AN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ANALYSIS OF THE STEVEDORING INDUSTRY IN THE PORT OF HOBART.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Commerce in the University of Tasmania in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Economics.

by P.D. GOURLEY

1969

DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis represents my own original work, that it contains no material which has already been published or otherwise used by me, and that to the best of my knowledge it contains no copy or paraphrase of material previously written by another person or authority except where due acknowledgement is made.

(P. D. Gourley)

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION.

1. Introduction

In Australia considerable time and effort have been spent upon investigation into the stevedoring industry. Saddled as it is with peculiar organisational structures and fluctuating demands for labour, and more recently with redundancy problems which have come as a result of increased mechanisation of stevedoring procedures, the industry has had, from an industrial relations point of view, a history which is often well described as turbulent. The Australian Stevedoring Industry Board Report of 1950 stated that:

The history of industrial relations on the waterfront shows that there has never been a true industrial equilibrium in the industry.

Again Foster J., in "The Report on the Control of the Stevedoring Industry" states that the industry has had:

a long record of turbulence and struggle stretching back to pre-Arbitration Court days - a story of evil conditions, low wages, unsatisfactory relationships, of bitterness and unrest.

A glance at an admittedly fallible indicator of industrial conflict, strike activity statistics, reveals that the stevedoring industry has a record that is matched by only a few other sections of the workforce in Australia. (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2).

^{1.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Board, Annual Report, 1949/50, p.68.

Quoted in K.F. Walker, <u>Industrial Relations in Australia</u> (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956). pp. 275 - 276.

In 1962 J.E. Isaac could note that:

The decline in strike activity in coal mining has placed stevedoring close to being the most strike prone industry in Australia.

Being such a troubled industry stevedoring has been the subject of a number of "macroscopic" governmental inquiries which have sought, not without sucress, to discover remedial measures that might be applied to the industry so that the ills that have plagued this area of employment might be eliminated. Relatively little has been done, however, to analyse these problems in a "microscopic" manner. Thus it was thought that a study of the stevedoring industry in the Port of Hobart, from an industrial relations point of view, could be profitably undertaken, and that the conclusions of such a study could provide a useful complement to the larger industry-wide examinations that have been made.

2. Objectives

The principal objectives of this exercise are as follows. First, to describe the historical and organisational aspects of the stevedoring industry with particular reference to the Port of Hobart. Secondly, to examine the content and context of the job of the waterside workers in the Port of Hobart and to determine the influence of these factors on industrial relations in the industry in the Port. Thirdly, to consider the nature of the employer-employee relationship with particular reference to some of the features of this relationship in the industry

^{1.} J.E. Isaac, Trends in Australian Industrial Relations (Melbourne : Melbourne University Press, 1962) p. 3.

Table 1.1
Industrial Stoppages by Industry Groups (Australia).

Source: Commonwealth Labour Reports.

•

Year	Coal mining		Stevedoring		Manufacturing		Building and Construction	
/	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
1950	953	74.7	104	8.2	118	9.2	21	1.6
1951	912	67.8	197	14.7	142	10.6	25	1.9
1952	1219	74.9	154	9.4	164	10.1	27	1.7
1953	944	64.7	268	18.4	143	9.8	41	2.8
1954	942	63.2	234.	15.7	192	12.9	47	3.2
1955	777	50.7	308	20.1	277	18.1	72	4.7
1956	665	50.9	298	22.8	1 64	12.6	81	6.2
1957	518	47.0	273	24.7	165	15.0	50	4.5
1958	416	42.2	256	25.9	17 0	17.2	55	5.6
1959	330	38.0	189	21.8	225	25.8	38	4.4
1960	329	28.7	308	27.0	316	27.6	99	8.6
1961	235	28.8	151	18.6	270	33.1	101	12.4
1962	299	25.3	180	15.2	498	42.1	135	11.4
1963	222	17.7	312	25.0	489	39.1	146	11.7
1964	223	16.7	317	23.8	577	43.3	140	10.5
1965	208	15.5	271	20.1	- 554	41.2	196	14.6
1966	212	16.7	49	3.8	645	50.7	248	19.5

(Percentages expressed in this table represent the percentage of the total number of industrial stoppages in Australia for any one year).

Table 1.2
Industrial Stoppages by Industry Groups (Tasmania)
Source: Commonwealth Labour Reports.

Year	Engineering Metals and Vehicles		Stevedoring		Other Manufacturing		Building and Construction	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
1951	_	_	17	85.0	-	-	2	10.0
1952	2	7.7	19	73.1	-	-	2	7.7
1953	- .	-	14	77.8	-	-	-	-
1954	2	6.5	23	74.2	-	-	-	-
1955	2	4.2	39	81.3	1	2.1	1	2.1
1956	1	2.2	40	88.9	-	- ,	1	2.2
1957	1	2.8	30	83.3	2	5.6	-	-
1958	2	8.3	20	83.3	1	4.2	_	-
1959		-	31	93.9	1	3.0	-	
1 960	1	2.5	30	75.0	-	-		-
1961	1	7.1	9	64.3	-	-	_	-
1962	1	5.6	9	50.0	2	11.1	1	5.6
1963	1	9.1	6	54.5	2	18.2	-	-
1964	2	25.0	4	50.0	1	12.5	1	12.5
1965	-	-	10	58.8	-	-	3	17.6
1966	1	7.1	-	-	1	7.1	4	28.5

(Percentages expressed in this table represent the percentage of the total number of industrial stoppages in Tasmania for any one year.)

in the Port of Hobart and to ascertain what implications these features hold both for employer-employee relationships and industrial relations in the industry. Fourthly, to assess the impact upon industrial relations, again with particular reference to the Port of Hobart, of some of the recent developments in the stevedoring industry.

3. Propositions

Specifically it is proposed that the following variables have exerted a determining influence upon industrial relations in the Hobart stevedoring industry.

- (a) Historical considerations.
- (b) Job content.
- (c) Job context: Seasonal nature of the work; lack of promotional opportunities; the hours of work; job security; wages.
- (d) Work force characteristics: Age of workers and the length of their employment in the industry; the gang or basic work group.
- (e) Industry-Community relations.
- (f) The employer-employee relationship: The casual nature of the work; the foremen (supervision); the grievance machinery; organisations situated in-between employers and employees, i.e., the union, employer associations and the regulatory governmental statutory agencies.
- (g) Mechanisation of stevedoring procedures.
- (h) Semi-permanent employment in the Port of Hobart.
- (i) The Industrial Relations Committees.
- (j) The 1965 amendments to the Stevedoring Industry Act.
- (k) The National Stevedoring Industry Conference that was instituted in 1965.

4. Some definitions

It is important at this stage to define some basic terms.

First, what do we mean by industrial relations, and secondly, what do we have in mind when we speak of 'good' industrial relations, or the pursuance of desirable ends in the modification of industrial relations systems?

By industrial relations we do not simply mean relations between an organised group of employees and an employer or group of employers. As K.F. Walker observes:

this usage is far too restricted to do justice to the facts of industrial life or to the range of research which has produced data relevant to these problems. Even those researchers who have focused their inquiries upon collective relations have found that they have been forced to take into account relations within the plant and even, at times, relations between employees in order to explain the relations which develop at the more formal level.

Of course this is not to say that we are interested in, for example, all the separate social relations of employers and employees. Rather we are interested in these relations only in so far as they affect the relations between those who organise and those who perform the actual work tasks.

As Walker notes, in this way industrial relations is narrower than the study of sociology in general. 2

The term industrial relations is generally used to describe the relations listed above in organisations that are concerned with the production of marketable goods and/or services. Thus, it may be applied

^{1.} K.F. Walker, Research Needs in Industrial Relations (Perth, Western Australia: University of Western Australia Press, 1960), p.2.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 4.

to primary production, manufacturing, building and construction, wholesale and retail trade, banking and transportation.

It covers manual, clerical and technical workers. How people get together at their work, what difficulties arise between them, how their relations, including wages and working conditions, are regulated, and what organisations are set up for the protection of different interests It is concerned with relations between parties in industry.... The emphasis however, is upon relations, human relations in the process of production. The processes themselves, and the material organisation of production, types of machinery and equipment, sales organisation, etc.... are all outside the subject, except that improved efficiency yields more production and this provides the basis for better working conditions.

Perhaps more precision can be given to our definition by an examination of J.T. Dunlop's description of an industrial relations system. Dunlop writes:

An industrial relations system at any one time is regarded as being comprised of certain actors, certain contexts, an ideology which binds the industrial relations system together, and a body of rules created to govern the actors at the work place and the work community.

The actors in the system include first, a hierarchy of managers and their representatives in supervision, secondly, a hierarchy of workers and their spokesmen, and thirdly, specialised government agencies concerned with workers, enterprises and their relationships. Dunlop further observes that the actors in an industrial relations system interact in a setting which involves three sets of givens. These features of the environment, or contexts of the system, are determined

^{1.} J. Henry Richardson, An Introduction to the Study of Industrial Relations (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1954), p. 12.

^{2.} J.T. Dunlop "Industrial Relations and Industrial Society", Unions,
Management and the Public, ed. E.W. Bakke, Clark Kerr and C.W. Anrod,
(New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1960), p. 2.

by the larger society and its other sub-systems and they are not explained within an industrial relations system. The significant aspects of the environment in which the actors interact are:

- (a) The technological characteristics of the work place and the work community; this context defines the type of work place and the operations and functions of the workers and managers and to some degree influences the role of the specialised agencies. Some facets which might be isolated include fixed or variable work place, size of the work group, stable or variable work force and operations, job content and the scheduled hours and shifts of the work place.
- (b) The market or budgetary constraints which impinge upon the actors.

 Among the features which may be distinguished here are, the characteristics of the labour force, the size of the enterprises, market or budget homogeneity among the enterprises, and the scope of the market or budget.
- (c) A third context of the system is the locus and distribution of power in the larger society, of which the particular industrial relations complex is a sub-system. This distribution of power in the larger society does not directly determine the interaction of the actors in the industrial relations system, rather the power orientation of a political party, or army group, or dictator, or public opinion will tend to shape the sub-system.

Now these actors in given contexts establish rules for the work place and the work community, including those governing the contacts among actors in an industrial relations system. This net-work of rules consists of procedures for establishing rules, the substantive rules and the procedures for deciding their application to particular situations. These rules may be made by different sectors of the system

and their content will vary from system to system. The rules may be expressed in a variety of forms; the regulations and policies of the management hierarchy; the laws of any worker hierarchy; the regulations, orders or awards of government agencies; collective agreements, and the customs and traditions of the work place.

A final element in this theoretical system is an ideology or set of ideas and beliefs commonly held by the actors that helps to bind and integrate the system. This ideology defines the role and place of each actor and the ideas that each actor holds towards the place and functions of others in the system. Where managers' and workers' ideologies contradict each other the work community is likely to be volatile and unstable. The ideology of an industrial relations system need not be identical with the ideology of the larger society, yet it will be markedly affected by the process of industrial relations in that society. 1

It is hoped that the outline of Dunlop's industrial relations system lends clarity and precision to the definition of industrial relations. The different variables discussed in this theoretical system will be related back to the actual situation here under discussion in the course of the exercise.

The second definition we must make is what do we mean when we speak of a 'good' state of industrial relations. Negatively, we do not mean the supression or elimination of conflict. Clark Kerr writes that:

agressive industrial conflict, in one form or another, cannot be eliminated and can only be temporarily

see J.T. Dunlop, op. cit.

suppressed....and that such conflict, provided that it takes place within certain broad rules of the game, can serve important social functions.... Labour management conflict flows inevitably from the unsatiated desires of men, the relationship of managers and managed, the need to adopt to changed conditions in one form or another, and the drive for institutional separatedness.

Indeed apart from its seeming inevitability, industrial conflict does serve some useful functions in society. From aggressive conflict, or its possibility, the solution to problems can be found, and through this parties can find bases for continued association and acceptance of each other. Secondly, open conflict can reduce tensions. A quick strike can bring to the surface a problem which may otherwise have lingered on causing a smouldering discontent for a long period. Thirdly, in the conflict between management and the union the interests of the worker are often best served. In the competition for his loyalty the worker's interests are advanced and he is saved from complete domination by either management or union. ²

This is not an argument in support of industrial anarchy, the only products of which are frustration and serious economic disruption and continual bitterness in industrial relations. It is, however, an argument against the suppression or elimination of conflict.

Referring to the larger society Robert Dubin notes that the democratic framework is based upon the assumption that differences in point of view and outlook will exist and that there will be freedom to

^{1.} Clark Kerr, "Industrial Conflict and Its Mediation", American Journal of Sociology Vol. 60 (December, 1954), pp. 230 - 231.

^{2. &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 232 - 233.

express these differences. If chaos is to be avoided differences must be resolved; society may be threatened when unsolved differences produce destructive pressures. In democratic societies the mechanism of majority rule is the method adopted for the accommodation of differences. Majority rule in this case means that the group with the largest allegiance may work towards its goals in the society having due regazd for the rights of the minority. The democratic process then:

has built into it devices for permitting the ongoing business of society to be carried forward without total consensus on the goals and the means of achieving these goals.

In this way conflict is accommodated to in a democratic society.

No means are sought to suppress or eliminate conflict, rather

mechanisms are brought into operation to solve problems which arise

from conflict which stems from differences of opinion with respect to

ends and means. In this way anarchy is avoided and the force of

destructive pressures is minimised, while at the same time the right

to dissent is preserved.

What then of our industrial relations sub-system? We must agree that the preservation of the system is most important. Further, as in democratic societies, we must agree that the right to hold different opinions and the right to dissent is fundamental. Indeed, as Clark Kerr asserts, differences and conflicts are endemic to industrial relations systems. Industrial dissatisfaction should not, and perhaps cannot be, suppressed. In these circumstances we have to decide what

^{1.} Robert Dubin, "Constructive Aspects of Industrial Conflict" in Industrial Conflict, ed. A. Kornhauser, Robert Dubin and A.M. Ross, (New York: McGraw -Hill Coy., 1954), p.38.

^{2. &}lt;u>Ibid</u>.

type of system best provides for the expression of discontent and at the same time will preserve itself from destruction.

We saw that democratic society with plural goals remained functional through the mechanism of majority rule. Obviously this 'counting of heads' solution cannot be directly translated to an industrial relations system. Dubin suggests that:

The key concept is disorder. By disorder we mean behaviour that interrupts the normal business of society. We also mean that if this behaviour continues for a sufficient length of time, the fundamental ideas of right and wrong in the society, would be subject to serious challenge as a result.

A system that seems to incorporate this criterion of disorder is proposed by W.F. Whyte in his book "Pattern for Industrial Peace". Whyte's pattern of 'organised co-operation' is a pattern of industrial relations characterised by those structures and attitudes which permit conflict which can always be resolved short of disorder; a disorder which is violent, which is injurious to the public welfare and which is destructive of the organisational structure and the human relations that are prescribed by the organisation. Where the system can be described as 'organised co-operation' there is sufficient mutual understanding and beneficial interaction between the actors in the system, and a realisation of the interdependence of the units in the system, for all parties to work actively together, as George Homans notes, not simply to hold one another at an arms length and to say 'no' to his proposals,

^{1.} R. Dubin, op. cit., p. 38.

^{2.} W.F. Whyte, Pattern for Industrial Peace (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951).

^{3.} Ibid., pp. 169 - 172.

but to increase the effectiveness of the organisation in producing goods and services, and to increase the human development and satisfactions of the people in the plant.

Within Whyte's framework there is plenty of room for conflict; the possibility of strikes should not be precluded. Yet the structures for negotiation and mediation seem to be amenable to the system to a degree that would permit accommodation to this conflict before serious disorder arose. This then is what we mean by a 'good' state of industrial relations.

5. Sources and Method

A most important source of information in this investigation was a mailed, written questionnaire. It is perhaps necessary to explain the questionnaire in some detail; why it was used, what it sought to discover, the construction of the questionnaire and the method of its application, the results obtained and the limitations and the validity of these results.

The broad objectives of the questionnaire were to translate the objectives of the research into questions the answers to which would provide data to check propositions and explore the research area, and to motivate the respondents to communicate the required information. More particularly the questionnaire sought information that could be divided into two categories. First, purely factual information, such as age,

^{1.} George Homans, "Industrial Harmony as a Goal", in Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, op. cit., p. 49.

^{2.} L.L. Festinger and D. Katz, Research Methods in the Behavioural Sciences (New York: The Dryden Press, 1953), p. 340.

length of employment on the waterfront, type of job, extent of union activity, and so on. Secondly, an attempt was made to solicit waterside workers' opinions and attitudes towards their jobs, towards their employers, the foremen, the Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority (A.S.I.A.) and the Waterside Workers' Federation (W.W.F.). It was thought that such information would provide a useful supplement to waterside worker opinion as expressed by the W.W.F., and to opinions expressed to the writer in discussions and interviews he had with certain employees. In addition it was envisaged that useful comparisons could be made with. the information obtained through the questionnaire. E.g., age could be compared with attitudes towards particular aspects of the job.

A further point which must be considered is why a mail questionnaire was used. Considering the type of information that was being sought, and the fact that only a random sample of the total population was to be canvassed, the personal interview would possibly seem to be the ideal tool. The personal interview permits not only the explanation of questions in such a way as to elicit the appropriate answer, but it also would have meant that a greater percentage of the population would have been effectively contacted. At the same time a number of considerations suggested that the use of the mail questionnaire would be appropriate in the circumstances. The time factor had to be taken into account. The time involved in arranging and conducting 125 interviews of perhaps an hours duration was enough to be prohibitive so far as personal interviews were concerned. On the more positive side some factors suggested the use of the mail-questionnaire. In the first place, it has been found that results obtained from mailed questionnaires

are often more reliable than those obtained from direct interviewing, for mailed questionnaires eliminate interviewer bias and the answers tendered in these impersonal questionnaires are often given more freely and more honestly. The validity of this claim would be further reinforced by the fact that the questionnaire used was an anonymous one. Secondly, some researchers would claim that, despite the problem of nonresponse, mailed questionnaires have been found to produce valid results for comparatively homogeneous populations. As it can be assumed that waterside workers are a relatively homogeneous group this point lends weight to that argument that, for the purpose of obtaining the required information, the mailed questionnaire was an adequate and appropriate tool.

The questionnaire was applied to a randomly selected sample of waterside workers in the stevedoring industry in the Port of Hobart.

The sample was selected with the co-operation of the local branch of the W.W.F. The sample size of 125 was arbitrarily chosen. A sample of 125 represents, approximately, a one in five sample. Assuming a 50% response this would mean an effective sample of one in ten. Considering the relative homogeneity of the population this sample size was thought to be quite adequate.

^{1.} L.E. Benson, "Mail Surveys Can be Valuable" Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 10 (1946), pp. 234 - 241.

^{2.} R. Franzen and P.F. Lazarfield, "Mail Questionnaire as a Research Problem", Journal of Psychology, Vol. 20 (1945), pp. 293 - 320.

^{3.} Waterside workers in Hobart all perform the same type of work, generally their wages are the same; 60% of the workers in the Port of Hobart are over the age of 50 years. They represent a relatively homogeneous group compared to persons that might be employed in a large office or manufacturing plant.

A total of 78 responses was received. This represented a percentage return of 62.5. However, six of these replies were unanswered. Usable responses then totalled 72, an effective percentage response of 59.8.

The quality of responses, on the whole, was very good. Many of the respondents wrote in comments on various questions in the margins and at the end of the questionnaire. There were some questions that caused some obvious general difficulty. The 'matrix' type question on the foremen caused confusion and many respondents did not properly answer this question. Further some questions caused difficulty due to the degree of generalisation that was involved in them. 1

It is important to examine the results obtained in the questionnaire in order to determine the extent of bias due to non-response. From the point of view of age the respondents approximately represented the total population. (see Table 1.3) David Wallace suggests² that with homogeneous populations mail response bias is not likely to be very large. His point is obvious. Yet we may still ask the question, what human population is truly homogeneous and how do you measure degrees of homogeneity? In this instance, while it may be argued that waterside workers represent a fairly homogeneous population, it would be doubtful if their homogeneity could be stretched to cover the wide variety of questions that were asked in the questionnaire. Thus, to assert that there is little bias in this sample simply because the population is

^{1.} see Appendix A for a copy of the questionnaire that was administered.

^{2.} David Wallace, "Mail Questionnaires Can Produce Good Samples from Homogeneous Populations", in R. Ferber, "The Problem of Bias in Mail Returns", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 12 (Winter, 1948/49), p. 670.

Table 1.3 Age distribution . comparison Age Under 50-54 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 55-59 60-64 over 65 25 Group 30 84 Official 5 33 50 81 88 138 85 No figures. Port of Hobart. 5.1 23.2 14.3 14.1 0.8 5.6 8.4 13.7 14.8 % ASIA Report 1965/66. Age 7 19 11 10 6 12 3 No. Distribution of respondents 8.3 4.2 9.7 26.4 14.3 14.0 18.0 to question-naire. Under Age over 65 31-35 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 26-30 36-40 25 Group

1. Four respondents did not answer this question.

reasonably homogeneous may be a trifle rash.

One check upon the bias in the responses due to non-response is to select a sub-sample of the non-respondents and endeavour to contact them personally. Bias can then be shown to exist if there is a sub-stantial difference between the original respondents and the sub-sample of non-respondents. However, as the questionnaire was an anonymous one the conducting of such an exercise was impossible.

R. Ferber suggests another solution to the problem of non-response bias in mail questionnaires. 1 Ferber writes:

If a mail survey is biased with respect to a certain characteristic, the order of the responses to the relevant question(s) would be expected to show some trend. Thus, if sixty per cent of mail respondents have been beguiled by the New Look as compared to only forty per cent of the non-respondents, the frequency of favourable replies will orginarily diminish with the lateness of response.

Therefore, we have to try and detect such trends and determine their significance. The problem in statistical terms is this:

Is the order of returns with respect to a certain characteristic so improbable as to be significant or can it be ascribed to sampling variations.

The problem can now be solved by a random order test. In the case of a variable such as age, response bias may be determined through the use of the rank correlation coefficient. The responses are ranked according to the values of the particular characteristic. These ranks are then correlated with the order in which the responses are

^{1.} R. Ferber, op. cit., pp. 669 - 676.

^{2. &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 672

^{3.} Ibid.

returned by means of the formula:

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{6 - \Sigma d^2}{n(n^2 - 1)}$$

where,

n = the number of responses

d = the difference between the order received and the rank order of the characteristic of the same respondent.

Thus for the characteristic 'length of employment on the Hobart waterfront' r may be calculated as follows:

$$r_{s} = 1 - \frac{6 \quad \Sigma d^{2}}{n(n^{2} - 1)}$$

$$= 1 - \frac{6 \times 53211.5}{68(68^{2} - 1)}$$

$$= .0156$$

We now wish to use this information to test the hypothesis that $\rho_{\rm g}$, the rank correlation coefficient in the population from which the sample was taken, is zero. If this hypothesis is tenable we can ascribe the order of returns with respect to a certain characteristic to sampling variations.

Now for samples of size more than twenty the sampling distribution of r_s is not significantly different from the normal distribution.

Thus, where

$$z = r_{s/\sigma_r}$$

(where σ_{r} is the standard error) has the standard normal distribution.

^{1.} see T. Yamane, Statistics: An Introductory Analysis 2nd Edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p.469.

Therefore, the probability that |Z! will exceed 1.96 is only 5%. So if,

we can reject the null hypothesis:

Ho :
$$\rho_s = 0$$

in favour of the alternative :

$$H_1: \rho_s \neq 0$$

at the 5% level of significance.

Now for
$$n = 68$$
,

$$\sigma_{r} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{67}} = \frac{1}{8.185}$$

$$\therefore Z = r_{s/\sigma_{r}}$$

$$= (.0156)(8.185)$$

$$= .1277$$

Thus, |Z| does not exceed 1.96, so we accept the hypothesis that $\rho_{\rm g}=0$. That is, at the 5% level of significance of non-response bias is presumed to exist with respect to the characteristic 'length of employment on the Hobart waterfront'.

A similar analysis was performed on the characteristic 'time engaged on current job'. At the 5% level of significance no bias was found to exist with respect to this characteristic. 1

On the basis of the evidence available it was concluded that the effective sample obtained was representative and that it was free from non-response bias.

Apart from the questionnaire a good deal of information was obtained, of a factual and attitudinal nature, from interviews and conversations with a number of workers and officials. These interviews and conversations also provided data that was helpful so far as the understanding of opinions that were tendered in the questionnaire was concerned, for they provided the worker with an opportunity to expand his views by reference to remembered incidents and experiences.

Interviews and discussions with representatives of the local branch of the A.S.I.A., the Association of Employers of Waterside Labour (A.E.W.L.), the Department of Labour and National Service, the shipping and stevedoring companies, and the Foremen Stevedores' Association yielded much valuable information.

The yearly reports of the Australian Stevedoring Industry Board, and more recently the A.S.I.A. were consulted, as well as the various publications of the W.W.F. The writer was permitted to peruse the minutes of meetings of the local Industrial Relations Committee and the Boards of Reference. These gave an appreciation of the more informal

^{1.} It should be noted that the above calculations were performed assuming an infinite population.

aspects of the grievance machinery.

Past reports of inquiries into the stevedoring industry in

Australia were helpful, as were the awards of the Commonwealth Court of

Conciliation and Arbitration.

Occasional newspaper and magazine articles were useful.

6. Limitations

Although some of the limitations of the questionnaire have already been noted, some of the broader limitations of the study will now be listed.

First, it must be remembered that this exercise is not a total consideration of a particular industrial relations system and of the factors that will affect relations within the system. Thus, while such variables as job context and content, employer-employee relations, and some recent developments in the industry will be dealt with in some detail, little attention will be paid to the effect of such factors as the national economic, political, social and cultural environments upon the industrial relations system in the stevedoring industry in Hobart.

Secondly, while the study concentrates on the stevedoring industry in a particular port it seeks to explain outcomes principally in terms of attitudes and structures. Apart from a broad historical consideration little attention will be paid to events, apart from those of obvious importance, e.g., the National Stevedoring Industry Conference, which events, as W.F. Whyte has demonstrated, ¹ can have

^{1.} see W.F. Whyte, Pattern for Industrial Peace, op. cit.

important repercussions so far as relations in industry are concerned.

Thirdly, it was found that written material on the local waterfront, especially from an historical point of view, was almost
negligible.

Fourthly, no consideration will be undertaken of the role and effect of the wharf tally clerks in and on the industrial relations system.

Fifthly, it must be remembered that in this study attention is focused upon the stevedoring industry in the Port of Hobart. Thus, although it must be recognised that there are external factors, e.g., developments in the stevedoring industry in Australia generally, that will affect the pattern of relations in the Port of Hobart, any attempt to generalise from the particular conclusions derived herein must be accompanied by careful qualification.

Sixthly, while some emphasis is placed upon the leadership factor in the industry, because of the fact that little attention was paid to the process of minute events, there is a paucity of data gathered in relation to this variable.

CHAPTER 2.

A SHORT HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE STEVEDORING INDUSTRY IN AUSTRALIA

An appreciation of the rather unhappy history of relations in the stevedoring industry in Australia is the key to an understanding of many of the ingrown problems that pester the industry today. It is a history of suppression and vengeance, of intolerance and intransigence. At the same time, it is a history of gradual, if at times imperceptible, fluctuating, improvement in relations.

The fact that the industry is, and has been for many years, directed and controlled on all sides on a national basis means that the industrial relations experience in all ports in Australia has a substantial common denominator. Thus, although in this thesis we are primarily concerned with stevedoring operations in the Port of Hobart, a broad industry-wide description of the history of relations within the industry will be undertaken in this chapter. Important particular aspects of the Hobart experience will be emphasised throughout.

1. Early times: Union development

If one wished to be pedantic one could date the stevedoring industry in Australia back to the first settlement. For our purposes we could regard the first significant developments in the industry as occurring towards the end of the last century. During this period trade unions were struggling to find their feet, trade was increasing, steamships were replacing sailing ships, the mining boom was breaking

the economic spell over Tasmania and there was considerable industrial unrest associated with the depression of the 1890's. Indeed, it was the stevedoring industry that was at the centre of the great maritime upheaval in 1890.

In Sydney in 1872 the Sydney Labouring Men's Union was formed.²
Through this Union an attempt was made to unite the waterfront cargo workers. However, the Union was crushed in 1875 after a strike. The workers reformed again in 1882 with the crystallisation of the Sydney Wharf Labourers' Union. In its turn this Union was crushed following the strike of 1890. Yet gradually the waterside workers in the major ports of Australia managed to establish their unions. In 1902 the Waterside Workers' Federation, with a governing Federal Council, was formed, and 1907 a branch of the Federation was established in Hobart. In Sydney there were two unions, however, W.M. Hughes lined up the Melbourne and Sydney branches of the Federation against the other union and the latter capitulated. ³ By 1914 the W.W.F. (Waterside Workers' Federation) had managed to install itself in most ports of the Commonwealth as the one union in the stevedoring industry.

Prior to 1914 the terms of employment in the industry were settled independently in the various ports, some by agreement and some by state industrial tribunals. From early times waterside workers were quite militant. Strikes were not uncommon and there were manifestations

^{1.} K.F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, op. cit., p. 276.

T. Nelson, <u>The Hungry Mile</u>, (Sydney: Newsletter Printery, 1957), p. 20.

^{3.} I. Turner, <u>Industrial Labour and Politics</u> (Canberra; Australian National University Press), p. 40.

of an early distrust of arbitration. In 1902 W.M. Hughes told Sydney waterside workers:

If we are going to sit down and rely wholly on the (N.S.W.) Arbitration Court to adjust our grievances and look after our interests then what is the good of the union to us....This (is) all tommy-rot, and every concession wrung from the employers (is) not through dread of law but through stability of our Union.

Then in March 1914, as a result of a dispute over overtime between the W.W.F. and the Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association and others, the Federation submitted a log of claims to the Commonwealth Arbitration Court for hearing. In April of that year Mr. Justice Higgins brought down the first Commonwealth Award with respect to the stevedoring industry. From this time conditions of employment in the industry have been regulated through the Arbitration Court.

At the time of the making of the Award the W.W.F. was a most peaceful and amiable body. This was at least in part due to the fact that the Federal Council of the Federation was heavily loaded with members of the Federal Parliament, among them W.M. Hughes and Andrew Fisher who were now at the Government benches. These members had to be aware of the political image of the Federation as well as the economic advantage of its members. Indeed in making an amendment to the 1914 Award in 1915 Mr. Justice Higgins commented:

In making my order therefore, I can treat this (W.W.F.) as a strong, responsible and honourable union and feel justified in reposing in it more powers and discretions than I would repose in a union whose attitude and character have supplied reasons for distrust.

^{1.} I. Turner, op. cit., p. 39.

^{2.} see Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, Vol. 8, p. 53 et. seq.

^{3.} I. Turner, op. cit., p. 83.

^{4.} Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, Vol. 9, 1914, p. 296.

The situation with respect to the W.W.F. which had led Mr. Justice Higgins to the opinion reflected in his above statement did not prevail for long. Disputes arose in the port of Melbourne which the Federal Council of the Federation found itself unable to control. The rank and file had begun to move. More uncontrollable stoppages occurred in other ports of the Commonwealth. Demands for higher wages, conscription, and other issues led the Federal Conference of the Federation to resolve that from now on branches should be represented exclusively on the Federal Council by working members or by branch officials. Hughes and the politicians were deposed.

2. The Strikes of 1917 and 1928

In 1917 the Sydney Branch of the Federation commenced a strike in support of striking Government railway employees. Other branches also ceased work. As a result of this strike a rival union organisation, the Permanent and Casual Wharf Labourers' Union, was formed. The Union consisted mainly of volunteers who had responded to a call made for 'free' labour. This second union was confined to New South Wales until 1927. No branch of the Union was ever formed in Hobart.

Relationships in the stevedoring industry became even worse during the 1920's. In the first Report of the Australian Stevedoring Industry Board it was noted:

^{1.} I. Turner, op. cit., pp. 84 - 85.

^{2.} K.F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, op. cit., p. 276.

There was an undercurrent of friction and antagonism on the waterfront in the years following that war. (1914-18). The use of volunteer labour during the 1917 strike split the labour forces on the waterfront into opposing groups, the predominant union manifesting an increasing bitterness in its relations with employers. Conditions of preference had always been a sore point in the affairs of waterfront unions.

Industry relations became more and more strained. A crisis point was reached in 1928. In that year the Federation struck against a new Award made by the Arbitration Court. 2 In making the Award Judge Beeby was critical of both the Waterside Workers' Federation and the employers; the Federation for engaging in direct action to achieve conditions of employment not sanctioned by the Arbitration Court, and the employers for acceding to many of the Federations demands that were so pressed. For a perceived diminishing efficiency on the waterfront Beeby blamed the union. In the Award Beeby hinted that the union preference clause would be dropped if there were further strikes; the overtime rate was reduced from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $1\frac{1}{4}$ of the regular rate; substantial penalties were provided for stop work demonstrations, and a second pick-up was ordered during the working day. Previously if the men had signed on in the morning and if the job was finished before the end of the day they were paid a full day's wage, even though they had only worked for an hour or so. 3 The W.W.F. rejected the Award, and by early September of 1928 a full scale strike was underway.

Most Australian ports, with the exception of Sydney, took part in the strike. The strike was characterised by extreme violence. In

^{1.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Board, Annual Report, 1950, p. 14.

^{2.} Report of Committee of Inquiry into the Stevedoring Industry (Canberra; Commonwealth Government Printer, 1957), p. 24.

^{3.} Mark Perlman, Judges in Industry (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1954), pp. 132 - 133.

Melbourne, the storm centre of the strike, a waterside worker was killed by a policeman; free labourers had their houses bombed; two waterside workers were sentenced to life imprisonment for their part in an attack upon a club with which some volunteer labourers were associated; street rioting and mob violence was not uncommon. 1

During the strike employers sought to secure the services of non-union labour, and the Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association successfully applied to Chief Justice Detheridge for a suspension of the union preference clause which was incorporated in Judge Beeby's award. Additionally the Commonwealth Government hurriedly passed the Transport Workers' Act. Regulations promulgated under this Act provided for the issuing of licences to transport workers. The licence admitted an holder to work on the waterfront. A worker could have his licence summarily revoked for refusal to comply with a lawful order in relation to his employment, for refusal to work in accordance with a current waterside award, for a conviction of an offence against the Regulations, or for conviction of an offence under Commonwealth or State law committed on a wharf or a ship. From October 1928 no unlicensed person was to be engaged as a waterside worker.

After a month or so the strike came to a fitful close and work resumed in ports throughout Australia. As a result of the strike the Waterside Workers' Federation had lost its most powerful weapon, an

^{1.} see W. Jethro Brown, "Strike of the Australian Waterside Workers" Economic Record, 5, (1929), pp. 22 - 33. also T. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 44 - 47.

^{2.} The award provided for preference in employment, with certain exceptions to members of the W.W.F. on the understanding that the Union would recruit members when there was a shortage of labour, see Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, 26, 1928, pp. 885 - 888.

^{3.} Mark Perlman, op. cit., p. 134.

^{4.} W. Jethro Brown, op. cit., p. 28.

element of control over the supply of labour, the Arbitration Court had delivered an award which was highly favourable to the employers, and there was considerable friction between the two unions, the Waterside Workers' Federation and the Permanent and Casual Wharf Labourers' Union, and between unionists and 'volunteer' labour engaged under the provisions of the Transport Workers' Act. (It might be noted here that very few non-unionist, volunteer workers were employed in Hobart under the provisions of the Act). The strike had made relations on the waterfront as fractious and as bitter as ever.

Yet the 1928 upheaval had served to illustrate a point. While the Arbitration Court had felt itself constrained to take punitive measures against expressions of dissatisfaction on the part of the Federation, it was, at the same time, unable to force any reform of the structure and organisation of the industry. Thus, while the Court could suppress overt symptoms of discontent it could do nothing to remove the apparent causes of this discontent. From the Court's point of view this must have been a most frustrating position. Reform, it seemed, could only be expected to come as a product of external initiatives.

3. The 1930's: The debasement of industrial relations

Then came the depression of the thirties. After the 1928 strike the Permanent and Casual Wharf Labourers' Union had grown and extended (in 1930 it had obtained an award from the Arbitration Court applicable to its members in New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia), the W.W.F. had been rendered weak and ineffective, while other non-unionists were also employed on some of the wharves. Yet the

employees were, from an industrial relations point of view, all but powerless.

On the other hand, the employers were in an extremely puissant position. Apart from the disunity of the labour force and the weakness of the unions, there was during the 1930's an over supply of labour on the wharves. The whip was in the hands of the employers. The First Report of the Australian Stevedoring Industry Board noted in this respect:

Humanitarian considerations, and thought for those who were dependent on the wage earners, should have been enough for the employers not to have added to the self-inflicted suffering of the wharf labourers, already worsened by the miserable years of the depression. But the intolerance which had come to characterise the attitude of parties in the industry caused employers to inflict added poverty on many men....Many regular followers of the industry were "neglected" to such an extent that one hesitates to envisage the destitution and poverty in their homes. The bitterness which bit deeply into the minds of the men was reflected in the sullenness of their attitude during these bad years.

The system of job recruitment prior to 1939 was one which was wide open to abuse. Those who wished to offer themselves for work would assemble at various points on the waterfront (the situation in Brisbane was slightly different) and the foremen would hand pick those men he required. Often the foremen selected men whom he knew could be relied upon to work at an exceptionally fast rate; the selection of a few 'strategic' rate-busters would be enough to ensure that the rest of the gang would also work at this rate. Further, some of the foremen were only prepared to employ those workers who were willing to hand over

^{1.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Board, Annual Report, 1950, p. 15

to them a certain percentage of their wages or provide them with certain other perquisites; vegetables from the garden or a "night on the beer". Waterside workers were in the position of paying for the privilege of casual work. In Adelaide, after a job applicant's wife was demanded as the price of a job, volunteer gangs of sixteen men were formed as these were hired as groups. However, choice could still be made between gangs by the foremen.

Under amendments passed in 1934 Waterside Employment Committees. could be established consisting of representatives of both parties to the industry with a government official as chairman. One of the purposes of these Committees was to define the requirements of the port and to establish first, second, and third class preference categories of license holders. With a few exceptions, these measures were not fully applied. They were not applied in Hobart. In Newcastle Coal-trimmers had their work allocated on a strict rotary system, however, in most other ports preference was still given to certain men under the right of employers to free selection.²

In Brisbane, after the 1928 strike a bureau was established for the distribution of labour. The bureau provided for a system of engagement based not only upon a limitation of numbers but also on an allocation of men from the bureau according to a roster. The bureau was conducted by a joint committee of stevedoring employers. A number of men, determined by the employers, were registered by the bureau,

^{1.} Mark Perlman, op.cit., p. 137.

^{2.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Board, Annual Report, 1950, pp.17-18.

supplied with discs, given numbers and placed in numerical order on a roster. An employer desiring labour would apply to the Superintendent of the Bureau and the Bureau would allocate the labour to the employer from the roster to meet the requisition.

In addition to the 'disc men', 'outsiders' registered under the Transport Workers' Act 1928 were also admitted to the Bureau on days when there were unsatisfied requisitions.

responsible for discipline; a discipline which could entail the suspension or cancellation of bureau membership. The Federation was critical of the bureau scheme, justifiably in many instances according to the Lawson Report of 1939, because of the fact that singular employer control could still lead to abuses. This criticism not withstanding, the Brisbane Bureau system did represent an improvement over past practices. Regrettably, while many other ports did adopt a bureau system, some as early as 1917, they were for the most part systems which only provided for a restriction of numbers; there was no rostering, and discrimination in engagement could still be freely exercised.

Meantime employers were still able to force rates of work and extend shift hours. Shifts of 24 hours and even longer were not uncommon. One watersider explained the situation to the writer in the following terms:

^{1.} Report of Committee of Inquiry, 1957, op. cit., p. 38.

^{2.} Ibid.

^{3.} Ibid.

^{4.} quoted in Report of Committee of Inquiry, 1957, op.cit., p. 37.

The Foreman would say to you, 'I want 100 tons loaded an hour' or 'This will be a 24 hour shift', and if you failed to make the loading rate laid down, or if you protested in any way you simply lost your job. Might was right.

During the 1930's then, conditions of employment were oppressive and degrading. Work was carried out at forced rates and individual protest was impossible; from a union point of view there was no adequate system of counter-vailing power. Work efficiency was high and the waterfront was peaceful, yet these conditions were purchased at a high price. In 1944 Dr. R. McQueen, reported, after examining upon Government request, several hundred stevedores:

My chief impression was that all of them were prematurely aged. It was rare to find any man who did not look at least ten years older than his stated age. Their outward appearance was more than confirmed by physical examination. The majority of them showed the usual stigma of abnormally early and rapidly progressing senility - high blood pressure, thickened and calcified arteries and degenerative disease of the heart muscle.

During the 1930's the seeds of bitterness, hatred and distrust were firmly rooted into the system.

In 1936 a new Federal Award for the Waterside Workers'

Federation was made by Judge Beeby. At the same time His Honour made
a new award for the Permanent and Casual Wharf Labourers' Union. With
the decline of the latter union, the Federation Award of 1936 became,
with some minor exceptions, the Award for the industry. This award was
a general code for the industry. It prescribed rates of pay, laid down

^{1.} quoted in Mark Perlman, op. cit., p. 138.

^{2.} Report of Committee of Inquiry, 1957, op.cit., p. 15.

conditions of work, including times and places of engagement, meal hours, time off, holidays, obnoxious cargoes and protective clothing, transfers of labour and working in the rain. This Award, subject to subsequent amendments, was to operate until 1960.

In 1939, just prior to the outbreak of World War II, two reports

were submitted to the Commonwealth Attorney General. One, "Conditions

4. The Lawson and McDonald Reports 2

on the Waterfront at the Principal Ports of the Commonwealth, 1939", was prepared by the then Minister for Trade and Customs, Mr. J.N. Lawson, the other, "Waterfront Conditions - Certain Queensland Ports" was presented by Senator A.N. McDonald. Both reports revealed the parlous situation that existed on the Australian waterfront with respect to the employment of waterside labour. The Reports made the following points:

(a) That there was an over-supply of labour on the wharves which had resulted in intense competition for work. This had in turn made it difficult for regulars and almost impossible for casual workers to earn a satisfactory wage.

- (b) That considerable friction was caused by the existence of two unions in the industry.
- (c) That the lengths of certain shifts were excessive and that in some instances certain machinery (conveyor belts) was being used in such a way as to force the workers to perform their duties at an unreasonable pace.

1. Ibid.

^{2.} Copies of these Reports could not be located. The findings of the Reports were gleaned entirely from secondary sources.

- (d) That generally the standard of amenities and sanitary facilities provided was very low.
- (e) The Lawson Report recommended the suspension of the Transport Workers' Act 1928 and the registration in each port of enough waterside workers to carry out stevedoring operations, and that this system of employment be managed by a joint committee of employers and employees, with a Federal Government representative as chairman. Lawson expressed some admiration for the system operative at the Brisbane Bureau. 1

5. World War II: The advent of the regulatory governmental agency

With the outbreak of war in 1939 the position with respect to the supply of waterside labour changed sharply. Where once there was a surplus of labour, now there was a shortage. Consequently there was a shift in power from the employers to the employees. At this time the influence and strength of the Permanent and Casual Wharf Labourers' Union was diminishing; the Waterside Workers' Federation found itself in a new position of power. Now old grievances that had been suppressed for a decade could be brought to the surface. The Federation's turn for revenge had come; the servant now became the tyrant. The seeds of bitterness so forcibly planted during the 1930's could now bear their tart fruit.

Now, because labour was in short supply and because of the casual nature of the work, waterside workers could pick and choose as to when they would work and what type of cargoes they were prepared to handle. In

^{1.} see Australian Stevedoring Industry Annual Report, 1950, pp. 17-19, The Australian, Oct. 26, 1967, p. 16, K.F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, op.cit., p. 283, R. O'Dea, Industrial Relations in Australia, op.cit., p. 88, Report of Committee of Inquiry, 1957, op.cit., pp. 17-19, 25.

1941 Conciliation Commissioner G.A. Mooney reported that at the pick-up centres he had seen a great number of men quite disinterested when labour was called for day jobs at ordinary rates, but as soon as night shifts carrying overtime rates were placed on the board "there was quite a buzz of excitement and men crowded around the foremen for the pick-up for night work. Frequently the men inquire of the Superintendent the nature of the cargo, and if they don't like it, they simply hang off...."

The workers could now scoff at the foremen; their security no longer depended on him. One waterside worker explained the prevailing attitude to the writer in the following terms:

When the Federation got the whip after 1938 we would just look for an excuse to go out (walk off the job) and I suppose we behaved a bit irresponsibly. Whereas once we were loading 100 tons of cargo a shift, now we might only load five, and if the foreman so much as said to us "Hurry up you bastards" then we would all go out. We really got our own back.

With the extension of the war into the Pacific the stevedoring industry assumed a new importance in Australia. In the early months of 1942 the United States, now energetically concerned about dampening the fervour of rampant Japanese imperialism, was making extensive use of Australian port facilities. American authorities soon tired of the contumacious behaviour of the Australian waterside worker and they informed the Australian Federal Government that unless the work situation improved the United States Army would unload its ships with American personnel. The Federal Government was moved into action. A

^{1.} Report of Committee of Inquiry, 1957, op. cit., p. 17.

^{2.} Mark Perlman, op. cit., p. 139.

special committee was formed comprising Justice Sir Owen Dixon of the High Court of Australia, Sir Thomas Gordon the Director of Shipping, and Mr. J. Healy the General Secretary of the Waterside Workers' Federation. The Committee was to determine as a matter of urgency what steps could be taken to meet the situation. The Committee recommended that a Board be established for the supervision and administration of waterfront labour and that some industrial functions of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration be vested in the new body. 1

Consequently, under the provisions of the National Security
Regulations, a Stevedoring Industry Commission was created in April of
1942 with powers substantially the same as those recommended by the
special Committee. The Commission was comprised of representatives
from overseas and Australian shipping and stevedoring companies, the
Commonwealth Government and the Waterside Workers' Federation. The
Chief Justice of the Arbitration Court was the Chairman. The Commission
exerted an unprecedented degree of control over the industry, and
although it was born at a time when conditions on the waterfront were
extremely chaotic its activities did result in an evident increase in
labour productivity and a reduction in trivial and irresponsible
stoppages. The Commission was able to introduce an element of discipline
which had disappeared in 1939 with the labour surplus. The Commission
enforced a check on attendance and introduced roster systems, with the

^{1.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Board, Annual Report, 1950, p. 19.

^{2.} Ibid.

obligation to work shifts and cargoes as determined by roster. The Commission represented the first serious step towards the decasualisation of the industry.

6. The Foster Report

In October 1945 Mr. Justice Foster was commissioned to conduct an inquiry into aspects of waterfront control and to report as to the desirability of their continuance in existing form. Judge Foster made the following recommendations:

- (a) That a permanent Stevedoring Industry Commission be set up with two representatives of the Waterside Workers' Federation, one from the Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association and one from the Overseas Shipping Representatives' Association, and with a Chairman who would be either an Arbitration Court judge or a conciliation commissioner.
- (b) That the Chairman's job be a full-time undertaking.
- (c) That the new Stevedoring Commission have the responsibility for making and enforcing awards and otherwise administering the industry.
- (d) That the Stevedoring Industry Commission have the power to arrange for such amenities as canteens, first-aid stations and the like.
- (e) That the Commission license all stevedores and, if necessary, set up and implement schemes to decasualise the industry.
- (f) That the Commission be given certain disciplinary powers, and that the Waterside Workers' Federation be given union preference.²

^{1.} Ibid., p. 20.

quoted in Mark Perlman, "An Industrial Problem: Australia's Longshoremen", Labor Law Journal, (July 1953), pp. 467 - 468.

Meantime, while the Government was contemplating the recommendations of Judge Foster, the wartime Stevedoring Commission introduced attendance money payments and annual leave provisions in early 1947.

Later in the same year the Stevedoring Industry Act was passed. This Act gave effect to the recommendations made by Judge Foster in his Report.

The 'new' Commission did not last long. Early in 1949 strikes occurred in most Australian ports as a result of the imprisonment of the General Secretary of the Australian Communist Party for some rather gratuitous, seditous utterances, and the Secretary of the Federated Ironworkers' Association for contempt of the Arbitration Court. Mr. Justice Kirby, the Chairman of the Stevedoring Industry Commission, found the situation most vexatious. He claimed that the Federation had deliberately counselled its members to disobey orders of the Commission by conducting stoppages for political purposes. He stated that unless Messrs. Healy and Roach (the W.W.F. representatives on the Commission) could give him an assurance that they would refrain from counselling disobedience to the orders of the Commission of which they were members, then he (Kirby) would ask the Minister to relieve them of their duties. Healy and Roach refused to give the required assurances and when the Federation refused to replace them on the Commission, the Commission lapsed and was disbanded.

Around this time the Waterside Workers' Federation finally

^{1.} R. O'Dea, op. cit., p. 89.

^{2.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Board Annual Report, 1950, p. 23.

absorbed the remnants of a rather crumpled and depleted Permanent and Casual Wharf Labourers' Union. Stevedoring had become basically a one union industry.

7. The Australian Stevedoring Industry Board and the Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority

In July of 1949 the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949 was passed. This Act abolished the Stevedoring Industry Commission which was established under the provision of the Stevedoring Act of 1947 and it created in its place the Australian Stevedoring Industry Board (A.S.I.B.). Apart from spelling out the functions of the Board in some detail, the Act did constitute the Board in a somewhat different manner, both so far as form and function were concerned, from the old Commission of 1947. The Board consisted of a Conciliation Commissioner as Chairman, the manager of a ship owning and stevedoring company and a representative from the Federal Treasury. The Chairman was the only full-time member of the Board. Further, with respect to function, the 1949 Act now placed all matters coming under arbitral jurisdiction, to prevent and settle industrial disputes and to make awards, within the ambit of the Arbitration Court. In addition the Court was given power to regulate "industrial matters" with respect to interstate and overseas trade. Other regulatory and administrative functions were left to the Board. Board continued in existence until 1956.

Under the provisions of the 1954 Stevedoring Act a Committee of Inquiry was established under the chairmanship of Mr. J.B. Tait, Q.C. The Committee issued an interim report in February 1956, and a final report in March, 1957. The Committee was critical of the

constitution of the A.S.I.B. and the consequent deficiencies in its functions. The Report claimed that the division of regulatory powers between the Board and the Arbitration Court had been a major factor contributing to the unsatisfactory state of affairs that existed in the stevedoring industry. The Report was also critical of the fact that only one member of the Board, the Chairman, was fulltime.

Then, in 1956 a new bill to govern industrial relations in the industry was introduced at the same time as the re-cast Conciliation and Arbitration Act. Under this bill the old Board was to be replaced by a Stevedoring Industry Authority (A.S.I.A.). Now the statutory provisions regulating the industry came to be contained in the Stevedoring Industry Act 1956, and in Division 4 of Part III of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-56. Whereas the Board had the power to regulate and control the performance of stevedoring operations, the 1956 Act did not include the controlling of stevedoring operations as a function of the Authority. The power to regulate the stevedoring industry was vested in the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. The Commission is empowered to:

- (a) prevent or settle, by conciliation or arbitration industrial disputes; and
- (b) to hear and determine industrial matters submitted to it in so far as those matters relate to trade and commerce with other countries or in a Territory of the Commonwealth, whether or not an industrial dispute exists in relation to those matters.

^{1.} Report of Committee of Inquiry, 1957, op. cit., p. 23.

^{2.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1956/57, p. 7.

^{3.} Ibid.

^{4.} Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904-59, Se ction 82, Part III, Division 4.

The Commission has not therefore the legislative character that the Court possessed under the 1949 Act.

The main functions of the Authority under the 1956 Act include the payment of attendance monies, the conducting of employment bureaux, the determination of methods, times and places of engagement for waterside workers, the provision of amenities and facilities for the training of stevedores.

The primary responsibility for the recruitment of waterside labour remained with the Waterside Workers' Federation.

Meanwhile in June 1956 an interim Award was made allowing for, among other things, payment for public holidays not worked and sick leave. It also encouraged the use of the press and radio pick up system. The Award represented a further step towards the decasualisation of wharf employment.

8. 1956 to 1968: Uneven steps towards improved relations

From about 1956 to 1960 some substantial advances in the mechanisation of stevedoring operations were made in the Port of Hobart. This period saw the palletisation of the fruit crop, increased sling loads as a result of the 1956 Interim Award, smaller gangs, increased use of fork lift trucks in vessel holds, the bulk handling of grain, the pre-palletisation of sugar and the pre-slinging of certain cargoes. By 1960 the unit freight method of shipping was becoming quite common,

^{1.} Stevedoring Industry Act 1956.

Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1955/56,
 p. 9.

particularly in the inter-state trade. While these developments brought with them increased efficiency in stevedoring operations, they also foreshadowed a decline in the total amount of work available on the wharves.

A notable feature of the period 1956/60 was the ructions that developed in the port of Hobart as a result of a refusal on the part of two watersiders, F.J. and D.V. Hursey, to pay a political levy struck by the local branch of the Federation. The Hursey's were expelled from the union, however, the Authority continued to roster them for work in accordance with the duty laid on it by the Stevedoring Industry Act 1956, to ensure a fair distribution of work among registered waterside workers, for in the statutory scheme under which registration was maintained no mention was made to the effect that failure to pay union dues or otherwise relinquishing union membership was a ground for de-registration although Union membership was a condition of initial registration. Members of the Federation in Hobart refused, on many occasions, to work with the Hurseys and things were made rather uncomfortable for both of the 'recalcitrants'. Picket lines frequently refused the Hurseys admittance to work.

In October 1957 F.J. Hursey caused to be issued out of the Supreme Court of Tasmania a writ alleging wrongful expulsion from the union, and conspiracy. He claimed damages from the local President and Secretary of the Federation for conspiracy, and damages against the

Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1959/60, pp. 18 - 19.

^{2.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1957/58, p. 37.

^{3.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1958/59, pp. 47 - 48.

President, Secretary and Hobart Branch of the Federation for wrongful expulsion. Then again in February of the following year further writs were issued from the Supreme Court, on behalf of both the Hurseys, claiming further damages against the persons mentioned in the previous writs, plus sixty one named waterside workers for mob actions by the named defendants in preventing the plaintiffs from obtaining employment as waterside workers. 1

Still waterside workers consistently refused to work with the Hurseys.

In November of 1958 the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court gave a judgement for F.J. and D.V. Hursey. He ruled that the compulsory political levy imposed by the branch of the Federation was invalid, and awarded each of the Hurseys £2,500 damages against the Waterside Workers. Federation, its Hobart Branch, and certain individual members.

The Federation appealed to the High Court of Australia against the decision. Meanwhile the Hurseys were rostered for work again. There were more picket lines, walk-offs and disturbances. Then in September 1959 the High Court delivered its judgement. It held that the political levy had been validly imposed. It also noted that excessive damages had been awarded by the Tasmanian Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Taylor commented that while the conduct of the defendants was inexcusable and warranted grave censure (Section 44(i) of the Stevedoring Industry Act with regard to picketing had been violated), the Hurseys must share to

^{1.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1957/58, pp. 36 - 37.

Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1958/59,
 p. 45.

some extent the blame for bringing about the lawlessness and hostility that surrounded the case. Damages were reduced from £2,500 to £1,000 in both cases.

The real issue of the political levy was thus resolved. The case was one which commanded nation-wide attention, and it brought to the Hobart waterfront tensions, high-feelings and hostilities that were more characteristic of the larger mainland ports.

In 1960 the President of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission made a new award to cover the stevedoring industry. This was the first comprehensive award made in relation to the industry since 1936. The Award provided that all existing customs, practices and agreements inconsistent with the Award were to be inoperative. A new "code" for the industry was instituted.

In June 1961 amendments to the Stevedoring Industry Act introduced long service leave and strengthened the disciplinary provisions of the existing legislation. While the long service leave amendments represented further measures towards the decasualisation of the industry, the disciplinary provisions did appear to have both good and bad effects.

Under Section 52A of the amendments to the Act, whenever there was an unauthorised stoppage involving either 250 men or one third of the regular labour force at the port, the Authority was required, unless it took disciplinary action against all the men involved under Section 36 of the Act, to make a declaration listing all the men who took part in

Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1959/60, p. 72.

^{2.} see Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, Vol. 94, pp. 3 - 106.

see Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1960/61, pp. 40 - 42.

the stoppage. The consequences of making such a declaration were that each man involved forfeited (for each day of the stoppage) the next four attendance money payments he would otherwise have received, and the qualifying service for long service leave for each man was to be reduced by such numbers of days not exceeding thirty for each day of the stoppage. 1

The new disciplinary measures were not well received in some quarters. In the year 1961/62 throughout Australian ports there were 63 stoppages in respect of which declarations were made under Section 52A. For the year this amounted to a forfeiture of £379,335 in attendance money. Taking an industry wide perspective the amendments seemed to have the effect of accentuating industrial unrest rather than relieving it. However, the view was put to the writer by persons associated with the stevedoring industry in Hobart that in this port, and indeed in many of the smaller ports, the abovementioned penalty amendments did manage to suppress a good deal of overt industrial conflict.

In July of 1961 the militant General Secretary of the Waterside Workers' Federation, Mr. J. Healy, died. He had held the post since 1937. He was replaced by a more moderate candidate, Mr. C.H. Fitzgibbon.

In May 1963 a conference was called by the Minister for Labour and National Service in an attempt to improve the industrial relations climate on the waterfront. At the Conference were representatives from

^{1.} Ibid.

Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1961/62,
 p. 51.

the Australian Council of Trade Unions, the Waterside Workers*

Federation, the Stevedoring Industry Authority, the employers and the

Department of Labour and National Service. Agreement was reached over
a considerable range of topics.

It was agreed to establish Industrial Relations Committees in all ports. These Committees would be composed of delegates from employers and employees, and they would meet at regular intervals to discuss problems and grievances. National Committees were also formed; matters could be referred to these committees that could not be solved at the local level. It was further agreed to suspend the operation of Section 52A of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1956-62 for a period of twelve months.

The period 1960-68 saw a considerable increase in the mechanisation of stevedoring operations in the port of Hobart. In 1964 the roll-on roll-off ferries, Seaway King and Seaway Queen came into service for trade between Hobart and Sydney and Hobart and Melbourne. The design of these vessels is a combination of the roll-on roll-off and lift-on lift-off cargo handling systems. Cargo, unitised in small and large containers, and on pallets, is lifted aboard by four electrically powered deck cranes. Vehicles, semi-trailers, refrigerated trucks, cars, etc., are driven aboard through a stern opening. In 1965

Authority,
1. see Australian Stevedoring Industry/ Annual Report, 1962/63, pp.43-47.

^{2.} The demand for general cargo labour in the Port of Hobart first began to decrease when the "Princess of Tasmania" was commissioned in 1959 for the Devonport-Melbourne run. A considerable amount of Hobart general cargo previously handled by direct traders was immediately diverted to the "Princess of Tasmania" via road transport. The change was permanent.

^{3.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1963/64, p. 21 and 23.

the Australian National Line vehicular ferry, the Empress of Australia, commenced operations. While the operation of these ferries has provided some waterside workers with semi-permanent, and even permanent employment, it has also resulted in a spectacular decline in the demand for waterside labour in Hobart. In 1960 the port quota was 750; in 1963 it was 620. By June 1967 it was down to 375. The decline in the amount of labour demanded is further reflected in the labour activity statistics. For the year ended June, 1963 the daily average employment, expressed as a percentage of registrations was 67.7%, with 21.2% on attendance money, both credited and penalty. For the year ended June 1966, the daily average employment expressed as a percentage of registrations was 54.4% with 30.1% on attendance money, both credited and penalty. The significance of this decline in demand for waterfront labour in Hobart will be dealt with at a later stage.

1963/64 was a reasonably stable year so far as unauthorised stoppages were concerned, but during 1964/65 there were 884 such stoppages on the Australian waterfront. The loss in man hours was more than double the previous year, and the greatest loss since 1960/61.²

Then in June of 1965 it was announced that Mr. Woodward of the Victorian Bar would conduct an inquiry into the stevedoring industry. The Federation announced that they would not co-operate with the inquiry and that they intended to hold 24 hour fortnightly stoppages beginning on the 4 of August. Two such stoppages were held.

^{1.} see Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Reports, 1965/66, p. 87, and 1962/63, p. 127.

Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1964/65,
 p. 39.

^{3.} Ibid., p. 17.

On the 8th of October the Federal Government introduced legislation amending the Stevedoring Industry Act. The chief effect of these amendments was to deprive the Waterside Workers' Federation of its power over recruitment, and to place this function exclusively in the hands of the Authority. The amending legislation also contained threats of union deregistration in the event of unsatisfactory behaviour. 2

The legislation was hotly received by the Federation, however opposition quickly mellowed and when the Federal Government, acting upon ACTU initiatives, proposed an all-in conference with Mr. Woodward as chairman, in lieu of the Inquiry, the Federation agreed. The first meeting of this Stevedoring Industry Conference was held in late October. A number of meetings were held subsequently. Agreement in principle was reached over a wide variety of topics and a General Report was finally published in April, 1967. The Conference ushered in a period of almost unprecedent calm to the Australian waterfront. Perhaps its most important single achievement was the agreement reached on the idea of permanent employment, the ultimate step in the de-casualisation of wharf labour. Subsequently permanent employment has been introduced into a number of mainland ports, including Sydney and Melbourne. Feasibility studies are being conducted and plans are being made for the extension of this most desirable system of employment. In Hobart, since 1962, attempts have been made to encourage waterside workers to transfer to other ports where there is a shortage of waterfront labour, for the

^{1.} see Chapter 6 for a fuller treatment of the history and details of this legislation.

^{2.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1965/66, pp. 38 - 39.

^{3.} National Stevedoring Industry Conference, General Report, April, 1967.

surplus of labour that exists in Hobart would make it very difficult to establish permanent employment here. It might be noted that only a few watersiders have been prepared to transfer to other ports either permanently or temporarily.

Such then, in sketchy form, is the history of relations in the stevedoring industry in Australia. It has been ravelled, chaotic, bitter and often lawless, yet an appreciation of this history is fundamental to an understanding of the industry. No implications will be drawn at this stage, rather this will be attempted in dealing with particular topics as they arise in succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER 3.

ORGANISATION STRUCTURES.

W.F. Whyte in his book "Men at Work" notes that the formal organisation structure has an important bearing on the behaviour of individuals in an organisation. Therefore, having examined the historical contexts of the stevedoring industry, an examination of the organisational structures of the industry will be attempted in this Chapter. Thus, the organisation of employers, employees and regulating agencies associated with the industry will be particularised in both their local and national aspects, and the inter-relationships of these organisations will be detailed. Further, the legislative framework within which these agencies operate will be described. An outline of the actual organisation of the work will also be presented.

Here we are dealing with, first, the actors within the industrial relations system; the hierarchy of managers and their representatives in supervision, the hierarchy of workers and their spokesmen, and the specialised governmental agencies concerned with workers'enterprises and their relationships. Secondly, we will also be dealing with some of the contexts of the system; in particular the technological characteristics which define the work place and the operations and functions of workers and managers, and the influences of the specialised governmental agencies. Attention will also be paid to the rules established both by

^{1.} W.F. Whyte, Men at Work (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press and Richard D. Irwin, 1961), Chapter 6.

and for the actors in their special work contexts.

1. The Organisations

(i) Employees.

The principal union associated with the stevedoring industry is the Waterside Workers' Federation. The stated purpose of the Hobart Branch of the Federation is:

to combine in one body all persons engaged in the loading, discharging and/or coaling of ships, in order that their interests may be protected, their status raised, and their conditions improved.

The Rules establish, in some detail, the means by which the Branch can aim to achieve its objectives. The government of the Branch is entrusted to a Committee of Management which is comprised of a President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, Vigilance Officer and seven General Members. The Committee members are elected annually and the Secretary and Vigilance Officer are full-time union officials. Locally, the Federation is represented on the Tasmanian Trades Hall Council, mainly to facilitate the solution of inter-union demarcation problems.

So far as the national structures of the union are concerned, there is, first, the All Ports Biennial Conference which is the supreme policy making body of the Federation. It is composed of Branch representatives, and its decisions are binding on all branches, officers and members of the Federation. The actual national government of the

^{1.} Revised Rules of the Waterside Workers' Federations of Australia,
Höbart Branch (Hobart: Monotone Print, 1962), p. 2.

Federation is vested in the Federal Council which comprises representatives elected annually from zones into which the branches are divided. There are 23 Federal Councillors, plus two fulltime Federal officials. In general, the Council has full power to carry out the objectives of the Organisation, subject to the strictures of the All Ports Conference. There is also an Executive Committee of not less than six members appointed at each meeting of the Council. There are two fulltime Federal Officials; a General Secretary-Treasurer, and a Federal Organiser. These officers are elected every three years by members. There is a General President who is elected annually to preside over all meetings of the Council and all Conferences and meetings of the organisation. Further the W.W.F. is affiliated with the A.C.T.U., the national equivalent of the local trades hall councils. The main task of the A.C.T.U. is to formulate and co-ordinate union policy and union practice on industrial and political matters at the national level. 2

There are other union organisations associated with the performance of stevedoring operations in Australia. Perhaps the two most important are the Australian Foremen Stevedores? Association and the Federated Clerks Union of Australia. Members of the Federated Clerks Union provide the tally clerks on the wharves; these clerks control cargo in its passage to or from the wharves and they keep a tally of this cargo. Some of the tally clerks are employed on a permanent basis; others on a semi-permanent basis. The semi-permanent clerks are worked on a

^{1.} see Report of Committee of Inquiry, 1957, op. cit., p. 27.

^{2.} J.E. Isaac and G.W. Ford, (eds.) Australian Labour Relations
Readings (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1966), p. 86.

roster system managed by the Association of Employers of Waterside

The Foremen Stevedores. Association (F.S.A.) is comprised of foremen who are employed in the stevedoring industry. The Association is organised on a state and Federal basis. There are biennial elections for office bearers. On the state level in Tasmania the F.S.A. is represented on the local Trades and Labour Council, however on the national level the Association has no links with the A.C.T.U. The Federal Secretary is a full-time employee of the Association. The broad objective of the Association is to protect the interests of the foremen in the industry. The Association receives an award from the Arbitration Commission.

(ii) The Employers

The employers in the industry can be regarded as those companies, firms and persons who undertake the loading and discharging of cargo into and from ships. These are the stevedoring companies. In Hobart there are two such stevedoring companies; the Union Steamship Company, and the Tasmanian Stevedoring Company. The Union Company is also a shipping company. The more indirect employers are the shipping companies and agents who contract out stevedoring work to the stevedoring companies through the Stevedoring Industry Authority. It should be further noted that these shipping companies and agents are often the

^{1.} Report of Committee of Inquiry, 1957, op. cit., p. 27.

main shareholders in the stevedoring companies. It would be suffice to say that the organisation of employers in the stevedoring industry is closely connected with that of the shipping interests.

The most important bodies in the stevedoring industry, on the employer side, are the shipping companies. These companies have formed themselves into a number of associations. First, there is the Overseas Shipping Representatives Association (O.S.R.A.). This Association is comprised of companies and agents concerned with the operation of overseas ships. The O.S.R.A. is mainly responsible for shipping traffic organisation; it is indirectly concerned with industrial matters in the stevedoring industry in that some of the members of the Association are members of the Association of Employers of Waterside Labour.

Secondly, there is the Australian Steamship Owners' Federation (A.S.O.F.). The Federation is composed of Australian shipping interests. It has its own traffic committees and it is concerned with the rationalisation of local shipping services. It conducts certain industrial functions for its members with the maratime unions.

Thirdly, there is the Independent Steamship Owners' Federation (I.S.O.F.), which is composed of shipping interests that are not represented on either the O.S.R.A. or the A.S.O.F. It performs similar functions for its members as the A.S.O.F. does for its members.

Fourthly, there is the Association of Employers of Waterside

^{1.} Ibid., pp. 27 - 29.

^{2.} K.F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia. op. cit., p. 227.

Labour (A.E.W.L.). This Association was first established on a national basis in 1963 (prior to 1963 such Associations had existed at a state or local level only) whereupon it assumed the functions of the Central Committee of Overseas and Inter-State Shipowners and the Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association (C.S.O.A.). It now functions to determine and deal with matters relating to industrial affairs affecting the stevedoring industry. As a registered organisation under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, the A.E.W.L. is now fully representative of shipping and stevedoring interests throughout Australia; its members are representative of the O.S.R.A., the A.S.O.F., and the I.S.O.F. The Constitution of the A.E.W.L. provides for the policy and control of industrial matters to be the responsibility. of a bienially elected Committee of Management. Similarly, a Committee of Management in each state is elected by members of the Association in that State to perform the functions of the Association as broadly stated above. 1 To these ends the Association employs permanent officials who are governed by the Committees of Management.

- (iii) Specialised Government Agencies and the Legal Framework
 - (a) The Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority and the Department of Labour and National Service.

As noted in Chapter 2, in 1956 the Australian Stevedoring

Industry Authority was created to replace the Stevedoring Industry

Board. The Authority was contrived as a statutory corporation under the

see Association of Employers of Waterside Labour, Report, 1964/66,
 p. 6.

provisions of the Stevedoring Industry Act. 1956. The Authority consists of a Chairman and two other members familiar with industrial matters and representative of management in industry and trade union affairs. The functions of the Authority are described in some detail in Section 17 of the Stevedoring Industry Act. They include the regulation of the industry, the making of attendance money and other payments to waterside workers, the recruitment of waterside labour, the arranging for the allocation and engagement of waterside workers to stevedoring operations, the training of persons in stevedoring operations. the investigation of causes of delays in stevedoring work and the determination of improved methods, the ensuring of safe working conditions and the publishing of information relevant to the industry. The Authority is also empowered to exercise such powers and perform such functions as the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, by award or order, directs. To these ends the Authority is represented in the major ports by a Local Representative and such staff as are necessary for the performance of the functions of the Authority.

One of the most important functions performed by the Authority under the direction of the Arbitration Commission is that of acting as a Board of Reference; a type of in-industry arbitral mechanism. In most ports, indeed in Hobart, the Board of Reference is the Local Representative of the Authority or the assistant to the Local Representative.

^{1.} see Stevedoring Industry Act 1956-66, Section 17.

^{2.} see Award, Waterside Workers, March, 1960 (Canberra: Government Printer), Section 28 (a), p. 22.

The functions of the Boards of Reference are listed in the Award as follows:

To hear, determine, or report on all matters referred to it by this award for hearing, determination or report; (ii) To inquire into and report to the Commission on any suggestion by a Branch of the Federation or any employer for variation of this award to meet the particular needs of a port: (iii) To encourage and facilitate the making of agreements in different ports on matters not covered by this award; (iv) To settle disputes on any matters (not involving interpretation of any term of this award) arising out of this award or out of this award as supplemented by orders of the Authority; To inquire into allegations that mechanical appliances introduced by employers are, or any method of working is, dangerous and for that purpose to co-operate with and obtain reports from local factory inspectors, and obtain the assistance of such experts as may be available. (vi) Not withstanding any provision of this award other than this paragraph, to deal with all matters referred to it in paragraphs (i) to (v) hereof whether submitted to it by the party entitled to submit it under any provision or on its own motion after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard.

The operations of these Boards of Reference are quite significant for they help to localise disputes; they enable particular solutions to be found to local problems.

The A.S.I.A. is ultimately responsible, as a governmental agency, to the Parliament through the Minister for Labour and National Service.

The Department for Labour and National Service is the Department in the Commonwealth Government responsible for the formulation of broad

industrial policy, especially with respect to the stevedoring industry. The A.S.I.A. provides the agency whereby the policies formulated by the Minister and the Department may be put into administrative effect. Further, it is often through the offices of the Department of Labour and National Service that the all-in conferences, at which all parties in the stevedoring industry are represented, are conducted. Here, then, we have two types of specialised governmental agency. First, there is the department concerned mainly with broad policy matters, and secondly, the A.S.I.A. more concerned with the actual administrative regulation of the industry. (see functions listed above).

Apart from those sections dealing with the specific functions and the creation of the A.S.I.A., the Stevedoring Industry Act 1956-66 contains some further important sections. Part III of the Act contains detailed provisions relating to port quotas and the registration of employers and waterside workers. Qualification for registration, the responsibilities of the registered and penalties for the non-adherence to the regulations and the conditions under which registration of employers or employees may be cancelled or suspended are all listed. Also detailed in the Act are some of the duties of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and the Commonwealth Industrial Court. Part IIIA of the Act contains provisions relating to long service leave. In the financial provisions of the Act 3 it is provided, among other things, that there shall be paid to the Authority out of

^{1.} see Stevedoring Industry Act, 1956-66, Sections 24-45.

^{2.} Ibid., Sections 45A-45P

^{3.} Ibid., Part IV, Sections 46-52

Consolidated Revenue Fund amounts equal to the amounts raised under the Stevedoring Industry Charge Act 1947-54.

(b) Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and the Commonwealth Industrial Court.

In Australia, as an effect of the Commonwealth Constitution, the power to regulate industrial relations is divided between the Commonwealth and the States. The principal industrial power is assigned to the Commonwealth by paragraph (xxxv) of Section 51 of the Constitution which empowers the Parliament of the Commonwealth to make laws with respect to conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one state. The principal objectives of the Commonwealth in the industrial sphere as listed in the Conciliation and Arbitration Act are:

- (a) to promote good will in industry:
- (b) to encourage conciliation with a view to amicable agreement, thereby preventing and settling industrial disputes;
- (c) to provide means for the preventing and settling of industrial disputes not resolved by amicable agreement, including threatened, impending and probable industrial disputes, with the maximum of expedition and the minimum of legal form and technicality;
- (d) to provide for the observance and enforcement of agreements and awards made in the settlement of industrial disputes; and
- (e) to encourage the organisation of representative bodies of employers and employees and their registration under this Act.

The arbitral and judicial agencies of the Commonwealth Government created for the purpose of exercising this industrial function have

^{1.} Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904-66, Section 2.

especially important relations with the stevedoring industry in Australia. After the Boilermakers' Case of 1956¹ the arbitral and judicial functions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Court were divided between two newly created bodies; a Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and an Industrial Court. ²

The powers and functions of the arbitral agency, the Commission, with regard to the stevedoring industry, are outlined in Division 4, Sections 81 to 88 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-66. The Commission also derives certain powers in relation to port stoppages under the Stevedoring Industry Act 1956-66. (see Section 52A of that Act: however the operation of this section has been suspended since 1963). Further powers are conferred on the Commission by Sections 35, 37, 37A and 43 of the same Act, and by Part III of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1965 (No. 66 of 1965). It has been suggested that this very precise detailing of powers and functions and areas of jurisdiction is desirable because of the existence of the A.S.I.A. whose powers and functions, to a certain extent, overlap with those of the Commission. 3

The Commission operates mainly in the making and varying of awards

^{1.} see "Boilermakers' Case (1956) " Commonwealth Law Reports, Vol. 94, 1956.

^{2.} It should be noted that under Section 49(5) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1956 (No. 44 of 1956) awards and orders of an arbitral nature made by the 'old' Court under provisions of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949-54 were not to have the force and effect as if they were made by the Commission. Presumably then these orders and awards were still to be dealt with by the 'old' Court. Further transitional functions with respect to the stevedoring industry were to be performed by the Conciliation and Arbitration Court. (see Section 6, Stevedoring Industry Act, 1956-66).

^{3.} Obe R. Foenander, <u>Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in Australia</u> (Sydney: Law Book Company of Australia Pty. Ltd., 1959), pp. 143-144.

and in the arbitration of particular disputes. Certain matters are reserved exclusively for the Commission in Presidential Session, e.g., alteration of standard working hours, alteration of the basic wage for males or females and the altering of provisions relating to long service leave. With regard to other matters, whether involved in an industrial dispute or not, the powers of the Commission are exercisable by a presidential member of the Commission assigned by the President for the purpose. 2

The awards and the variations of awards that are handed down by the Commission provide for, in great detail, regulations, binding on all parties to the award, which define general conditions of work. Rates of pay, hours of work, holidays, rest periods, gang sizes, boards of reference, stop-work meetings, damaged or obnoxious cargoes, and many other factors are particularised in the award; it is the 'code' of the industry. Provisions are made in the Conciliation and Arbitration Act for the enforcement of these awards. These provisions are very seldom invoked. There is no record of a prosecution against an employer for breach of the Award.

The judicial agency within the conciliation and arbitration machinery is the Commonwealth Industrial Court. The Court is composed of a Chief Judge and not more than six other judges. The jurisdiction of the Court may be exercised with respect to wrongful dismissal of an employee, the interpretation of an award, the determination of the

^{1.} Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904-66, Sect. 33(1)

^{2.} Ibid., Sect. 84 (1)(1A)

Ibid., Sections 119-126.

eligibility of persons to belong to registered organisations, the determination as to the consistency of registered organisations rules with the Act, disputes arising out of entitlements to membership, matters of practice and procedure, questions of law referred to it by the Commission, and so on. The Court has the power to order compliance with an award proved to be broken. Penalties may be imposed by the Court for the non-compliance with an order of the Court and it has the same power to punish for contempt of court as the High Court of Australia.

Apart from sections specifically dealing with the operations of the Commission and the Court, the Conciliation and Arbitration Act contains important provisions relating to registries and registrars, registered organisations, disputed elections in registered organisations and industrial agreements.

These then are the main specialised governmental agencies associated with the stevedoring industry and the legislative framework within which the industry operates.²

2. The Actual Organisation of the Work

If a shipping company or agent has a ship coming into port to receive or discharge cargo the company or agent will notify a steve-doring company of the amount of labour that will be required to handle the cargo and the times at which this labour will be required. The

^{1.} see Ibid., Sections 104(2), 107.

Other agencies, such as the Hobart Marine Board which is responsible for the development and management of port facilities, could not be regarded as having an important bearing on the stevedoring industry industrial relations system.

stevedoring company will then apply to the A.S.I.A. for the number of gangs required for the performance of the job. In the Port of Hobart the A.S.I.A. then rosters out the gangs according to a points rostering system; this system allocates labour in such a manner as to provide for a short term equalisation of earnings among all registered waterside workers in the Port. The A.S.I.A. notifies the gang members who are required for work either through the press or the radio to go direct to their jobs. Often it is not known at the time the press notice is submitted to the daily paper exactly what the labour requirements will be; the ship may not have berthed or, as is often the case, it is not known how many waterside workers will be absent on any one day. Thus, in the press notice certain workers are requested If it is found that to present themselves for an 8.00 a.m. pick-up. more labour is required than was previously budgeted for then this demand is met from the 8.00 a.m. pick-up. In the event of an absolute shortage of labour, gangs are allocated on a 'first-in, first-served' basis to the stevedoring companies, with occasional exceptions being made in the case of cargoes that are of a perishable or urgent nature. It must be remembered that there are basically two types of waterside worker. The permanent gang member and the "floater". In the allocation of work the permanent gang member is almost always rostered with his gang; the "floater" on the other hand is rostered on an individual basis, usually being seconded to a gang in the case of the absence of a permanent gang member, or when the members of a permanent gang have to be increased for the performance of a certain stevedoring operation.

The work is conducted on a shift basis and weekend work. particularly during the fruit export season, is not uncommon. Further, after the equalisation of earnings agreement in Hobart in 1963, work is now allocated on a day-to-day basis, rather than allowing gangs to remain on the one job until it is finished, as is the case in some mainland ports. This day-to-day rostering of gangs enables wages to be equalised over short periods. At the time of the introduction of the system some employers were of the opinion that the system would be grossly inefficient as it could involve different gangs performing the same job each day. A further source of concern with respect to the equalisation of earnings agreement arises from the fact that because the gang does not always necessarily complete a given task, then the work gratification of the gang will be limited to the extent that the sense of psychological closure or sense of completion in finishing a meaningful unit of work will be limited. However, the system has been found to be quite workable, for it has resulted in more workers being more familiar with a greater variety of jobs than would have been the case had the one gang or group of gangs always remained on the job until it was completed.

Apart from gangs rostered for 'normal' stevedoring operations, some workers are also rostered for amenities duties. These workers are responsible for keeping the change and other amenities rooms in good order.

^{1.} see D. Katz and R. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organisations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 433 - 434.

Apart from those waterside workers rostered for work on a daily basis, some workers are employed on a semi-permanent basis with one of the stevedoring companies. Thirty seven men are employed on a three monthly basis to perform the required stevedoring operations for the roll-on, roll-off ferries, the Seaway King and the Seaway Queen. A further twelve men are employed now on a permanent basis to discharge those stevedoring functions associated with the operation of the Australian National Line's ferry, The Empress of Australia.

3. On the Job.

The actual stevedoring operations are performed by work units known as gangs. In Hobart there are thirteen men in a regular gang. The gang is a fairly cohesive social and functional unit. Prior to the commencement of a job all the workers on the job will elect a job delegate. This job delegate will act as spokesman for the entire labour force. Each gang also has a permanent gang leader who acts as spokesman for the gang. This gang leader may or may not be the job delegate. It is the responsibility of the employer, or his representative on the job, to direct the method of working on the job, and the job delegate is not permitted to interfere with the authority of the employer in this regard. 2

The gangs are divided into three sections. First, there are the deckmen. These are the winckmen and the hatchmen. The deckmen are

Joel A. Fadem, "Organisational Design: The Case of the Australian Waterfront", Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 9, (Mar. 1967), p. 28.

^{2.} Award - Waterside Workers, 1960, Section 31(b)

^{3.} We are not dealing here with gangs that are engaged in the loading or unloading of the roll-on, roll-off ferries.

perhaps the most prestigous for the winchmen have the most skilled jobs, while the hatchmen's job is quite important for he is in a position where he may control the pace of the work. (It is interesting to note that collectively in the questionnaire deckmen thought that working conditions were more satisfactory than the rest of the waterside workers. (see Table 3.1). Secondly, there are the holdmen. These men are responsible for the actual handling of the cargo in the hold of the ship. Their job is often dirty and tiring, but their location is such that they are reasonably free from supervision and they can take turns at letting one another rest. Thirdly, there are the gangway men. These workers, who possibly have the easiest job of all, hook-on the slings and provide others for successive handling. Aside from these gang members there are the 'shedmen' who receive cargo from the trucks and prepare it for slinging. Among this category one might include fork lift truck drivers.

As might be expected conditions on the roll-on, roll-off ferries are somewhat different, especially so far as the roll-on, roll-off cargo is concerned. However, the lift-on, lift-off cargo of the Seaway vessels is handled in much the same way as is cargo on conventional vessels, despite the fact that gang sizes are smaller.

The employers' representatives on the job are the foremen and the supervisors. The supervisor will pass particular instructions

^{1.} Joel A. Fadem, op. cit., p. 29.

	Tab1	(N =	72)	
			No.	%
		Very satisfactory	2	25.0
		Satisfactory	3	37.5
	Deckmen	About average	3	37.5
		Unsatisfactory	-	_
		Very unsatisfactory	_	_
How do you find				
working conditions?		Very satisfactory	3	4.6
İ		Satisfactory	25	40.9
	Others	About average	31	50.8
		Unsatisfactory	2	3.2
		Very unsatisfactory	-	

on to the foreman on the amount of labour that will be required for a certain job, and when and where this labour will be required. The supervisor is the person who is ultimately in charge of a given job, while a certain number of foremen will be in charge of a certain number of different hatches on the job. The foremen are responsible to the supervisor. Often if there are three or four foremen on the one job the supervisor will appoint a 'charge foreman' whose responsibility it is to see that the entire job is performed satisfactorily.

It is the responsibility of the foreman to see that the cargo is loaded and/or unloaded in a safe and efficient manner. The foreman must see that the cargo is not damaged in any way; that the cargo is being loaded and unloaded in a safe manner; and that the cargo is being safely stowed in the ship, and in such a way as to meet the requirements laid down by the ship's representative on the job (usually the Mate).

The foreman has certain powers of dismissal, and he may bargain with the job delegate over marginal wage allowances for certain types of work. If the job delegate receives no satisfaction from the foreman he may take his case to the supervisor, and so the matter is propelled through the grievance machinery, often being ultimately settled by a Board of Reference.

The foremen are the real 'men in the middle' in the stevedoring industry. They are unionised, and two of the foremen in the Port of Hobart are not permanently employed by a stevedoring company.

4. The Port of Hobart.

The present main port of Hobart is extremely compact, being U-shaped and with only 2000 feet or less separating the two main arms....It is literally true to say that the port and the city are one, the principal buildings such as Parliament House, the Town Hall and the General Post Office being only a stone's throw from the harbour.

The port is the main port for southern Tasmenia. The principal imports are metal manufactures, motor vehicles, durable and non-durable consumer goods, fertilisters and certain raw materials. The main exports are fruit, wool and other primary products, paper and confectionary. The Port is at its busiest during the fruit export season which lasts from about March to May of each year. At this time the demand for labour in the Port is such that waterside workers from other Australian ports are transferred to Hobart, on a voluntary basis to assist with the work, the local waterside labour force being unable to meet labour demands at these times. The port quota at Hobart stands at 375. The number of persons registered for employment as waterside workers in the Port is 548.

Because the wharves are situated in close proximity to the business and commercial centres of Hobart, and because of the fact that Hobart has reasonably well developed suburban districts, there is no dock-side community to be found in the Port, such as exists around

^{1.} Tasmanian Year Book, 1968, p. 527.

^{2.} The port quota is defined in the Stevedoring Industry Act 1956-66, section 25(d) as the number of waterside workers which, in the opinion of the Stevedoring Industry Authority, is required for the proper and effective conduct of stevedoring operations in the port.

^{3.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1966/67, p. 80.

many large ports, where large groups of waterside workers live.

Indeed, in the administration of the questionnaire, it was discovered, that at least so far as the sample was concerned, that waterside workers' residences are well scattered throughout practically all the suburban areas of the town. Geographically then there is no grouped social dock-side community. The existence of such communities has been found to influence industrial relations processes in other ports.

In this chapter we have been concerned to describe the associations of employers and employees and the specialised governmental agencies that operate within the stevedoring industry, and the legislative framework within which they operate. An attempt has also been made to outline the organisation of the work in the industry. In the chapter the emphasis was on description; the implications of some of the described structures, so far as industrial relations are concerned, will be presented in subsequent chapters.

^{1.} see The Dock Worker: An Analysis of Conditions of Employment in the Port of Manchester. University of Liverpool, Department of Social Science (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1956).

CHAPTER 4.

THE JOB : CONTENT AND CONTEXT.

Having considered the historical background and the structural setting of the stevedoring industry, in this Chapter an examination will be made of the environmental and physical characteristics of the job, and an attempt will be made to assess the effects of these characteristics in the industrial relations processes in the industry.

More specifically, the following aspects of the job will be scrutinised: The content of the job; the physical effort and the skill required to discharge the work, and the danger involved in the work. The broader contextural aspects of the job, such as its casual and seasonal nature, promotional opportunities, job security, wages and hours of work, and such environmental features as amenities provided and the type of work force to be found in the industry will be investigated. Finally, the relationship between the waterside worker and the larger society and the stevedoring industry industrial relations system will be briefly explored.

Thus, we are here concerned with an important 'context' of the system as noted by J.T. Dunlop within which the actors of the system interact. This context is described as the technological characteristics of the work place and the work community. We have partially

^{1.} see Chapter 1, pp. 7 - 8.

described this context in Chapter 3. There, however, we were mainly concerned with structures; in this Chapter much greater emphasis will be placed on the content and the particular contextural nature of the job.

In dealing with the topics outlined above we will be able to make a consideration of these topics from the point of view of the waterside worker through the answers obtained from the written questionnaire. This type of analysis is important for it must be realised that it is the actual worker perception of aspects of the job that will determine his response to these aspects and his behaviour in and effect on the industrial relations system. A simple objective consideration of the work facets to be dealt with in this Chapter could result in the neglect of subtleties and ambiguities that can be appreciated when considered, as it were, through the workers' eyes.

In this Chapter then, we will be talking about some of the satisfactions and deprivations experienced by the waterside worker in relation to his work. Before we proceed it is important to make some brief note on the relationship between work conditions, worker satisfaction and industrial conflict.

As we saw in Chapter 1, industrial conflict can be regarded as being endemic to industrial relations systems. Industrial conflict can occur independently of worker satisfaction and conditions of work.

Daniel Katz observes:

^{1.} see Ross Stagner, Psychology of Industrial Conflict (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956), Chapters 2 and 3.

Industrial conflict is not necessarily a pathological phenomenon to be understood as the desperation efforts of deprived and discontented people...

Therefore, conditions of work and worker satisfaction are not the only factors that will determine the amount of conflict in any system at one time. This is not to say that these factors are unrelated, for as Katz further observes:

Worker deprivations and gratifications are important in furnishing the reservoir of feeling and motivation.... They become salient in conflict when the worker has identified their causes and perceives a solution in organised struggle with the employer.

Yet the relationship is not always an especially clear one. For example, conditions of work may be extremely congenial and satisfying, yet the management and the workers may quarrel bitterly. Conversely, workers may find their work conditions most depressing and still not express their dissatisfaction with the conditions in a direct or overt manner.

Though it is clear that the context in which the actors in an industrial relations system interact will affect the behaviour of the actors, it is difficult to relate specific aspects of the work situation which will affect worker satisfactions to specific expressions of dissatisfaction in the form of industrial conflict. With the help of information obtained through the questionnaire suggestions can be made and directions can be outlined in this regard, but one must be wary of

^{1.} Daniel Katz, "Satisfactions and Deprivations in Industrial Life", in Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, op. cit., p. 86.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 87.

particularisation. Generally speaking, it may be said that unsatisfactory working conditions that are likely to result in worker dissatisfactions, are factors which make industrial conflict at least more
specious.

1. Job Content.

First, stevedoring work is hard, and often dirty and most unpleasant, requiring considerable physical effort, especially from those gang members who are obliged to work in the hold of the ship.

As has been noted in Chapter 2 the waterside workers job has been made, in the past, especially strenuous by long hours (shifts of 17 hours and longer were not uncommon) and by foremen who forced their charges to work at particularly fast rates. As Dr. McQueen reported in 1943, the effects upon the general health of the workers as a result of these conditions of work were quite disastrous. 1

Now, however, conditions of employment have improved tremendously. Hours and conditions of work are strictly regulated and increased
mechanisation has made the work less physically exacting. Yet this is
not to say that the work is not still fairly physically demanding.

Table 4.1 indicates waterside workers' opinions on this matter.

Secondly, the work is of a fairly dangerous nature. In 1943

Dr. McQueen perceived that cases of spinal and head injuries, multiple

bone fractures and finger amputations abounded. Again the position has

^{1.} see Chapter 2, p. 34.

	Table 4.1	(N = 72)
Do you find your job -	very physically tiring fairly physically tiring slightly physically tiring not at all physically tiring unanswered	3 34 26 8 1

·	Table 4.2	(N = 72)
	extremely dangerous	2
	fairly dangerous	53
Is your work -	only slightly dangerous	16
,	not at all dangerous	_
	unanswered	2
·		

improved a great deal with improved and less dangerous methods of work and the greater emphasis that is placed now on safety and accident prevention. Waterside workers themselves still regard their job as being of a fairly dangerous nature. (see Table 4.2).

Thirdly, stevedoring work is, apart from a certain expertise required on the part of winchmen and hatchmen, at best a semi-skilled occupation. Here too patterns of work have changed over the years with increased mechanisation which has made it necessary for waterside workers to receive training in the proper handling of equipment and so on, but on the whole no great skills are called for in the performance of duties.

2. Job context. 1

(a) Casual and seasonal nature of the work.

In the Port of Hobart stevedoring work can be regarded as being casual and seasonal in nature. While it is true that since 1940 substantial steps have been taken to decasualise dock work through the rostering of work, the payment of attendance money and long service leave, basically workers are still employed on a day to day basis. (The implications of this will be considered in Chapter 5 which will deal with employer-employee relations).

The work is seasonal to the extent that the demand for labour is highest during the fruit export season which lasts from about late February to late May of each year. While many persons associated with

^{1.} Supervision as an important element of job context will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter.

^{2.} Exceptions to this are noted in Chapter 3, p. 67.

the industry put forward the opinion to the writer that seasonalism was something that the industry as a whole had come to terms with and learned to live with, it does seem to pose certain problems.

It appeared that, while overtime work is generally prized for the rates of pay that attach to such work, many waterside workers resented having to work periods of overtime during the fruit export season in order to earn a satisfactory yearly income. (See Tables 4.3 and 4.4).

Apart from general resentment at having to work overtime, and the fact that overtime work possibly makes waterside work, in a broad sense, even more irregular, the following two specific complaints were made with respect to the seasonal nature of the work in the Port of Hobart.

First, the fact that the seasonal nature of the work causes some uneveness in the level of wages received by all workers results in some problems so far as family budgeting is concerned. One worker expressed the problem to the writer in the following terms:

while the overall yearly income might look pretty good there are variations in the weekly level. We get good money during the apple season, but for a good part of the year we might be on attendance money for the most part. Now this is all right if you can save during the apple season, but many can't. You tend to spend as much as you earn, or you spend on things that you have been unable to afford during the other part of the year. If you don't save during the apple season you can be in for hard times.

Thus, while much has been done to average out and equalise earnings, particularly in the short run, the fact of substantially different

Table 4.3	. (N = 72)
Do you have to work a large amount of overtime during the year in order to earn a satisfactory yearly income?	Yes No Unanswered	66 4 2

Table 4.4	(N	= 72)
If you feel that you have to work a	Yes	37
large amount of overtime during the	No	20
year in order to earn a satisfactory	Indifferent	8
yearly income, do you resent having to do this ?	Unanswered	7

earnings rates throughout the year as a result of the seasonal nature of the work in the Port of Hobart still can cause the waterside worker certain difficulties.

A second problem associated with the seasonal nature of the work, as outlined to the writer by a local union official, was that from a bargaining point of view the union is in its strongest position during the fruit export season, yet for a number of reasons they feel that they are unable to take full advantage of the situation. In the first place, the workers do not want to lose money (wages) during the fruit export season through work stoppages; particularly the local workers. The comment was made to the writer by a person closely associated with the stevedoring industry in the Port that rransfer workers who came to Hobart for the fruit season are often keen to 'stir up a bit of trouble*, however it was noted that these persons are quickly told to 'button-up' by the local workers who are eager to achieve maximum return for their labours at a time of high labour demand. A second factor restraining the union from engaging in industrial action at this time is an expressed desire on the part of the union not to impose any undue hardship on the fruitgrowers and other persons associated with the industry, who, given a season of low prices on world markets for their products, might be at pains to *make ends meet. From a public relations point of view also, of course, it would be unwise for the union to initiate an industrial stoppage during the fruit export season if it could be clearly shown that one particular section of the community (fruit growers) was bearing the

brunt of the dysfunctional consequences flowing from the work stoppage.

Thus, while seasonalism may be an element in the stevedoring industry in Hobart that persons associated with the industry have come to accept as a 'fact of life' which even has associated with it certain desirable features, such as above average earnings and regular employment for a period, it does pose certain problems for the waterside worker and his union.

(b) Promotional opportunities.

worker? A few workers do manage to become foremen in the industry, but only a few. Indeed, it would seem that only a few waterside workers would ever really aspire to the position of foreman for the change in jobs would entail a drastic revision of loyalties on the part of the worker.

Apart from promotion to the position of foreman some slightly indirect promotional avenues present themselves. A worker may become a full time union official (a secretary or vigilance officer), or a 'permanent' job delegate, or he may aspire to the more prestigous gang positions of winchman or hatchman. Yet these avenues can scarcely be regarded as promotional opportunities in a real sense. While it is true that the attainment of the position of winchman in a gang or permanent union official may involve an increase in status and perhaps

^{1. &#}x27;Permanent' here in the sense that in any work group a particular person, A, will invariably be elected job delegate.

a more rewarding job, it does not bring with it an increase in financial return. This, combined with the fact that opportunities even for this narrow form of promotion are themselves few, leads one to the conclusion that the promotional opportunities open to the waterside workers are quite inconsiderable.

What are the consequences of this state of affairs? Betty V.H.

Schnieder and Abraham Seigal in a study of the United States West Coast longshore industry states that worker attitudes are shaped by promotional opportunities, that where these opportunities exist the work force will be generally characterised by conservatism and responsibility and that where these opportunities do not exist the work force is likely to be militant and irresponsible. Clearly with respect to the Australian (Hobart) stevedoring industry the facts would seem to fit the theory, yet some important qualifications must be made.

First, militancy and irresponsibility among Australian waterside workers can be traced to other sources. For example, irresponsibility, or a lack of concern for employer objectives, could in part be attributed to the fact that the casual nature of the work and the absence of a permanent employer-employee relationship has forced a separation of interests and goals as between employers and employees. Secondly, in speculating upon the degree of frustration and dissatisfaction that workers are likely to experience as a result of limited promotional opportunities one must differentiate between those who

^{1.} Betty V.H. Schnieder and Abraham Seigal, <u>Industrial Relations in the Pacific Coast Longshore Industry</u> (Berkely: <u>Institute of Industrial Relations: University of California</u>, 1956).

^{2.} Irresponsibility in this context perhaps being best defined as a lack of concern for employer objectives

^{3.} See Chapter 5, pp. 130-133.

expect promotion and those who do not expect promotion. It could be safely assumed that a waterside worker's expectancy of promotion would not be high, and it could be concluded that his frustration and dissatisfaction with his prospects in this regard would not be nearly as significant as a worker whose expectation of promotion had been high and who had yet been denied the chance to realise these expectations.

Thirdly, Herzberg et. al., claim that opportunity for advancement seems to decrease in importance with age. The high average age of waterside workers in the Port of Hobart could be a factor which tends to moderate discontent arising from a lack of promotional opportunities.

The effect of limited promotional opportunities upon industrial relations processes in the stevedoring industry will be tempered by the above considerations.

(c) Hours of work.

The hours of work may be considered under four broad headings.

First, the average weekly number of hours worked. Secondly, the overall yearly irregularity in the demand for labour in the Port of Hobart due to certain seasonal influences in primary production. Thirdly, weekly irregularity in the demand for labour and the necessity for shift work, and fourthly, overtime work.

As the effects of the seasonal irregularity of work and the workers' attitudes towards overtime have already been dealt with, in this section the effects of the length of the weekly hours of work

^{1.} F. Herzberg, B. Mausner, R.O. Peterson and D.F. Capwell,

Job Attitudes: A Review of Research and Opinion (Pittsburgh:

Psychological Service of Pittsburgh, 1957), p. 76.

and shift work will be concentrated upon.

Table 4.5 indicates that the weekly hours of work per waterside worker in the Port of Hobart is fairly low.

For the year 1966/67 the figure was only 21.9 hours per week, as compared with 29.7 hours per week per waterside worker, averaged out for all Australian ports.

Now what does this mean for the waterside worker in Hobart? First, it would seem to have a substantial effect upon the level of wages received. Table 4.6 indicates that while the average weekly wage for a worker in the Port of Hobart for the year 1966/67 was \$46.50, the corresponding figure for all Australian ports in the same year was \$58.70. Secondly, it means that waterside workers in Hobart have a lot of leisure time on their hands. How this will effect the workers will depend to a large extent, upon the individual's propensity to engage in outside activities that he might find satisfying, and the facilities that are available for the performance of these activities. Some waterside workers expressed the opinion to the writer that one of the things that appealed to them most about their jobs was the amount of free time it permitted. This is possibly one of the reasons why, in answer to a question on reasons for taking up dock work, thirty two workers answered 'attraction to conditions of dock work'. (see Table 4.7). On the other hand, it could be assumed that there would be some waterside workers who would be more satisfied with longer hours of work, particularly if more work was to mean higher wages.

So far as shift work is concerned we can see from Table 4.5 that between 20% and 25% of work time is devoted to shift work. This

Table 4.5
Weekly hours: Hobart - All Atstralian Ports
Source: A.S.I.A. Annual Report

				Time and	l holf	Double	Time		····
	Years	Hours(a)	Ordinary Time (%)	Evening Shift	Other	Midnight Shift		2½ times	Meal hours worked
	1956/57	26.4	68.9	25.0		5.4	•	0.6	0.1
Hobart	1959/60	26.7	66.8	22.0	3.3	1.4	5.5	0.9	0.1
nobal t	1965/66	25.7	63.4	17.1	-	1.2	10.9	7.4	-
	1966/67	21.9	63.6	23.8	-	0.4	7.2	5.0	-
	1956/57	26.9	65.1	22.2	-	10.3	_	2,1	0.3
All Australian	1959/60	26.6	65.7	19.3	1.7	5.0	5.5	2.5	0.3
Ports	1965/66	28.3	62.9	20.5	0.3	5.7	7.1	3.2	0.3
	1966/67	29.7	62.7	19.7	0.4	6.2	7.0	3.5	0.5

⁽a) - Weekly average hours worked per waterside worker in the real labour force.

Table 4.6
Hours and Earnings: Hobart and All Australian Ports

Source: A.S.I.A. Annual Reports

	Year	Hours (a)	Wages (\$)	Attendance Money	Sick Leave	Pub. hol. not worked	Total
	1956/57	26.4	31.55	2.47	0.16	1.38	35.55
Unhont	1959/60	26.7	36.15	1.65	0.53	1.12	40.45
Hobart	1965/66	25.7	44.16	4.03	0.74	1.39	50.32
	1966/67	21.9(b)	38.65	5.64	0.75	1.46	46.50
	1956/57	27.2	34.38	2.62	0.23	1.36	38.59
A11	1959/60	27.5	38.52	2.61	0.62	1.10	42.82
Australian Ports	1965/66	28.8	48.64	1.69	0.71	1.32	52.36
	1966/67	29.7	53.60	2.87	0.78	1.45	58.70

- (a) Weekly average hours per waterside worker of real labour force.
- (b) At least in part due to a very poor fruit export season.

	Table 4.7 ^(a)	
What were your reasons for taking up dock work?	Attraction to conditions of work Convenience Persuasion of family or friends Only job available at the time Attraction of wages Other reasons Don't know or unanswered	32 14 7 30 11 6 2

(a) In answer to this question respondents were asked to tick as many answers as they thought were applicable.

	Table 4.8	(N = 72)
How do you like working shifts?	I dislike shift work very much I dislike it somewhat I don't mind it I like it fairly well I like shift work very much Unanswered	18 12 32 4 3

is mainly evening shift work (5.00 p.m. until 11.00 p.m.). There are some rather infrequent midnight shifts (11.00 p.m. until 7.00 a.m.) that are usually worked for the purpose of equalising uneven hatch hours and avoiding delay to ships when only one or two hatches have to be worked to complete the job. Worker attitudes towards shift work is fairly divided (see Table 4.8).

V.H. Vroom suggests a model within which we can consider the likely effects of shift work upon workers' attitudes. Vroom's basic assumption is that:

the valence of a given work schedule for a person will be an inverse function of the extent to which that work schedule restricts his ability to perform satisfying leisure activities.


There are two central concepts in Vroom's model; the time pattern for an activity and the discordance of a work schedule for a given activity.

The time pattern for an activity is obtained by plotting the probability that an activity can be performed at various times of the day. Some activities (Activity A) are highly flexible and can be performed at any time of the day; many hobbies are essentially of this order. Other activities are highly inflexible (Activity C), for example, the watching of a particular television programme, or attending a meeting. Other activities are moderately flexible (Activity B).

Vroom defines the discordance of a work schedule' as the amount of overlap between the work schedule and the 'time pattern' for that

^{1.} V.H. Vroom, Work and Motivation (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 156.

Figure 4.1



activity. This can be represented schematically by superimposing the work schedule on the time pattern. (see Figure 4.1 p.90) Now from the diagram we can guage the discordance of each of the activities with respect to the different work schedules.

While no attempt was made to determine the leisure activities of waterside workers, some conjectures can still be made. The main types of activity we need concern ourselves with are the highly inflexible activity, Activity C, and the moderately inflexible activity, Activity B. Now evening shift work (Work schedule 3) (4.00 p.m. until 12 midnight) will interfere with both of these activities. Workers may miss meetings or particular television programmes, or so far as the moderately inflexible activities are concerned, they may be denied the opportunity of doing something in the garden, going to the beach or fishing, or partaking of some alcoholic refreshment after work. Thus, with evening shift work there is a substantial amount of discordance. With Work Schedule 2 there is also a good measure of discordance, although it is doubted whether this would result in much worker dissatisfaction as these are the work hours that the majority of workers in society are constrained to operate under. So far as Work Schedule 1, the midnight shift, is concerned, it would seem that there is very little discordance, yet waterside workers are extremely reluctant to work this shift; the decision on whether or not to work a midnight shift very often being taken by a Board of Reference. This is possibly the case simply because of the work hours themselves, and not because of the fact that the mid-night schedule will impinge upon 'leisure activities'.

The significant dislike of shift work can thus be explained in the above terms. Another factor that must be born in mind is that shift work on the Hobart waterfront is not a regular affair in the sense that the shift work of a worker in a factory is a regular affair. The waterside worker may be suddenly called upon to work an evening or midnight shift once a month or once a year; he does not have to work a definite shift for a definite period. Thus, there can be no 'acclimitisation' to the working of shifts. The irregularity of this type of work could be an additional discordant variable.

(d) Job Security.

Job security is a most important factor affecting the satisfaction of workers in industry. In this regard M.S. Viteles observes that:

approximately 31% of employees in the six plants surveyed by the National Conference Board in 1947 ranked 'Job security - employment stabilisation' as first in importance among 71 morale factors. This percentage is three times as high as that applying to 'Compensation-base pay', which was second in frequency of choice as the most important factor.

Other studies corroborate this conclusion.²

Workers in the Port of Hobart seemed to be at least apprehensive about their future in the industry (see Table 4.9). It is interesting to note that 43 or 59.7% of the respondents saw their

^{1.} Morris S. Viteles Motivation and Morale in Industry (London: Staples Press Limited, 1954), pp. 302-303.

^{2.} see C.E. Jurgensen, "Selected Factors which Influence Job Preferences", Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 31, 1947, pp. 553 - 563.
L.G. Reynolds and J. Shister, A Study of Job Satisfaction and Labour Mobility (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949).
N.M. Davis, "Attitudes to Work Among Building Operators", Occupational Psychology, Vol. 22, 1942, pp. 56 - 62.

future in the industry as 'somewhat worse' or 'much worse than a few years ago'. Undoubtedly this can, in large part, be attributed to the perceived threat posed to the workers job security by the mechanisation of stevedoring procedures. In response to the question 'Do you believe that mechanisation and automation represent serious threats to your job security?', 1 64 or 88.9% of the respondents replied in the affirmative. (see Table 4.10).

One can appreciate waterside workers' misgivings over their future in the industry if one considers the drastic decline in the demand for waterside labour that has taken place in Hobart over the past ten years, a decline which has come about principally as a result of the increased mechanisation of stevedoring procedures; particularly the roll-on, roll-off ferries.

Table 4.11 illustrates the decline in the port quota (the number of men, determined by the ASIA, required for the efficient performance of stevedoring operations in the port) and the registered port strength (the number of waterside workers registered as eligible for work in the port), and the increasing divergence between the port quota and the registered port strength.

The problem is a most troublesome one. Baldly stated it means that there are proportionately more men to do less work, for the registered port strength is not brought into line with the port quota by simply dismissing certain workers according to a determined formula.

^{1.} It must be noted that this question could be regarded as being of a rather leading nature.

46		Table 4.9 (N = 72)	
	Would you say that your future as a waterside worker looks -	Much better than a few years ago Somewhat better About the same as a few years ago Somewhat worse Much worse than a few years ago Unanswered	6 11 10 26 17

	Table 4.10	(N = 72)
Do you believe that mechanisation and automation represent serious threats to your job security?	Yes No Don't know Unanswered	64

Apart from engendering feelings in the waterside worker of insecurity about their future these workers also felt that mechanisation has had a negative effect on their wages. (see Table 4.12).

Some suggestions have been made as to how the problem of the over supply of labour may be overcome. 1

First, the lowering of the retirement age from 70 to 65 combined with some type of pension scheme would mean that in Hobart over the next ten years approximately 200 men would be retired from the industry. While this would alleviate the problem in the long run, it poses no short term solution. Secondly, programmes of assisted retrenchment have been suggested. However, in a port like Hobart where there are only 21 workers, or 3.8% of the workforce, under the age of 35 years (see Table 4.13) retrenchment would be extremely difficult. It is not easy to find alternative employment for men over the age of forty years who have laboured all their working lives in the stevedoring industry and who possess no particular skills outside the industry. 2 Even if the retrenchment of some younger workers was possible it would mean that the work force remaining would have a signally elderly complexion. A third partial solution suggested to mitigate the problems posed by an over supply of labour in the Port of Hobart is the transference of wharf labour to those ports where labour demand is high. Some workers, with the assistance of the A.S.I.A., have followed this course of action, while others have been prepared to

^{1.} see National Stevedoring Industry Conference, General Report, op. cit., pp. 25, 46-50.

^{2.} see Hilda R. Kahn, Repercussions of Redundancy: A Local Survey (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1964), Chapters 3 and 9. Here Kahn notes that older, semi-skilled or unskilled redundant workers found it especially hard to get new jobs. In Chapter 9 it is claimed that in the particular survey reported 'youth' was the real asset in gaining new employment rather than skill.

Table 4.11
Port Quotas and Registered Ports Strengths: Hobart
Source: A.S.I.A. Reports

Date	Port Quotas	Registered port strength
30th June 1957	825	915
30th June 1959	750	814
30th June 1965	425	597
30th June 1967	375	585

Tal	ble 4.12 (N =	(N = 72)	
Do you believe that mechanisation and automation have had any effect on the wages you receive?	Decreased wages Increased wages Had no effect on wages Don't know Unanswered	59 1 4 6 2	

Table 4.13
Age distribution: Hobart

Source : A.S.I.A. Report 1966/67.

Age	Under 25	25-29	30-34	35-3 9	40-44	45-4 9	50-54	55 –5 9	60-65	Over 65	Total
No.	1	1	1 9	45	73	83	122	100	80	41	585
%-age	0.2	0.2	3.4	8.0	12.9	14.7	21.6	17.7	14.1	7.2	100

.

accept temporary transfer to another port during the 'slack' season in Hobart. The results, however, have only been marginally significant for only a few workers have been prepared to have themselves transferred either on a temporary or a permanent basis. Again considering the age structure of the work force this reluctance on the part of the waterside worker to change his place of employment is understandable. Many of them may own their own houses; they may feel disinclined to break with an established circle of friends and a social context in which they feel at home, and sell up the lot and start again in Sydney or Melbourne, even in the face of a growing feeling of insecurity about their work future in Hobart.

A solution to the problem of an over supply of labour in the Port of Hobart does not seem to be readily at hand, indeed the problem is made all the more formidable by the fact that no clear idea can be obtained as to the demand for labour in the Port in the future. For the moment the problem remains and with it the feelings of worker insecurity.

What effect, then, is this likely to have on the industrial relations process? B.A. Grove and W.A. Kerr, in a semi-controlled experiment, noted that job insecurity produced in a group of workers:

an inverse halo effect, apparently causing employees to express discontent with their actually superior pay and working conditions as well as 'lower than normal expectancy' attitudes towards their work associates and immediate supervisors.

^{1.} B.A. Grove and W.A. Kerr, "Specific Evidence on the Origin of Halo Effect in the Measurement of Employee Morale", Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 34, 1951, p. 170.

while conditions obtaining in the stevedoring industry in Hobart are not exactly the same as those described in the 'experiment', it is reasonable to assume that the effects of job insecurity in the industry could approximate those described by Grove and Kerr, especially when one considers that wages and working conditions in Hobart could not be regarded as being "superior".

(e) Wages.

Wages can be regarded as a contextural factor in the work environment. Wages represent, at least in part, the worker's formal reward for his contribution to the functioning of the organisation, and as such they can be expected to effect the satisfaction and morale of the worker. The nature of the relationship between wages and job satisfaction is a debatable one. The Scientific Management School, which included such persons as F.W. Taylor, the Gilbreths and others, regarded the worker in a narrow and physiological sense. Taylor considered man as a rational animal concerned with the maximum satisfaction of his economic wants. A large pay packet, it was believed, would make for a happy, productive and satisfied worker, regardless of job content or job conditions. The rationale behind this type of thinking has, for many years, been the rationale behind many incentive schemes in industry which dangle 'juicy carrots' in front of workers in attempts to make them work harder and more productively; earn more and be more satisfied. And yet while the limitations of the assumption of economic man are freely acknowledged, many economists and executives still tend to reason from the assumption as if it were close to actuality.

^{1.} for a treatment of this 'tendency' see W.F. Whyte, Money and Motivation (New York: Harper and Row, 1955), Chapter 1.

The commonly encountered response to union agitation for higher wages, "You can pay them this and they will still not be happy", perhaps says more than the articulators of this opinion intend, for it implies that the level of wages is not the only factor affecting the satisfaction of the worker. F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson in their classic study "Management and the Worker" based on the famous experiments conducted at the Hawthorne works of the Western Electric Company in Chicago lay low the idea of pure economic man. Roethlisberger and Dickson state that:

none of the results gave the slightest substantiation to the theory that the worker is primarily motivated by economic interest. The evidence indicated that the efficacy of a wage incentive is so dependent on its relation to other factors that it is impossible to separate it out as a thing in itself having an independent effect.

Social scientists have pointed out that man has other needs apart from those of a physiological nature. Douglas MacGregor notes that man also has social and egoistic needs; the latter relating to one's self-esteem and reputation. He claims that these needs become more important motivators of behaviour as the physiological needs come to be more and more satisfied.²

The concept of "homo oeconomicus" is, then, entirely unsatisfactory. W.E. Moore suggests that the true nature of man is somewhere between a distinct economic man and the sociologists' indistinct

^{1.} F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939), p. 576.

^{2.} Douglas MacGregor, The Human Side of the Enterprise (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 36 - 39.

non-economic man. 1 W.F. Whyte states the matter in the following terms:

Many people are arguing the question today: which is the more important to workers, economic incentives or human relations? In that form the question is meaningless and unanswerable. Men are interested in money. They are also concerned about their relations with other men. Offer them a financial reward that damages their relations with other men, and you can hardly expect them to respond with enthusiasm. The issue then is not economic incentives or human relations. The problem is to fit economic incentives and human relations effectively together, to integrate them.

Wages than should be considered as <u>part</u> of the contextural climate affecting the satisfaction and behaviour of workers. V.H. Vroom notes:

When one considers correlational evidence, there is some data showing that income level is positively associated with job satisfaction.

Satisfaction with wages among waterside workers in Hobart, as determined by the questionnaire, was fairly well spread. (see Table 4.14). In considering wage satisfaction in this case a number of factors have to be taken into account. First, the questionnaire was administered in June and July of 1967. This is a time of the year when wages are relatively low; lower, that is, than wages received during the fruit export season. From this point of view then we might expect a higher degree of dissatisfaction than would have been obtained had the questionnaire been issued at a time of the year when the demand for labour was high. Secondly, some respondents would

^{1.} W.E. Moore, Industrial Relations and the Social Order (revised edition) (New York: The MacMillan Coy., 1951), Chapter 11.

^{2.} W.F. Whyte, "Economic Incentives and Human Relations", Harvard Business Review, Vol. 30, March/April 1952, p. 73.

^{3.} V.H. Vroom, op. cit., p. 150.

have been, at the time of their replying, semi-permanently employed, on a monthly or yearly basis, with a stevedoring company. We could expect these persons to be more satisfied with their level of wages at that time. Thirdly, the question posed in the questionnaire is slightly ambiguous in that respondents could have expressed their feelings about either their 'present' level of wages, or their yearly average wage level. These factors must be born in mind in evaluating the following considerations. 1

Vroom notes that:

satisfaction stemming from the receipt of wages is dependent not on the absolute amount of these wages, but on the relationship between that amount and some standard of comparison used by the individual.

Taking as a standard of comparison wages received in other industries, it is interesting to note that 55 or 76.4% of the respondents were of the opinion that their wages compared quite favourably or very favourably with wages received in other industries. (see Table 4.15). And, by and large, the wages received by waterside workers do compare favourably with the wages received by workers in comparable forms of employment. Some dissatisfaction could spring from the fact that waterside workers in the Port of Hobart do receive less wages than the average earnings for all such workers in all Australian ports. (see Table 4.6).

The union, the Waterside Workers' Federation, often tends to

^{1.} In this section we will be concerned with the actual level of wages, the dysfunctional consequences resulting from irregular weekly wage rates having been considered in Section 3(a) of this Chapter.

^{2.} V.H. Vroom, op. cit., p. 151.

	Table 4.14 (N =	72)
How satisfied are you with your present level of wages ?	Very dissatisfied Quite dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied Fairly well satisfied Very well satisfied Unanswered	9 22 18 19 2 2

7	Table 4.15	(N = 72)
How do you think your wages compare with those received in other industries ?	Very unfavourably Quite unfavourably Quite favourably Very favourably Unanswered	4 10 51 4 3

put the wage question forward as the basic problem associated with the industry, and they compare the workers' wage, not always with wages received in other industries, but with the alleged high profits of the shipping companies. In their publication 'The Case for the Waterside Worker' we read:

The waterfront is the classic field of industrial conflict in Australia today. The problem in all its ugliness is a failure to give a fair share to the waterside worker and the high profits of the shipowners. All other troubles arise from this prime cause.

If the relative wage level does then seem to be at least fairly satisfactory and the workers do seem to view their comparative wage level in a favourable light, why are so many workers dissatisfied with the level of wages and why does the union place such emphasis on the wage question?

Herzberg, Mausner, Petersen and Capwell report that, when workers were asked to rank different aspects of the work role in terms of their importance, wages tend to be ranked as being less important than security, promotional opportunities and working conditions. Yet at the same time wages are often seen from the union and individual worker point of view as the most significant cause of dissatisfaction. This perhaps is the case because of the tangibility of the wage issue. Thus, the tendency is to express dissatisfaction in terms of demands for higher wages. It may be the case in the Hobart

^{1.} The Case for the Waterside Worker (Annandale: Union Printing Limited, undated), p. 36.

^{2.} F. Herzberg, B. Mausner, R.O. Peterson and D.F. Capwell, op. cit., Chapter 3.

stevedoring industry that while the union and the workers have come to accept as part of the job its seasonal nature and fluctuating weekly wage levels, its casual nature, its lack of promotional opportunities and so on, they still find these factors frustrating and dissatisfying, yet they feel uneasy about articulating their discontent in these terms. This being so, they express this feeling of discontent through claims for higher wages.

Secondly, a desire for higher wages can be the expression of a desire for the gratification of needs associated with status, recognition and self-esteem. Again it is the tangibility of the wage issue that seems to bring it to the fore.

Thirdly, increased wages may be thought to be needed to satisfy real economic needs. As the questionnaire was applied in Hobart at a time when the weekly wage for dockers was possibly not high, it is plausible that this could have been a partial reason for the substantial expression of discontent with wage levels in the questionnaire.

The general conclusion so far as the wage issue is concerned is that, while money is a most important means whereby human needs and wants are satisfied, expression of dissatisfaction with wages must not always be regarded, a priori, as though the wage level is the determining factor. It would seem that in the stevedoring industry in Hobart, while many variables act to produce worker discontent, this discontent is often expressed in the industrial relations processes in terms of wage dissatisfaction and demands for higher wages.

The factors mentioned above then, the casual and seasonal nature of the work, the lack of promotional opportunities, the degree of job security, shift work and the level of wages are perhaps the

principal contextural factors in the industrial relations system in the stevedoring industry in the Port of Hobart.

3. Work Force Characteristics

In this section an attempt will be made to isolate some of the characteristics of the work force of the stevedoring industry in the Port of Hobart and to explore some of the relationships between these characteristics and the content of the work and the associated contextural variables.

(a) Age and Length of Employment on the Wharves.

M.S. Viteles, in his book "Motivation and Morale" cites the findings of Benge and Coppell, who conclude in a particular study that with employees under twenty years of age morale is relatively high; those between twenty and twenty nine years of age have a relatively low morale, while morale rises again for each successive age group over the age of thirty years. Similar results were obtained so far as the length of employment was concerned. These findings of Benge and Coppell are confirmed by Herzberg et. al. 2

Tables 4.16 and 4.17 illustrate the age distribution of respondents to the questionnaire and the time that these respondents have been employed on the Hobart waterfront. It will be noted that the age distribution of the questionnaire corresponds approximately to the

^{1.} E.J. Benge and D.F. Coppell, "Employee Morale Survey", Modern Management. Vol. 7, (January) 1947, pp. 19-22, quoted in M.S. Viteles, op. cit., pp. 277-281.

F. Herzberg, B. Mausner, R.O. Petersen and D.F. Capwell, op. cit., Chapter 2.

Table 4.16 Age Distribution: Hobart (a) Over 65 Under 25-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 Unans. Age 25 No. 3 7 12 19 11 10 6 4 % 4.2 9.7 16.7 26.4 15.3 13.8 8.3 5.6

(a) This represents the age distribution of respondents to the questionnaire. For 'actual' age structure see Table 4.13.

actual age distribution depicted in Table 4.13. A comparison of Table 4.13 and Table 4.18(next page) serves to point out that the average age of watersiders in the Port of Hobart is much higher than that of all other Australian ports. What effect then is this likely to have upon industrial relations in the stevedoring industry in Hobart?

Some indication can be gained by comparing attitudes expressed in the questionnaire with 'age' and 'length of employment'. Such an analysis revealed the following results:

- (a) Those waterside workers under the age of 51 years were more dissatisfied with working conditions than those over 51.
- (b) Those under the age of 51 were more satisfied with working conditions at the present as compared to several years ago than those over 51.
- (c) Those under the age of 51 were less satisfied with wages than those over 51.
- (d) Those under 51 felt slightly less secure in their jobs than those over 51.
- (e) Those with more than twenty years employment on the wharves were more satisfied with wages than those with less than twenty years service.
- (f) Waterside workers with more than twenty years employment on the wharves were less satisfied with working conditions now than those with less than twenty years such work experience.
- (g) Those with over twenty years employment on the wharves were more satisfied with working conditions now than several years ago than those with less than twenty years employment.

Table 4.17 Length of Employment on Hobart Wharves (a) 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 Unanswered Years 13 27 9 10 2 5 3 1 No. 2 37.5 12.5 18.1 13.8 2.8 6.9 4.2 1.4 2.8 %-age.

(a) This table represents the Length of Employment distribution of respondents to the questionnaire.

Table 4.18 Age Distribution : All Australian Ports Source : A.S.I.A. Report 1966/67										
Age	Under 25	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	Over 64
%-age	2.7	5.8	8.1	10.8	13.7	13.9	16.6	13.3	10.0	5.1

(h) Those with under twenty years employment on the wharves felt less secure than those with over twenty years employment. 1

On the whole these results are in accord with the findings of Benge and Coppell, and Herzberg et. al. This is, assuming factors like working conditions, job security and wages will affect employee morale and job satisfaction, satisfaction does seem to be higher among older waterside workers and watersiders who have worked for more than twenty years on the wharves in the Port of Hobart, than among younger (under 51 years) workers and those who have worked for less than twenty years on the wharves. At first sight there would seem to be some contradiction in the results. In the first place, (a) and (f) appear to be inconsistent. This can be explained by the fact that there were some workers under the age of 51 with more than 20 years experience on the wharves who expressed a relatively high dissatisfaction with work conditions, while at the same time there were those over the age of 51 with less than 20 years experience on the wharves who expressed a relatively low dissatisfaction with work conditions. In the second place, the seeming inconsistency between (b) and (g) can be explained in similar terms. There were those workers under the age of 51 and with over twenty years experience on the wharves who expressed a relatively high degree of satisfaction with work conditions now as compared with several years ago, while there were those workers over

^{1.} These results were obtained by rating responses, in an arbitrary manner, adding and averaging them for both categories and making comparisons. This method has the weakness of not taking into account the true effect of extreme hard cores of opinion that might exist. It was generally found however, that with respect to the questions considered, there was a fairly even distribution of responses.

the age of 51 with less than twenty years experience on the wharves who expressed a relatively low degree of satisfaction with work conditions now as compared to several years ago. Such expressions of opinion are understandable when it is remembered that those workers with over twenty years experience of work on the wharves could possibly see a greater improvement in working conditions, having perhaps been initiated into wharf labour in the 1930's, than those persons for whom the injustices of the 'bull-gang' days are only folk tales.

Conclusion (g) would seem to support this view.

On the whole it would appear that the younger workers are more discontented with their lot than the older workers. What are the implications of this for the industrial relations system? As has already been noted the average age of workers in the Port of Hobart is fairly high; 61.6% of the work force being over the age of 51. Taking into account the findings of Benge and Coppell and Herzberg et. al., and the opinions expressed in the questionnaire that was administered as part of this study, it is suggested that the increasing average age of the worker population and the concomitant increasing length of employment per worker are marginal factors operating to mitigate worker discontent.

(b) The Work Group.

The studies conducted at the Hawthorne Western Electric Company focused attention upon the work group in industry and the influence of group characteristics and structures upon productivity and morale both of the group as a whole and of the individual members of the group.

^{1.} see Roethlisberger and Dickson, op. cit.

In considering the importance of the work group M.S. Viteles notes:

There is, unquestionably, much justification for the insistence upon the force of the social situation in determining both output and satisfaction at work, and laying the ground for industrial peace or conflict. ... Not alone the Hawthorne studies, but the work of Lewin and his associates, have made it increasingly evident that the problems of production, satisfaction and morale in industry are, at least in part, problems of group relationships.

Therefore, in this section a brief consideration of the basic work group, the gang, in the stevedoring industry will be undertaken. The gang will be described in terms of its characteristics and the interaction of these characteristics, and an attempt will be made to determine the likely effect of these characteristics on the nature of the gang and the subsequent effect upon the satisfactions of the workers and the industrial relations processes.

The actual structures and functions of the gang have been described in the previous Chapter and will not be repeated here. It will be recalled that there are two broad categories of workers; the permanent gang member who has a definite job within a gang and who is usually rostered for work with this gang, and there is the 'floater' or 'extra' who is not attached permanently to a gang but who fills in with different gangs when required. Joel A. Fadem observes that the gangs are:

^{1.} M.S. Viteles, op. cit., p. 206.

^{2.} see Chapter 3 pp. 65 - 70.

usually highly cohesive social as well as functional units, and job choice, which is to some degree higher when a man is a floater or extra, is often sacrificed for continuous interaction with one's mates.

Indeed, the work groups do appear to be fairly cohesive units. In reply to a question "Do you really feel part of your work group?"

60 or 83.3% of the respondents to the questionnaire replied "Yes, I feel I am really a part of it". (see Table 4.19).

There are many other factors that would suggest a highly cohesive work group. First, there would appear to be a certain homogeneity of social characteristics. Many workers have relatives working on the wharves. (see Table 4.20). Secondly, because of the separation of employer and employee, waterside workers seem to have a horizontal rather than vertical orientation with respect to their work. i.e. in the performance of their jobs the workers seek the approval of their work mates rather than their superiors. This would reinforce group cohesion. Thirdly, the job is of a reasonably homogeneous nature as we have noted earlier. The work group is so spatially organised as to provide good opportunities for worker interaction, and the greater the opportunity for interaction the more cohesive the group. Fourthly, in many gangs the permanent members have been working together for long periods, (up to twenty years). Again Seashore notes

^{1.} Joel A. Fadem, op. cit., p. 28.

^{2.} Homogeneity of workers' social characteristics is an important factor affecting work group cohesion. see, L.R. Sayles,

Behaviour of Industrial Work Groups (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 58 - 61.

^{3.} see W.F. Whyte, Men at Work, op. cit., p. 542.

^{4.} see Chapter 3, pp. 67 - 68.

^{5.} Stanley E. Seashore, Group Cohesiveness in the Industrial Work Group (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, Survey Research Center, 1954), pp. 95 - 96.

	Yes, I feel I am really part of it	60
Do you really feel	Yes, I feel I am included in most ways	6
part of your	Yes, I feel I am included in some ways	4
work group ?	No, I feel I don't really belong	1
	Unanswered	1

	Table 4.20	(N = 7
Were, or are, any of your relatives waterside workers?	Father Grandfather Brother/s Other/s None Unanswered	

that continuity of group membership will act in such a way as to make the work group more cohesive. 1

Given a highly cohesive basic work group in the stevedoring industry in Hobart what are the implications of this so far as the industrial relations processes are concerned? W.F. Whyte, in considering certain empirical data in his book "Men at Work", tends to link high work group cohesion with militancy. However, he later warns that we should not assume that high work group cohesion automatically results in worker militancy. In this respect Seashore concludes that:

Members of highly cohesive groups will exhibit less anxiety than members of low cohesive groups with respect to matters relevant to group activities or group setting.

Presumably this relatively low anxiety level of members of highly cohesive work groups will have a negative effect so far as the militancy of the group is concerned. Also, of course, there will be many other factors affecting worker militancy apart from the nature of the work group. L.R. Sayles observes that:

attachment to the immediate and easily perceived face-to-face group is the predominant reality of organisation experience. For the individual it provides a source of personal security in an impersonal environment.

^{1.} Ibid., p. 102.

^{2.} W.F. Whyte, Men at Work, op. cit., Chapter 17.

^{3.} Ibid., p. 547.

^{4.} Stanley E. Seashore, op. cit., p. 97.

^{5.} L.R. Sayles, op. cit., p. 146.

In the stevedoring industry in Hobart it is suggested that the gang provides a stable social group with which workers can identify themselves and within which they are able to realise important social needs.

At the same time certain waterside workers chose to remain outside the permanent gang preferring random job assignments as floaters which they find preferable to permanent work group membership. (see Table 4.21). This is similar to a conclusion reached in a study of the Port of Manchester by the Social Science Department of the University of Liverpool.

It would appear that, so far as the organisation of the work group in the Port of Hobart is concerned, there exists a system which combines the best of both worlds. On the one hand, there is the permanent gang which certain workers would seem to prefer, while on the other hand there is the floater status with no fixed group associations which others find preferable. Thus, while work group cohesion may be a factor acting to produce worker militancy, for a substantial proportion of the worker population the group provides the occasion for a socially rewarding interaction which serves to make the job much more satisfying. Decisions to alter current gang structures and methods of work should not be taken lightly, for in so doing the informal organisation of the gang might be damaged to such an extent that valued permanent gang relationships are abrogated which

^{1.} The Dock Worker, op. cit., p. 61.

T	able 4.21	(N = 72)
Are you a permanent gang member or a floater?	Permanent gang member Floater Unanswered	38 31 3
Would you prefer to be a permanent gang member or a floater ?	Permanent gang member Floater No preference Unanswered	38 26 7 1

could result in feelings of dissatisfaction and insecurity among the workers.

4. Industry and Community.

Industrial relations do not operate in a vacuum; they operate in an overall environmental context which the particular industrial relations sub-system will affect and which in turn will be affected by the encompassing context. Clark Kerr and Abraham Seigal have clearly pointed out that there is some relationship between overall societal variables and industrial relations. In this section some cursory observations on the nature of the relationship between stevedores and the industrial relations system in which they operate and the society at large will be made.

Industrially, geographically and socially waterside workers do not form a distinctively isolated group in society. Industrially the workers union, the Waterside Workers' Federation, is linked with the A.C.T.U., and on the state level with the local Trades Hall Council. It has been suggested that the A.C.T.U. has had a substantial moderating influence on the behaviour of the W.W.F. Secondly, in Hobart there is no geographically isolated and concentrated waterfront community. Indeed, the random sample of workers selected for the purposes of the questionnaire that was administered in relation to this study indicated a fairly even spread of waterside workers throughout

Clark Kerr and Abraham Seigal, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike - An International Comparison", in A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin and A.M. Ross, op. cit., pp. 189 - 212.

^{2.} J.E. Isaac, op. cit., p. 18.

practically all suburbs of Hobart. Thirdly, there is little evidence to suggest that the waterside worker is socially isolated. In this respect R.J. May concludes:

there is little data to support the premise that Australian waterside workers as a whole are socially isolated. Social, economic and cultural exchanges (including the spread of education, greater equality of opportunity, governments redistributive and welfare policies, credit facilities and mass communications) have done much to reduce social and regional isolation. Today, despite some inequality and great variability of earnings waterside workers enjoy an average wage well above the basic wage (for a much shorter average working week) and roughly equal to the average earnings per male unit employed, thus permitting a standard of living in line with that of workers in other industries.

Nevertheless, in the community the exaggerated wharfie stereotype does persist. The stereotype is often re-inforced by editorial writers, cartoonists, politicians and others. This stereotype, at its extreme, defines the waterside worker as a lazy and idle Communist, or Communist stooge, bent on causing as much industrial strife as possible for its own sake. In the second reading speech made by the Minister for Labour and National Service (Mr. MacMahon) in introducing the Stevedoring Industry Bill, 1965, we read:

The dominant factor responsible for bad relations on the waterfront is the domination of the policies and actions of the W.W.F. by Communists in key positions, and the manner in which it is used as an instrument of Communist Party policies.

^{1.} R.J. May, "Determinants of Industrial Relations Pattern in the Australian Stevedoring Industry", <u>Journal of Industrial Relations</u>, Vol. 3, (Oct.) 1961, p. 158.

^{2.} Parliamentary Debates, Commonwealth of Australia, Vol. 47 House of Representatives (New Series). p. 1249.

The Australian International News Review saw the 1965 stevedoring industry legislation as the common sense slaughter of waterside reds, Fabian socialists, small 1-liberals, progressives, rat-bag intellectuals and modern people in the unions. The very mention of the words waterside worker is often enough to elicit such unflattering evocations as 'Commies', 'Reds', or just plain 'lazy bastards' from many people.

Waterside workers themselves perceive these expressions of community opinion in a particularly sharp light. One worker commented to the writer:

Some people look askance at the wharfie as some strange kind of animal; other people labour under the belief that we get high wages for little work.

In an official publication of the W.W.F. we read:

The waterside worker is a vulnerable figure...
The Union, and he himself, are misrepresented by people who have never been on a wharf, let alone at a ship side loading or unloading cargo. Editors who hide in their ivory towers pour torrents of words on the defenceless head of the wharfie; managing directors who have never lifted anything heavier than a cocktail glass are tremendously knowledgeable about sling loads and output per hour. Radio and T.V. jokes abound concerning slow motion on the waterfront, news items are coloured by stories of the lazy "man with the hook". That of course is a fairy tale.

The stereotype conceptions of the waterside worker then, combined with the fact that many persons regard dock work as a low status occupation, seems to produce in the worker a certain amount of

^{1.} Editorial, Australian International News Review, Oct. 9, 1965, p. 8.

^{2.} The Case for the Waterside Worker, op. cit., p. 3.

resentment and indignation which perhaps re-inforces the militancy and sense of solidarity among these workers. Certainly this could lead to further action on the part of the dockers and their union which the community would regard as being irresponsible and which would sustain and harden community stereotype conceptions and in turn result in further resentment and indignation among waterside workers. So a nasty syndrome is established. While this reasoning may be a little too simple and abstracted, the point can be made that community attitudes towards waterside workers do tend to re-inforce worker militancy in that industry with consequent effects upon the industrial relations processes.

In this Chapter we have attempted to examine the content and context of stevedoring work within the Port of Hobart. We have been concerned principally with the stevedore; we have not been concerned with the tally clerks, foremen, supervisors or others who have certain responsibilities in the industry. An attempt has also been made to outline some of the characteristics of the work force. (No detailed consideration of the casual nature of the work or the effect of supervision, as contexts of the system have been made. These will be dealt with in a subsequent Chapter.). In dealing with these work force characteristics, and the content and context of the job, some likely relationships between these factors and worker satisfactions and the industrial relations system and its processes have been ventured.

Broadly it may be concluded that there are many factors, such as work content, the seasonal nature of the work, the lack of promotional opportunities, the hours of work, job insecurity, community attitudes, gang structures and characteristics which act and interact upon one another to produce worker discontent which could result in conflict in the industrial relations processes. On the other hand, factors such as the high average age of the work force and the rewarding nature of group work appear to enhance worker satisfactions, and perhaps mitigate industrial conflict.

CHAPTER 5.

EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

C.A. Myers observes that:

The employer-employee relationship is the focal point in the analysis of industrial conflict and in the examination of methods for reducing it.

Therefore, in this Chapter the nature of the employer-employee relationship in the stevedoring industry, particularly in the Port of Hobart, will be examined with reference to the industrial relations system. Thus far in this exercise we have dealt with some important aspects of the relationship between the employer and the employee in the industry. In Chapter 2 some general historical considerations were outlined; in Chapter 3 some of the very broad, formal organisational structures of the industry were described, while in Chapter 4 some particular aspects of the relationship, such as wages, hours and conditions of work were considered. In this Chapter attention will be paid to the following features of the relationship: the casual nature of the work; the role and effect of the foreman in this context; the role and effect of such agencies as the A.S.I.A., the A.E.W.L., the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and the W.W.F. Some attention will also be paid to the mechanics of the grievance procedures.

^{1.} C.A. Myers, "Basic Employment Relations", in Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, op. cit., p. 319.

It is important to consider the above mentioned factors in the context of the employer-employee relationship for as Myers notes:

The goals and job satisfactions of industrial workers will differ in particular plants and industries, depending upon the degree to which certain ones have already been achieved or realised and upon the general social and economic environment at the time. The significant point, however, is that, unless each of these employee goals or aspirations is met in some measure by the employment relationship, the occasion for tension and conflict remains.

1. Some features of the relationship between employers and employees In the Port of Hobart.

The actual formal structural relationships between the workers and their union, their relations with employers and employer agencies, the mutual connections of these bodies with governmental agencies, and the historical evolution of these relations have already been described in Chapters 2 and 3. Some special features of this rather complex employer-employee relationship will now be separated out and examined in some detail in order to estimate what implications these features hold for the industrial relations system.

(a) The lack of permanence.

Apart from certain minor exceptions there are no permanent employer-employee relations in the stevedoring industry in Hobart in the sense that certain waterside workers are constantly employed by one

1. Ibid.

stevedoring company. Thus, while substantial steps have been taken in the past towards a decasualisation of employment in the industry, basically employment is still of a casual nature, at least in the Port of Hobart. In answer to a question "Do you regard your work as being of a casual nature?", 56 or 77.8% of respondents to the questionnaire replied in the affirmative. (See Table 5.1).

The undesirable consequences of the nature of this type of employer-employee relationship have long been recognised. In 1914, in making the first Waterside Workers Federal Award, Mr. Justice Higgins noted that:

The vital facts of the position are that the work is casual, uncertain, that jobs are short, that men have to wait on the wharves, often fruitlessly; and that the necessities of man and his dependents are certain, continuous and incessant.....It is lamentable that so many lusty men, mostly in the prime of life, should have to stand about, idle...earning nothing some days, nothing some weeks and earning high wages some weeks by excessive toil... There is a tremendous waste of potential human energy involved. Yet, under existing conditions, it is essential for the carrying on of this industry that these men hold themselves free from other engagements, and ready for the ships when they come. As one man puts it, "They look to a certain boss for a living, and the boss expects them to roll up". Their service to the public is not confined to the actual physical exertion; they serve the public by waiting in readiness for the ships to come. They are entitled at least to food, clothes and shelter for themselves and their dependents for the whole time of this service... If people expect cabmen to be ready for a call at the stand, they must pay an extra rate to cover the time lost in waiting.

^{1.} Some 37 workers are employed on a three monthly, semi-permanent basis with the Union Steamship Company to perform stevedoring operations in relation to the operation of the Company's roll-on, roll-off ferries. A further 12 workers are employed on a permanent basis to perform similar work for the Australian National Line in conjunction with the operation of the Line's "Empress of Australia".

Table :	5.1	(N = 72)
Do wou gogod wour	Yes	56
Do you regard your job as being of	No	14

•

It would be absurd to say...that the obligation of the master ceases with the actual physical exertion: "They also serve who only stand and wait".

In 1920 the Shaw Inquiry in Britain observed:

The system of casualisation must, if possible, be torn up by the roots. It is wrong. And the one issue is as to what practical means can be adopted by readily providing labour, while avoiding cruel and unsocial conditions.

Over the years much has been done to decasualise waterside employment in Australia. The Report of the National Stevedoring Industry Conference stated that:

It is true that some of the disadvantages of casual employment have been eliminated by the registration system, the payment of attendance money, the granting of annual leave, sick leave and long service leave benefits, and by independent control of rostering.

Yet, as we have noted above, employment in the industry in Hobart is basically of a casual nature.

What then are some of the broad consequences of the casual nature of employment so far as employer-employee relationships are concerned?

First, a casual system of employment almost invariably means a very casual attitude, not only on the part of the employee, but also the employer. This is quite understandable. The employers have little control over discipline and no control over recruitment. They

^{1.} Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, Vol. 8, 1914, pp. 72-73.

^{2.} quoted in Australian Stevedoring Industry Board, Annual Report, 1949/50, p. 27.

^{3.} see Chapter 2,

^{4.} National Stevedoring Industry Conference, General Report, op. cit., p. 3.

^{5.} see Final Report, Committee of Inquiry under Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into certain matters concerning the Port Transport Industry. London, August, 1965, H.M.S.O., Cmnd. 2734, pp. 9 - 11.

have no constant contact with waterside workers that they employ. Thus, there is scarcely any question of a particular employer forming a rational and consistent personnel policy. Rather the responsibility for getting the job done efficiently is left to the supervisor and the foremen, while industrial matters are dealt with by the A.E.W.L.

Secondly, there is little direct, constant communication between employer and employee. This means that agreements reached between employers and employees, and awards handed down by the Arbitration Commission tend to be treated in a strict and legalistic sense. Such awards and agreements tend not to be regarded liberally and constructively, but rather they are applied in a fairly inflexible manner. To a large extent this situation can be regarded as a function of the casual nature of the work and the fact that, because of the casual nature of the work, no adequate system of formal and/or informal communication has been able to develop that would permit a more flexible application of work regulations. Also, of course, the lack of an adequate system of communication between employer and employee means that the initiation of change is very difficult.1 Hobart, the use of the Industrial Relations Committee, and on a national level the National Stevedoring Industry Conference, does mean that, so far as the introduction of new methods into the industry is concerned, communication problems have been somewhat mitigated.

^{1.} see The Dock Worker, op. cit., p. 113.

Historically speaking, however, there can be little doubt that the inadequacy of communication facilities between management and employees, especially during the 1930's, made the achievement of a satisfactory state of industrial relations most difficult.

Related to the problem of poor communications between employer and employee in the stevedoring industry is the complexity of the employer unit. Local and overseas shipping companies, stevedoring companies, the A.S.I.A. and the A.E.W.L. all have particular employer roles to play. Undoubtedly the multiple nature of, and the indirectness of, the employer-employee link hinders the achievement of good communications in the industry.

Table 5.2 gives some indication of how satisfied the employees are with the amount of information they receive from the shipping companies on what the shipping companies are planning to do, and how satisfied they are with the extent and effectiveness of employeremployee communication.

Thirdly, as a consequence of the casual nature of the work, it is suggested by some writers on the stevedoring industry that this type of employment attracts a "high proportion of less stable and less desirable types of men", and that because of this, employeremployee co-operation is made more difficult. This idea is related to the Kerr-Seigal hypothesis which states that:

^{1.} see K.F. Walker, <u>Industrial Relations in Australia</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 289.

	Table 5.2 (1	= 72)
How satisfied are you with the amount of information you get from the shipping companies on what they are doing and/or planning to do?	Not very well satisfied Somewhat satisfied; could get more Fairly well satisfied Well satisfied Unanswered	20 7 3

If the job is physically difficult and unpleasant, unskilled or semi-skilled and casual and seasonal and fosters an independent spirit (as in the logger in the woods), it will draw tough, inconstant, combative and virile workers, and they will be inclined to strike.

The above hypothesis contains an accurate description of working conditions in the stevedoring industry, and the description of the type of worker attracted to the industry closely approximates the "wharfie" stereotype, however, the truth or falsity of the assertions presented above is difficult to prove.

A fourth consequence of the casual nature of the work is that, as there is a separation of employer and employee, so there is a separation of the interests and goals of the employers and employees. Thus, while waterside workers are a part of the stevedoring industry work hierarchy, their goals and interests are quite different from those of the employers. There are feelings among a substantial proportion of workers that the employers have little interest in, or understanding of, the problems of waterside workers. (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). Furthermore, there is ample evidence to suggest that the employees, far from regarding themselves as working in active co-operation with the employers to achieve mutual goals, regard themselves as being engaged in a protracted struggle with their employers

^{1.} Clark Kerr and Abraham Soigal, "The Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike - An International Comparison", in Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, op. cit., p. 195.

^{2.} see Betty V.H. Schnieder and Abrahan Seigal, op. cit., pp. 33-36.

so far as goals are concerned. There seems to exist a peculiar and uncommon estrangement between the employer and employee in the industry. The following quotations from worker and union sources are indicative and suggestive in this regard:

Dog Collar Acts and stevedoring industry amendments, with all their denials of human rights, have been spawned by the (shipping) cartel. The shipowners' strike-breaking methods have usually outstripped in brutality those of other employers. They constantly turn the waterfront into a storm centre through their arrogance and greed. They keep wages and margins low and get away with filthy amenities that would bring Health Department prosecutions to any factory owners so neglecting elementary needs.

It has always been a turbulent industry, an industry tooth for tooth, eye for eye, with the shipowners always wanting to do the extraction.

The waterfront is the classic field of industrial conflict in Australia today. The problem in all its ugliness is a failure to give a fair share to the waterside worker and the high profits of the shipowners...Too many people seeking an easy way of assessing conflict on the waterfront find it fashionable - almost patriotic - to blame the waterside worker. To probe deeper, the position is exposed as a conflict which is as old as industry itself - too little for the men, too much for the shipowners.

One waterside worker commented to the writer :

All relations with the shipping companies are almost totally impersonal. The waterside worker is more or less just another number.

^{1.} T. Nelson, op. cit., p. 87.

^{2.} V.S.C. Williams, Facts of the Waterfront (Hobart: Stencilled newsheet, 1965), p. 2.

^{3.} Case for the Waterside Worker, op. cit., p. 36.

Ta	Table 5.3	
How much interest do you think the shipping companies have in the suggestions that might be put forward by your union ?	No interest Some interest Considerable interest A great deal of interest Don't know Unanswered	25 36 8 - 1

Table 5.4		(N = 72)	
What sort of understanding do you think the top management people in the shipping companies have of the problems of the waterside worker ?	No understanding A little understanding Some understanding Considerable understanding Good understanding Unanswered	16 13 19 8 11	

Another said:

The shipping companies are like insurance companies; they want everything their own way.

An ex-General Secretary of the Federation, Mr. J. Healy, in his report to an All Ports Biennial Conference, put matters very succinctly when he said:

Our relations with the employers have, to say the least, not been close.

The above represented views are, of course, re-inforced when the employees and their union are accused of acting in a manner detrimental to the interests of the nation, whose interests frequently appear to coincide with the employers.

The point can be validly made that the worker sentiments expressed above are not unique to the stevedoring industry in Australia. However, the degree of congruency of goals and interests reflected in the worker quotations cited above does seem to be especially low. Looking at the industry from an historical point of view it would seem that this divergence of goals and interests is, at least in part, attributable to the casual nature of the work; the lack of a permanent employer-employee relationship. This employer-employee, goal-interest-separation, which was forced so wide during the 1930's, still remains despite the important steps that have been made since those times to decasualise the industry.

For these reasons, then, it is believed that the casual nature

^{1.} General Secretary's Report, Seventh All Ports Bienniel Conference, Waterside Workers' Federation, 1958 (Forest Lodge: Newsletter Print, undated), p. 75.

of the work has had an effect upon the employer-employee relationship such as to make the achievement of a satisfactory industrial relations climate very difficult. Thus, immediate practical considerations aside, the introduction of a permanent system of employment into the stevedoring industry in Hobart would seem to be most desirable. It would permit employers to develop a consistent personnel policy, it would improve communications between employers and employees, and it would result in a greater degree of integration of employer and employee goals and interests. Permanent employment would also mean an evening out of wages over the year; at present in Hobart weekly wage levels fluctuate widely throughout the year, and as was pointed out in Chapter 4, this has certain undesirable consequences. Purther, waterside workers in the Port of Hobart for the most part agree that the introduction of a system of permanent employment into the Port would be a good thing. (see Table 5.5).

All this is not to say that the introduction of permanent employment into the Port would result in automatic and eternal industrial calm. Experiences in the ports of Sydney and Melbourne after the introduction of permanent employment are demonstrative in this regard. Permanent employment in Hobart would, however, represent a proper re-structuring of the industry, in which the achievement of improved employer-employee relations would be probable.

^{1.} see Chapter 4, pp.79 - 81 and pp. 98 - 104.

Table 5	.5	(N = 72)
Do you agree that permanent employment for waterside workers is desirable?	Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree Unanswered	30 25 7 6 3

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(b) Point of Contact: The Foreman

A point of contact between employer and employee in the stevedoring industry is the foreman, whose role has been previously described in Chapter 3. Before examining more closely the details of the position of the foreman in the industry, some preliminary remarks on the relationship between supervision and job satisfaction should be made. V.H. Vroom observes that:

There is some disagreement concerning the importance of immediate supervision in worker satisfaction.

Vroom quotes M.L. Putnam, who in discussing the results of the program of interviewing in the Hawthorne works of the Western Electric Company states:

Finally, the comments from employees have convinced us that the relationship between first line supervisors and the individual workman is of more importance in determining the attitude, morale, general happiness, and efficiency of that employee than any other single factor.

Herzberg, Mausner, and Synderman suggest that the importance of supervision has been over-rated:

The negligible role which inter-personal relationships play in our data tallies poorly with the assumption basic to most human relations training programms that the way in which the supervisor gets along with his people is the single most important determinant of morale.

On the other hand Herzberg, Mausner, Petersen and Capwell in an

^{1.} V.H. Vroom, op. cit., p. 105.

^{2.} M.L. Putnam, "Improving Employee Relations", Personnel Journal, 8, 1930, p. 325, quoted in V.H. Vroom, op. cit.

F. Herzberg, B. Mausner and B. Synderman, The Motivation to Work (2nd Edition) (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959), p. 115, quoted in V.H. Vroom, op. cit.

analysis of fifteen studies discovered that supervision was frequently mentioned as a source of satisfaction. They concluded that attitudes and effectiveness of employees seems to be a direct function of supervision.

However, W.F. Whyte notes that:

the technology and nature of the tasks to be performed by the workers tend to shape the role, and influence the behaviour of the foreman.

This fact perhaps explains the disagreement that seems to exist as to the relationship between supervision and job satisfaction. Thus the role of the foreman and his relationship with and effect upon the industrial relations system in the stevedoring industry in Hobart will be considered here without any particular preconceptions as to the relationship between supervision and job satisfaction.

What are some of the features of the foreman's position? As has already been noted there are approximately thirteen foremen employed in the stevedoring industry in the Port of Hobart; all but two of these are permanently attached to one of the two stevedoring companies that operate in this Port. The two 'freelance' operators accept work not only in Hobart but in other ports in Tasmania, and also in other mainland ports. (Additional 'freelance' foremen are employed in Hobart during the fruit export season when the demand for labour is high). Those foremen who are permanently attached to the stevedoring companies in Hobart have certain tasks to perform for the

^{1.} F. Herzberg, B. Mausner, R.O. Petersen and D.F. Capwell, op. cit., Chapter 6.

^{2.} W.F. Whyte, Men at Work, op. cit., p. 377.

companies when there is no actual stevedoring work to be attended to. The foremen are, together with the supervisors, responsible for the actual loading and unloading of cargoes. They see that these operations are carriedout safely, and efficiently and that the cargo is not damaged in any way. With the exception of those workers who are semi-permanently and permanently employed on the roll-on, roll-off ferries, there is no constant contact between a particular foreman and a particular gang. As has been mentioned, the foremen are unionised; their association is known as the Foremen Stevedores Association.

What then are some of the consequences of these arrangements for employer-(foreman)-employee relations?

First, in this situation the foreman is the real 'man in the middle'. Because of the fact that there are no permanent foremen-worker relations the foremen do not seem to be primarily allied with the workers. Yet, at the same time, as many of the foremen are ex-waterside workers and in these times do not have such unlimited powers to hire and fire as they had in the past (prior to 1939), their primary associations do not seem to lie with the employers either. This makes the job a fairly exacting one. One foreman explained to the writer:

In many ways it is a difficult job. You have to know how to treat the men and at the same time you have to keep good relations with the supervisor who is often on the job with you. You can appreciate some of the problems of the waterside worker, for often they are similar to yours, that will affect the job that he does, but if anything goes wrong then it is your responsibility.

Thus the foreman is in a markedly ambiguous position, owing dual allegiance to both worker and employer. This does tend to make his

job, if seriously taken, a fairly exacting one.

Secondly, and again because of the lack of a permanent relationship between a foreman and a gang, it is more difficult to establish a sense of rapport and understanding between foreman and worker than would be the case in other industries.

Thirdly, the rotation of foremen and workers makes it difficult for the foreman to articulate to the workers general employer policy. Any such policy that is expressed, albeit indirectly, in the performance of the job would tend to be that of the particular foreman rather than of the employer. This is undoubtedly also a function of the peculiar position of the foreman in the industry.

Fourthly, in their evaluation of the foremen is it likely that the workers are tempted to select the lowest common denominator.

That is to say, because workers are supervised by different foremen from day to day, in their evaluation of these foremen they may be tempted to judge all on the performance of the worst.

Worker attitudes towards foremen are naturally ambivalent. In answer to a question "How well do the foremen handle the human relations side of their jobs?" 51 or 70.8% of the respondents to the questionnaire replied "some well; others not so well". (see Table 5.6). One waterside worker explained to the writer:

Different foremen treat you differently. I can go up and say, "Look I would like a day off to go up to the dogs". One will say, "Oh yes, what are you backing?", and ask you to put a couple of quid on for him. Others are quite different. You might ask to be let off to go to a funeral, and they will ask you whether or not the deceased person was a close relative or not. If you say "No", he was a work mate or something, they will just shake their heads and say, "No, sorry, nothing doing".

Yet despite the suspected operation of the lowest common denominator effect, 56 or 77.8% of the respondents to the questionnaire were of the opinion that the foremen were either 'quite reasonable' or 'about average' in what they expected of the workers, (see Table 5.7) while seven respondents thought that the foremen were 'very reasonable'. Waterside workers thought that the foremen were rather concerned about keeping costs down (see Table 5.8) and that they supervised fairly closely. (see Table 5.9).

In summary it could be said that, apart from small clashes which might generate some heat, the relations between foremen and waterside workers are relatively free from antagonism in the industry in Hobart. More broadly speaking, it is suggestive that in "The Case for the Waterside Worker", (a publication printed for the W.W.F.) while some harsh words are reserved for the shipowners, the A.S.I.A., and the Federal Government, the foremen are not mentioned. 1

There are a number of special factors in the industry in Hobart that have some bearing on foremen-worker relations. In the first place, the average age of waterside workers in Hobart is quite high. Thus, we would expect a relatively large number of waterside workers to have been employed in the industry when the foreman was a very powerful figure, whose powerful office was frequently abused. And we could expect a large number of current workers to have been employed in the industry when memories of the 'bull-gang' system were

^{1.} see "Case for the Waterside Worker", op. cit.

^{2.} see Table 1.3, p. 19.

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Table 5.6	(N = 72)
	Do not handle it at all well	1
How well do the foremen	Some well; others not so well	51
handle the human	Fairly well	8
relations side of their	Quite well	10
jobs?	Very well	1
	Unanswered	1

	Table 5.7	(N = 72)
How reasonable are the foremen in what they expect of you?	Very unreasonable Quite unreasonable About average Quite reasonable Very reasonable Unanswered	2 2 27 29 7 3

	Table 5.8	(N = 72)
In day to day operations how concerned are your foremen with keeping costs down ?	Very concerned; they watch costs closely Quite concerned Fairly concerned Not too concerned Not at all concerned Unanswered	19 16 25 7 - 5

	Table 5.9	(N	= 72)
Do your foremen supervise very closely, or do they leave you fairly much on your own?	The foremen supervise very closely Fairly closely Moderately closely The foremen use little supervision Unanswered	,	13 32 18 7 2

closer in time and perhaps more vivid because of this. This could have one of two effects. It could lead the worker to regard the foreman in similar terms as he was regarded in the 1930's. On the other hand, perceiving the foreman now adopting an apparently more satisfactory role, the older worker could be favourably impressed with the improvement and as a result be more satisfied with the foremen than the younger workers for whom the work experiences of the 1930's in the stevedoring industry are but stories. Indeed what slight evidence there was available suggested the latter effect to be true. The older workers were of the opinion that the foremen were slightly more reasonable in what they (the foremen) expected of one than the younger workers were.

A second factor having a special bearing upon foremen-worker relations in the stevedoring industry in Hobart is the seasonal mature of the work. This means that extra temporary foremen have to be employed during the fruit export season, and that extra water-side workers have to be transferred from other ports to Hobart so that stevedoring operations can be efficiently discharged. This in turn means that workers have to adjust to new foremen, and vice versa. One foremen explained some of the difficulties that can arise in this situation to the writer in the following terms:

^{1.} This conclusion was obtained by using the technique described in Chapter 4, p. 109. It must be also remembered that in Chapter 4 it was concluded that the older workers were generally more satisfied with their jobs than the younger workers.

Some chaps who come across from the mainland seem to set on stirring up a bit of trouble. They might say, "Well in Sydney we do this in such and such a way. Why don't you do it this way here", and so on. You have to let them know where you stand and not let them get on top of you, otherwise they will give you Hell.

Though the effect of mechanisation on the role of the foreman will be discussed in more detail further on in this exercise, it might be noted at this stage that mechanisation has tended to make the foreman's job a little more technical, also perhaps a little easier, in that now, with the containerisation and unitisation of cargoes, close and detailed supervision is not so important. The mechanisation of stevedoring procedures has also meant a decline in the demand for foremen's services; a function of the decline in the demand for operative waterside labour. One foreman expressed to the writer certain doubts about the job security of the foremen in the industry in Hobart in the future.

A fourth factor, or combination of factors, which certainly has had some bearing upon relations between foremen and workers in the industry in Hobart is the size of the Port and the fact that no labour has been recruited to the workforce since 1956. These two factors mean that foremen and workers have, and have had, the opportunity to get to know and understand each other. The workers get to know what to expect from a particular foreman and what the foremen expect of them more so than in larger ports when there is no

^{1.} see Chapter 6, p. 176 for the effect on supervision of the roll-on, roll-off ferries in the Port of Hobart.

^{2.} Late in 1968 another stevedoring company closed down leaving only two such companies operative in Hobart.

permanent employment. Further, in many ways, this makes the job of the foreman much easier. One foreman explained the situation to the writer in the following terms:

You get to know the gangs after a while. You may have three gangs to look after and you know that one of these gangs can be trusted to do the job properly. In this case you can simply say to this one gang that you would like the job done in a certain way and you can go away and know that the job will be done in just that way. The other two gangs might not be quite as good and you realise that you have to keep a pretty close eye on them. You get to know the gangs you can trust and those you cannot.

A final point that must be made in reference to the position and role of the foreman in the stevedoring industry is the decline in the authority of this person. This is a phenomenon that has been observed in industry generally; it is what Reinhard Bendix describes as part of the 'internal bureaucratisation' of the management of labour. This diminution in the authority of the foreman is most pronounced in the stevedoring industry. During the 1930's the foreman had almost unlimited power to hire and fire. However, with the introduction into the industry of a roster system of employment and the passing of the disciplinary function into the hands of the specialised statutory governmental agency in the industry, the power of the foreman to hire and fire workers was virtually eliminated. Concomitant with this development the foreman in the industry now has to "know more than his old-time counterpart". For example, in

^{1.} see F.J. Roethlisberger, 'The Foreman: Master and Victim of Double Talk", Harvard Business Review, Spring, 1945, pp. 283 - 298.

^{2.} Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torch books), (Torchbooks edition, 1963), p. 215.

^{3.} Roethlisberger, op. cit., p. 284.

the stevedoring industry in Australia it is necessary for the foremen to have a good knowledge of awards and agreements which detail exactly the conditions under which waterside workers operate.

What are the consequences of this diminution in the authority of the foreman? Roethlisberger observes that:

To the foreman it seems that he is being held responsible for functions over which he no longer has any real authority.

Translated specifically into stevedoring industry terms it may mean that at the moment in Hobart foremen have the responsibility for the achievement of certain objectives, yet at the same time their disciplinary powers are less than are necessary to ensure the satisfactory achievement of these objectives. Indeed, one foremen did maintain to the writer that such was the case. It would seem easy, however, to over estimate the importance of this problem. Furthermore, it would appear that should a substantial problem actually exist in this regard that a system of permanent employment where the employer had the responsibility for at least the minimum of disciplinary functions would resolve this difficulty.

In summary then, what kind of influence does the foreman have upon industrial relations in the stevedoring industry in the Port of Hobart? We have seen that there seems to be little resentment of the foreman arising from his role in the industry during the 1930*s, and that generally workers have a good opinion of the foremen.

^{1.} Ibid., p. 286.

Because of the smallness of the Port and the fact that no labour has been recruited to the workforce for twelve years, it was condluded that foremen and workers have a reasonable understanding of each other. On the other hand, the ambivalent position of the foreman in the industry was noted and it was felt that in assessing the foreman, the workers could tend to select the lowest common denominator. The dysfunctional consequences of the lack of constant contact between foreman and worker were described, and it was observed that given this situation it was difficult for the foreman to attempt to articulate to the workers any constant and consistent employer personnel policy. the content of which in any case would be restricted because of the industry structures. The structural position of the foreman does seem to be an undesirable one; a system of permanent employment would undoubtedly improve the situation such that, generally speaking, the foreman could play a much more positive role in industrial relations in the industry than he does at the moment.

(c) Point of Contact: The Grievance Machinery

The grievance machinery is that machinery of both a formal and informal nature which exists in an organisation to deal with interchanges between workers, union representatives, employers and arbitral authorities which arise out of some form of worker dissatisfaction in the work relationship. The nature and use of such machinery can have an important bearing on the nature of the employer-

^{1.} Here, of course, we are neglecting to take into account the small day to day details of particular foremen-worker relations which can have such an important effect upon an industrial relations system. E.g. see W.F. Whyte, Pattern for Industrial Peace, op. cit.

employee relationship. Van D. Kennedy hypothesizes that:

grievance negotiation, like any other form of union-management inter-change, can be the means of creating, aggravating or prolonging conflict but that it is on the whole a process and a set of relationships which contain inherent elements making for a reduction of conflict.

The broad general purposes of the grievance machinery may be summarised as follows. First, the grievance machinery and the procedures of the same are important in the locating of difficulties in the employer-employee relationship. Secondly, it can be used to channel information both ways, up and down, the organisational hierarchy. Thirdly, the grievance procedures translate the general language of the contract or award into particular decisions in specific circumstances. And fourthly, it may be used to shape the relationship between management and workers. In the stevedoring industry in Australia generally, where the relationship between employer and employee is especially tenuous, the grievance machinery that exists is most important in determining the temper of these relations.

A description of the actual structures of the grievance machinery in the Port of Hobart is tended in other sections of this exercise. 3

Here the course of a hypothetical grievance will be traced. If a grievance should come up on the job the foreman and the gang leader will discuss the matter; if no solution is reached the matter may

^{1.} Van D. Kennedy, "Grievance Negotiation", in Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, op. cit., p. 280.

^{2.} J.T. Dunlop and James J. Healy, "The Grievance Procedure", in Bakke, Kerr and Anrod, op. cit.

^{3.} see Chapter 3, pp. 57-58and Chapter 6, pp. 180-184.

be referred to the job delegate and the supervisor, or in the latter's absence, the charge foreman. Should no agreement arise from this discussion the matter is referred to an authorised representative of each of the parties, usually the Federation Vigilance Officer or Secretary and an Industrial Officer from the A.E.W.L. Should the authorised representatives be unable to reach agreement the matter is referred to an Industrial Relations Committee for consideration at its next meeting, or if the matter is especially urgent, a special meeting of the Committee may be called. It also is customary in the Port of Hobart to utilise the services of the A.S.I.A.'s Port Inspector as a conciliator if the authorised representativescannot agree. Alternatively the matter may be referred to a Board of Reference for arbitration. If no agreement can be reached as to where it should be referred, it is referred to the Board of Reference if the matter is within the jurisdiction of the Board. Matters may be passed from the local Industrial Relations Committee to the national Committee where the particular consideration is deemed to be of national import. Finally, if either party to a Board of Reference is unsatisfied with the decision of the Board he may appeal against the decision to the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. The Industrial Relations Committee, as part of the grievance machinery, is also used to discuss and endeavour to reach agreement on matters which either of the parties refers to the Committee, and to consult prior to the introduction of a method of working that is new to the Port, or the introduction of a type of mechanisation that is new to the Port.

Now the effectiveness of the grievance procedure is dependent upon a large number of factors, many of which defy general definition and quantification. Personality factors, the nature of day to day relations, the nature and method of actual operation of the grievance machinery, the type of union and job environmental influences are all factors that will affect the effectiveness of the machinery. Kennedy observes:

the quality and character of the general unionmanagement relationship in a bargaining unit are basic and that, if conflict is pervasive in that relationship, the grievance process is not capable of working any deep changes in it.

Kennedy also notes that:

In usually incompatible relationships the grievance process may operate as a sort of guerilla warfare during which each parties keep sniping at each other and endeavour to keep their forces at martial pitch in preparation for open conflict.

It is suggested that at one stage in the history of the stevedoring industry in Hobart the grievance machinery was all but useless, but that with the passage of time changing influential factors in the industry have so affected the grievance machinery as to render it a useful means for the accommodation of conflict, and a positive factor in itself in the improvement of relations in the industry.

Specifically, it is suggested that in the 1940's and early

^{1.} see W.F. Whyte, Pattern for Industrial Peace, op. cit.
This study gives some idea of the many small and seemingly
unimportant factors that often exert an apparently disproportionate
influence on the effectiveness of the grievance procedure. They
are factors that often only microscopic examination of events will
reveal.

^{2.} Van D. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 284.

^{3.} Ibid., p. 282.

1950's relations in the industry were such that they frustrated any attempts to maintain a viable grievance machinery. This is especially true of the early 1940's, when the workers, realising that the balance of power had turned in their favour, were quick to seek revenge from the employers for what the workers regarded as the unjust treatment they had received at the hands of the employers during the 1930's. In 1956 K.F. Walker could write of the industry in Australia generally:

Although the unremitting struggle between unions and employers has been carried on in a variety of legal and institutional settings, it has not yet undergone any fundamental change. The parties attitudes of mutual antagonism and suspicion, accompanied by hostility between foremen and employees, have not altered in seventy years. There has been no accommodation to each others point of view, no recognised continuity of interest to provide an axis of development towards co-operation and industrial peace.

During the 1940's while the union emphasised the predatory nature of the employers, and the employers accused the union of irresponsibility, disloyalty to country, and Communism, the reasonable discussion of grievances was impossible. Since these times, however, certain elements have acted and reacted in a related way to improve and transform the environment in such a way as to make it more amenable to proper grievance machinery operation.

What have been some of these elements? First, the personality factor does seem to have been most important. Many persons associated with the industry indicated to the writer that from the late 1950's

^{1.} K.F. Walker, <u>Industrial Relations in Australia</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 277.

^{2.} It is not difficult to equate overt industrial action with treason during time of war.

union officials and employer representatives exhibited an increasing facility for the settling of local disputes by informal negotiation processes, in the Port of Hobart. Corroboratory evidence, of the kind gathered by W.F. Whyte in some of his detailed, microscopic, empirical investigations, 1 could not be gathered by the writer to lend support to this contention. Secondly, the size of the work force, the decreasing number of employers and the fact that there has been no recruitment to the industry since 1956 in the Port of Hobart seem to be factors which have acted in such a way as to create a more satisfactory climate for industrial relations. These factors, mean that workers, union officials, officers from the A.S.I.A., and employer representatives have the opportunity to get to know each other personally to a far greater extent than would persons in some of the larger mainland ports. In grievance negotiation this can be most important; persons get to know each others' idiosyncracies, methods of communication become familiar and relations become more even and predictable. Thus the machinery is lubricated and the basis is laid for the more expeditious settlement of disputes. Thirdly, the actual nature and structure of the negotiating machinery is important in promoting the utility of the machinery. 2 Such machinery as exists in the industry in the Port of Hobart does at least seem to be adequate. While some complaints were made to the writer as to the effectiveness of communications between employers and supervisors and foremen, and

^{1.} see W.F. Whyte, Men at Work, op. cit. and Pattern for Industrial Peace, op. cit.

^{2.} see Sumner H. Slichter, The Challenge of Industrial Relations (Ithaca, New York: Cornel University Press, 1947), pp. 132-134.

union officials and job delegates so far as the passing on of Industrial Relations Committee decisions was concerned, the machinery does provide for the prompt settlement of disputes on a local basis by negotiation through the Industrial Relations Committee procedures, or by arbitration through the Boards of Reference. In addition, the Industrial Relations Committees do permit the exchange of views between employer and employee representatives on matters that may not arise as a result of a grievance. E.g. details of proposed changes in work method as a result of the introduction of a mechanised technique. Fourthly, the formalisation of grievance procedures in the Industrial Relations Committees can be regarded as a refinement of the machinery for it ensures that all grievances are treated in a similar and consistent manner.

The abovementioned factors have certainly played an important part in improving the nature of day to day relations in the stevedoring industry in Hobart and thus in turn making the grievance machinery more workable. Other variables have also been influential in this regard; the National Stevedoring Industry Conference established in 1965, the general apparent nation-wide improvement in industry relations since 1965 and the institution of semi-permanent employment in the Port of Hobart. Further, at times when the demand for labour is low in the industry in Hobart, an operation which is delayed by dispute, rather than be performed later at overtime rates,

^{1.} see Chapter 6, pp. 180-184.

^{2.} A person associated with the industry estimated that over 80% of grievances are settled before they reach the Board of Reference level.

^{3.} see P. Pigors and C.A. Myers, <u>Personnel Administration</u> (4th Edition) (Tokyo: Kogakusha Coy., Ltd., 1961), pp. 247 - 249).

will be completed at ordinary rates by men other than those originally involved in the dispute. This means that the men who initiate a dispute can lose out financially when the demand for labour is low. This tends to insure that only genuine grievances are brought forward at these times. With the possible introduction of full-scale permanent employment into the industry in Hobart in the future and the continued improvement in industry relations, it can be expected that the grievance procedures and machinery will become an even more effective instrument in the accommodation of conflict, and a more potent force in the betterment of relations in the industry in turn.

(d) Organisations in Between

In this section a brief examination of some of the organisations which could be considered as coming in between employers and employees in the stevedoring industry will be undertaken in order to determine what kind of effect these organisations have upon the nature of the employer-employee relationship. The A.S.I.A. and its predecessors, the employer organisations such as the A.E.W.L., the C.S.O.A., and the O.S.R.A., the union body, the W.W.F., and the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission will all be considered.

(i) The A.S.I.A. and its predecessors.

The A.S.I.A. is, and its predecessors the A.S.I.B. and the first and second Stevedoring Industry Commissions have been, the statutory authorities created by the Federal Government to order and regulate, from day to day, the structures and relations in the industry. 1

^{1.} For a more detailed account of the specific functions of these various government agencies see Chapter 2, pp. 57 - 61.

What effect have these bodies had on employer-employee relations? First, these institutions, despite early opposition from employers, 1 have done much to decasualise employment in the industry be establishing port quotas, roster systems of employment and the payment of attendance money when work is not available. Secondly, the statutory authorities, by attention to such matters as amenities and safety, have helped to improve the overall conditions of work. Thirdly, the authorities have provided an in-industry arbitral mechanism for the prompt arbitration of grievances which have proved to be incapable of solution through a process of employer-employee negotiation. Fourthly, the statutory authorities, particularly the A.S.I.A., have done much to foster consultation between shipowners and stevedores, and have generally been able to improve communications between the different actors in the system. 2 Fifthly, by the publishing of annual reports containing considerable comment and detailed statistics relating to the stevedoring industry it is certain that these governmental agencies have greatly contributed to a better understanding of the problems of the industry in Australia.

The above-mentioned factors do seem to suggest that the regulatory governmental agencies have had a beneficial effect upon industrial relations in the industry. However, the position of the A.S.I.A. at the moment, with the industry in such a state of change, is an indeterminate one. Workers attitudes towards the Authority in the Port of Hobart are fairly mixed. (see table 5.10). Further, it is

^{1.} K.F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, op. cit., p. 282.

^{2.} R.J. May, op. cit., p. 164.

	Table 5.10	(N = 72)
Do you agree that the A.S.I.A. gives the waterside worker a fair go ?	Strongly agree Agree Don't know Disagree Strongly disagree Unanswered	9 26 3 23 9 2

clear that the introduction of permanent employment would eventually mean a changed role for the A.S.I.A., although as the General Report of the National Stevedoring Industry Conference makes clear the role of the Authority will remain substantially unchanged until such time as permanent employment has undergone a sufficiently long and satisfactory trial period. Ultimately, at least in the permanent employment ports, it would seem inevitable that such current Authority functions as rostering and allocation of work, recruitment, discipline and payment of long service leave will pass to the employers. This transition period will certainly pose some substantial problems, as the General Report notes:

There can be no doubt that the position of the Authority and its officers during the trial period of the scheme will be a difficult one. In introducing the sweeping changes contemplated in the industry there are bound to be teething troubles and these could be aggravated by any rigid attitudes or excess of zeal on the part of the Authority, the employers, the Federation or their respective officers. The situation is one which will call for moderation, and co-operation on the part of everyone connected with it. The Conference can only express the hope that this attitude will, in the interests of the industry, prevail.

Thus, while the various statutory authorities do appear to have substantially contributed to an improvement in relations in the industry in the past, the success of their future operation will depend, to a large extent, on the attitudes of the various parties in the

^{1.} National Stevedoring Industry Conference, General Report, op. cit., p. 13.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 15.

and the ability of the Authority to adapt its role to meet changing circumstances.

(ii) The Waterside Workers' Federation

The sole union in the stevedoring industry in Australia is the W.W.F. Generally the union could be described in R. Dubin's terms as a "life embracing union" where, because of the structure of the industry, workers have tended in the past to identify themselves entirely with the union organisation, regarding their employers as almost alien beings.

The Federation has been a most militant organisation. It has manifested its militancy in a number of ways. First, it has been prone to direct industrial action to achieve its goals; it has exhibited a prediliction for quick stoppages rather than long drawn out strikes, often over matters of a political and social nature not related to immediate working conditions. Secondly, much of the Federation's literature and official pronouncements have been couched in terms of class warfare and struggle. This has meant that the Federation has often been speaking a language that has been incomprehensible and inflammatory so far as the employers have been concerned. In this type of situation communication becomes difficult. Thus, the union will accuse the employers of 'narrow economics'; employers will accuse the union of 'unsound economics'. The union will charge employers with being unscrupulous monopolists who are

^{1.} R. Dubin, Working Union-Management Relations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1958), p. 79.

bleeding the country; employers will charge the union with Communist tendencies and a disregard for the public interest. Thirdly, the volatile situation that has existed in the industry has produced union leaders of a charismatic nature who have exerted enormous influence on the union, and in turn upon relations in the industry. The most outstanding example was Mr. J. Healy, who was General Secretary of the Federation from 1937 until 1961.

The Federation is further characterised by a fairly high degree of participation in its affairs (see Table 5.11) and members feel that the union is doing a good job. (see Table 5.12). The Federation exerts a tight discipline over its members, 2 despite the fact that in two major strikes, in 1917 and 1928, the Federation was defeated by strike-breakers.

Looking at the W.W.F. one might be tempted to conclude that the union has been the prime cause of industrial unrest in the industry. This would not be a novel conclusion. Such a suggestion would, however, be an idle one. It is undeniable that union militancy has come about as a result of the organisational structure of the industry and the peculiar conditions of employment that have existed in the industry. While union militancy may have perpetuated and magnified industrial unrest it is impossible to say that it has caused it. As K.G.J.C. Knowles has observed, unions and union leaders are often

^{1.} see E. Wight Bakke, <u>Mutual Survival</u>: <u>The Goals of Union and Management</u> (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 19-58.

^{2.} see P.W.D. Matthews and G.W. Ford, Australian Trade Unions (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1968) p. 99.

^{3.} see R.J. May, op. cit., p. 165.

the midwives rather than the begetters of strikes and discontent.

The relationship between the degree of union militancy and industry structures and conditions is reflected in the recent developments that have occurred in the stevedoring industry. The introduction of permanent employment into a number of mainland ports following upon the productive National Stevedoring Industry Conference that was initiated in 1965, the expansion of the grievance procedure in the industry into not merely an appeals mechanism but a problem solving device, and the introduction of a pensions scheme have been accompanied by an apparent decline in the militancy of the W.W.F. The ready and co-operative participation of the Federation in the Conference and the less militant attitudes of the Federal leadership of the union are indicative. Indeed it would appear that, with the gradual improvement in conditions in the industry, relations between union and management do seem to be changing from "open warfare" to something at least approaching "working harmony". The violent anti-management attitude that has characterised the union in the past is now definitely tempered; this is especially true of the local Hobart branch. And this cannot be

^{1.} quoted in A.M. Ross and P.T. Hartman, Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), p. 147.

^{2.} It is undeniable that the current General Secretary of the W.W.F., Mr. C. Fitzgibbon, is less militant and more pragmatic than the previous incumbent of that office, Mr. J. Healy. Speaking to waterside workers in Melbourne, Mr. Fitzgibbon was reported as saying that there was competition between people on the waterfronts in Australia to prove who was the most militant. He claimed that the minds of the competitors was on the next Federal elections in 1970 and that the theory was that he who shouted the loudest and demanded the most would receive the most votes. "We will not take part in this competition in militancy", Mr. Fitzgibbon said. see John Hurst, "Wharfies Shout for Votes, says Union Chief." The Australian. Nov. 18, 1968, p. 2.

^{3.} L.R. Sayles and G. Strauss, The Local Union: Its Place in the Industrial Plant (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), Chapter 2, "Changing Relations between Union and Management".

	Table 5.11	
Do you attend meetings of your union -	Frequently (1 in 4) Fairly frequently (1 in 6) Seldom (1 in 8) Never	39 13 17 3

•

	Table 5.12	(N = 72)
Do you think that your	Yes, very good	42
union is doind a good job?	Fairly good	27
	Fairly poor	1
	Very poor	2
	the control of	

regarded solely as a function of improved structures and conditions in the industry. The role of the A.C.T.U. has certainly been important. It appears as if the A.C.T.U. has been able to rescue the W.W.F. from an industrial limbo by providing an important communication link between the Federation and a Federal Government that has amply demonstrated in the past its loathing of the W.W.F., and between the Federation and the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission which the Federation has so frequently defied.

Care must be taken not to conclude from the above remarks that the Federation has undergone such a metamorphosis as to change it over night, as it were, into a flabby, muscleless union that could not be tempted into direct action. Indeed with the industry in such a state of flux such industrial action on the part of the Federation might be expected, yet this is not to say that the union is as militant as ever. The conclusion can be reached that the attitude of the Federation is becoming more one of co-operation; an attitude which, in the negotiation, discussion and solution of the industry's problems, will be less characterised by protestation than by positive participation.

(iii) Employers' Associations

The structure and development of the principal employer associations is outlined in Chapter 3.² It appears that these associations were formed in response to employee unionisation; employers feeling that they would be in a more powerful position in dealing with the union if they spoke in a united voice, rather than each employer

^{1.} It was the A.C.T.U. that suggested to the Federal Government the National Stevedoring Industry Conference in 1965.

^{2.} see Chapter 3, pp. 55 - 57.

dealing with the union on an individual basis.

Prior to the formation, on a national basis, of the A.E.W.L. the divergence of interests between overseas and coastal shipping companies did lead to different approaches to industrial relations.

K.F. Walker writes:

The relative unimportance of stevedoring costs to overseas companies makes them readier to compromise, as does their greater concern with adherence to sailing schedules. Executives of coastal shipping companies are under the eye of cost-conscious boards of directors which encourages them to be more intransigent.

To what extent this is true of the industry at present is difficult to estimate. With the responsibility for the handling of industrial matters now entirely in the hands of the A.E.W.L. it is suspected that the differences of opinion as between overseas and coastal shipping interests would be resolved within the Association; thus in their dealings with the employees in industrial matters it would seem that the previous ambiguity that existed has been eliminated. Indeed this has been the principal effect of the various employer associations upon the industrial relations processes in the stevedoring industry; that is, they have enabled the employers to present a united front in dealing with the union on industrial matters. The current arrangements with respect to the A.E.W.L. seem to maximise this tendency.

^{1. &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 55 - 57.

^{2.} K.F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, op. cit., p. 287.

(iv) The Conciliation and Arbitration Commission

In this section a very cursory look will be taken at the effect had upon industrial relations in the stevedoring industry in Australia of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, and its predecessor the Conciliation and Arbitration Court.

J.E. Isaac observes that:

The logical basis of the Australian system of compulsory arbitration is primarily the speedy "settlement" of industrial disputes rather than the encouragement of collective agreements. This attitude derives from the troubled years of the 1890's, when public opinion, greatly disturbed by lengthy stoppages in strategic industries, demanded government intervention to end the stoppages if necessary by the imposition of the terms of settlement. For a few years, there was virtually a breakdown in a few key industries in the relationship between unions and employers, the latter refusing to deal with unions and insisting on the freedom of contract. Under these circumstances, compulsory arbitration not only provided a means of settling the disputes, but also rehabilitated and stimulated unionism.

One might conclude then that the effect of the external arbitral machinery as exists in Australia so far as the settlement of disputes and general improvement of relations is concerned in the stevedoring industry, where union-employer relations have often all but collapsed, would be most salutory. Indeed, in many respects the effect has been beneficial. The Commission, and the Court before it, have provided machinery for the solution of disputes, and they have been able to formulate from time to time general awards regulating conditions of

^{1.} J.E. Isaac, "Prospects for Collective Bargaining", in J.E. Isaac and G.W. Ford, (eds.) Australian Labour Relations Readings (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1966), p. 432.

employment in the industry. J.E. Isaac claims:

The development of a centralised wage determination with nation-wide application of key wage elements has discouraged the use of the strike weapon in the process of wage determination.

However, the role of arbitration in the industry is restricted by one factor and made difficult by another. First, it is restricted in so far as it cannot effect any basic re-organisation in the industry; for this reason K.F. Walker suggests that arbitration in the stevedoring industry has been a "relative failure". Walker writes:

Stevedoring presents another example of the relative failure on the part of compulsory arbitration, but for quite different reasons from those applicable to the metal trades. In this industry the trouble is the fundamental instability of employment, and arbitration has not been able to provide a sufficiently stabilising influence because it has no power to control the basic economic and technological factors producing the instability.

Secondly, the role of arbitration is made difficult by virtue of the fact that under a system of compulsory arbitration the right to strike and lockout are assumed not to exist. In relation to this point J.E. Isaac writes:

In practice, of course, these rights are exercised even under compulsory arbitration, and the law must punish the offending parties or close its eyes to such offences. The latter course is in most cases expedient but legally anomalous. The former is legally proper but its effect on industrial relations, anomalous, because the normally accepted notions of crime and punishment are not applicable in industrial

^{1.} J.E. Isaac, letter to A.M. Ross dated August 27, 1958, quoted in A.M. Ross and P.T. Hartman, op. cit., p. 149.

^{2.} K.F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia. op. cit., p. 291.

relations. The right to strike, for example, is the very basis of trade unionism. A blanket denial of the right may be regarded as a threat to unionism itself. Punishment for the exercise of this right may reduce the incidence of strikes, but it will certainly accentuate industrial unrest. For after all, the relationship between union and management does not end with the imposition of punishment. Both must continue to work with each other.

The penal provisions contained in the Conciliation and Arbitration Act and the Stevedoring Industry Act designed to deter stoppages have frequently had the reverse effect. They have often precipitated direct action on the part of the W.W.F. and have made relations between employers and employees more strained. In this respect Isaac observes, in reference to the penal provisions contained in Section 52A of the Stevedoring Industry Act:

Far from being a deterrent to stoppages, these provisions have tended to produce strikes in protest against them. Since these provisions aim directly at the pay of industrial workers, it is not surprising that they are interpreted as an attempt to drive a wedge between the individual members and their union. The militant and solidary character of this union (the W.W.F.) should have made it clear that such an attempt would have been strongly resisted. Moreover, once members have lost their entitlement to a large number of attendance money payments, resistance turns to defiance. He that is drenched does not fear the rain.

It is believed that these remarks about the particular provisions of Section 52A of the Stevedoring Industry Act could be validly made about the penal provisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act.³

^{1.} J.E. Isaac, "Prospects for Collective Bargaining", op. cit., p. 427.

^{2.} J.E. Isaac, "Penal Provisions under Commonwealth Arbitration" in J.E. Isaac and G.W.Ford, op. cit., p. 386.

^{3.} While Isaac's remarks concerning Section 52A may be valid for the stevedoring industry in Australia as a whole, some persons associated with the industry in the Port of Hobart maintained to the writer that the provisions of Section 52A were effective in suppressing a good deal of overt industrial conflict in the Port.

Such then has been the influence of compulsory arbitration upon industrial relations in the stevedoring industry in Australia. The consequences have been both good and bad; the net effect is immeasurable.

In this Chapter attention has been concentrated upon some features of the employer-employee relationship in the stevedoring industry in the Port of Hobart, and an attempt has been made to guage the effect these particular features have, and have had, upon the nature of employer-employee relations.

It was noted that one of the most undesirable aspects of the employer-employee relationship was the lack of a permanent relation between employer and employee; that is to say, employment in the industry in Hobart is essentially of a casual nature. In itself this factor has resulted in a separation of the interests and goals of employers and employees and has made communication between the two difficult. It has affected the role of the foreman, the effectiveness of the grievance machinery, the attitudes of union and employer associations, the role and effectiveness of the Federal arbitral authorities, and it has necessitated the operation of a specialised, governmental, statutory authority in the industry to regulate relations. It was admitted that, while substantial steps have been taken to decasualise employment in the industry, until such time as the ultimate step in decasualisation was taken and a system of permanent employment introduced the problems arising from the essentially

casual nature of the work would remain.

The decline in the authority of the foreman was described and the problems associated with his job as a result of the casual nature of the work were outlined.

The improvements in the grievance machinery were noted. It was concluded that, in large part, the increased effectiveness of the grievance machinery was a function of the improved nature of employeremployee relations in the industry in Hobart, which in turn had come about as a consequence of the compatability of personalities involved in union and management organisations, the size of the Port, national developments in the industry, and so on, and to make the effect circular, improvements in the grievance machinery.

So far as the organisations "in between" were concerned, the beneficial effects of the operation of the A.S.I.A. and its predecessors were outlined; a restriction of the functions of such governmental agencies in the future was predicted. It has certainly been true that the militancy of the W.W.F. has aggravated industrial unrest in the industry, however, it was concluded that union militancy has not been a cause of industrial conflict. It was also concluded that union attitudes have become definitely tempered over the past few years and that union approaches now are far more co-operative than they have been in the past. Mention was made of the moderating influence of the A.C.T.U. in this regard. The role and effect of the employers' associations were taken into account, while the restricted and difficult role of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and its predecessors was briefly reviewed.

CHAPTER 6.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STEVEDORING INDUSTRY

Industrial relations systems should not be considered in static, unchanging terms. Changes in organisational design, job environment, formal and informal relationships all operate in such a way as to render an industrial relations system a dynamic and variable thing. Therefore, in this Chapter an outline will be presented of some of the recent developments in the stevedoring industry and the possible effects of these developments upon the industrial relations system will be suggested. Factors of particular relevance to the Port of Hobart, such as the mechanisation of stevedoring operations and the advent of semi-permanent employment, together with broader considerations, such as the recently constituted Industrial Relations Committees, the 1965 stevedoring industry legislation and the subsequent National Stevedoring Industry Conference, will be dealt with.

1. The Mechanisation of Stevedoring Operations

First, we might briefly recapitulate on the main forms of mechanisation that have been introduced into the stevedoring industry in Hobart since 1945. After the war, fork lift trucks were brought into the industry. The use of these trucks greatly reduced the amount of heavy lifting work that workers were required to undertake. The year 1956 saw the palletisation of the fruit crop which once again reduced the amount of heavy lifting to be done, and it reduced gang sizes by six, from 27 to 21 men. About the same time facilities for the bulk

handling of grain were installed in the Port. This resulted in a labour saving of approximately 600 man days per month. Over the period 1956 to 1960 the containerisation of inter-state cargoes proceeded apace; gang sizes were reduced by a further five men. By 1960, 75% of inter-state cargo was being transported in containers. In 1964/65 the roll-on, roll-off ferries commenced operation in the Port. The operation of these ferries reduced the demand for labour by some 200 men; all of the inter-state cargo, except that to Adelaide and Brisbane, is at the moment being handled by thirty five men. All in all, it could be said that the Port of Hobart has perhaps experienced a greater degree of mechanisation of its stevedoring operations than any other major Australian port. What effect has this had upon the work situation in the industry in Hobart?

First, so far as the nature of the work is concerned, there can be little doubt that the advances in mechanisation have made the job less physically exacting, cleaner, and slightly more skilled. At least with respect to overall working conditions and the amount of dirty work to be done the waterside workers themselves perceive a substantial improvement. (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). As one waterside worker quite simply remarked to the writer:

Mechanisation and automation have improved working conditions markedly.

Secondly, the opinion was also expressed to the writer that mechanisation has made the job of the waterside worker more skilled and more technical in its nature, and that this trend should continue. A person closely associated with the stevedoring industry in the Port made the following observations to the writer:

The workers are now able to take a certain pride in their work for now they are responsible for the handling of reasonably complex machinery. Now they are inclined to consider themselves more as technicians, for they have more responsibilities than they had in the past.

Thirdly, as we have seen, mechanisation has had the effect of dramatically reducing the demand for labour in the Port. (see Table 6.3). The port quota and the registered port strength have declined since 1956; the port quota more markedly so. The number of hours of work per waterside worker per week, despite the decrease in registered port strength, has also shown a slight decline. This means that there is less work available per worker. What are the implications of these facts? As we have already observed in Chapter 4 it has engendered in many waterside workers certain feelings of job insecurity. Further. as we saw in Chapter 4 the waterside workers believe that mechanisation has had an adverse effect upon their wages. (see Chapter 4, Table 4.12). (Table 4.6 in the same Chapter suggests that there are some grounds for workers believing this to be true). There is also an attitude among waterside workers that they have not received a fair share of the benefits that have come as a result of mechanisation on the wharves (see Table 6.4). The workers, particularly in their publications, claim that they do not receive a fair share of the cake, and that improvements in productivity should be reflected in their wages and in the provision of a pensions scheme. 2 It is significant to note

see Chapter 4 Tables 4.9 and 4.10. The consequences of this induced job insecurity have also been canvassed in Chapter 4, pp. 92 - 97.

^{2.} see Case for the Waterside Worker, op. cit., pp. 2-3, 20-23.

	Table 6.1 (N	= 72)
In your opinion has mechanisation and automation -	Improved working conditions considerably Only slightly improved working conditions Resulted in no improvements in working conditions Had an adverse effect on working conditions Unanswered	53 11 - 6 2

	Table 6.2	(N = 72)
Do you have more or	Much more dirty work now A little more dirty work now	
less dirty work to	About the same	16
do now than several	A little less dirty work now	23
years ago?	Much less dirty work now	28
·	Unanswered	1

Table 6.3
Source: A.S.I.A. Annual Reports

HOBART

	<u> </u>	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	<u> </u>	
30 June Year	Port Quota	Registered Port Strength	Hours of work per week per worker	Year
1956	900	887	34.6	1955/56
1957	825	9 15	26.4	1956/57
1958	750	863	26,7	1957/58
1959	750	859	26.2	1958/59
1960	750	813	26.7	1959/60
1961	950(a)	783	27,5	1960/61
1962	980	772	27,3	1961/62
1963	620	729	27.3	1962/63
1964	920(b)	706	30.1	1963/64
1965	425	597	24.2	1964/65
1966	375	594	25.7	1965/66
1967	375	585	21.9(c)	1966/67

⁽a) The port quota was raised to this figure for the fruit export season. The figure was reduced in August 1961 to 700, and increased to 980 for the subsequent season.

⁽b) Raised to this figure for the fruit export season.

⁽c) Due in large part to a very poor fruit export season.

Tabl	Table 6.4	
Do you believe that waterside workers have received a fair share of the benefits that have come as a result of mechanisation and automation?	Yes No Don't know Unanswered	8 57 4 3

·

that in October of 1967, following on from agreements reached earlier during the National Stevedoring Industry Conference, a general contributory pension scheme was announced which would give a basic retirement pension of \$240 for each waterside worker for each full year of service on the wharves. It would be hoped that this scheme would give the workers a greater degree of financial security in the face of an over supply of labour in the industry, and that the workers would view this as at least a marginal sharing of the benefits that have flowed as a consequence of the mechanisation of stevedoring procedures.

Thirdly, mechanisation has had some effect on gang sizes; palletisation of the fruit crop and containerisation reduced gang sizes by eleven men. However, the reduction in gang sizes did not interfere with the basic structure of the gang. Yet it should be recognised that any future application of mechanised techniques that interferes with the basic structure of the gangs and that restricts the opportunities for worker on-the-job interaction, and that tends to upset the cohesion of the work group should be very carefully embarked upon. It is important in the implementation of new mechanised techniques to consider how well the individual and the individual social-work unit, the gang, will fit thenew technological system. In the search for this social-technical compatability Katz and Kahn observe that:

Priority is accorded to the technical requirements of task accomplishment but this does not mean that any so-called technical improvement imported from another industry is accepted uncritically as an appropriate modification of an existing work structure.

^{1.} The Australian, Oct. 7, 1967, p. 1.

^{2.} D. Katz and R. Kahn, op. cit., p. 433.

For as A.R. Rice asserts:

The performance of the primary task is supported by powerful social and psychological forces which ensure that a considerable capacity for co-operation is evoked among the members of an organisation created to perform it.

Katz and Kahn argue that a viable socio-technical system² is one that provides certain sources of gratification for persons in getting work done. These are:

1. a sense of completion in finishing a meaningful unit of work, 2. some control over their own activities by those engaged in the task, and 3. satisfactory relationships with those performing related tasks.

Thus, in any alteration of existing gang structures that may result from the application of new, mechanised techniques in the stevedoring industry, it is vital that existing worker gratification sources be taken into account. The most desirable form of work group, the one which must always be striven for, is well described by Rice as:

^{1.} A.R. Rice, <u>Productivity and Social Organisation</u>: <u>The Ahmedabad Experiment</u> (London: Tavistock Publications Limited, 1958),p.33.

^{2.} The concept of the socio-technical system arose from the consideration that any productive system requires both a technological equipment and process layout - and work organisation relating to each other those who carry out the necessary tasks. The technological demands place limits on the type of work organisation possible, but a work organisation has social and psychological properties of its own that are independent of technology. (see A.R. Rice, Ibid., p. 4).

^{3.} D. Katz and R. Kzhn, op. cit., pp. 433-434.

^{4.} For a detailed examination of current, and likely future relationships between basic work group structure and the technological organisation of the job on the Australian waterfront see Joel A. Fadem, op. cit.

A group consisting of the smallest number that can perform a whole task and can satisfy the social and psychological needs of its members is, alike from the point of view of task performance and those performing it, the most satisfactory and efficient group.

Fourthly, mechanisation in the stevedoring industry has had some effect upon supervision. So far as the roll-on, roll-off ferries are concerned supervision has been made much easier and there is less need for close supervision. This is because the work on these vessels assumes for the workers, after awhile on the job, a more or less routine nature; the workers being able to efficiently discharge their duties with a minimum of supervision. Similarly with respect to work on the more conventional type of vessel, the palletisation and containerisation of cargoes has made the task of the supervisor and the foreman a little easier, if more technical, than was previously the case when more detailed attention had to be paid to the stowing of items in the ship. Thus, as a result of the palletisation and containerisation of cargoes there is perhaps again less need for close supervision of work.

In summary then, we have seen that the mechanisation of stevedoring operations has had a considerable effect upon the demand for labour and the type of work to be performed in the Port of Hobart. Perhaps less importantly it has also had some effect upon supervision and gang structures. We also noted that mechanisation had a

^{1.} A.R. Rice, op. cit., p. 36.

^{2.} It should be remembered that work on the roll-on, roll-off ferries is conducted on a semi-permanent basis. See Chapter 3, p. 67.

'perceived' effect upon wages received, perhaps because of the fact that mechanised techniques have further emphasised the seasonal nature of the work in so far as there is now proportionately less work available during the slack export season.

What are the likely future trends? It is clear that the mechanisation of procedures in the industry will continue with much the same effects as in the past; decreasing demand for labour, more palatable and rewarding work and with certain effects upon gang structures and the nature of supervision. Yet the change will be gradual, and if this can be combined with more flexible attitudes on behalf of employers and employees then there is good reason to believe that these changes will be satisfactorily adapted to.

2. <u>Semi-permanent employment</u>

With the introduction of the roll-on, roll-off ferries into the Port of Hobart certain numbers of waterside workers have come to be employed on a semi-permanent basis to perform the stevedoring business associated with the operation of these vessels. What has been the workers' response towards this form of employment? In the questionnaire that was administered a question was directed towards those workers who had been semi-permanently employed to work on the Australian National Line's ferry 'The Empress of Australia'. Of the thirteen respondents who had been so employed, ten regarded this form of

^{1.} see Chapter 3, p. 67, for the details of these arrangements.

^{2.} Waterside workers employed on 'The Empress of Australia' are now so employed on a permanent basis. At the time the questionnaire was administered they were employed on a semi-permanent basis.

employment as either 'very satisfactory' or 'satisfactory'. (see
Table 6.5). Further a person closely associated with the stevedoring
industry in Hobart, on the employer side, expressed the opinion to
the writer that waterside workers, while they are semi-permanently
employed, do appear to be more contented with their work and that they
do appear to adopt a more 'responsible' attitude toward their jobs.
He claimed that in the event of wet weather employees working on the
"Seaway" vessels would simply go and put their wet weather clothing on
and continue the job, whereas when these same employees were working
at 'ordinary' times on conventional vessels they would frequently
complain or even refuse to work, with protective clothing, while the
weather was inclement.

This evident satisfaction with semi-permanent employment can be explained in fairly predictable terms. First, there is a regularity in employment; workers are not subject to the call-up and they know when they will be required to work from week to week. Secondly, there is an evenness in the level of wages that the workers receive. Thirdly, there is an element of constancy in the supervision and the employer-employee relationship that is somewhat lacking in non-permanent wharf employment. Thus, the employees know what to expect so far as supervision is concerned. Fourthly, this semi-permanent employment provides a sense of work continuity; workers continue on the one job until it is completed, and fifthly, as we saw above, there is not so much need for close supervision on the roll-on, roll-off ferries. It would seem that work on the ferries does not interfere with the basic gang structures, although it does decrease the size of the gang to eleven. There is one hatchman, one crane driver, four holdmen and four

Tabl	le 6.5 (1	N = 72)
Have you ever been employed on a semi-permanent basis with the Australian National Line?	Yes No Unanswered	13 55 4
How have you liked the semi-permanent employment with the Australian National Line?	Very satisfactory Satisfactory Fair Unsatisfactory Very unsatisfactory Unanswered	6 4 2 - 1

•

men on the wharves plus a fork lift truck driver. Hence, while the size is reduced the basic gang structure is the same. 1

On the other hand, the semi-permanent employment that there is in the Port of Hobart may have some undesirable consequences. The fact that a certain number of waterside workers are now employed on a semi-permanent basis to perform the 'ferry-work' means that there is less work on the whole available in the short term for the remaining members of the Port work force. This problem is given especial emphasis when one considers the substantial decline in the demand for labour following the introduction of the roll-on, roll-off ferries.

Generally, however, the experience of semi-permanent employment in the stevedoring industry in Hobart seems to lend support to the contention expressed earlier in this exercise² that the introduction of a permanent system of employment in the industry in this Port would be most desirable.

3. Industrial Relations Committees

At a National Conference of representatives of the stevedoring industry in 1963 it was agreed that:

Industrial Relations Committees comprised of equal numbers of representatives of the Federation and Employers should be set up in all ports, together with a National Industrial Relations Committee of representatives of the parties at the national level.

The Seaway vessels are a combination roll-on, roll-off, lift-on, lift-off type vessel. see Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1963/64, pp. 21-23.

see Chapter 5, pp. 133-134.

^{3.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1963/64, p. 24.

In January, 1964 such a Committee was established in Hobart.

It was agreed that the Committees should meet at regular intervals and also hold special meetings as required from time to time. Any matter coming before a local committee could be referred to the National Committee by either party. The agreement provided that, with respect to disputes arising on the job, such matters be dealt with in the following manner:

(i) any question from which dispute could arise. or has arisen, shall first be considered by the delegate and supervisor or in the absence of the supervisor, the charge foreman and both shall consult together for this purpose; should agreement not arise from this discussion, the matter shall be referred to an authorised representative of each of the parties, whether a member of the Industrial Relations Committee or not. Where necessary these representatives shall attend the dispute as quickly as possible with a view to settling it; (iii) should the authorised representatives of the parties be unable to reach agreement, the matter shall be referred to the Industrial Relations Committee for consideration at its next meeting, or if an urgent matter, a special meeting, or alternatively to the Chairman of the Board of Reference. If no agreement can be reached as to where the matter should be referred, it shall automatically be referred to the Board of Reference if it is within the jurisdiction of the Board.

Other functions of the Committees were:

to discuss and endeavour to reach amicable agreement on matters which either of the parties refers to the Committee and to consult before the introduction of a method of working which is new to the port or the introduction of a type of mechanisation which is new to the port.

^{1.} Ibid., pp. 25-26.

^{2.} Ibid.

The agreement also provided that once a matter had been brought before a Committee work would continue without interruption in accordance with the award until a decision had been reached. Some minor modifications to the agreement were made by the National Stevedoring Industry Conference in 1965 relating to the right to stop work because of an unreasonable instruction or because of a bona fide safety issue, and relating to an employers right to dismiss labour.

In its Annual Report in 1964 the A.S.I.A. stated that:

The objective behind the setting up of these Committees was to improve industrial relations on the waterfront and thereby prevent unnecessary stoppages of work. It was envisaged that they would provide consultation machinery for avoiding industrial disputes, for dealing with disputes that might arise, and for the discussion of other matters of concern to the parties.

What then has been the effect of the industrial relations committees in Hobart? In 1964 the A.S.I.A. commented that:

There are some ports where the principles underlying the concept of the Industrial Relations Committees applied prior to their establishment. That is to say, it was the practice for representatives of the parties to discuss and attempt to settle any dispute that arose, and if unsuccessful, to refer it to a Board of Reference. In those ports the Committees have effected virtually no change in the method of handling disputes. So far as the other ports are concerned....there has to date, unfortunately been little evidence that the Committees are fulfilling the role envisaged for them. There is no evidence that they have had any significant influence in reducing the incidence of disputes on the waterfront or in improving the overall standard of industrial relations.

^{1.} Ibid.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 27.

^{3.} Ibid.

It was the unanimous opinion of those persons associated with the stevedoring industry in Hobart with whom the writer spoke that the local Committee fell into the first category mentioned by the A.S.I.A. above. The Committee has been successful in that it has formalised structures that have facilitated means for a mutual exchange of views; it has prevented disputes before they were able to get underway; it has permitted the local negotiation of local problems; and it has created the opportunity for union and management to discuss proposed changes in the industry.

The Industrial Relations Committee has been successful in Hobart, first, because before the Committee was established the sort of conciliatory approach institutionalised by the 1963 agreements was encouraged in the Port. Thus, the formal establishment of the Committee simply meant building on a base that already existed. Secondly, it was suggested that the leadership-personality factor was an important element in the good working of the local Committee. Union and employer representatives, it was claimed, had a special relationship with each other which often permitted the expeditious settlement of disputes before they were ably to flare up out of proportion to their true significance. And thirdly, the fact that Hobart is a relatively small Port may mean that union and management hierarchies are not as remote as, and more accessible than, their counterparts in the larger ports where the Committees have not worked so well. This being the case it would seem that Industrial Relations Committees would have agreater chance of achieving their objectives in the Hobart environment.

A union official, while praising the efficacy of the local Committee, did tender two criticisms. First, that local employers often do not have the power, or are reluctant, to make decisions on local matters, preferring to leave these decisions for higher offices. And secondly, that decisions reached between employers and union representatives in the Committee are often not properly communicated to the foremen.

Generally, however, it can be concluded that the local Industrial Relations Committee has served a very beneficial purpose. The Committee has provided an excellent means for the discussion of mutual points of concern and for the settlement of grievances. 1

4. 1965 Stevedoring Industry Legislation

The 1965 stevedoring industry legislation represents an important point in the history of industrial relations in the industry. Following as it did a year of increased industrial unrest on the waterfront, unrest which was at least on the surface often associated with external political considerations such as the war in Vietnam and the threat of increased direct action on the part of the W.W.F. in defiance of the Arbitration Commission, the legislation was followed by a period of almost unprecedented industrial calm on the waterfront throughout Australia. It was during this period of industrial calm that bold strides were made, on a collective basis.

^{1.} It is estimated that approximately 70% of worker grievances are now resolved through the Industrial Relations Committee.

towards a more satisfactory structuring of relations in the stevedoring industry.

It is therefore important to consider this legislation, its content, its intentions and its setting in order to determine its impact and influence upon subsequent developments in the stevedoring industry in Australia.

On the 22nd of June 1965, the Minister for Labour and National Service announced that:

Mr. A.E. Woodward of the Victorian Bar has accepted my invitation to undertake an inquiry into the stevedoring industry. Mr. Woodward will commence the inquiry as quickly as possible.

On the 29th July, 1965 a list of matters on which Mr. Woodward would be seeking submissions was circulated among interested parties. The list included measures which might be taken to improve efficiency on the wharves, whether existing arrangements for the supervision of stevedoring operations were appropriate or adequate, whether provisions with respect to discipline or the manner of its administration called for any changes, whether particular measures were called for with respect to redundancy, age distribution of the workers, port stoppages and disputes which were not related to the terms and conditions of employment, and finally whether a workable plan of permanent employment could be worked out for the industry and whether or not this plan would be of benefit to the industry. ²

Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, <u>Annual Report</u>, 1964/65, p. 17.

Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1965/66, p. 22.

The W.W.F. announced that it would not co-operate with the inquiry; the inquiry was branded by the Federation as 'bogus'. Then on the 30th of July the Federation issued a press statement announcing that it had decided to hold a 24 hour national stoppage on the 4th of August and that this stoppage would be followed by similar stoppages at fortnightly intervals. The stated objectives of the stoppages were to secure the nationalisation of the stevedoring industry, the modernisation of the ports, and security for all workers. On the same day the Federation informed the Conciliation and Arbitration

Commission that rather than take its claims to the Commission it would revert to direct action.

Mr. Justice Gallagher then refused to extend to the Waterside Workers' Award the $1\frac{1}{2}$ % margins decision of the Commission. On August 4th Mr. Docker, the Federal Industrial Officer of the Federation, was quoted as saying:

There is no future in the Arbitration Commission so far as wages are concerned. Anyone who suggests that we should arbitrate is either a fool or is misleading the workers. We are fighting the Government on these matters.

However, the increase in margins was subsequently granted on the 27th of August after the Federation had decided to call off its fortnightly 24 hour stoppages. We might ask why did the Federation decide to call off the stoppages? Two inter-related reasons might be suggested. First, as the Inter-State Executive of the A.C.T.U.

^{1.} Ibid.

^{2.} quoted in Second Reading Speech, Stevedoring Industry Bill, 1965 by Minister for Labour and National Service, House of Representatives, 23 September, 1965.

noted on the 3rd September the Federation had earlier disregarded the rules of the A.C.T.U. in beginning a dispute without notification of that body. Without the backing of the A.C.T.U. the Federation may have decided to pull its horns in. Secondly, it was rumoured at the time that the Federal Government was planning to take some action with respect to the stevedoring industry; particularly with respect to the W.W.F. In 'The Bulletin' of August 7th a member of Parliament was quoted as saying:

The waterfront chaos is political in its origins and the only solution to it lies in political action.

In an article in the same magazine on August 28th, J. Brockett predicted that the Government would introduce legislation that would remove from the Federation the power of recruitment and possibly even deregister the Federation. Persons closely associated with the industry to whom the writer spoke conveyed the opinion that there was a certain fear in the Federation at the time that the Government was determined to smash the W.W.F. This fear was perhaps all the more positive due to the fact that the Federation was, at the time, off-side of the A.C.T.U. (It would be unlikely that the Government would risk the alienation of the whole trade union movement by deregistering a union closely allied to and working through the A.C.T.U.). Nevertheless, for whatever reason, the W.W.F. did call off the planned national fortnightly stoppages.

^{1.} quoted in, Brian Buckley, "On the High Tide", The Bulletin, August 7, 1965, pp. 15-16.

J. Brockett, "Time Running Out", The Bulletin, 28 August, 1965, p. 15.

Then on September 23rd the predicted legislation to amend the Stevedoring Industry Act 1956-62 was introduced into the Federal Parliament. The legislation contained two distinct types of provisions. The provisions in Part II amended the Stevedoring Industry Act and were to operate immediately. The provisions contained in Part III were not to be implemented unless or until the conduct of the Federation, or a substantial number of its members, prevented or hindered the achievement of the objectives of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-65, or prevented, hindered or interfered with the carriage of goods or the conveyance of passengers coming within the Act. The provisions of the legislation then were double-barreled. Those provisions incorporated in Part II being actual changes, and those in Part III being threats of further changes contingent upon the actions of the W.W.F. of a number of members of the same.

The effects of the principal amendments to the Act were:

- (a) Removal of the right to recruit waterside labour from the Federation and the vesting of this function in the A.S.I.A.
- (b) The requiring of employers to ensure that the performance of stevedoring operations by waterside workers engaged by them are at all times properly supervised.
- (c) Appeals to the Arbitration Commission against the suspension of registration or attendance money entitlements were limited to cases in excess of seven days.
- (d) In appeals to the Commission against suspension or cancellation of registration the appellant rather than the Authority was required to satisfy the Commission that the decision was not justified or that it was too severe.
- see Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1965/66, p. 38.

(e) In the event of the Federation or a sufficient number of its members engaging in conduct that prevented, hindered or interfered with matters contemplated by Part III previously mentioned, the steps necessary to give effect to the provisions of that part are as follows: The Minister may make application to the Commission for a finding that the conduct of the Federation or a substantial number of its members has prevented, hindered or interfered with the matters mentioned.

If a declaration to that effect is made by the Commission, the Governor-General may issue a proclamation. The issue of a proclamation in these circumstances would mean that:

- (i) The Federation's registration under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act would be cancelled and its officials would no longer have any standing or rights under the Award or the Stevedoring Industry Act.
- (ii) Waterside workers would continue to be employed under the terms and conditions of the Award and should still be entitled to attendance money and other payments made by the Authority.
- (iii) Any lease, tenancy or licence from the Authority or the Commonwealth to the Federation would be terminated subject to the right compensation.
- (iv) Another union could be registered in place of the Federation in any port.

In the Second Reading Speech on the Bill the Minister for Labour and National Service made, among others, the following points. That Communists in and behind the W.W.F. were posing a substantial threat to the welfare of the nation; a threat that was, at least for the Minister, comparable to that posed by the miners' strikes of 1949; that the dominant factor responsible for bad relations on the waterfront was the domination of the policies and actions of the W.W.F. by Communists; that the Bill he was introducing was not a

^{1. &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 38-39.

reaction to a particular set of circumstances, but that it represented the Government's conclusions reached after 20 years of study of the waterfront; that the Bill did not pretend to deal with the long term problems of the waterfront and that these would be left to Mr. Woodward; that Part III of the legislation dealt with matters that cannot wait for Mr. Woodward; that the most important provisions in the Bill were those which sought to remove the recruitment function from the W.W.F. The reasons for this particular proposed amendment were, the Minister claimed, due to the fact that recruitment had been delayed in certain ports, that some persons with criminal records were being recruited into an industry where pillaging was a problem, and that men previously de-registered were being re-nominated by the Federation. 1

At best the Minister's speech did appear to contain certain contradictory aspects. The Minister claimed that the Parliament was facing exactly the same problem as it faced in 1949 with respect to the coal mining industry. The analogy is a dubious one. The situation in the coal mining industry was far more desperate in 1949 than was the situation in the stevedoring industry in 1965. In 1949 the then Government undertook especially bold measures to deal with a particular situation. The Minister claimed that the proposed changes in the stevedoring industry in 1965 were not in reaction to a particular set of circumstances but that they represented the

Second Reading Speech, Stevedoring Industry Bill, 1965, op. cit.

conclusions reached by the Government over a long period. At the same time the Minister claimed that the legislation did not pretend to deal with the long term problems of the industry and he asserted that Part II of the legislation dealt with matters that could not wait for Mr. Woodward's Report. The most important provision of Part II was that the recruiting function be transferred from the W.W.F. to the A.S.I.A. This provision could only be regarded as having a possible, gradual, long term effect on the industry. As J. Brockett noted:

The Government's decision to take away recruitment from the W.W.F. will not result of itself in any radical change in the water-front work force. No significant change could be expected within five years.

Thus, while asserting that themeasures incorporated in the legislation were not designed to cope with a particular set of circumstances the Minister at the same time claimed that these measures did not pretend to deal with the long term problems of the industry, while the principal change incorporated in the legislation could only possibly have a long term effect.

The legislation received a hostile immediate reception from certain quarters. A newsheet issued by the W.W.F. proclaimed:

The Stevedoring Industry Bill 1965 has been classed by union leaders as the greatest attack on the trade unions ever made in this country. Its object, which is not denied by the Minister in charge of the Bill (Mr. MacMahon), is to crush the waterside workers and their Union, no matter how much democracy suffers in the process.

^{1.} J. Brockett, "At Last the Confrontation", The Bulletin, October 2, 1965, pp. 14-15.

Newsheet, <u>Stevedoring Bill - Threat to all Unions</u>, issued by the Waterside Workers' Federation, printed by Newsletter Printery, Forest Lodge, undated.

In its editorial columns "The Australian" was quite critical of the new legislation. It was claimed that a skin deep approach to the problems of the waterfront had been adopted by the Government, that it (the Government) had shown contempt for an inquiry that it had instigated on the industry, and that it had placed the A.C.T.U. in an invidious position. They wrote:

The present arrangements act against the interests of the nation, of the exporters, of the shipping companies - and the ordinary waterside worker.

The then Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives, Mr. A. A. Calwell, speaking on the Bill noted:

The purpose of the Bill was to break the W.W.F., not to break the Communists' hold on the Sydney and Melbourne waterfronts....The Bill could only cause more turbulence on the waterfront and its implementation could cause chaos beyond the industry.

Mr. Calwell was not alone in his conviction that the Bill would be a generator of wider conflicts on the waterfront. John Stubbs wrote:

> There is a real possibility that troops will be unloading ships on Australian wharves before the end of the year because of the industrial turmoil that is certain to follow the Federal Government's decision to take over control of the recruiting of watersiders.

Yet despite these gloomy predictions, and despite the tattered arguments that were used in support of the Bill, from this time on relations in the stevedoring industry came to be characterised by a

^{1.} Editorial, "Dilemma of the Waterfront", The Australian, 25th September, 1965, p. 8.

^{2.} quoted in The Australian, October 2, 1965, p. 4.

^{3.} John Stubbs, "Troops May Have to be Used on the Wharves", The Australian, September 24, 1965, p. 3.

known previously. After the original hectic reception of the September legislation opposition to the measures was minimal. Labour Party reaction in the Parliament turned feeble; there was little in the way of united resistance on behalf of the trade union movement; indeed, it was claimed that the W.W.F. had come to tamely accept the changes. 1

Since 1965 the industry has been relatively free from severe industrial unrest. Permanent employment has been achieved in a number of mainland ports, while achievements with respect to industrial relations committees, long service leave, retirement pensions, redundancy and so on do represent palpable improvements in structures, procedures and conditions. There are still many problems, yet the future does look brighter ahead; brighter than in July, 1965.

What contribution did the Stevedoring legislation of 1965 make to the improved state of affairs in the industry? Clearly, proponents of the legislation would like to consider it to be directly causative, yet the main provision of the Bill, the one transferring the recruitment function, could not be said to have had any meaningful direct influence to this date. However, it could have been that the threats (deregistration, etc.,) contained in the legislation were enough to convince the W.W.F., both officials and rank and file, to adopt a less militant attitude and a more conciliatory line lest they

^{1.} J. Brockett, "W.W.F. Goes Salvaging", The Bulletin, November 6, 1965, pp. 14-15.

be crushed, especially when one considers that there was a reluctance on the part of the A.C.T.U. to engage in a head on collision with the Federal Government on behalf of the W.W.F. 1 As was noted earlier, the Federation abandoned the planned fortnightly 24 hour national stoppages and accepted the $1\frac{1}{2}\%$ margins increase before the September legislation was introduced. Thus, the legislation could be regarded as a factor which pressurised the Federation into the National Stevedoring Industry Conference from which much apparent good has come. In this sense the stevedoring legislation of 1965 can be regarded as a turning point. Whether the proponents of the legislation anticipated this outcome or not is anybody's guess.

5. National Stevedoring Industry Conference. (1965).

Following the 1965 amendments to the Stevedoring Industry Act the A.C.T.U. approached the Federal Government with a proposal for a conference whose objective would be the long term improvement of conditions in the stevedoring industry. In October, 1965 the Prime Minister announced that such a conference in which representatives of the A.C.T.U., the W.W.F., the Association of Employers of Waterside Labour, the A.S.I.A., and the Department of Labour and National Service were to participate. Mr. A.E. Woodward of the Victorian Bar was appointed chairman of the Conference. At its first meeting the Conference agreed on a wide variety of topics for discussion, among

^{1.} Patrick Nilon, "Improvement Must Come", The Australian, 24 September, 1965, p. 3.

them, clarification of procedures for the Industrial Relations

Committees, permanent employment, retirement pensions, redundancy,

handling of disputes, discipline, improved rates of work, higher wages

and long service leave. 1

Agreement was reached gradually, at least in principle, over the whole range of matters on the Conference agenda. The Conference was conducted in an atmosphere of goodwill probably unparalleled in the history of the industry in this country.²

What then was the nature of some of the more important agreements reached at the Conference? First, and perhaps most importantly, agreement was reached on a scheme of permanent employment to be implemented in a number of the major ports. The scheme involves a system of weekly hire for all regular waterside workers in the major ports. The General Report of the Conference explains that:

Many workers in such ports will have weekly hire with operational stevedores at the outset of the scheme and the proportion will later increase. The remainder will have weekly hire with a representative employer-operated Holding Company which will then make them available for particular jobs with operational stevedores. There will be built in safeguards to ensure generally comparable earnings between Holding Company employees on the one hand and operational employees on the other.

The introduction of this form of employment would seem to be a very definite step in the right direction for, as we saw in Chapter 5,4 permanent employment could help in the solution of many of the

^{1.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1965/66, pp. 23-24.

^{2.} see National Stevedoring Industry Conference, General Report, op. cit., p. 3.

^{3.} National Stevedoring Industry Conference, General Report, op. cit., p. 4.

^{4.} see Chapter 5, pp.123-133for some of the consequences of the lack of a permanent employer-employee relationship.

industrial problems in the stevedoring industry. As the General Report notes even Holding Company employment would still have great advantages over the present casual system for:

In the first place, active personnel managers or industrial officers should be able to develop direct relationships with the men concerned. The functions of rostering, leave granting, paying and dispute handling will bring them into frequent contact with the employees of the Company. It should be possible to make them feel that the Holding Company has a real existence, is interested in its employees, and that they are working for it in a real sense, even though their labour is hired out to operational stevedores on a short term basis.

In recommending a scheme of permanent employment the Conference recognised that there would be some ports that, inevitably, could not be covered by the scheme. Indeed, it was suggested to the writer by a number of persons in the stevedoring industry in Hobart that it would be most difficult to implement a system of permanent employment in the industry in this Port at the moment because of the fact that the registered port strength is far in excess of the port quota, and because of the seasonal nature of the work. This is not to say that permanent employment will not become a more feasible proposition at some time in the future so far as the Port of Hobart is concerned, or that the introduction of permanent employment in other ports will not have any effect on industrial relations in Hobart. Secondly, the Conference also recognised that, while the functions of the A.S.I.A. would remain substantially the same for an adequate trial period for

^{1.} No detailed treatment or criticisms of particular aspects of the scheme envisaged by the Conference will be offered here.

National Stevedoring Industry Conference, General Report, op. cit., p. 5.

^{3. &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 11.

permanent employment, at some time in the future there would be a need to reconsider the role of the Authority in the industry as a result of permancy, which could result in a diminution in the responsibilities of that body.

Thirdly, the Conference agreed that some new approaches to discipline in the industry would be necessary, especially with the advent of permanent employment. It was recognised that now the employer would have to accept a greater responsibility for discipline. A disciplinary code for lesser offences was discussed which found some favour on all sides, however as there proved to be irreconciliable differences as to how the code should be administered the detailed proposals had to be shelved. 1

The Conference also agreed to provide certain refinements to the procedures of the Industrial Relations Committees, the provisions of a pensions scheme and long service leave. Certain suggestions were also made with respect to the problem of redundancy in the industry.

What were the main results of this National Stevedoring
Industry Conference? In the first place, following the 1965 amendments to the Stevedoring Industry Act and the commencement of the
National Conference, the stevedoring industry experienced an almost
unprecedented period of industrial calm. Doubtless all parties to
the Conference were keen to see the venture succeed, and there was a

^{1.} Ibid., p. 18.

^{2.} see Chapter 6, p. 182.

^{3.} see Chapter 6, p. 174.

^{4.} see National Stevedoring Industry Conference, General Report, op. cit., pp. 25, 46-50.

would produce results of very significant and lasting benefit to the industry. Secondly, the Conference provided the opportunity for an interaction, in a favourable atmosphere, 2 which could only have raised the level of mutual understanding between the parties to the discussions. Thirdly, the importance of the achievement of agreement on a scheme of permanent employment and the actual implementation of this scheme in a number of ports should not be under estimated. Permanent employment does seem to be a basic requirement if the industry is to achieve some satisfactory form of organisational design. In toto, the accomplishments of the Conference represented one of the most vital contributions to the decasualisation of the industry in its history. Yet we should be careful not to assume that the Conference has provided a package solution to all the industrial relations problems associated with the industry. In speaking of the Report of the Conference the Minister for Labour and National Service stated:

certain feeling among waterside workers of hope that the Conference

This whole episode has surely disposed once and for all and in the clearest possible way the old notion that used to be freely canvassed that industrial trouble was inseparable from the stevedoring industry. There is absolutely no reason why the peace of the last 18 months should not continue indefinitely.

The Minister's sentiments do seem to be rather too hopeful. In the first place, as we noted in Chapter 1, industrial conflict does seem to be endemic to industrial relations systems. 4 Secondly, industrial

^{1.} A number of waterside workers expressed these feelings to the writer at that time.

^{2.} The General Report commented that agreements were reached in an atmosphere of goodwill probably unparalleled in the history of the industry in this country, see National Stevedoring Industry Conference, General Report, op. cit., p. 2.

^{3.} quoted in Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1966/67, p. 20.

^{4.} see Chapter 1, pp. 9-10.

relations systems are dynamic and changing and particular solutions to particular industrial relations problems cannot be expected to apply for all time. And thirdly, no industrial relations system is such, or should be such, as to preclude the possibility of conflict; a conflict that can be accommodated to within definite functional limits. Thus, while the major contribution to the betterment of industrial relations in the stevedoring industry made by the National Conference must be acknowledged, a realisation of the limitations of the solutions proposed must temper our expectations for the future.

Why was the National Conference begun in 1965 so successful? It would appear that in large part the success of the Conference was attributable to a far more flexible and 'reasonable' approach to the talks on the part of the W.W.F. In August 1965 the Federation had refused to take part in an inquiry into the stevedoring industry; in fact they branded the inquiry as "bogus". Their attitude at this time was most militant and dogmatic. Then in October of the same year the Union seemed to effect a complete about-face when it agreed to take part in the National Conference. What were the reasons for the change? The Federation did seem concerned about the threatening provisions contained in Part III of the amendments to the Stevedoring Industry Act that were introduced in 1965. These provisions, which included the threat of de-registration should the W.W.F., have engaged in certain untoward courses of action, may have convinced the Union that it was in its best interests to join in the Conference and reap what benefits it could in this way for its members. Further, there can be little doubt that the A.C.T.U. played a substantial role in convincing the W.W.F. of the efficacy of their (the W.W.F.) taking

part in the National Conference. After all it was the A.C.T.U. that first suggested to the Federal Government that such a conference be instituted.

A second reason why the Conference was as successful as it was is that it provided a very desirable mechanism for the introduction of change into the industry. Employees will frequently resist changes if these changes are simply imposed by their employers without prior employer-employee consultation. Workers are apprehensive about change, for they may believe that it will result in a decreased wage, job insecurity, disruption of a satisfying social work organisation, or they may be simply afraid of the unknown. Strauss and Sayles note that:

Management often regards resistance as something essentially irrational, forgetting that apparently irrational attitudes or behaviour may be symptoms of deep-seated problems....Too often management assumes that winning acceptance of change merely requires good statemanship or one-way communications. Just as management plans the technical aspects of change, so it must consider in advance the impact on human relations. It must seek to find out how change will affect the people involved. and particularly how it will affect their inter-relationships. The first step in dealing with resistance is to bring the real problems out into the open, to establish genuine two way communication....Those who are seeking to initiate change would be wise to listen carefully to questions, objections and suggestions for modification. Questions should be answered. Some objections and proposed modifications may be useful...Other objections and modifications may not be of a high quality themselves, but their acceptance in a spirit of bargaining may make it easier to win acceptance for the overall change.

^{1.} see Lester Coch and J.R.P. French, "Overcoming Resistance to Change", Human Relations. Vol. 1, 1948, pp. 512-532.

^{2.} G. Strauss and L.R. Sayles, <u>Personnel</u> (2nd Edition)(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 306.

Accordingly, it is important when introducing change into industry to involve all parties that will be affected by the changes in prior consultation so that the problems and perceived effects of the proposed changes can all be clearly noted. And this participation in the implementation of the change must be and seem real to all parties.

P.R. Lawrence warns that:

Participation will never work so long as it is treated as a device to get somebody else to do what you want him to do. Real participation is based upon respect. And respect is not acquired by just trying; it is acquired when the staff man (in this case the employer) faces the reality that he needs the contributions of the operating people.

It would seem that on the national level the Stevedoring Industry Conference has managed to accomplish this real sense of participation in industry change for all groups associated with the industry. Certainly this is a most important factor behind the success of the Conference.

A third possible reason why the Conference achieved so much was the influence of the Chairman, Mr. A.E. Woodward. The Minister for Labour and National Service stated that the Government was especially appreciative of the fine job that Mr. Woodward had done as Chairman. His work earned the goodwill of all engaged in the Conference. 3

P.R. Lawrence, "How to Deal with Resistance to Change", Harvard Business Review, Vol. 32, May-June 1954, p. 56.

^{2.} Undoubtedly, on the local level, the Industrial Relations Committee has achieved the same result in the Port of Hobart.

^{3.} Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, Annual Report, 1966/67, p. 20.

In this Chapter an examination has been made of some of the recent developments that have taken place in the stevedoring industry. In particular an attempt has been made to analyse some of the implications for industrial relations in the Port of Hobart flowing from the Port's special experiences with respect to mechanisation, semi-permanent employment and Industrial Relations Committees. It was observed that mechanisation had decreased the demand for labour in the stevedoring industry in Hobart to such an extent that the amount of surplus labour in the Port had made improbable the introduction of a permanent system of employment, for the moment. It had also resulted in a decrease in the amount of work available per worker, and that it had engendered in the workers certain feelings of job insecurity. At the same time it had made possible the introduction of a semipermanent system of employment to which attached many beneficial The workings of the Industrial Relations Committee in the Port were outlined. It was noted that in Hobart the Committee had functioned quite satisfactorily, for the institution of the Committee in 1963 simply represented a formalisation of procedures that were in use in the Port prior to that date. In a more general sense a review was presented of the 1965 amendments to the Stevedoring Industry Act, and the results and effects of the National Stevedoring Industry Conference were presented. It was concluded that, while the amendments affirmed as most important by the Minister for Labour and National Service were of no immediate consequence, the legislation may have pressurised the W.W.F. into the National Stevedoring

Industry Conference which ushered in an unprecedented period of industrial calm and the achievements of which represent some of the most important steps in the decasualisation of employment in the industry to date.

CHAPTER 7.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

1. Introduction

In the statement of the conclusions there are two most important considerations to bear in mind. First, the variables which define the industrial relations system and which affect the nature of the processes and determine the pattern of relations within the system will be, to some extent, isolated in the statement of the conclusions, yet all these variables bear complex "relationships of mutual dependence" upon each other; thus a change in one variable in the system will not only affect the pattern of relations in its own right, but it will affect other variables in the system, which in turn will affect other variables, and so on. All of these effects will carry various implications so far as the processes and the overall pattern of industrial relations in the industry are concerned. 2 However, in the presentation of the conclusions, while the basic relationships between the variables will be noted, no attempt will be made to detail all possible relationships so that the total impact of changes in particular variables can be gauged. Rather it is hoped that the conclusions will convey a satisfactory overall impression of the determinants of the industrial relations pattern in the industry in

^{1.} see W.F. Whyte, Men at Work, op. cit., p. 51.

^{2.} R.J. May, op. cit., points out the dangers inherent in the approach that seeks to explain the pattern of industrial relations in the stevedoring industry in terms of one variable.

the Port of Hobart without this detailed presentation of the relationships of mutual dependence between the determinants, which relationships however, should be kept in mind. Secondly, it is important in the consideration of the conclusions to have regard to the limitations of this study. Those formal limitations apparent to the writer are presented in Chapter 1.

2. Summary and Conclusions

The history of industrial relations in the stevedoring industry in Australia generally and in Hobart in particular has not been a happy one. Relations during the 1930's and 1940's were especially bad. The antagonisms that developed during these years frustrated the early workings of the governmental agencies in the industry and re-inforced in both employers and employees rigid and dogmatic attitudes; employees emphasising the perceived rapacity of employers; employers emphasising the perceived sloth and lack of concern for the public interest of the employees. And while there has been a very definite improvement in relations over the years the attitudes that were established and re-inforced prior to, during, and immediately after the second World War still affect relations in the industry to this day. At the same time, it would appear that employees, contrasting present conditions with those that prevailed in the 1930's, tend to be favourably impressed with the comparison and consequently more satisfied with their jobs. In this respect it is pertinent to note that older workers and those who have been employed in the industry for relatively long periods tend to be more satisfied with their jobs than younger workers and those with less

work experience in the industry.

2. Stevedoring work is, despite substantial improvements, physically exacting, fairly dangerous and unskilled or semi-skilled.
Kerr and Seigal note that:

If the job is physically difficult and unpleasant, unskilled or semi-skilled, and casual or seasonal, and fosters an independence of spirit...it will draw tough, inconstant, combative and virile workers, and they will be inclined to strike.

The stevedoring industry in Hobart admirably fulfils the Kerr-Seigal qualifications so far as job content is concerned. While the Kerr-Seigal worker characteristics closely conform to the popular "wharfie" stereotype, insufficient data was collected in this study to permit such a definitive description of "the wharfie" to be made.

3. Job context has an important influence upon industrial relations. In the stevedoring industry in Hobart the following factors were found to be significant. First, the seasonal nature of the work means that workers earn high wages for part of the year and relatively low wages for the rest of the year. Some workers explained to the writer that when the fruit export season came along and the demand for labour was high and wages were high that one tended to spend on those goods which one could not previously afford. Thus, when the fruit export season ended and workers had not saved as much as they should have done, they again fell upon hard times. Further,

^{1.} Clark Kerr and Abraham Seigal, op. cit., p. 195.

bargaining power was at its strongest during the fruit export season, the union was reluctant to forceably press its claims at this time for it would mean a loss in wages for its members, it could place intolerable pressures upon the marginal producer in the fruit industry, whose position is reputed to be precarious, and it would be a disastrous exercise in public relations on the part of the W.W.F.

A second important contextural influence upon the industrial relations pattern is the lack of promotional opportunities in the industry. Schnieder and Seigal note that when promotional opportunities do not exist workers tend to be militant and irresponsible. Thus while irresponsibility, or lack of concern for employer objectives, and militancy can be traced to other sources, for example the casual nature of the work, and that dissatisfaction arising from lack of promotional opportunities will be tempered by workers expectations in this regard, the absence of such opportunities can be regarded as a marginal influence on workers attitudes.

Thirdly, the hours of work is an important contextural factor to be taken into account. As consideration has already been made of the yearly irregularity in the hours of work due to the seasonal nature of employment in the industry, in this section attention will be paid to the average weekly number of hours worked, shift work

^{1.} B.V.H. Schnieder and A. Seigal, op. cit.

and overtime work. The average weekly number of hours worked in the Port of Hobart is usually below that same figure for all Australian Ports. (see Table 4.6). This means relatively lower wages and more leisure time for workers in the Port of Hobart. Certainly some workers are happy to have a lot of spare time on their hands, however, others intimated to the writer that they would be more satisfied with more work, especially as this would mean higher wages. Worker attitudes towards shift work were mixed. (see Table 4.8). Dissatisfaction can be possibly explained in terms of V.H. Vroom's diagram (see Chapter 4, p. 90), and by the fact that shift work is not a regular affair in the sense that shift work in a manufacturing plant, for example, may be considered to be a regular affair. Finally, while overtime work is generally prized for the rates of pay that attach to this work, 51.4% or 37 of the respondents to the questionnaire resented having to work overtime in order to earn a satisfactory yearly income.

A fourth element in the job context that was examined was job security. 43 or 59.7% of the respondents to the questionnaire saw their future in the industry as being "somewhat worse" or "much worse than a few years ago". These feelings can be traced back to the perceived threat to job security posed by the mechanisation of stevedoring procedures. (64 or 88.9% of respondents believed that mechanisation posed threats to their job security, while 59 or 81.9% believed that mechanisation had an adverse effect on their wages) Workers' apprehensions as to their future have been very much affected by past experience. From June 1957 to June 1967 the

port quota for Hobart has declined from 825 to 375, while in the same period the registered port strength has fallen from 915 to 585. The decline in the demand for labour reflected in these figures can almost entirely be explained in terms of increased use of mechanised procedures. These feelings of job insecurity would surely be accentuated by the fact that the average age of waterside workers in the industry in Hobart is high. (61.6% of workers are over the age of 50 years.) It was concluded that as job insecurity was an important determinant of worker satisfaction, that the insecurity felt by waterside workers in the Port of Hobart could produce in them an 'inverse halo effect' which would result in the workers feeling discontented with other aspects of their jobs which otherwise they may have been quite happy with.

Wages were another aspect of the job context that were considered. Worker satisfaction with the level of wages as determined by the questionnaire was fairly mixed. (see Table 4.14). On the other hand, 51 or 70.8% of the respondents believed that the wages they received compared "quite favourably with wages received in other industries". Worker dissatisfaction with the level of wages and the emphasis that the W.W.F. places on the wage issue may be explained in terms of the tangibility of the wage issue, the desire for higher wages for the gratification of needs associated with status, recognition and self-esteem, and of course, the desire for more money to satisfy real economic needs. Thus, so far as the question of wages is concerned, it was concluded that, while money is a most important means whereby human needs may be satisfied, the expression

of dissatisfaction with wages should not always be regarded, a priori, as though the wage level is the determining factor.

with respect to the above mentioned contextural factors one cannot say that because they, either jointly or severally, result in worker dissatisfaction that this will necessarily produce conflict in the industrial relations system and its processes. All these factors must be viewed in the perspective of the overall pattern of mutually dependent variables. Generally it may be said that dissatisfaction arising from job insecurity, hours of work, wages and the other contextural variables, does make conflict in the system more specious.

4. What is the effect of particular work force characteristics upon the industrial relations system? First, it was found that, apart from some minor exceptions, the older workers and those workers with a long record of work experience in the stevedoring industry were more satisfied with their jobs than the younger workers and those who had been employed in the industry for only a relatively short period. The significance of this conclusion can be appreciated when one considers that 61.6% of workers in the Port of Hobart are over the age of 50 years, and that no labour has been recruited to the work force in the industry in the Port since 1956. Secondly, so far as work groups were concerned it was found that gangs were highly cohesive social units with which workers, especially permanent gang members, could identify themselves with, and within which they could realise important social needs which tend to make the work more rewarding. Further it was found that the 'floater' status (being not

permanently attached to a gang, provided the opportunity for those workers who preferred to remain outside the permanent gang and accept random job assignments to do so.

- 5. With respect to industry-community relations it was concluded that while waterside workers do not form an industrially, geographically and socially isolated group in the society, stereotype conceptions of the waterside worker, combined with the fact that many persons tend to regard dock work as a low status occupation, seems to produce in the worker a certain amount of resentment and indignation which perhaps re-inforces workers' militancy and sense of solidarity.
- 6. A substantial part of this exercise was devoted to an examination of the nature of the employer-employee relationship.

 The conclusions derived can be presented in the following manner:
- (a) That the casual nature of the work has resulted in, firstly, very casual attitudes on the part of management and workers in the industry. (Casual here perhaps being best defined as neither party really caring much for the welfare of the other). Secondly, that the casual nature of the work meant that there was little direct, constant, effective communication between employees and the complex employer unit. This has resulted in awards and agreements being treated in a fairly inflexible and legalistic sense and that change in the industry has been difficult to facilitate. Thirdly, some writers have claimed that the casual nature of the work has attracted to the industry a "high

proportion of less desirable and less stable types 1 (see Conclusion 2). However, the veracity of this assertion is hard to prove. Fourthly, the casual nature of the work appears to have forced a separation of interests and goals between employers and employees. It is believed that this lack of goal congruency has provided a substantial barrier to communication and made the achievement of a satisfactory state of industrial relations most difficult.

(b) The position of the foreman in the industry was examined. It was found that the foreman was the real 'man in the middle' in the industry who could neither be considered as a part of the management nor of the worker establishments, yet who owed allegiance to both; that because of the lack of a permanent foreman-gang relationship it was difficult for both parties to obtain a good understanding of each other; that the rotation of workers and foremen made it difficult for the foremen to articulate any general employer policy; and that in the evaluation of the foremen the workers are tempted to take the lowest common denominator. It was further discovered that several special considerations operate to affect the nature of the foreman-worker relationship in the Port of Hobart. First, the seasonal nature of the work means that extra foremen and stevedores are employed in the industry in Hobart at certain times of the year. This in turn means that workers have to adjust to new foremen and vice versa. Secondly, mechanisation has made the job of the foreman a

see K.F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, op. cit., p. 289.

little more technical, yet at the same time perhaps a little easier.

And thirdly, because of the size of the work force and the fact that
no labour has been recruited to the force for twelve years workers
and foremen have had a greater opportunity to get to know and understand each other than their counterparts in the larger mainland ports.

The declining authority of the foreman in the industry was noted, and
it was concluded that in this minor aspect that there was perhaps an
imbalance in the authority and responsibility of the foremen. Finally,
it was concluded that while conflict in the stevedoring industry
frequently centres around the foremen that the effect of supervision
upon industrial relations is minimal.

(c) Times were in the stevedoring industry when employer-employee relations were such that the maintenance of a satisfactory grievance procedure was impossible. Now, however, in the industry in Hobart such grievance machinery as exists is most useful in both the accommodation to and the amelioration of conflict. What factors have operated to render the grievance machinery a viable proposition? The general answer to this question is, of course, the general improvement in relations in the industry. More particularly one might observe that, firstly, the personality factor has been an important influence in Hobart. Secondly, the actual nature and structure of the machinery itself has been important; not only does the machinery provide for the prompt settlement of grievances, but the regular meeting of employer and employee representatives in the Industrial Relations Committee provides the opportunity whereby the representatives can discuss mutual problems and plan the introduction of change in the

industry. Thirdly, and again, the size of the industry in Hobart is believed to be such that all parties have a greater opportunity to get to know each other than persons would have in a larger port. This factor would surely make more easy the operation of the grievance machinery in Hobart.

The improvements in the method and functioning of the grievance machinery, which has been made possible by the improved nature of the employer-employee relationship in the industry, has insured that this machinery has itself in turn been a potent force in the betterment of relations in the industry.

(d) Those organisations situated in-between the employer and employee have had vital and various influences on the nature of the employer-employee relationship. First, the regulatory governmental statutory agencies, the A.S.I.A. and its predecessors have done much to decasualise employment in the industry. By attention to such matters as amenities and safety they have greatly improved working conditions. The A.S.I.A. currently provides an in-industry arbitral mechanism for the prompt arbitration of grievances which have proved incapable of solution through negotiation. Further the statutory authorities have done much to foster consultation between employers and employees, and have generally been able to effect an improvement in communications between the various parties in the industry. Finally, by the annual publication of comment and detailed statistics relating to the stevedoring industry the governmental agencies has contributed to a greater understanding of the problems of the industry in Australia. However, recent developments do suggest that the future

operation of these agencies will be more restricted than it is at the moment.

Secondly, so far as the union is concerned, the W.W.F., it can be said that it has been a very militant union which has often acted in such a way as to perpetuate and magnify industrial conflict, at least in the short run, however, it is idle to conclude that the union has caused such conflict. At the same time, the improved working conditions of today can in large part be ascribed to the hard work of the W.W.F. in the past. Now it seems clear that the W.W.F. in 1968 is a far less militant organisation than it was in the 1930's and 1940's. This change may, in part, be attributed to the improved conditions in the industry and to the moderating influence of the A.C.T.U.

Thirdly, the employers associations represent further organisations that are in between the employer and the employee. It was concluded that whereas prior to 1963 when the A.E.W.L. was formed on a national basis, the divergence of interests between the everseas and coastal shipping groups did lead to an ambiguity in employer attitudes in industrial dealings with the unions. With the formation of the A.B.W.L. on a national basis the employers do now tend to present a united front in dealing with the unions on industrial matters.

Fourthly, so far as the arbitral agencies of the Commonwealth Government are concerned, it was seen that in some respects the influence of these agencies upon industrial relations in the stevedoring industry has been most salutory. However, the role of arbitration in the industry is, and has been, restricted, for it is

unable to effect any basic re-organisation within the industry. In addition, its role has been made difficult for it is assumed under a system of compulsory arbitration that the right to strike and lock-out do not exist. Thus, the penalties that have been applied in the past against the W.W.F. for strike action, far from being a deterrent to stoppages, have often tended to produce them.

7. The increasing mechanisation of stevedoring operations has important implications for relations in the industry. First, it has meant that work in the industry is now generally less physically exacting and that the job is rather more skilled than in the past. Secondly, in the Port of Hobart mechanisation has resulted in a substantial decline in the demand for labour such that, at the moment, the registered port strength part exceeds the port quota. This has engendered in many workers certain apprehensions as to their future in the industry, and it has posed problems so far as the introduction of a system of permanent employment is concerned. Thirdly, mechanisation has had, as has been noted in conclusion 6(b), some effect upon supervision. The role of the foreman has been somewhat easier, if a little more technical, by advances in mechanisation; workers are coming to be more controlled by work flow rather than by direct supervision. E.g., on the roll-on, roll-off ferries there is an unchanging job to be performed for each loading and unloading of each vessel. Workers then easily come to know what is required of them without close supervision. Fourthly, mechanisation has had the effect of reducing gang sizes. As yet there has been no change in the basic gang structures. It should be warned that the introduction of any mechanised technique that would affect the basic structure of the gang in such a way as to break down work group cohesion and limit the opportunities for worker interaction on the job should only be very carefully undertaken.

- 8. It was determined that the experience of semi-permanent employment in the stevedoring industry in Hobart has been most satisfactory both from the point of view of the employers and the employees. It has provided certain workers, for a period, with a sense of continuity and regularity of employment; an evenness in the level of wages and a constancy of supervision. The experience of semi-permanent employment in Hobart lends strong support to the contention that a permanent system of employment would be a most desirable thing in this Port.
- 9. The conclusion was reached that while the establishment of an Industrial Relations Committee in Hobart in 1964 simply meant the formal institutionalisation of existing informal procedures that had been used for some time in the handling of grievances, the formalisation of these procedures has been worthwhile for now all grievances are treated in a definite and consistent manner. Further the Industrial Relations Committee provides employers and employees with an opportunity to meet together to discuss problems and difficulties, which direct contact can only but enhance mutual understanding.

- passed in 1965 do seem to represent something of a turning point in the history of the industry. While the principal amendment embodied in the legislation transferring the recruitment function from the W.W.F. to the A.S.I.A. could scarcely have had any direct effect, particularly in Hobart, to this day, the severe nature of the threats contained in the legislation seemed to be sufficient to convince the Federation at the time to adopt a less militant attitude and to agree to take part in the National Stevedoring Conference which commenced towards the end of 1965. The period 1965 to 1968 has been a period of almost unprecedented industrial calm in the stevedoring industry during which time fundamental improvements in the structuring and organisation of the industry have been accomplished together with a distinct improvement in relations.
- 11. Such improvements in structures and relations generally that have been achieved have been in no small part a consequence of the efforts of the National Stevedoring Industry Conference. In a General Report issued in April 1967 the Conference indicated that agreement, at least in principle, between employer, employee and government representatives had been reached over a wide range of topics. Perhaps the most significant achievements of the Conference was the agreement that was reached on a scheme of permanent employment that has subsequently been implemented in a number of the larger mainland ports. Permanent employment represents the final step in the decasualisation of the industry; such a development can only be regarded as a very definite step in the right direction.

The question might be asked, why was this Conference so successful when other similar Conferences have been apparent failures? In the first place, the more flexible and pragmatic approach of the W.W.F. which had been more or less pushed into the Conference by the monitory provisions of the 1965 stevedoring industry legislation, was an important factor. Secondly, the Conference provided an ideal mechanism for the introduction of change and the discussion of problems. Thirdly, the influence of the Conference Chairman, Mr. A.E. Woodward, was claimed to be significant.

Such then are the principal conclusions that have been derived from this exercise. Industrial relations in the stevedoring industry in the Port of Hobart have, over the years, gradually improved until now, far from the open-warfare, disorganised conflict of the 1903's and 1940's, the system could be said to at least approximate that type described by W.F. Whyte as "organised co-operation". It is hoped that the outline of the variables in the conclusions partially describes the impulses that have acted to effect this broad change in the pattern of relations, although detailed inter-relationships have not been traced, nor have all the influential variables been considered.

^{1.} see W.F. Whyte, Pattern for Industrial Peace, op. cit.

Maugre the fact that the prediction of industrial trends is indeed a risky business, on the basis of the evidence considered herein there seems little reason to suspect why current favourable trends should not continue, provided that all parties in the industry ever bear in mind that the constants in social systems are are change and imperfection. Conflict cannot be banished, nor should it be, though it must be accommodated to and defined within certain functional limits. If the actors within the system are cognizant of these facts, and if they are prepared to interact with each other for the purpose of defining and re-defining problems and to search for mutually acceptable and contemporaneous solutions to their problems, then there does seem to be very good reason for optimism about the future of industrial relations in the stevedoring industry in the Port of Hobart.

APPENDIX A.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

Per	sonal Background and Empl	oyment History.
1.	Please indicate into whi	ch age bracket you fall :
	Under 25	46 to 50
	26 to 30	51 to 55
	31 to 35	56 to 60
	36 to 40	61 to 65
	41 to 45	over 65
	12 00 10	
2.	How long have you been w	orking on the Hobart waterfront?
	(years) (months approx.)
3.	What is your current job holder, shedman.	? for example, winchman, hatchman,
	**************************************	(write in)
4.	Approximately how long h	ave you had this job?
	· <u></u>	years) (months)
5.	Are you a "regular" or a	n "irregular"?
		regular
		irregular
6.	Were, or are, any of your (Tick where applicable)	relations waterside workers?
	1	Father
	{	grandfather
		prother or brothers
	······	other (specify if you like)
		one of my relatives, to my knowledge, are or have been employed on the wharves

7.	What were you as you think	or reasons for taking up dock work? (Tick as many apply)
		attraction to conditions of dock work
		convenience
		persuasion of family or friends
		only job available at the time
		attraction of wages
	******	other reasons (specify if you like)
	-	don't know
Nat	ture of the Wor	k Itself
1.	Do you find y	our job - (tick one)
		very physically tiring
		fairly physically tiring
	-Ta-Ta-Ta-Ta-Ta-Ta-Ta-Ta	slightly physically tiring
		not at all physically tiring
2.	In general, a	re working conditions - (tick one)
		very satisfactory
		quite satisfactory
		about average
		quite unsatisfactory
		very unsatisfactory
3.	Is your work	- (tick one)
	-	extremely dangerous
		fairly dangerous
		only slightly dangerous
		not at all dangerous
4.	How do you 1i	ke working shifts? (tick one)
		I dislike shift work very much
		I dislike it somewhat
		I don't mind it
		I like it fairly well
		I like shift work very much

3.	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	ars ago? (tick one)
		much more dirty work now
		a little more
	-	about the same
	·	a little less now
	***************************************	much less dirty work now than several years ago
6.	What do you th your job? (t	ink your friends outside the waterfront think of ick one)
		my friends think it is a good job
	-	a fair job
		a poor job
	<u></u>	I don't know what my friends outside the waterfront think in this respect
7.		ing into consideration, how satisfied are you with s compared to several years ago?
		much less satisfied now
		a little less satisfied now
		about as satisfied now as I was several years ago
		a little more satisfied now
		much more satisfied now
Wor	k Groups	
1.	Are you a perm	anent gang member or a 'floater'?
	***************************************	permanent gang member
		'floater'
2.	Would you pref (tick one)	er to be a permanent gang member or a 'floater'?
	Tomas States	permanent gang member
	-	'floater'
	~~~	no preference

3.	no you reel y	ou are really part or your work group? (tick one)
	-	Yes, I feel I am really part of it
		Yes, I feel I am included in most ways, but not in others
		Yes, I feel I am included in some ways, but not in others
		No, I don't feel I really belong
Wag	es	
1.	How satisfied	are you with your present level of wages? (tick one)
	-	very dissatisfied
		quite dissatisfied
		neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
		fairly well satisfied
		very well satisfied
2.		o work a large amount of overtime over the whole year arn a satisfactory yearly income?
		yes
		no
3.	If the answer do this?	the question 2 is "yes", do you resent having to
		yes
	9 <del>71</del>	no
		indifferent
4.	How do you this industries? (	ink your wages compare with those received in other (tick one)
		very unfavourably
		quite unfavourably
		quite favourably
		very favourably
		- -

5.	Do you believe that the main problem of the waterside worker with regard to his work relates to the level of wages rather than problems posed by mechanisation and automation, pensions and the like?		
		yes	
		no	
		don*t know	
Emp	loyee-Employer	Relations	
1.		at sort of relations do you have with your employers? shipping companies. (tick one)	
	4	very poor	
		poor	
		fair	
		good	
	-	very good	
2.		understanding do you think the top management people ng companies have of the problems of the waterside k one)	
		top management people in the shipping companies have no understanding of our problems	
		a little understanding of our problems	
		some understanding of our problems	
		a considerable understanding of our problems	
	***	a good understanding of our problems	
3.		ew years has there been a change in the interest the anies hold in the problems of the waterside worker?	
		the shipping companies are much less interested in our problems now	
		somewhat less interested now	
		there has been no change in the level of interest	
		somewhat moreinterest now	
		the shipping companies are much more interested	

4.	Have you ever Australian Nat	been employed on a semi-permanent basis with the ional Line?
	<del></del>	yes
		no
5.	If the answer were you so em	to question 4 is "yes", approximately how long ago ployed?
		I am currently so employed
		less than a year ago
		about a year ago
	***************************************	more than a year ago
6.		er been employed on a semi-permanent basis with National Line, how have you liked this form of (tick one)
		very satisfactory
		satisfactory
		fair
		unsatisfactory
		very unsatisfactory
7.		are you about the amount of information you get ing companies about what they are doing and/or? (tick one)
	***************************************	not very well satisfied
		somewhat satisfied, but could get more
	-	fairly well satisfied
		well satisfied
The	Foremen	
1.	How reasonable	are the foremen in what they expect of you? (tick one)
		very unreasonable
		quite unreasonable
		about average
		quite reasonable
		very reasonable

۷.	• • •	ne safely? (tick one)
	not	too concerned at all that we do our job safely
	not	too concerned
	fai	rly concerned
	ver	y concerned that we do our work safely
3.		ervise you fairly closely, or do they leave your own? (tick one)
	the	foremen supervise very closely
	fai	rly closely
	mod	erately closely
	the	foremen use little supervision
4.	Do your foremen -	(tick one)
	alw	ays tell you in advance of changes in your work
	nea	rly always tell us in advance of such changes
	tel	l us occasionally
		foremen seldom tell us in advance of changes our work
5.	In day to day oper keeping costs down	ations how concerned are the foremen with ? (tick one)
	ver	y concerned; they watch costs closely
	qui	te concerned
	fai	rly concerned
		too concerned; they keep an eye on costs, but y do not worry about them too much
	not	at all concerned about costs
6.	jobs? By this we	remen handle the human relations side of their mean getting people to work well together, s to do the best they can, letting people know etc. (tick one)
		foremen do not handle the human relations rt of their jobs at all well
	som	e handle it well; others not so well
	the	foremen handle the humdn relations parts of ir jobs fairly well
		te well
	ver	y well

7. From your dealings with the foremen, how do you think the following comments generally fit them? (Read down the left hand column and then mark in the square you feel contains the most appropriate comment. Thus with the item 'Bossy', if you think this fits 'fairly well' mark in the square under 'fairly well', and so on.

ITEM	Fits very well	Fits fairly well	Does not fit	Does not fit at all
Considerate of our feelings	į.			
Unnecessarily strict			, g. r. rgsg ra e ne e e	
Is a leader of men				
Bossy				
Quick to criticise				
Is a driver of men				
Says one thing means another				
Treats employees as inferiors				
Is a warm and friendly person				

# Mechanisation and Automation

1.		elieve that mechanisation and automation have had any n the wage you receive? (tick one)
		decreased wages
		increased wages
		had no effect on wages
		don*t know
2.	•	elieve mechanisation and automation represent threats to security?
		yes
		no
		don't know
3.	In your	opinion, has increased mechanisation and automation - e)
		improved working conditions considerably
		improved working conditions only slightly
		resulted in no improvement in working conditions
٠		had an adverse effect on working conditions
4.	of the	elieve that waterside workers have received a 'fair share enefits which have come as a result of mechanisation mation?
		yes
		no
		don't know
Cası	ual Natu	e of the Work
1.	Do you	egard your job as being of a casual nature?
		yes
		no

۷.			(tick one)
		s	trongly agree
		a	gree
		·	ndecided
		d	isagree
		s	trongly disagree
3.		agree thasible? (	t permanent employment for waterside workers tick one)
		S	trongly agree
		a	gree
		u	ndecided
		d	isagree
		s	trongly disagree
Job	Securi	<u>ty</u>	
1.	Would	you say yo	ur future as a watersider looks - (tick one)
		81	uch better than a few years ago
		8	omewhat better
		a	bout the same as a few years ago
		s	omewhat worse
		m	uch worse than a few years ago
The	Union	(Waterside	Workers* Federation)
1.	Do you	attend br	anch meetings of your union - (tick one)
		f	requently (at least one in four)
		<u> </u>	airly frequently (one in six)
		<u> </u>	eldom
		n	ever
2.			tend branch meetings of your union, why? you think apply)
		te	oo far to go
		t	oo busy to spare the time
		no	ot interested
		01	ther reasons (specify if you like)

3.	Do you think	your union is doing a good job? (tick one)
		yes, very good
		fairly good
	-	fairly poor
	<u></u>	very poor
4.	Have you ever how many years	held office on the union executive? If so for
		yes (number of years held office)
		no
5.		est do you think the shipping companies have in the estions that might be put forward by your union?
		no interest
		some interest
	-	considerable interest
	-	a great deal of interest
		Its Agencies  I the present Commonwealth Government is disposed ide workers? (tick one)
		favourably
		indifferently
		unfavourably
		·
	<del></del>	don't know
2.	Do you agree t waterside work	hat the Stevedoring Industry Authority gives the er a fair go? (tick one)
•	-	strongly agree
	<del>- 1111 - 1111 - 1</del>	agree
		don't know
	•	disagree
	-	strongly disagree

3.	-	_	ith the suggestion that the stevedoring industry onalised? (tick one)
			strongly agree
			agree
		<del></del>	undecided
			disagree
			strongly disagree

Please feel free to use the remaining space to make any other comments you wish.

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