. This is no longer the case. After integration, the power to appoint, e.g. the police, fire department personnel and those of the refuse and environmental sanitation, have been removed from the local chief executives; hence, their loss of direct supervision and control over these departments. But, this diminished power of the mayors was not accompanied by an information campaign to inform the people of the change.

Most importantly, the MMC and the other government agencies concerned must review the current policy of pouring the bulk of resources re the upgrading and improvement of Metropolitan Manila on physical infrastructure. A framework is needed for formulating a perspective of expenditures on basic needs or for ensuring the proper balance of expenditures for human settlements relative to other resource demands, such as the requirements for sustained long-term economic growth and international commitments of government.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a discussion in historical perspective of the issue, see T.S. Simey, *Social Science and Social Purpose*, London, 1968.
2. Arthur Seldon, "Commitment to Welfare: A Review Article", *Social and Economic Administration* (London), Vol. 2, 1968, p. 98.
3. For a discussion of the search for significant improvements demanding new perspectives on the city renewal program of the United States, roughly from 1959-1965, see Ira M. Robinson, "Beyond the Middle-Range Planning Bridge", *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* (New York), Vol. XXXI, 1965, pp.304-312.
4. Alfred J. Kahn, *Theory and Practice of Social Planning*, New York, 1969, Chapter XII.
5. Public enterprises attached to a ministry for policy and program coordination, yet allowed greater autonomy in formulating and executing its budget, although its operating and capital budgets are subject to review and approval by the supervising ministry if that public enterprise had an operating deficit at the close of a fiscal year.
6. Stephen P. Robbins, *The Administrative Process*, New Jersey, 1980, p. 7.
7. Charles Abrams, *The City is the Frontier*, New York, 1965, pp. 179-180.
8. Melvin M. Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility", in Bernard J. Frieden and Robert Morris, Editors, *Urban Planning and Social Policy*, New York, 1968, p. 14.
9. Charles P. Kindleberger, *Economic Development*, London, 1965, p. 3.
10. Ian L. McHarg, "Man and Environment", in Leonard J. Duhl, Editor, *The Urban Condition*, New York, 1963, pp. 48-49.
11. Lewis Mumford, *The City in History*, New York, 1961, p. 87.
12. The First Lady of the Philippines Imelda Marcos in a speech delivered at the National Convention on Human Settlements, July 1975 at the Philippine International Convention Centre, Manila.
13. Mumford, *op.cit.*, p. 573.
14. David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindbloom, *A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process*, New York, 1963, p. 102.
15. Richard M. Titmuss, "Poverty vs. Inequality: A Diagnosis", *The Nation*, CC, No. 6, 1965, p. 131.
16. McHarg, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

17. Ralph Taylor and George A. Williams, "Comments on the Demonstration Cities Program", *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, (New York), Vol. XXXII, 1966, p. 367.
18. "Sanitary-Core" houses in which occupants can build improvements as they are able to afford. The strategy is for the government to show the way. This was adopted in the face of competing demands on meagre government resources and the hundreds of thousands of Filipinos nationwide needing public assistance in almost all aspects of life.
19. See "Philippines 81" a special survey compiled by Ken McGregor for the *Financial Review Survey*, Sydney, 10 August 1981.
20. *Ibid.*
21. T.H. Marshall, *Social Policy*, London, 1975, p. 165.
22. Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration*, New York, 1967, p. 3.
23. Imelda Marcos, *op. cit.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, New York, 1963.

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