# Dilapidated Huts and Piles of Rocks: The Geopolitics of Cultural Heritage in Antarctica

by
Rebecca Elise Hingley

Master of International Affairs, Australian National University, 2016

Bachelor of Arts, Australian National University, 2015

Department of English | School of Humanities | College of Arts, Law and Education

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Tasmania
October 2021

*For my grandparents,*

*Nana & Pa J*
*Nana & Pa H*

# Abstract

The idea of heritage in Antarctica stereotypically evokes images of disintegrating huts buried under snow or ice, and rock cairns scattered across the continent. Similarly, it might be thought that the challenges of heritage management in this polar region are limited to maintaining the physical longevity of sites situated in an extreme and remote environment. But these historic remains are powerful political resources as well as vulnerable cultural artefacts. This thesis examines how Antarctic heritage is deployed for geopolitical means by states, providing them with an alternative pathway to influence international affairs. This appropriation of cultural heritage is of particular importance to the currently well-managed, yet technically unresolved, issue of sovereignty south of 60° South latitude. Although the region's overarching governing regime specifically prohibits states from asserting sovereignty within this geographical area, states can enhance their presence in Antarctica by treating historical sites and monuments as signifiers of territorial occupation. The aim of this thesis is therefore to expose how and why the governance of Antarctic heritage concerns more than the preservation and conservation of historic remains, and what effects these alternative agendas have on multilateral relations.

Previous research has established the inherently political nature of cultural heritage and its management in Antarctica. This thesis deepens and extends this research by: arguing that there is an official discourse on Antarctic heritage; examining who this discourse has been constructed by (and whom it benefits); critically analysing the underlying assumptions of this discourse; and investigating how states have applied this discourse within the practice of international relations.

The analysis draws primarily upon scholarship from two disciplines, Political Geography and Heritage Studies. Both of these fields of research support a critical interpretation that not only problematises how states have managed and engaged with Antarctic heritage, but also questions what cultural heritage in Antarctica actually is. Under these broad disciplinary mandates, this thesis employs a discourse analysis as its methodological framework to interrogate the conceptualisation and content of the official discourse on Antarctic heritage, and to investigate how this dominant discourse can and has been geopolitically manipulated by states operating in the polar region.

Structurally, the thesis is centred around three primary research questions. The first asks, ‘Whose perspective on Antarctic heritage counts?’ Both qualitative and quantitative coding techniques are used to answer this question, identifying claimant states as responsible for the definition and treatment of Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments (HSMs) to date. The second research question asks, ‘How have states deployed Antarctic heritage for geopolitical means?’ Here, a geopolitical reading is used to analyse the ways in which states have exploited Antarctic heritage – within exercises of de facto sovereignty; to bolster nation-building strategies; and to meet environmental expectations. The third and final research question asks, ‘Which non-state actors have engaged with Antarctic heritage?’ Again, a geopolitical reading is the chosen method, revealing that although states are the most powerful actors in the region at present, other non-state actors – including the tourism industry, non-governmental organisations, and individuals – can and do perceive of Antarctic heritage differently to states.

In answering these questions, this thesis offers an in-depth and nuanced account of how Antarctic heritage has come to be officially curated and deployed, and also outlines the current and potential future geopolitical implications of a statist interpretation of heritage within Antarctic affairs.

## Declaration of Originality

*This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any material that infringes copyright.*

*I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged, nor has this thesis been submitted for any degree or other purposes.*

*I declare that this is my own work and has not been submitted in any form for another degree or diploma at any university of other institution of tertiary education. Information derived from the published or unpublished work of others has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references is given.*

Signed,

Rebecca Hingley

30 April 2021

## Statement of Authority of Access

*This thesis is not to be made available for loan or copying for two years following the date this statement was signed. Following that time, the thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and communication in accordance with the* Copyright Act 1968.

Signed,

Rebecca Hingley

30 April 2021

## Statement Regarding Published Work

*Chapters Five and Nine have been published in modified form as:*

Hingley, Rebecca, "Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments: Conceptualizing heritage on and around the frozen continent." In *Notions of Heritage*. Québec: Presses de l'Université du Québec, forthcoming 2021.

Hingley, Rebecca. "Diverging Antarctic Heritage Discourses: The geopolitical ramifications of non-state actor engagement with the 'state-sanctioned' version of Antarctic heritage." *The Geographical Journal* (February 2021).

*Due to the inclusion of published material there is unavoidable repetition of material between chapters in this thesis. I am the sole author of both publications.*

*The publishers of these two papers hold the copyright for that content and access to the material should be sought from the respective journals/publishers. The remaining nonpublished content of the thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and communication in accordance with the Statement of Access and the* Copyright Act 1968.

Signed,

Rebecca Hingley

30 April 2021

# Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisory team who have been a constant source of guidance and inspiration throughout this entire project. In particular, Professor Elizabeth Leane has worked tirelessly to provide me with second to none support and has shown me what hard work and dedication can achieve; Dr Karen Alexander has helped me take on interdisciplinary research and has given me consistent encouragement; and Dr Julia Jabour has helped me find my confidence in academia and has offered sage advice. The combined efforts of these three remarkable women have enabled me to thrive during my candidacy and have equipped me with invaluable skills for the future.

This project greatly benefited from the financial support of a Research Training Program scholarship from the Australian Government. In addition, a travel grant from the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research allowed me to attend the Standing Committee on Humanities and Social Sciences biennial conference – an event that came to represent a turning point in my project.

I am grateful for opportunities made available to me by colleagues at the Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies. I am indebted to Dr Andrew Jackson for his orchestration of an internship at the Australian Antarctic Division; to Professor Marcus Haward for the opportunity to program and chaperone a student exchange at the Oceans University of China; and to Dr Hanne Nielsen for the chance to present my research within a teaching environment (and also for her mentorship in early career research).

The comradery I have shared with my postgraduate peers since my first week on the island has been indispensable. From discussing important candidature milestones and hurdles, to syncing our lunch breaks and discussing office politics, we have shared the ups and downs of PhD life, which made day-to-day research not only bearable but enjoyable. The current and former members of office SocSci 317 – in particular, Suus, Eliza, Gabby, Jayson, Sam, Briohny, and Keely – grounded my PhD experience, and I am grateful for the life-long friendships we have made.

I would also like to thank my family. The hospitality of my in-laws, Kim and John, provided welcome getaways and study relief; and rivalry with my brothers, Pip and Lac, left me with no choice but to also earn the title of 'Dr.' My mum, Julie-ann, generously agreed to read over the final draft of this thesis, but most importantly taught me to take a thoughtful and thorough approach to the things in life that matter. My dad, Lyle, was my sounding board and spent hours with me on the phone talking through ideas and arguments, sharing in my frustrations and excitement along the way.

Finally, my husband, Mitch was my stabilising force and acted as my confidant, chef, mechanic, and even humoured my wildlife rehabilitation pursuits to fulfill the role of wallaby dad (to joeys, Hugo, Winston, and Winnifred – my hoppy companions who also played their part in reminding me that there is more to life than the PhD).

All these humans, and non-humans, made it possible for me to reach the end of this mammoth task in relatively sound frame of mind.

I hope they share my joy in its completion,

Rebecca Hingley
nipaluna (Hobart), 30 April 2021.

*My research was conducted on lutruwita (Tasmania) Aboriginal land.*
*I acknowledge with deep respect the traditional owners of this land, the muwinina people.*

# Table of Contents

## Part III: Inter-state

## Part IV: Extra-state



## Part V: Conclusion

# List of Figures

# List of Tables

# List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AAD | Australian Antarctic Division |
| AAT | Australian Antarctic Territory |
| AD | Addendum Paper |
| AHC | Australian Heritage Council |
| AHD | Authorised Heritage Discourse |
| AHT | Antarctic Heritage Trust |
| ALSA | Antarctic Legacy of South Africa |
| APA | Antarctic Protected Area |
| ASMA | Antarctic Specially Managed Area |
| ASOC | Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition |
| ASPA | Antarctic Specially Protected Area |
| ATCM | Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting |
| ATCP | Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party |
| ATS | Antarctic Treaty System |
| AUV | Automated Underwater Vehicle |
| BP | Background Paper |
| CAA | Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration |
| CCAMLR | Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources |
| CEP | Committee for Environmental Protection |
| CMP | Conservation Management Plan |
| COMNAP | Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs |
| CRAMRA | Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities |
| HASS | Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences |
| HSM | Historic Sites and Monuments |
| IAATO | International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators |
| ICG | Intersessional Contact Group |

| | |
|---|---|
| ICOMOS | International Council on Monuments and Sites |
| IGY | International Geophysical Year |
| IP | Information Paper |
| IPHC | International Polar Heritage Committee |
| IUCN | International Union for Conservation of Nature |
| MHF | Mawson's Huts Foundation |
| MISA | Malaysian International Seminar on Antarctica |
| MP | Management Plan |
| MPA | Marine Protected Area |
| MSSSI | Marine Site of Special Scientific Interest |
| NAM | Non-Aligned Movement |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NZAHT | New Zealand Antarctic Heritage Trust |
| PAHD | Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse |
| POI | Pole of Inaccessibility |
| PRIC | Polar Research Institute of China |
| SATCM | Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting |
| SCAR | Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research |
| SORS | Southern Ocean Rim States |
| SP | Secretariat Paper |
| SPA | Specially Protected Area |
| SPRI | Scott Polar Research Institute |
| SRA | Special Reserved Area |
| SSSI | Sites of Special Scientific Interest |
| UKAHT | United Kingdom Antarctic Heritage Trust |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation |
| UNGA | United Nations General Assembly |
| WP | Working Paper |

# Preface

*18 degrees of difference*

Figure 0.1: The author at her home during a snow event in southeast Tasmania.
(Photo taken by author.)

On 4 August 2020, during the latter stages of my thesis research, I was snowed-in at my house just outside of Hobart, Australia (42° South latitude). Much of Tasmania's southeast was blanketed by a weather system that had moved northward from the Antarctic continent causing snow to fall close to sea level. Although the snow did not stick on the ground in town as it did at my home in the Huon, Hobart residents were on 'Snow alert … as "Antarctic air" [swept] towards Tasmania.'[1] It was a stark reminder of the reason we had moved to the state in the first

[1] Damian McIntyre, "Snow alert for Hobart as 'Antarctic air' sweeps towards Tasmania," the *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 3 August 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-03/snow-alert-for-hobart-as-cold-front-bound-for-tas/12518408.

place – for its proximity to the frozen continent.[2] I had very literally migrated south to live as close as I reasonably could to Antarctica in order to study it. In the above photo, I am standing in front of tree ferns, or *Dixonia antarctica* – further tangible evidence of the island's ancient geographical connection with Antarctica (Gondwana).

Perhaps the reason for all the excitement (including my own) in the lead up to the snow, or at least the potential for it, was because the white stuff is what many Australian – even Tasmanian – people associate with an environment they would not normally find themselves in: an environment that epitomises polar places. Even the anticipation of snowfall evokes an affective link with Antarctica. For me, the snowfall on that day was a physical reminder of the continent's proximity to me and the island, and acted as a metaphor for Antarctica's global connectedness. This polar region is often considered to be a unique, exceptional, and mystical place a world away from everyday life,[3] but it cannot and does not exist in a vacuum. Just as its weather patterns creep north, international politics creeps south and influences the everyday governing of the geographic area south of 60° South latitude. In this sense, Antarctic geopolitics really is *un*exceptional. However, this does not mean that it is not distinct or worthy of further investigation; quite the opposite. Because of the Antarctic region's susceptibility to political forces operating elsewhere around the globe, the effect these forces have on Antarctic affairs is unique. In this thesis, I study these geopolitical pressures through their manifestation within Antarctic cultural heritage management.

[2] I was drawn to the University of Tasmania/Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies for its critical mass of expertise in Antarctic Studies – a research connection that cannot be separated from Hobart's geographical proximity to the continent and status as an Antarctic Gateway city.
[3] Maria Ximena Senatore, "Things in Antarctica: An archaeological perspective," *The Polar Journal* 10, no. 2 (2020): 1.

# Chapter One: Introduction

*The geopolitics of Antarctic heritage*

Figure 1.1: The sinking of the *Endurance*. (Frank Hurley/Scott Polar Research Institute.)

At the 2019 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM XLII), the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) designated the wreck of the *Endurance* – a vessel used by Ernest Shackleton's 1914-1916 Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition – as a Historic Site or Monument (HSM), despite its unknown location (Figure 1.1).[1] Five of the seven criteria for HSM designation listed under the HSM Guidelines were cited to justify its historic significance.[2] The United Kingdom (UK) had flagged its intention to make the proposal at the previous ATCM (XLI) in 2018, stating in a Working Paper that it wished to 'confirm the protection status of the vessel in the event that it is located,' after learning of plans by non-

[1] It is estimated to be located somewhere on the seabed of the western Weddell Sea. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraph 113.
[2] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for proposing new Historic Sites and Monuments*, Resolution 8, 1995.

governmental actors to locate the wreck in coming seasons.[3] From January to February 2019 the Weddell Sea Expedition[4] attempted to find the wreck with the assistance of an Automated Underwater Vehicle (AUV) – a piece of technology that was eventually lost somewhere under the sea ice of the Weddell Sea during the efforts. Even though the expedition did not successfully locate the wreck, expedition members and the reporting media celebrated the attempt and compared the expedition's plight with that of Shackleton's men, referencing the harsh Antarctic conditions as the ultimate nemesis and reason for failure.[5]

Apart from affirming humans' tendencies to rationalise their present situation (the fate of the Weddell Sea Expedition) with events of the past (the Heroic Era),[6] the activity and interest around the *Endurance* demonstrates the complexity of managing heritage in Antarctica. The first challenge this wreck poses, even prior to attempts to locate it, is in relation to issues of possession and responsibility. It was clear that the UK was concerned about non-governmental parties locating the wreck, and therefore once aware of potential plans to do so, the state secured the wreck's protection under two separate ATCM resolutions.[7] This protection pertained not only to the ship, but also personal possessions and all artefacts lying nearby on the seabed. These pre-emptive steps are controversial because the seabed on which the *Endurance* rests is an area contested between the UK, Argentina, and Chile – even though by definition the seabed is not within claimed territory, it may be below waters appurtenant to claimed area – meaning that the wreck could be interpreted by the wider international community as lying outside the UK's sovereignty and jurisdiction. The UK has also claimed responsibility for how the wreck should be treated if found – undisturbed, photographed only, and left in situ. In effect, the UK has positioned itself as head curator, drawing upon established international principles and adopting best practice for the management of underwater cultural heritage.[8] The historic

[3] The United Kingdom, *Notification of pre-1958 historic remains: Wreck of Sir Ernest Shackleton's vessel Endurance*, WP021 (2018): 3.
[4] An expedition funded by a Netherlands-based marine charity, The Flotilla Foundation.
[5] The History Channel aired an episode titled 'Endurance: The Hunt for Shackleton's Ice Ship' on November 28, 2020 in which several key expedition members were interviewed throughout the voyage, and also several news outlets have covered the expedition in the past few years such as those from the British Broadcasting Corporation, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the Scott Polar Research Institute (Cambridge University) and the expedition's website. History's Greatest Mysteries, "Endurance: The Hunt for Shackleton's Ice Ship," *History Channel*, 28 November 2020, https://www.history.com/shows/historys-greatest-mysteries/season-1/episode-3.
[6] The Heroic Era is typically defined as the period between 1895 and 1922 when explorers from primarily white colonial nation-states were exploring, mapping, and researching the region.
[7] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for handling of pre-1958 historic remains whose existence or present location is not yet known*, Resolution 5, 2001; and Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for the assessment and management of Heritage in Antarctica*, Resolution 2, 2018.
[8] The International Polar Heritage Committee (IPHC) plays an important role in determining best practice for the treatment of underwater archaeology in the polar region.

remains of the *Endurance* also highlight the growing significance and acceptance of what in the following I term 'temporarily intangible' heritage in Antarctica. Even though the wreck is yet to be found and the state of its existence is unknown, it represents a legendary story of survival within Antarctic history. Lastly, the equipment lost during the 2019 expedition raises questions about the definition of heritage as opposed to waste. A submarine-like device (the AUV) now resides somewhere in the Weddell Sea, but what potentially defines this chunk of metal as waste, while a decaying wooden ship is considered heritage? These are the types of questions with which this thesis is concerned.

As these recent events suggest, historic remains in Antarctica are powerful political resources as well as vulnerable cultural artefacts. The management[9] of these sites is therefore not limited to ensuring their physical longevity. It also involves diplomatic negotiations over what can and cannot be considered heritage in Antarctica in the first place, and subsequently how it should be engaged with. The decisions made and codified within this managing process take place against the backdrop of the region's overarching governing regime, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). At first, it may not be apparent how dilapidated huts buried under snow and ice or piles of rocks scattered across the continent can impact Antarctic geopolitics, but not all governance takes place within traditional arenas of diplomacy. This is particularly important to recognise in a global region like Antarctica where an international treaty prohibits conventional claims to sovereignty. In this context, these historic remains serve as states' physical signifiers of past conquest and occupation in Antarctica. In an effort to better understand the geopolitical appropriation of historic sites and monuments by states in this part of the world, this thesis considers how Antarctic heritage has been officially curated and deployed, and explains the geopolitical implications of a statist interpretation of heritage. I argue that the prevailing approach to heritage in Antarctica has been developed by states, exploited by states, and adhered to by non-state political actors.

This thesis' problematisation of Antarctic heritage as both a concept and a practice challenges arguments for Antarctic 'exceptionalism' – that is, the idea that Antarctica is 'a place apart' from the rest of the globe; a pristine space reserved for peace and science.[10] But even though

[9] I use this term in the same way as Barr – that is, to refer to the overarching regulation, administration, and treatment of cultural heritage within Antarctica. Susan Barr, "Twenty years of protection of historic values in Antarctica under the Madrid Protocol," *The Polar Journal* 8, no. 2 (2018): 241-264.
[10] Elizabeth Leane, "Fictionalizing Antarctica," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 27.

the region's history is unique and its overarching governing regime is worthy of celebration, Antarctica is not exempt from the social, cultural, and political forces that exist around, and influence, the rest of the globe. An analysis of the governing of Antarctic heritage is instrumental in illustrating the unexceptional nature of Antarctic geopolitics.

## 1. Research Questions: The 'who,' the 'how,' and the 'which' of Antarctic heritage geopolitics

Within this thesis, I aim to better understand the nature of Antarctic geopolitics through an analysis of states' deployment of Antarctic heritage for geopolitical means. To meet this objective, I pose three primary research questions, which divide the body of the thesis into three sections (see bold in Figure 1.2). The form and method for each section necessarily differ, but all are informed by a broadly critical approach that suspects Antarctic heritage management of being co-opted by statist agendas. I address the perspectives of non-state political actors, but inevitably the predominant focus is on states as they are the most dominant actors in the region.




Figure 1.2: Map of research questions.

My first primary research question is: ‘Whose perspective on Antarctic heritage counts?’ This question implies that there are multiple perspectives on Antarctic heritage, and therefore potentially multiple ways in which it could be governed. My assumption here is that the perspective that counts is the one written down and enshrined within international law, or in other words, is adopted as the official interpretation of heritage within the ATS. The author/s of heritage discourse in this region have not been explicitly identified previously, nor has the framework they have constructed within the region’s governing regime been deconstructed. By identifying whom Antarctic heritage has been curated by and for, and what Antarctic heritage entails, I expose the underlying power dynamics and decision-making processes. In turn, these findings have ramifications for understanding how Antarctic heritage has been managed in the past and present, but also for determining how it could be managed in the future.

My second primary research question is: ‘How have states deployed Antarctic heritage for geopolitical means?’ As touched upon earlier, this question arises from my interest in states proposing, designating, and managing Antarctic heritage for means other than the conservation and preservation of the historic remains themselves. I am not suggesting that states do not invest in the protection of these artefacts at all, but rather that they have identified the governance of Antarctic heritage as a means to achieve additional national objectives. The most obvious and valuable function Antarctic heritage can serve for states is as evidence of past, present, and intended future presence in the region. But heritage sites and objects can also assist in nation-building efforts for states with more recent Antarctic pasts, and help states appear to be meeting environmental expectations. I will analyse all of these ulterior statist motives for the protection of historic remains on and around the continent, making explicit what is implicitly known about the management of Antarctic heritage in the process. More generally, my answer to this research question gives further explanation to state behaviour in the region, particularly in relation to the governance of protected areas.

My third and final primary research question is: ‘Which non-state actors have engaged with Antarctic heritage?’ No thesis on the geopolitics of Antarctic heritage management would be complete without an acknowledgement of the role of non-state actors. Although states are still the most dominant political actors within both international politics around the globe as well as in Antarctica, several non-state actors are active and influential within the region. The three I investigate within this section are the tourism industry, non-governmental organisations

(NGOs), and individuals. Each of these groups hold alternative interpretations of heritage to states, and although they have not yet actively challenged how the prevailing perspective defines and manages Antarctic heritage, there is potential for their perceptions to influence how historic remains in Antarctica are perceived and used in the future. At present, however, their engagement with Antarctic heritage co-exists with the statist perspective in relative harmony. As will become evident throughout the course of this thesis, the cultural phenomenon of heritage is by no means a fixed thing. It is an intersubjective concept socially determined by various actors at various points in time.

## 2. Background: Antarctic Studies, Political Geography, and Heritage Studies

These questions are inspired by previous research within the field of Antarctic Studies[11] focusing on either Antarctic geopolitics, Antarctic heritage, or both. Political geographers and Heritage Studies scholars have already debated the value of analysing geopolitical discourse, discussed the defining characteristics of geopolitical discourse in Antarctica, outlined the problems facing Antarctic heritage governance overall, and detailed issues pertaining to the management of Historic Sites and Monuments in particular. I address each of these contributions and what they mean in the context of this thesis below.

The analysis of geopolitical discourse anywhere on the globe, and in relation to any cultural phenomenon (such as cultural heritage) has not always been considered a legitimate line of enquiry within Political Geography. Until the emergence of critical geopolitics in the late twentieth century that contemplated the social construction of 'place,' the discipline was concerned only with how politics can affect geographical spaces, and not the reverse. Following this critical turn, scholars researching Antarctic geopolitics also adopted the latter view, what is also referred to as the 'new geopolitics.' Dodds began discussing the discourse of Antarctic geopolitics in 1997 to reveal the dominant spatialisations or discourses of the region throughout the twentieth century, in turn giving context and explanation to the behaviour of political actors, both state and non-state, which operate there.[12] Dodds uses the term 'geopolitical imagination' to acknowledge that Antarctica is as much a product of the imagination as it is a tangible place. He also emphasises that because only a select few can

[11] This new subfield is now offered as an interdisciplinary study pathway at multiple universities around the globe including the University of Tasmania in Australia, the University of Canterbury in New Zealand, the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom, and the University of Groningen in the Netherlands.
[12] Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics in Antarctica: Views from the Southern Oceanic Rim* (Cambridge: Scott Polar Research Institute, 1997).

experience the continent and its surrounding ocean, their accounts of these places become highly fetishised – in effect skewing the geographical knowledge distributed and reproduced.

This imbalance in the distribution of knowledge about Antarctica results in a power imbalance within the practice of Antarctic geopolitics, which includes the governance of Antarctic heritage. Chaturvedi is acutely aware of the need for equitable and socially sustainable policymaking on the behalf of developing countries within the region. He focuses on the elements – that is, the people, materials, resources, and even history – that make up the territorial units that are sovereign states.[13] He advocates for the adoption of a critical lens to view geopolitical research and believes that 'the success of the new geopolitics on the ground … depends largely on the ability and willingness of politics to transcend narrow state-centred, power-political concerns and to address the issues that concern humanity as a whole.'[14] With regard to the polar regions in particular, he comes to the conclusion that they 'have been perceived differently at different times in history, and the human perceptions of, and attitudes to, these regions have also changed from one historical period to another.'[15] The overall relationship between discourse and power and its manifestation within Antarctica informs the methodological underpinning of this thesis.

The protracted issue of sovereignty in Antarctica heavily influences geopolitical discourse in the region, which again includes discourse on Antarctic heritage. Since the Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1961, claims to territory south of 60° South latitude have been effectively 'frozen,' meaning that territorial claims are prohibited while the Treaty is in force, and that those made prior to 1961 do not receive formal international recognition. Several scholars have commented on how this sovereignty dilemma has characterised Antarctic affairs to date. Chaturvedi talks about how 'both the polar regions have been deeply affected by the sovereignty discourse, the geography of imperialism and the geopolitics of state power.'[16] Collis also analyses imperialistic agendas and describes 'cultural technologies' that states have pursued throughout the Heroic Era, which include 'representation, international territorial law, and the body of the explorer.'[17] Lastly, Dodds discusses how performances of sovereignty in

[13] Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions: A Political Geography* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1996).
[14] Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions: A Political Geography*, 259.
[15] Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions: A Political Geography*, 81.
[16] Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions: A Political Geography*, 81.
[17] In this article Collis is referring specifically to Australian Antarctic histories of occupation. Christy Collis, "The Proclamation Island moment: making Antarctica Australian," *Law Text Culture* 8, no. 1 (2004): 40.

Antarctica – such as those traceable in 'maps, postage stamps, public education, flag waving, place naming, scientific activity, the regulation of fishing, flying pregnant women to the region and public ceremonies such as commemoration'[18] – fit within a broader colonial project for Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Sovereignty is therefore a defining characteristic of Antarctic geopolitics and is helpful in explaining state behaviour in the region, particularly in relation to the management and treatment of historic remains. These observations on Antarctic sovereignty are also relevant to this thesis' analysis of Antarctic heritage, as they provide vital context for how and why these historic remains came to be situated in the region in the first place.

The emergence of a 'new geopolitics' in the discipline of Political Geography and its application within an Antarctic (and Arctic) context has culminated in the emergence of critical polar geopolitics[19] – the subfield in which this thesis is grounded. In addition to providing an epistemological foundation for my research, this critical body of work validates my analysis of an otherwise under-researched pathway of international relations and diplomacy: cultural heritage management. In other words, this scholarship from Political Geography has provided me with a mandate to study cultural phenomena within Antarctic geopolitics, whilst scholarship from Heritage Studies has provided me with the necessary knowledge of this phenomena – cultural heritage – to sustain and meaningfully add to the conversation.

The challenges facing heritage governance around the globe have been discussed by heritage professionals and experts for decades, but similar to Political Geography, Heritage Studies has only recently accepted discourse analysis as a legitimate method of enquiry.[20] Ever since the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) first attempted to define heritage values within the ATS at the first ATCM, criticism from polar heritage specialists has grown. This group holds two primary concerns: who and what Antarctic heritage has come to represent, and how heritage in Antarctica is evaluated and subsequently treated.

[18] Klaus Dodds, "Sovereignty watch: claimant states, resources, and territory in contemporary Antarctica," *Polar Record* 47, no. 3 (2011): 234.
[19] This subfield includes the analysis of Arctic affairs.
[20] Smith was particularly instrumental in this development, but I will wait to discuss her contribution in relation to the prevailing discourse on Antarctic heritage until *Chapter Five: Authorising Heritage*. Laurajane Smith, *Uses of Heritage* (London: Routledge, 2006).

The first concern is in relation to the official recognition, documentation, and protection of some historic sites over others, namely sites from within the Heroic Era over sites from within the sealing and whaling period.[21] Researchers such as Senatore and Avango have raised the profile of the sites that commemorate exploitation over exploration – that is, sealing and whaling sites rather than those linked to the Heroic Era. Senatore describes the complex heritage-making process in Antarctica, highlighting the differing perspectives that have sought to either question or reinforce the dominant narratives of Antarctic history.[22] She argues that since the signing of the Treaty in 1959, competing national interests have made heritage in the region a political issue, and suggests that national appropriation of heritage is why the narratives of human experiences and presences in Antarctica have omitted industrial and contemporary archaeologies thus far.[23] Senatore believes that the official representations of heritage in Antarctica today (HSMs) are 'material expressions of the dominant narratives of Antarctic history'[24] in which the sealing and whaling sites have been framed as 'part of a shameful past of over-exploitation of Antarctic marine resources that are currently being protected.'[25] Avango also focuses on industrial heritage sites and shows how historic sites such as Antarctic whaling sites can be used to construct narratives that support claims for political influence.[26] These accounts of alternative and less attractive Antarctic histories are integral to defining what official discourse does not typically categorise, commemorate, and celebrate as 'heritage,' and hence are central to this thesis' analysis of the official discourse on Antarctic heritage and its application by states.

The second concern held by heritage specialists pertains to the method and logic of heritage evaluation within Antarctic governance. Although the ATS has adopted guidelines for the assessment of sites of historic significance since 1995, the criteria these guidelines follow are strategically vague in an attempt to avoid international discord within both their initial adoption and subsequent operation. This has left historic sites in Antarctica vulnerable to state

[21] Sealing began in the region at the end of the eighteenth century, while whaling began at the end of the nineteenth century. Tom Griffiths, *Slicing the Silence: Voyaging to Antarctica* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2007), 55-58.
[22] Maria Ximena Senatore, "Archaeologies in Antarctica from Nostalgia to Capitalism: A Review," *International Journal of Historical Archaeology* 23, (2019): 755-771.
[23] Senatore, "Archaeologies in Antarctica from Nostalgia to Capitalism: A Review," 755-771.
[24] Senatore, "Archaeologies in Antarctica from Nostalgia to Capitalism: A Review," 767.
[25] Senatore, "Archaeologies in Antarctica from Nostalgia to Capitalism: A Review," 767.
[26] Dag Avango, "Working geopolitics: sealing, whaling, and industrialized Antarctica," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017).

exploitation because there is no consistent definition of what is and is not considered heritage. The lack of guidance was problematic during the 'clean-up Antarctica' campaign initiated during the 1980s' environmental movement.[27] In relation to the otherwise environmentally responsible and sustainable behaviours encouraged by this movement, Barr and Chaplin report their trepidations over the ensuing 'overwhelming reason to remove all traces of past human activity' on and around the continent.[28] Pearson also points out that 'what is artefact and what is rubbish is a central issue in making appropriate decisions that balance cultural heritage and environmental values.'[29] Evans reinforces this argument and highlights the delay in the adoption of best practice in cultural heritage management in Antarctica when discussing Australia's cultural heritage management approach.[30] But to further complicate the issue, these scholars are generally aware that what one person or country considers heritage, another may not, and therefore that it is impossible to reach a universal definition of Antarctic heritage that works in practice. Avango summarises this subjectivity well when he talks about heritage sites in Antarctica as 'places of memory, which actors for various reasons have defined as cultural heritage.'[31] This thesis acknowledges these concerns, but instead of trying to find a potentially non-existent solution, it performs a discourse analysis to show how this ad hoc approach to heritage management in Antarctica came about, and to also consider the current and potential future geopolitical implications of this discourse development.

Commentary relating specifically to Historic Sites and Monuments is also of key relevance here. Roura's highlighting of the linkage between Antarctic geopolitics and HSM designation has had a strong influence on my own analysis.[32] His investigation of the features and geopolitical uses of HSMs is the precursor for what this thesis is trying to achieve: a comprehensive geopolitical analysis of cultural heritage in Antarctica. Lintott also corroborates the importance and relevance of a geopolitical analysis of cultural heritage in Antarctica when

[27] Emma Shortis, "Lessons from the Last Continent: Science, Emotion, and the Relevance of History," *Communicating the Climate* 4, (2019): 53-60.
[28] Paul Chaplin and Susan Barr, "Polar Heritage: Rubbish Or Relics?" *Heritage at Risk* (2002/2003): 233.
[29] Michael Pearson, "Artefact or rubbish – a dilemma for Antarctic managers," in *Cultural Heritage in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions*, eds. Susan Barr and Paul Chaplin (Oslo: ICOMOS, 2004), 42.
[30] Sherrie-lee Evans, "Icy Heritage–managing Historic Sites in the Antarctic: Pristine Wilderness, Anthropogenic Degradation or Cultural Landscape?" *The Polar Journal* 1, no. 1 (2011): 87-100.
[31] Dag Avango, "Historical Sites and Heritage in the Polar Regions," in *The Routledge Handbook on the Polar Regions*, eds. Mark Nuttall, Torben R. Christensen, and Martin J. Siegert (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 116.
[32] Ricardo Roura, "Antarctic Cultural Heritage: Geopolitics and Management," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017).

analysing Scott's and Shackleton's Huts through the discipline of International Relations.[33] But Warren's 1989 Masters thesis, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties,"[34] is the most comprehensive attempt yet at such an analysis and therefore is the primary point of departure for my own research. Warren's primary objective was to emphasise the lack of adequate protection for what she called 'Historic Resources' in the region; she believed that the ATS had not given the subject sufficient recognition, attention, or prioritisation prior to this. She intended to fill this gap and create impetus on the issue so that HSMs could 'survive as more than curiosities' in the region. In her final chapter, Warren makes several recommendations and provides several options for implementation, but her overall petition can be summarised as requesting three developments: 'the adoption of criteria for site designation, the use of professionals trained in appropriate fields and a financial commitment to implement protection strategies.'[35] In reflecting on these requests some three decades later, I would argue that these appear to have been only partly achieved: criteria for HSM proposals were adopted in 1995; heritage trusts and foundations are now involved with the conservation of HSMs, but the advice of heritage experts is yet to be fully integrated within the ATCM decision-making processes; and a large portion of the funding for the maintenance of HSMs derives from private donors rather than national programs.

Although this thesis draws on similar content to Warren and similarly questions the politics and management of Antarctic heritage, my approach differs in three integral areas. First, my research questions the operation of heritage management systems in the region, but it also questions the underlying discourse. Secondly, the methods and techniques I employ contrast: a discourse analysis as opposed to problem-solving, and a geopolitical reading as opposed to a survey. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, our a priori assumptions on the politicisation of Antarctic heritage diverge: Warren believes that with the implementation of effective criteria for HSM proposals, 'the potential political motivation to designate an Historic Resource [is]

[33] Bryan Lintott, "Scott's and Shackleton's Huts: Antarctic Heritage and International Relations" (PhD diss., University of Canterbury, 2015).
[34] Patricia Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties" (draft of master's thesis, University of Washington, 1989), 21. Due to COVID-19 restrictions I was unable to source the final thesis from the UOW, but had access to the penultimate draft.
[35] Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties," 108.

eliminated,'[36] whereas I argue that Antarctic heritage and its governance is inherently political and therefore it is impossible to isolate the management of these places and objects from the politics of the region more widely. In addition to these methodological differences, several significant developments have occurred within the three decades that separate our theses – most prominently, the signing of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. Nonetheless, the direction and objectives of my analysis are strongly indebted to her work, as well as the scholars mentioned above.

## 3. Research Scope: Terms and Boundaries

Here I set my parameters for the thesis by defining key terms and marking significant boundaries. The definitions most crucial to make are in relation to the primary research areas of geopolitics and heritage. A classical interpretation of the term 'geopolitics' focuses on the practical application of geostrategy by state elites.[37] However, the term became tainted by the *Geopolitik* of the Nazi regime during the 1930s, and after its explosive use by intellectuals, politicians, and the public in the 1980s, political geographers sought a new definition. In response to this need, Ó Tuathail and Agnew reconceptualised the definition of 'geopolitics' to describe a formal academic area of enquiry, as well as a practical discourse. These scholars maintained that 'the natural environment and geographical setting of a state … exercised the greatest influence on its destiny,'[38] but, in stark contrast to their predecessors, did not believe that this setting was absolute, non-discursive, or removed from politics. Chaturvedi adopted this view when discussing the polar regions and defined new geopolitics as 'both a new geography and a new politics … [that are necessary as] politics becomes more civil-society-oriented, transcending narrow state-centric concerns, and as a geography becomes more humanized.'[39] I adopt this critical interpretation, as it encompasses not only how geographical space can affect the practice of politics, but also how politics can affect the meaning of place.

[36] Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties," 113-114.
[37] Virginie Mamadouh and Gertjan Dijkink, "Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse," *Geopolitics* 11, no. 3 (2006): 353.
[38] Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," *Political Geography* 11, no. 2 (1992): 191.
[39] Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions: A Political Geography*, 2.

The definition of 'heritage' has undergone a similar evolution. Until the critical turn within Heritage Studies at the new millennium, the term was relatively unproblematised.[40] The only direction was from the word 'eritage' – translating from Old French as property which 'devolves by right of inheritance in a process involving a series of linked hereditary successions'[41] – and as such the derivative 'heritage' was used to refer overwhelmingly to material historic remains, usually those that could be passed on. But after the 'heritage boom' of the late twentieth century,[42] heritage experts began to question the material and nationalistic focus of the field. A decade later, Winter sought to clarify how these experts understood and applied heritage, and concluded that there was still no consensus on what heritage actually entailed within the new subfield of critical heritage studies.[43] Just as geopolitics can be considered a social construct, so can heritage. I therefore refer to heritage throughout this thesis as a dynamic and contested concept, the meaning of which is determined by the user. It is embodied within practices, experiences, emotions, and physical materials in which differing and incompatible meanings can exist simultaneously.[44] However, my main focus is on material remains, as the official definition of Antarctic heritage with which I am concerned is synonymous with the designated HSMs on and around the continent. I also discuss informal Antarctic heritage, such as historic places or objects that are yet to be proposed for official protection, but much less so.

The boundaries for this thesis are geographical, temporal, and theoretical. Geographically, I apply the official description from the Antarctic Treaty: 'the area south of 60° South Latitude.'[45] This is because the official version of Antarctic heritage within this system is my primary focus. Temporally, I investigate the 60-year period between 1959 and 2019, as it encompasses all official discussions on Antarctic heritage up until the time of writing. Lastly, I have narrowed the theoretical boundary of the concept of heritage. Although there is no universal definition for heritage, there is a general consensus among heritage scholars that the

[40] Emma Waterton, Laurajane Smith, and Gary Campbell, "The Utility of Discourse Analysis to Heritage Studies: The Burra Charter and Social Inclusion," *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 12, no. 4 (2006): 339.
[41] Nezar Alsayyad, *Consuming Tradition, Manufacturing Heritage: Global Norms and Urban Forms in the Age of Tourism* (London: Routledge, 2013), 2.
[42] This boom took place in countries such as the United Kingdom. Tim Winter, "Clarifying the critical in critical heritage studies," *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 19, no. 6 (2012): 532.
[43] Winter, "Clarifying the critical in critical heritage studies," 532-545.
[44] Brian Graham, Gregory Ashworth, and John Tunbridge, *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy* (London: Arnold, 2000), 5.
[45] Article VI, *The Antarctic Treaty*, 1 December 1959, Washington.

phenomena can be separated into two broad (although interconnected) camps: cultural and natural. The focus of this thesis is on Antarctic *cultural* heritage.

Lastly, this thesis does not question *if* the management of heritage in the Antarctic region has been politicised, but rather *how* management has been manipulated by political actors. Ultimately, the recognition, protection, and celebration of heritage in this polar region proves no exception to the management of heritage elsewhere around the globe. The Treaty represents an outstanding achievement within the practice of international relations and is regarded as a gold standard for international regimes. But even this impressive legal artefact and its subsidiary instruments and bodies cannot curb states' drive to pursue national agendas through alternative avenues of governance. It would be naïve to assume that the seemingly untouched continent is also untouched by the everyday workings of international politics.

## 4. Thesis Structure: Chapter Outlines

The thesis comprises 10 chapters, divided into five parts. The first part is introductory (Chapters 1 and 2); the second (Chapters 3, 4, and 5), third (Chapters 6, 7, and 8) and fourth (Chapter 9) parts are loosely dedicated to intra-, inter- and extra-national levels of analysis, respectively; and the last part forms a conclusion (Chapter 10).

*Chapter One: Introduction* (this chapter) introduces the research topic, problem, and questions, gives a brief overview of the existing literature, sets the scope of the research, and provides a map to the thesis. *Chapter Two: Methodology* outlines the methodological framework and makes explicit my ontology, epistemology, axiology, and methods and techniques.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 answer the first primary research question, 'Whose perspective on Antarctic heritage counts?' *Chapter Three: Codifying Heritage* investigates how the prevailing discourse on Antarctic heritage has been constructed by breaking down the ATS mechanisms for the development of an HSM Framework, and by identifying this framework's key components. *Chapter Four: Claiming Heritage* asks who has constructed this prevailing discourse by coding state behaviour against key progressions in the HSM Framework, identifying the most active parties and providing a quantitative reading for reference. *Chapter Five: Authorising Heritage* examines the characteristics of the prevailing discourse by comparing it with an existing model of heritage on a global scale.

Chapters 6, 7, and 8 answer the second primary research question, 'How have states deployed Antarctic heritage for geopolitical means?' Each conducts a geopolitical reading of this deployment and provides case examples, and chapter weighting depends on the prevalence of the motive. *Chapter Six: Reinforcing Heritage* analyses Antarctic heritage as a means to exercise de facto/symbolic/effective sovereignty and investigates three HSMs as case examples. *Chapter Seven: Constructing Heritage* analyses Antarctic heritage as a means to nation-build and investigates two HSMs as case examples. *Chapter Eight: Wasting Heritage* analyses Antarctic heritage as a means to meet environmental expectations and investigates one HSM case example.

*Chapter Nine: Reconceptualising Heritage* addresses the third primary research question, 'Which non-state actors have engaged with Antarctic heritage?' This marks a departure from the state-centric focus and recognises the importance of non-state actors in the region. This chapter explores how three non-state actors – the tourism industry, NGOs, and individuals – perceive, and engage with, Antarctic heritage.

Finally, *Chapter Ten: Conclusion* draws the preceding analysis into a whole and includes brief discussion of findings and contributions.

## 5. Summary: A geopolitical analysis of discourse on Antarctic heritage

There is no doubt that the management of cultural heritage in Antarctica is inherently political. There is uncertainty, however, around the origins, nature, and application of the geopolitical discourse on Antarctic heritage. This thesis deepens and extends previous research by: arguing that there is an official discourse on Antarctic heritage; identifying who has constructed this discourse; critically analysing the underlying assumptions of this discourse; and investigating how state and non-state actors have applied this discourse within the region's geopolitics.

# Chapter Two: Methodology

*A discourse analysis of Antarctic heritage management*

This chapter articulates my overarching methodology, and outlines the philosophical, theoretical, and practical stances I employ throughout this thesis. I will explicitly define my ontological, epistemological, and axiological posture – or in other words, explain what, how, and why I study – as well as explain my methodological decisions. Each of these helps me to answer this thesis' foundational questions on Antarctic geopolitics and heritage. I begin by considering ontological, epistemological, and axiological questions, before turning to the more practical questions concerning the selected method and techniques.

## 1. Ontological Questions: *What is Antarctic heritage?*

A researcher's ontology is their philosophical standpoint that infiltrates, either consciously or subconsciously, every aspect of their research. It is dangerous to assume that we can 'insert ourselves into the world free of theory, and [that] such theory [will] be unaffected by our experiences in the world.'[1] For this thesis, I am applying a constructivist approach that renders the world inherently social, and subsequently, political. Constructivists generally believe that social reality is constructed and does not exist outside of human consciousness, as 'the human world is one of artifice … "constructed" through the actions of actors themselves.'[2] An ontology also determines what phenomena are worth investigating, and the nature of those phenomena.

For this thesis, the phenomenon in question is Antarctic cultural heritage, or more specifically – Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments (HSMs) – and I am interested in the discourses that surround them. Therefore, my 'data set' is the texts that detail and manage their existence: official documents within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). This group of documents is a unique set of texts that contain important information on HSMs, and therefore have much to tell us about the geopolitical meaning of Antarctic heritage. Ideas, norms, interests, identities, and memories concerning the management of the sites and artefacts are pertinent to my

[1] Juliana Mansvelt and Lawrence Berg, "Writing Qualitative Geographies, Constructing Meaningful Geographical Knowledges," in *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography*, ed. Iain Hay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 341.
[2] Friedrich Kratochwil, "Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study," in *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*, eds. Karin Fierke and Knud Jørgensen (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 17.

investigation. Antarctic heritage is an intersubjective and mutually constituted phenomenon that does not and cannot exist in a vacuum; and just as reality is not 'out there,' neither is this phenomenon.

The inherently political nature of heritage underlies this thesis' primary objective: to expose the geopolitical meanings of HSMs. According to Roura, heritage is a 'meaning rather than artefact, and similarly geopolitics "is not a struggle for space; it is a contest to give spaces specific meanings,"'[3] and to create 'place.' This statement resonates with my approach to an investigation of HSMs, as it highlights the constructed nature of heritage. Antarctic heritage cannot be defined as merely the physical sites and monuments on the continent. Although these places and objects are central, heritage is much more than this. Heritage is a practice, experience, or emotion, which means that material heritage is 'a physical representation of … "the past" that speak[s] to a sense of place, a sense of self, of belonging and community.'[4] Nor do I take the concept of place for granted. According to Antonello, place is 'material as well as discursive, rooted as well as connected, stable and unstable, made by human and non-human agents, and with multiple temporalities.'[5] In this regard, this thesis moves away from 'Antarctic exceptionalism' – that is, the frequent representation of Antarctica as 'a passive [space], simply awaiting ever-greater human impact and intervention.'[6] On the contrary, Antarctica is a complex *place* becoming less remote. It is a 'part of the world, and in order to understand it, it is crucial that it not be segregated from the complex ideological and geopolitical dynamics by which it is shaped.'[7] These realisations on the meaning of heritage, space and place provide the core inspiration for my project.

## 2. Epistemological Questions: *How do we come to know the geopolitics of Antarctic heritage?*

A researcher's epistemology is their theory of knowledge that directs how they go about knowing, or attempting to know, the phenomena they study. How we conduct our research is

[3] Ricardo Roura, "Antarctic Cultural Heritage: Geopolitics and Management," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 478-479.
[4] Laurajane Smith, *Uses of Heritage* (London: Routledge, 2006), 30.
[5] Alessandro Antonello, "Finding Place in Antarctica," in *Antarctica and the Humanities*, eds. Roberts Peder, Lize-Marié van der Watt, and Adrian Howkins (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 184.
[6] Klaus Dodds and Richard Powell, "Polar Geopolitics: new researchers on the polar regions," *The Polar Journal* 3, no. 1 (2013): 4.
[7] Klaus Dodds and Christy Collis, "Post-colonial Antarctica," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 53.

embedded in a set of assumptions made explicit by our ontology. I have already made the assumption that the world is inherently social and political, and that the phenomena I investigate are socially constructed. How I then go about understanding these phenomena therefore requires an approach that can denaturalise them. A critical enquiry that problematises, challenges, and is suspicious of hegemonic ways of knowing, proves appropriate. Such an approach is also aware that all knowledge is situated, tied to different contexts, and entangled in power relations.[8]

When we reconsider the concept of heritage from this critical perspective, the most dominant and current discourses surrounding it are made visible, and broader questions concerning political life in Antarctica can be answered. As mentioned previously, heritage is a practice, experience, or emotion. However, the current, prevailing discourse favours a Western outlook that privileges materialism, preservation, timelessness, and innate value.[9] With regard to space and politics, previous discourses framed geopolitics as a grand narrative within strategising that sought 'to "unlock" the secrets of the physical earth and lionise the power of the mountain range, the river, the maritime strait, the ocean, the island, the desert and the atmosphere.'[10] Contemporary criticism challenges these assumptions about space, and illuminates the practices by which political actors spatialise international politics. The location of Antarctica within modern geographical imagination depicts it as the 'new' and 'last' frontier,[11] implying its susceptibility to state exploitation. A similar logic can be applied to HSMs: states assign 'particular meanings to historical events embodied in cultural remains' in an attempt to conform to an overarching national narrative about their historic presence in Antarctica.[12]

## 3. Axiological Questions: *Why is the geopolitics of Antarctic heritage worth studying?*

A researcher's axiology is the socio-political context of their research. It necessitates recognition of the research process as political and value-laden. An active engagement with this reality makes for a more rigorous analysis as the researcher is required to practise humility

[8] Anna Uminska-Woroniecka, "Cultural Diplomacy in International Relations Theory and Studies on Diplomacy," *Actual Problems of International Relations* 2, no. 127 (2016): 4.
[9] I will outline Smith's argument for a dominant discourse in much greater depth in *Chapter Five: Authorising Heritage.* Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 29.
[10] Dodds and Powell, "Polar Geopolitics: new researchers on the polar regions," 3.
[11] Klaus Dodds and Mark Nuttall, *The Scramble for the Poles: The geopolitics of the Arctic and Antarctic* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 20.
[12] Roura, "Antarctic Cultural Heritage: Geopolitics and Management," 469.

– flagging their suppositions and acknowledging the contribution they are attempting to make. The first major context that informs my axiology is the interdisciplinary nature of my research. I support the view that too often 'too much intellectual energy … goes into creating maintaining boundaries between stylized camps,'[13] and that it is important not to get mired in 'distracting definitional battles of paradigm wars.'[14] I am engaging with both Political Geography and Heritage Studies to more fully understand the geopolitical nature of Antarctic heritage.

The second major context that informs my axiology is the position my research holds within the Humanities and Social Sciences (HASS) disciplines which have come to be categorised under the umbrella term of 'Antarctic Studies.'[15] This field contains a diverse group of disciplines – from International Relations to Musicology – that are in conversation with each other. As Steel points out in an introduction to a special issue of *The Polar Journal* on the value of the social sciences in polar research, 'One need only point out that robots have not yet completely taken over the study of the polar regions, nor do polar bears, penguins and ice sheets study themselves. People do all these things, along with making decisions as to how these regions are governed … the results of these studies have much to say about the possible fates of these regions.'[16] Until recently, however, these contributions have ranked second place to the practice of Science – that is, the physical, natural, and biological sciences – that has colonised the continent to date.[17] The Antarctic Treaty has dubbed Science as the 'currency of influence' since it entered into force mid last century.[18] But it is now apparent that 'representations [of Antarctica] do matter, and they deserve to be studied and understood.'[19] This attitude is a product of the cultural[20] and social[21] turn in the field within the past decade or so.

---

[13] Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 11.
[14] Jennifer Mason, *Qualitative Researching* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2018), 24.
[15] As mentioned in *Chapter One: Introduction*, Antarctic Studies is offered as a study pathway at multiple universities around the globe. The hosting of biennial conferences by the Standing Committee on Humanities and Social Sciences (of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research) suggests a form of coherence across this family of disciplines.
[16] Gary Steel, "Polar, Social, Science: A Reflection on the Characteristics and Benefits of the Polar Social Sciences," *The Polar Journal* 5, no. 1 (2015): 3.
[17] Antonello, "Finding Place in Antarctica," 197.
[18] Elizabeth Leane, "Introduction: The Cultural Turn in Antarctic Studies," *The Polar Journal* 1, no. 2 (2011): 149.
[19] Leane, "Introduction: The Cultural Turn in Antarctic Studies," 150.
[20] Leane, "Introduction: The Cultural Turn in Antarctic Studies," 149-154.
[21] Steel, "Polar, Social, Science: A Reflection on the Characteristics and Benefits of the Polar Social Sciences," 1-7.

My research is therefore unavoidably politically charged. This is evident in both its formulation as an interdisciplinary project, and its position within the broader Antarctic research agenda. The former requires me to make decisions concerning the application of varying approaches, whilst the latter supports efforts to raise the profile of the HASS disciplines within Antarctic research. The last step in unpacking my axiology is to make explicit my hypothesis. I am suspicious of political actors and their use of Antarctic heritage, and, subsequently, my main objective is to expose the geopolitical meanings of HSMs.

## 4. Methodological Questions: *How do we analyse the geopolitics of Antarctic heritage?*

In addition to encompassing the ontological, epistemological, and axiological predispositions of the researcher, a methodology also outlines the more practical methods and techniques employed by the researcher. The method for this thesis is a discourse analysis, and the techniques are coding and close reading. Below I address what each of these entails, their application within this thesis, and their limitations.

### 4.1 *Method – Discourse Analysis*

At the heart of critical enquiry is the analysis of discourse. Although there is no shared understanding of how to do a discourse analysis,[22] the origins of the task can be attributed to the work of late twentieth century French philosophers.[23] Discourses are frameworks of thought through which the world is made meaningful, and which are embedded within texts, written, spoken, or otherwise. A discourse analysis subsequently aims to provide a better, more profound account of these social practices via an examination of these texts. Within the context of this thesis, the texts are the 'socio-cultural resources and rules by which the geographies of international politics get written.'[24] Researchers pose 'how' rather than 'what' questions that are spatially and historically sensitive in order to reach a 'primordial understanding' of their subject matter.[25] Furthermore, by acknowledging that discourses are situated – that is, produced, received, and manipulated within a particular time and place – discourse analysts are well positioned to identify and critique existing power structures. It is possible for multiple

[22] Martin Müller, "Doing discourse analysis in critical geopolitics," *L'Espace Politique* 12, no. 3 (2010): 1-21.
[23] Namely, Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of texts and Michel Foucault's genealogical analysis.
[24] Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," *Political Geography* 11, no. 2 (1992): 193.
[25] Richard Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics," *Alternatives* 12, (1987): 403.

complex and contradictory discourses to be in circulation at any one time, but there tends to be one hegemonic discourse for each social reality. Discourse analyses strive to provide a better, more profound account of our social reality by engaging a collection of techniques to expose the creation of meanings, and their communication through language and text.

My selection of discourse analysis as the primary method for this thesis is corroborated by the data set type. The data collected lends itself to a discursive reading as it is a collection of official documents from within the ATS regarding heritage management in the region (as further detailed in the following chapter, *Chapter Three: Codifying Heritage*). These records are quite literally a textual representation of the Antarctic heritage discourse – the 'geopolitical scripts and storylines in the discursive policy process.'[26] The official descriptions of the HSMs themselves are also descriptions of the social world around them; and they are, to a degree, the very narrative that is under investigation.[27] Of course, discourses are more than texts as they embody frameworks of thought that are not exclusively expressed by textual means,[28] but for the purposes of this thesis, these documents offer a valuable data set from which I can draw significant insight concerning heritage management processes in Antarctica. They contain 'background knowledge'[29] – that is, 'assumptions about the world that are never made explicit or are not advanced by author or speaker as debatable.'[30] Once revealed, however, these assumptions can be questioned, potentially leading to a reinterpretation and reapplication of the prevailing discourse. Moreover, scientific investigation is in one sense a literary exercise in and of itself, as it is about the fate of statements as they interact with one another.[31]

I am inspired by works from within Political Geography which have applied the philosophical foundations of discourse analysis and explore the relationship between power and discourse. Political geographers now largely agree that geopolitical discourse is never a natural or non-

[26] Virginie Mamadouh and Gertjan Dijkink, "Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse," *Geopolitics* 11, no. 3 (2006): 355.
[27] Roura, "Antarctic Cultural Heritage: Geopolitics and Management," 480.
[28] Martin Müller, "Reconsidering the concept of discourse for the field of critical geopolitics: Towards discourse as language and practice," *Political Geography* 27, no. 3 (2008): 334.
[29] Norman L. Fairclough, "Critical and descriptive goals in discourse analysis," *Journal of Pragmatics* 9, no. 6 (1985): 739.
[30] Mamadouh and Dijkink, "Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse," 357.
[31] John Law, *After Method: Mess in Social Science Research* (Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2017), 28.

discursive phenomenon,[32] but is instead deeply rooted in power/knowledge relations.[33] Nor is space ever blank; rather, it is 'riddled with meaning, symbolism, contradictions, various layers of history, social and cultural practices and complex power relationships.'[34] Lastly, political geographers have discussed how the concepts of space and power intersect, and have developed the idea of 'power-geometries' to 'capture both the fact that space is imbued with power and the fact that power in its turn always has a spatiality.'[35] The work of the scholar is therefore to analyse and problematise the spatiality of power operating beneath the geopolitical discourse in question – in this case, the discursive production of heritage in Antarctica.

However, carrying out a discourse analysis does come with its challenges, primarily in relation to issues of transparency and function. Discourse analyses are often accused of a lack of transparency toward method and technique applied.[36] This vagueness is blamed on a 'post-positivist sensibility that is itself wary of the idea of a simple list of methods.'[37] The standard practice is to leave methodologies as implicit rather than make them explicit,[38] but this approach makes it difficult to verify what was actually involved in the research process, and how others can replicate it within another context. Regarding its function, a discourse analysis cannot predict which discourses may achieve dominance in the future, as their production is the result of a struggle between social actors.[39] It can expose and reposition discourses, but not transcend them.[40]

---

[32] Ó Tuathail and Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," 192.
[33] Leslie Hepple, "Metaphor, Geopolitical Discourse and the Military in South America," in *Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representations of Language*, eds. Trevor Barnes and James Duncan (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 139.
[34] Peter Shirlow, "Representation," in *Key Concepts in Political Geography*, eds. Carolyn Gallaher, Carl T. Dahlman, Mary Gilmartin, Alison Mountz, and Peter Shirlow (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009), 310.
[35] Doreen Massey, "Concepts of space and power in theory and in political practice," *Documents D'anàlisi Geogràfica* 5, (2009): 19.
[36] Mamadouh and Dijkink, "Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse," 364.
[37] Lawrence Berg, "Discourse Analysis," in *The International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, eds. Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift (Amsterdam: Elsevier Ltd, 2009), 218.
[38] Berg, "Discourse Analysis," 218.
[39] Mamadouh and Dijkink, "Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse," 358.
[40] Mamadouh and Dijkink, "Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse," 351.

4.2 *Techniques – Coding and Close Reading*

Technique can be understood as 'the art or craft of performing a particular task.'[41] The techniques I employ to carry out this discourse analysis are coding and close reading, each of which I detail in turn below.

The technique of coding is applied to effectively extract meaning from texts, and is a heuristic, 'exploratory problem-solving technique without specific formulas or algorithms to follow.'[42] Although texts (as described above) would appear to lend themselves to qualitative analysis, coding demonstrates a means to effectively translate qualitative data into quantitative data with minimal loss of meaning. Coding is not a precise science, but rather an interpretive act that serves as a 'transitional process between data collection and more extensive data analysis.'[43] Given that coding is cyclical in nature, it sometimes requires multiple cycles using different codes in order to develop closeness with, and potential themes from, the data.[44] Here, I borrow Saldaña's definition of a code as 'a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data.'[45] These codes can also be quantified by simply ascertaining how many times they occur within the text (or in my case, also represent submitted diplomatic papers).

This quantification process can be carried out either manually or automatically with coding software. I use a combination of the two so as to retain comfortable contact with the data (pen and paper), whilst at the same time managing ideas and maintaining 'rapid access to conceptual and theoretical knowledge' (computer).[46] This allows me to keep appropriate distance from the data and switch between 'closeness for familiarity and appreciation for subtle differences [and] distance for abstraction and synthesis.'[47] I use NVivo (version 12) data analysis software to assist me in this process. This software is a popular choice for social scientists conducting a discourse analysis as it allows researchers to not only code, store, and archive large amounts of textual and graphic material, it also has an interface that supports complex correlation calculations (although my own data synthesis did not require these additional functions). I

[41] Margaret Zeegers and Deirdre Barron, *Milestone Moments in Getting Your PhD in Qualitative Research* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Ltd, 2015), 87.
[42] Johnny Saldaña, *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015), 9.
[43] Gregory Owen, "Qualitative Methods in Higher Education Policy Analysis: Using Interviews and Document Analysis," *Qualitative Report* 19, no. 26 (2014): 16.
[44] Saldaña, *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers*, 9.
[45] Saldaña, *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers*, 4.
[46] Pat Bazeley, *Qualitative data analysis with NVivo* (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2007), 2-3.
[47] Bazeley, *Qualitative data analysis with NVivo*, 8.

started coding in NVivo only after I had conducted an initial reading of the documents, as I was then able to familiarise myself with the text and perform 'category construction, based on the data's characteristics, to uncover themes.'[48] It is up to the analyst and not the software to identify the themes or 'nodes' present within the text. Only once the analyst has determined these categories can the software be programmed to identify and code them. This is an iterative process with theory and evidence informing each other. A more grounded or inductive approach initially fits with my underlying constructivist ontology – one that considers the documents as 'social facts' – and the post-structuralist epistemology – one that is wary of these facts. Towards the end of the coding process, the codes that the analyst identifies can be thematically arranged. This is a form of pattern recognition that requires: a focused review of the data; reflection upon themes and categories already identified; and potential re-coding.[49] I outline the details of my coding technique within my codebook contained within *Chapter Four: Claiming Heritage*, as this is the chapter in which I conduct a quantitative analysis of my results. I then juxtapose these findings with existing models in *Chapter Five: Authorising Heritage*.

The predominant challenge encountered with coding relates to researcher choice, which is always at risk of selection bias. Researchers must make decisions concerning what set of questions they will ask of the data, what they will emphasise, and what they will pay little or least attention to. To do this, the researcher must demonstrate that they can identify information that is pertinent to the phenomenon, separating it from that which is not.[50] All the while they must remain objective (seeking to represent the research material fairly) and sensitive (responding to even subtle cues to meaning) throughout,[51] and avoid falling into the 'coding trap.' The researcher encounters this trap when they become so bogged down in their data that they can no longer 'see the forest for the trees.'[52]

The second technique I employ is close reading. In the past, close reading has been described as the 'primary methodology' of Literary Studies.[53] This technique typically requires the reader

[48] Glenn Bowen, "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method," *Qualitative Research Journal* 9, no. 2 (2009): 32.
[49] Bowen, "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method," 32.
[50] Bowen, "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method," 32.
[51] Bowen, "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method," 32.
[52] Bazeley, *Qualitative data analysis with NVivo*, 8.
[53] Matthew L. Jockers, *Macroanalysis: Digital methods and literary history* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2013), 6.

to become familiar with the chosen text, to consider it in detail, and to be critical of it. Brummett defines close reading as 'the mindful, disciplined reading of an object with a view to deeper understanding of its meanings.'[54] Throughout this thesis, I am specifically concerned with the geopolitical meaning of the texts I interrogate. In this sense I am responding to Finnemore and Sikkink's plea to 'reassert "thick" regional geographical knowledge in the face of "thin" universal theorising about world affairs.'[55]

To carry out my geopolitical reading, I begin by closely reading the current Historic Sites and Monuments List.[56] This List provides a factual summary of what sites and monuments were accepted when, proposed by whom, and managed by whom. I then select case examples to investigate varying geopolitical themes across part III. The challenge here is to trace how sites of Antarctic heritage – which are both complex material places and geographical abstractions – are reduced to opportunities for strategic gain within the context of Antarctic geopolitics.

The limitations of a close reading are similar to those of coding, in that this technique relies heavily on the researcher's unique interpretation of the texts they encounter. The product is an intimate but subjective understanding of the chosen topic. Furthermore, given the level of attention required for close reading, I am able to select only a small number of case examples for analysis. This reduces the scope of the analysis but increases its comprehensiveness.

## 5. Practising Reflexivity: *A political geographer in Antarctic Studies*

Research design should not be a passive process, nor should our efforts prioritise method over methodology. As there is no one privileged way of exploring, understanding, and knowing the world we live in, it is vital for the researcher to explicitly and clearly state their ontological, epistemological, axiological, and methodological underpinnings to foster greater understanding. In my case, I have explained my ontology as constructivist, my epistemology as critical, my axiology as determined by the current state of HASS-based Antarctic research, and my methodology as encompassing various techniques of discourse analysis. This explanation gives transparency to the nature, direction, and purpose of the research offered in this thesis and makes clear the ground on which the following chapters rest.

---

[54] Barry Brummett, *Techniques of Close Reading* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2018), 2.
[55] Mamadouh and Dijkink, "Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse," 352.
[56] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Revised List of Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments*, Measure 12, 2019.

# Chapter Three: Codifying Heritage

*The codification of heritage within Antarctic governance*

The official discourse on Antarctic heritage is codified within the Antarctic Treaty System and its accompanying apparatus. Codification is an act of formal documentation that attributes greater recognition to one party's interpretation over another's, and advances and cements some norms instead of others by affording them legal meaning and weight.[1] This chapter is the first of three parts that, like a triptych, hinge together to address the 'how,' the 'who,' and the 'what' of Antarctic heritage discourse. Here I establish *how* the official discourse on Antarctic heritage is codified, in preparation for the following chapter that identifies *whose* perspective it reflects, before finally delving into *what* the discourse characteristically entails in the fifth chapter.

International norms are a part of international discourse and are key to unlocking how the discourse has been constructed. International law arranges these norms in a hierarchy to specify their relative influence over the behaviour of their addressees (nation-states).[2] I begin by discussing the role of international norms in developing discourse within International Relations, before I apply pre-existing theories on norm progression to the Antarctic context. I then explain the mechanisms through which states have operationalised an official discourse on Antarctic heritage to create Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments. Finally, I conclude with an outline of what I call the 'HSM Framework' – that is, the textual codification of the official discourse on cultural heritage in Antarctica.

## 1. Normalisation of Antarctic Heritage Management

The Oxford English Dictionary defines a norm as 'a pattern; a type, a standard.'[3] International Relations theorists have identified three types of norms within the discourse and practice of

[1] While codifying and coding are very similar words, they mean quite different things in academic research and in this thesis. The first is an International Relations (IR) term used often within IR and International Law (IL), and the second (explained in the previous chapter) is a method within discourse analysis.

[2] Some international norms, such as *jus cogens* or 'compelling norms,' fall into the category of 'hard law,' whilst others, such as ordinary or 'twilight' norms, fall into the category of 'soft law.' Ulrich Beyerlin, "Different Types of Norms in International Environmental Law Policies, Principles, and Rules," in *The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law*, eds. Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Ellen Hey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 425-448.

[3] The Oxford English Dictionary, "Quick search: Norm," accessed 24 March 2020, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/128266?rskey=pCWQ5H&result=1#eid.

international politics: regulative norms, constitutive norms, and prescriptive norms.[4] Regulative norms indicate what is obligated, prohibited, or permitted and are defined as the 'goals' of the normative system; whilst constitutive norms represent possibilities for new activity, and progress and represent the 'beliefs' of the normative system. For example, the World Heritage Convention assigns parties with a duty to identify, protect, conserve, present, and transmit cultural and natural heritage – a regulative norm;[5] and defines 'cultural heritage' as monuments, groups of buildings, and sites – a constitutive norm.[6] Prescriptive norms, on the other hand, represent a broader moral objective, for example, the Convention's promotion of cooperation among states to protect heritage around the globe.

Each of these types of norms are recognisable within Antarctic affairs: regulative norms order and constrain state behaviour, such as the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources' (CCAMLR) regulation of fishing and 'rational use' in the Southern Ocean;[7] constitutive norms construct new identities and categories, such as the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty's (Environmental Protocol) definition of Antarctica as a 'natural reserve';[8] and prescriptive norms evaluate and recommend what ought to be done, such as the Antarctic Treaty's reconceptualisation of the purpose of the area south of 60° South latitude for 'peace and science.'[9]

In an attempt to analyse the progression of norms within international relations in general, Finnemore and Sikkink developed a 'life cycle' for the emergence of norms within international relations, as seen in Table 3.1. The cycle details three phases through which norms progress in order to reach complete acceptance or normalisation within the International System.[10]

---

[4] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 891-892.
[5] Article 4, the *World Heritage Convention*, 16 November 1972, Paris.
[6] Article 1, the *World Heritage Convention*.
[7] Article II, the *Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources*, 20 May 1980, Canberra.
[8] Article II, the *Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty*, 4 October 1991, Madrid.
[9] Preamble, *The Antarctic Treaty*, 1 December 1959, Washington.
[10] IR theory refers to the International System as being the environment in which nation-states co-exist.

Table 3.1: Reproduced from Finnemore and Sikkink's model, 'The Norm Life Cycle.' ("International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 898.)

| *The Norm Life Cycle* | *Stage 1: Norm emergence* | *Stage 2: Norm cascade* | *Stage 3: Internalisation* |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Actors* | Norm entrepreneurs with organisational platforms | States, international organisations, networks | Law, professions, bureaucracy |
| *Motives* | Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment | Legitimacy, reputation, esteem | Conformity |
| *Dominant mechanisms* | Persuasion | Socialisation, institutionalisation, demonstration | Habit, institutionalisation |

In this section, I apply this life cycle to the emergence of norms on the protection of cultural heritage in Antarctica. It is helpful to understand the genealogy of these norms, because the behaviours, perceptions, and expectations that they embody are eventually codified within the practice of Antarctic affairs and the governance of Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments (HSMs).

The first stage of Finnemore and Sikkink's cycle concerns committed entrepreneurs and their use of organisational platforms to agitate for change. Norms for the protection of Antarctic heritage emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. Even though states established a register for historic sites and monuments in Antarctica (the HSM List) within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) in 1972, it served an administrative role only, documenting the whereabouts of certain historic artefacts on the continent rather than outlining clear instructions and objectives for their protection. The physical protection of cultural heritage in the region was first championed by trusts and foundations that began to form in the 1980s and 1990s: such as the United Kingdom Antarctic Heritage Trust (UKAHT), founded in 1987; and the Mawson's Huts Foundation, founded in 1996. These charities charged themselves with the responsibility of conserving and preserving historic remains on and around the continent on behalf of their nation-state, and raised the profile of Antarctic cultural heritage in the process. Since 2000, however, the International Polar Heritage Committee (IPHC) has been the organisation in the best position to influence state behaviour within the ATS on the matter. The IPHC can now be considered the leading norm entrepreneur on heritage protection in Antarctica (and possibly also the Arctic), as it is a scientific committee of heritage experts and professionals called upon to

advise on heritage-related matters. They provide advice by drafting and contributing to papers received by states at ATS forums. In the words of Finnemore and Sikkink, the IPHC is an agent that has 'strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community'[11] – in this case, states' commitment to conservational best practice in the polar regions.

The second stage of Finnemore and Sikkink's cycle refers to the role state actors play in socialising and demonstrating norms in return for increased legitimacy within international affairs. The protection of Antarctic heritage began to gain traction within the ATS at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) during the 1990s. In 1995, the ATCPs developed official guidelines for the proposing of HSMs that would enable the parties to legitimate and protect their material remains on the continent.[12] In order to achieve this, ATCPs submitted various papers on the topic to the Meeting for discussion, and eventually adopted amendments to effectively legalise the consensus reached. More recently, in 2018, the ATCPs drastically revised these guidelines (with the help of the IPHC) to provide better instruction on what Antarctic heritage is, and how it should be treated.[13] This development signalled a new prioritisation of heritage matters within the region's governance. The current agenda of the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) – the body responsible for advising ATCMs on heritage issues, among others – now lists HSMs as a priority.[14] Therefore, while states acknowledged the existence of historic artefacts, places, and events in the region almost 50 years ago, only now, with the help of a key norm entrepreneur (the IPHC), are states beginning to meaningfully consider their management.

The third and final stage of Finnemore and Sikkink's cycle involves the internalisation of the norm through its incorporation within relevant governing institutions to ensure conformity from all invested actors. The protection of cultural heritage in Antarctica appears to have passed the 'tipping point' that saw these norms accepted and adopted by ATCPs, but they are not yet fully internalised. Although the ATS records these norms in various amendments and they sit within a framework for Antarctic heritage governance, states do not adhere to these norms in any uniform fashion. For example, ATCPs have assured the longevity of some historic sites

[11] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 896.
[12] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for proposing new Historic Sites and Monuments*, Resolution 8, 1995.
[13] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for the assessment and management of Heritage in Antarctica*, Resolution 2, 2018.
[14] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, 199.

with the development of binding Management Plans (MPs), whilst neglecting other sites whose current condition is not even known. The criteria for the designation of HSMs are also relatively broad. They encompasses a wide range of justifications for HSM protection that prevents the emergence of a single and unified message. If conservation and preservation of material heritage is the final goal, then, in order to ensure conformance and compliance, ATCPs would do well to enforce mechanisms such as mandatory Conservation Management Plans (CMPs) or site inspections. In the meantime, diverging views on why and how Antarctic heritage should be protected will prevent the internalisation of norms on Antarctic heritage protection.

Therefore, although norms on Antarctic heritage protection underlying the official discourse on Antarctic heritage management have 'emerged,' 'cascaded,' and – as I investigate shortly – been codified within the official discourse on Antarctic heritage, they have not yet been 'internalised.' This is primarily due to competing attitudes on why Antarctic heritage is worth protecting, and what form that protection should take. This dissonance also explains the ad hoc nature of management to date. But if recent activity and progress maintains pace, these norms could reach habitualisation within the next decade – this is assuming states can agree upon, enact, and regulate a single vision for managing Antarctic heritage.

## 2. Mechanisation of Antarctic Heritage Management

States have operationalised norms on heritage protection for the region under the auspices of the ATS. The ATCPs have constructed a framework for the proposition, designation, and management of HSMs in this international forum – that is, the sites and monuments that are documented as the official version of Antarctic heritage. There are five mechanisms through which these norms have emerged and cascaded: submitted papers that propose particular courses of action for Antarctic heritage; the Committee for Environmental Protection that gives advice on Antarctic heritage; Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings that provide an official forum for Antarctic heritage; intersessional activity on Antarctic heritage; and amendments that enact decisions concerning Antarctic heritage.

As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the process of norm emergence and cascade begins with the norm entrepreneur's proposition (persuasion) of the norm and finishes with states' acceptance of it (demonstration). In the Antarctic context, the tipping point is reached when the ATCPs approve the norm at an ATCM following its endorsement by heritage non-state actors in a submitted

paper. However, the process is not always so linear. For example, a paper could be submitted, then discussed by the CEP but not recommended for adoption to the ATCM, leading to a second submission at the following ATCM. Alternatively, the ATCM could request an Intersessional Contact Group to convene on the matter, again resulting in more papers.




Figure 3.1: The emergence and cascade of a norm on cultural heritage protection within the Antarctic Treaty System.

This section explains the five mechanisms that states can employ within Antarctic affairs to introduce norms on heritage protection: submitted papers, the CEP, ATCMs, intersessions activity, and amendments.

### 2.1 *Submitted Papers*

Papers are an invaluable source of information for revealing who said what and when in relation to the development of an official discourse on Antarctic heritage. Consultative Parties can submit five types of papers to a Meeting: Addendum Papers (ADs), Background Papers (BPs), Information Papers (IPs), Secretariat Papers (SPs), and Working Papers (WPs), but only WPs, IPs and BPs are relevant here.[15]

These three types of papers each have a slightly different function. WPs are used predominantly by states to propose an idea or course of action, IPs are usually used to provide additional or accompanying information for these proposals or other issues that may arise at the Meeting, and BPs are similar to IPs as they also provide supporting information but hold less weight (and appear to be submitted less frequently as a result). Furthermore, only the ATCPs, the three

[15] Information Papers are preferred to Addendum Papers to provide additional information on heritage-related matters, and Secretariat Papers are for the use of the Secretariat rather than the ATCPs.

'Observers,'[16] and the three 'Invited Experts'[17] can submit WPs.[18] This restriction effectively raises the stature of the WPs, making them the most effective avenue for an ATCP to propose a particular course of action at a Meeting, and subsequently are cited much more frequently than IPs, despite having a much lower submission rate. The 2019 ATCM (XLII), for example, had 70 WPs submitted (across all topics, not just heritage) compared to 165 IPs. IPs (which any party can submit) are supplementary to WPs, while BPs provide background information on a particular topic that may or may not be raised within a Meeting. Parties have submitted papers concerning Antarctic heritage under all three types.

The most obvious motive for heritage-related WP submissions are HSM proposals. Within such submissions ATCPs should address the relevant criteria contained within the HSM Guidelines and Guide to have the best chance of having their proposal accepted and the historic site or monument designated. The most recent example of this is Argentina's WP025 (2019), *Proposal for designation of a new Historic Site and Monument "C.A Larsen Multiexpedition cairn"*, jointly prepared with Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK). IPs concerned with Antarctic heritage often provide updates on the condition of HSMs, but can also give additional information for HSM proposals or even serve as a notice for intended future WP submission – a route Russia took in 2004 when it submitted IP045, *Orthodox temple in the Antarctic*, in its consideration of this site for HSM designation.[19] Lastly, BPs on heritage matters are not so common, although parties have submitted them on occasion, such as BP041 (2012), *Antarctic Heritage Trust Conservation Update*, submitted by New Zealand. WPs, IPs, and BPs therefore leave a paper trail on what certain actors thought about Antarctic heritage at particular points in time.

Submitting a paper to the CEP/ATCM is the first official step a norm entrepreneur can take to formally introduce a norm to the ATS. Papers are an effective way for them to call attention

[16] The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP), and the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR). It should be noted that these observers and invited experts (following footnote) are only co-authors with ATCPs on WPs to an ATCM – rather than being the single author. However, in the past they have submitted WPs as single authors to Meetings of Experts. These types of meetings do not make decisions; rather they produce a final report – with recommendations – to an ATCM, where decisions might be made. This therefore reduces the ability of the observers and NGOs to substantively influence decision-making.
[17] The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), and the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO).
[18] These papers are published in the four Treaty languages – English, French, Russian and Spanish, and their purpose is defined under Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the ATCM.
[19] Russia's proposal never came to fruition.

to, frame, or even create issues during the norm emergence stage. They present a valuable opportunity for the norm entrepreneur to present information and use their expertise to change state behaviour.[20]

2.2 *The Committee for Environmental Protection*

The Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) informs ATCMs on heritage-related matters and is the advisor on the protection of the Antarctic environment.[21] It is the key forum for discussion on protected areas in Antarctica, and is the body responsible for providing advice to, and formulating recommendations for, ATCMs on the implementation of the Environmental Protocol, signed in 1991 and in force in 1998.[22] The Committee usually meets in conjunction with ATCMs, but does have the capacity to conduct itself independently. Membership currently comprises 40 ratifying states, 29 of which are ATCPs and 11 of which are non-ATCPs.[23] After the Meeting, the CEP Chair is presented with a final report for consideration that contains advice and recommendations for presentation at the ATCM and all matters covered and opinions offered.[24]

Within its first decade of existence, the efforts of the CEP led to the adoption of almost 50 amendments (Measures, Resolutions and Decisions).[25] Every CEP agenda makes room for the discussion of Antarctic Protected Areas (APAs) – under which HSMs fall along with Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPAs) and Antarctic Specially Managed Areas (ASMAs). The APA system is an integral part of the Environmental Protocol and is regulated by its fifth annex. The Protocol's objective, as stated within Article 2, is to prohibit, restrict, or manage activities within these area – often with the use of MPs, due to their outstanding 'environmental, scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness values.'[26] ASMAs in particular – which can include HSMs – allow states 'to assist in the planning and co-ordination of activities, avoid possible conflicts, improve cooperation between Parties or minimise environmental impacts.'[27] HSMs fit within the values category, and as such CEP deliberations lay the foundations for their designation and management.

[20] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 897-899.
[21] Rodolfo A. Sánchez and Ewan McIvor, "The Antarctic Committee for Environmental Protection: Past, present, and future," *Polar Record* 43, no. 3 (2007): 245.
[22] See Article 12 of the Environmental Protocol for further details on the function of the CEP.
[23] Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, "Parties," 2021, https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Parties?lang=e.
[24] Sánchez and McIvor, "The Antarctic Committee for Environmental Protection: Past, present, and future," 240.
[25] Sánchez and McIvor, "The Antarctic Committee for Environmental Protection: Past, present, and future," 243.
[26] Article 3, Annex V, the *Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty*.
[27] Article 4, Annex V, the *Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty*.

Once a norm entrepreneur's paper is accepted by the CEP Portal, it is scheduled for discussion when the Committee next meets. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, 'new norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest.'[28] This means that when the CEP meets, states consider the value of the norm and assess it against others, such as norms on environmental protection – which, in some scenarios, conflict with norms on heritage protection.

### 2.3 *Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings*

Important documentation that protects HSMs would not exist without the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs), as this is where states have negotiated, agreed upon, and adopted: the initial list recording all HSM designations (Recommendation 9, 1972),[29] the initial guidelines on HSMs (Resolution 8, 1995),[30] and the initial guide on HSMs (Resolution 1, 2008)[31] – all of which I discuss at length in section 3. The first mention of 'historic monuments' was at the first ATCM in 1961 (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2: ATCM I, Parliament House, Canberra, 10 July 1961.
(Australian Government, National Archives of Australia.)

[28] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 897.
[29] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *List of Historic Monuments*, Recommendation 9, 1972.
[30] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for proposing new Historic Sites and Monuments*, Resolution 8, 1995.
[31] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guide to the Presentation of Working Papers Containing Proposals for Antarctic Specially Protected Areas, Antarctic Specially Managed Areas or Historic Sites and Monuments*, Resolution 1, 2008.

ATCMs have been held annually since 2001, and prior to this were generally held biennially, with Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (SATCMs) occurring semi-regularly in between. The host state alternates between the ATCPs, and during the two-week long meeting ATCPs, non-ATCPs, Observers, and Invited Experts discuss both the practicality and legality of the Treaty's implementation and matters of common interest. At these Meetings, the ATCPs are the only parties that have decision-making powers, and all decisions must be reached by consensus. The primary purpose of ATCMs is to provide a forum for the exchange of information and to formulate amendments concerning the uses of, and jurisdiction over, Antarctica.[32] During its deliberations, the ATCM also considers advice given by the CEP. The ATCM is the body ultimately responsible for the designation of objects and places in Antarctica as 'heritage.'

Norm entrepreneurs have been successful in their persuasion when enough states recognise the value of the norm and begin what Finnemore and Sikkink describe as the norm's 'socialisation.'[33] In the Antarctic context, this is when a critical mass of ATCPs endorse the norm at an ATCM. From here, there is a cumulative effect, and as more states accept the norm, the remaining states succumb to 'peer pressure' and adhere. Moreover, even though decision-making within the ATS is consensus-based, some states' endorsement can be worth more than others, given their overall standing within the region – for example, the seven countries who hold claimant state status. This supportive behaviour also marks the beginning of the norm's cascade.

### 2.4 *Intersessional Activity*

ATCM final reports record intersessional activity on Antarctic heritage, as the discussions and events that take place within this period are both planned and later reflected upon within the annual meetings. Given that ATCMs only occur once a year for less than a fortnight, it is difficult to address every item on the agenda in great detail during the Meeting itself, and therefore any progress possible between Meetings becomes vital. The ATCM forms Intersessional Contact Groups (ICGs) as a way of brainstorming or reviewing matters that require further attention, with their terms of reference and coordinators determined by the CEP meeting prior to their commencement. This was the case in 1999 when an open-ended ICG was

[32] Karen N. Scott, "Institutional Developments within the Antarctic Treaty System," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 52, (2003): 477.
[33] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 902-903.

proposed and subsequently formed to develop guidelines for the implementation of a protected areas scheme – under which HSMs would fall, and at which time their values and features were discussed.[34]

Other intersessional activity such as workshops are also valuable sources of information. To date, ICGs have convened four workshops on Antarctic Protected Areas: the *1992 Antarctic Protected Areas* workshop held in Cambridge;[35] the 1998 *Antarctic Protected Areas* workshop held in Tromsø;[36] the 1999 *Second Workshop on Antarctic Protected Areas* held in Peru;[37] and the 2019 *Joint SCAR/CEP Workshop on Further Developing the Antarctic Protected Area System* held in Prague.[38] It is therefore worth investigating the agendas and reports of these workshops as they likely make reference to, and in turn impact, the development of an official discourse on Antarctic heritage.

In the context of the norm life cycle, intersessional activity can be considered to fulfill the same socialisation mechanism as ATCMs in that they represent a continuation of conversations, negotiations, and debates initiated at the Meeting.

### 2.5 *Amendments*

The efforts of all the above culminates in the passing of heritage-related amendments: Measures, Decisions, Resolutions, and Recommendations. Before continuing, it is worth noting here that at the 1995 ATCM under Decision 1, Recommendations were split into three new categories: 'Measures' (legally binding), 'Decisions' (procedural matters), and 'Resolutions' (hortatory). The nature and procedure of decision-making within the ATS determines which of these amendments ATCPs make, as well as the effort these states must exert to reach particular outcomes. The most defining characteristic of decision-making within

[34] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXIII Final Report*, 1999, paragraph 55. New Zealand, *Terms of Reference (a) - Development of Guidelines for Protected Areas Under Annex V of the Environmental Protocol*, WP011 (2000).
[35] The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research and the International Union for Conservation of Nature, *Developing the Antarctic protected area system: proceedings of the SCAR/IUCN Workshop on Antarctic Protected Areas*, 29 June - 2 July 1992, Cambridge (Gland: IUCN, 1994).
[36] Norway and the United Kingdom, *Report of the Antarctic Protected Areas workshop*, WP026 (1998).
[37] Peru, *Report of the second workshop on Antarctic Protected Areas*, WP037 (1999).
[38] Australia, the Czech Republic, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, and the United States, *Recommendations arising from the Joint SCAR / CEP Workshop on Further Developing the Antarctic Protected Area System. Prague, Czech Republic, 27-28 June 2019*, WP070 (2019). Australia, the Czech Republic, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, and the United States, *Co-conveners' report of the Joint SCAR / CEP Workshop on Further Developing the Antarctic Protected Area System. Prague, Czech Republic, 27-28 June 2019*, IP165 (2019).

the ATS is that it is consensus-based; all ATCPs must approve Recommendations or Measures before the Meeting can adopt them and they come into effect, as they are the only parties that can contribute to consensus at ATCMs.[39] The Treaty establishes this requirement of widespread agreement to compensate for the varying juridical positions on sovereignty.[40] Notably, the ATCPs retain policy-making power for all of the membership.[41]

The procedure of decision-making also has multiple phases beginning with discussion, negotiations, and compromise between the parties, before (any of the four) amendments are proposed, recommended, and in the case of Recommendations and Measures, approved. Measures are intended to 'be legally binding once they have been approved by all [ATCPs]'; whilst Decisions relate to 'internal organizational matters, and become operative immediately'; and Resolutions contain 'hortatory texts adopted at an ATCM, but are not explicitly binding on states.'[42] Measures can be adopted at different rates depending on how quickly the ATCPs' governments approve the amendment, but more recently Measures have been subject to 'Fast Approval.'[43] As mentioned above, there was no specification of Decisions, Resolutions and Measures until 1995. The main reason behind this change in amendment status was to clarify the legal nature and obligatory status of the recommendations made within the Meetings.[44]

Understanding these technical means of Antarctic law-making gives greater context for the amendments proposed, recommended, and approved in relation to Antarctic heritage matters. For example, the List which contains all the HSM designations is legally binding as it is a Recommendation first adopted and approved in 1972,[45] and then again as Measures in 2003,[46]

[39] Discussion continues until the Chair is convinced that consensus is either reached or not reached (see Rule 24 of the *Rules of Procedure*). Antarctic Treaty System, *Rules of Procedure of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting and the Committee for Environmental Protection*, updated November 2019, 12.
[40] If the ATCM was to make decisions by a majority, then it would not be possible to hold in abeyance the claims to territory in the region.
[41] Klaus Dodds, "Governing Antarctica: Contemporary Challenges and the Enduring Legacy of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty," *Global Policy* 1, no. 1 (2010): 110.
[42] Christopher Joyner, "Recommended Measures Under the Antarctic Treaty: Hardening Compliance with Soft International Law," *Michigan Journal of International Law* 19, no. 2 (1998): 424.
[43] This status is recorded on several Measures available via the Antarctic Treaty website.
[44] Decision 1, 1995 had a dual effect: to 'minimize the considerable delay between the adoption of the recommendations and when they become effective,' and 'to lessen the prospect that "innocuous" recommendations … would not be needlessly subjected to the governmental approval process.' Joyner, "Recommended Measures Under the Antarctic Treaty: Hardening Compliance with Soft International Law," 424.
[45] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *List of Historic Monuments*, Recommendation 9, 1972.
[46] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Revised List of Historic Sites and Monuments*, Measure 3, 2003.

2015,[47] 2016,[48] and 2019,[49] and the HSMs contained within are also designated through legally binding Measures (previously Recommendations). On the other hand, the Meeting has established guidelines and a guide for HSMs through hortatory Resolutions – that is, merely documents of encouragement. This was presumably to avoid designation becoming a protracted and contentious process, especially considering the level of subjectivity involved in determining what is and is not 'heritage.'

The adoption of amendments at ATCMs is a clear demonstration of a heritage protection norm's successful cascade. States make these adoptions for several reasons, but the two Finnemore and Sikkink describe that resonate most within the Antarctic context are legitimacy and belonging.[50] By formally adopting a particular norm, states can gain international legitimacy and avoid being labelled as a pariah or rogue state, and they can also gain domestic legitimacy from their constituents. States also comply with norms to show that they have adapted to the social environment and therefore belong. This is particularly important in Antarctica where states gain admission to the 'club' of ATCPs by meeting expectations and satisfying particular criteria.

## 3. Codification of Antarctic Heritage Management

Three key documents within the Antarctic Treaty System comprise what I refer to as the HSM Framework: the List, the Guidelines, and the Guide for Historic Sites and Monuments. These official instruments all play individual yet complementary roles in the management of historic remains in Antarctica, conceptually, administratively, and physically. To discern the influence of these three texts on the management of Antarctic heritage over the past six decades, in the following I trace the formal progressions of the HSM List, Guidelines, and Guide. This includes consideration of their revisions, associated documents, and discussion at Meetings.

[47] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Revised List of Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments: Lame Dog Hut at the Bulgarian base St. Kliment Ohridski, Livingston Island and Oversnow heavy tractor "Kharkovchanka" that was used in Antarctica from 1959 to 2010*, Measure 19, 2015.
[48] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Revised List of Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments: Incorporation of a historic wooden pole to Historic Site and Monument No 60 (Corvette Uruguay Cairn), in Seymour Island (Marambio), Antarctic Peninsula*, Measure 9, 2016.
[49] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Revised List of Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments*, Measure 12, 2019.
[50] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 903.

3.1 *The HSM List*

The HSM List is an amalgamation of all the historic sites and monuments designated as HSMs since 1970. There are currently 94 entries: 89 that are active and five that have been delisted. The List provides a succinct summary of the HSMs and their details, and its most current version includes for each entry a number, description, location, and designation/amendment.[51] The number simply refers to the order of designation; the description provides a brief summary of the site or monument and identifies the 'Original proposing Party' and the 'Party undertaking management'; the location provides geographical coordinates; and the designation/amendment lists any Recommendations or Measures relevant to the HSM's designation and management. The number, location, and designation/amendment are fairly self-explanatory, but the description is open to interpretation as it is not just a record of remains, but rather a narrative carefully composed and submitted by the proposing party. Table 3.2 outlines in chronological order the key moments in the development of the HSM List as the first foundational document in the HSM Framework. The first three columns are factual, while the last two are my own interpretation.

Table 3.2: Key moments in the development of the HSM List between 1961-2019.

| **Year** | **Document** | **Title/Subject** | **Description** | **Significance** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1968 (ATCM V) | Rec. 4 | *List of historic monuments* | 'Historic monuments' had already been mentioned at the first ATCM in 1961. However, this amendment contains the first mention of a 'list of historic monuments.' It recommends 'that a list of historic monuments which should be preserved be drawn up,' and 'that each government circulate a list of historic monuments through diplomatic channels to other Consultative Governments.' | The first mention of a list of historic remains |
| 1970 (ATCM VI) | WP009 | *Amalgamated List of Historic Monuments in Antarctica* | This paper outlines an 'Amalgamated List of Historic Monuments in Antarctica.' The first version contained 45 entries with descriptions and responsible parties attached, but the revision, dated 10 days later, deleted five entries, and omitted the responsible parties. Although the | The first amalgamated list of historic monuments in Antarctica |

[51] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Revised List of Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments*, Measure 12, 2019.

| Year | Document | Title/Subject | Description | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | first version of the List is often credited to the 1972 ATCM, this Working Paper is the first to gather together the proposed HSMs prior to their official designation. | |
| 1972 (ATCM VII) | Rec. 9 | *List of Historic Monuments* | This amendment presents the first official HSM List. It contains 43 entries with descriptions and a sub-note stating that 'The Consultative Meeting does not approve or disapprove the place names appearing in the texts of this List in the different languages.' This list became effective 2003. | The first official HSM List |
| 1987 (ATCM XIV) | Final Report | *Paragraph 137* | A statement on the value of HSMs as 'witnesses to a significant human presence in the Antarctic; and which are an essential part of the record of human activity in Antarctica.' | Acknowledges the value of HSMs |
| 1996 (ATCM XX) | Res. 4 | *Guidelines for proposing Historic Sites and Monuments* | Up until 1996, the official list had not identified responsible parties. This Resolution highlights 'that those who originally created Historic Sites or Monuments are not necessarily the same as the designators for the Sites or the proposers of Management Plans for some sites,' and therefore 'During the preparations for the Listing of a Historic Site or Monument, or the writing of a Site Management Plan, adequate liaison is accorded by the proposing Party with the originator of the Historic Site or Monument and other Parties, as appropriate.' | Identifies discrepancy between proposing and managing parties |
| 2001 (ATCM XXIV) | Res. 4 | *Review of Historic Sites and Monuments* | By 2001, 74 HSMs had been designated, but the List had not been updated since the initial 43 entries. Following a proposal for 'a thorough review of the list of HSMs' (WP016) the Meeting passes this Resolution. | Proposal for the first review of the HSM List |

| Year | Document | Title/Subject | Description | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2002 (annex entered into force on 24 May) | Annex V Protocol | *Article 8: Historic Sites and Monuments* | This article: specifies that designated HSMs are to be recorded on the List; outlines that HSM proposals 'shall be deemed to have been approved 90 days after the close of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting at which it was adopted'; and states that the List can be amended, and should be maintained by the Depository. | Reiterates the role of the HSM List |
| 2003 (ATCM XXVI) | Meas. 3 | *Revised List of Historic Sites and Monuments* | This Measure and its annex present the first revised official list of HSMs since its publication in 1972. It contains the 76 HSMs designated up until this point, their descriptions, the proposing and managing parties, details of their adoption, their location, and a note stating that 'The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting neither approves, nor disapproves of the place names used in the listing below.' It became effective 2003 after being subject to 'Fast Approval.' | The first review of the HSM List |
| 2015 (ATCM XXXVIII) | Final Report | *Paragraph 177* | The CEP advises the ATCM that 'future proposals for new designations of HSMs should be put on hold until some further guidance has been established in this regard' following a suggestion to 'initiate further discussion on the designation of Historic Sites and Monuments, in the broader sense' (Paragraph 148). This is the first time the Meeting places a moratorium on the List. | A moratorium on additions to HSM List |
| 2015 (ATCM XXXVIII) | Meas. 19 | *Revised List of Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments* | This Measure and its annex provide an updated official list of HSMs, bringing the total listed to 92. | An HSM List revision |

| Year | Document | Title/Subject | Description | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 (ATCM XXXIX) | Final Report | *Paragraph 169* | Due to the moratorium placed on the HSM List at the 2015 ATCM, the CEP denies two HSM proposals (contained in WP048 rev. 1 and WP051). This is the only instance to date in which the Meeting has denied HSM designation. | Two HSM proposals denied designation |
| 2019 (ATCM XLII) | Dec. 1 | *Redesign of the Format of the List of Historic Sites and Monuments* | This Decision seeks to 'incorporate the following new fields of information, in addition to the existing fields of "No.", "Description", "Location" and "Redesignation/Amendment", to the List of HSMs: Name; Type; Conservation status; Description of the historical context; Applicable criteria in accordance with Resolution 3 (2009); Management tools; Photos; and Physical features of the environment and cultural and local context.' Reformatting the List would require both the proposing and managing parties to provide further information and detail about each HSM (effectively making them more accountable for its appropriate designation and management). | Proposal to reformat the HSM List |
| 2019 (ATCM XLII) | Meas. 12 | *Revised List of Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments* | This Measure and its annex provide an updated official list of HSMs – bringing the total listed to 94 after two HSMs were designated at the 2019 ATCM – and signifies an end to the moratorium on proposals placed four years earlier. | Moratorium lifted and additions made to HSM List |

### 3.2 *The HSM Guidelines*

The HSM Guidelines vet the sites and monuments for admission to the HSM List. These guidelines provide ATCPs looking to propose particular historic remains for listing with criteria, and, in later versions, instructions for successful designation. These Guidelines were made available for the first time only in 1995,[52] meaning that states had proposed and

[52] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for proposing new Historic Sites and Monuments*, Resolution 8, 1995.

designated the previously listed 71 HSMs without any formal guidance. Since then, the ATCM has updated and supplemented the primary Guidelines on a number of occasions. When the Guidelines were first revised in 2009,[53] they provided detailed steps for the management of HSMs in the form of management plans and conservation strategies. The purpose of the Guidelines' most recent revision in 2018 is three-fold: to protect historic sites and monuments pre-designation, to advise potential HSM designations, and to manage HSMs post-designation. The 2001 ATCM (XXIV) introduced parallel guidelines – the Guidelines for pre-1958 historic remains[54] – to protect such remains by awarding them automatic protection for three years upon their discovery.[55] The 2018 Guidelines[56] provide the most extensive instructions yet in a lengthy 18-page document prepared after two back-to-back ICGs convened on the subject, and include an instructive flow chart for decisions on heritage management (see Figure 3.3).




Figure 3.3: Reproduction of the four-step process visualised in the most recent HSM Guidelines. (Resolution 2, 2018, 4.)

None of these guidelines have been or are legally binding as they are Resolutions and not Measures. However, they do provide valuable guidance for those preparing HSM proposals, assessing HSM proposals, and managing designated HSMs. The WPs proposing HSM designation also reference these documents. Table 3.3 outlines in chronological order the key

[53] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for the designation and protection of Historic Sites and Monuments*, Resolution 3, 2009.
[54] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for handling pre-1958 historic remains*, Resolution 5, 2001.
[55] Barr comments that the 2001 guidelines were slow to come about as the ATS 'rolls slowly and needed time to think about this revolutionary idea.' Susan Barr, "Twenty years of protection of historic values in Antarctica under the Madrid Protocol," *The Polar Journal* 8, no. 2 (2018): 257.
[56] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for the assessment and management of Heritage in Antarctica*, Resolution 2, 2018.

moments in the development of the HSM Guidelines as the second foundational document in the HSM Framework.

Table 3.3: Key moments in the development of the HSM Guidelines between 1961-2019.

| **Year** | **Document** | **Title/Subject** | **Description** | **Significance** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1995 (ATCM XIX) | Res. 8 | *Guidelines for proposing new Historic Sites and Monuments* | This Resolution introduces the first guidelines for HSM proposals. The Meeting recommends 'that the following Guidelines for the Designation of Historic Sites and/or Monuments should be used by the Governments of the Consultative Parties in proposing sites,' and that 'Proposals for Historic Sites and/or Monuments should address one or more of the following': a historical event, a historical figure, a historical feat, an activity that has helped to develop knowledge of Antarctica, an example of technical or architectural value, a potential to educate people about human activities in Antarctica, or an example of symbolic or commemorative value for 'people of many nations.' From this point onwards, Working Papers containing HSM proposals should consult these criteria. | The first HSM Guidelines |
| 2001 (ATCM XXIV) | Res. 5 | *Guidelines for handling pre-1958 historic remains* | After receiving a proposal (WP023), the Meeting passes this Resolution as a means to protect 'pre-1958 historic artefacts/sites whose existence or location is not known,' awarding them an interim protection period of three years. This amendment is significant as it presents another avenue for heritage protection for parties to have their historic remains not yet located (or even confirmed as still in existence) awarded status and protection. | Guidelines for pre-1958 historic remains |

| Year | Document | Title/Subject | Description | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 (ATCM XXXII) | Res. 3 | *Guidelines for the designation and protection of Historic Sites and Monuments* | These guidelines extend the initial 1995 guidelines. The original criteria remains the same, but this revision adds further instructions attending to protection, marking, review, management, categorisation, and visitation of historic remains. | The first review of the HSM Guidelines |
| 2010 (ATCM XXXIII) | Final Report | *Paragraphs 201-203* | An ICG is proposed to both 'evaluate the concept of what is considered to be "historic", and to include the more holistic concept of "enhancement", which encompasses protection, conservation and dissemination' (WP047). But due to the large intersessional workload at this time, the CEP instead welcomed 'informal discussions in the intersessional period, supported by the CEP web-based forum with a view to reporting' at the next CEP meeting. | The first proposal for an ICG on HSMs |
| 2013 (ATCM XXXVI) | Final Report | *Paragraphs 144-145* | It is suggested that 'the Committee might consider at some time in the future engaging in a broader discussion on Historical Sites and Monuments designations,' and that 'intersessional discussions could be valuable.' Reminiscent of the suggestion three years prior, the CEP again denies formal intersessional action on the matter as it 'did not view the issue as an urgent priority,' and instead notes it in the Five-Year Work Plan. | The second proposal for an ICG on HSMs |
| 2016 (ATCM XXXIX) | Final Report | *Paragraph 157* | Six years after the initial proposal for an ICG on HSMs, the CEP agrees to establish a two-year ICG with the aim of 'developing guidance material for Parties' assessment of conservation | An ICG on HSMs is formed |

| Year | Document | Title/Subject | Description | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | approaches for the management of Antarctic heritage objects.' In preparation for this ICG, parties pose a series of 13 questions relating to management, significance, preservation, objectives, accessibility, advice, and collaboration, and considered consultation with heritage experts. | |
| 2018 (ATCM XLI) | Res. 2 | *Guidelines for the assessment and management of Heritage in Antarctica* | The CEP endorses a revised set of guidelines for adoption at the ATCM. These revised guidelines represent perhaps the most important progression within the entire HSM Framework to date as they provide comprehensive instructions for dealing with Antarctic heritage. The 18-page document states the aims of the guidelines clearly, describes heritage and historic 'values,' defines relevant terminology, elaborates on the criteria, considers different modes of conservation, lays out steps for HSM listing, explains different management approaches, addresses environmental issues, and finally, discusses education and outreach initiatives. | HSM Guidelines are extensively revised |

### 3.3 *The HSM Guide*

The HSM List and Guidelines are essential documents for those proposing, designating, or managing HSMs, but the Guide on Antarctic Protected Areas – what I refer to as the HSM Guide – is also useful. The Guide is an important part of the HSM Framework, as while the Guidelines specify what can and cannot be considered heritage, the Guide details the process to propose a site of heritage, providing practical information such as what ATCPs should include within the WP containing the proposal. The Guide remained unchanged for the first 10 years of its existence up to 2018, when an ICG substantially extended the template, providing an outline for a 'Cover Sheet for a Working Paper on a Historic Site or Monument.' Table 3.4

outlines in chronological order the key moments in the development of the HSM Guide as the third foundational document in the HSM Framework.

Table 3.4: Key moments in the development of the HSM Guide between 1961-2019.

| **Year** | **Document** | **Title/Subject** | **Description** | **Significance** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 (ATCM XXXI) | Res. 1 | *Guide to the Presentation of Working Papers Containing Proposals for Antarctic Specially Protected Areas, Antarctic Specially Managed Areas or Historic Sites and Monuments* | The Guide is introduced to give parties an indication of what the expected inclusion were for Working Papers containing proposals for HSMs, as well as ASPAs and ASMAs. The annex contains instructions and templates for the drafting of these papers, and questions to be addressed on the cover sheet. | The first HSM Guide |
| 2011 (ATCM XXXIV) | Res. 5 | *Revised Guide to the Presentation of Working Papers Containing Proposals for Antarctic Specially Protected Areas, Antarctic Specially Managed Areas or Historic Sites and Monuments* | A revised guide is introduced, although it makes no modifications to the section on HSMs. | The first review of the HSM Guide |
| 2016 (ATCM XXXIX) | Res. 5 | *Revised Guide to the presentation of Working Papers containing proposals for Antarctic Specially Protected Areas, Antarctic Specially Managed Areas or Historic Sites and Monuments* | A revised guide is introduced, although, again, it makes no modifications to the section on HSMs. | The second review of the HSM Guide |
| 2018 (ATCM XLI) | Res. 3 | *Revised Guide to the presentation of Working Papers containing proposals for Antarctic Specially Protected Areas, Antarctic Specially Managed Areas or Historic Sites and Monuments* | A revised guide is introduced and the template for Working Papers for HSM proposals is extended to include the type of HSM, its historical and cultural features, and plans for its management. | HSM Guide is extensively revised |

## 4. Summary: The emergence and cascade of norms on heritage protection

In this chapter I have described the formal mechanisms through which states codify Antarctic heritage and have defined a framework for Antarctic heritage management. The mechanisms are institutionally and textually embedded within the Antarctic Treaty System and provide various avenues for norms on Antarctic heritage to emerge and, in some cases, become legalised. The HSM Framework offers clarification on what Antarctic heritage management looks like in practice, and where and when key progressions have occurred. The official discourse on Antarctic heritage is characterised by its emergence amongst the policies and procedures of the Antarctic Treaty System, and the scaffolding for its construction is a series of progressions within key textual instruments. To use Finnemore and Sikkink's language, norms on heritage protection in this part of the world have emerged and cascaded, but are yet to be internalised as the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties are yet to reach agreement on a single narrative of Antarctic heritage. Now that it is apparent *how* Antarctic heritage is codified, in the next chapter I will turn to identifying *who* has performed the codifying.

# Chapter Four: Claiming Heritage

## *Identifying the official perspective on Antarctic heritage*

The objective of this chapter is to identify which state perspectives are most closely reflected in the prevailing Antarctic heritage discourse – or, more simply, to demonstrate to whom this discourse 'belongs.' In *Chapter Two: Methodology*, I justified my selection of discourse analysis as a productive way to approach this task. I also introduced the technique of coding that I will put into practice here to translate the chosen texts (qualitative data) into meaningful statistics (quantitative results).[1] Through an analysis of Antarctic Treaty System documents, I show how geopolitical discourse on heritage in Antarctica reflects the perspective of a privileged few.

In order to do this, this chapter focuses on identifying which states are most actively contributing to the development of the HSM Framework, and also how and when this contribution occurs. I argue that states' level of engagement equates to their level of influence in the management of Antarctic heritage. This is because states who contribute more frequently than others have a greater chance of their perspective being codified within overarching regulation and are therefore more likely to have the perspective that 'counts'– as outlined at length in relation to the emergence of international norms in the previous chapter.

Other researchers have conducted similar analyses to determine who the leading parties are in Antarctic politics, but have differed in focus, scope, and aim. For example, Dudeney and Walton assess policy papers and scientific publications of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties between 1994 and 2012 to understand how scientific research influences Antarctic politics.[2] Here, I draw upon the submitted papers, final reports (of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings and the Committee for Environmental Protection), and records of intersessional activity, all between 1961 and 2019 to identify the most influential party/ies in the management of Antarctic heritage.

[1] See *Chapter Two: Methodology*, section 4 for a detailed explanation of method and techniques applied throughout this thesis.
[2] John R. Dudeney and David W.H. Walton, "Leadership in politics and science within the Antarctic Treaty," *Polar Research* 31, no. 1 (2012): 1-9.

I begin by explaining the methods for my investigation, before presenting the results, and then analysing the findings on individual, collective, and collaborative approaches to heritage in Antarctica. Finally, I conclude the chapter by contemplating what the contributions mean for a universal definition of Antarctic heritage.

## 1. Method: Coding as a means to quantify state behaviour

Within this chapter I use coding as the basis for a quantitative assessment of state behaviour. This technique helps discern how power dynamics have affected the development of a discourse on Antarctic heritage and led to the authorisation of one perspective. The assumption is that the state whose perspective is successfully recorded and translated into international law is consequently the one that 'counts.'

I collected the data from three predominant modes of state engagement within the Antarctic Treaty System: paper submission, meeting discussion, and intersessional activity. The first mode of engagement is documented online by the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat; the second mode is recorded in the meeting minutes published within each final report; and the third mode – which includes both formal and informal reviews, discussions and workshops – takes place outside of the annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs), but is proposed and reported on in the final reports also. All of these sources are publicly available on the Antarctic Treaty website.[3]

Since its establishment in 2001, the Secretariat has facilitated information coordination, distribution, and storage, essentially fulfilling a largely organisational function. It is also responsible for the production and publication of final reports and supplies administrative support to the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) by maintaining an 'environmental archive,' especially in relation to protected areas.[4] The final reports provide an account of conversations held between parties on Antarctic heritage and its management (among other things) within an international forum and are written by individuals observing the meetings – the rapporteurs. Although the rapporteurs cannot capture discussions between parties word-for-word, they do record a valuable summary of the key debates and amendments

[3] Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, "Meeting Documents Archive," 2021, https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Meetings/DocDatabase?lang=e.
[4] Karen N. Scott, "Institutional Developments within the Antarctic Treaty System," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 52, (2003): 485.

passed that all parties involved then edit, paragraph-by-paragraph, prior to the closing plenary. These reports heavily cite relevant documents such as submitted papers (discussed in greater detail below) and describe important information such as details of intersessional workshops. I extract from the final reports statements from the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs), Observers and Invited Experts on heritage-related matters, and the heritage-related amendments themselves that form the legal outcome of meeting deliberations.

To answer the guiding question for this chapter, which is also a primary research question for this thesis overall – 'Whose perspective on Antarctic heritage counts?' – I attribute certain actions that further the discourse to certain actors – in this case, the ATCPs. I analyse the data sources listed above to credit key progressions in the development of the Historic Sites and Monuments (HSM) framework to particular parties. Figure 4.1 is my codebook that details the logic behind the coding process and arranges the elements relative to one another.




Figure 4.1: Codebook for diagnosing which actors are progressing the HSM Framework components and how.

This codebook provides instructions to organise, make sense of, and analyse the data collected. In order to credit the key progressions in the HSM Framework development, I first ask a series of preceding questions (the relationship of which I explain in the following section) that concern: what is being progressed, how was this progress made, and who is accountable for this progress. These are the guiding questions that determine the ensuing coding process, as their immediate answers form the overarching coding categories: the HSM Framework within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is *what* is being progressed; the different modes of state engagement explain *how* this progress is made; and the ATCPs are *who* are involved in this progress. These coding categories then contain a number of codes that further break down these categories. The previous chapter already divided the HSM Framework into three codes: the HSM List, Guidelines and Guide. In relation to states' modes of engagement, three codes are possible: papers submitted at ATCMs,[5] discussion raised at ATCMs,[6] and intersessional activity occurring between ATCMs.[7] Lastly, the actors can either be ATCPs, non-state actors such as the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, or the Antarctic Treaty System's moving parts, which include the Meeting, the Committee, and the Secretariat. For the purposes of this chapter's state-centric analysis, however, I code only the ATCPs, given their investment in the governance of the region, as indicated by the darker shading of the ATCPs code, but not the other two (I address the role of non-state actors in *Chapter Nine: Reconceptualising Heritage*). Finally, some of these codes are broken down into nodes, which in this case further specify the means ATCPs use to develop the HSM Framework: Working Papers (WPs), Information Papers (IPs) and Background Papers (BPs); both independent and collective discussion; and formal contributions such as Intersessional Contact Groups (ICGs), informal contributions such as discussions and reviews, and workshops within intersessional periods.

Given that the primary function of this codebook is to help measure the weight of one state's contribution over another, it is important to detail how I make these calculations. To assign states credit for their contributions, the nodes that stem from the mode category are each worth a 'contribution count' of one. What this means is that for each occasion a country submits a paper, raises discussion, or leads intersessional activity on Antarctic heritage, I attribute them one 'contribution count' that when summed equals their overall contribution to the development of the HSM Framework. Therefore, the larger a state's 'contribution count,' the

[5] This includes papers submitted to the CEP.
[6] Again, this includes CEP meetings.
[7] As well as CEP meetings.

greater its role and influence: in forming the ways in which Antarctic heritage is perceived and discussed; or alternatively, the stronger its claim to the official perspective on Antarctic heritage.

Inevitably, there are limitations to this method. The most obvious is that the evaluation process does not take into account the exact content of each node. For example, a state that submits an IP on Antarctic Protected Areas (APAs) – that does not specifically mention HSMs but does acknowledge 'historic value' and helps clarify why HSMs are being protected – I grant the same 'contribution count' as a state who raises discussion on the need for a complete overhaul of the HSM Framework. I justify this approach by maintaining that what really 'counts' is the frequency with which a state engages with the HSM Framework. The number of times a state acts in relation to Antarctic heritage demonstrates its underlying commitment to the formation of a formal and institutionalised discourse on Antarctic heritage. I am also wary of the complexity involved in creating a coding system that objectively and consistently ranks and qualifies every single node. The chosen approach therefore offers a quantitative reading of discourse construction and provides broad insight into who is doing or saying what, when.

## 2. Results: Development of the HSM Framework between 1961-2019

The codebook (Figure 4.1) contains three guiding questions, but in answering the second question – 'How was this progress made?' – I also address the other two adjoining questions.[8] This is because in the process of working out how progress has been made (Q2), I consider the type of contribution (Q1), and the identities of the contributors (Q3). For example, a Working Paper (*how*) on additions to the HSM List (*what*) could be submitted by Australia (*who*). Therefore, I present the results in relation to ATCPs' modes of engagement with the HSM Framework. In total, ATCPs have thus far submitted 50 papers on Antarctic heritage management to ATCMs – both independently and collectively; have explicitly discussed Antarctic heritage management on 50 occasions at ATCMs – both independently and collectively; and have led 13 intersessional activities, including ICGs, discussions, reviews, and workshops related to Antarctic heritage management.[9]

[8] This is why Q2 is boldened in my codebook/Figure 4.1.
[9] Table 11.1 in the Appendix details every contribution made by the ATCPs.

From the raw results, I modelled a timeline for the development of the HSM Framework on key progressions, or in other words, the progress made in relation to the HSM List, Guidelines and Guide. Figure 4.2 shows that the rate of progression over the 58-year period is roughly exponential, with a peak in activity in the mid-1980s, likely due to the 1985 Special Antarctic Treaty Meeting (SATCM) on APAs, and more broadly the global environmentalism of the time.




Figure 4.2: Key progressions in the development of the HSM Framework between 1961-2019, according to contribution count (the answer to Q1).

The coding method measures this progress by counting how many times a state submits a relevant paper to an ATCM, raises relevant discussion at an ATCM, or leads relevant intersessional activity between ATCMs. Figure 4.3 presents a chronological account of paper submission, discussions raised, and intersessional activity on Antarctic heritage by ATCPs between 1961 and 2019. As identified in the previous chapter, activity pertaining to HSMs and their management began at the first ATCM in 1961 with the mention of 'historic monuments.' However, progress after this point was minimal until the last decade, during which ATCPs have discussed the matter at almost every ATCM, and the Meeting has steadily adopted Resolutions, Measures, Decisions, and Recommendations on HSM designation and management.




Figure 4.3: Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party mode of engagement with the HSM Framework between 1961-2019 (the answer to Q2).

The graph shows that there was a surge in submission of papers on the topic more recently, with almost two thirds submitted in the twenty-first century, and 40 per cent in the last decade alone.[10] Of the 50 papers, 42 were Working Papers, seven were Information Papers and one was a Background Paper. This breakdown is not surprising considering the differing functions of each of these types of papers (as outlined in the previous chapter).

In relation to discussions, states have raised the management of HSMs at every ATCM in some shape or form since 1998 – apart from in 2003 and 2014 when no papers were submitted under the agenda item, no relevant discussion was raised, and no intersessional activity was held either side of the Meeting. Prior to 1995, states mentioned HSMs only intermittently and with low frequency, except for in 1987 when the Meeting (that is, unidentifiable ATCPs therefore not represented on the graph) acknowledged that 'the issue of preservation and protection of historic monuments and sites deserved careful attention and should be addressed in a more comprehensive manner.'[11] The past four years in particular are the most active on record for Antarctic heritage, with discussion on the topic almost doubling in this timeframe. In 2016 the ICG on the HSM Framework was formed; in 2017 several papers were submitted, the concepts of 'heritage' and 'universality' were raised, and an ICG was held; in 2018 the findings, reports, and recommendations from the ICGs were presented; and in 2019, the moratorium on HSM

[10] 2009 to 2019.
[11] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XIV Final Report*, 1987, paragraph 143.

proposals was lifted. Lastly, ATCPs have made progress on Antarctic heritage management during intersessional periods.

Intersessional activity on Antarctic heritage has occurred intermittently since 1992. Intersessional ICGs, discussion, and reviews were held between 1999-2000 for development of the HSM criteria; between 2007-2009 for a review of the HSM Guidelines; between 2016-2018 for the revision of the HSM Guidelines and Guide; and most recently, between 2019-2020 for the drafting of Conservation Management Plans (CMPs). Informal intersessional discussions and reviews were held between 2010-2012 to attempt to define what Antarctic heritage actually is, and between 2018-2019 for the revision of the HSM List format. Lastly, the intersessional workshops on APAs, and by extension Antarctic heritage and HSMs, was held in 1992 in Cambridge, 1998 in Tromsø, 1999 in Lima, and 2019 in Prague.

Finally, to identify which ATCPs are contributing the most to the development of the HSM Framework, Figure 4.4 below presents the papers, discussions, and intersessional activity according to state contribution. I examine these gross results in the following section.




Figure 4.4: Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party contributions to the development of the HSM Framework between 1961-2019 (the answer to Q3).

## 3. Analysis: State contributions to the HSM Framework

This section processes the above preliminary results to discern who, or which ATCP, has made the greatest contribution to an official discourse on Antarctic heritage, and shifts from a quantitative lens to a qualitative one. First, I contextualise the contribution of each individual state. Secondly, I consider the contributions of different groups or collectives of states. And thirdly, I compare the contributions of cooperating states (which I term 'targeted enquiries').

### 3.1 Individual Enquiries: *Contributions of all 29 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties*

This sub-section expands on the gross results by detailing and contextualising each of the ATCP's individual contributions to an official discourse on Antarctic heritage. Here I conduct a longitudinal study of state contribution. By tracing the nature of ATCPs' behaviour over time, I can judge patterns in each's contribution. At an initial glance it is apparent that claimant, and reserved claimant, states are the most active: the United Kingdom, Norway, Argentina, and Chile have all contributed substantially more than the other states; and Australia, New Zealand and the United States are in the following bracket. This result is unsurprising given the engagement of these particular states within the Heroic Era, their ensuing claims to territory in the region (the Peninsula in particular), and their role as original signatories to the Treaty. Nevertheless, it is important to investigate the details of each state's contribution to understand how they have participated and when. I address the states in alphabetical order and provide a brief summary and comment on each state's performance in the italicised text. I conclude by discussing how the most active and therefore dominant contributor has advanced the discourse on heritage in the region.

**Argentina** was first vocal on HSMs and their management at the 2007 ATCM (XXX) when it questioned historical references made within a WP submitted by Chile on the application of the APA system.[12] Argentina commented again in 2009, when Chile resubmitted the paper,[13] and encouraged the 'adoption of clear language in the proposal to note that these proposed guidelines should not impact upon existing Historic Sites and Monuments as this may alter the way that these sites or monuments are managed,'[14] and also when it expressed its concerns

[12] Chile, *Antarctic Protected Areas System: Revised List of Historic Sites and Monuments (Measure 3 (2003) Draft Guidelines for its Application*, WP038 (2007).
[13] Chile, *Antarctic Protected Area System: Revised list of Historic Sites and Monuments - Measure 3 (2003). Guidelines for its application*, WP003 (2009).
[14] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXII Final Report*, 2009, paragraph 109.

regarding additional authorisation requirements for entering or visiting a site or monument.[15] In 2010, Argentina defended its own paper[16] arguing for an increase in paperwork as there was a 'crucial need to reinforce the use of the Guidelines in designating protected areas.'[17] It was at this ATCM that Argentina began to make its mark on Antarctic heritage management by proposing, within a WP and accompanying IP,[18] further discussion on 'a change in strategy for dealing with historic sites and monuments, both to evaluate the concept of what is considered to be "historic", and to include the more holistic concept of "enhancement", which encompasses protection, conservation and dissemination.'[19] Although the Meeting did not accept this proposal, Argentina led informal discussions on the matter during the following two intersessional periods.[20] After each period, Argentina presented WPs summarising the debate on the concept of patrimony.[21] In 2013, despite calling for an ICG on HSMs just three years prior, Argentina advised against Norway's proposal for 'broader discussion on [Historic] Sites and Monuments designations,'[22] arguing that it was not an 'urgent priority' – possibly suggesting that it wanted to lead the discussion itself.[23] It nonetheless returned to the issue in 2016 when it stressed the 'need to consider the individual heritage value of items to each Member and … the need for more debate in relation to ex situ conservation as HSMs are a considered part of Antarctic heritage.'[24] When an ICG on HSMs was finally formed at the 2016 ATCM (XXXIX), Argentina welcomed the progression as it believed that 'some concepts related to heritage were not clearly defined in the Antarctic Treaty System e.g. universality, which may have consequences for the national histories of individual Parties,' and therefore that 'participants in the continuing Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) discussions should draw on relevant national experts.'[25] It also supported the proposal for a workshop in

[15] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXII Final Report*, 2009, paragraph 135.
[16] Argentina, *Use of the Guidelines for the designation of Protected Areas*, WP050 (2010).
[17] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXII Final Report*, 2009, paragraph 181.
[18] Argentina, *Proposal for the discussion of aspects related to the management of Historic Sites and Monuments*, WP047 (2010); and Argentina, *Additional information for the discussion of aspects related to the management of Historic Sites and Monuments*, IP022 (2010).
[19] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIII Final Report*, 2010, paragraph 201.
[20] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIII Final Report*, 2010, paragraph 203.
[21] Argentina, *Report of the Informal Discussions on Historic Sites and Monuments*, WP027 (2011); and Argentina, *Final Report of the Informal Discussions on Historic Sites and Monuments*, WP046 (2012).
[22] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXVI Final Report*, 2013, paragraph 144.
[23] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXVI Final Report*, 2013, paragraph 145.
[24] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIX Final Report*, 2016, paragraph 156.
[25] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XL Final Report*, 2017, paragraph 60.

2019.[26] Lastly, at the 2019 ATCM (XLII), Argentina submitted a WP[27] that proposed a reformatting of the List and requested that the Secretariat update the Antarctic Treaty website in line with this change.[28] It also submitted an IP[29] with Chile that queried the definition of an HSM. *Argentina has therefore not only been active in opposing and proposing changes to the HSM Framework, it has also been attentive to the conceptual issues concerning Antarctic heritage overall. Argentina's participation within the Heroic Era, its overlapping territorial claim and geographical proximity to the continent potentially explain this thoughtful approach.*

**Australia** appears to have remained relatively inactive on heritage matters at ATCMs, saving its energy for intersessional workshops. At the 2019 ATCM (XLII), however, it did respond to a remark made by China that suggested the terms of reference for the 2019 workshop had not been adequately addressed, and advised the Meeting that the co-conveners – of which Australia was one – 'had made best efforts to reflect the key points raised.'[30] With regard to intersessional activity on HSMs, Australia co-convened the 1998 and 2019 APA workshops. Lastly, Australia has submitted just four papers relating to the management of the HSMs, including a WP in 1987 that provided examples of application of APAs and discussed potential threats to these areas and their subsequent need for zoning;[31] a joint WP in 2018 that proposed the 2019 workshop;[32] a WP in 2019 that contained recommendations from the workshop;[33] and an IP for the co-convener's report on the workshop.[34] *Australia has therefore made a relatively modest contribution to the HSM Framework. Given that Australia participated in the Heroic Era, lays claim to 42 per cent of the continent after the gifting of Antarctic territory by the British in 1933, and holds four independent HSMs and one joint HSM, this contribution is perhaps less than might be expected.*

---

[26] Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, the United Kingdom, and the United States, *Proposal for a joint SCAR/CEP workshop on further developing the Antarctic protected area system*, WP016 (2018).
[27] Argentina, *Proposal to redesign the format of the list of Historic Sites and Monuments*, WP065 (2019).
[28] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraph 126.
[29] Argentina and Chile, *Report of the Joint Inspections Program undertaken by Argentina and Chile under Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 14 of the Environmental Protocol*, IP083 (2019).
[30] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraph 180.
[31] Australia, *Antarctic Protected Areas - examples of application*, WP016 (1987).
[32] WP016 (2018).
[33] Australia, the Czech Republic, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, and the United States, *Recommendations arising from the Joint SCAR / CEP Workshop on Further Developing the Antarctic Protected Area System. Prague, Czech Republic, 27-28 June 2019*, WP070 (2019).
[34] Australia, the Czech Republic, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, and the United States, *Co-conveners' report of the Joint SCAR / CEP Workshop on Further Developing the Antarctic Protected Area System. Prague, Czech Republic, 27-28 June 2019*, IP165 (2019).

**Belgium** has submitted one joint paper[35] and made one joint comment on the HSM Guidelines and Guide at the 2016 ATCM (XXXIX),[36] but has not led any intersessional periods. *Belgium has therefore had minimal input into the development of the HSM Framework. This is slightly unexpected given that Belgium was active within the Heroic Era, during de Gerlache's late nineteenth century expedition that was arguably the first to winter over,*[37] *and does have an HSM to commemorate this feat.*[38]

**Brazil** has not submitted any papers on HSM management nor initiated any discussions on the subject at any ATCMs or within any intersessional periods. *Brazil has therefore had no direct input into the development of the HSM Framework. This is unremarkable given that Brazil was absent from the Heroic Era, holds no claim to territory in Antarctica, and does not have any HSMs.*

**Bulgaria** has not submitted any papers on HSM management nor initiated any discussions on the subject at any ATCMs or within any intersessional periods. *Bulgaria has therefore had no direct input into the development of the HSM Framework. This is only slightly unexpected as although Bulgaria does have one HSM listed,*[39] *this was not designated until 2015, and Bulgaria was absent from the Heroic Era.*

**Chile**'s contribution to the development of the HSM Framework culminated in the CEP's recommendation of Resolution 3 at the 2009 ATCM (XXXII), that is, the HSM Guidelines. Before the CEP made this recommendation, Chile had submitted a series of WPs[40] at multiple ATCMs towards the development of a document which could 'maintain and improve the quality of the protection afforded to the present sites and monuments and appropriately build on the established rules and procedures to manage the List of Historic Sites and Monuments,'[41]

[35] WP016 (2018).
[36] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIX Final Report*, 2016, paragraph 206.
[37] After the expedition ship, the *Belgica*, became trapped in ice the party were forced to outstay the winter – there was no stated intention for the party to winter over. Marcus Haward, "The originals: the role and influence of the original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty," in *The Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 238.
[38] HSM 45.
[39] HSM 91.
[40] WP038 (2007); Chile and the United States, *Antarctic Protected Area System: Revised List of Historic Sites and Monuments Measure 3 (2003) Guidelines for its Application*, WP061 (2008); and WP003 (2009).
[41] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXI Final Report*, 2008, paragraph 216.

and that the Committee could endorse at the 2009 ATCM (XXXII).[42] A particular IP[43] submitted by Chile in the process, however, is worth noting as it provided context for the drafting of the Guidelines between 2006-2009. This IP began by highlighting the potential spatial dimension of HSMs if designated as APAs, before acknowledging Warren's 1989 Masters thesis[44] that introduced seven categories of HSMs for the 59 entries at that time.[45] Most significantly, Chile recognised the HSM List as 'a management tool, where commemoration is not a ritual exercise but the expression of a mutual commitment to the diffusion of historic Antarctic values' within the IP. A WP[46] submitted much earlier, in 1987, also provided the first overall commentary on what was happening with heritage management in Antarctica and raised questions surrounding definitions such as that of 'object' and how the ATS should interpret it. In 1999, Chile co-convened the 1999 APA workshop with Peru. Finally, Chile has also worked alongside its neighbour, Argentina, on occasion. It supported Argentina's bid to have the holistic concept of 'enhancement' applied to Antarctic heritage, joined many parties in supporting the proposal for the 2019 workshop, and questioned the meaning of HSMs with Argentina in a 2019 IP.[47] *The Chilean approach to the development of the HSM Framework has therefore been proactive and relatively consistent over the past decade. Considering that Chile was a participant of the Heroic Era, claims overlapping territory on the continent, holds the largest number of independent HSMs of any state and is relatively proximate to Antarctica; a noticeable involvement in the HSM Framework is expected.*

**China** was silent on HSM issues until the 2010-2011 informal intersessional discussions that prompted it to speak up at the following ATCM, stating that 'caution was necessary as in the diversity of cultures that exist in the Antarctic community any rigid definition [of an HSM] might not prove helpful.'[48] China raised this issue of diverging views on heritage again at the 2019 ATCM (XLII) when commenting on the report of the APA workshop held just prior to

[42] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXII Final Report*, 2009, paragraph 110.
[43] Chile, *Antarctic Protected Area System: Revised List of Historic Sites and Monuments. Measure 3 (2003). Draft Guidelines for its Application*, IP092 (2006).
[44] Patricia Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties" (draft of master's thesis, University of Washington, 1989).
[45] '16 associated with the Heroic Age of Exploration, 15 commemorating an expedition, 15 memorials to the dead (tombs and cenotaphs), 5 associated with the first station of a country or opening of a station, 2 reference points for scientific work, 2 commemorating national heroes not connected with Antarctica, 1 commemorating the visit of a Head of State, and 3 with no reason stated.' IP092 (2006).
[46] Chile, *Protection and valuation of Historical Sites*, WP031 rev. 1 (1987).
[47] IP083 (2019).
[48] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIV Final Report*, 2011, paragraph 125.

the Meeting, as it believed that 'intensive discussion and divergent views were essential to the success of a workshop' but that some of these 'different opinions expressed in the workshop had been missed in both WP070 [the recommendations] and IP165 [the report]'[49] from, and of, the workshop. It urged that the 'recommendations should have covered all views in a balanced and scientific way'[50] to which some members 'agreed on the importance of an assessment.'[51] *China therefore holds a strong opinion on heritage in Antarctica – not necessarily on how the ATS physically manages heritage, but rather on how it conceptualises heritage within this multicultural environment, as evident in its elevation of non-dominant perspectives. Given that China's induction to the HSM List in the 1980s was much later than some other states, and taking into account China's recent growth in presence and investment in the region, its decision to speak up on heritage-related matters within the ATS over the past decade appears to be a natural progression of its increasing engagement in the region and System.*

**The Czech Republic** was responsible for hosting the 2019 workshop on APAs. As a result, it also co-authored the post-workshop recommendations[52] and report[53] with the co-conveners. *The Czech Republic's involvement with the HSM Framework is therefore minimal. This involvement could even be considered incidental, in that Prague hosted the 2019 ATCM (XLII) and for logistical reasons the APA workshop had to be held in the same location. The Czech Republic's minimalist approach is expected given that it was not officially represented within the Heroic Era, holds no claim to territory in Antarctica, and does not have any HSMs.*

**Ecuador** has not submitted any papers on HSM management nor initiated any discussions on the subject at any ATCMs or within any intersessional periods. *Ecuador has therefore had no direct input into the development of the HSM Framework. This is unremarkable given that Ecuador was absent from the Heroic Era, holds no claim to territory in Antarctica, and does not have any HSMs.*

**Finland** has not submitted any papers on HSM management nor initiated any discussions on the subject at any ATCMs or within any intersessional periods. *Finland has therefore had no direct input into the development of the HSM Framework. This is unremarkable given that*

[49] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraph 178.
[50] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraph 178.
[51] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraph 179.
[52] WP070 (2019).
[53] IP165 (2019).

*Finland was absent from the Heroic Era, holds no claim to territory in Antarctica, and does not have any HSMs.*

**France** is near absent on Antarctic heritage matters. It has never commented on heritage within ATCMs – apart from a brief expression of support for the review of the List alongside the United Kingdom (UK) in 2011[54] – and the only paper it has submitted on the topic was co-authored (a joint proposal with many other states for the 2019 APA workshop).[55] *France therefore seems relatively uninterested in the HSM Framework and its development. This is intriguing as France was active in and prior to the Heroic Era, and maintains a territorial claim in East Antarctica.*

**Germany** was a key ally of Norway's push for further and broader discussions on Antarctic heritage in 2013, commenting that 'intersessional discussions could be valuable.'[56] It was also a co-author of the 2018 WP,[57] proposing the 2019 APA workshop. *Other than this statement of support and paper, Germany has made no significant contributions to the HSM Framework. This is as expected because even though Germany participated within the Heroic Era, its HSMs do not commemorate this period, but rather more recent national expeditions that do not help the state elongate its presence in the region. Nor does Germany hold a successful claim to territory in Antarctica due to post-war reparations that excluded it from doing so.*

**India** has not submitted any papers on HSM management nor initiated any discussions on the subject at any ATCMs or within any intersessional periods. *India has therefore had no direct input into the development of the HSM Framework. This is slightly unexpected because although India was not active in the Heroic Era and does not hold a claim to territory in Antarctica, it does have two independently proposed HSMs.*

**Italy**'s engagement with the management of Antarctic heritage appears non-existent at first glance. However, in 1996 it did submit a WP[58] that addressed 'a specific regulatory need' for the protection of HSMs. This paper made several interesting points. After recapping the current state of affairs for HSMs at this time, the paper distinguishes between sites and monuments

[54] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIV Final Report*, 2011, paragraph 138.
[55] WP016 (2018).
[56] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXVI Final Report*, 2013, paragraph 144.
[57] WP016 (2018).
[58] Italy, *Specially Protected Areas: Sites and Monuments*, WP013 (1996).

that ‘can be considered to be of common archaeological or historical interest,’ as opposed to those that ‘were erected purposefully by national [governments] in order to symbolize their heritage and represent their interest in Antarctica.’ This is significant, as the nationalistic purpose of HSMs is rarely openly acknowledged within the ATS. More importantly, however, this paper attempts to establish a new category of ‘Originating Parties,’ with membership granted to those that have ‘generated the historical heritage.’ The paper then makes reference to the difference between historic values and natural values, stating that the former more readily receives legal consideration because ‘a Party which, through the deeds of its nationals, has built, left, or otherwise originated artificial features or objects of historical value in the Antarctic, carries a distinct and specific cultural and ethical interest on the conservation and protection of such own historical heritage.’ Lastly, the paper lays out consequences for the unnecessary handling of historic remains: ‘any concrete intervention (such as for instance the taking of samples or the installation of equipment in close proximity) may actively interfere with the object or site and may irrecoverably [detract] from its original state.’ *Italy therefore has a very clear vision of who should be responsible for Antarctic heritage (‘originating parties’), what it is, and how the HSM Framework should conserve it. This is interesting as Italy has not proposed any HSMs itself,*[59] *was not a participant of the Heroic Era, and does not hold a claim to territory on the continent.*

**Japan** drafted and submitted the very first list of historic monuments within a WP[60] in 1970 that was modified two years later to become the first official HSM List. The composition of this amalgamated list was slightly different to that of the 1972 list, as explored in the previous chapter. It was also a co-author of the 2018 WP[61] proposing the 2019 APA workshop. *Apart from this initial contribution and the joint paper, however, Japan has remained absent from discussions and negotiations of the HSM Framework. This is as expected because even though Japan was a participant of the Heroic Era through Nobu Shirase’s expedition, its single HSM commemorates a recent national expedition rather than this historic period, and, as with Germany, post-war reparations excluded it from claiming territory in Antarctica.*

[59] Although Italy does jointly manage HSM 14 with New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
[60] Japan, *Amalgamated List of Historic Monuments in Antarctica*, WP009 (1970).
[61] WP016 (2018).

**The Netherlands** does not appear to have contributed to any discussions on Antarctic heritage management thus far, apart from one WP[62] it submitted in 1996 that explained how HSMs should be classified upon the entry into force of Annex V of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Environmental Protocol). The paper described its purpose as 'an attempt to determine what happens to SPAs [Specially Protected Areas], SSSIs [Sites of Special Scientific Interest], MSSSIs [Marine Site of Special Scientific Interest], MPAs [Marine Protected Areas], SRAs [Special Reserved Areas] and Historic Sites and Monuments when Annex V takes effect' before clarifying that when this event does happen, all HSMs 'listed by any ATCM before this moment, are included in the List of Historic Sites and Monuments under Annex V.' *Apart from this paper, the Netherlands has remained absent from conversations on the development on the HSM Framework. This is unremarkable given that the Netherlands was absent from the Heroic Era, holds no claim to territory in Antarctica, and does not have any HSMs.*

**New Zealand** first referred to HSMs and their management at the 1989 ATCM (XV) when calling for 'a comprehensive review of the protected area network and policy' that could help 'improve site protection for historic monuments,'[63] after submitting a WP[64] on 'the protection of the Antarctic environment.' Two years prior to this, in 1987, it had submitted a WP[65] that discussed the importance of buffer zones for HSMs. However, New Zealand's most significant paper submission was WP009 in 1995 that outlined draft guidelines for the proposal of HSMs, including the seven criteria that are still active today.[66] Building on the 1999 APA workshop's findings, New Zealand submitted a WP[67] that contained further suggestions and was then selected to lead the first ICG on APAs.[68] New Zealand presented its report[69] at the 2000 SATCM (XII), in which it referred to 'historic values' as embodied in 'features or objects that represent, connate or recall events, experiences, achievements, places or records that are important, significant or unusual in the course of human events and activity in Antarctica.' *New Zealand's engagement with the HSM Framework is therefore relatively consistent yet*

[62] The Netherlands, *Areas, sites, monuments and Annex V*, WP005 (1996).
[63] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XV Final Report*, 1989, 238.
[64] New Zealand, *Working paper on the protection of the Antarctic environment*, WP004 (1989).
[65] New Zealand, *Historic Sites and Monuments*, WP013 (1987).
[66] New Zealand, *New Historic Sites and Monuments: Suggested Guidelines for the Designation of Historic Sites*, WP009 (1995).
[67] New Zealand, *Development of Guidelines for the Protected Area Designation Process*, WP036 (1999).
[68] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXIII Final Report*, 1999, paragraph 80.
[69] New Zealand, *Terms of Reference (a) - Development of Guidelines for Protected Areas Under Annex V of the Environmental Protocol*, WP011 (2000).

*restrained. This is reflective of New Zealand's broader engagement within the region throughout history. It was present in the Heroic Era and is a claimant but, like Australia, only because it inherited land initially claimed by the British Empire.*

**Norway**'s relationship with the HSM Framework began when it hosted the 1998 APA workshop in Tromsø. This workshop, co-convened with Australia, Chile, and the United Kingdom (UK), addressed APAs and their management and made reference to 'historic values.'[70] However, Norway's most obvious contribution to the management of Antarctic heritage is its formation of the guidelines that award all pre-1958 historic remains in Antarctica yet to be recorded or discovered with an automatic three-year interim protection once found. The Meeting adopted these guidelines, initially outlined in a 1999 WP[71] and then again within a WP[72] submitted to the 2001 ATCM (XXIV), in Resolution 5 (2001). With regard to the HSM List, although Norway was not directly responsible for its initial recording or later revisions, in 2001 it did offer advice on creating an archive to retain records of sites and monuments that had been lost or destroyed,[73] and in 2009 recommended that 'adequate liaison is accorded by the proposing Party.'[74] During this period Norway was also responsible for raising the profile of the International Polar Heritage Committee (IPHC) and the role it plays in Antarctic heritage management,[75] reminding members that 'the IPHC could provide useful support in … historic heritage work.'[76] After participating in the informal intersessional discussions on HSMs that began in 2010, Norway began to lobby for further discussion on HSMs and their management, noting at the 2011 ATCM (XXXIV) that 'there are a number of relevant issues to discuss further to achieve a common understanding of how to classify historical sites and monuments.'[77] In 2013, Norway suggested that the Committee 'might consider at some time in the future engaging in a broader discussion on Historical Sites and Monuments designations' pointing out that 'many constructions in Antarctica might be considered to have historical value and this could lead to the designation of a large number of historic sites in the future.'[78] Norway reiterated the point in 2015 when it suggested that 'it now could be timely to initiate further

[70] Norway and the United Kingdom, *Report of the Antarctic Protected Areas workshop*, WP026 (1998).
[71] Norway, *Automatic Protection of Pre-1957 Historic Remains*, WP020 rev. 1 (1999).
[72] Norway, *Proposal: Guidelines for handling of pre-1958 historic remains in Antarctica*, WP023 (2001).
[73] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXIV Final Report*, 2001, paragraph 74.
[74] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXII Final Report*, 2009, paragraph 107.
[75] Norway, *Antarctic historic resources*, IP038 (2001).
[76] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXIX Final Report*, 2006, paragraph 84.
[77] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIV Final Report*, 2011, paragraph 126.
[78] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXVI Final Report*, 2013, paragraph 144.

discussion on HSM designations in the broader sense.'[79] Finally in 2016, after submitting yet another WP[80] on the matter, ICGs led by Norway and the UK were formed and held between 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 to prioritise 'heritage management issues and the importance of developing policies for the Antarctic Treaty System in this area.'[81] After the first period of the ICG, Norway and the UK submitted a WP[82] that reported some of the issues identified, concluding 'that the understanding of the terms "sites" and "monuments" needed further consideration; that considering the concepts of general heritage values and specific historic values separately could be useful; that the introduction of the concept of universality must be treated carefully; and that guidance material should provide an overview of the broad suite of management options available.'[83] At the 2018 ATCM (XLI), a WP[84] provided this guidance material and revised both the HSM Guidelines and Guide, culminating in Resolutions 2 and 3 (2018), respectively. Norway was also a co-convener of the 2019 workshop that sought to continue this momentum.[85] *Overall, Norway has played a fairly active and supportive role in the development of the HSM Framework by collaborating with others when appropriate, particularly the UK, or providing advice when necessary. Given that Norway was a Heroic-Era participant and is a state claiming territory in Antarctica, its level of activity is not unexpected, but the cooperative nature of that activity could be.*

**Peru** has not been a part of discussions on the management of Antarctic heritage apart from its co-convening/hosting of the 1999 APA workshop. After hosting the workshop, Peru prepared and submitted a report[86] for the 1999 ATCM (XXIII) that contained a summary of the workshop's objectives, key points outlining identified areas of weaknesses in the APA system, and five recommendations for the CEP. If Lima had not hosted the 1999 ATCM (XXIII) immediately after this workshop, Peru's involvement in this workshop may not have eventuated. *Like the Czech Republic, Peru's involvement in the development of the HSM*

[79] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXVIII Final Report*, 2015, paragraph 152.
[80] This paper 'summarised approaches to historical heritage management, including discussing advantages and disadvantages to in situ and ex situ preservation approaches for historic heritage values.' Norway, *Consideration of protection approaches for historic heritage in Antarctica*, WP030 (2016). Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIX Final Report*, 2016, paragraph 153.
[81] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIX Final Report*, 2016, paragraph 73.
[82] Norway and the United Kingdom, *Report of the intersessional contact group established to develop guidance material for conservation approaches for the management of Antarctic heritage objects*, WP047 (2017).
[83] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XL Final Report*, 2017, paragraph 114.
[84] Norway and the United Kingdom, *Report of the intersessional contact group established to develop guidance material for conservation approaches for the management of Antarctic heritage objects*, WP020 (2018).
[85] WP016 (2018).
[86] Peru, *Report of the second workshop on Antarctic Protected Areas*, WP037 (1999).

*Framework is minimal and coincidental. This is unremarkable given that Peru was absent from the Heroic Era, holds no claim to territory in Antarctica, and only has one joint HSM.*

**Poland** has not submitted any papers on HSM management nor initiated any discussions on the subject at any ATCMs or within any intersessional periods. *Poland has therefore had no direct input into the development of the HSM Framework. Even though Poland was not active in the Heroic Era and does not hold any territorial claims in Antarctica, this is still slightly unexpected given that Poland has three HSMs, all designated in the mid-1980s.*

**The Republic of Korea** has not submitted any papers on HSM management nor initiated any discussions on the subject at any ATCMs or within any intersessional periods. *Korea has therefore had no direct input into the development of the HSM Framework. This is unremarkable given that Korea was absent from the Heroic Era, does not hold a territorial claim in Antarctica, and does not hold any HSMs either joint or independent, despite an attempted designation in 2016.*[87]

**The Russian Federation** was partially responsible for the formation of the original HSM List as, in 1972, it submitted a WP[88] containing a draft recommendation for a list of 43 historic monuments. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this list contained two fewer than the amalgamated list submitted by Japan in 1970. After submitting this paper, Russia submitted only one IP in 2004[89] on HSMs prior to the joint proposal for an APA workshop in 2019.[90] This 2004 IP contained justification for the potential designation of an Orthodox temple in Antarctica, but Russia never followed through with the proposal.[91] *Apart from its initial contribution, Russia's involvement with the development of the HSM Framework is therefore relatively minor. Considering Russia's participation in exploration during and prior to the Heroic Era, its status as a reserved claimant, and its impressive number of independent entries on the HSM List, it is noteworthy that it has not been more present on heritage-related matters.*

[87] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIX Final Report*, 2016, paragraph 165.
[88] The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, *Historic monuments*, WP034 rev. 1 (1972).
[89] The Russian Federation, *Orthodox temple in the Antarctic*, IP045 (2004).
[90] WP016 (2018).
[91] It is unknown why this proposal was never followed through with, even after the head of the Russian Orthodox Church visited in 2016 to acknowledge the structure's significance.

**South Africa** has not contributed to any discussions on Antarctic heritage, except within an IP[92] submitted at the 2017 ATCM (XL) describing the overall aim of the Antarctic Legacy of South Africa (ALSA) as efforts to archive historic material 'for both national and international posterity, but especially for future generations in South Africa.' The paper also contextualised ALSA's purpose more generally within the broader mandate of education and outreach on Antarctica. *Despite its proximity to the continent, South Africa has not intervened in the development the HSM Framework. This is likely due to the internal strife under apartheid that caused South Africa to withdraw from Antarctic affairs during the mid to late twentieth century and that led other ATCPs to consider its exclusion from the ATS altogether.*[93]

**Spain** has not submitted any papers on the subject of HSM management, but it has commented on the matter at ATCMs on a few occasions. In 2007 it expressed its interest in reviewing the draft of the 2008 HSM Guidelines[94] as submitted by Chile,[95] in 2009 it agreed with Argentina that visitors must acquire permission to visit an HSM,[96] and in 2019 it signposted its intention to list the *San Telmo* shipwreck as an HSM.[97] Lastly, it was a co-convener of the 2019 APA workshop. *Spain has therefore made occasional contributions to the HSM Framework but has not been responsible for any significant progressions in its development. This is unremarkable because Spain was not present within the Heroic Era, holds no claim to territory in Antarctica, and does not have any independent HSMs.*

**Sweden** has not submitted any papers on HSM management nor initiated any discussions on the subject at any ATCMs or within any intersessional periods. *Sweden has therefore had no direct input into the development of the HSM Framework. This is largely unremarkable because even though Sweden took part in the Heroic Era, it holds no claim to territory in Antarctica, and has only two joint HSMs.*

**Ukraine** has not submitted any papers on HSM management nor initiated any discussions on the subject at any ATCMs or within any intersessional periods. *Ukraine has therefore had no direct input into the development of the HSM Framework. This is unremarkable given that*

---

[92] South Africa, *Creating Awareness: the Role of the Antarctic Legacy of South Africa (ALSA)*, IP051 (2017).
[93] Lize-Marié van der Watt, "Return to Gondwanaland: South Africa, Antarctica, minerals and apartheid," *The Polar Journal* 3, no. 1 (2013): 72-93.
[94] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXX Final Report*, 2007, paragraph 148.
[95] WP038 (2007).
[96] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXII Final Report*, 2009, paragraph 136.
[97] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraphs 117-118.

*Ukraine was absent from the Heroic Era, holds no claim to territory in Antarctica, and has not proposed any HSMs.*[98]

**The United Kingdom** (UK) has been vocal on HSM issues since the first mention of an official list and instructions for its formation in a paper submitted by the UK itself in 1970.[99] A subsequent paper from the UK at the following ATCM also sought to resolve disagreements surrounding the descriptions for sites and monuments contained within this list.[100] In 1992 it hosted the first workshop on APAs,[101] co-convened another workshop in 1998, and at the 2000 SATCM (XII) on APAs refocused attention on the HSM List. On this occasion it raised 'the more generic issue of regularly reviewing the list Historic Sites and Monuments,'[102] and submitted a WP that contained a questionnaire for distribution to the proposing parties of HSMs.[103] The UK then addressed the HSM Guide when it submitted a WP[104] for its revision in 2007, and another in 2008[105] containing a template for HSMs that Resolution 1 (2008) incorporated. In 2016, the UK suggested[106] further revision of the Guide 'to facilitate the collection of additional information on how proposed protected areas fit within systematic environmental-geographic framework tools.'[107] The UK finally addressed the HSM Guidelines in 2016 when the Meeting formed an ICG led by the UK and Norway, in which the UK encouraged 'the involvement of heritage experts with and without Antarctic backgrounds to share best practice.'[108] Over this period between 2016-2019 the ATCPs discussed and extensively modified the HSM Guidelines, as well as the Guide. In 2019, the UK continued to offer its opinion on the management of Antarctic heritage by submitting a paper[109] that outlined the benefits of CMPs given 'the global significance of Antarctic heritage, despite Antarctica's remote location,'[110] and was made the lead for 2019-2020 intersessional discussions on the

[98] Although Ukraine does jointly manage HSM 62 with the United Kingdom.
[99] The United Kingdom, *Draft Recommendation on Historic Monuments*, WP005 rev. 1 (1970).
[100] The United Kingdom, *Historical monuments*, WP011 (1972).
[101] The United Kingdom, *Proposals for improving the Protected Area System*, WP010 (1997).
[102] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *SATCM XII Final Report*, 2000, paragraph 77.
[103] Although this questionnaire had a disappointing return rate, as commented on in the following CEP meeting. The United Kingdom, *Review of the List of Historic Sites and Monuments*, WP004 (2002).
[104] The United Kingdom, *Guidance for Working Papers on Area Protection and Management*, WP043 (2007).
[105] The United Kingdom, *Guidance for Working Papers on Area Protection and Management*, WP041 rev. 1 (2008).
[106] The United Kingdom, *Revision of the 'Guide to the presentation of Working Papers containing proposals for Antarctic Specially Protected Areas, Antarctic Specially Managed Areas or Historic Sites and Monuments'*, WP005 (2016).
[107] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIX Final Report*, 2016, paragraph 77.
[108] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIX Final Report*, 2016, paragraph 73.
[109] The United Kingdom, *The Benefits of Conservation Management Plans for Antarctic Heritage*, WP058 (2019).
[110] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraph 123.

matter.[111] In addition to these efforts to develop all three key documents in the HSM Framework, the UK proposed and co-convened the 2019 workshop.[112] It also made intermittent contributions to discussions on HSMs at ATCMs over the years, covering topics including ex situ conservation in 2004,[113] classification of HSMs as APAs in 2007,[114] the issue of double designations in 2009,[115] the impossibility of a 'rigid definition of "historic monuments" [due to] the diversity of the Antarctic community' in 2011,[116] 'greater international collaboration between those responsible for the management of Antarctic heritage and HSMs' in 2016,[117] and the opportunity for new HSM proposals 'in the lead up to significant anniversaries of historical achievements' in 2018.[118] *The UK has therefore been extremely active in both conversations on, and action toward, the development of the HSM Framework ever since its beginnings in 1970. This is as expected given the UK's high level of investment in Antarctic exploration during the Heroic Era, claim to contested territory across the Peninsula, and strong representation on the HSM List both in independent and collective entries.*

**The United States** (US) first mentioned HSMs at the 1989 ATCM (XV) when identifying one of its HSMs and its management as an exemplar of 'useful means of increasing protection for historic monuments and sites.'[119] In 2007, the US offered to help Chile develop the HSM Guidelines in the following intersessional period,[120] which a 2008 WP had recommended for adoption.[121] At this time, it also noted 'the importance of ensuring all HSMs were properly managed as a legacy for future Antarctic generations.'[122] In 2011 it also contributed to discussions concerning the concept and definition of 'historic heritage.'[123] Lastly, in 2018 the US, along with Argentina, agreed to examine the format of the HSM List, and in 2019 helped propose, and then co-convene and report, on the APA workshop.[124] *The US has therefore contributed to heritage-related matters only occasionally but significantly, helping to directly*

[111] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraph 125.
[112] WP016 (2018).
[113] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXVII Final Report*, 2014, paragraph 170.
[114] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXX Final Report*, 2007, paragraph 35.
[115] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXII Final Report*, 2009, paragraph 47.
[116] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIV Final Report*, 2011, paragraph 126.
[117] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIX Final Report*, 2016, paragraph 150. The United Kingdom, *Managing Antarctic Heritage: British Historic Bases in the Antarctic Peninsula*, WP012 (2016).
[118] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLI Final Report*, 2018, paragraph 116.
[119] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XV Final Report*, 1989, paragraph 142.
[120] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXX Final Report*, 2007, paragraph 151.
[121] WP061 (2008).
[122] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXX Final Report*, 2007, paragraph 150.
[123] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIV Final Report*, 2011, paragraphs 122-128.
[124] WP016 (2018), WP070 (2019), IP165 (2019).

*develop the HSM Guidelines as well as the List. Considering the US' historic presence on the continent, its status as a reserved claimant, and its three independent entries on the HSM List, this involvement in the development the HSM Framework is not surprising.*

**Uruguay** has not submitted any papers on HSM management nor initiated any discussions on the subject at any ATCMs, but it did co-convene the 2019 APA workshop. *Uruguay has therefore had little input into the development of the HSM Framework. However, any input at all is noteworthy given that Uruguay was absent from the Heroic Era, holds no claim to territory in Antarctica, and does not have any HSMs.*

There is, therefore, great disparity in individual state contributions. The individual state that has contributed the most is the United Kingdom. The UK has submitted the most papers on the topic of Antarctic heritage management, has commented the most on Antarctic heritage matters, and has supported the most intersessional activity on the management of Antarctic heritage. Of the 50 papers in total, the UK is responsible for authoring or co-authoring 17 of these. In comparison to the other claimant states, this is more than double the amount that Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, and Norway have each submitted, over four times that of Australia, and far more than France, given it has submitted only one jointly submitted paper on the topic. According to the contents of the final reports, comments from the UK account for almost half of the total 'discussion count' on Antarctic heritage. Argentina and Norway come in at second place (30 per cent), then Chile third (18 per cent), Australia fourth (10 per cent), New Zealand fifth (six per cent), and France last (two per cent). Argentina, Norway, and the UK raised the most topics, with Argentina focusing on the definitional issues surrounding the concept of heritage, Norway focusing on the need for a common understanding of heritage, and the UK making comment on both of these topics as well as the issue of double designations, collaboration, and future proposals. Lastly, the UK has hosted the 1992 APA workshop, co-convened the 1998 and 2019 APA workshops, co-led the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 ICGs on Historic Sites and Monuments, and is currently leading intersessional discussion on CMPs for HSMs. Norway and Chile both co-convened two APA workshops and each led two intersessional ICGs, discussions or reviews. Argentina led three more recent informal intersessional discussions and reviews, Australia co-convened two APA workshops and New Zealand led one ICG. France has not had any intersessional involvement. The UK's contribution to heritage management in Antarctica would therefore appear unparalleled.

All this writing, talking, and doing by the UK is important because, as explained in the previous chapter, these are the mechanisms by which norms on the protection of Antarctic heritage can 'emerge,' 'cascade,' and eventually be 'internalised.' The UK's submission of papers on heritage matters to the ATCM helps persuade other parties of the value of a particular course of action on Antarctic heritage management and helps such a norm to emerge; the UK's discussion of heritage matters at ATCMs can assemble a critical mass that supports a particular course of action on Antarctic heritage management and leads to the norm's cascade; and the UK's participation within intersessional activity on heritage matters can enact a particular course of action on Antarctic heritage management, further socialising the norm bringing it closer to internalisation.

It is no coincidence that the UK and the other major contributing states have a claim to territory in Antarctica. These claimants are invested within all spaces of Antarctic governance, including heritage management, as they quite literally have a stake (their claimed sector) in the game (Antarctic affairs). The following sub-section now turns to other groups of states that might be expected to hold significance in the context of Antarctic heritage discourse.

### 3.2 Collective Enquiries: *Contributions from different groups of states*

While the above examined and contextualised the heritage-related contributions of individual states, the following considers the collective contributions of different groups of states. The four categories explored below are: those represented on the HSM List; those active within different historic periods of Antarctic history; states with specific positions within the ATS (ATCPs, original signatories, and claimant states); and states from particular geographical regions. I first provide a synopsis of the absolute contributions within each of these collectives – as indicated by the absolute contribution count (ACC). This helps to identify how a bloc of states are performing overall. I then calculate the relative contribution for each – as indicated by the relative contribution count (RCC). The relative contribution count = total contribution count (i.e., the total number of papers, discussion occurrences, and intersessional participation together) ÷ number of states in that category (e.g. the five Gateway states). This second count takes into account the relative number of states within each category and therefore helps to identify outsized contributions. This brings the raw findings into perspective and is instructive in terms of identifying how active a particular bloc is in comparison to others.

3.2.1 *States that have either proposed or managed HSMs*

Figure 4.5 outlines the absolute and relative contribution counts for states on the 2019 HSM List, states on the 1972 HSM List, and states with joint HSMs.




Figure 4.5: Absolute (ACC) and relative (RCC) contributions by HSM proposers and managers.

States that have either proposed or managed HSMs might be expected to have a high level of investment in their management, certainly more so than states that have not. Of the ATCPs not featured on the 2019 HSM List,[125] only two have submitted papers on the topic;[126] none have weighed in on discussions regarding HSMs or heritage at any ATCMs; and only two have fulfilled a leading role in heritage-related intersessional activities.[127] Those that do feature on the 2019 HSM List,[128] on the other hand, have submitted a total of 48 papers on the matter, have 'discussed' heritage at ATCMs on 50 occasions, and have led 13 intersessional discussions, reviews, or workshops on Antarctic heritage. States represented on the original 1972 HSM List[129] submitted over 90 per cent of the papers, instigated almost 95 per cent of these discussions, and are responsible for all of the 13 intersessional activities on heritage. Furthermore, the 12 states that have jointly proposed HSMs[130] submitted over 85 per cent of

[125] Brazil, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Uruguay.
[126] Netherlands with WP005 in 1996, and the Czech Republic with joint WP016 in 2018 and joint WP070, and IP165 in 2019.
[127] The Czech Republic and Uruguay's respective hosting and co-convening of the 2019 APA Workshop.
[128] Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
[129] Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom.
[130] Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

the papers, are responsible for the instigation of discussion on all accounts but one,[131] and have played a leading role in every intersessional event on heritage.

Some HSM List states are relatively inactive, however. Bulgaria, India, Japan, Peru, Poland, and Sweden have never discussed heritage matters at an ATCM, although Japan has submitted two papers,[132] one of which was the original amalgamated list of historic monuments. Bulgaria's inactivity may be due to the fact that it joined the List only in 2015; India's may be due to its concentration on the launching of a successful national Antarctic research program that had deferred its attention to scientific research; Japan's could be explained by restrictive post-WWII reparations and a sole HSM entry dating back to 1972; Peru's may be because it only holds one HSM proposed jointly with Chile and Spain; Poland's could be a result of its control under the Soviet Bloc until 1991; and Sweden's may be because it only holds one HSM, proposed jointly with Argentina.

The relative contribution count for each of these groups puts these findings into perspective and reveals that states currently represented on the HSM List (2019) have performed at a count of **5.29**, 'members' of the original HSM List (1972) have performed at a count of **11.78**, and those that have collaborated on HSM entries have performed at a count of **8.83**. What this suggests is that those who joined the HSM List when it first opened in 1972 have remained active in the space, while the newer entrants to the HSM List have made comparatively minor contributions effectively reducing the relative contribution count for the HSM List overall. Those that collaborate on the proposal and management of HSMs are also more likely to contribute.

### 3.2.2 *States active within the Heroic Era*

Figure 4.6 outlines the absolute and relative contribution counts for states active within the pre-Heroic Era period, the Heroic Era, and between the Heroic Era and the International Geophysical Year (IGY).

[131] China in 2019. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraph 178.
[132] WP009 (1970) and WP016 (2018).




Figure 4.6: Absolute (ACC) and relative (RCC) contributions by states active in different historical periods.

States active within the Heroic Era (1895-1922)[133] would be expected to have historic remains or events to commemorate as this period was when states first began staking their claim to the continent. Therefore, by extension they would also be expected to have an interest in the management of the HSMs. There is no question that these states are highly invested in the development of the HSM Framework, given that they have submitted over 90 per cent of the papers, have dominated almost 95 per cent of the discussion on the management of HSMs at ATCMs, and have led all of the 13 intersessional periods addressing heritage. The states exhibited on the HSM List that did not participate within the Heroic Era are Bulgaria, China, India, Italy, Poland, Peru, Spain, Ukraine and the US. Bulgaria, China, and India all have relatively new additions to the List; Italy and Ukraine only co-manage HSMs; Poland was annexed by the Soviet Union and was not in control of its foreign affairs until 1991; Peru and Spain jointly manage their HSM with each other and Chile; and the US was active in the mid-nineteenth century and then again from the late 1920s, but not in between. To put the performance of states active in Antarctica during this period into perspective, the periods before and after are also worth investigating: the pre-Heroic Era period (pre-1895), and the period in between the Heroic Era and the International Geophysical Year (1922-1957). States active during the period prior to the Heroic Era submitted just over half the papers, contributed to 70 per cent of the discussion, and led just over half of the intersessional periods. States active in the 1922-1959 interim period submitted just under 95 per cent of the papers, attributed to just over 95 per cent of the discussion, and led all 13 intersessional periods.

[133] Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Again, it is not possible to fully appreciate the weight of these contributions without considering them relative to the number of states within each category. The relative contribution count for states within the Heroic Era is **8.83** (identical to that of joint HSM proposal/management), the count for states within the pre-Heroic Era period is **11.33**, and the count for states active between the Heroic Era and the IGY is **7.71**. This chronologically decreasing rate of relative contribution contradicts an assumption for Heroic Era states having the most effective contribution. But then again, states with a longer history with the continent do likely have more historical material to propose, and more time has elapsed since the historical object or place came into existence making it a more likely candidate for heritage status than younger objects and events in history.

3.2.3 *States that hold specific positions within the ATS*

Figure 4.7 outlines the absolute and relative contribution counts for states that are original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty, and those that claim territory in Antarctica.




Figure 4.7: Absolute (ACC) and relative (RCC) contributions by original signatories and claimant states.

Within the ATS, states fall into particular groupings, including the ATCPs, original signatories to the Treaty, and the claimant states. This analysis suggests that states in these groups also share particular relationships to heritage. Non-ATCPs are limited in their ability to contribute as, in the words of the Antarctic Treaty website, they are 'invited to attend the Consultative Meetings but do not participate in the decision-making.'[134] This means that they cannot table Working Papers or contribute to consensus to adopt amendments, but they can still contribute within meeting discussions and to intersessional activity. When it comes to the management of Antarctic heritage, it appears that the 25 non-ATCPs have not used ATCMs as a platform to

[134] Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, "Parties," 2021, https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Parties?lang=e.

talk about heritage or the intersessional periods as an opportunity to offer their ideas on the subject. In fact, these states are completely absent from any conversation on Antarctic heritage within the ATS. But given they do not have a past explorative history with the continent, nor a current research program on the continent, this is expected. However, a number of them have acceded to the Environmental Protocol,[135] which would imply that they have an interest in the management of APAs or are at least aware of, and acknowledge, their purpose. The 12 original signatories, all of which are ATCPs,[136] on the other hand, have authored or co-authored all but three of the papers, are responsible for over 95 per cent of the discussion, and have played a leading role in all of the intersessional ICGs, discussions, reviews, or workshops on Antarctic heritage. Of this group, seven are claimant states.[137] These claimants have submitted over 85 per cent of the papers, sustained over 90 per cent of the discussion, and have helped organise all of the intersessional activities on Antarctic heritage so far. The primary motivation behind the claimants' high level of contribution to an Antarctic heritage discourse comes from their need to remain relevant and present in the governance of the region more generally. Although some are more active than others, overall, these claimants are the driving force behind the formation and construction of an official discourse on Antarctic heritage management.

Finally, the relative contribution count for these categories of states largely reflects the above findings. The count for the original signatories is **9.00**, while the count for the claimant states is **14.71** – the highest contribution count of all state collectives considered so far. The zealous contribution by the claimant states is again understandable when considering the benefits Antarctic heritage can bring to furthering statist agendas (an idea further explored throughout *Chapter Six: Reinforcing Heritage*, *Chapter Seven: Constructing Heritage*, and *Chapter Eight: Wasting Heritage*).

### 3.2.4 *States from particular geographical regions*

Figure 4.8 outlines the absolute and relative contribution counts for states active within five global regions: Africa, America, the Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Antarctic Gateway states.

[135] Belarus, Canada, Greece, Malaysia, Monaco, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland, Turkey, and Venezuela.
[136] Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, New Zealand, Japan, Norway, Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
[137] Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom.




Figure 4.8: Absolute (ACC) and relative (RCC) contributions by states in different geographical regions.

States from particular geographical regions might be expected to demonstrate different levels of commitment to the region depending on where they are situated on the globe. This is primarily due to the continent's inaccessibility, both physically (its remoteness from population centres) and logistically (its extreme climate). The ATCPs represent four global regions: Europe, America, the Asia-Pacific, and Africa. The European ATCPs,[138] who make up the largest group of 15, have submitted over half of the papers contributing to the development of the HSM Framework, account for almost exactly two thirds of the discussion instigated at ATCMs, and have played a leading role in three of the four APA workshops and three intersessional periods since the 2016 ATCM (XXXIX). The American ATCPs,[139] representing both North and South America, have submitted approximately a third of the papers, account for just under half of the discussion instigated, and have run eight intersessional activities held on Antarctic heritage. The ATCPs from the Asia-Pacific[140] have submitted just over 20 per cent of the papers, account for just under 20 per cent of the discussion, and have led three of the 13 intersessional events on heritage. Lastly, the sole African ATCP, South Africa, has submitted one paper[141] and has barely contributed to the development of the HSM Framework

[138] Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.
[139] Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and the United States.
[140] Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea.
[141] IP051 (2017).

with no discursive input, and there is no evidence of its participation within any intersessional activities. As already mentioned, domestic politics hampered South Africa's engagement in Antarctic affairs for a majority of the twentieth century.

There are countless reasons why a state would or would not engage in discourse on Antarctic heritage on different occasions, but an overarching explanation links back to the era of exploration when states were first staking their claim to the continent – either during this period or in the decades directly after. This would explain why the European ATCPs – despite being in the opposing hemisphere – have a noticeable presence, as they were active within the region at this time and therefore were able to generate content for future commemoration.

The Gateway states[142] form the last geographical region of enquiry due to their relative proximity to the continent. Geographical proximity appears to play a significant role for this group, with the exception of South Africa. These five states have submitted almost half the papers, account for half of the discussion, and have led or co-convened nine intersessional events. This close proximity to the continent manifests in the development of strong 'Antarctic propinquities' – that is, a state's emotional or conceptual closeness to the frozen region. The concept of propinquity in the Antarctic context was first described by Child as 'the notion that proximity to a certain disputed area conveys certain rights,'[143] before being applied by Brady to New Zealand Antarctic relations as something that 'gives it a special sense of connection to the continent that other nations might find hard to understand or accept.'[144] O'Reilly and Salazar also make reference to the concept when discussing inhabitation of the continent, observing how stations and bases operate 'as a kind of non-sovereign semi-enclave to showcase a nation's interests in Antarctica and promote national culture and boast scientific pedigree.'[145] Of course, when the Antarctic continent was first discovered in the nineteenth century, no Indigenous population was present and therefore no state could assert long-term permanent habitation prior to any other. In an effort to overcome this missing link, some Antarctic states – Southern Ocean Rim States (SORS) in particular – have asserted their propinquity. Given the Gateway states' high count, as shown in Figure 4.8, the analytical results suggest that these

[142] Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, and South Africa.
[143] Jack Child, "Stamps of the American Quadrant of Antarctica and the South Atlantic Islands" (paper presented at Blount Postal History Symposium, Smithsonian Institution - National Postal Museum, 30 September 2010).
[144] Anne-Marie Brady, "New Zealand's Strategic Interests in Antarctica," *Polar Record* 47, no. 2 (2011): 126–134.
[145] Jessica O'Reilly and Juan Francisco Salazar, "Inhabiting the Antarctic," *The Polar Journal* 7, no. 1 (2017): 19.

propinquities would translate to enthusiasm for the management of the state's association with the continent in the past – their Antarctic heritage.

The relative contribution count for the states in each of these regions tells another story to the absolute contribution count, however. The count for the African state is **1.00**, the count for the American states is **7.71**, the count for the Asia-Pacific states is **3.83**, and the count for European states is **4.40**. This means that although European states have the highest count – that is, they account for the largest of papers, discussion, and intersessional activity – when considering that there are over double the number of states from this region active within Antarctic heritage management, the significance of activity per state is reduced. A couple of extremely active states therefore hold up the count. The relative contribution count of the Gateway states at **11.40** is less surprising, however. This is because the geographical proximity of these states to Antarctica has resulted in increased contact with the continent, its exploration, and management.

The states that are most active within the development of an official discourse on Antarctic heritage are therefore states that are 'members' of the original 1972 HSM List; have participated within the period prior to the Heroic Era; hold consultative party, original signatory, and claimant state status; and are geographically located closer to the continent. These categories overlap considerably. HSM proposals and designations secure interest in the HSM Framework that manages the use of Antarctic heritage. Historical participation in the region supplies historic remains or events for commemoration. Territorial claims encourage an active role in the management of Antarctic heritage. And geographical location affirms Antarctic propinquity. Overall, however, the claimant states have the highest relative contribution count (14.71). Of the 22 non-claimant states, almost a third have never submitted papers on the topic, contributed to discussions on the management of HSMs at ATCMs, or meaningfully contributed to intersessional reviews, discussions, or workshops addressing Antarctic heritage. The remaining 15 that do contribute have submitted just over 15 per cent of the papers, account for just over 20 per cent of the discussions on Antarctic heritage, and have hosted/co-convened two workshops[146] and co-led one informal intersessional review.[147] Although in theory all ATCPs should have the same amount of power to persuade, socialise,

[146] Peru hosted the 1999 APA workshop, and the Czech Republic hosted the 2019 APA workshop with Spain, the United States, and Uruguay co-convening.
[147] The US helped Argentina review the HSM List format in 2018-2019.

and demonstrate norms on the protection of Antarctic heritage, in practice the collectives of states identified above have directed the conversation.

### 3.3 Targeted Enquiries: *Contributions from cooperating states*

This last sub-section contemplates how the claimant states in particular have worked together. As illustrated in Figure 4.9, two blocs have emerged: one consisting of a pair of European states – Norway, and the United Kingdom; and the other, a pair of South American states – Argentina, and Chile. The three remaining claimant states, Australia, France, and New Zealand, have barely collaborated, only supporting comments, co-authoring papers, or intersessional activity on one or two occasions each.


Figure 4.9: Geographical location of cooperating claimant states.

It is no coincidence that these two sets of collaborating states include the most active individual contributors to the development of an official Antarctic heritage discourse. These states have recognised which other parties hold an approach to the management of Antarctic heritage similar to their own and have cooperated accordingly. Prior to their joint leading of the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 ICGs on Antarctic heritage management, Norway and the UK submitted

papers in 2016 on the need for a consideration of the approach overall,[148] and the need for a revision of one of its components,[149] respectively. This shared enthusiasm for the improvement of the HSM Framework made them both willing and acceptable candidates for the ICG leadership roles. During and after the ICGs, they co-authored two intersessional reports addressing the discussions and progress made within these periods that would eventually lead to the adoption of the 2018 HSM Guidelines and Guide. Two decades prior, they submitted a joint report on the 1998 APA workshop.[150]

Argentina and Chile collaborated in a much less obvious or arranged manner. Evidence of their collaboration and visionary alignment is buried in the text of final reports. Their shared desire to better explicate Antarctic heritage became apparent in 2010 when Argentina proposed an ICG to develop a widespread understanding of what heritage entails in Antarctica. In the process it raised the concept of 'enhancement' in a WP[151] that Chile welcomed and described as 'an important concept that should underlay the approach to [HSMs].'[152] They also co-authored a paper in 2019 that expressed an interest in different groups' 'observations regarding what defines an HSM.'[153]

Overall, due to the consensus-based decision-making model of the ATS, collaboration is necessary for the adoption of any amendment on the management of HSMs. This process of adoption also marks the demonstration of the norm on Antarctic heritage protection. But particular patterns of formal cooperation between the ATCPs, or claimants more specifically, have emerged. One explanation for these pairings could be cultural hegemony within the ATS – that is, a preference of some cultural values and ideologies over others. The European states could be seen as protecting their long and durable presence in the region, while the South American states could be regarded as asserting their propinquity with the continent as a result of their geographical connection and proximity.

[148] WP030 (2016).
[149] WP005 (2016).
[150] WP026 (1998).
[151] WP047 (2010).
[152] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIII Final Report*, 2010, paragraph 202.
[153] IP083 (2019).

## 4. Summary: No universal definition of Antarctic heritage

The differing approaches to Antarctic heritage management evident in states' formal participation on heritage matters heritage point to a larger issue that characterises the contributions discussed in this chapter as a whole: that current definitions of, and approaches to, heritage in Antarctica are not universal. In an attempt to displace tension that would inevitably arise from the enforcement of some conceptualisations of heritage over others, the ATS has operated in a highly inclusive manner. Since the List officially opened in 1972, the official 'rejection rate' of HSM proposals has been almost zero – only two proposals have been denied,[154] but this was essentially a postponement arising from the Meeting's moratorium on additions to the List whilst the Guidelines were being reviewed. Furthermore, when sites have been delisted, their removal from the List occurred not due to a difference of opinion, but rather because they were either subsumed into another HSM listing or no longer existed.[155]

The objective of this chapter was to reveal whose perspective on Antarctic heritage 'counts,' so as to expose the power dynamics operating within the governance of Antarctic heritage. My analysis of the absolute contribution count concluded that those who claimed Antarctic territory have contributed most frequently to the development of the HSM Framework, followed by the 'members' of the original 1972 HSM List, and then the Gateway states. The European ATCPs contributed roughly half as much as these groups, the American ATCPs a third as much, the Asia-Pacific ATCPs a quarter as much, and the African ATCP barely at all.

When considering the relative contribution count, however, it is the claimant states who contribute most actively. There are just seven of them and they account for 85 per cent of the papers submitted, are responsible for instigating 95 per cent of the discussions had on Antarctic heritage management, and have played an important role in all of the intersessional periods on heritage. It is worth noting exceptions to this pattern: France, a claimant, is inexplicably quiet, while the United States, a reserved claimant, has played a significant role, submitting four papers, offering its assistance at several ATCMs, and helping organise the two most recent intersessional events on heritage.

[154] The Republic of Korea and Argentina had HSM proposals denied at the 2016 ATCM (XXXIX).
[155] HSMs 12 and 13 were subsumed into HSM 77, and HSM 25, 31, and 58 were removed as they no longer existed. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Revised List of Historic Sites and Monuments*. Measure 3, 2003.

The bluntest answer to the question of ‘Whose perspective counts?’ on matters of Antarctic heritage is the United Kingdom. The UK proves the most proactive in this area and is therefore the most influential in this governing space. It has authored almost a third of the papers on Antarctic heritage, is by far the most vocal state in commenting on the topic at meetings, and is the most active intersessionally – hosting or leading six of the 13 sessions on heritage. It is also no surprise that the UK belongs to many of the groups of states that the collective analysis identified as most active: it is an HSM List member, an original signatory, a European state, and a claimant state.

Understanding what these findings really mean requires further investigation into what Antarctic heritage represents for the United Kingdom, as well as other Antarctic states, on a broader philosophical scale. The next chapter examines the nature of this official perspective on Antarctic heritage and whether it coincides with wider global trends in heritage discourse.

# Chapter Five: Authorising Heritage

## *The Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse (PAHD)*[1]

In the previous two chapters I examined how a formal discourse on Antarctic heritage has developed, as well as who was responsible for developing it. These chapters established that the HSM Framework is a codification of official discourse on Antarctic heritage, and that the narrative has been largely written by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. This chapter takes these findings and combines them to explore what I will heretofore refer to as the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse*, or PAHD. This authorised discourse embodies how the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties think and talk about heritage in Antarctica, and subsequently determines how this heritage is managed in practice. As will become evident throughout the course of this chapter, this discourse includes the criteria, typologies, and features associated with the material heritage, as these both inform, and are informed by, the (immaterial) discourse.

The idea of a prevailing or dominant discourse derives from the work of Smith, a critical heritage studies scholar. In an effort to critically reflect upon and deconstruct heritage as a modern concept, Smith critiques what she suspects is a 'rather hegemonic discourse about heritage, which acts to constitute the way we think, talk and write about heritage … [and that] promotes a certain set of Western elite cultural values as being universally applicable.'[2] Smith argues that the current accepted and applied discourse on heritage throughout the globe is not the *only* discourse on heritage, but that it is the *dominant* one. Smith develops this hypothesis into what she terms the 'Authorised Heritage Discourse' or AHD, to challenge 'the common sense assumption that "heritage" can unproblematically be identified as "old", grand, monumental and aesthetically pleasing sites, buildings, places and artefacts.'[3] She also makes reference to the situatedness of heritage, defining heritage as an experience in a particular context that helps position one's 'place' in a cultural, social, and physical world. The relevance of the AHD to Antarctic heritage has only been recognised very recently by Senatore, who briefly mentions Smith's understanding of 'heritage as meaning rather than artefact' when

[1] This chapter has been accepted for publication in modified form as: Rebecca Hingley, "Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments: Conceptualizing heritage on and around the frozen continent," in *Notions of Heritage* (Québec: Presses de l'Université du Québec, forthcoming 2021).
[2] Laurajane Smith, *Uses of Heritage* (London: Routledge, 2006), 11.
[3] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 11.

discussing the dominant narratives of Antarctic history.[4] However, other than this contribution, there has been no effort to directly correlate the two – that is, the AHD and what I call the PAHD.

In the first two sections of this chapter, I investigate how the PAHD is situated and how it has been realised, before comparing it with the prevailing discourse on global heritage identified by Smith (the AHD). The existing theoretical frameworks from relevant research fields called upon are Political Geography, Cultural Studies, and Antarctic Studies. The first two situate the PAHD within broader theoretical discussions (section 1); and the third details the material realities of the PAHD (section 2). Following on from this, the last section scrutinises the characteristics of the PAHD (sections 3 and 4). Consideration of the situation, realisation, and characterisation of the PAHD altogether, produces an in-depth account of the discourse overall.

## 1. Situatedness of the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse*

To fully understand the nature of the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse*, it is essential to understand how it is situated. This is because it is impossible to take discourse out of the context in which it is constructed. By definition, discourses embody and reproduce knowledge claims.[5] Critical geographers reference this notion of situatedness within their research, as the sub-discipline does not recognise one objective and ultimate truth or valid knowledge.[6] In keeping with these efforts, I also consider the situatedness of a discourse on Antarctic heritage. In particular, insights from Political Geography and Cultural Studies explain how the PAHD is uniquely situated within space and culture. These findings also provide necessary context for an analysis of the PAHD's realisation and characteristics in the sections to follow. With this in mind, I apply these spatial and cultural lenses to the PAHD.

### 1.1 *Spatialisation of the PAHD*

A spatial analysis of the PAHD highlights the mutual constitution of heritage and place. The past helps turn spaces into places, and place fosters a sense of belonging, which is a key facet

[4] Maria Ximena Senatore, "Archaeologies in Antarctica from Nostalgia to Capitalism: A Review," *International Journal of Historical Archaeology* 23, (2019): 755-771.

[5] This idea is often linked to Haraway's thesis on 'situated knowledge' in which she rejects the notion of universal objectivity, or what she describes as the 'god trick,' and argues that no claims to knowledge are from a position of 'nowhere.' Donna Haraway, "Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective," *Feminist studies* 14, no. 3 (1988): 575-599.

[6] Martin Müller, "Text, discourse, affect and things," in *The Routledge Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus, and Joanne Sharp (London: Routledge, 2013), 53.

of heritage. The spatial elements of location, distribution, scale, and temporality are helpful to consider when contemplating the spatialisation of the PAHD. Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge explicitly discuss the first three elements, describing them as concerns that 'reoccur in various guises throughout the[ir] book.'[7] They believe: that consideration of the location of heritage can help to answer the traditional geographical questions of 'where?' and 'why is it there?'; that by acknowledging the distribution of heritage it is possible to understand how some places have more or less heritage; and that heritage can exist at local, regional, national, and international scales.[8] In relation to the last element of temporality, they simply maintain that the concept of time remains central as 'the field of vision is restricted to a highly selective view of a small fraction of possible pasts or envisaged futures.'[9] These themes, though well recognised in Heritage Studies more generally, are yet to be applied to Antarctic heritage specifically.

The location of Antarctic heritage is its most obvious and defining feature. As all '"pasts" occurred somewhere and all "somewheres" have a past,'[10] it is impossible to ignore the effect location has on the development and deployment of a heritage discourse. In this instance, the location is the Antarctic continent and its surrounding ocean. Antarctica is considered one of the most remote and inhospitable places on Earth, and as a result its heritage discourse is founded on the achievements of those who have managed to reach the continent and reside there. Given that only a relatively small number of people can survive in this extreme environment, the continent appears only minimally impacted by humans in comparison to others. As places are in a continuous state of becoming, the current imaginary of Antarctica as a 'pristine wilderness' for human discovery has not always been, and may not always be, privileged. This instability is evident now more than ever, as the Anthropocene has changed understandings of human interactions and involvement in landscapes that were previously considered pristine.[11] In fact, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) negotiated in the 1980s, temporarily envisioned the continent as a potential resource, and if ratified could have shifted Antarctica's trajectory and written an

[7] Brian Graham, Gregory Ashworth, and John Tunbridge, *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy* (London: Arnold, 2000), 4.
[8] Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge, *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy*, 4.
[9] Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge, *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy*, 2.
[10] John Tunbridge and Gregory Ashworth, *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict* (New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1996), 24.
[11] Elizabeth Leane and Jeffrey McGee, *Anthropocene Antarctica: Perspectives from the Humanities, Law and Social Sciences* (London: Routledge, 2019), 2.

entirely different heritage discourse – perhaps one that supported human ingenuity to conquer the environment instead of advancing scientific knowledge. This extreme environment has also determined the fate of the historic places and objects commemorated, leaving them relatively undisturbed due to their remote location, but also causing them to deteriorate in harsh conditions.[12] Lastly, this inaccessibility has also led to the idea of Antarctica lying primarily within the popular imagination. This is because visiting it in person and experiencing it directly is not feasible for the vast majority of people.[13] Thus encounters with the frozen continent are largely vicarious, conducted through various cultural texts such as exploration narratives, novels and films, television documentaries, and museums.[14]

Another defining feature of the PAHD concerns the distribution of Antarctic heritage throughout Antarctic space. Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments (HSMs) – peppered throughout the continent and its surrounding ocean and islands – record the physical origins of various national Antarctic narratives, all of which the PAHD validates. All HSMs have specific coordinates, as indicated by the crosses in Figure 5.1:

[12] While popular discourse and imagination depicts Antarctic weather and climate as perfectly preserving historic remains such as the Heroic Era huts in the region, the wind, snow, and ice are often responsible for the burial or severe damage of these sites.
[13] Even though tourism has increased exponentially over the past few decades, it does not equate to the vast majority of Antarctica's population year-round.
[14] Examples include the 2014 epistolary novel, *Where'd You Go Bernadette*, the 1982 thriller film, "The Thing," and the blizzard room at the International Antarctic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand.



Figure 5.1: Distribution of HSMs in Antarctica as depicted on the Antarctic Digital Database Map Viewer. (Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, Antarctic Digital Database Map Viewer, https://www.add.scar.org/.)

The concentration of crosses on the Antarctic Peninsula, indicating a 'hot spot' for historical activity, is not surprising, considering that South America's proximal location to the continent led a number of Antarctic expeditions of the Heroic Era to depart from there. The crosses also concentrate coastally, with only a few visible in the continent's interior. The physical nature of the continent makes both coastal and interior positions precarious. Those on the coast face potential future engulfment as a result of rising sea levels, whilst those in the interior cannot remain in situ, as the ice constantly shifts. Indeed, all artefacts on the continent are highly mobile. Given the shifting nature of the ice, the force of the wind, and the weight of the snow,

historic remains are constantly moved, buffeted, and crushed by the unforgiving environment unlike anywhere else in the world. Human interference also alters the state and position of the HSMs. Some HSM managers have removed contents of HSMs for ex situ preservation, such as the century-old fruitcake found inside *Borchgrevink's Hut* at Cape Adare (contained within HSM 22).[15] And some managers have even relocated elements of HSMs permanently for external exhibition, for example, part of the nuclear reactor, PM-3A (HSM 85) now housed at a museum in California.[16] While this practice of removal is generally discouraged within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), it means that some HSMs may receive more public exposure than others, therefore raising their profile and the stories they retell.

Like the material artefacts it is concerned with, the PAHD also exists across a vast space. It occurs at different scales, but primarily centres around the state. Antarctic heritage can and does occur inter-nationally and extra-nationally, but manifests most prominently on an intra-national level, as evidenced by a greater number of independent HSMs than collective HSMs,[17] and the large number of HSMs that commemorate national heroes and expeditions. The HSM List also celebrates Antarctic heritage between states, but predominantly only when states jointly propose and manage the sites or monuments. Extra-national Antarctic heritage likewise exists, but is not officially recognised on the HSM List, or in other words, acknowledged by the PAHD. Industrial heritage sites from the whalers active in Antarctica between the late eighteenth to late twentieth century are a good example, as they are difficult to reconcile with the mainstream version of Antarctic heritage.[18] Engagement with, and presence within, Antarctica by non-state actors – such as the whalers and sealers of the past, and current-day tourists – provide the foundations for alternative interpretations of Antarctica's past that I investigate in part IV of this thesis.

---

[15] The cake, along with other artefacts from the area, was conserved by the Antarctic Heritage Trust and put on temporary display to the public at the Canterbury Museum in 2019 before it was returned to the hut in Antarctica. The Canterbury Museum, "Once in a lifetime chance to see famous artefacts from Antarctica's first buildings," 11 April 2019, https://www.canterburymuseum.com/about-us/media-releases/once-in-a-lifetime-chance-to-see-famous-artefacts-from-antarcticas-first-buildings/.

[16] To celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Operation Deep Freeze, the Seabee US Navy Seabee Museum in Port Hueneme opened an exhibit, 'Seabees on Ice,' that displayed the nuclear reactor's control room. Ventura County Star, "LOOKING BACK: Seabees face hidden dangers on the ice," 28 April 2010, http://archive.vcstar.com/news/looking-back-seabees-face-hidden-dangers-on-the-ice-ep-369094984-349712831.html/.

[17] Only 29 of the HSM List entrants were jointly proposed.

[18] Dag Avango, "Working geopolitics: sealing, whaling, and industrialized Antarctica," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 485-504.

The last defining feature of the PAHD is temporality, which is intrinsically related to spatiality. According to Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge, heritage is 'a view from the present, either backward to a past or forward to a future … [but] the viewpoint cannot be other than now.'[19] What this means is that heritage discourses are understood differently at different points in time. Antarctic heritage currently focuses on past individual and national feats of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Furthermore, I calculate the average age of Antarctic heritage to be just over five decades, as the average time elapsed – between the deposition of a certain object or occurrence of a certain event in history and their designation as an HSM – is 54 years. This is noteworthy given that most designations were made when the HSM List was established in 1972, and the date 54 years prior was 1918 – the end of the Heroic Era. This suggests that the vast majority of HSMs therefore give their proposers a way of timestamping their presence in the region prior to the freezing of territorial claims that occurred when the Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1961. This average of years elapsed also suggests that after approximately half a century, states consider these historic objects and events in this part of the world to be 'heritage.'

Each of these elements demonstrates how the PAHD is bound up with the notions of space, which in turn has implications for the governance and geopolitics of Antarctic heritage. As Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge note, 'all heritage is someone's heritage and therefore logically not someone else's.'[20] The previous chapter – which sought to reveal from where the perspective represented in the formal discourse on Antarctic heritage originated – identified the United Kingdom as the most active state within the HSM Framework to date. This chapter showed that non-Western perspectives, such as those of Argentina, Chile, and China, are not recorded to the same extent or frequency as Western perspectives, and extra-national perspectives are completely absent due to the exclusion of non-state actors from decision-making within the ATS. The location, distribution, scale, and temporality of official Antarctic heritage all add value to, and contextualise, an investigation of the politics of the PAHD. Furthermore, Smith's analysis of heritage as a discourse reflects political geographers' efforts to trace a particular geopolitical discourse. She also frames heritage as a form of spatialisation by describing it as a performance that takes place within a particular space 'helping us position ourselves as a national community or individual.'[21] Consequently, it is not only the subject of

[19] Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge, *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy*, 2.
[20] Tunbridge and Ashworth, *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict*, 21.
[21] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 75.

Smith's research that makes her work valuable here, but also the common language and reflexive approach she shares with those who study critical geopolitics. I now turn to examining ways in which Antarctic heritage is not only a spatial phenomenon but a cultural construct also.

1.2 *Culturalisation of the PAHD*

Understanding Antarctic heritage as a complex cultural phenomenon enhances efforts to understand the PAHD, its construction and its use. The 'Circuit of Culture' first introduced by du Gay in 1997 is a helpful model for conducting a 'cultural study' of heritage. The circuit introduces five processes that overlap and intertwine, as detailed below in Figure 5.2. du Gay states that engagement with the circuit is the method 'through which any analysis of a cultural text or artefact must pass if it is to be adequately studied.'[22] Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge have already applied this model to the concept of heritage more generally, but it is yet to be applied to the Antarctic context specifically. Doing so makes explicit processes within the construction of the PAHD that are otherwise implicit: those of representation, identity, production, consumption, and regulation. I unpack these processes in further detail below.




Figure 5.2: du Gay's Circuit of Culture. (Paul du Gay, *Production of culture/cultures of production*, London: Sage/Open University, 1997.)

[22] Paul du Gay, *Production of culture/cultures of production* (London: Sage/Open University, 1997), 3.

The meaning of an object is determined by its representation rather than its mere existence. This is because the words that are chosen to describe it, the images that are chosen to depict it, the emotions that are chosen to evoke it, and so on, hold meaning themselves. According to Hall, it is 'by our use of things, and what we say, think and feel about them – how we represent them – that we *give them a meaning*.'[23] These acts of representation also apply to HSMs. Consider their evaluation and classification, for example. Article V of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Environmental Protocol) describes HSMs as exhibiting 'outstanding historic value' and grants them internationally recognised protection by classifying them as an Antarctic Protected Area (APA). Furthermore, the documenting of these sites and monuments on the HSM List almost instantaneously promotes their status. For example, HSM 28, which might otherwise be described as a decaying wood and a pile of rocks, became a commemoration of the first French Antarctic expedition after its designation in 1972.

The concept of identity is relational – that is, the construction of one identity only occurs in relation to another. The identity that HSMs help form is predominantly nationalistic, as expected, given that their proposers, designators, and managers are states constantly in competition with one another. The HSM List can therefore be co-opted by national agendas,[24] which might explain the initial rush by states to have their sites and monuments recorded on the HSM List when it opened in 1972. However, this list does allude to an international sense of belonging in several of the HSMs jointly listed. For example, HSM 60 on Seymour Island represents historic cooperation between two Antarctic states during the Heroic Era, Sweden and Argentina. Also, despite the state-centric design of the HSM List, and a state monopoly over the official definition of Antarctic heritage, alternative non-state identities still promote to a public audience their perceived 'right' to the continent, as demonstrated by the calls to establish a World Park in Antarctica in the 1980s in the name of the 'Common Heritage of Mankind.'[25] Therefore, heritage in Antarctica speaks to multiple imagined communities,[26] even while states dominate.

---

[23] Italics in original. Stuart Hall, *Representation: cultural representations and signifying practices* (London: Sage/Open University, 1997), 3.
[24] This process is explored further in *Chapter Six: Reinforcing Heritage*, *Chapter Seven: Constructing Heritage*, and *Chapter Eight: Wasting Heritage*.
[25] During the 1980s environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) campaigned for Antarctica's reconception as a World Park, effectively aiming to realise the Common Heritage of Mankind principle that holds in trust certain territorial areas for future generations.
[26] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, revised (London: Verso, 1991).

All culture is produced by someone at a particular point in time. This means that Antarctic Treaty states do not simply stumble across HSMs. They produce them within a particular setting that gives meaning to their present-day existence. Failure to acknowledge the details of the sites and monuments' social as well as physical constructions prohibits a sound interpretation of their overall significance. In terms of their physical production, they are located in one of the most inhospitable places on Earth, making their conservation difficult and their consumption by the public challenging. In terms of their social production, the primary sponsors for the expeditions taking place during the Heroic Era that produced the majority of HSMs (the era that is accountable for the majority of the HSM listings) were states and prominent national bodies such as the Royal Geographical Society, as well as newspapers, publishers and private donors that constructed the expeditions for the pursuit of national glory.[27] Individual expeditioners sympathised with this national sentiment and on occasion voluntarily performed acts of de facto sovereignty for the state, such as proclaiming territorial claims on behalf of the motherland and conducting flag-raising at strategic destinations.[28] Although these tasks aligned with individuals' desires for adventure and glory, the state could influence and reward such behaviour. Acknowledging these contexts highlights whose agendas were being fulfilled at the time of production and reproduction.

How culture is consumed reflects how it is valued by society. How and where people consume HSMs reinforces what they mean and to whom they are important. For a majority of the HSMs, public access is relatively difficult, making on-site engagement near impossible despite one of the criteria listing 'the potential to educate people about significant human activities in Antarctica' as cause for designation. Antarctic tourism proves an exception. Port Lockroy (HSM 61) is the best example of on-site consumption as it is the most visited historical site by tourists in Antarctica. In addition to containing a historic building, the site encourages public engagement with its inclusion of a museum, post office, and gift shop. Virtual visits, narrative accounts, and replicas also enable engagement with the historic site or monument off the continent – a type of engagement that is particularly important for the continent as a whole

[27] For example, in 1928 philanthropist Macpherson Roberston donated 10,000 pounds to the 1929-1931 British, Australian, New Zealand Antarctic Research expeditions. The Australian Antarctic Division, "Sir Douglas Mawson (1882 to 1958)," 8 March 2019, http://www.antarctica.gov.au/about-antarctica/history/people/douglas-mawson.

[28] During the 1911-1914 Australian Antarctic Expedition, Sir Douglas Mawson attempted to obtain permission to claim land for the British, and performed a ceremony of flag-raising and proclamation thereafter. Beau Riffenburgh, *Aurora: Douglas Mawson and the Australasian Antarctic Expedition 1911-14* (Norwich: The Erskine Press, 2011), 83.

given that it is a place most people will never visit. Take, for example, the virtual tour of Scott's *Terra Nova* Hut at Cape Evans made available on Google Maps in 2012.[29] As a result of this technological advancement, the HSM managers have made the site almost instantaneously accessible to a potential audience of millions.

The regulation of culture is often the responsibility of a select few. The regulation process enables the promotion of a particular representation, and the marginalisation of another, as someone has to decide on and enforce the rules and guidelines.[30] The ATS heavily regulates the nature of HSMs' on-site consumption, yet at the same time, the envisaged objectives of their consumption determine their regulation. For example, the New Zealand Antarctic Heritage Trust carefully curates *Terra Nova* hut in anticipation of public observation[31] – making what Roura refers to as 'inappropriate interventions [to] reflect more authentically its heroic era use'– which even included the repositioning of a dead penguin on a desk.[32] Warren describes this as the 'period room approach' that pursues various goals: 'tidying up, attempting to create a home-like appearance, attempting to create a lived-in look, restocking the hut to represent better the variety and quality of supplies, distributing artifacts throughout the hut where they seem most appropriate and restoration to the appearance of greatest hardship.'[33] Although these non-governmental organisations are responsible for the conservation of heritage on the ground, ultimately states are the arbiters of what can and cannot be considered Antarctic heritage. Furthermore, despite the consensus-based nature of decision-making within the ATS, a select few states dominate the discussion and progression of Antarctic heritage management – as established in the previous chapter.

The *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse* therefore fits within both spatial and cultural understandings of discourse. That is, geographers would concur that the PAHD can be located, distributed, scaled, and temporalised, and cultural theorists could observe the artefacts'

---

[29] Rebecca Rosen, "A Visit to the World's Most Remote Antarctic Outposts With Google 'Street' View," *The Atlantic*, 18 July 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/07/a-visit-to-the-worlds-most-remote-antarctic-outposts-with-google-street-view/259960/.
[30] Fiona McLean, "Museums and the construction of national identity: A review," *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 3, no. 4 (1998): 249.
[31] New Zealand Antarctic Heritage Trust, *Conservation Plan: Scott's Hut, Cape Evans* (Christchurch: New Zealand Antarctic Heritage Trust, 2004), 101.
[32] Ricardo Roura, *The Footprint of Polar Tourism: Tourist behaviour at cultural heritage sites in Antarctica and Svalbard* (Groningen: University of Groningen, 2011), 244.
[33] Patricia Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties" (draft of master's thesis, University of Washington, 1989), 64.

representation, identification, production, consumption, and regulation. These theoretical underpinnings are valuable as they provide context for the following investigation of the PAHD's realisation in practice – that is, the material heritage that represents the product of its core values and assumptions.

## 2. Realisation of the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse*

The *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse* is enacted and realised within the material cultural heritage in the region – that is, the tangible historic artefacts in Antarctica, or more specifically, the Historic Sites and Monuments themselves. These places and objects of historical significance provide the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) – the authors of the prevailing discourse – with an anchor point for their narratives on Antarctic heritage. Although the HSM label is a product of the PAHD, without physical historical remains or knowledge of their existence there would be no sites to multilaterally manage and govern in the first place. This section focuses on the criteria applied to HSMs, as well as their typology, and predominant features. The criteria prescribe what the ATS expects within HSM proposals, the typology reflects what HSM proposals have looked like in reality, and the predominant features show trends in the content of HSM proposals.

### 2.1 *HSM Criteria*

Criteria for HSM designation were first introduced within the ATS in 1995 when New Zealand submitted a Working Paper containing 'Suggested Guidelines for the Designation of Historic Sites.'[34] This paper lists seven criteria, at least one of which HSMs proposals should address for successful designation. The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) adopted the Resolution in 1995, and, despite two revisions of the HSM Guidelines occurring in the meantime, the wording has remained unchanged. The Resolution lists the criteria as:

a. a particular event of importance in the history of science or exploration of Antarctica occurred at the place;
b. a particular association with a person who played an important role in the history of science or exploration in Antarctica;
c. a particular association with a notable feat of endurance or achievement;

[34] New Zealand, *New Historic Sites and Monuments: Suggested Guidelines for the Designation of Historic Sites*, WP009 (1995).

d. representative of, or forms part of, some wide-ranging activity that has been important in the development and knowledge of Antarctica;
e. particular technical, historical, cultural or architectural value in its materials, design or method of construction;
f. the potential, through study, to reveal information or has the potential to educate people about significant human activities in Antarctica;
g. symbolic or commemorative value for people of many nations.[35]

This set of criteria is arguably the most critical part of the HSM Framework, as it determines what can and cannot be deemed Antarctic heritage, and therefore formally and legally classified as such. However, for reasons investigated below, these criteria function in practice more like optional guidelines. Some examples of sites or monuments that fit the criteria are as follows: a) *Landing Rock* (HSM 81) to commemorate d'Urville's landing in 1840; b) *Fukushima's Rock Cairn* (HSM 2) to commemorate a member of the fourth Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition who died in 1960; c) *Pole of Inaccessibility Station building* (HSM 4) to commemorate the 'conquest' of the Pole of Inaccessibility by the Soviets in 1958; d) *Base "W", Detaille Island, Lallemand Fjord, Loubet Coast* (HSM 83) to commemorate a British science base established in 1956 for the International Geophysical Year, e) *Lillie Marleen Hut* (HSM 79) to commemorate the hut erected to support the work of the 1979/1980 German Antarctic Northern Victoria Land Expedition; f) *González Pacheco Shelter* (HSM 33) to commemorate González Pacheco, a Chilean Lieutenant Commander, and the potential of his memory 'to educate people about significant human activities in Antarctica'; and g) *Antarctic Treaty Monument* (HSM 82) to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the signing of the Antarctic Treaty. However, the frequency of adherence to the criteria by states proposing HSMs is another question investigated next.

### 2.2 *HSM Typology*

A typology is a classification method often applied within the social sciences, and in this case, an HSM typology is a classification of the different types of HSMs. In 1989, Warren proposed a typology of Antarctic heritage management that examined the rationalisation behind each

[35] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for proposing new Historic Sites and Monuments*, Resolution 8, 1995.

HSM. Given that Warren is one of the only scholars to have done so,[36] and that her thesis was one of the first efforts to summarise discontent with the state of heritage management in Antarctica overall,[37] I give special consideration to her typology here. Warren delineated eight categories of HSMs (of the 53 listed at the time) according to the reasons stated for their designations: 19 to commemorate the Heroic Era; 10 to commemorate an expedition; nine to commemorate the deceased; five to commemorate a station; two to commemorate scientific work; two to commemorate a national hero; one to commemorate a Head of State visit; and five with no reason stated. According to Warren, only 31 could be considered 'Historical Resources.'[38] Furthermore, Warren concluded: that the concept of HSMs had not been the product of analysis and research by heritage experts; that national Antarctic programs did not prioritise HSMs, as evident in their lack of substantial funding; that untrained volunteers had conducted the majority of fieldwork at HSM sites; that the designations represented a means to demonstrate national presence; and that the ATS had barely considered the implications of HSM designation.[39]

Warren's review of HSM management was well received and since it was first published has been cited multiple times within both policy documents and academic articles. In 2006 a Chilean Information Paper referred to her typology when proposing draft guidelines on APAs, stating that 'most of Warren´s categories still stand' but that her review had 'failed to consider historic sites as elements of the Antarctic Environment which require environmental impact assessments.'[40] In 2011, Evans cited Warren in an article discussing the absence of best practice guidelines and policies within the delivery of Antarctic heritage management.[41] Evans commended Warren for her 'intention to fill a gap in the existing system for designating and protecting the Historic Monuments of the Antarctic,'[42] and noted that although the ATS had

[36] Lintott provided a brief overview of heritage values associated with the HSM proposals pre- and post-1995 in 2017. Bryan Lintott, "Antarctica: Human Heritage on the Continent of Peace and Science" (paper presented at ICOMOS annual conference, 2017).
[37] Sherrie-lee Evans, "Icy Heritage–managing Historic Sites in the Antarctic: Pristine Wilderness, Anthropogenic Degradation or Cultural Landscape?" *The Polar Journal* 1, no. 1 (2011), 89.
[38] Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties," 94-97.
[39] Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties," 99-100.
[40] Perhaps tellingly, her name was wrongly recorded as 'Philip Warren' within this paper. Chile, *Antarctic Protected Area System: Revised List of Historic Sites and Monuments. Measure 3 (2003). Draft Guidelines for its Application*, IP092 (2006).
[41] Evans, "Icy Heritage–managing Historic Sites in the Antarctic: Pristine Wilderness, Anthropogenic Degradation or Cultural Landscape?" 87-100.
[42] Evans, "Icy Heritage–managing Historic Sites in the Antarctic: Pristine Wilderness, Anthropogenic Degradation or Cultural Landscape?" 89.

made some progress on heritage management in Antarctica since 1989, the 1991 Environmental Protocol – that had tasked itself with the management of Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPAs) – had not resolved a number of the problems Warren identified when its relevant annex entered into force in 1998.[43] Lastly, in 2018, Barr referred to Warren by outlining the 'shortcomings of the HSM listing' in an article reviewing the protection of historic values under the Environmental Protocol after 20 years.[44] Warren's typology and the research that has referenced it since demonstrate the ambiguity of the HSM proposal process and the overall lack of consensus on Antarctic heritage within the ATS.[45]

### 2.3 *HSM Features*

HSM features can be defined in terms of their type and function. In 2016, Roura, a polar tourism and heritage researcher and practitioner, neatly laid out these two features. [46] In relation to the types, he employs a material interpretation and lists buildings, camps, and human remains as the most common 'things' that constitute an HSM,[47] and describes their functions as primarily commemorating exploration, making note of how few sites reference whaling activities.[48] Although this consideration of HSM function appears to also categorise the rationalisation for their proposal in a way similar to Warren, Roura's scope differs. Lastly, Roura also describes 'contemporary memorials' that are 'simultaneously sites and monuments – that … memorialise a certain event more or less as it happened.'[49] These features further contextualise the many ways in which states propose and designate HSMs within the PAHD, and also deploy them for geopolitical means.

Together, the HSM criteria, typology, and features paint a picture of what the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse* has come to represent in practice. With a grasp on the PAHD's material realisation, I now consider the key characteristics it exhibits. The following section

---

[43] Evans, "Icy Heritage–managing Historic Sites in the Antarctic: Pristine Wilderness, Anthropogenic Degradation or Cultural Landscape?" 92.
[44] Susan Barr, "Twenty Years of Protection of Historic Values in Antarctica under the Madrid Protocol," *The Polar Journal* 8, no. 2 (2018), 241–64.
[45] If the typology were extended to the subsequent 41 HSMs that have been designated since, it might look something like this: 12 to commemorate an expedition; nine to commemorate a station; nine with no reason stated; five to commemorate the Heroic Era, three to commemorate the deceased; two commemorate scientific work; one to commemorate a national hero; and none to commemorate a Head of State visit.
[46] Ricardo Roura, "Antarctic Cultural Heritage: Geopolitics and Management," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 468-484.
[47] Roura, "Antarctic Cultural Heritage: Geopolitics and Management," 472.
[48] Roura, "Antarctic Cultural Heritage: Geopolitics and Management," 473.
[49] Roura, "Antarctic Cultural Heritage: Geopolitics and Management," 472.

analyses how the behaviour of the PAHD compares with an existing model of heritage – Smith's Authorised Heritage Discourse.

## 3. Characterisation of the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse*

The HSMs in Antarctica are the physical instantiation of the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse*, and although they exhibit the discourse's most distinctive traits, they do not explicitly define them. This section applies prior research and insight from critical heritage studies – more specifically, Smith's Authorised Heritage Discourse – to the PAHD to identify its key characteristics and discusses the implications of the characteristics that diverge from the AHD thereafter.

The argument for an AHD was first introduced by Smith in 2006 when she boldly claimed, 'there is, really, no such thing as heritage.'[50] By this she meant that objects and places that are considered 'heritage' are not inherently valuable; their value is only a result of their social construction as 'heritage.' Heritage is therefore not one single 'thing' but rather multiple social practices and discourses active at any given time. The AHD is simply the dominant heritage discourse at present, and although the concept of heritage is as old as humanity itself, Smith stresses that the emergence of this particular discourse coincided with the codification of nationalism into the nation-state.[51] In addition to this Western bias, she summarised the AHD's privileging of 'monumentality and grand scale, [and] innate artefact/site significance tied to time depth, scientific/aesthetic expert judgement, social consensus and nation building.'[52] Other characteristics of the AHD include a conservation ethic that encourages observation from afar rather than direct use or engagement, and a focus on tangible rather than intangible heritage such as dance, experience, or storytelling.

The following discerns if and how the PAHD aligns with the AHD through an analysis of the AHD's characteristics. The 10 key characteristics of the AHD that I have identified render heritage: innate, good, pristine, tangible, inheritable, passive, professional, national, politicised, and commodified.

[50] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 11.
[51] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 18.
[52] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 11.

### 3.1.1 *Innate*

The AHD assumes the innate value of heritage. This refers to the idea that objects or places of heritage are considered to be inherently valuable and have innate meaning.[53] But from the constructivist perspective followed by critical geographers, the innate value and meaning of an object or place, heritage or otherwise, is simply not possible as the world and its contents are socially constructed and continuously reconstructed.

When the idea of innateness is applied to Antarctic heritage, material remains are not only considered inherently valuable because they are 'old'; they are also considered significant because of the unique physical environment in which they are situated. Although there are official criteria for HSM designation, the effectiveness of this criteria is questionable, as: states do not always engage with them meaningfully, they have not been revised since they were first adopted in 1995, and by the time they had been introduced a majority of the sites had already been designated. Prior to 1995, listing requirements were arbitrary and a site only needed to be considered 'historically significant' – a category that was never qualified. Furthermore, until the drafting of Annex V of the Environmental Protocol that refers to 'sites or monuments of recognised historic value,' there was no explicit valuing process ascribed to HSMs within the ATS. Therefore, even though there is a set of criteria for HSMs that suggests that their value is not innate but culturally contingent, the criteria have not been effective and as a result there is no consensus on a specific definition of Antarctic heritage. But irrespective of their effectiveness, their mere existence means that, in theory, states do not assume the innate value of Antarctic heritage.

### 3.1.2 *Good*

Smith argues that within the AHD, heritage is assumed to represent 'all that is good and important about the past.'[54] Positive historical events are remembered, and negative ones are forgotten.

Antarctic heritage is no exception, with the admirable achievements of twentieth-century heroes taking precedence over humanity's 'ugly' history of sealing and whaling in the region, leading to what Senatore and Zarankin regard as a favouring of a narrative of exploration over

[53] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 3.
[54] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 29.

exploitation.[55] In their efforts to pluralise the agents, and widen the scope, of Antarctic cultural history, Senatore and Zarankin conclude that 'the stories related to scientific exploration are "preserved" by means of the commemoration of specific events, dates, or people, in specific locations (e.g. huts) whereas stories associated with the exploitation of Antarctic resources have been and are silenced and forgotten.'[56] Furthermore, Antarctic states often draw on the achievements of their national Antarctic heroes, but less often their flaws. Take for example, the association of Robert Falcon Scott with eight HSM entries, none of which mention his highly critiqued leadership qualities.[57] Overall, like the AHD, what the PAHD commits to memory is more often cause for celebration than reflection.

### 3.1.3 *Pristine*

The perceived 'pristineness' of natural heritage within the AHD finds its roots in the Romantic movement of the late eighteenth century. The initial concept of 'pristine wilderness' led to the nature/culture divide in heritage[58] – that is, an oversimplified binary that fails to recognise how human cultural practices affect landscapes, and how landscapes locate these practices. An emphasis on pristine nature also assumes that natural landscapes 'needed to be protected from the depredations of human activities.'[59] To this day, the World Heritage List maintains a divide between natural and cultural heritage.[60]

From this perspective, Antarctica is a prime candidate for protection, as the historic sites and monuments in Antarctica conform to an institutionalised idea of landscape, and are also often physically inseparable from their environment – frozen in place and unable to be preserved ex situ (in a controlled environment). Pristineness has been at the heart of not only the World Park scenario forwarded by environmental activists, but also at the core of the ATS itself. The Environmental Protocol was the product of an international effort to recognise and protect the 'wilderness and aesthetic values'[61] of the Antarctic environment and established APAs, of

[55] Maria Ximena Senatore and Andrés Zarankin, "Widening the scope of the Antarctic heritage archaeology and the ugly, the dirty and the evil in Antarctic history," in *Polar settlements – location, techniques and conservation*, eds. Susan Barr and Paul Chaplin (Oslo: ICOMOS IPHC, 2011), 51-59.
[56] Senatore and Zarankin, "Widening the scope of the Antarctic heritage archaeology and the ugly, the dirty and the evil in Antarctic history," 57.
[57] HSMs 18, 20, 22, 69, 70, 75, 89, and 90. The most scathing review of Scott's character was published by Huntford in 1979. Roland Huntford, *Scott and Amundsen* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979).
[58] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 78.
[59] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 21.
[60] The first two article of the *World Heritage Convention* define cultural and natural heritage, respectively. Article 1 and 2, the *World Heritage Convention*, 16 November 1972, Paris.
[61] Preamble, Article 3, the *Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty*, 4 October 1991, Madrid.

which HSMs are a part. Evans argues that this framing of the Antarctic environment as a 'pristine wilderness' in the late 1980s actually 'inspired practices and policies of environmental management which resulted in heritage destruction and removal,'[62] referring specifically to the removal of historic resources deemed rubbish. These disputes surrounding what defines something as 'rubbish or relic'[63] are ongoing, and while there is a lack of consensus, the ATS cannot reach a coherent approach.[64] This was evident in the discussion preceding the proposal of HSM 92, *Oversnow heavy tractor "Kharkovchanka" used in Antarctica from 1959 to 2010*. Some states argued that the tractor should be preserved ex situ, that is, removed from the continent and taken back to Russia for display in a museum there. But the Russians had other plans as they had intended to leave the tractor in situ, sealing it for 'eternal storage'[65] so that it would be 'best appreciated by expeditioners and other visitors to Antarctica.'[66]

The ATCPs' opposition to this proposal suggests a valuing of Antarctica's 'natural' over its 'cultural' heritage, which has resulted in a greater mobilisation and resources for the conservation of ASPAs with significant 'aesthetic' value, but not so much those with 'historic' value. For example, it could be argued that the substantial protection in place for Cape Denison, HSM 77, is not due to its designation as an HSM, but rather because Australia successfully established both an ASPA and an Antarctic Specially Managed Area (ASMA) in the surrounding area.[67] In an investigation of the Environmental Protocol's 'aesthetic values,' Summerson goes so far as to suggest that 'all Antarctica is wilderness unless it has been degraded by human activity, i.e. the construction of infrastructure.'[68] Irrespective of the focus or prioritisation, pristineness has been at the forefront of the PAHD, like the AHD, for over the past three decades.

### 3.1.4 *Tangible*

The AHD supports the idea of material authenticity and emphasises the tangibility of heritage. But this attention to 'things' fails to acknowledge the fact that not all heritage is tangible and

---

[62] Evans, "Icy Heritage–managing Historic Sites in the Antarctic: Pristine Wilderness, Anthropogenic Degradation or Cultural Landscape?" 92.
[63] Paul Chaplin and Susan Barr, "Polar Heritage: Rubbish Or Relics?" *Heritage at Risk* (2002/2003): 233-235.
[64] This dilemma will be investigated further in *Chapter Eight: Wasting Heritage*.
[65] The Russian Federation, *Proposal on inclusion of the oversnow heavy tractor "Kharkovchanka" that was used in Antarctica from 1959 to 2010 to the List of Historical Sites and Monuments*, WP031 rev. 1 (2015).
[66] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXVIII Final Report*, 2015, paragraphs 170-171.
[67] The site is contained within ASPA 162 and ASMA 3, both designated in 2004.
[68] Rupert Summerson, "The Protection of Wilderness and Aesthetic Values in Antarctica" (PhD diss., University of Melbourne, 2013), iii.

that really 'there is no such thing as "heritage"' given it is a discursive construction.[69] Despite efforts to incorporate intangible heritage within the AHD – such as the 2003 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) *Convention for the Safeguarding on Intangible Cultural Heritage* – the focus remains on 'brutal physical statements' that render intangible heritage 'invisible or marginal, or simply less "real."'[70] The Convention defines intangible heritage as 'the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage.'[71]

The majority of the entries on the HSM List do represent material historical sites or monuments, even if snowfall has now buried them. However, the pre-1958 guidelines for the protection of historical remains not yet discovered (introduced in 2001) has validated the argument for the protection of heritage that cannot be seen or found – what I call 'temporarily intangible' or hidden heritage. I borrow the term 'intangible' from the UNESCO Convention because, even though these sites still physically exist somewhere, they are currently unlocatable and untouchable, meaning that within policy frameworks they are managed like a memory and are treated as conventional intangible heritage would be. The designation of Amundsen's tent – buried somewhere under the ice at the geographic South Pole and therefore unfindable and invisible – as HSM 80 in 2005 was a monumental occasion in the acknowledgement of temporarily intangible heritage in Antarctica. More recently, this HSM was used as precedence to designate the wreck of the *Endurance* (located somewhere at the bottom of the Weddell Sea) as HSM 93,[72] and justifies Spain's intention to designate a shipwreck (located somewhere in the Drake Passage) as an HSM in the future.[73]

The fact that the ATS awards protection to, or officially designates as HSMs, historical remains not yet found or even confirmed are still in existence, is remarkable. But on the whole, the PAHD mimics trends of the AHD. With only two entries on the HSM List so far currently representing hidden heritage,[74] sites and monuments that can or could be seen or touched are

[69] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 13.
[70] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 53.
[71] Article 2, the *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage*, 17 October 2003, Paris.
[72] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraph 113.
[73] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraph 117.
[74] HSM 80 and HSM 93.

prioritised, so much so that replicas of plaques have been manufactured and housed in museums off the continent to maintain this physical link.[75]

### 3.1.5 *Inheritable*

The AHD requires an object of heritage to be passed on from one person to another, which explains how an object of heritage may initially come into being. An emphasis on inheritance also 'promotes the idea that the present has a particular "duty" to the past' and creates the need for spokespersons to oversee the transition.[76] This makes the current generation 'stewards or caretakers of the past' whose responsibility it is to 'save' heritage for future generations.[77]

Within the Antarctic context, the ATCPs have acted as the spokespersons for Antarctic heritage to date, further emphasising the state-centric production and consumption of Antarctic heritage. The unofficial managers of the HSMs such as heritage trusts or foundations are also caretakers, but state policy and budgetary priorities are ultimately responsible for the condition in which an HSM is passed on to the next generation, if at all. Due to the inhospitable Antarctic environment, Antarctic heritage sites often have poor visibility, and subsequently low political value to states, so national Antarctic programs do not always invest in costly conservation projects that would ensure their longevity or effectively communicate their values to a broad audience. Further complications arise when states jointly propose and/or manage an HSM: which state is responsible for the upkeep of the site? Take, for example HSM 36, *Dallmann Expedition Plaque*. Argentina and the United Kingdom jointly proposed the monument, but one of the managing parties is Germany. Although Germany did not officially propose the HSM and therefore is not officially responsible for its condition, the monument commemorates a German expedition, so naturally Germany is highly invested in its fate. Therefore, unlike the AHD, the inheritability of HSMs would appear relevant but perhaps not vital to the PAHD, because once states have had their historic remains successfully designated, these sites and monuments have effectively fulfilled their geopolitical function as signifiers of spatial occupation.

[75] The plaques for HSMs 12, 27, 36, and 53 have all been replicated.
[76] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 19.
[77] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 29.

### 3.1.6 *Passive*

Passive engagement with heritage is not only commonplace but also expected and even policed within the AHD. Heritage should be viewed from afar rather than actively engaged with. The favoured mode of interaction is founded on the belief that 'We have no right whatever to touch them [heritage objects]. They are not ours. They belong partly to those who built them, and partly to all generations of mankind who are to follow us.'[78] Passivity also supports the notion that those who engage with heritage are empty vessels or 'dupes' that need educating on the right way to interact with heritage.

This 'do not touch' or 'glass case' mentality is typical of institutions such as museums that often prescribe visitor experience,[79] but also of engagements with Antarctic heritage on and off the continent. Antarctic heritage is figuratively and quite literally 'frozen in time.' The 'conserve as found' ethos is so powerful in this context that HSM managers have left sites, such as historic huts, exposed to the elements for fear of changing the site's composition.[80] Passive engagement is also a legal obligation of the ATS that requires parties to acquire permits prior to visitation of certain historical sites, especially in the case of tourist vessels, and that may soon require states to attach a Conservation Management Plan (CMP) to every HSM proposal.[81] The PAHD has therefore not strayed from the AHD's passive approach to heritage that dictates what behaviour is acceptable within their vicinity.

### 3.1.7 *Professional*

The AHD is also a discourse that privileges professional knowledge and values of the past over others, effectively dominating the regulation and conservation of heritage. The 'experts' are those who have 'the ability or authority to "speak" about or "for" heritage,' and who are subsequently called upon to make pronouncements on the nature and meaning of heritage.[82] As a consequence, the dominant discourse limits broader debate and reinforces its own interpretation. This specialised yet exclusive group of professional conservators, conservation archaeologists, and other heritage practitioners gets to discern what is and is not worth 'saving,' and what 'translates' as heritage for the lay interpretation. In the past, these professionals have

[78] John Ruskin, *Seven Lamps of Architecture* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1849), 358.
[79] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 31.
[80] This is perhaps one of the reasons why Mawson's Huts at Cape Denison were not preserved until the Mawson's Huts Foundation inherited site conservation from the Australian Antarctic Division in the mid-1990s.
[81] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraphs 123-125.
[82] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 12.

perpetuated the expectation of passive engagement discussed above, because in theory they are the only ones trained and capable of handling and interpreting heritage.

Within the Antarctic context, however, the professional perspective has been largely absent from the value assessments behind HSM designations. This is primarily due to the prioritisation of state agendas over any other in the region, and perhaps even an indifference to heritage experts' opinions symptomatic of a broader marginalisation of non-science-based professional perspectives in an Antarctic context.[83] Although ATCMs often consult other experts such as glaciologists, marine biologists, and climatologists; heritage practitioners have not enjoyed the same degree of contact, suggesting lesser prioritisation of heritage matters across the System in general. This might explain why the HSM Framework – that is, the official realisation of a discourse on Antarctic heritage – was developed in such an ad hoc manner (and why the criteria for HSM designation are so broad to avoid any scenes of 'international discord'). But this division is starting to dissolve as states more frequently call upon and incorporate ideas from heritage experts, such as the International Polar Heritage Committee (IPHC). Unilateral efforts by New Zealand have updated the Meeting on the agenda and advice of organisations such as the Antarctic Heritage Trust in papers submitted to the ATCMs since 1999.[84] More recently, and on a multilateral scale, the drafting of the 2018 HSM Guidelines and Guide demonstrate a wider acceptance and proactive collaboration between states and heritage practitioners.[85] Overall, however, the PAHD has not been professionalised to the same degree as the AHD.

### 3.1.8 *National*

The AHD's realisation of it is bound up with the birth of the nation-state in the seventeenth century. This modern interpretation of heritage 'takes its cue from the grand narratives of the nation'[86] and is used to bolster national ideologies and legitimise state formation. Nationalism is a meta-narrative that binds people together, and therefore the development of a national heritage was, and still is, an effective way of ensuring 'social cohesion and identity and to

[83] Historically, the objectives of science and exploration in Antarctica were inseparable. Ben Maddison, *Class and Colonialism in Antarctic Exploration, 1750-1920* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2014), 10.
[84] New Zealand, *Antarctic Historic Resources*, IP012 (1999).
[85] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for the assessment and management of Heritage in Antarctica*, Resolution 2, 2018.
[86] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 11.

structure social relations,'[87] at the same time as determining what is and is not authentic or legitimate.

State actors are the primary claimants of Antarctic heritage, not because no other Antarctic heritages associated with other actors exist, but rather because states – as the key players in the region and its governance – hold more power to assert these claims to heritage. This nationalisation of Antarctic heritage is evident in the sheer number of entries on the register that commemorate national heroes, expeditions, and feats as opposed to the efforts of the early sealing expeditions. The first entry on the HSM List demonstrates such devotion to the 'mother-state,' as it is a flagpole erected by the First Argentine Overland Polar Expedition in 1965. Although snow and ice now buries the pole itself, photographs of expedition members proudly saluting their national flag still circulate and it remains an active HSM. Article IV of the Treaty may have prohibited official proclamations and exercises of sovereignty in Antarctica, but states continue to assert de facto sovereignty on the continent by means of symbolic or ceremonial activities such as flag hoisting.[88] Therefore, like the AHD, the PAHD fully embraces the role of the nation-state and prioritises its perspective in the official record of what heritage looks like in Antarctica, and how it should be governed.

### 3.1.9 *Politicised*

The AHD, like any discourse, is inevitably political. Heritage is a political resource at the disposal of political actors who employ it to foster a sense of belonging amongst a particular group and is subsequently a key element of identity politics. It can also be used to contest received knowledges and identities, so is 'not only a tool of governance, but also a tool of opposition and subversion.'[89] Heritage practitioners are not exempt either, as they are 'required to adopt an overt political agenda in defining which groups and interests they seek to support and those they challenge.'[90]

In Antarctic affairs, the act of HSM proposal and designation is in itself a formal political act, as states use this regulatory pathway to receive some form of recognition by peers of their presence on the continent in the form of historic remains, found or otherwise. The almost non-

[87] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 263.
[88] This idea is investigated further in the following chapter, *Chapter Six: Reinforcing Heritage*.
[89] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 52.
[90] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 38.

existent rejection rate of HSM proposals suggests that this is an uncontentious and successful method. Overall, both the AHD and the PAHD are therefore unsurprisingly highly politicised.

### 3.1.10 *Commodified*

The AHD accommodates the commodification of heritage. The heritage industry has been witness to what some heritage professionals perceive as a 'Disneyfication' of heritage tourism that reduces the complex phenomenon of heritage to 'simple entertainment, with the derogative motive of the "theme park."'[91] In this process, heritage sites became popular destinations for tourists to simply pass through rather than engage with meaningfully.

Although the Antarctic region does not boast a thriving heritage industry, tourism operators do frequently use heritage as a means to sell their product. Many of the voyages' itineraries make reference to the Heroic Era and plan their stops to take place at sites of historical significance such as Port Lockroy or Deception Island. Some operators even name their 'expeditions' after historic figures, such as Chimu's 'In Shackleton's Wake' 21-day itinerary.[92] Of course, many of the HSMs are inaccessible to the continent's visitors, but they can be reproduced elsewhere. The Mawson's Huts Replica Museum in Hobart is particularly successful as an HSM reproduction off the continent, at least in terms of visitor feedback. Online reviews from visitors have documented their sense of vicarious experience of the replicated HSM[93] with statements such as 'probably the closest I will ever get to the real thing.'[94] Overall, despite the remoteness of Antarctic heritage, the PAHD still commodifies the historic remains there, just as the AHD does with heritage objects elsewhere around the globe.

## 4. Challenges Posed by the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse*

Of course, these 10 characteristics of the Authorised Heritage Discourse are not equally weighted, nor are they mutually exclusive. They do not present a static account, but rather a dynamic set of traits that describe the discourse at a particular point in time. Some characteristics refer to the values that constitute the discourse, some refer to the institutions and

---

[91] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 33.
[92] Chimu Adventures, "In Shackleton's Wake," accessed 6 September 2019, https://www.chimuadventures.com/en-au/antarctica/shackletons-wake.
[93] HSM 77.
[94] TripAdvisor, "Mawson's Hut Replica Museum," accessed 4 September 2019, https://www.tripadvisor.com.au/ShowUserReviews-g255097-d5605486-r549052937-Mawson_s_Hut_Replica_Museum-Hobart_Greater_Hobart_Tasmania.html.

processes that manage it, and some refer to whom its intended benefactors may be. Tellingly, the PAHD's departures from the AHD identified above reveal some of the challenges Antarctic heritage management is currently grappling with. I capture these problem areas below, focusing respectively on the values embodied within the PAHD, the institutions operating for the PAHD, and the people benefiting from the PAHD.

Understanding how states value Antarctic heritage is the first step to understanding how the prevailing discourse operates. As already established, states mostly select Antarctic heritage to correspond with the qualities of good, pristine, and tangible. But officially, the PAHD does not assume its innate value, as explicit and formal criteria for the designation of HSMs do exist. As previously highlighted, however, the effectiveness of this criteria is questionable for various reasons. By the time New Zealand introduced the criteria in 1995 within a Working Paper, more than two thirds of the HSMs to date had already been designated. In addition to this, although Chile and the United States agreed to examine the format of the HSM List during the 2018-2019 intersessional period, no effort has yet been made to revisit the entries to discern whether or not those prior to 1995 are worthy of HSM status in a contemporary context. Furthermore, engagement with the criteria since has been poor, with few HSM proposals referring directly to them, as it is not a legal requirement to do so. Despite the revision of key documents within the HSM Framework in 2018, states have left the heart of the HSM Framework – the criteria – unchanged despite a rapidly changing political climate that might dictate different foci other than the nation-state or 'many nations.' This was perhaps a deliberate decision as more definitive criteria may lead to disputes over what the ATS can or cannot consider heritage, and by extension potentially jeopardise Article IV pertaining to territorial claims. Nevertheless, this ambiguity leads to a 'watering down' of heritage in Antarctica as states are able to propose almost any object or site as heritage. India's proposal of a station built only a year prior to its designation as an HSM,[95] and a non-existent rejection rate in almost 50 years, is testament to this.[96] It would therefore appear that the PAHD does not consider the value of heritage in Antarctica innate, but nor does is it specifically stipulate what heritage is – a step that would avoid anything and everything being defined as such. This has led to the development of an ad hoc regime which may be highly susceptible to increasingly securitised national agendas.

[95] HSM 44.
[96] A proposal made by the Republic of Korea was denied at the 2016 ATCM (XXXIX), but only because a moratorium had been placed on the List whilst the Guidelines were reviewed.

The weak institutionalisation of the criteria has ultimately led to a deprioritisation of heritage matters until recent times. At first glance, the rules of engagement under the AHD and the PAHD look relatively similar, with passivity and subsequent inheritability assumed by both. However, the institutions that oversee them are not the same and a slight bending of the rules in the Antarctic context has occurred, particularly in relation to the honouring of custodianship responsibilities. Unlike the United Nations' World Heritage List established in the same year as the HSM List (1972), the latter has no body that can administer the sites or provide advice. The ATS' Committee for Environmental Protection, comprised of state representatives, assesses HSM proposals, but has placed heritage management low on its agenda. Although HSMs fall under the category of APAs, which includes other areas such as Marine Protected Areas and Specially Managed Areas, unlike these, HSMs do not require a Management Plan (MP); which leads to a diminishing of their status in terms of obligations and implies that their protection and longevity is less important than the other areas. Other than the ATS, the state itself is the only other institution that can officially influence the fate of historical remains on the continent. The state is solely responsible for the proposing of an HSM and is formally responsible for its management – although other bodies such as trusts and foundations may undertake the physical conservation and preservation on its behalf. Decisions made at this national level ultimately determine how or whether an HSM is maintained and therefore inheritable in the future. As a result, financial and logistical decisions within national programs have a major impact on the longevity of these precarious sites. For example, a lack of funding to overcome logistical obstacles has meant that the huts at Cape Denison in Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) have not enjoyed annual visitation and maintenance.[97] Due to the high level of commitment required for conservation, if states can extract the political value of HSMs and successfully embed them within national memory without costly upkeep, their weak commitment – while perhaps not justified – is certainly logical. Furthermore, Warren noted over three decades ago now that 'only with narrowly drawn standards will the list of Historic Resources [the HSM List] gain credibility among the ATCPs and, therefore, receive their cooperative and active support.'[98] The institutions that are responsible for the formal recognition and protection of Antarctic heritage – the ATS and the state, respectively – do not appear to prioritise these tasks of administration and consultation.

[97] An iceberg, B09, that calved from Antarctica in 1987 blocked access when it entered Commonwealth Bay in 2011, but the site can still be accessed by air.
[98] Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties," 92.

Like the nature of states' existence within the International System, some perspectives on heritage necessarily take precedence over others. The lack of actively competing perspectives on heritage in Antarctica has arguably led to the creation of a single and stagnant nationalised approach. If states had invited experts and professionals into the ATS in a more urgent and sincere fashion, perhaps this would not be the case. This is because the presence of non-state actors in Antarctica is integral to keeping state behaviour in check in the absence of an external body that may otherwise hold them accountable. Within the Antarctic context, the absence of heritage experts at the fundamental level of discourse formation is potentially damaging, as complex processes of conservation and preservation in a challenging environment are left open to state manipulation. However, the ATS' recent moratorium on the proposing and designating of historic sites and monuments whilst the Guidelines and Guide were reviewed is promising.[99] Perhaps this trend of collaboration with those most informed and trained will continue. But the record to date shows that, in practice, powerful actors within the ATS deliberately sideline contesting perspectives. Environmental activists, such as Greenpeace International, actively pursue their quest for the continent to be classified as a world heritage site and refute the state-centric interpretation of natural heritage that disregards the broader philosophical appeal of the seventh continent to humanity as a whole. As a result of such perceived uncooperative behaviour, the ATCPs have refused the organisation individual observer status on multiple occasions.[100] At present, Antarctic heritage is very much determined by and for the state, but as experts are more frequently invited into the ATS, which not only governs how this heritage is to be protected but also conceived, and as non-state actors increasingly engage with the continent on their own terms, this reality may change. For the time being, however, the ATS and its instruments for claiming this territory show no signs of faltering.

## 5. Summary: An Unexceptional Heritage Discourse

This chapter has sought to situate, describe, and deconstruct what I have termed the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse* – the PAHD – in order to fully appreciate what it comprises. It has established that the PAHD is inherently a spatial and cultural phenomenon; that its primary subjects are HSMs; and, most significantly, that on the whole it behaves very similarly to the pre-existing dominant global heritage discourse – what Smith calls the Authorised Heritage

[99] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXVIII Final Report*, 2015, paragraph 177.
[100] Although Greenpeace is a member of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, a coalition for ENGOs active in the region that does have observer status, it has attempted to obtain its own observer status on multiple occasions.

Discourse – and in this sense is unexceptional. This compatibility is significant as it challenges the argument for Antarctic exceptionalism that conceptualises and frames Antarctica as 'a place apart,' somehow exempt from the social, cultural, and political forces that operate elsewhere around the globe.[101] Rather, just like places and objects of heritage found throughout the world, those on and around the frozen continent are mostly good, pristine, and tangible, are engaged with passively, and are nationalised, politicised, and commodified.

Even though this discourse is the dominant one, it has by no means produced a robust framework for the management of heritage in Antarctica. The HSM Framework suffers from: a lack of coherence as a result of its ad hoc development; a record of weak prioritisation of heritage as a matter for consideration by both the states who 'own' it and the system that oversees it; and a state-centricity that works to exclude competing and alternative perspectives and experiences of Antarctic heritage. The ambiguity of the process of valuing objects and places in Antarctica as 'heritage' is not an obstacle easily overcome, as it would require all parties to agree upon a concise definition of heritage. The current vague parameters are likely favoured by states who wish to keep the definition as broad as possible so as to maximise the opportunity for potential future designations. However, the outlook is slightly more positive in relation to the prioritisation of heritage within the ATS. The past five ATCMs, as well as intervening intersessional periods, have consistently discussed heritage related matters with much enthusiasm. Nonetheless, the state-centric approach to governance in Antarctica overall is not likely to change anytime soon as – until such time as the 'death of the state'[102] arrives – they are the predominant actors in the region.

This chapter concludes my initial investigation into *how* the PAHD was constructed (*Chapter Three: Codifying Heritage*), *who* it was constructed by (*Chapter four: Claiming Heritage*), and *what* its construct is (this chapter) in response to the first primary research question, 'Whose perspective counts?' In the following three chapters I will address the next primary research question, 'How is this perspective deployed for geopolitical means?'

[101] Elizabeth Leane, "Fictionalizing Antarctica," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 27.
[102] Gerald H. Blake, "Globalisation and the Paradox of Enduring National Boundaries," in *Vanishing Borders: The New International Order of the 21st Century*, eds. Lee Boon-Thong and Tengk Shamsul Bahrin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 257.

# Chapter Six: Reinforcing Heritage

*Antarctic heritage as a means to exercise de facto sovereignty*

In the previous three chapters I identified the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse* (the PAHD), the actors who developed it, and its key characteristics. I will now investigate how states have applied the discourse for geopolitical means. The following three chapters will study three potential ulterior motives held by states (that is, other than preserving and conserving) and their fulfillment under the guise of Antarctic heritage management. The first of these motives is the exercise of sovereignty. In this chapter I focus on how states use Historic Sites and Monuments to demonstrate their durable presence on and around the continent, and to affect decision-making processes within the Antarctic Treaty System. The other two motives concern nation-building and meeting environmental expectations, and are the foci of *Chapter Seven: Constructing Heritage*, and *Chapter Eight: Wasting Heritage*, respectively.

I first contextualise the concept of sovereignty in theory and practice, then outline the case selection process, before commencing the geopolitical reading and analysis of three case examples. These examples shed light on how and to what extent the symbolic exercise of sovereignty is being deployed within Antarctic heritage management.

## 1. The Exercise of Sovereignty

To acknowledge the complexity of sovereignty, I divide this contextual section into three areas that consider it as: a) a concept in international affairs; b) a motive for cultural heritage management; and c) a practice in the polar regions. These academic, cultural, and geographical understandings of sovereignty correspond to the theoretical, topical, and geographical parameters for this thesis – that is, a geopolitical discourse analysis, of cultural heritage management, in Antarctica.

### *1.1 Sovereignty in international affairs*

The concept of sovereignty – theorised extensively by International Relations (IR) scholars and political geographers, and codified within International Law – is classically defined as a state's monopoly on the legitimate use of power, within a defined territory, and over a population.[1]

[1] Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3.

However, this traditional interpretation is challenged when technological advancements put weapons in the hands of civilians, borders become increasingly irrelevant, and identity politics redefines what it means to be a citizen. States can exercise sovereignty without full autonomy over the use of power, as was the case with private military contractors in the Bosnian War; they can exercise sovereignty within contested territories, as is the case with the construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank; and they can exercise sovereignty over a population that does not necessarily pledge allegiance to them, as is the case with the Chinese government and the population of Hong Kong. These discrepancies have led critical IR scholars to question whether the concept is stable, or in fact problematic and conditional.[2] Constructivist scholars of the linguistic turn in particular argue that the meaning of sovereignty is highly contingent upon its use.[3] Moreover, they maintain that sovereignty is an intersubjective phenomenon and therefore cannot exist without mutual recognition. Subsequently, how states regard each other's claims to sovereignty – that is, their external sovereignty – affects the meaning and value of it.

Scholars from the sister discipline of Political Geography also query the underlying assumptions of the traditional interpretation of sovereignty within international relations. Agnew questions three of these assumptions: that sovereignty is simply a 'state of nature,' that it is absolute, and that it is territorialised. He states that sovereignty has not been exogenously bestowed upon states, but is rather a 'social fact produced by the practices of states';[4] is not enjoyed equally by all states and can be shared across polities and possessed by political actors other than states; [5] and operates in spaces beyond and irrespective of borders.[6] With particular focus on this last finding – what he calls the 'sovereignty-territory' nexus – Agnew questions the relationship between sovereignty and territory by arguing that 'political authority is not restricted to states and that such authority is thereby not necessarily exclusively territorial.'[7]

---

[2] See Bartelson's chapter in *Critical Imaginations in International Relations* for an account of recent criticism of the concept within International Relations Theory. Jens Bartelson, "Sovereignty," in *Critical Imaginations in International Relations*, eds. Aoileann Ni Mhurchu and Reiko Shindo (Oxon: Routledge, 2016), 184.

[3] Including: Roy Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979); John G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, eds. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, eds. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Alexander Wendt, **"**Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, (1992): 391–425; and Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[4] John Agnew, "Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95, no. 2 (2005): 440.

[5] Agnew, "Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics," 440-441.

[6] Agnew, "Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics," 456.

[7] Agnew, "Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics," 441.

Lastly, Agnew addresses the idea of effective or de facto sovereignty – that is, a political entity's capacity to exercise its right to political independence and autonomy.[8] He argues that de facto sovereignty is all there is as he believes that de jure sovereignty – which is the legal possession established by international law – cannot exist.[9] I now unpack this idea further within the discussion of sovereignty in the polar regions.

### 1.2 *Sovereignty on ice*

The typical exercise, practice, or assertion of sovereignty is closely linked to the three Westphalian tenants of sovereignty mentioned above – power, territory, and population. States demonstrate their power through enforcement and control; assert their territory by maintaining the integrity of their borders; and control their populations through effective governance. For example, in the Arctic, states have increased their military presence in the region to showcase their 'hard power' capabilities, have regulated shipping routes through their maritime zones, and have negotiated with Indigenous populations to formalise territorial claims. Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty effectively de-escalated tensions surrounding territorial claims in the opposing polar region by neither confirming nor denying past territorial claims on the continent, but disallowing reinforcement of existing claims, or further claims, while in force. Given that states can possess sovereignty without a monopoly on the use of power, a physical territory, or population as discussed earlier, at the time of negotiating and signing of the Antarctic Treaty states could not resolve the issue of political authority south of 60° South latitude. I introduce the work of several scholars who have considered the ramifications of this protracted issue below.

Dodds and Hemmings have analysed the issue of Antarctic sovereignty by scrutinising state behaviour and contemplating whether or not it is problematic in light of the neutralised territorial claims. They believe that state paranoia results in what they have labelled 'treaty sovereignty' or 'frontier vigilantism': strategies inspired by a fear of others and their intentions on the continent.[10] Examples of these efforts by claimant states to entrench their claims include investment in capital infrastructure, publication of maps, production of postage stamps, and of

---

[8] Trudy Jacobsen, Charles Sampford, and Ramesh Thakur, eds. *Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia?* (London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013), 195.
[9] Agnew, "Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics," 437.
[10] Klaus Dodds, "Sovereignty watch: claimant state, resources, and territory in contemporary Antarctica," *Polar Record* 47, no. 3 (2011): 234; and Klaus Dodds and Alan Hemmings, "Frontier Vigilantism? Australia and Contemporary Representations of Australian Antarctic Territory," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 55, no. 4 (2009): 513-529.

course, foreign policy in reaction to other states' actions in the region – such as Australia's response to Japan's Antarctic whaling program.[11] Hemmings neatly summarises how the action brought against the Japanese whaling company, Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd, in the Australian Federal Court is internally 'consistent with Australia's assertion of a territorial claim to a part of Antarctica that it calls the Australian Antarctic Territory … [but that] hardly any other [external] state (including Japan) recognises the claim.'[12] Irrespective of whether or not states engage these strategies to intentionally assert sovereignty over a certain geographic area, the fact there is potential for other states to interpret them as such is important, as sovereignty is necessarily an intersubjective phenomenon – that is, it cannot exist without external recognition.

Howkins has also discussed the issue of sovereignty in Antarctica but in relation to environmental regulation. In relation to the Antarctic Protected Area (APA) system, he argues that state proposals to create and manage these areas offers states the opportunity to 'behave like de facto sovereigns by taking a lead in protecting the environment.'[13] As I have argued throughout this thesis, it seems plausible that states, including non-claimants, would turn to other means of exerting their sovereignty, such as dominating the decision-making processes under the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). Three other Antarctic scholars also sympathise with this view: van der Watt argues that the domination of environmental discourse in Antarctica by states is a powerful strategy in Antarctic politics;[14] Sampaio claims that scientific research and environmental protection provide 'alternative authority deployment and territoriality in Antarctica';[15] and Brady argues that China uses environmental protection as a 'means to control territory' in the form of 'soft presence.'[16] Even though negotiations must reach consensus at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs), some voices at the table are louder than others and therefore experience greater authority than those who are silent or absent

[11] In 2014, Australia challenged Japan's scientific whaling program at the International Court of Justice.
[12] Alan D. Hemmings, "Problems Posed by Attempts to Apply a Claimant's Domestic Legislation Beyond its Own Nationals in Antarctica," *Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law* 11, no. 3 (2008): 207.
[13] Adrian Howkins, "Politics and environmental regulation in Antarctica: a historical perspective," in *The Routledge Handbook on the Polar Regions*, eds. Mark Nuttall, Torben R. Christensen, and Martin J. Siegert (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 343-344.
[14] Lize-Marié van der Watt, "Contemporary environmental politics and discourse analysis in Antarctica," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2017).
[15] Daniela P. Sampaio, "The Antarctic exception: how science and environmental protection provided alternative authority deployment and territoriality in Antarctica," *Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs* 11, no. 2 (2019): 107-119.
[16] Anne-Marie Brady, *China as a Polar Great Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 264.

– as established in *Chapter Four: Claiming Heritage* in relation to the development of the HSM Framework.

Dodds, Leane and Jabour, and Wood-Donnelley all discuss the performance of sovereignty in a polar context. Dodds' work mentioned above in relation to state paranoia also refers to these behaviours as a 'sovereignty performance.'[17] Leane and Jabour pick up this notion of performance and discuss what it means in an Antarctic setting: 'Sovereignty performances take on distinct forms in a region where the incongruity between human ability to withstand the environment and the confidence with which that environment is declared to be under human control constantly threatens to turn such displays into parody.'[18] Lastly, Wood-Donnelly argues that because polar sovereignty requires action, it becomes a performance for the international community to witness.[19] In relation to Antarctica, although Article IV does not technically diminish the territorial claims, states cannot enforce these claims. This is problematic if Agnew's assumption from earlier – that territorial claims only exist within the practice of international relations (de facto sovereignty), and not international law (de jure sovereignty) – is applied. The performance and symbolism of sovereignty in Antarctica in particular is perhaps more critical for states than anywhere else in the world, given that the Treaty prohibits its traditional exercise. For example, states cannot militarily occupy the region, they cannot control who enters their claimed territory (as not all nations recognise the seven claims), and they cannot make expeditioners of other citizenship abide by their domestic rule of law.

With these key arguments from polar scholars in mind, in the next section I connect the concepts of sovereignty, Antarctic geopolitics, and cultural heritage management, to argue that Antarctic heritage is a key facilitator in performances of sovereignty.

### 1.3 *Sovereignty and Antarctic heritage*

It is useful to understand the broad application of heritage within the exercise of sovereignty before exploring how this process operates in Antarctica. Exercises of sovereignty and heritage within specific empirical contexts, such as the politics of Native American heritage, have been

[17] Dodds, "Sovereignty watch: claimant state, resources, and territory in contemporary Antarctica," 231-243.
[18] Elizabeth Leane and Julia Jabour, "Performing Sovereignty over an Ice Continent," in *Performing Ice*, eds. Carolyn Philpott, Elizabeth Leane, and Matt Delridge (Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 2020), 172.
[19] Corine Wood-Donnelly, *Performing Arctic Sovereignty: Policy and Visual Narratives* (Oxon: Routledge, 2019), 10.

the subject of a number of case studies.[20] However, the body of academic literature on the theoretical linkage between sovereignty and heritage remains small. Scholars who do address this relationship include Winter, Timothy, and Francioni. In this section I outline their contributions and then apply them to the Antarctic context.

Winter, Timothy, and Francioni all discuss the intersection of sovereignty and cultural phenomena such as heritage. Winter identifies 'hidden forms of sovereignty' in the practice of 'heritage diplomacy.'[21] He believes a close reading of political actors' behaviour is necessary within a new postcolonial era of 'sovereignty and property claims over culture, with material pasts being put to work in the forging of newly formed "imagined communities" in regions with deep histories of cultural exchange and flows.'[22] Timothy sympathises with Winter's approach in his investigation of tourism as a means to legitimise sovereignty claims in the polar regions.[23] He finds that 'a functioning tourism industry fulfils the three legal requisites for international recognition and acceptance: the place can support human habitation, there exists a history of claimant-state occupation, and state functions/responsibilities are being exercised.'[24] Lastly, Francioni focuses on the role of heritage within international law and describes how heritage can counterbalance sovereignty by transcending territorial borders and empowering non-state actors.[25] He also discusses how cultural heritage – which he defines as the product and processes of culture – influences the emergence of norms and actors within international law.[26] Although these three scholars have discussed Antarctic heritage in relation to the notion of sovereignty specifically, and others have done so in passing,[27] there are further

[20] Mark J. Wolff, "Spirituality, culture and tradition: An introduction to the role of tribal courts and councils in reclaiming Native American heritage and sovereignty," *Thomas Law Rev.* 7, (1994): 761-768.
[21] Tim Winter, "Heritage diplomacy," *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 21, no. 10 (2015): 998.
[22] Winter, "Heritage diplomacy," *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 1009.
[23] Dallen J. Timothy, "Contested Place and the Legitimization of Sovereignty Claims through Tourism in Polar Regions," in *Tourism and Change in Polar Regions: Climate, Environments and Experiences*, eds. C. Michael Hall and Jarkko Saarinen (London: Routledge, 2010), 288-300.
[24] Timothy, "Contested Place and the Legitimization of Sovereignty Claims through Tourism in Polar Regions," 290.
[25] Francesco Francioni, "Beyond state sovereignty: the protection of cultural heritage as a shared interest of humanity," *Michigan Journal of International Law* 25, no. 4 (2003): 1209-1228.
[26] Francioni, "Beyond state sovereignty: the protection of cultural heritage as a shared interest of humanity," 1209.
[27] Collis discusses Australian and American Antarctic heritage from a spatial perspective, while Roura briefly discusses how HSMs can support sovereignty claims. Christy Collis, "Cold colonies: Antarctic spatialities at Mawson and McMurdo stations," *Cultural Geographies* 14, no. 2 (2007): 234-254; Christy Collis, "The Proclamation Island moment: making Antarctica Australian," *Law Text Culture* 8, no. 1 (2004): 39-56; and Ricardo Roura, "Antarctic Cultural Heritage: Geopolitics and Management," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017).

insights to be gained from applying a perspective of International Relations or Political Geography to this issue. This is my objective for the remainder of this chapter.

If, as Howkins, Timothy, and others claim, states have exercised sovereignty in Antarctica under the guise of seemingly innocuous diplomatic administrative processes such as environmental regulation or tourism management, it is plausible that states could be behaving similarly in relation to Antarctic heritage management. A number of Historic Sites and Monuments (HSMs) descriptions make reference either explicitly or implicitly to territorial occupation on the continent. HSMs such as *Mawson's Rock Cairn on Proclamation Island*[28] or *Landing Rock at Terre Adelie*[29] celebrate the discovery of geographic areas by expeditioners representing their states (Australia and France, respectively). Less obvious examples of occupational presence include entries from Chile on the first official HSM list in 1972 that referred to several sites as evidence of Chilean 'pre-IGY activity'[30] – a period when sovereignty claims were still active. Warren's remark from 1989 on the psychological role that historic resources play in society as 'symbols of permanence and of continuity' still holds true today.[31] While there are a number of HSMs, then, that would repay a geopolitical analysis, within the space available here I focus on three particularly revealing case examples.

The critical reflections on the concept and practice of sovereignty in international affairs on a global scale are transferable to Antarctic affairs. The antiquated characteristics of sovereignty arguably do not apply given the region's unique history.[32] The perception of a state's sovereignty by its peers – its external sovereignty – is paramount given no one state occupies the continent.[33] And finally, effective, or de facto sovereignty is essentially the only form of sovereignty possible given the stipulations of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. Acknowledging these facts, the following gives an overview of states' exercise of sovereignty in Antarctica over approximately a century.

[28] HSM 3.
[29] HSM 81.
[30] HSMs 30, 32, 34, 35, and 37.
[31] Patricia Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties" (draft of master's thesis, University of Washington, 1989), 50.
[32] Particularly those pertaining to territory and population given the freezing of territorial claims and absence of an Indigenous population.
[33] For a legal perspective that questions this view, see Scott's recent article on the external interpretation of Australia's claim to sovereignty in the region. Shirley Scott, "The Irrelevance of Non-Recognition to Australia's Antarctic Territory Title," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 70, no. 2 (2021): 491-503.

## 2. Case Selection: HSMs that could support the practice of de facto sovereignty

Almost all the entries on the HSM List could be considered acts of symbolic sovereignty, given that HSM proposals are – in and of themselves – a textual record of states' Antarctic pasts. But when surveying the HSM List, I noticed three predominant ways in which HSMs could contribute to exercises of de facto sovereignty: as territorial markers, as national celebrations, and as signifiers of conquest. Table 6.1 outlines the relevant HSMs.

Table 6.1: HSMs that could support the practice of de facto sovereignty (* indicates selected case example).

| **Form of de facto sovereignty** | **HSM number** | **Commemoration** |
|---|---|---|
| Territorial markers | 1 | Commemorates the flag mast erected by the First Argentine Overland Expedition at the South Pole in 1965. |
| | 3 | Commemorates the rock cairn and plaque installed by the British, Australian and New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition (BANZARE) on Proclamation Island in 1930. |
| | 5 | Commemorates a rock cairn and plaque installed by BANZARE at Cape Bruce in 1931. |
| | 6 | Commemorates a rock cairn installed by Sir Hubert Wilkins in the Vestfold Hills in 1939. |
| | 24 | Commemorates a rock cairn installed by Roald Amundsen on Mount Betty in 1912. |
| | 27 | Commemorates a rock cairn and plaque installed by the second French Antarctic expedition on Petermann Island in 1909. |
| | 28 | Commemorates a rock cairn, plaque and wooden pillar installed by the first French Antarctic expedition on Booth Island in 1904. |
| | 36 | Commemorates a German expedition's landing on King George Island in 1874 with a plaque installed retrospectively by Edward Dallmann. |
| | 45 | Commemorates the landing of the Belgium Antarctic Expedition on Brabant Island in 1898 with a plaque installed retrospectively by Adrien de Gerlache. |
| | 60 | Commemorates a rock cairn, plaque and wooden pole installed by the Swedish South Polar Expedition on Seymour Island in 1903. |
| | 66 | Commemorates a rock cairn installed by the Norwegian Antarctic Expedition in the Alexandra Mountains in 1911. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 72 | Commemorates a rock cairn installed by Klarius Mikkelsen in the Vestfold Hills in 1935. |
| | 81 | Commemorates a small island discovered, and plaque installed, by Jules Dumont d'Urville and his crew in Terre Adélie in 1804. |
| | 94 | Commemorates a rock cairn installed by Carl Anton Larsen on Marambio Island in 1892. |
| National celebrations | 34 | Commemorates Chilean naval hero, Arturo Prat, with a bust erected at Arturo Prat Base in 1947. |
| | 35 | Commemorates the Virgin of Carmen with a wooden cross and statue also erected at Arturo Prat Base in 1947. |
| | 37 | Commemorates another Chilean naval hero, Bernardo O'Higgins, with a bust erected at Cape Legoupil in 1948. |
| | 40 | Commemorates an Argentinian naval hero, José de San Martin, with a bust, grotto and flag installed at Base Esperanza in 1955. |
| | 54 | Commemorates American explorer, Richard Byrd, with a bust installed at McMurdo Station in 1965. |
| Signifiers of conquest | 4* | Commemorates the first expedition to reach the Pole of Inaccessibility. |
| | 11 | Commemorates the first traverse. |
| | 29 | Commemorates the first Argentine lighthouse in Antarctica. |
| | 59* | Commemorates potentially the first people 'to live and die' in Antarctica. |
| | 61 | Commemorates the first atmospheric recording. |
| | 72 | Commemorates the first woman to set foot on the continent. |
| | 80* | Commemorates the first person to reach the South Pole. |
| | 94 | Commemorates the first Antarctic fossil discoveries. |

The HSMs that serve as territorial markers are the most common. More than one in 10 HSMs deliberately commemorates expedition landings and territorial proclamations on the continent – that is, acts that mark the longevity of occupation by the proposing state. Collis counts such acts as a contemporary form of colonialism, arguing that these HSMs represent explorers' physical contact with claimed space – that is, their cultural practice of spatial possession to not only 'perform rituals of territorial annexation, but to textualise them for popular and governmental consumption.'[34]

[34] Collis, "The Proclamation Island moment: making Antarctica Australian," 46-52.

Next most common are HSMs that represent a national celebration. These play an important role in committing key events or people to national memory within the Antarctic context, and often take the form of busts or monuments of celebrated national heroes or icons to attach Antarctic space to the motherhood state. The transplanting of these figures into Antarctic space is a performance of national pride and possession that foregrounds the presence of these states on and around the continent.

The final and smallest group of HSMs that signify conquest commemorate the successful completion of certain feats before other states. These HSMs become a form of soft power – that is, power that cannot be measured by brute military potential but rather persuasion.[35] Nye first coined the phrase 'Soft Power' in 2002,[36] and continued to develop the idea years later.[37] Nye argues that states have the ability to co-opt and persuade international affairs through cultural values, ideas, and agenda-setting, as opposed to hard or economic power, which coerces or conquers through military might.[38] Salazar has discussed this concept in relation to the Antarctic context, stating that, 'Soft power in Antarctic geopolitics cannot … be limited only to science diplomacy. Or nor should it be if we endeavour to develop more holistic ethical frameworks to engage with Antarctica in decades to come.'[39] In this sense, the management and governance of heritage in Antarctica can be considered a form of cultural diplomacy.

While the third group of HSMs is the smallest, it is also the most significant in terms of states' displays of sovereignty through heritage. This is because HSMs signifying national conquest are more than functional markers of space or temporary celebrations, as for the HSMs in the previous two groups. HSMs signifying conquest go one step further and pose one nation's achievements in relation to another, thereby fulfilling the external as well as internal elements of a sovereignty performance. I analyse three HSMs from within this group (with asterisks) – HSM 4, HSM 59, and HSM 80. I select these three HSMs because of the significance of the events they commemorate on an international stage: the first expedition to reach the Pole of Inaccessibility (supposedly the most remote place on the continent); arguably the first people

[35] Gail D. Lord and Ngaire Blankenberg, *Cities, Museums and Soft Power* (Washington, DC: The AAM Press, 2005), 9.
[36] Joseph S. Nye, *The paradox of American power: Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
[37] Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
[38] Nye, *The paradox of American power: Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone*, 8-9.
[39] Juan Francisco Salazar, "Geographies of place-making in Antarctica: an ethnographic approach," *The Polar Journal* 3, no. 1 (2013): 64.

‘to live and die’ in Antarctica; and the first person to reach the South Pole. HSM 4 is revealing in that it represents a significant first on the continent – one that several parties have re-enacted since – but has been abandoned both physically and administratively by its proposing state since its designation almost 60 years ago. HSM 59 was selected as a case for this chapter because it claims to commemorate ‘possibly the first people to live and die in Antarctica’: a bold statement regarding Antarctica’s discovery and habitation. And finally, HSM 80 commemorates the first people to reach the Geographic South Pole and represents the first temporarily intangible or hidden historic remain successfully designated as an HSM.

If external sovereignty can be interpreted as a performance by states for other states, then the soft power (that these HSMs possess) is the unit of measure. Achieving ‘firsts’ before other states is a display of soft power and is a demonstration of symbolic or de facto sovereignty. Given the relatively recent discovery of Antarctica in relation to the birth of the nation-state, the continent has set the scene for several state ‘firsts’ in the twentieth century. I explore the three selected HSMs that commemorate these conquests in greater depth below.

## 3. Case Examples: HSM 4, HSM 59, and HSM 80

As explained within my methodology, the method of analysis for the selected HSM case examples is a critical geopolitical reading. This approach is systematic and can be applied in the same way for each case. I begin by providing a brief summary of the HSM and its proposing and managing state/s, and go on to retrace its proposition, designation, and management. I then perform a spatial analysis and consider the HSM from an intra-national, inter-national, and extra-national perspective. Finally, I offer a counter case to acknowledge that there are exceptions to the pattern.

## 3.1 HSM 4, *Pole of Inaccessibility Station building*



Figure 6.1: Approximate location of HSM 4.

As the name suggests, HSM 4 consists of a station building, constructed by the Soviets in 1958 during the International Geophysical Year (IGY), and is located at the Pole of Inaccessibility – that is, the point in Antarctica most distant from the coast (although this point can change depending on whether or not ice shelves are taken into consideration). The site includes a bust of Lenin mounted on top of the building and which, as of 2007, is the only element not buried by snow.

Figure 6.2: Pole of Inaccessibility Station. (Stein Tronstad/Norwegian Polar Institute, 2008.)

HSM 4 is one of the Russian Federation's eight Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments. As a reserved claimant, Russia does not hold any formal territorial claims to the continent at present but has reserved the right to do so in the future (the United States has also reserved their own claim). Russia's declaration as one of nine states who have officially and publicly declared their interest in claiming territory in Antarctica, means that it is likely interested in using its HSMs for political gain. Of the eight HSMs Russia independently proposed and manages, it had six (including HSM 4) designated on the first official HSM List in 1972[40] and the remaining two over 50 years later.[41] In 2004, Russia signposted a potential designation for a ninth HSM but never followed through with it.[42] Apart from the formation of the first informal HSM List, Russia has been relatively absent from discussions and actions concerning the HSM Framework.[43]

### 3.1.1 *The proposition, designation, and management of HSM 4*

HSM 4 was included within the first official HSM list in 1972, but given there were no proposals for the original entrants, it can only be assumed that the Soviet Union followed recommendations from the 1968 ACTM to 'circulate a list of historic monuments through diplomatic channels to other Consultative Governments.'[44] The wording of HSM 4's description on the first informal list within a Working Paper submitted by the Soviets[45] and the first official list is identical, suggesting that there was consensus on its description. It is also impossible to identify which HSM criteria the Soviet Union would have applied, as in 1972 the formal criteria did not yet exist. However, applying the criteria retrospectively can help explain why the Meeting has not delisted the HSM. Of the seven criteria, the first and third seem most applicable: the journey to the Pole of Inaccessibility by the Third Soviet Antarctic Expedition in 1958 represents 'a particular event of importance in the history of science or exploration of Antarctica'; and the fact that the destination was the Pole of Inaccessibility, defined as the most remote place in Antarctica (and, given Antarctica's own remoteness, perhaps the world), represents 'a particular association with a notable feat of endurance or achievement.' The fourth criterion, which addresses 'wide-ranging activity that has been important in the development of knowledge of Antarctica,' also applies, as the efforts of the Soviets in 1958

[40] HSMs 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11.
[41] HSM 88 in 2013 and HSM 92 in 2015.
[42] The Russian Federation, *Orthodox temple in the Antarctic*, IP045 (2004).
[43] As established in *Chapter Four: Claiming Heritage*, section 3.
[44] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Designation of SPA 4 (Sabrina Island, Balleny Islands)*, Recommendation 4, 1966.
[45] The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, *Historic monuments*, WP034 rev. 1 (1972).

were dedicated, at least officially, to the IGY.[46] The last detail of any HSM's proposal worth considering is its timing in relation to the event, place or thing being commemorated – in this case the building of a station during the IGY in 1958 at the Pole of Inaccessibility. This means that 14 years had passed between when this event took place and when the Soviets made their proposal. Given the political pressure to propose sites when the List came into effect in 1972 – as evidenced by the 43 initial listings that have only risen by just over 50 new listings in almost 50 years since – it is difficult to know if HSM 4 would have been proposed earlier had the official list existed.

The Recommendation that contained the official designation for HSM 4 took many years to come into effect. Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty necessitates that measures 'shall become effective when approved by all the Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings held to consider those measures.' For this reason, the 1972 HSM List, which contained HSM 4, only came into effect in 2003. All the original signatories approved the recommendation[47] within three years, except Chile, which approved it in 1981 and the Netherlands in 2003. Again, as this was the first official list of Antarctic historic sites and monuments, it is impossible to link approvals from the ATCMs to one particular HSM. Given the occupational significance of HSMs, it is also not surprising that it took over three decades for states to demonstrate their official acceptance of the List. The final description of HSM 4 is definitely worth investigating, however. The description reads: *Station building to which a bust of V.I. Lenin is fixed, together with a plaque in memory of the conquest of the Pole of Inaccessibility by Soviet Antarctic explorers in 1958.* The key word here is 'conquest,' a word that is often used to describe a state's acquisition of territory by force. Article I of the Antarctic Treaty, which reserves the continent for peaceful purposes only, disallows military subjugation. But it would appear that in this context, the Soviet Union used the word to imply that they had to overcome an obstacle in order to reach and inhabit the Pole of Inaccessibility, and therefore have control over the space that is only possible or justified by an act of conquering. This said, the term 'conquest' is also often used in relation to the north and south geographic poles, so perhaps the Soviets used such rhetoric to create equivalence with the 'original' conquering of the 'actual' (geographic) South Pole. But even still, this last interpretation suggests a significant feat for the reserved claimant.

[46] The Soviets were at the site of the station only briefly. Elizabeth Leane, *South Pole: Nature and Culture* (London: Reaktion Books, 2016), 144.
[47] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *List of Historic Monuments*, Recommendation 9, 1972.

The managing state for HSM 4 is the same as its proposing state, Russia (the successor state after the break-up of the Soviet Union). After HSM 4's designation in 1972, there has been no evidence of its active management either by the official managing state or other parties. An absence of Management Plans (MPs) or Working or Information Papers concerning the HSM's management, as well as the physical state of the site, testifies to this. In 2012, Russia actually amended[48] the official description so that two new sentences followed the original description: 'As of 2007 the station building was covered by snow. The bust of Lenin is erected on the wooden stand mounted on the building roof at about 1.5 m high above the snow surface.' Russia also updated the geographical coordinates. Within the Working Paper Russia submitted to make this amendment, the HSM was first named 'Lenin's Bust,' not the 'Pole of Inaccessibility Station building' – an error that potentially reveals Russia's true prioritisation. Even if this amendment could be viewed as Russia's passive management of the site, the state has made no effort to conserve or preserve the site otherwise, in contrast with its other HSMs (HSM 92, for example, was restored between 2013 and 2015).[49]

3.1.2 *Intra-national, inter-national, and extra-national geopolitical ramifications of HSM 4*

For a researcher without fluent Russian, it is difficult to discern the intra-national interpretation of HSM 4. However, the translation of one publication in particular provides some insight. A 1979 article published on the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute website addressing the twentieth anniversary of the building of the Pole of Inaccessibility station discusses the significance of the site and what it meant for future scientific research in Antarctica.[50] It characterises the expedition as the longest scientific trip into the Antarctic interior at that time and describes the Pole of Inaccessibility as being 'discovered' by the Soviet people. Towards the end of the piece it quotes the Norwegian explorer, Fridtjof Nansen, and states that the success of the campaign was due to the right people being in the right place at the right time; and in its final sentence the English translation reads, 'the campaign and discovery of the Pole of relative inaccessibility can rightfully take its place among the outstanding geographical discoveries of the 20th century.'[51] Gan also talks about how the Soviets 'felt that there could be no backing away from "doing the impossible"; national pride served to strengthen their

[48] The Russian Federation, *Proposal on revision of Historic Sites and Monuments under management of the Russian Federation*, WP036 (2012).
[49] The Russian Federation, *Proposal on inclusion of the oversnow heavy tractor "Kharkovchanka" that was used in Antarctica from 1959 to 2010 to the List of Historical Sites and Monuments*, WP031 rev. 1 (2015).
[50] Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, "20 years of the discovery of the Pole of Inaccessibility of Antarctica," accessed 4 October 2019, http://www.aari.aq/publication/avsyuk/avsyuk.html.
[51] Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, "20 years of the discovery of the Pole of Inaccessibility of Antarctica."

resolve to embark on the scientific conquest of their own Poles: the South Geomagnetic Pole and the Pole of Inaccessibility.'[52] There is therefore some evidence of national pride attached to the Pole of Inaccessibility building, and by extension HSM 4.

It is at the inter-national level that the reception of HSM 4 by other states becomes highly relevant to discussions of sovereignty in Antarctica. An investigation of the proposition and establishment of the station reveals how the Pole of Inaccessibility building has been used as a tool of Russian diplomacy. The IGY marked the beginning of the Soviets' presence in Antarctica after a hiatus of over 100 years (Bellingshausen had circumnavigated the continent in 1819-1821), and – due to 'the size of their contribution to the international scientific endeavour, the location of their bases and their status as a world power' at the time[53] – they enjoyed substantial influence within Antarctic affairs. The Soviets never intended to be excluded from discussions concerning territorial claims in Antarctica, and in order to make clear their position, addressed a Memorandum in 1950 to Argentina, Australia, France, Norway, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK), and United States (US) stressing the '"indisputable" and "historic" right of the Soviet Union to participate in solving the Antarctic problem.'[54] It was in this political climate that they proposed to build a station at the Pole of Inaccessibility. The Soviets initially proposed building a station for the IGY at the prestigious Geographic South Pole, but the Americans – themselves apparently prompted by Soviet plans – announced their own intention to build there, forcing the Soviets to shift focus to the alternative 'Pole.'[55] The Soviets therefore settled for the Pole of Inaccessibility as it could still service their underlying intention: to assert their impressive presence in the region.

The physical establishment of the station was an even more overt display of sovereignty. The Soviets built the station, along with others, in Australian Antarctic Territory – potentially an 'anti-colonial' statement designed to reject Australia's claim.[56] This move produced a nervous response in Australia, which did not wish Soviet stations to remain after the IGY had finished.[57] In response to an Australian journalist in 1958, Nikita Krushchev stated that the decision to

[52] Irina Gan, "Red Antarctic: Soviet Interests in the South Polar Region Prior to the Antarctic Treaty, 1946-1958" (PhD diss., University of Tasmania, 2009), 93.
[53] Irina Gan, "'Will the Russians abandon Mirny to the penguins after 1959 . . . or will they stay?'" *Polar Record* 45, no. 2 (2009): 167.
[54] Boleslaw Boczek, "The Soviet Union and the Antarctic Regime," *The American Journal of International Law* 78, no. 4 (1984): 837.
[55] Leane, *South Pole: Nature and Culture*, 138.
[56] Collis, "Cold colonies: Antarctic spatialities at Mawson and McMurdo stations," 239.
[57] Gan, "'Will the Russians abandon Mirny to the penguins after 1959 . . . or will they stay?'" 167.

build stations in that location was 'not on the permission of a claimant whose claims were not recognised by either the USSR or the USA,'[58] giving the Australian Government even more cause for concern. Following on from this building proposal, physical efforts to establish the station demonstrate a display of de facto sovereignty. The higher, colder, windier, and more remote Pole of Inaccessibility[59] represented an even tougher challenge than the Geographic South Pole, providing an opportunity for the Soviets to do something more impressive than the Americans, 'achieve the unachievable' and raise national prestige.[60] Such a performance, act, or demonstration of sovereignty in Antarctica would prove to other states operating in Antarctica at the time the Soviets' investment within the region. This also explains why the Soviets initially planned for the station at the Pole of Inaccessibility to be called *Sovetskaya*, which translates to 'belonging to the Soviets';[61] why a life-size bust of Lenin sits atop the building (that is arguably more important than the building itself now that the latter lies beneath the snow); and why expeditioners supposedly fired rockets into the air after raising a flag on site for the first time.[62] After the station's abandonment in 1958, the Ninth Soviet Antarctic Expedition revisited it in 1964 to take geodetic and seismic readings en route to Queen Maud Land. In the following year, the Americans visited during their Queen Maud Land Traverse. The Americans allegedly turned the bust of Lenin to face in the direction of Washington instead of Moscow, and the Twelfth Soviet Antarctic Expedition allegedly repositioned him to his rightful orientation upon their last visit to the site in 1967.[63] Overall, the Soviet campaign sought to 'conquer the harshest climatic conditions and most unforgiving terrain in attempts to reach, and to conduct scientific investigations at, two of the most remote unexplored parts of the Antarctic continent,'[64] in an attempt to establish its 'domain of practice'[65] in the region.

Various private expeditions in the twenty-first century demonstrate extra-national engagement of HSM 4. These pilgrimage-like expeditions have each had differing objectives. The first, in 2007, was a three-man team from the UK that used only skis and kites to reach the site. Once

---

[58] Gan, "'Will the Russians abandon Mirny to the penguins after 1959 . . . or will they stay?'" 172.
[59] Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Pole of Inaccessibility," *Britannica*, accessed 18 March 2021, https://www.britannica.com/place/Pole-of-Inaccessibility.
[60] Gan, "Red Antarctic: Soviet Interests in the South Polar Region Prior to the Antarctic Treaty, 1946-1958," 176.
[61] Gan, "Red Antarctic: Soviet Interests in the South Polar Region Prior to the Antarctic Treaty, 1946-1958," 46.
[62] South Pole Station, "The Pole of Inaccessibility (POI)," accessed 4 October 2019, https://www.southpolestation.com/trivia/igy1/poi.html#ref.
[63] South Pole Station, "The Pole of Inaccessibility (POI)."
[64] Gan, "Red Antarctic: Soviet Interests in the South Polar Region Prior to the Antarctic Treaty, 1946-1958," 128-129.
[65] Robert Dixon, *Prosthetic Gods: Travel, Representation, and Colonial Governance* (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2001).

they arrived, they took note of the condition of the bust, stating that 'he [the bust of Lenin] is totally frost free as if he was put there yesterday.'[66] They then 'pitched their tent 30ft from Lenin's gaze.'[67] The following year another expedition visited the Pole of Inaccessibility: a Norwegian-United States team who, on their way to the Geographic South Pole, celebrated New Year's Day at the site. A few years later in 2011, an American pair attempting a transcontinental crossing of Antarctica stopped at the site.[68] The last documented visit to the HSM was by Australian explorer, Geoff Wilson, who in 2019 used kite power to travel around the continent.[69] All these expeditions confirm the desirability to 'conquer' such a remote place from both an individual as well as nationalistic perspective.

### 3.1.3 *Counter Case – The IGY South Pole station*

Understanding why a particular Antarctic historic site or monument was proposed, designated, and is managed as an HSM is essential to understanding the politicisation of heritage management in the region on a broader scale. However, understanding how it contrasts with sites that have not been designated is also important as it highlights instances where the strategy has not been employed. The South Pole station built by the Americans during the IGY is an obvious counter example. It was the original site proposed by the Soviets for their station, but the First Antarctic conference in 1955 awarded the site to the Americans instead.[70] Crucially, despite the existence of the remains of two disused stations, the Americans have not yet proposed any part of the site as a potential HSM. The site already falls under the protection of an Antarctic Specially Managed Area (ASMA 5), but this form of APA does not perform the same geopolitical function for a state as an HSM does. ASMAs represent states' intentions for a site but do not allow for direct attribution of it to them; instead, states propose and manage them on behalf of the APA system and the areas are by no means annexed by the states themselves.

---

[66] Explorer's Web, "'It so, so very surreal,' team n2i meets Lenin at the POI! Marines arrive Patriot Hills," accessed 4 October 2019, https://www.explorersweb.com/polar/news.php?id=15549.

[67] British Broadcasting Corporation, "UK team makes polar trek history," accessed 4 October 2019, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sci/tech/6281839.stm.

[68] Sebastian Copeland, "Antarctica 2011-12 Legacy Crossing," accessed 4 October 2019, http://sebastiancopelandadventures.com/antarcticaexpedition.

[69] He posed with the bust of Lenin and the Australian flag once he arrived. Brittney Kleyn, "Gold Coast Antarctic explorer Geoff Wilson becomes the loneliest man on Earth," *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 2 December 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-12-02/geoff-wilson-crossing-antarctica-pole-of-inaccessibility/11755588.

[70] Gan, "Red Antarctic: Soviet Interests in the South Polar Region Prior to the Antarctic Treaty, 1946-1958," 95.

ATCMs have designated other HSMs inside ASMA 5 – such as HSM 80 (Amundsen's tent), analysed as the last case example in this chapter. Of course, it is only possible to speculate why a proposal has not been submitted. But perhaps the most obvious explanation for this case is that the designation of only one of the three stations at the South Pole as an HSM may break the continuity of America's perceived presence on site. Or, because the US still occupies the site to this day, an official recognition of the site is not pressing. Or finally, perhaps because the site is home to numerous national Antarctic histories – including the famous Norwegian and British legacies – the political tension that the HSM proposal and designation process could cause as a result of the required selection of proposing and managing parties makes it an unnecessarily provocative move. However, there is a very real chance that the US, as an active Consultative Party and reserved claimant, may reassess its current approach in light of future developments – such as further construction on site, or simply as time passes and the historical value increases.

## 3.2 HSM 59, *San Telmo Cairn*



Figure 6.3: Approximate location of HSM 59.

The rock cairn referred to in the name of HSM 59 is found on the beach at Livingston Island, within the South Shetlands off the west coast of the Antarctic Peninsula. This cairn and a plaque commemorating the officers, soldiers, and seaman aboard the Spanish naval ship, *San Telmo* when it sank in 1819 is also part of the HSM but is located on the hill opposite the islets named after the ship. Prior to its sinking, the ship was on a mission to quell Peruvian liberation forces in El Callao.

Figure 6.4: The *San Telmo*. (Carlos Parrilla Penagos.)

Chile, Spain, and Peru share HSM 59, which is Spain's and Peru's only HSM, joint or otherwise. It is one of Chile's 13 HSMs, only four of which are jointly proposed and managed. The obvious connection between these three countries is their shared national languages and cultural heritage, but only Chile has a proximal connection with the frozen continent. Chile is one of the most active states in relation to the development of the HSM Framework (the HSM Guidelines in particular).[71] The previous chapter also found that more recently, Chile has joined with Argentina to raise the concept of 'enhancement'[72] and question the meaning of HSMs overall.[73] Peru and Spain on the other hand have been much less involved. Although Peru hosted the 1999 APA workshop, this was most likely due to the ATCM for that year being held in Lima just after the workshop. Spain has commented on HSM issues at ATCMs in the past and co-convened one APA workshop, but this is the extent of its contribution.

[71] As established in *Chapter Four: Claiming Heritage*, section 3.
[72] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXVIII Final Report*, 2015, paragraph 201.
[73] Argentina and Chile, *Report of the Joint Inspections Program undertaken by Argentina and Chile under Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 14 of the Environmental Protocol*, IP083 (2019).

3.2.1 *The proposition, designation, and management of HSM 59*

In 1991 Chile and Spain submitted the proposal for HSM 59 within a Working Paper.[74] Presumably Chile is a proponent not because the historic remains are its own, but rather because it has an acute interest in historical claims made in the Peninsula region and was a witness of the historic events as they unfolded. The paper provides 'Background Information' that describes the ship's life, from its construction in 1789, through its sinking on 2 September 1819 when it was 'presumably dashed against the reefs of Livingston Island, in the vicinity of Cape Shirreff,' to its declaration as lost on 6 May 1822 by the Admiral of the Spanish Fleet. Captain Robert Fildes later found the wreck and described what he found at Half Moon Bay: 'an anchor stock from a 74-gun ship, with an iron fluke and a copper cleat … together with booms with sails attached to them and other types of sparring' – all of which have not had a recorded sighting since.[75] The Working Paper also refers to Captain James Weddell's account: he suggests that 'the shipwreck victims survived but perhaps perished in attempt to cross the Drake Sea in a cutter or rowboat salvaged from the disaster.'[76] Lastly, the paper offers a description for the monument, provides details of the Site of Special Scientific Interest at Cape Shirreff, and mentions the planned research program by Chile and Spain to locate the wreckage. Given that, like HSM 4, HSM 59's proposers had it designated prior to the introduction of the formal criteria in 1995, it is possible to identify the criteria that it is honouring in retrospect. The second and third criteria seem most appropriate as the former requires 'a particular association with a person who played an important role in the history of science or exploration of Antarctica,' or in this case 644 people; and the latter requires a 'particular association with a notable feat of endurance or achievement,' in this case possibly the first humans to 'live and die' in Antarctica. In addition to the nature and credibility of the proposal for HSM 59, its timing is also worth considering. Officially designated 172 years after the sinking of the ship in the nineteenth century, according to popular expectations, HSM 59 might be considered to have earned its classification as 'heritage.'

The designation process for HSM 59 was uneventful according to the final report of the 2013 ATCM (XVI), in which the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) recommended designation to the Meeting for adoption. It is worth noting though, that Recommendation 11 (1991), which contained the proposal for HSM 59, never actually entered into effect because

[74] Chile and Spain, *Historical Site*, WP039 (1991): 1-6.
[75] WP039 (1991): 2.
[76] WP039 (1991): 3.

one of the required Contracting Parties, Ecuador, never submitted its approval.[77] But as mentioned previously, for an ATCM to officially adopt an HSM, consensus is required. The ATS eventually adopted the sites in 2003 when Recommendation 11 (1991) was subject to 'Fast Approval' and came into effect under Measure 3 (2003) on 18 September. The official description is also essential to unpacking the geopolitical meaning behind an HSM as it is the carefully curated narrative concerning the site or monument's existence written by the proposing state/s. HSM 59's is as follows: *A cairn on Half Moon Beach, Cape Shirreff, Livingston Island, South Shetland Islands and a plaque on 'Cerro Gaviota' opposite San Telmo Islets commemorating the officers, soldiers and seamen aboard the Spanish vessel San Telmo, which sank in September 1819; possibly the first people to live and die in Antarctica.* The last sentence is important as it highlights perhaps the most significant Antarctic 'first' of them all – that is, the first humans to reside in the region – but this is yet to be verified.

The management of HSM 59 technically falls under the responsibility of the listed managers, who are Chile, Spain, and Peru. But since an Antarctic Specially Protected Area (ASPA) had been established on and around the same site in 2002 under Decision 1, the management of this ASPA (149) by Chile and the United States from 1998,[78] is also relevant. In relation to the HSM specifically, none of the managers have submitted a MP or related Working or Information Papers. However, in relation to ASPA 149, several Working Papers containing draft MPs have been submitted, the most recent in 2016.[79] The 'Historical Features' mentioned in these documents recount the history of the *San Telmo* and its significance, while acknowledging its wrecking as a form of human impact within the ASPA. Despite the fact that HSM 59 commemorates an event rather than a material artefact, physical elements are still present – that is, the rock cairn and the plaque mentioned in the official description – but their

[77] Even though the recommendation was 'not in force' for Ecuador, approving parties could adjust their domestic laws. As of 2002, when Annex V of the Environmental Protocol came into force, Article 8.2 states that 'Unless the measure specifies otherwise, the proposal [for listing of an HSM] shall be deemed to have been approved 90 days after the close of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting at which it was adopted, unless one or more of the Consultative Parties notifies the Depositary, within that time period, that it wishes an extension of that period or is unable to approve the measure.'

[78] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *National responsibilities for revising management plans of Antarctic protected areas*, Resolution 1, 1998.

[79] Chile and the United States, *Draft Revised Management Plans for ASPA 149 Cape Shirreff, Livingston Island, South Shetland Islands*, WP019 rev. 1 (2004); Chile and the United States, *Final Revised Management Plan for ASPA 149 Cape Shirreff and San Telmo Island, Livingston Island, South Shetland Islands*, WP005 (2005); the United States and Chile, *Revised Management Plan for Antarctic Specially Protected Area No. 149 Cape Shirreff and San Telmo Island, Livingston Island, South Shetland Islands*, WP006 (2011); and the United States, *Revised Management Plan for Antarctic Specially Protected Area No. 149 - Cape Shirreff and San Telmo Island, Livingston Island, South Shetland Islands*, WP002 (2016).

condition is currently undocumented. The most recent MP does not even mention the existence of the plaque, only the cairn.

3.2.2 *Intra-national, inter-national, and extra-national geopolitical ramifications of HSM 59*

The intra-national significance of HSM 59 to each of the proposing states is once again difficult to gauge for someone outside of the national context, but it is still helpful to consider this internal perspective as it indicates how that state and its population may value the HSM outside of the region. While the ship itself is a common denominator for all three proponents, the political ramifications of the designation as an HSM for each of these states varies. Of the three, Chile stands to gain the most – geopolitically – from the commemoration as it records a historical event that potentially undermines northern European claims to the region's discovery. Chilean intra-national policies wholly embrace Chile's claimant state status and citizens are consistently reminded of their connection with the continent through maps, flags, school curriculum, and more.[80] In comparison to Spain and Peru, the stakes are especially high for Chile, as it claims territory in the Antarctic region. Spain invests in the future conservation and preservation of the *San Telmo* wreckage, but not for the same reasons as Chile. The ship was part of the Royal Spanish Armada, a state vessel that if found would be classified as a mass military grave, a fact Spain sought to make clear in its 2019 Working Paper.[81] The sinking of the ship had tangible consequences for those back home in Spain, as once the Minister of the Navy had declared it lost, the state provided support to the orphans and widows of *San Telmo's* crew. A Spanish edition of an international tabloid, *The Diplomat*, commended Spain's recent and successful bid to have the wreckage protected under Resolution 5 (2001) and its intention to have it designated as an HSM, as an 'achievement.'[82] Lastly, Peru's inclusion within the HSM's proposition and management seems curious as it is not very invested in Antarctic affairs overall, nor does the *San Telmo's* mission to quell liberation forces in El Callao seem like a desirable activity to commit to national memory. Because the listing is probably of little consequence to Peru's intra-national politics it could be a tactical choice for the state to simply be included within the HSM process and hence temporarily in the spotlight within the ATS.

[80] The Chilean Antarctic Institute has disseminated programs to 'high schools, day care centers, labor unions, neighbourhood associations, and other organizations' since its founding in 1963. Luis S. Mericq, *Antarctica: Chile's Claim* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1987), 100-101.
[81] Spain, *Notification of pre-1958 historic remains: The Spanish shipwreck "San Telmo"*, WP018 rev. 1 (2019).
[82] The Diplomat, "Spain achieves Antarctic Treaty protects remains of Spanish ship 'San Telmo,'" 17 July 2019, https://thediplomatinspain.com/en/2019/07/spain-achieves-antarctic-treaty-protects-remains-of-spanish-ship-san-telmo/.

To understand the effect HSM 59 has on inter-national relations, it helps to first acknowledge the broader geopolitical context. The three proponents are non-English speaking states that represent a non-Western perspective at the ATCMs. This is significant with regard to the issue of sovereignty because when claims to territory in Antarctica were being made in the twentieth century, the European claimants worked to bolster theirs by making reference to national expeditions, maps, and proclamations; while the South American claimants argued that they did not need claims primarily due to their 'inherited right' to the continent granted by their geographical proximity.[83] However, once it became apparent that the European states did not recognise these rights, Argentina and Chile undertook 'claim-making activities.'[84] HSM 59 is unavoidably entangled in these efforts as it potentially commemorates the earliest modern presence of human life in Antarctica as Hispanic. In this respect, Chile in particular could effectively be seen as bolstering their claims to sovereignty by means of denying the northern European claims to the first discoveries in the region in relation to Antarctic explorers such as Fabian Gottlieb Thaddeus von Bellingshausen and Edward Bransfield. As Pearson stated in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in 2018, archaeology 'establishes an interest, if not a stake, in future discussions about territorial claims or commercial exploitation.'[85]

In this light, the recent declaration by Spain at the 2019 ATCM (XLII) that detailed the revival of efforts by itself and Chile to locate the wreckage somewhere at the bottom of the Bransfield Strait becomes not just an archaeological mission, but a geopolitical one also.[86] Spain argued for the ship's interim protection under the pre-1958 historic remains guidelines[87] within a Working Paper.[88] Within this paper it stated that the archaeological findings 'reliably identified by Spanish archaeologists between 1992 and 1995' prove 'the presence, albeit temporary, of shipwreck survivors who managed to live for a small period of time.'[89] This paper also sought to identify Spain's definition of 'wreckage' to include 'all parts and accessories associated with

[83] Shirley Scott, "Three waves of Antarctic imperialism," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 41. 37-49
[84] Scott, "Three waves of Antarctic imperialism," 46.
[85] Michael Pearson interviewed by the British Broadcasting Corporation. Martha Henriques, "The bones that could shape Antarctica's fate," *British Broadcasting Corporation*, 22 October 2018, http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20181019-the-bones-that-could-shape-antarcticas-future.
[86] Efforts by the Canadian government between 2008 and 2016 to search for, and successfully locate, Sir John Franklin's ships in the Arctic, the *Erebus* and *Terror*, are comparable.
[87] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for handling of pre-1958 historic remains whose existence or present location is not yet known*. Resolution 5, 2001.
[88] WP018 rev. 1 (2019): 1-5.
[89] WP018 rev. 1 (2019): 4.

the vessel, armaments, equipment, supplies, as well as the ship itself and the crew and military staff transported in it … [and] all the personal objects that the crew would have left in the ship when it sank.'[90] Most significantly, it was at this ATCM that Spain 'noted its intention to submit a proposal to declare the wreck of the *San Telmo* an HSM.'[91] This move further emphasises the importance of the ship and its crew that could have survived on the floating wreckage long enough to sight and even reach the Antarctic continent. If this is verifiable, Spain would supersede Russia's sighting of the continent by one year.

The extra-national significance of HSM 59 is perhaps the most visible out of all of the HSMs, as it potentially commemorates humanity's first exposure to the continent: a land previously thought to have been unencountered by humans and a place that the majority of humans will never reach. [92] This first for humankind is comparable to humans' journey to the Moon (though the identity of the people involved is known in that case). There is also a degree of solemness to this potential accomplishment, as 'the event remains the greatest single loss of life yet to occur south of 60°S.'[93] Over 600 sailors, soldiers, and naval officers died – almost three times the number of fatalities suffered as a result of the Mount Erebus plane crash in 1979 (HSM 73).[94]

### 3.2.3 *Counter Case – Archaeological findings on Livingston Island*

Given the Chileans desire to prove their 'right' to, as opposed to 'claim' of, Antarctica it is surprising that upon discovering a human skull on Livingston Island in 1985, they did not seek to have the site immediately designated as an HSM. Archaeologists found the skull of a young Indigenous Yámana woman at Yamana Beach, named thereafter by the Chilean Antarctic Institute in 1985. They dated it as approximately 175 years old, and the individual to be 21 years old at the time of death.[95] Most importantly, these calculations situate the woman in this location between 1819-1825, within the sealing period (which could explain her transportation

[90] WP018 rev. 1 (2019): 5.
[91] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraph 117.
[92] It is possible that seafaring first nations, such as the Maori, encountered the region and continent much earlier than the Europeans, but little research on this has been conducted to date. However, it is confirmed that Maori were aboard the whaling ships of the nineteenth century. Klaus Dodds and Kathryn Yusoff, "Settlement and unsettlement in Aotearoa/New Zealand and Antarctica," *The Polar Record* 41, no. 2 (2005): 141-155.
[93] WP005 (2005): 16.
[94] 257 people lost their lives when the commercial flight they were aboard crashed into the slopes of Mount Erebus, Ross Island on 28 November 1979.
[95] Daniel Torres, "Observations on ca. 175-year old human remains from Antarctica (Cape Shirreff, Livingston Island, South Shetlands)," *International Journal of Circumpolar Health* 58, no. 2 (1999): 72-83.

to the island).[96] What this means is that the woman's remains could represent the first Indigenous link with the region. Political commentators also recognise the significance of this finding. According to the BBC, if Chile 'can demonstrate that it had people living in Antarctica earlier than other nations staking land claims, then they have a stronger hand in negotiations.'[97]

The fact that the remains are of a woman in a male-dominated environment creates even more intrigue. Perhaps a proposal is yet to be made for this very reason: the findings concern an unidentified female, with likely no allegiance to the nation-state considering Chile only gained its independence in 1818. The strained relationship between modern-day Chile and the Indigenous peoples of Southern Patagonia due to a genocidal history might have also dampened the outcome of the findings.[98] To underline the point, one possible reason for a lack of official recognition is that these remains were of a body – female and Indigenous – very different to the stereotypical Antarctic explorer – male and of European origin. It could also be a result of the vagueness of the findings and their inability to be verified at this time, but this is unlikely as the MP for ASPA 149 acknowledges that since 2005 the discovered skull was determined to be that of a young woman.[99]

## 3.3 HSM 80, *Amundsen's Tent*

Figure 6.5: Approximate location of HSM 80.

[96] Torres, "Observations on ca. 175-year old human remains from Antarctica," 72.
[97] British Broadcasting Corporation, "The bones that could shape Antarctica's fate."
[98] The arrival of European settlers in Tierra del Fuego in the nineteenth resulted in the dispossession of Indigenous land and physical destruction of the Indigenous peoples: the Selk'nam, the Kawésqar, and the Yámana. Carlos Gigoux, "'Condemned to Disappear': Indigenous Genocide in Tierra del Fuego," *Journal of Genocide Research* (2020): 1-22.
[99] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXVIII Final Report*, 2005, 174.

The eponymous tent was pitched at the South Pole on 14 December 1911 upon the Norwegian team's arrival and last seen by the British *Terra Nova* Expedition party a month later. Despite its unknown location as the result of being buried under snow and ice for over a century, the 2005 ATCM (XXVIII) designated the tent as an HSM.

Figure 6.6: Amundsen and his men at the South Pole, 16 December 1911. (Olav Bjaaland, 1911.)

HSM 80, *Amundsen's Tent*, is one of Norway's 11 Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments, and one of its two active and independently proposed and managed sites. The other independent HSM[100] – a rock cairn in the Queen Maud Range – is also associated with Roald Amundsen and his achievements at this time but was designated much earlier when the first official HSM List was created in 1972. Given that Norway is a claimant state, it is unsurprising that it has been reasonably engaged with the development of the HSM Framework.[101] However, what is surprising is that it has had only two independent HSMs designated, compared to the other claimant states that have at least four listed. HSM 80 is a fitting case for this chapter as it

[100] HSM 24.
[101] As established in *Chapter Four: Claiming Heritage*, section 3.

embodies the most significant, or at least most remembered and popularised, Antarctic 'first': the first people to reach the Geographic South Pole.

### 3.3.1 *The proposition, designation, and management of HSM 80*

Norway made the proposal for HSM 80 in 2005 within a Working Paper.[102] The paper argued for the designation of the tent, irrespective of its location, on the grounds that its material remains were not sufficiently legally protected under Resolution 5 (2001) regarding pre-1958 historic remains. This was the first time that hidden heritage had been proposed as an HSM. Norway acknowledged this fact within the paper, recognising that 'Most historic sites and monuments listed on the HSM-list presently are associated with known existence and location.'[103] Despite the fact that the Meeting had established the criteria for HSM proposals under Resolution 8 (1995) a decade earlier, the proposal did not explicitly address any criteria but did state that 'Amundsen's tent is both a material object and an intangible cultural heritage of value both for Norway and the Antarctic society at large.'[104] Heritage expert Barr, concurs with this assessment of the tent's intangible value, stating that the 'image of the small tent with flag flying from the top and with four men lined up before it … is for many people the embodiment of Antarctic history … the image in the mind of the tent at the Pole was worth far more than some scraps of canvas [the tent] that could be displayed quite out of context.'[105] The HSM certainly appeals to the first three criteria in that it: commemorates a particular event of importance in the history of Antarctic exploration – the 'race' to the Geographic South Pole; is associated with a person who played an important role in the history of Antarctic exploration – Roald Amundsen; and is associated with 'a notable feat of endurance or achievement' – reaching the Geographic South Pole. The Working Paper also provided a detailed description and inventory of what might be found in the tent if excavated, either on purpose or by accident:

> The tent was small and only taken along in case the group had to divide into two. It had been sewn of thin, grey-brown coloured, windproof material … an extra pole to a total height of about 4m to make a flagpole for two flags: a small Norwegian one and pennant on which FRAM was painted … a small bag containing a letter to King Haakon of Norway proclaiming the attainment of the South Pole, … extra equipment: a sextant

[102] Norway, *Listing of the Amundsen Tent on the List of Historic Sites and Monuments*, WP039 (2005): 1-4.
[103] WP039 (2005): 2-3.
[104] WP039 (2005): 1.
[105] Susan Barr, "Twenty years of protection of historic values in Antarctica under the Madrid Protocol," *The Polar Journal* 8, no. 2 (2018): 257.

> with glass horizon, a hypsometer case, 3 reindeer-skin foot bags, some footwear and gloves. A plaque with the 5 men's names was fastened to the tent pole.[106]

The designation of HSM 80 was a significant event on two accounts: it demonstrated an official recognition by Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) that the tent of the first people to reach the Geographic South Pole was worthy of recognition and protection; and that this recognition did not require the location of the material artefact to be known. With regard to the latter, the paper containing its proposal clearly stated on two occasions that, 'although the precise current location of the Amundsen tent is unknown, it was erected at 90ºS in 1911, and there seems to be no clear legal argument preventing the listing of it on this basis.'[107] The approval by ATCPs was also subject to 'Fast Approval' and came into effect less than three months after the closing of the 2005 ATCM (XXVIII), meaning that no states expressed any significant outlying concerns to deny the tent's award of HSM status. The official description contained in the designation is also worth considering. HSM 80's is as follows: *Amundsen's Tent. The tent was erected at 90° by the Norwegian group of explorers led by Roald Amundsen on their arrival at the South Pole on 14 December 1911. The tent is currently buried underneath the snow and ice in the vicinity of the South Pole*. There are a few things to note about this entry: none of the other men accompanying Amundsen to the South Pole are named, effectively reinforcing an emphasis on individual heroes throughout the telling of Antarctic history;[108] the use of the word 'currently' implies that the tent could be excavated in the future, or possibly recognises the mobile nature of the ice in which the HSM is trapped; and perhaps most noticeably, there is no reference to the Norwegian team being the first people to arrive at the Pole (or to Scott's team's arrival about a month later). This last omittance suggests that, given the sheer weight of the feat achieved, it is assumed knowledge that this was humans' first encounter with the Pole. Nevertheless, it represents a conscious decision by Norway not to mention Amundsen being first to reach the Geographic South Pole within this official and administrative context.

Given that HSM 80 is an example of temporarily intangible cultural heritage – that is, the physical artefact is currently unlocatable and therefore untouchable – its management requires

[106] WP039 (2005): 1.
[107] WP039 (2005): 1.
[108] Maddison talks about the 'heroisation' in the introduction of his 2014 book. Ben Maddison, *Class and Colonialism in Antarctic Exploration, 1750-1920* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2014), 3.

a slightly different approach than that applied to other HSMs. It is clear that by listing HSM 80, Norway made a serious effort to ensure its protection both at present and in the future. The paper proposing the HSM listing goes into great detail about the potential threats that face the tent, stressing that: 'Excavation, or indeed any disturbance of the ice layers around the tent area at all, would not only destroy the intangible, but highly present feeling of the tent as an unchanged symbolic object frozen in time, but would in recompense present the Antarctic society and the general public with a disappointing fact of the tent's current, sorry condition. Excavation in or near to the site of the tent would also run the risk of further damaging the remains over and above whatever the ice has already done to it.'[109] The paper also indicated that these threats could come from semi-regular proposals and attempts to locate and excavate the tent for reasons such as exhibition or research. Furthermore, Norway stated that the guidelines for the protection of pre-1958 remains not yet located (that Norway helped develop) did not provide a sufficient legal basis to prevent excavation. However, it did make a caveat for the accidental excavation of the tent that could occur during future projects at the Geographic South Pole, given its unknown location. Two years after HSM 80's designation, the Meeting adopted ASMA 5 that encompasses this site as a way to manage the Amundsen-Scott station situated at the South Pole.[110] Within the draft MP for this ASMA, an addendum from Norway, Australia, and the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) was added to ensure that a 'nothing to be removed' statement was applied to the tent and 'other relics' from 1911/1912 in the area.[111] This HSM, although its whereabouts is unknown, is therefore potentially the most managed and protected of them all.

3.3.2 *Intra-national, inter-national, and extra-national geopolitical ramifications of HSM 80*

The achievement HSM 80 represents is of significant intra-national value. Norway's independence as a state, after its dissolution with Sweden, occurred only six years prior to the Norwegian expedition party reaching the Geographic South Pole. This feat – accomplished in the name of a recently independent Norway – was therefore a welcome addition to the writing of a new national narrative. Norway acknowledged this in the HSM proposal, describing Amundsen's expedition as playing an important part 'in defining the new nation of Norway

[109] WP039 (2005): 2.
[110] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Designation of ASMA 5 (Amundsen Scott South Pole Station) and 6 (Larsemann Hills)*, Measure 2, 2007.
[111] Presumably, they were referring to any historical artefacts left in or around the tent – 'other relics' was not qualified. The United States, *Draft Management Plan for ASMA No. X: Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station, South Pole*, WP003 (2007).

after its revival as a sovereign nation in 1905. The tent as a material object is thus heritage of national value for Norwegians.'[112] The name Amundsen gave to the camp at the pole, *Polheim*, which translates as 'Home at the Pole,' likely represents a longing for the warmth of his home country whilst in the most inhospitable environment on Earth. Norwegian nationals have made several efforts to locate the tent. Monica Kristensen, popular Norwegian researcher, and explorer otherwise known as the 'Queen of the Poles,' attempted to locate the tent on three occasions: once in 1986/1987, once in 1991/1992, and finally in 1993/1994.[113] The Norwegian Olympic Organising Committee partially sponsored the last attempt, as the primary objective of the mission was to locate the tent, excavate it, and bring it back to Norway to display at the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Olympics. At the time, according to a popular travel website, the 'whole of Norway was following the search, giving both encouragement and criticism. "Turn back before it's too late!" and "Leave the tent where it is!" were just some of the newspaper headlines.'[114] More recently, Havard Tommeras travelled to the Geographic South Pole during the centenary in 2011 with a replica he had made of the tent and pitched it there.[115] The Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, also travelled to the historic site to commemorate this event. The domestic population's enduring pride demonstrates a connection with their Antarctic heritage that is strengthened by the fact that the artefact remains in an unknown location. The contribution the tent makes to the national narrative does not rely on the knowledge of its exact location.

The inter-national relevance of HSM 80 is profound, as its designation has the potential to exacerbate international tensions, as well as encourage international cooperation. With regard to the former, the race to the Geographic South Pole between Amundsen and Robert Falcon Scott at the beginning of the twentieth century is perhaps the most obvious display of national rivalry in Antarctica to date. Much like the Space Race of the 1960s, the race to the South Pole tested the physical and technical efforts of states, with the competition in the polar context culminating in the pitching of a tent at 90° South – an artefact now buried beneath layers of ice and snow. Although Norway's commitment to the 'sector principle'[116] meant that its initial

[112] WP039 (2005): 2.
[113] Beau Riffenburgh, ed. *Encyclopedia of the Antarctic: Volume 2* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 1095.
[114] Kristin M. Hauge, "Monica Kristensen is the Crime Queen of Svalbard," *Scandinavian Traveler*, 16 May 2016, https://scandinaviantraveler.com/en/people/monica-kristensen-is-the-crime-queen-of-svalbard.
[115] Tim Bowden, "Amundsen Centenary Celebrations 2," 17 March 2012, https://www.timbowden.com.au/2012/03/17/amundsen-centenary-celebrations-2/.
[116] The principle on which claims to territory in Antarctica and the Arctic have historically been made. The claiming state 'delimits the extent of its territory by the use of lateral boundaries' to the Pole. Gillian Triggs, "Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica," *Melbourne University Law Review* 13, (1981): 140.

claim to territory on the continent in 1939 did not appear to extend all the way to the Pole as the other six claimants' did, in a 2014-2015 White Paper, the Norwegian government clarified that: 'the purpose of the annexation was to establish possession of "land which until now has been without rule and which no one other than Norwegians has studied and mapped."' On this basis, Norwegian authorities have not opposed any interpretation of the claim as extending all the way to and including the pole itself.[117] HSM 80 provides evidence for this mentioned 'studying and mapping.'

However, it would appear that beyond the statements made in the internal White Paper, Norway has made no external effort to announce to its peers an unwavering claim to the South Pole area. Moreover, as noted above, the description of HSM 80 does not actually specify that Amundsen was in fact the first person to reach the Geographic South Pole, even though it would be historically accurate to do so. The HSM proposal itself fosters international cooperation as it identifies the value of the tent to 'Antarctic society' at large and testifies that 'The image of the small tent left standing alone in the vast expanse of ice on the polar plateau thus epitomizes this last great geographical conquest on earth and gives immediate associations to expedition history that may be said to have international significance.'[118] This appeal to international significance could actually qualify the HSM under the seventh HSM criterion that stipulates the 'symbolic or commemorative value for people of many nations.'[119]

Lastly, as the first example of an ATS-recognised temporarily intangible or hidden heritage site, HSM 80 has influenced the proposition of other potential HSMs, both current and potential future designations, but whether or not this contributes to greater international competition or harmony is difficult to say. The designation of Amundsen's tent has inspired two historic sites or monuments since: HSM 94, commemorating the wreck of the *Endurance*, and the wreckage of *San Telmo* (the ship mentioned, but not specifically commemorated, in HSM 59) that has been signposted as a potential future HSM. The location of both these sites, like that of the tent, is unknown. At the ATCM prior to HSM 94's designation, a Working Paper submitted by the UK (who would later propose the HSM), stated that 'it is our intention to do this [have HSM status granted] whether the site of *Endurance* is discovered or not, noting the precedent of HSM

[117] Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Norwegian Interests and Policy in the Antarctic*, White Paper 2014-2015, 17.
[118] WP039 (2005): 2.
[119] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Guidelines for proposing new Historic Sites and Monuments*, Resolution 8, 1995.

80 Amundsen's Tent, the exact location of which is also not known.'[120] With regard to the *San Telmo* wreck, Spain also indicated its intention to have the site commemorated as an HSM at the 2019 ATCM (XLII).[121] It seems that the designation of the tent in 2005 has successfully introduced the notion of heritage intangibility in Antarctica. Given the nature of the physical Antarctic environment, this progression could lead to a wave of submissions in coming years.

The extra-national realisation of HSM 80 is similar to that of HSM 4, in that private expeditions have sought to re-enact or honour the historic achievement. HSM 80, however, receives much more attention due to the prestige associated with reaching the Geographic South Pole as opposed to the lesser-known Pole of Inaccessibility. A recent project under the (US) Antarctic Artists and Writers Collective – by performance artist, Patricia A. Suchy, and scientist and playwright, Vince LiCata – *Persistence of Vision: Antarctica,*[122] is one of many artistic interpretations of the historic photos of the Norwegian tent at the South Pole: namely the photo of Amundsen and his men securing 'victory' facing toward the flag atop the tent after pitching it; and Bower's photo of Scott and his men admitting 'defeat' after discovering the tent. The project re-enacts these famous scenes through a series of 'video portraits' – that is, sequences filmed in slow motion and paired with dialogue from scientists and support staff. These narrators connect and compare themselves to the polar explorers saying things such as: 'I'm experiencing what they experienced,' 'step into these guys' shoes,' and 'they may have walked on the very patch of ground that we drilled into.' These performative acts reveal a fascination with humankind's polar past and demonstrate an active remembrance of the role that the tent played in December 1911.[123]

### 3.3.3 *Counter Case – Scott's tent*

As mentioned earlier, there is reason to believe that HSM 80 has opened the door for a series of currently intangible HSMs to be listed – that is, artefacts known to be on the continent or in its surrounding ocean, but currently hidden. The most obvious counter example to Amundsen's

[120] The United Kingdom, *Notification of pre-1958 historic remains: Wreck of Sir Ernest Shackleton's vessel Endurance*, WP021 (2018): 4.
[121] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, paragraph 117.
[122] Patricia A. Suchy and Vince LiCata, "Persistence of Vision: Antarctica 2017/2020," *Antarctic Artists and Writers Collective*, accessed 28 March 2021, https://www.aawcollective.com/adequate-earth-exhibition#turning.
[123] Literature has also paid tribute. The most well-known piece of writing associated with Amundsen's tent is John Leahy's 1928 'In Amundsen's Tent.' As Leane comments, 'The fantastic horrors of Leahy's story are anchored in the actual experiences of explorers … [and Leahy's readers] would have understood the symbolic significance of the tent as a sign of Amundsen's victory.' Elizabeth Leane, *Antarctica in Fiction: Imaginative Narratives of the Far South* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 70.

tent is Scott's tent – which the UK has not (yet) sought to have designated as an HSM or even protected under the pre-1958 historic remains guidelines. National and international memory embeds Scott's infamous tale of tragedy, and therefore the lack of an official commemoration of his final resting place, companions, and artefacts is perplexing. Shortly after the news of his death, the British celebrated Scott's achievements unanimously 'through the language of heroism and character';[124] several memorials have been erected across the UK in his honour since;[125] the UK's primary polar research body, the Scott Polar Research Institute, is named after him; and in 2012 for the centenary celebration of his efforts to reach the South Pole, the UK military launched an expedition to retrace the steps of his team.[126] Furthermore, the bodies of the men remain in the tent, which would give the UK even more reason to propose the monument as an HSM due to the sensitive nature of the site. The commemoration of loss of life is also a credible argument for designation under the second criterion for HSMs: 'a particular association with a person who played an important role in the history of science or exploration in Antarctica.'

Perhaps the tarnishing of Scott's reputation by the revisionist turn that caused irreversible damage to the memory of the man hampered efforts to have him commemorated on an international scale.[127] In addition, Scott's memory was possibly not a priority of the UK's foreign policy agenda within this period, as perhaps it was thought that the commemoration of Scott's death would emphasise the tragedy and ultimate failure of his mission for the British Crown – and result in the commemoration of 'bad' as opposed to 'good' heritage as discussed in the previous chapter. Lastly, the rough location of Amundsen's tent is estimated to be close to the South Pole,[128] whereas the location of Scott's is more difficult to judge as it is likely on a constantly moving ice shelf. [129]

---

[124] Max Jones, *The Last Great Quest: Captain Scott's Antarctic Sacrifice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 12.
[125] Statues of Scott are located in Portsmouth, Devonport, and London.
[126] Ministry of Defence, "UK military expedition marks centenary of Scott reaching South Pole," *Government of the United Kingdom*, 17 January 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-military-expedition-marks-centenary-of-scott-reaching-south-pole.
[127] Huntford's scathing biography is one of the most prominent examples in the challenging of Scott's character. Roland Huntford, *Scott and Amundsen* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979); and Max Jones, "From "Noble Example" to "Potty Pioneer": rethinking Scott of the Antarctic, c.1945–2011," *The Polar Journal* 1, no. 2 (2011): 191-206.
[128] In 2011, one hundred years after the tent was first pitched, Orheim estimated with high certainty that the tent lay between 1.8 and 2.5 km from the Pole. Olav Orheim, "The present location of the tent that Roald Amundsen left behind at the South Pole in December 1911," *The Polar Record* 47, no. 3 (2011): 268-270.
[129] Headland estimates that the 'camp may reach the position of the current ice front [Ross Ice Shelf] in around the year 2,250; some 340 years after the journey began.' R. K. Headland, "Captain Scott's last camp, Ross Ice Shelf," *The Polar Record* 47, no. 3 (2011): 270.

## 4. Summary: Antarctic heritage management – a zero-sum game

The concept of sovereignty in international relations is contingent, constructed, and intersubjective. In the geographic space south of 60° South latitude – Antarctica – sovereignty has been a vexed issue ever since states first encountered the seventh continent in the early nineteenth century. Despite the commendable efforts of the Antarctic Treaty to anaesthetise all claims to territory when it entered into force in 1961, states have identified alternative pathways to assert their influence in the region's governance – of which the proposition, designation, and management of HSMs is but one. States have harnessed Antarctic cultural heritage as a form of soft power and have co-opted the heritage management processes to persuade Antarctic affairs – in this case to affirm their long-lasting and enduring presence in the region. The three cases investigated in this chapter demonstrate the varying application of this strategy.

HSM 4 represents a deliberate attempt by the Soviet Union to 'achieve the unachievable,' rival the American's plans for a station at the South Pole, and showcase national pride with the deliberate inclusion of a historic revolutionary figure. Not only is this HSM a blatant display of the Soviet's logistical and technological capabilities in an extreme environment, it is also a performance of sovereignty of the kind that Dodds, Leane, Jabour, and Wood-Donnelly describe. The installation of a bust of Lenin and the rockets that were rumoured to have been fired upon the station's completion paid homage to the mother state and signified the capturing of this polar space, augmenting Russia's presence in the region. The performance may not have had a conventional audience, but nonetheless its meaning and intent were the same as any conventional ceremonial display of sovereignty. This argument is supported by the fact that Russia has not actively managed the site since its designation in 1972. The HSM had served its tactical purpose once it was 'immortalised' on an internationally acclaimed register, and therefore its physical longevity is now inconsequential to the national agenda.

HSM 59 is a less obvious attempt by a trio of states, Chile, Spain, and Peru, to highlight the Hispanic rather than non-northern European origins of potentially the first people to inhabit the region. This Antarctic 'first' suggests a rewriting of history that acknowledges the presence of the southern European and South American peoples in the region prior to those typically cited such as Bellingshausen and Bransfield. This is significant as it offers an alternative argument for sovereignty – one based on proximity and presence rather than proclamations and conquests. The non-fixed and socially constructed nature of sovereignty is highly evident when

considered in this context. Although Francioni's reading of heritage refers to the ability for heritage to transcend borders and empower non-state actors, in this instance it could be considered to transcend global regions and empower the Global South. Here, cultural heritage is a means for South American states to forward their perception of sovereignty in contrast to the Western claim-based understanding.

Lastly, HSM 80, while holding the potential to be geopolitically manipulated given that it commemorates arguably the most significant Antarctic 'first' to date, is a modest entry whose main impact is to introduce the concept of temporarily intangible heritage to the Antarctic context. Again, Francioni's interpretation of heritage in relation to sovereignty is useful here. Although Amundsen's tent is not explicitly being used by the Norwegians for political gain, the classification of the tent as formal heritage has led to the introduction of a new norm with Antarctic heritage management – the legitimisation of heritage currently intangible. HSM 80 has and will continue to provide precedence for historic remains of this nature in Antarctica. This contribution should not be underestimated, because even though Norway has not applied HSM 80 to support its claim to sovereignty in the region, the proposal of this new type of HSM demonstrates a deliberate attempt by the claimant to direct the outcome of heritage governance. In turn, this type of persuasive behaviour could be interpreted as a demonstration of soft power.

Of course, these three HSMs represent just a fraction of the entries on the HSM List. But their commemoration of three important Antarctic 'firsts' – the first people to the Pole of Inaccessibility, possibly the first people to live and die in the region, and the first people to reach the Geographic South Pole – makes them susceptible to recruitment by states as accomplices in their competing assertions of sovereignty in the region. Therefore, just as Howkins argues that states might use environmental regulation as method to exercise de facto sovereignty, Timothy argues that states use tourism to legitimise territorial claims, and Salazar argues that states use science in the practice of geopolitics, I argue that states use heritage management as a means to demonstrate their soft power. This is because the relationship between the practice of cultural heritage management and the exercise of sovereignty are entangled, and ultimately states can and do deploy Antarctic heritage as a means to influence international affairs and publish their past, present, and future presence in the region. As Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge observe, 'heritage is often implicated in the same zero-sum definitions of power and territoriality that attend the nation-state and its allegories of

exclusivity.'[130] As these geopolitical readings demonstrate, heritage serves as a type of socioeconomic power in the practice of international relations. For example, in the same way that the World Heritage List is a key soft power indicator within international affairs,[131] so the HSM List is such for Antarctic affairs – the only difference being scale. The institutionalisation of heritage therefore works to enhance state-based power and nationalist agendas in the region.[132]

[130] Brian Graham, Gregory Ashworth, and John Tunbridge, *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy* (London: Arnold, 2000), 24.
[131] Hanna Schreiber, "Intangible cultural heritage and soft power–exploring the relationship," *International Journal of Intangible Heritage* 12, (2017): 45.
[132] Colin Long and Sophia Labadi, eds., *Heritage and globalisation* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 20.

# Chapter Seven: Constructing Heritage

*Antarctic heritage as a nation-building tool for New Polar Powers*

In addition to using Antarctic heritage as a geopolitical means to exercise sovereignty, states can also use historic remains to develop their national identities, both on and off the continent. I use the term 'nation-building' to describe this process: a term (defined in greater detail below) that captures the importance of the overlap between identity politics and cultural heritage. The group of states that frequently engage Antarctic heritage in this way have been labelled as 'new'/'emerging'/'intensifying,' or more recently, 'fast-rising' polar powers.[1] The two states most frequently cited in the New Polar Powers category are China and Russia, but others such as India, Brazil, and South Africa could also be included.[2] I argue that despite the sometimes sensationalist speculation that surrounds their intentions in the region within the mainstream media, these states are stereotypically less concerned with claiming territory or sovereignty in Antarctica than the 'older' Antarctic states – such as the seven claimant states – and are more concerned with cementing their image or reputation as a polar nation and controlling how it is received by both their international peers and domestic constituents.

The most valuable function a Historic Site and Monument can serve for such states is to prove their historical connection to the frozen continent through granting official recognition and celebration of past activities on the continent. This material evidence not only legitimises newer presence and activities in the region under the current governing regime, the Antarctic Treaty System, it also helps develop a state's image of itself by instilling confidence in constituents of their state's external capabilities. I begin this chapter by defining 'nation-building' and explaining the intrinsic connection between 'nation-building' and heritage. I then recount my case selection process, before analysing two case examples of New Polar Powers using Historic Sites and Monuments to nation-build.

[1] McGee and Liu referred to China and India as 'fast-rising' powers in their discussion of early twenty-first century challenges to Antarctic governance. Jeffrey McGee and Nengye Liu, "The challenges for Antarctic governance in the early twenty-first century," *Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs* 11, no. 2 (2019): 73.

[2] The emergence of these states in Antarctica is in sync with their emergence elsewhere around the globe. This has earned them their own acronym within International Relations – 'BRICS': Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

## 1. The Practice of Nation-Building

'Nation-building'[3] typically refers to the binding together of a group of peoples within the bounds of the modern nation-state, which is an organisational indicator of the International System. This interpretation from International Relations subsequently frames the developing state in relation to its position and performance within the international system.[4] Although this definition can be effective for research conducted within disciplines, such as International Relations and Political Science, that focus on the state as the unit of analysis, this approach is less effective within the context of my analysis as it does not fully appreciate the supranational forces, such as cultural heritage, that also influence this process of state determination.[5] I therefore apply a holistic conceptualisation of nation-building that encompasses the notions of memory, identity, and tradition – all of which help to explain the relationship between heritage and the nation-state's construction.

This definition takes into account external as well as internal perspectives, which is important given my assumption that national images curated by states have a dual function: to present the nation to the outside world, as well as to develop a cohesive national identity within the state. To adapt the words of Ashworth, this chapter investigates 'the use of the [Antarctic] past as an expression of place-identity serving the creation and reinforcement of spatial political entities [like the nation-state].'[6] The following three sub-sections outline the role heritage and the past play in nation-building more generally, by addressing three main areas of research that illustrate just how interconnected the practices of heritage and nation-building are: the politics of memory, the politics of identity, and the politics of tradition. I believe that these three areas of research merge the processes of nation-building and heritage-making seamlessly. I begin each sub-section by describing these linkages before applying them to heritage-making in the Antarctic context.

---

[3] Although sometimes used interchangeably, nation-building and state-building are two distinct processes: the former refers to the creation or repair of 'cultural, social and historical ties that bind people together'; whereas the latter refers to the strengthening of government institutions such as 'armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-collection agencies, health and education systems and the like.' Francis Fukuyama, "Nation-Building 101," *The Atlantic*, January/February Issue 2004, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/01/nation-building-101/302862/.

[4] Harris Mylonas, "Nation-Building," *Oxford Bibliographies: International Relations*, 22 July 2020, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0217.xml#obo-9780199743292-0217-div2-0004.

[5] Gregory Ashworth, "From History to Heritage – From Heritage to Identity: In search of concepts and models," in *Building A New Heritage*, eds. Gregory Ashworth and P. Larkham (London: Routledge, 1994), 13.

[6] Ashworth, "From History to Heritage – From Heritage to Identity: In search of concepts and models," 13.

1.1 *The politics of memory*

Halbwachs' 'politics of memory' thesis provides the underlying conceptual link between heritage and nation-building. Halbwachs states that 'no memory is possible outside frameworks used by people living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections.'[7] This means that decisions concerning what is commemorated, how commemorations take place, and who commemorations are for, are inherently political and therefore should come under scrutiny.[8] The concurrent processes of forgetting or silencing are also subject to power relations,[9] as national narratives, written predominantly by the social elite, present 'a coherent ordering of events along a strict narrative line serving as an intellectual and emotional backbone of national identity.'[10] Furthermore, monuments in particular serve an integral purpose to the process of memory-making, as they 'demarcate particular events, individuals and locations as especially significant to the nation's memory; and … materialise this in durable form … This personification simultaneously substantiate[s] the idea of nations as having distinct, person-like identities.'[11] With regard to developing nations in particular, Nora states that the history of national development could be considered 'the oldest of our collective traditions: our quintessential *milieu de mémoire*.'[12] Therefore, given the lack of historical capital and national memory possessed by states that have only recently gained independence, the process of nation-building is all the more essential to their determination as a sovereign state.

This deficit in historical or cultural capital is visible in a 'postcolonial Antarctic.' Although Antarctica has no Indigenous population and was not colonised in the traditional sense, various scholars have argued that just as imperial powers partitioned Africa in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, there has been a similar 'scramble for the poles'[13] in which states have colonised the Antarctic space and defined it for their own purposes.[14] States that

[7] Maurice Halbwachs, *The collective memory* [translated by Francis J. Didder, Jr. & Vida Yazdi Ditter] (New York: Harper & Row, 1992), 43.
[8] Jenea Tallentire, "Strategies of Memory: History, Social Memory, and the Community," *Social History* 34, no. 67 (2001): 199.
[9] Tallentire, "Strategies of Memory: History, Social Memory, and the Community," 199-200.
[10] J. Assmann, "Cultural memories and national narratives: With some relation to the case of Georgia," White paper report prepared for the Georgian Ministry of Education, *Caucasus Context* 3, no. 1 (2007): 40.
[11] Sharon Macdonald, *Memorylands: Heritage and Identity in Europe Today* (London: Routledge: 2013), 166.
[12] Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire," *Representations* 26, (1989): 9.
[13] Klaus Dodds and Mark Nuttall, *The Scramble for the Poles: The geopolitics of the Arctic and Antarctic* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016).
[14] Scholars such as Christy Collis, Ben Maddison, Mark Nuttall, Klaus Dodds, and Alan Hemmings have all commented on the topic to varying degrees and at different stages. Dodds in particular called for a 'more sustained and potentially unsettling engagement with post-colonial Antarctic projects' in an article for the *Polar Record* in 2006. Klaus Dodds, "Post-colonial Antarctica: an emerging engagement," *Polar Record* 42, no. 1 (2006): 59.

arrived in the region after this period of colonisation – sometimes because they were under imperial rule or annexed at the time, such as India and Poland – are now engaging in nation-building activities through the means of Antarctic heritage. This is what makes a postcolonial reading of Antarctica relevant to a discussion of New Polar Powers and their engagement with Antarctic heritage management. More specifically, the related concept of 'polar Orientalism' discussed by Dodds and Nuttall in 2016 helps to describe the treatment of some of the New Polar Powers in the region.[15] They draw on Said's 1978 theory of *Orientalism*[16] – in which he examines the West's contemptuous portrayal of the East or 'the Orient' – to explain the reception and perception of Asian engagement in the polar regions. Dodds and Nuttall describe polar Orientalism as 'a way of representing, imagining, seeing exaggerating, distorting and fearing "the East" and its involvement in Arctic [and Antarctic] affairs.'[17] Dodds and another critical scholar, Collis, have since observed how 'a growing Asian interest and engagement in the Antarctic once provoked (and still provokes) unease from the original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty,'[18] and that 'we have an outdated perception … labouring under the misapprehension that Asian involvement and expertise is somehow unusual or strange in an Antarctic and Southern Ocean setting.'[19] Acknowledging these historical power imbalances gives greater context to the political climate in which states that are newer to the region are proposing Historic Sites and Monuments (HSMs) as a means to 'nation-build.'

### 1.2 *The politics of identity*

It is widely accepted across disciplines that heritage is a key component of identity politics, and therefore nationalism. A broad range of disciplines, from Political Science to Anthropology, have discussed the politics of nationalism. Perspectives from Political Geography, Heritage Studies, and International Relations in particular, proves most useful here. Although the concept of heritage is as old as humanity itself, according to Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge, the way we think about the past 'emerged at the same time as the codification of the nation-state.'[20] Heritage experts and practitioners agree with this proposition. When outlining her 'Authorised Heritage Discourse' (explained in *Chapter Five: Authorising*

[15] Dodds and Nuttall, *The Scramble for the Poles: The geopolitics of the Arctic and Antarctic*.
[16] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
[17] Dodds and Nuttall, *The Scramble for the Poles: The geopolitics of the Arctic and Antarctic*, 145.
[18] Klaus Dodds and Christy Collis, "Post-colonial Antarctica," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 59.
[19] Dodds and Collis, "Post-colonial Antarctica," 64-65.
[20] Brian Graham, Gregory Ashworth, and John Tunbridge, *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy* (London: Arnold, 2000), 11.

*Heritage*), Smith states that it 'takes its cue from the grand narrative of nation and class,'[21] and that it is 'both constituted by, and is a constitutive discourse of, the ideology of nationalism.'[22] Winter also describes the enduring relationship between heritage and the state, highlighting the 'ongoing appropriation of cultural heritage within the politics of nationalism.'[23] He also talks about how the 'arrival of new nations to the international stage through decolonisation heralded a new era of sovereignty and property claims over culture, with material pasts being put to work in the forging of newly formed "imagined communities" in regions with deep histories of cultural exchange and flows.'[24] Lastly, key thinkers from International Relations also reference the importance of the national past in understanding the phenomenon of nationalism. Benedict Anderson's 'imagined communities' and their 'deep horizontal comradeship'[25] rely upon particular representations of the past to bind populations within the nation-state, or what James Anderson describes as 'a receptacle of the past in the present.'[26] Billig's 'banal nationalism,'[27] on the other hand, describes mundane and vernacular performances of nationalism – such as museum exhibits – that remind people of their national identity.

Like any other region in the world, Antarctica is not exempt from states' demonstrations of nationalism, and as already identified in relation to the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse*, or PAHD, Antarctic heritage is nationalised. Even though states cannot technically claim Antarctica as their own, they still engage in strategic performances that suggest as much. Hemmings et al. helpfully identified 11 instances in which Antarctic nationalism might occur:

> (i) formally declared claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; (ii) relative proximity of Antarctica to one's metropolitan territory; (iii) historic and institutional associations with Antarctica; (iv) social and cultural associations; (v) regional or global hegemonic inclinations; (vi) alleged need in relation to resources; (vii) contested uses or practices in Antarctica; (viii) carry-over from intense antipathies outside Antarctica; (ix) national pride in, and mobilisation through, national Antarctic programmes; (x) infrastructure and logistics arrangements; or (xi) denial or constraint of access by one's

[21] Laurajane Smith, *Uses of Heritage* (London: Routledge, 2006), 11.
[22] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 48.
[23] Tim Winter, "Heritage and Nationalism: An Unbreachable Couple?" in *Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Heritage Research*, eds. Emma Waterton and Steve Watson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 331.
[24] Tim Winter, "Heritage diplomacy," *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 21, no. 10 (2015): 1009.
[25] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, revised (London: Verso, 1991), 6-7.
[26] James Anderson, "Nationalist ideology and territory," in *Nationalisms Self-determination and Political Geography*, eds. Johnston, R. J., Knight, D. B., and E. Kofman (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 24.
[27] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1995).

strategic competitors or opponents. In practice of course, these are likely to be manifested in combination.[28]

While a number of these instances are relevant to the focus of this chapter – that is, the relationship between Antarctic heritage and nation-building by newer Antarctic states – the two most obvious are: (iv), as it specifically refers to cultural connections with the region that would include cultural heritage; and (ix), as it specifically refers to national pride in Antarctic programs that act as a form of nationalism on ice. The national programs in particular are critical to establishing national Antarctic heritage, as without them approximately one third of the designated Historic Sites and Monuments would not exist,[29] and states not active in the Heroic Era would have no material remains to commemorate. Therefore, displays of Antarctic nationalism are not limited to the claimant states, or states that 'colonised' Antarctica in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Lastly, Warren also notes that the use of Antarctic historical resources is 'evident in developing nations which seek to foster a sense of national identity as expeditiously as possible.'[30] The second case example demonstrates this expedited process.

### 1.3 *The politics of tradition*

Finally, the concept of tradition emphasises why the notion of the past in relation to time elapsed is also important to consider when thinking about how heritage can affect a nation's image, both internally and externally. Both tangible and intangible subjects of heritage are often assumed to be 'old' – that is, the thing or event that is being commemorated was created or occurred generations prior to the act of commemoration. However, as Hobsbawm and Ranger identify in their 'invention of tradition' thesis, this is not always the case. Relatively recent pasts, they argue, are manipulated to represent a 'continuity with the past' as these manipulations are 'responses to novel situations which take the form of references to old situations.'[31] An example they cite is the rebuilding of the British Parliament in deliberate Gothic style. This event implied a continuity of the present with the past – one that may not be

[28] Alan D. Hemmings, Sanjay Chaturvedi, Elizabeth Leane, Daniela Liggett, and Juan Francisco, "The Role of Nationalism in the Contemporary Antarctic" (paper presented at the *7th Polar Law Symposium*, 2014), 1.
[29] 36 HSMs are directly linked to national Antarctic research expeditions post-1950 (and approximately 90 per cent of the HSM entries overall commemorate national events, figures, or infrastructure).
[30] Patricia Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties" (draft of master's thesis, University of Washington, 1989), 79.
[31] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1-2.

apparent or even exist otherwise – for application within public, and perhaps even international, relations.

This 'forging' of the present with the past is an attractive tactic to newer Antarctic states that might employ it to suggest that their connection with the continent does, or should, predate their HSMs' existence. This is not to insinuate that states are falsifying material remains to appear older than they are, but rather that they are using managerial processes to have the material remains of their relatively recent Antarctic pasts granted heritage status.

The politics of memory, identity, and tradition are all intertwined, and all contribute to an explanation of the link between nation-building and heritage. The politics of memory highlights why a state might employ nation-building strategies to compensate for a lack of historical or cultural capital, that includes heritage; the politics of identity exposes the concurrent formation of the nation-state and the conception of heritage that makes national heritage the predominant form of heritage; and the politics of tradition explains why states might forge their national narratives and seemingly 'invent' heritage.

## 2. Case Selection: HSMs that can be used to nation-build

Two groups of states use heritage as an opportunity to nation-build: minor polar powers and New Polar Powers. I define 'minor' polar powers as states that have been present in Antarctica throughout the Heroic Era and/or International Geophysical Year (IGY), but that have not established a strong voice in the region. This includes states such as Germany, Bulgaria, and Poland (formerly part of the Soviet Union). New Polar Powers, on the other hand, have relatively recent Antarctic pasts and therefore have a motivation to bolster their newer national Antarctic narratives with material historic evidence. What the categories of 'new' and 'minor' have in common, is their geopolitical disadvantage relative to that of the original Antarctic states, or more specifically the 12 original signatories of the Antarctic Treaty. By this logic, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) and South Africa cannot be considered New Polar Powers given that they were both present during the negotiations of the Treaty in the mid-twentieth century: a fair exclusion for this temporally oriented analysis. Of the 17 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) that are not original signatories, only eight have HSMs.[32] Of these eight, only five of these have independent HSMs: Poland, Bulgaria, Germany, China, and

[32] Bulgaria, China, Germany, India, Peru, Poland, Spain, and Sweden.

India (ordered from earliest to latest treaty ratification). These HSMs, and the legitimacy of presence they evoke, provide this collection of states with a unique opportunity to raise their profile within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and to nation-build – that is, they can either use their national Antarctic histories to gain recognition in Antarctic affairs; or they can use their national Antarctic histories to develop or strengthen their national identities in a domestic context. I have selected the two New Polar Powers within this group, China and India, as my case examples as theoretically they stand to gain more from participation within Antarctic heritage management than the minor polar powers.

China was not active in the Heroic Era or IGY but demonstrated its first interest in the region when it ratified the Treaty in 1983, and obtained consultative status in 1985 – all occurring within its internal 'Fight for Legitimacy Period' between 1979 and 1989.[33] Over the last decade, China has 'massively increased' its polar research budget,[34] brought a second icebreaker online (effectively doubling its research capacity),[35] and started building a fifth Antarctic research station that will become operable in 2022.[36] China's growing investment in the region has long faced consistent international scrutiny, particularly from the Western media, which is often highly suspicious of its intentions. Australian news outlets and even think tanks speculate regularly on the meaning of China's movements in Antarctica, or more pertinently, the Australian Antarctica Territory (AAT).[37] One of the most provocative examples is a feature article published by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) in March 2019 titled 'China unchecked in Antarctica: What is China doing down there? Truth is,

[33] Jonathan Harrington, "China in Antarctica: A History," *Southeast Review of Asian Studies* 37, (2015): 2.
[34] Anne-Marie Brady, "China's Expanding Antarctic Interests: Implications for Australia," *Australian Strategic Policy Institute* Report, August 2017, 8.
[35] Laura Zhou, "Chinese icebreakers set sail for Antarctic rendezvous that will herald 'new era of polar exploration,'" *South China Morning Post*, 22 October 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3034096/chinese-icebreakers-set-sail-antarctic-rendezvous-will-herald.
[36] China Daily, "China's 5th Antarctic research station to begin construction," 17 January 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201801/17/WS5a5ee960a310e4ebf433e4ef_1.html.
[37] A few examples include: News.com Australia's piece, 'As Australia looks north, China's presence in the Antarctic continues to grow'; The Australian Broadcasting Corporation's article, 'China and Russia are eyeing up Antarctica – and experts say Australia should be more concerned'; and the Lowy Institute's think piece, 'The heights of China's ambition in Antarctica.' Gavin Fernando, "As Australia looks north, China's presence in the Antarctic continues to grow," *News.com Australia*, 7 September 2018, https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/as-australia-looks-north-chinas-presence-in-the-antarctic-continues-to-grow/news-story/d93aa030c6846e5bfe98f6fdc12f93c9. Holly Roberson, "China and Russia are eyeing up Antarctica – and experts say Australia should be more concerned," the *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 28 October 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-28/china-and-russia-are-eyeing-up-antarctica/10433024. Nengye Liu, "The heights of China's ambition in Antarctica," the *Lowy Institute*, 11 July 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/heights-china-s-ambition-antarctica.

we don't know for sure.'[38] But to date, China has honoured the norms of the ATS – at least to the same standard as other Antarctic states – and has shown no indication of making territorial claims or engaging in mining activities that would threaten the ATS overall.[39]

India was not active in the Heroic Era or IGY and ratified the Treaty in 1983, obtaining Consultative Status within the same year. Although India might be termed a middle polar power – unlike China who has graduated to a major polar power over a relatively short timeframe – it has still attracted attention. In 1956 – approximately a decade after the 1947 Partition of India and decades prior to India's official entry to Antarctic affairs in the 1980s – India raised the 'Question of Antarctica' at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). This event is also referred to as the 'Antarctic Question,' or India's 'initiative' or 'intervention'.[40] Therefore, within its first decade of independence, India was challenging the 'whiteness' of the ATS, in which Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states, or the Global South, as a whole were seemingly underrepresented. After this attempt at inclusion failed, primarily due to Latin American opposition,[41] India eventually directed its efforts to joining the ATS instead. More recently, at the 2006 ATCM (XXIX), India upset the status quo again when it proposed to build a station in the Larsemann Hills. The Indian delegation actually stated that the area was 'important to the nation of India because it is at this point where the Indian subcontinent and Antarctica were connected during the time of Gondwana, 125 million years ago.'[42] In response to the proposal, 'some delegates were diplomatically though visibly irate … people began leaning over, speaking to one another, and tilting placards with their states' names on them, indicating their desire to speak.'[43] India eventually built the station in 2015, bringing its number of research stations on the continent to a total of three. Official and international recognition of this geographical link was evidently a key priority for India, as it implied that even though the

[38] Jackson Gothe-Snape, "China unchecked Antarctica: What is China doing down there? Truth is, we don't know for sure," the *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 30 March 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-30/china-in-antarctica-inspection-regime/10858486.
[39] Nengye Liu, "What Are China's Intentions in Antarctica? Reviewing China's activities and commitments under the 60-year-old Antarctic Treaty," *The Diplomat*, 14 June 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/what-are-chinas-intentions-in-antarctica/.
[40] Adrian Howkins, "Defending polar empire: opposition to India's proposal to raise the 'Antarctic Question' at the United Nations in 1956," *Polar Record* 44, no. 1 (2008): 35-44; Sanjay Chaturvedi, "India and the Antarctic Treaty System: Realities and Prospects," *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 42, no. 4 (1986): 351-380; and Sanjay Chaturvedi, "Rise and decline of Antarctica in Nehru's geopolitical vision: challenges and opportunities of the 1950s," *The Polar Journal* 3, no. 2 (2013): 301-315.
[41] Howkins, "Defending polar empire: opposition to India's proposal to raise the 'Antarctic Question' at the United Nations in 1956."
[42] Jessica O'Reilly, "Tectonic History and Gondwanan Geopolitics in the Larsemann Hills, Antarctica," *Political and Legal Anthropology* 34, no. 2 (2011): 215.
[43] O'Reilly, "Tectonic History and Gondwanan Geopolitics in the Larsemann Hills, Antarctica," 219.

state's national Antarctic program was in its infancy, India's association with the continent pre-dated European exploration.

The prominence of China and India within the ATS, despite their delayed entry, sets them apart from the previous three states mentioned. Two of their HSMs prove the most appropriate case examples for this chapter as they are directly applicable to nation-building strategies. They are: China's HSM 86, *No.1 Building at Great Wall Station* and India's HSM 44, *Dakshin Gangotri Plaque*. My investigation below demonstrates the important role these HSMs have played in reinforcing China's and India's legitimate presence in the region, and in developing their national Antarctic narratives.

## 3. Case Examples: HSM 86 and HSM 44

This geopolitical reading of HSM 86 and HSM 44 follows the method outlined in my methodology and applied in the previous chapter. First, I explain the physical attributes of the HSM and the broader situation of its proposing and managing state/s; secondly, I describe how the HSM has been proposed, designated, and managed; thirdly, I analyse the HSM's geopolitical deployment – in this case for nation-building – from an intra-, inter-, and extra-national perspective; and lastly, I offer a counter case. In relation to the third step of spatialised analysis, although nation-building can be framed as an inward-facing exercise, the external perception of a state, by both its peers and non-state actors alike, is part and parcel of the nation-building process.

## 3.1 HSM 86, *No.1 Building at Great Wall Station*

Figure 7.1: Approximate location of HSM 86.

*No.1 Building at Great Wall Station*, HSM 86, commemorates a building at the centre of the Great Wall Station built during the first Chinese Antarctic Research Expedition (CHINARE I) in 1985. With a physical footprint of 175m², it is located on the Fildes Peninsula of King George Island, and served as a 'station headquarters, meeting room, bedroom, workroom, communication room, dining room, kitchen, storeroom, medical room, post office and library.'[44]

Figure 7.2: Great Wall Station. (Murray Foote.)

[44] China, *Proposed addition of No.1 Building Commemorating China's Antarctic Expedition at Great Wall Station to the List of Historic Sites and Monument*, WP005 (2011): 4.

HSM 86 is one of China's two HSMs, both of which are located at the Great Wall Station (Figure 7.2). Although China had expressed interest in the Antarctic region prior to the 1970s,[45] it wasn't until the 'Fight for Legitimacy Period' within Chinese politics that it pursued full membership within the ATS. The proposition of its first HSM – a monolith erected to commemorate the Great Wall Station within the same year that it was constructed (HSM 52) – supported these efforts for greater recognition. Although the monolith is also an important cultural artefact for China, HSM 86 provides a better snapshot of China's approach to Antarctic heritage as its proposal was better documented and it has been actively managed since. As established in *Chapter Four: Claiming Heritage*, China has commented briefly on matters of Antarctic heritage at ATCMs: once in the 2010-2011 intersessional period to highlight the danger of strictly defining what constitutes an HSM, and again in 2019 to flag divergent views on Antarctic heritage. Given its increasing presence and footprint in Antarctica, China could well propose more HSMs in the future, and its ability as a strengthening polar power to validate its past activities through HSMs is valuable as it also gives greater credibility to activities it intends to conduct in the future. Understanding how China proposed, designated, and managed HSM 86, and the HSM's geopolitical consumption, helps reveal the way this historic site has helped China build its national image as an emerging polar power both on and off the continent.

### 3.1.1 *The proposition, designation, and management of HSM 86*

China made the proposal for HSM 86 in 2011 in a Working Paper.[46] The proposal lists three reasons for designation and refers to some of the HSM criteria. The first reason addresses the first HSM criterion, concerning an important event in the history of science or exploration in Antarctica, by stating that No.1 Building 'laid the foundation for China's long-term Antarctic research.' The second reason addresses the third HSM criterion, concerning notable feats, as the paper describes the construction process as difficult due to a lack of suitable equipment or expertise[47] and the efforts of the 130 expeditioners involved as 'heroic.'[48] The third reason addresses the sixth HSM criterion, concerning the ability to educate people on human activities in Antarctica, reporting that 'the Building has been introduced to the school textbooks of the primary school and middle school in China for popularizing polar science knowledge and

[45] In the 1950s China had attempted to participate within the IGY, but tensions with Taiwan had complicated any potential involvement. Wei-chin Lee, "China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet so Near," *Asian Survey* 30, no. 6 (1990): 580.
[46] WP005 (2011): 1-6.
[47] WP005 (2011): 4.
[48] WP005 (2011): 4.

cultivating the Antarctic expedition spirit of exploration, innovation and cooperation.' China proposed the building for commemoration in 2011, 26 years after its construction, and within the paper noted that the building's 'memorable significance is increasing with time.' This statement suggests that the proposers believed that the older the site or monument is, the more value it accrues – an assumption that aligns with dominant conceptions of heritage on a global scale. But perhaps this is only 'for show,' as China proposed and designated its first HSM (52) within the same year that it was created.

The Meeting designated HSM 86 at the 2011 ATCM (XXXIV).[49] The language used within the description for No.1 Building, like the paper that contained its proposal, is noteworthy. The description mentions the beginning of China's 'devotion' to Antarctic research in the 1980s: *No.1 Building at Great Wall Station. The No.1 Building, built in 1985 with a total floor space of 175 square meters, is located at the centre of the Chinese Antarctic Great Wall Station, which is situated in Fildes Peninsula, King George Island, South Shetlands, West Antarctica. The Building marked the commencement of China devoting to Antarctic research in the 1980s, and thus it is of great significance in commemorating China's Antarctic expedition*. This description also describes the building as marking the commencement of the Chinese Antarctic program overall – a significant event that provided the material evidence China needed to acquire ATCP status in the same year. When the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) considered the building's designation as an HSM at the 2011 ATCM (XXXIV), China highlighted the value of the building, suggesting that 'its inclusion on the list would be a positive enhancement,' presumably for the HSM List overall.[50] Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and 'Several Members' supported the proposal but expressed their concern for the management of its environmental impact considering the size and state of the building, and subsequently requested that China provide more information on its maintenance and conservation.[51] China notified these parties that it was in the process of developing a Management Plan (MP) that would be available in the near future.[52] The potential designation was then referred to the Meeting and the measure in which it was contained was subject to fast approval, entering into force just under four months later in September 2011.[53] China has not amended the description since designation.

[49] It was the only HSM designated by the Meeting at this ATCM.
[50] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIV Final Report*, 2011, paragraph 129.
[51] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIV Final Report*, 2011, paragraphs 130-131.
[52] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIV Final Report*, 2011, paragraph 132.
[53] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *HSM: No.1 Building at Great Wall Station*, Measure 12, 2011.

The managing party for HSM 86 is, as expected, the Chinese government. As promised, China submitted an Information Paper on the site's maintenance and conservation at the following ATCM in 2012.[54] The paper very clearly outlined who the responsible parties were for undertaking a two-to-three-year conservation project: the National Antarctic Program of China was to fund, the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) was to oversee, and the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) was to conduct the field work. The plan goes into detail about how the structure will be strengthened and services restored before finally addressing the issue of environmental protection. In this section China lists the 'environmentally friendly' materials it intends to use.[55] The paper states that the building had 'been included in the routine maintenance and conservation plan of China Antarctic Expedition's mission at Great Wall Station for many years'[56] – although this is hard to verify as previous reports on the Great Wall Station environment make no reference to No.1 Building.[57] While China has submitted detailed maintenance reports to the Meeting on other infrastructure at the station, such as the report on the removal of the old power building,[58] it had not submitted such a report in relation to the maintenance and conservation project for HSM 86 in the period since. This was even after Japan stated that 'it looked forward to China providing more data once the restoration work is completed' when the plan was first submitted.[59] Below, I suggest possible geopolitical explanations for this lack of documentation, despite the environmental risks posed.

3.1.2 *Intra-national, inter-national, and extra-national geopolitical ramifications of HSM 86*

The Chinese population's perception of China's presence in the Antarctic region was influenced by the construction of No. 1 Building at Great Wall Station, and the designation of this HSM marked an important progression in China's Antarctic narrative. Within the HSM proposal China describes the building as the first permanent dwelling on the Great Wall Station site that 'symbolized the beginning of understanding and exploring [of the] Antarctic by Chinese people' and whose construction process represented the 'epitome of Antarctic spirit

[54] China, *Brief Introduction of the Maintenance and Conservation Project of No.1 Building at Great Wall Station*, IP014 (2012): 1-4.
[55] IP014 (2012): 3.
[56] IP014 (2012): 3.
[57] China, *A Report on The Environment of Great Wall Station and Zhongshan Station in current years for ATCM*, IP083 (2005); China, *A report on the environment of Great Wall Station in recent two years*, IP067 (2004); China, *Report on clean-up and removal of the old power building at the Great Wall Station*, IP087 (2003); and China, *Oil spill contingency plan for Chinese Great Wall Station in Antarctica*, IP088 (1997).
[58] IP087 (2003).
[59] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXV Final Report*, 2012, paragraph 135.

worldwide.'[60] Young has recently commented on the role Antarctic policy plays within China's domestic affairs more generally: 'To shore up its domestic rule, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needs to keep China's economy strong, secure technological leadership, and demonstrate China's power in global affairs.'[61] Brady, a political scientist and influential public commentator on Antarctic affairs, has also recognised this reliance and states that 'China is now incorporating Antarctica into its meta-narrative on national identity and national interests.'[62] Brady also believes that there is a duality between China's internal and external communication: 'In materials aimed at foreigners, China's Antarctic officials give a very partial account, while what is revealed to Chinese audiences is completely different.'[63] This is significant, as it implies that the national identity China has developed within its borders is different to the one it portrays outside of them, but not unexpected, as the national image of all states necessarily takes on different forms depending on the audience. Due to the limitations of translation, I can only speculate externally on what the internal position may be. But for over a decade it would appear that the Chinese government has sought to raise public awareness of its activities in Antarctica as well as the political issues that surround them through wide media coverage,[64] engagement with the younger demographic,[65] and, in the case of HSM 86, publishing relevant teaching materials. The submitted proposal notes that the Chinese school curriculum now incorporates the first Chinese Antarctic Expedition and the establishment of the Great Wall Station as a means to popularise Antarctic science and raise public awareness of China's activities in the region.[66] Furthermore, the public had long been made aware of what the absence of a national research station (like HSM 86) represented – that was, China's denial of a 'right to speak' within the ATS. In 1983 the leader of the Chinese delegation, Guo Kun, vowed never to return to an ATCM until China had an Antarctic base. This 'painful narrative' of international exclusion was broadcast to the Chinese public on national television on

[60] WP005 (2011): 5.
[61] Claire Young, "Eyes on the Prize: Australia, China and the Antarctic Treaty System," the *Lowy Institute*, 16 February 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/eyes-on-prize-australia-china-and-antarctic-treaty-system.
[62] Anne-Marie Brady, "The past in the present: Antarctica in China's national narrative," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 284.
[63] Brady, "The past in the present: Antarctica in China's national narrative," 286.
[64] For example, the 'conquering' of the 'Inaccessible Pole' as reported by a Chinese tabloid in 2005. China Daily, "Explorers Conquer 'Inaccessible Pole,'" 1 January 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-01/18/content_410147.htm.
[65] Brady talks about the 'focus on mineral resources and exploitation that the Chinese authorities promotes to young audiences.' Anne-Marie Brady, *China as a Polar Great Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 42.
[66] WP005 (2011).

multiple occasions thereafter, further emphasising this humiliation of the national identity.[67] Lastly, the dedication of the 130 Chinese expeditioners – who quite literally engaged in nation-building efforts by constructing a logistical and now historical asset for their nation's nascent Antarctic program – explains the use of the word 'devotion' mentioned earlier, as it connotes (in English) duty and sacrifice. A Chinese newspaper reported that the building was constructed in just four weeks under harsh conditions, by expeditioners working up to 17-hour days with suboptimal equipment.[68] The Chinese population have therefore been exposed to and potentially become invested in their nation's Antarctic narrative through the existence of HSM 86.

Given that the existence of the nation-state is intersubjective, how states perceive each other necessarily affects their internal image and identity. From this outside perspective, HSM 86 has helped to legitimate China's regional presence in the eyes of its peers. The international community has been suspicious of China's activities in Antarctica ever since it first expressed an interest in the region in the 1950s.[69] This suspicion also arguably contributed to China becoming an ATCP in 1985, as this progression meant that China would not align with Malaysia's questioning of the status quo within the ATS at the time.[70] But China's confusing language both in the HSM proposal and more broadly has not helped its cause. The proposal contains emotive language throughout and especially in relation to the building's historic value, which it describes as fulfilling 'its historic mission to perfection.'[71] In 2017, China released a White Paper that employed similar language. In response to the almost uninterpretable pronouncements made within, such as 'the Antarctic Community of Human Destiny,' some scholars suggested that states needed to 'clearly articulate their interests' within Antarctic affairs to avoid misinterpretation and unnecessary tension.[72] But irrespective of its textual representation, HSM 86 does help legitimate China's presence in Antarctica to the international community, as not only does it represent the state's first research station that supported its bid

[67] Brady, "The past in the present: Antarctica in China's national narrative," 291.
[68] Liu Shiyao, "Remembering China's first Antarctic expedition leader Guo Wei," *People's Daily*, 10 April 2019, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_3278035.
[69] In the lead-up to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, the United States in particular was averse to the operation of 'Red China' Antarctica. Anne-Marie Brady, *The Emerging Politics of Antarctica* (London: Routledge, 2013), 4.
[70] Lee, "China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet so Near," 585.
[71] Lee, "China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet so Near," 585.
[72] Jeffrey McGee and Marcus Haward, "Australia-China Relations in the Frozen South," the *Australian Institute of International Affairs*, 28 February 2019, http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/australia-china-antarctica/.

for ATCP status, it is also a formal and international acknowledgement that China has a cultural, historical artefact on the continent worthy of recognition and protection.

In relation to nation-building, this legitimation is key to bolstering China's national pride still wounded by a 'Century of Humiliation' between 1839-1949:[73] 'As a country, which was once great, and is returning to a prominent position on the world stage, China has a lot to prove.'[74] HSM 86 therefore helps to elevate China's internal national image to a state capable of excelling technologically and culturally beyond its borders. This HSM can also be interpreted as a display of nationalism as explained by Hemmings et al.'s factors (v) and (xi): to make clear its potential regional or global hegemonic inclinations, and to deny the claimant states' territorial claims, respectively. By asserting past, present, and future presence in the region through HSM 86, China is maintaining relevance in a key global region and fulfilling its 'be proactive' approach to foreign policy.[75] Furthermore, even though a number of non-claimant states have HSMs in claimed territory, China's establishment of an HSM on the contested region of the Antarctic Peninsula in particular could be interpreted by other states as demonstrating a disregard for existing territorial claims on the continent.[76]

Two non-state actors in particular have either directly or indirectly engaged with China's nation-building activities in Antarctica: the international media and tourists. As mentioned earlier, the Western media in particular consistently reports on apparently suspicious Chinese Antarctic policy, contributing to a fear of a perceived 'Chinese Threat' both regionally and globally. Although international attention has shifted from Great Wall Station, in which HSM 86 is situated, to the planned fifth Chinese Antarctic research station in the Ross Sea,[77] speculation on China's intentions in the region are still helpful in understanding how the outside world perceives China's presence on the continent. More importantly, such suspicions could create a self-fulfilling prophecy in that they have the potential to influence and inform Chinese Antarctic policy. With regard to Antarctic tourism, Great Wall Station – located on the Antarctic Peninsula, the key region for tourist travel – experiences a particularly high rate

[73] Alison Kaufman, "Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission," *Center for Naval Analysis*, 10 March 2011, https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/hearing-chinas-narratives-regarding-national-security-policy.
[74] Brady, *The Emerging Politics of Antarctica*, 45.
[75] Brady, "The past in the present: Antarctica in China's national narrative," 296.
[76] Lee, "China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet so Near," 583.
[77] Nengye Liu, "What Does China's Fifth Research Station Mean for Antarctic Governance?" *The Diplomat*, 28 June 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/what-does-chinas-fifth-research-station-mean-for-antarctic-governance/.

of visitation, approximately 2,000 people per annum. As a result, China's Ministry of Natural Resources released an application guide for tourist activities at the station in September 2019. Given the station is the most popular Antarctic destination for Chinese tourists, who accounted for 14.6 per cent of approximately 56,000 tourists who visited the continent in the 2018-2019 tourist season (exceeded only by tourists from the United States),[78] HSM 86 receives a significant amount of domestic traffic – that is, Chinese citizens who have likely heard about the site prior to their arrival and who will likely recount their experience to fellow citizens after their departure.[79] In comparison to other states' HSMs, such as Australia's Mawson's Huts at Commonwealth Bay (HSM 77), which are lucky to be visited annually,[80] this is significant exposure. Other nationals have and do visit Great Wall Station, however.[81] Taiwanese scientists, or 'official tourists,' were invited to the station's inaugural ceremony in 1985 as part of the Chinese government's 'United Front' strategy.[82] Less formal events have also drawn people from around the globe to the vicinity of HSM 86 including a marathon in 2017 in which participants could 'see a bit of China in Antarctica, [and] learn a little about our Antarctic Chinese life,'[83] and a women's leadership voyage that made an 'unexpected stop' at the station in 2019.[84] One participant on that voyage was a Chinese national who said that she was filled 'with pride because she was able to see that her country was becoming more open,'[85] a shift that is favourable in the advertising of China's national narrative. This said, a strict set of

[78] The gross number of visitors to the region in 2019/2020 was 73,991, but as the 2020 ATCM did not go ahead, the numerical breakdown of the season are yet to be released. IAATO Overview of Antarctic Tourism: 2018-19 Season and Preliminary Estimates for 2019-20 Season. International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators, *IAATO Overview of Antarctic Tourism: 2018-19 Season and Preliminary Estimates for 2019-20 Season*, IP140 rev.1 (2019).

[79] According to a Chinese news website, over 2,000 Chinese tourists visit each season. Xinhua Net, "Have a trip to China's Antarctic station," 18 September 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/18/c_138401503.htm.

[80] Even with visitation totals reaching the hundreds before an iceberg blocked access to Commonwealth Bay in 2011, these numbers do not rival those for Great Wall Station.

[81] O'Reilly and Salazar's research discusses an 'interesting system of reciprocity and gift exchange' between the different national Antarctic programs on King George Island, which also visit each other's stations. Jessica O'Reilly and Juan Francisco Salazar, "Inhabiting the Antarctic," *The Polar Journal* 7, no. 1 (2017): 19.

[82] Lee, "China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet so Near," 582.

[83] Pavel Toropov, "The Great Wall Antarctic Marathon: penguins, icebergs and the coolest race you'll ever run," *South China Morning Post*, 11 September 2017, https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/health-beauty/article/2110596/great-wall-antarctic-marathon-penguins-icebergs-and-coolest.

[84] Diana Marcela Tinjacá, "The Great Wall station, unexpected stop for female scientists in Antarctica," *Agencia EFE*, 7 January 2019, https://www.efe.com/efe/english/technology/the-great-wall-station-unexpected-stop-for-female-scientists-in-antarctica/50000267-3860029.

[85] Tinjacá, "The Great Wall station, unexpected stop for female scientists in Antarctica."

guidelines that require the Chinese government to issue permits to visiting tourist operators prior to the season's commencement, ensure that outsiders are received on the state's terms.[86]

### 3.1.3 *Counter Case – Kunlun Station*

Kunlun Station is a Chinese site that has important nation-building potential for China but has not yet been designated an HSM. China currently boasts four Antarctic research stations: Great Wall Station established in 1985, Zhongshan Station established in 1989, Kunlun Station established in 2009, and Taishan Station established in 2014. Of these stations only one is a designated HSM. This is intriguing considering that: all would contain material remains that could qualify as potential HSMs; the proposal process is relatively straightforward and one China is familiar with; and the potential political gain to be made from having national heritage internationally recognised in Antarctica is significant, especially for a New Polar Power like China. From a strategic perspective, Kunlun Station in particular appears to be a reasonable candidate for China as its profile has already been raised within the ATS during discussions of a surrounding Antarctic Specially Managed Area (ASMA);[87] its name has 'deep cultural associations in China';[88] and it is situated on the other side of Antarctica from China's two pre-existing HSMs, enabling greater 'coverage.' Although the ASMA proposal was ultimately unsuccessful and very controversial, an HSM proposal process may not be, given that HSMs do not request the same level of obligation from the international community. In relation to the station's name, it represents a Daoist paradise and thus already has significant internal cultural meaning. Moreover, the naming process was a public exercise as Chinese officials chose the name from over 3,000 submissions by the public.[89]

Lastly, in relation to its positioning, it is the first continental research station for China and is in East Antarctica, an area largely claimed by Australia as AAT, so presents a strategic opportunity to performatively deny another state's territorial claim while simultaneously extending its own sphere of symbolic influence. Furthermore, the fact that the station is only 10 years old should not concern China, given that it proposed its first HSM (52) in the same year that it was installed. It is difficult to discern why China has not made a proposal, as it

[86] International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators, "2019-2020 Operational Instructions: For IAATO Office Representatives, Expedition Leaders, Field Staff, Vessel Masters and Officers," *IAATO Field Operations Manual*, 2019-2020.
[87] China, *Proposal for a new Antarctic Specially Managed Area at Chinese Antarctic Kunlun Station, Dome A*, WP008 (2013).
[88] Brady, *The Emerging Politics of Antarctica*, 46.
[89] Brady, *The Emerging Politics of Antarctica*, 34.

submits relatively few Working or Information Papers at ATCMs in comparison to the other ATCPs, it has not yet published an Antarctic White Paper,[90] and its domestic policy is difficult for outsiders to decode. However, given the controversy surrounding, and ultimate failure of, China's proposal for a new ASMA in the area, it is likely that China would like to avoid any further discussions on area protection in this part of Antarctica for the meantime. This said, now that the moratorium on HSMs proposals has been lifted and other states have had historical sites and monuments designated since, the situation may change.

## 3.2 HSM 44, *Dakshin Gangotri Plaque*

Figure 7.3: Approximate location of HSM 44.

*Dakshin Gangotri Plaque*, HSM 44, is a plaque embedded in rock at Dakshin Gangotri, a decommissioned Indian research station in East Antarctica. The plaque honours the landing of the first Indian national Antarctic research expedition, and lists names of those who took part. Over the years, however, the plaque at the once-operational station (now transit camp and supply base) has become buried under snow, making its existence on paper – that is, the HSM List – arguably more important than its physical existence on the continent. Given that HSM 44 celebrates a historical event in the form of a commemorative plaque rather than an artefact of the event or site, a lack of effort to resurface it is perhaps understandable.

[90] Although it did publish an Arctic White Paper in 2018; an Antarctic equivalent may not be far off. The State Council, "Full text: China's Arctic Policy," *The People's Republic of China*, 26 January 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm.



Figure 7.4: Plaque installed in rock at Dakshin Gangotri. (India, WP016 rev.1 1983 – image quality as in original.)

HSM 44, is one of India's two HSMs, both of which are plaques that commemorate Indian nationals for their efforts in national scientific research programs. India conducted its first national Antarctic research expedition in 1981/1982 and erected a plaque (HMS 44) that the Meeting designated as an HSM only one year later, but before the station it commemorates was actually built. The second HSM (78), designated in 2004, remembers members of the ninth national expedition who 'sacrificed their lives' in a mountain camp accident in 1990. India has not contributed to any discussions on Antarctic heritage management at ATCMs but has participated in one period of informal intersessional discussions on heritage. Although a developing country, India is recognised as an emerging polar power that has demonstrated an economic and political commitment to the continent in the past decade,[91] and therefore it is certainly possible that it will seek to have more of its historical sites officially recognised in coming years. The plaque at Dakshin Gangotri provides a distinctive example of nation-building in the Antarctic context by a developing country.

[91] In 2010, India led its first national expedition to the South Pole – an important moment in its national Antarctic narrative. Dodds and Collis, "Post-colonial Antarctica," 64.

3.2.1 *The proposition, designation, and management of HSM 44*

India proposed the plaque at Dakshin Gangotri station for HSM designation at the 1983 ATCM (XII) within a Working Paper.[92] This paper includes a draft recommendation as well as an explanatory note that describes how 'a large, suitable in situ rock was selected' for the brass plaque to be 'permanently cemented' on.[93] The site of the plaque was also noted to be 'of much importance' and formed 'a prominent landmark in the area.'[94] The final sentence of the explanatory note argues that because the plaque-bearing rock signifies the first landing of India's expedition to Antarctica in January 1982, it is, by consequence, a historical monument. At the time India made the proposal, the HSM criteria did not yet exist. Retrospectively, this site/monument appeals to the first criterion as the first Indian national Antarctic research expedition, which occurred at this site, classifies as 'a particular event of importance in the history of science or exploration of Antarctica.' Lastly, the timing of this proposal is significant within not only the timeline of the Indian Antarctic program, but also the HSM Framework overall. The plaque was installed prior to India becoming an ATCP and designated as an HSM prior to the construction of India's first permanent Antarctic research station – usually the key reference point for the commencement of a non-ATCP state's engagement with the continent.[95] Furthermore, given that the first Indian expedition returned to Goa on 21 February 1982, India made the designation at the earliest possible moment, the following ATCM in 1983. HSM 44 was also the first HSM the Meeting designated since the first HSM List was established over a decade earlier in 1972, and therefore represented the first new addition to the original list.

While outwardly HSM 44's designation appears unremarkable, the context of the process is significant. The opening plenary of the ATCM at which the Meeting adopted the recommendation containing the HSM proposal[96] was held the day after India was accepted as an ATCP.[97] The HSM description itself makes reference to the landing of the first Indian national Antarctic research expedition, a key indicator of the expedition's significance to national history: *Plaque erected at the temporary Indian station 'Dakshin Gangotri,' Princess Astrid Kyst, Dronning Maud Land, listing the names of the First Indian Antarctic Expedition*

[92] India, *Draft recommendation on Historic Sites and Monuments*, WP016 rev.1 (1983): 1-3.
[93] WP016 rev.1 (1983): 1.
[94] WP016 rev.1 (1983): 1.
[95] The plaque was designated as HSM 44 under Recommendation 7 in 1983, and construction of the permanent station finished in 1984.
[96] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Monument 44 (Dakshin Gangotri) added to List of Historic Monuments*, Recommendation 7, 1983.
[97] The 1983 ATCM (XII) was held between 13-17 September, and India was accepted as an ATCP on 12 September 1983.

*which landed nearby on 9 January 1982*. The wording of this description has not been changed since 1983 despite developments at the site that have witnessed Dakshin Gangotri's transition from a temporary base to an operable station between 1984-1990, and finally a transitory camp (not to mention that the entire site is now buried under snow and ice). India flagged an amendment to the description in 2004 but never followed through with this,[98] as evident in the two revised HSM Lists in 2015 and 2016 that contain unchanged wording for this entry. A more detailed history is uncovered when the environment in which this designation took place is acknowledged.

Although it may appear that management of or concern for the physical state of HSM 44 is minimal or even non-existent – as it commemorates a historical event rather than a tangible artefact that requires little 'upkeep' – India, as the managing party, did submit an Information Paper containing a review of HSM 44 in 2004.[99] This paper recorded that 'Yes, the site still exists, though the original plaque erected has been buried under snow,'[100] and that in light of the review's findings the site should not be delisted. The response to the review question, 'Does the site continue to meet the guideline for Historic Sites and Monuments set out in Resolution 8 (1995)?'[101] is revealing, however. It states that the permanent station established during the third national Antarctic research expedition of 1983/1984 'marks the advent of Indian foray in Antarctic Research [and has] special significance and place of honor in Indian History.'[102] This positioning is unusual as a state's first national research expedition, which the official HSM description actually references, would usually be considered its foray in Antarctic research. Despite this incongruity, the site does still fit the first criterion of Resolution 8 (1995).

3.2.2 *Intra-national, inter-national, and extra-national geopolitical ramifications of HSM 44*

The intra-national relevance of HSM 44 is best considered in what Chaturvedi terms the 'dawning' of Antarctica upon Indian consciousness – that is, a realisation by the Indian population that its nation's engagement with the frozen continent was in fact advantageous to both domestic and foreign policy and not just a peripheral national scientific exercise.[103]

[98] India, *Review of the Historic Site and Monument HSM 44 (a plaque erected at 'Dakshin Gangotri' Station)*, IP040 (2004): 1.
[99] IP040 (2004): 1.
[100] IP040 (2004): 2.
[101] IP040 (2004): 1.
[102] IP040 (2004): 1.
[103] Sanjay Chaturvedi, *Dawning of Antarctica: A Geopolitical Analysis* (New Delhi: Segment Books, 1990), iii-iv.

Although initial public awareness in the 1980s was poor and some questioned the justification of financial investment in a far off region whilst more pressing socio-economic problems needed attention at home, the Indian national Antarctic program has developed and grown since, and positive engagement with the domestic audience has increased.[104] Several activities at the site of HSM 44 itself demonstrate a recognition of the role Indian historic events have in the development of the nation overall. This public acknowledgement has been growing ever since the HSM was first established through to present-day celebrations of India's landing on the continent. For example, when the plaque was first installed, the national flag was hoisted on top of the rock it was cemented to and the name inscribed in the plaque itself, *Dakshin Gangotri*, was purposefully named after the sacred river Ganges in the Himalayas,[105] therefore 'not only establishing a permanent presence but also building ancestral connections with the Antarctic.'[106] Expeditioners also proudly celebrated India's Republic Day at the station on 26 January 1984 (with Soviet and German scientists in attendance).[107] More recently, an Indian tabloid, *India Today*, published an article celebrating the twenty-seventh anniversary of the Indian Antarctic program's arrival on the 'ice continent,' presenting *Dakshin Gangotri* as a key factor in the development of its program.[108]

An understanding of the temporality of HSM 44's establishment, proposal, and designation gives greater meaning to its geopolitical impact at an international level. As mentioned above, in the 1950s, India attempted to have the Global South better represented in discussions concerning the region's future. But when it did not successfully achieve its objective India eventually turned its efforts to joining the System instead. The establishment of HSM 44 is a product of these remarkably efficient and determined efforts. India's rapid achievement of ATCP status in 1983 enabled India to 'project and protect her perceived interests in the Antarctic in an effective manner.'[109] HSM 44 was subject to a similar fast-tracked approach, with its installation, proposition, and designation all occurring within an 18-month window.

---

[104] Several 'Outreach Programs' are listed on the National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research website. National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research, Ministry of Earth Sciences, "Outreach Program," *Government of India*, accessed 28 May 2020, http://www.ncaor.gov.in/antarcticas/display/373-outreach-program.
[105] Sanjay Chaturvedi, "India and Antarctica: towards post-colonial engagement?" in *The Emerging Politics of Antarctica*, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (London: Routledge, 2013), 61.
[106] Dodds, "Post-colonial Antarctica: an emerging engagement," 66.
[107] Department of Ocean Development, Government of India, *Annual Report 1985-1985*, https://web.archive.org/web/20130425173818/http:/www.dod.nic.in/ann84-85.pdf.
[108] India Today, "Indian Antarctic Programme: India first landed on the ice continent on this day in 1982," 9 January 2018, https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/gk-current-affairs/story/indian-antarctic-program-1130611-2018-01-09.
[109] Chaturvedi, *Dawning of Antarctica: A Geopolitical Analysis*, iv.

Given that the Meeting adopted the HSM just a day after India received ATCP status, India would have had to already have planned and drafted the HSM proposal it was going to submit prior to the Meeting. This is evidence of a fast-tracked nation-building strategy that allowed India to build its presence in the region. Furthermore, the material state of the HSM proposed was of little relevance to India: instead, it served as an avenue to source official recognition of India's first presence in the region. This same logic applies to the plaque itself as it is not a historic artefact, but rather a memorial. Overall, this approach was characterised by the nation's efforts to acquire a place at the ATS table, as reflected in the *permanent* cementing of a historical reference at a site reserved for a *temporary* station.

The establishment of HSM 44 and what it represents could be interpreted as a contradiction of India's previous extra-nationally positioned policies for the continent. As mentioned previously, India formally questioned governing arrangements for Antarctica at the UNGA in the 1950s, preferencing a trusteeship that would recognise and represent views of states outside of the growing colonial–imperial alliance. During this challenge, India championed the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) principle that considers Antarctica and its benefits – for example mineral resources – to be reserved and shared among all members of the international community.[110] Notably, this concept 'strives to embrace all humankind, not simply states.'[111] It has been argued that India's joining the ATS 'club' and its behaviour since, such as participation within a registry that can only record and protect statist accounts of Antarctic history, represents a 'withering' of its previous normative approach to Antarctic politics.[112] HSM 44 plays an important role in demonstrating this shift in India's foreign policy, marking the point at which India decided to pursue a national, rather than global, connection with the continent.

### 3.2.3 *Counter Case – A Malaysian HSM*

India has not been the only postcolonial state to challenge the state of Antarctic affairs. In fact, Malaysia is cited more frequently for the 'Question of Antarctica' raised at the UNGA in 1983. A year prior, the then Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, expressed his concerns that Antarctica had

[110] Patrizia Vigni and Francesco Francioni, "Territorial claims and coastal states," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 243.
[111] Christopher Joyner, *Governing the Frozen Commons: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental Protection* (Columbia: South Carolina University Press, 1998), 32.
[112] Chaturvedi, "India and Antarctica: towards post-colonial engagement?" 65.

become the privileged territory of a few states.[113] Like India, in an effort to raise its profile and transform from a developing to a developed nation,[114] Malaysia eventually ratified the Treaty in 2011 and has cooperated within the System ever since.[115] This progression – that is sometimes considered a co-opting of reticent Asian states[116] that ultimately made the 'Question of Antarctica' redundant – placed Malaysia in a similar position to India. However, unlike India, Malaysia has not proposed a historic site or monument for designation. This is despite having maintained presence on the continent for over two decades and having conducted activities – such as the first Malaysian scientific expedition in 1999 – that would satisfy the first criterion that acknowledges historical events of Antarctic exploration or science. Of course, the obvious reason for this would be that Malaysia has not yet obtained ATCP status so cannot submit a proposal to the Meeting. However, Malaysia's lack of ATCP status is itself significant in comparison to India. Malaysia has carried out 'substantial scientific activity' on the continent since 1998 as required by Article IX to obtain ATCP status,[117] has hosted biannual international seminars on Antarctic research,[118] and is a member of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR);[119] and would therefore seem a prime ATCP candidate.

Most significantly, Malaysia has shown an interest in celebrating its national Antarctic heritage and triumphs as evident in: an inspirational video released by the Akademi Sains Malaysia in 2011 titled 'My King and Emperor in Antarctica: Malaysia's Journey to the Ice';[120] establishment of the Sultan Mizan Antarctic Research Foundation in 2012 that aims to 'sustain

[113] B. A. Hamzah, "Malaysia and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty: a geopolitical interpretation," *The Polar Journal* 1, no. 2 (2011): 293.
[114] Sumitra Jayaseelan, "Development of Malaysia's position in Antarctica: 1983 to 2017," *The Polar Journal* 9, no. 1 (2019): 216.
[115] Hamzah, "Malaysia and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty: a geopolitical interpretation," 287.
[116] Such as India, China, and South Korea. Hamzah, "Malaysia and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty: a geopolitical interpretation," 295.
[117] The Malaysian Antarctic Research Program (MARP) was established in 1997 and extended its reach to the Arctic in 2006. Ahmad Firdaus Ahmad Shabudin, Rashidah Abdul Rahim, Norizan Md Nor, and Kamarulazizi Ibrahim, "Antarctic values and Malaysia's involvement in Antarctica: perceptions among young citizens of Malaysia," *Polar Record* 52, no. 3 (2016): 305.
[118] The eighth Malaysian International Seminar on Antarctica (MISA) was held in June 2019. Malaysian International Seminar on Antarctica, "Polar Regions in the Global Climate System," 18-19 June 2019, Universiti Putra Malaysia, https://www.int-conference.com/.
[119] Malaysia became a full member of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) in 2008 and hosted the biannual SCAR Open Science conference in 2016. Hamzah, "Malaysia and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty: a geopolitical interpretation," 297.
[120] Akademi Sains Malaysia (ASM), "MY King and emperor in Antarctica: Malaysian's journey to the ice," 13 December 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hr-0CUmk-f0.

Malaysia's presence in Antarctica';[121] and an educational program that sends students to the polar regions to 'provide them exposure to Malaysia's involvement in polar regions.'[122] Malaysia also hosted the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research's (SCAR) Open Science Conference and Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs' (COMNAP) meeting in 2016. It is interesting that two states with similar approaches to their Antarctic foreign policies would not behave in a similar manner when it comes to justifying their right to be active and present in the region. Both India and Malaysia challenged the status quo of the ATS before surrendering to it, but India has applied for ATCP status and HSM designations, whilst Malaysia, although it has remained active in Antarctic research and affairs, has not yet.

## 4. Summary: Forging Antarctic Pasts

The construction of the nation-state and national heritage is inseparable. Nowhere is this clearer than in Antarctica, where human presence is relatively recent, and states cling to falling down buildings or plaques buried under snow as a means to legitimise – and even forge – their historical presence on and around the continent. In turn, this legitimisation better defines these actors' broader existence as nation-states capable of engaging effectively in this global region. The region presents an opportunity for states to prove to both their peers and their constituents that they are capable of investing culturally, as well as economically and technologically, in national pursuits external to their borders. These actions demonstrate the determination of a country, developing or constructing its nationhood at multiple scales.

If the processes of nation-building and heritage-making are considered in tandem, then the geopolitical value of HSMs as nation-building tools by New Polar Powers becomes clear. Both of these state-performed processes require a selection of particular memories for commemoration, the cultivation of a specific and desirable identity, and usually time to demonstrate legitimacy and authenticity. The HSMs discussed in this chapter belonging to China and India – HSM 86 and HSM 44, respectively – exemplify how these states have used cultural heritage to build their national image. Again, the notions of memory, identity, and tradition help demonstrate this.

[121] Yayasan Penyelidikan Antartika Sultan Mizan (YPASM), "Yayasan Penyelidikan Antartika Sultan Mizan," accessed 8 November 2019, https://www.ypasm.my/ypasm/.
[122] Ann Marie Chandy, "Doing research work in Antarctica is this Malaysian's dream come true," *The Star*, 21 April 2017, https://www.thestar.com.my/lifestyle/people/2017/04/21/shoba-mary-thomas-research-antarctica-malaysia-scientist/.

When deciding on what to officially remember, both China and India came to the conclusion that their national Antarctic stations – the material manifestation of their national Antarctic research programs – were worth commemorating. In having these sites entered into an internationally recognised heritage register, both countries could build their historical and cultural capital, and ultimately gain admission to the 'Antarctic club.' Additionally, by behaving in this 'respectable' and predictable manner, these states were able to at least partially quell the 'fear of the East' held by the Western ATCPs.

In relation to their national identities, China and India used HSMs to signify what they did *not* represent. Both countries had been Antarctic outsiders until the late twentieth century. Prior to China's establishment of an Antarctic past, it had endured what it considers a 'Century of Humiliation.' But by engaging in acts such as HSM proposals, China had the opportunity to officially establish a legacy of exploration and research in this global region and subsequently to redeem its reputation. India's reputation in the region, on the other hand, had not been defined by a noticeable absence, but rather an active resistance that threatened the very existence of the group of states it would later join. India eventually decided to cooperate within the System in 1983, and dutifully engaged in activities typical of ATCP – including scientific research and indeed protection and management of heritage. This behaviour effectively shifted its status from a non-aligned to an aligned state (at least within this corner of the world). Antarctic cultural heritage provided these states with several opportunities to express their national identity and engage in performances of nationalism.

Lastly, the notion of tradition is important to consider. Although the dominant conceptualisation of heritage would have places and objects exist for a certain amount of time before they can be deemed 'heritage,' the sites designated as HSMs by these two New Polar Powers do not necessarily honour this ideal. HSM 44 in particular challenges this idea, considering that the building it was commemorating was proposed as an HSM before it was even constructed. This raises the question of heritage legitimacy and whether it can in fact be determined by time elapsed, or whether temporality holds little relevance in this context. Ambiguity surrounding this legitimacy also challenged the motives behind some states' eagerness to forge their Antarctic pasts.

In conclusion, China and India acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in 1983, yet they have made up for lost time in obtaining ATCP status and by having their material Antarctic heritage

successfully designated as HSMs. These historic remains have officialised their historic connections with Antarctica and the other states that operate in the region, which in turn writes a meaningful chapter in their national narratives as not just emerging polar powers, but as rising powers within global international politics in the twenty-first century.

# Chapter Eight: Wasting Heritage

*Antarctic heritage as a means to meet environmental expectations*

The evaluation of historic remains as heritage as opposed to waste, or vice versa, is a highly subjective, and therefore often contentious, process. All heritage can be considered waste, and all waste can be considered heritage.[1] Inconsistencies in the way Antarctic states define and apply the concepts of heritage and waste are possible due to the dubious approach to heritage in what I have termed the HSM Framework. So, what one state might consider heritage and therefore propose as a Historic Site and Monument for protection, another state may consider waste and demand its immediate removal. The legislation of the Antarctic Treaty System reflects these tensions. Recommendation 9 (1961), from the first Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, stipulates that 'objects of historic interest' must be protected, while Annex III of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty requires all waste to be disposed of and managed appropriately. However, the annex does provide an exception for 'any structure designated as a historic site or monument.'

The ability, based on the above, for states to designate as Historic Sites and Monuments what would otherwise be considered waste in need of immediate disposal off the continent, might be expected to function as a loophole for states to avoid lengthy, costly, and resource-draining clean-ups. Heritage specialist Barr has speculated that the exemption provided for historic structures within Annex III has given 'an opening for the possibility of it being used as an incentive to avoid the clearing up and removal of obsolete bases and other structures.'[2] So far this has not been the case, however. Hodgson-Johnston et al. remark that 'this [the caveat on the removal of waste] does not appear to have been used commonly as a method of avoiding responsibility of cleaning up old sites … with historic sites often the subject of extensive "clean-up."'[3] In this chapter, I begin by unpacking the relationship between heritage, waste, and Antarctica. I then select a case example (HSM 85, *Plaque Commemorating the PM-3A Nuclear Power Plant at McMurdo Station*) and a counter case example (Wilkes Station), to investigate the geopolitical motivations for conducting environmental clean-ups at historic sites

[1] Robert A. Blanchette, et al., "Environmental pollutants from the Scott and Shackleton expeditions during the 'Heroic Age' of Antarctic exploration," *Polar Record* 40, no .2 (2004): 143-151.
[2] Susan Barr, "Twenty years of protection of historic values in Antarctica under the Madrid Protocol," *The Polar Journal* 8, no. 2 (2018): 247.
[3] Indi Hodgson-Johnston, Andrew Jackson, Julia Jabour, and Anthony Press, "Cleaning up after human activity in Antarctica: legal obligations and remediation realities," *Restoration Ecology* 25, no. 1 (2017): 137.

in Antarctica. Through these examples, I argue that, in practice, states have remediated historic sites for a complex series of reasons, but predominantly to meet international obligations and expectations concerning the Antarctic environment.

## 1. Parallels Between Heritage and Waste

The intimate connection between the concepts of heritage and waste is well established. Buser, a leading toxic waste specialist, claims that ultimately 'waste is a loyal and challenging companion of mankind across all ages and cultures'[4] – and therefore a permanent component of cultural heritage. His primary thesis is that 'waste, an anthropogenic product, should also be regarded as a form of cultural heritage, even if this legacy primarily carries negative traits and in fact represents a burdensome heritage.'[5] From his perspective, rubbish is an archaeological asset. Ross and Angel also discuss the interconnectedness of the two concepts, highlighting how waste is 'beginning to challenge traditional definitions of heritage'[6] and drawing on the emerging field of discard studies to acknowledge the intersection between heritage conservation and material salvage.[7] Lastly, the Centre for Critical Heritage Studies at the University of Gothenburg has institutionalised these findings in its announcement of a new research theme of 'Waste/Wasted Heritage' with the aim 'to explore the more complicated understandings of objects, places, practices and values that cut across these two categories [waste and heritage] and to consider how such explorations might illuminate new ways of understanding the role of heritage in the Anthropocene and lead to new, cross-cluster collaborations on issues of contemporary global concern.'[8] Following on from these developments, I draw on the existing literature to make three parallels between heritage and waste that can be usefully applied to the Antarctic context: temporality, politicisation, and social construction. These parallels demonstrate the complex dynamic between heritage and waste in this polar setting – a dynamic that ultimately determines what Antarctic heritage is, as well as the processes that manage it.

[4] Marcos Buser, *Rubbish Theory: The Heritage of Toxic Waste* (Amsterdam: Reinwardt Academy, 2015), 9.
[5] Buser, *Rubbish Theory: The Heritage of Toxic Waste*, 10.
[6] Susan Ross and Victoria Angel, "Heritage and waste: introduction," *Journal of Cultural Heritage Management and Sustainable Development* 10, no. 1 (2020): 1.
[7] Ross and Angel, "Heritage and waste: introduction," 1-2.
[8] University of Gothenburg, "Centre for Critical Heritage Studies (CCHS): Waste/Wasted Heritage," accessed 16 February 2021, https://www.gu.se/en/critical-heritage-studies/research/wastewasted-heritage.

### 1.1 *The temporality of heritage and waste*

Both heritage and waste are temporally positioned. The relevance of time to object valuation was first introduced by Thompson in 1979 within his 'Rubbish Theory,' which predicts that all objects fall into either the category of 'durable,' those that are increasing in value (heritage); or 'transient,' those that are decreasing in value (waste).[9] More recently, in 2015, Thill continued this argument, stating that 'waste is every object, plus time' and a change of sentiment is the only missing ingredient.[10] Given that heritage is about humans' relationship with the past through the commemoration of often tangible artefacts, understanding the logic behind the classification of these objects is key to understanding what society has defined (and subsequently protected) as heritage at different points in time.

With regard to Antarctic heritage, and Historic Sites and Monuments (HSMs) in particular, I calculate the average time elapsed between when a historical object was installed or when a historical event occurred, and when it was officially designated as an HSM, to be just over 50 years. Five decades might appear a short timeframe, but given the continent's relatively recent discovery, 50 years is considered 'old' in this part of the world. When surveying the HSM List, Roura discusses the possibility of potential HSMs getting stuck in a limbo of timelessness and valuelessness: 'A particular item may go through these various stages [transient – rubbish – durable] during its life cycle, in a number of possible combinations. While materials in the "rubbish" category might be a liability for the originators of those materials, items in other categories could be used in different ways for geopolitical purposes.'[11] Legacy waste – that is, historical waste associated with past human activity in the region – also complicates the classification process as it can neither be classified as waste for immediate evacuation, or cultural heritage suitable for HSM designation.

### 1.2 *The social construction of heritage and waste*

Heritage and waste are both socially constructed. Just as critical heritage theorists such as Smith reject the assumed innate value of an object,[12] Thompson argues that while 'we all tend to think that objects [such as rubbish] are the way they are as a result of their intrinsic physical

[9] Michael Thompson, *Rubbish Theory: The creation and destruction of value* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
[10] Brian Thill, *Waste: Object Lessons* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 8.
[11] Ricardo Roura, "Antarctic Cultural Heritage: Geopolitics and Management," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 470.
[12] Laurajane Smith, *Uses of Heritage* (London: Routledge, 2006), 3.

properties,' this view is 'reassuring but false.'[13] It follows that there can never be one universally agreed upon or timeless definition of heritage or waste, because what one person might consider heritage another may consider waste, and the same applies to the interpretation of these concepts within different eras.

Heritage is socially constructed in Antarctica, just as it is elsewhere. The HSM criteria help to make explicit the current conceptualisation of heritage in the region but are not necessarily an accurate reflection of all parties' approaches to heritage – a point raised by China at the 2019 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM XLII),[14] and the entire focus for part II of this thesis. More broadly, the overarching imaginary of Antarctica within International Relations has shifted over time. Up until the environmental movement of the 1980s, it was not uncommon for Antarctica to be perceived as a desolate wasteland. Pyne talks about James Cook being one of the many people to 'accuse The Ice of sublime ugliness.'[15] Louis Bernacchi, Antarctic explorer, echoed this sentiment in 1899 when he described Antarctica as, '"unexpressibly desolate", with "snow peaks rising beyond one another until by distance they dwindled away to insignificance."'[16] Even today, Oxford Dictionaries online cites Antarctica within its definition of 'wastes': a 'large area of barren, typically uninhabited land,' and provides 'the icy wastes of the Antarctic' as an example.[17]

These conceptions help explain why the frozen continent has been historically regarded as a literal wasteland perfect for the dumping of nuclear waste. The idea was seriously entertained in 1974 when the primary theme of a meeting at the Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI) in the United Kingdom was, 'The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in the Antarctic Ice Sheet.'[18] This event also highlighted the northern hemispheric bias of states that do not 'feel' Antarctica's immediate presence in the way that Southern Ocean Rim States (SORS), such as Argentina and Chile, might.[19] However, new appreciations of wilderness mobilised within the

[13] Thompson, *Rubbish Theory: The creation and destruction of value*, 8-9.
[14] China raised the issue of 'cultural diversity' in relation to the definition of heritage in Antarctica. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIV Final Report*, 2011, paragraph 125.
[15] Stephen J. Pyne, *The Ice: A Journey to Antarctica* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1986), 159.
[16] Quoted in David Day, *Antarctica: A Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2013), 107.
[17] It also cites nuclear waste as an example of 'waste': 'Unwanted or unusable material, substances, or by-products.' Oxford Dictionaries, "Waste," accessed 13 November 2019, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/waste.
[18] J. Weertman, "Radioactive waste disposal in Antarctica" (paper presented at Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research meeting, Cambridge, 1974).
[19] Barney Brewster, *Antarctica, wilderness at risk* (Virginia: Friends of the Earth, 1982), 57.

environmental movement and enshrined within the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Environmental Protocol), as well as the Treaty's initial reconceptualisation of Antarctica as a continent for peace and science, has shifted these perceptions of the landscape over time. The Environmental Protocol reframed the Antarctic environment as in need of protection from human intervention, transforming what was once considered redundant 'wasteland' into appreciated 'wilderness.'

### 1.3 *The politicisation of heritage and waste*

Finally, given that the concepts of heritage and waste are socially constructed and ever-evolving, they are both inherently political. As discussed in *Chapter Five: Authorising Heritage*, competing power dynamics ultimately determine the definition and management of heritage and waste at particular points in time. Bell describes how this imbalance can lead to cultural hegemony, with one interpretation and approach dominating over and even destroying others.[20] This power imbalance not only applies to questions concerning whether a particular object or site should be protected as heritage or discarded as waste, but also how it should be protected or discarded. Decisions concerning the conservation of historic remains in situ or ex situ, and the remediation of waste on-site or disposal of it off-site, take more into account than the fragility/stability of the object/waste for example. They also consider who the intended audience or witnesses are for each pathway and what the possible reception might be.

Heritage in Antarctica is not exempt from politicisation either. The most obvious example of disagreement over the fate of heritage/waste in the region is in relation to the 'clean-up Antarctica' campaign initiated during the world-wide environmental movement of the 1980s. Heritage experts, namely Chaplin and Barr, were concerned that these efforts might become 'an overwhelming reason to remove all traces of past human activity' from the continent, and that ambiguous differentiation between 'relics' and 'rubbish' might lead to problematic assessments.[21] Pearson was also concerned about this delineation and pointed out that 'what is artefact and what is rubbish is a central issue in making appropriate decisions that balance cultural heritage and environmental values.'[22] Evans and Senatore have seconded this

[20] Johnathon S. Bell, "The Politics of Preservation: Privileging One Heritage over Another," *International Journal of Cultural Property* 20, no. 4 (2013): 431-450.
[21] Paul Chaplin and Susan Barr, "Polar Heritage: Rubbish Or Relics?" *Heritage at Risk* (2002/2003): 233.
[22] Michael Pearson, "Artefact or rubbish – a dilemma for Antarctic managers," in *Cultural Heritage in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions*, eds. Susan Barr and Paul Chaplin (Oslo: ICOMOS, 2004), 42.

argument and contend that uncontrolled clean-ups could threaten material evidence of past operations and falsify the historical picture.[23]

With these three parallels between heritage and waste established, I now detail my case selection process for an investigation of the geopolitical consequences of the complex relationship between heritage and waste within an Antarctic context.

## 2. Case Selection: HSMs that could otherwise be interpreted as waste

Several entries on the HSM List appear to be conserving and preserving what could otherwise be interpreted as waste and are therefore candidates for investigation here. They include HSMs 71, 76, and 92, which protect purportedly unsightly remains from the whaling industry, a Chilean station destroyed by natural disaster, and a retired Russian tractor, respectively. Although these HSMs are not the selected case example for this chapter, I introduce each below for further context before justifying the HSM I do select for further analysis – HSM 85.

HSM 71, *Whalers Bay*, is a joint HSM designated in 1995 and proposed and managed by Chile and Norway. The entry protects 'all pre-1970 remains on the shore of Whalers Bay' on Deception Island which was the site of two volcanic eruptions in the 1960s – one in 1967 and another in 1969, which together partially buried the site.[24] The 'management package' for the island – a one page introduction in Measure 10 (2012) to the past, present, and future management strategies for the island – acknowledges that 'large quantities of waste are present in and around the buildings at Whalers Bay,' and as a result recommends a permit for 'ongoing clean up of debris' within the conservation strategy.[25] It is also noted that graffiti is present in some parts of the site, but that if deemed of historic significance should not be removed.[26] Therefore, the official managing parties acknowledge that the site still contains waste and subsequently commit to an ongoing clean-up.

---

[23] Sherrie-lee Evans, "Icy Heritage–managing Historic Sites in the Antarctic: Pristine Wilderness, Anthropogenic Degradation or Cultural Landscape?" *The Polar Journal* 1, no. 1 (2011): 87-100; and Maria Ximena Senatore, "Things in Antarctica. An archaeological perspective," *The Polar Journal* 10, no. 2 (2020): 397-419.

[24] 'The 1967 volcanic eruption on Deception Island resulted in the deposition of a 1-5 cm layer of ash over Whalers Bay, whilst the 1969 eruption caused a lahar (mud slide) which partly buried the site.' Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Antarctic Specially Managed Area No 4 (Deception Island): Revised Management Plan*, Measure 10, 2012, 164.

[25] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Antarctic Specially Managed Area No 4 (Deception Island): Revised Management Plan*, Measure 10, 2012, 162.

[26] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Antarctic Specially Managed Area No 4 (Deception Island): Revised Management Plan*, Measure 10, 2012, 165.

HSM 76, *Aguirre Cerda Station ruins*, is a Chilean historic site designated in 2001 and is closely related to HSM 71 above. The site's description is as follows: *a Chilean meteorological and volcanological center situated at Pendulum Cove, Deception Island, Antarctica, which was destroyed by volcanic eruptions in 1967 and 1969*. The final paragraph of the Working Paper submitted to propose this HSM states that at a workshop at the Chilean Antarctic Institute 'a consensus emerged that the destroyed base, whose ruins represent in a most dramatic way the impact of natural phenomena on an Antarctic Base, should be afforded the protection of a Historic Site.'[27] It goes on to state that apart from a 'clean-up of unnecessary debris,'[28] the site should be preserved in its present state as a ruin. It is telling that although the majority of the paper's efforts are spent outlining the significance of the station when it was in operation, it is only the volcanic eruption responsible for its destruction that is explicitly listed as a reason for designation. It could be argued that the capability for nature to create waste is what is being officially remembered here, rather than the station and what it facilitated in the past.

HSM 92, *Oversnow heavy tractor "Kharkovchanka" that the Russians used in Antarctica from 1959 to 2010*, is a Russian historic monument designated in 2015. The entry on the HSM List highlights that it was the Soviets' first non-serial transport vehicle, meaning that they produced it individually rather than as part of a series and never used it outside of Antarctica. When the Russians proposed this designation in 2015, some debate arose concerning the tractor's removal from the continent. Despite Russia's efforts to satisfy environmental requirements within this proposal, which reports that 'Remains of diesel fuel, technical oils and hydraulic fluids were fully removed from fuel tanks and aggregates of the tractor in order to avoid a possible adverse environmental impact,'[29] some parties suggested that the tractor should be conserved and commemorated ex situ – for example, in a Moscow museum.[30] In response, Russia argued that it wanted to preserve the tractor in situ for 'eternal storage'[31] so that it would be 'best appreciated by expeditioners and other visitors to Antarctica';[32] and that it had 'hermitically sealed [the doors] to keep out snow in preparation for its long-term display in Antarctica.'[33] The matters of context and visibility are important here, as presumably the

[27] Chile, *Proposal to include the ruins of BSE Pedro Aguirre Cerda on the historic sites and monuments list*, WP034 (2001): 2.
[28] WP034 (2001): 2.
[29] The Russian Federation, *Proposal on inclusion of the oversnow heavy tractor "Kharkovchanka" that was used in Antarctica from 1959 to 2010 to the List of Historical Sites and Monuments*, WP031 rev. 1 (2015): 5.
[30] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXVIII Final Report*, 2015, paragraph 171.
[31] WP031 rev. 1 (2015): 7.
[32] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXVIII Final Report*, 2015, paragraphs 170-171.
[33] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXVIII Final Report*, 2015, paragraph 170.

Russian government considered their broken-down 60-year-old tractor of greater strategic value in the extreme environment than behind closed doors in a state museum thousands of miles away, despite the likelihood of a much larger audience in the latter situation.

These three sites support Hodgson-Johnston et al.'s observation that preparation for HSM proposals and designation would appear to prompt states to clean up historic sites[34] (and even commemorate the very production or clean-up of waste): HSM 71 is subject to ongoing clean-up efforts, HSM 76 has had unnecessary debris removed, and HSM 92 has had environmentally hazardous substances removed. Therefore, these sites do not demonstrate an evasion of environmental obligations under Annex III of the Environmental Protocol. But given the performativity and visibility of these clean-ups, and therefore the political credibility they offer, the motivations behind them can be problematised. While any of the above examples could form a useful case for analysis, I have selected as my key example HSM 85, *Plaque Commemorating the PM-3A Nuclear Power Plant at McMurdo Station* – the only HSM that commemorates nuclear waste. The reason for this choice is that HSM 85 demonstrates perhaps the most extensive clean-up and waste disposal efforts to take place on the continent to date, given the toxicity of the waste on site. The HSM and its history offers productive material for an investigation of underlying motives.

## 3. Case Example: HSM 85

Holtorf and Högberg provide helpful context for an analysis of an HSM associated with toxic waste. They argue that making nuclear waste management a question of heritage – that is, redefining nuclear waste as 'cultural heritage of the future' – can be 'instructive in relation to records, knowledge and memory concerning geological repositories of nuclear waste.'[35] They emphasise how the realms of cultural heritage management and waste management are similar in their approaches to 'permanent and suitable preservation, secure storage of material items, long-term memory keeping, and knowledge transfer to future generations' and thus have a shared 'future consciousness.'[36] Hardesty also identifies the advantage of reframing nuclear or toxic waste, and describes it as first, a *historical document* that 'contains information about its [toxic waste] life history that is independent of written accounts, oral testimony, and other

[34] Hodgson-Johnston, Jackson, Jabour, and Press, "Cleaning up after human activity in Antarctica: legal obligations and remediation realities," 137.
[35] Cornelius Holtorf and Anders Högberg, "Nuclear Waste as Cultural Heritage of the Future" (paper presented at *Waste Management Symposium*, 2-5 March, 2014, Tempe, Arizona), 2.
[36] Holtorf and Högberg, "Nuclear Waste as Cultural Heritage of the Future," 1.

pathways into the past';[37] secondly, a *commodity*, in the sense that the 'fate of toxic waste and other hazardous landscape elements often depends directly on changing perceptions of their economic value';[38] and thirdly, an *idea*, given its capacity to 'carry meaning or evoke responses.'[39] Hardesty even discusses the idea of toxic waste in 'pristine wilderness' and how some would lobby for the waste's removal to preserve the environment, whilst others would rebut that the waste should remain in place.[40] These are useful insights to keep in mind when analysing the various geopolitical meanings of HSM 85.

As with the previous two chapters, this chapter employs a critical geopolitical reading of states' use of HSMs for means other than the preserving and conserving of cultural heritage. I outline the contextual details of HSM 85, including its proposing and managing state/s; explain the HSM's proposal, designation, and management; analyse the geopolitical implications of the HSM and its clean-up from an intra-national, inter-national, and extra-national context; and finally consider a counter case where states could potentially be interpreted as falling short of their environmental obligations in the name of heritage.

## 3.1 HSM 85, *Plaque Commemorating the PM-3A Nuclear Power Plant at McMurdo Station*



Figure 8.1: Approximate location of HSM 85.

[37] Donald L. Hardesty, "Issues in Preserving Toxic Wastes as Heritage Sites," *The Public Historian* 23, no. 2 (2001): 20.
[38] Hardesty, "Issues in Preserving Toxic Wastes as Heritage Sites," 22.
[39] Hardesty, "Issues in Preserving Toxic Wastes as Heritage Sites," 23.
[40] Hardesty, "Issues in Preserving Toxic Wastes as Heritage Sites," 25.

HSM 85 consists of a bronze plaque commemorating a decommissioned nuclear power plant that operated between 1962-1972 at the United States (US) McMurdo Station (Figure 8.1). It is secured to a large vertical rock on the western face of Observation Hill, the former site of the PM-3A reactor. The 'P' stands for portable, the 'M' for medium, the '3' represents it as the third reactor of its kind, and the 'A' indicates a field of installation.[41] The reactor was also known as a NNPU, short for Naval Nuclear Power Unit, which developed into the nickname, 'Nukey Poo.' The plaque itself details who was responsible for its authorisation, funding, design, erection, operation, and maintenance (Figure 8.2), and lists its primary achievement as being the 'only nuclear power plant to have operated in Antarctica.'[42] The other achievements listed are in relation to its power output, its support of the desalinisation plant, and its record power run at 4,400 hours.[43]




Figure 8.2: Close-up of the bronze plaque. (United States, WP005 2010.)

[41] National Science Foundation, "Five Years of Nuclear Power at McMurdo Station," *Antarctic Journal of the United States* 2, no. 2 (1967): 38.
[42] Second last line on the plaque.
[43] Third last line on the plaque.

HSM 85 is one of the US' three entries on the HSM List. The other two entries are HSM 54 and HSM 55, both designated in the late 1980s: the former is a bust of Richard Byrd, also at McMurdo Station, and the latter is East Base on Stonington Island. As established in *Chapter Four: Claiming Heritage*, the US has become more involved in Antarctic heritage management discussions in the last decade or so, speaking up at the 2007 ATCM (XXX) about the importance of properly managing HSMs as they represent 'a legacy for future generations.'[44] As a reserved claimant state, the US has flagged its interest in claiming territory in the region and its HSMs – which demonstrate the US' historic presence in Antarctic – would be key accessories in legitimising this right, if the opportunity were to arise in the future. HSM 85's proposition, designation, and management, as outlined below, provides insight into the geopolitical narrative that has been associated with Nukey Poo's legacy since it was shut down in 1972.

### 3.1.1 *The proposition, designation, and management of HSM 85*

The US' treatment of HSM 85 before, during, and after its clean-up and designation helps explain how the bronze plaque that sits in its place has become geopolitically relevant. The US proposed the *Plaque Commemorating the PM-3A Nuclear Power Plant at McMurdo Station* in 2010 through a Working Paper submitted at the 2010 ATCM (XXXIII). In this Working Paper, the US reiterates that 'The plaque commemorates the significant technical achievement of safely installing, operating, and removing the first, and only, nuclear power plant in Antarctic'[45] and goes on to state that 'It set two records for the longest continuous operation of a military reactor.'[46] This paper provides background information detailing the power plant's perceived initial use, design, operation, and decommissioning and clean-up. The proposal also includes a close-up photograph of the bronze plaque (Figure 8.2) before installation and references the HSM criteria, explicitly addressing the first, third, and fifth, that refer respectively to a significant historical event, a notable feat, and technical value. The US presented the following argument:

1) The plaque is associated with a particular event of importance in the history of science, namely the first use of a nuclear reactor to power an Antarctic research station.

[44] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXX Final Report*, 2007, paragraph 150.
[45] The United States, *Proposed addition of the Plaque Commemorating the PM-3A Nuclear Power Plant at McMurdo Station to the List of Historic Sites and Monument*, WP005 (2010): 4.
[46] WP005 (2010): 4.

2) The plaque is associated with a notable achievement, namely the longest continuous and safe operation of a military nuclear reactor.
3) The plaque is associated with a nuclear reactor that had technical value in its design and construction. The reactor was designed to be flown on a C-130, and assembled in any environmental conditions.[47]

The HSM proposal followed the final clean-up of the site undertaken during the 2009/2010 austral summer that removed the last buildings and contaminated soil. This was almost five decades after the reactor had last been operative. It appears that the US thought it necessary to have the site returned to an acceptable 'clean' state, with all material evidence of the reactor removed, before it could be officially commemorated as an HSM. To this effect, HSM 85 commemorates the alteration of a historical site for environmental purposes.

The US had HSM 85 designated in 2010 with reasonable ease, with the proposal at the ATCM (XXXIII) receiving no resistance. Russia, historically not typically considered an ally of the US, actually supported the designation, noting that 'the plaque commemorates a memorable achievement, and represents a tribute to those involved.'[48] The Measure under which it was adopted, Measure 15 (2010), was subject to fast approval and came into effect just a few months later, in August 2010. It is perhaps surprising that no parties made an objection in response to such a proposal, considering that it protects the memory of technology that directly challenges the pristine and peaceful aspirations for the continent embedded within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) since 1991. Even though all human presence in the region unavoidably produces waste and undermines the continent's 'purity,' this reactor represents a particularly potent and dangerous kind of waste. Since 2010, the description has remained unchanged: *Plaque Commemorating the PM-3A Nuclear Power Plant at McMurdo Station. The plaque is approximately 18 x 24 inches, made of bronze and secured to a large vertical rock at McMurdo Station, the former site of the PM-3A nuclear power reactor. It is approximately half way up the west side of Observation Hill. The plaque text details achievements of PM-3A, Antarctica's first nuclear power plant*.

[47] WP005 (2010): 5.
[48] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XXXIII Final Report*, 2010, paragraph 188.

The Naval Nuclear Power Unit Group that installed the plaque on Observation Hill is largely responsible for the management of HSM 85 on behalf of its official managing party, the US government. Given that the HSM is a plaque embedded within a rock, it requires little maintenance, and as such, the US has no Management Plans (MPs), or any other documentation for that matter, outlining approaches to upkeep and maintenance. However, the US did actively manage the site in the period after the reactor was decommissioned and prior to the designation of HSM 85 – between 1972 and 2010. Within this timeframe, the Navy dug 'a 9,000 cubic meter hole to "restore" the site to its "original condition."'[49] Although these efforts were not able to return the site to its original morphological state as desired, they did address the contamination levels in the ground, and thus represent a prioritisation of the environmental condition of the site just a few years after PM-3A had stopped operating.[50] In 1975 the Meeting adopted a Recommendation that specifically addressed the growing concerns around the disposal of nuclear waste in the region and a need to 'preserve the unique quality of the Antarctic environment.'[51] At this same ATCM, an Australian representative, K. G. Brennan, announced that, 'The safe disposal or storage of radioactive waste produced in the course of nuclear energy generation [in Antarctica] is a problem facing a number of countries, and the problem seems likely to increase greatly in magnitude before the end of this century.'[52] The US' treatment of HSM 85 ultimately affects how it is received by its own population, the international community, and individuals – all of which I detail in the following sub-section.

### 3.1.2 *Intra-national, inter-national, and extra-national geopolitical ramifications of HSM 85*

The commemoration of PM-3A within HSM 85 was first and foremost an intra-national celebration of the US' technological progress. Following the US' technology-intensive victory during the Second World War, the state focused its efforts on conquering the two remaining frontiers: outer space and Antarctica.[53] The reactor provided a concrete example of the nation's pioneering technological advancements in one of the most hostile environments on Earth, and speaks to a period within American history in which 'Americans reasonably harbored grand

[49] Owen Wilkes and Robert Mann, "The story of Nukey Poo," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 34, no. 8 (1978): 36.
[50] Elsewhere around the globe, decommissioned nuclear power plants are usually entombed in concrete. Antarctic Homestead, "The Nuclear Age in Antarctica," accessed 14 March 2021, http://antarctic.homestead.com/nuclear.html.
[51] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *Efforts to stop disposal of nuclear waste in the Antarctic Treaty Area*, Recommendation 12, 1975.
[52] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM VIII Final Report*, 1975, 10.
[53] James Spiller, *Frontiers for the American Century: Outer Space, Antarctica, and Cold War Nationalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 3.

expectations that they would positively remake the world … assume dominion over the ends of the earth [and make] Antarctica … do their bidding.'[54] The US' decision to designate the former site of the reactor as an HSM in 2010, even despite the scepticism associated with nuclear technology in the region by this time, emphasises the important role HSM 85 was assumed to play in the American public's celebration of an 'American Century.'[55] Although PM-3A never operated in the US, the reactor carried great symbolic value, as at the time of its installation the 'pre-eminence in all things nuclear was a source of national pride and self-confidence.'[56] According to the then-director of the National Science Foundation's (NSF) Office of Polar Programs, Karl Erb, PM-3A demonstrated the US' continuing commitment to 'support the complex needs of modern science – both here [McMurdo Station], and throughout the continent.'[57] This significance was recognised years later at a dedication ceremony for the plaque on Observation Hill on 19 January 2010.[58] Before the installation of the plaque and this event, the site could have been regarded as what Glasberg refers to as a 'blackout' site – that is, a 'built environment that is no longer available to sight' and which leads people to question its former existence.[59] PM-3A is now accessible to a domestic audience in a permanent exhibit at the US Navy Seabee Museum in Port Hueneme, California – the same location to which the US shipped the low-level contaminated soil to during the clean-up phase.[60] The control room is available for public viewing and in 2010 a former officer in charge of the reactor in 1964, Charles Fegley, reported that a duplicate aluminium plaque of the bronze original in Antarctica was to be donated to the museum.[61] The museum has also made available links to online educational, historical videos that summarise and provide footage of the construction and installation process of the reactor at McMurdo in 1961/1962,[62] and the Florida Museum of Science and Industry held a travelling exhibit on PM-3A in the late 1990s.[63] Even though the

---

[54] Spiller, *Frontiers for the American Century: Outer Space, Antarctica, and Cold War Nationalism*, 3.
[55] Spiller, *Frontiers for the American Century: Outer Space, Antarctica, and Cold War Nationalism*, 3.
[56] William J. Nuttall, *The Nuclear Renaissance: Technologies and Policies for the Future of Nuclear Power* (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 2.
[57] Peter Rejcek, "Lasting Memory," *The Antarctic Sun*, 25 June 2010, https://antarcticsun.usap.gov/features/contentHandler.cfm?id=2177.
[58] WP005 (2010).
[59] However, Glasberg mistakenly noted in 2012 that there was 'not even a plaque to mark its [PM-3A] having been there [Observation Hill].' Elena Glasberg, *Antarctica as Cultural Critique: The Gendered Politics of Scientific Exploration and Climate Change* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 17.
[60] National Science Foundation, "McMurdo Station Reactor Site Released For Unrestricted Use," *Antarctic Journal of the United States* 14, no. 1 (1980): 4.
[61] Rejcek, "Lasting Memory," 3.
[62] Naval History and Heritage Command, "Seabee Historical Videos," *U.S. Navy Seabee Museum*, 9 February 2018, https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/seabee/explore/online-reading-room/seabeevideos.html.
[63] Rob Adams, "Letter from the Editor: PM-3A, Pioneer in Antarctic Research," *Atomic Insights*, 1 November 1996, https://atomicinsights.com/letter-from-editor-pma-pioneer-anarctic-research/.

story of Nukey Poo is an 'episode in the continent's history … not often told,'[64] the US appears to be proud of its nuclear experiment in Antarctica. HSM 85 has been described as occupying 'a small piece of real estate'[65] on the continent (refer here to *Chapter Six: Reinforcing Heritage* for discussion on symbolic sovereignty), while the final resting place for the repatriated contaminated soil has been described as 'a small corner of a United States field [that] will be forever Antarctica.'[66]

The US' remediation of the former site of the reactor prior to HSM designation also demonstrates the state's eagerness to be seen as satisfying inter-national expectations for environmental protection in the region. The US' obligations under the Environmental Protocol in particular explain the primary impetus for the clean-up. Article V of the Treaty stipulates that 'Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste material shall be prohibited.'[67] The US abided by this provision when making sure to return the site to its former state. The NSF reported that the 'United States felt that the spirit of the treaty made it proper to remove not only the reactor, but also soil at the site that received the normal discharge of effluents from the reactor.'[68] But this fastidiousness was not evident in the past when the reactor was operational, as when the Naval Nuclear Power Unit had discovered a leak of radioactive effluent the US exploited the vagueness of 'radioactive waste material' in the Treaty's text. The unit decided that this incident 'did not necessarily constitute a violation of the Antarctic Treaty, which bans disposing of radioactive waste, because the treaty did not define the term radioactive waste.'[69]

The US' oscillating attitudes to the protection of the Antarctic environment can be explained by the function the reactor fulfilled for the state at different points in time. While the reactor was operational, the US considered environmental impact less important than the economic and technological gain it stood to make, but once the reactor became a burden to the state due

[64] Hanne Nielsen, "Remembering Antarctica's nuclear past with 'Nukey Poo,'" *The Conversation*, 23 July 2018, https://theconversation.com/remembering-antarcticas-nuclear-past-with-nukey-poo-99934.
[65] Rejcek, "Lasting Memory," 3.
[66] Dean Calcott, "Strontium powered, Antarctica's nuclear past is little known," *The Press*, 27 December 1996, 14.
[67] It should be noted that nuclear explosions in this context refers to activities such as weapons testing and deployment, not the controlled nuclear reaction that occurs within a nuclear reactor to create nuclear energy to further scientific research on the continent. Ryan A. Musto, "Cold Calculations: The United States and the Creation of Antarctica's Atom-Free Zone," *Diplomatic History* 42, no. 4 (2018): 664.
[68] National Science Foundation, "McMurdo Station Reactor Site Released For Unrestricted Use," 3.
[69] Nor does the term 'disposal' refer to accidents within international law. Wilkes and Mann, "The story of Nukey Poo," 36.

to its poor performance and problematic maintenance, all evidence of it was discarded and the rhetoric shifted to prioritising the environment.[70] In other words, the nuclear waste was no longer a necessary byproduct of energy generation, but rather a distraction and obstacle to the commemoration of a great technological feat by the US. The reputational cost of leaving the waste in situ has become greater than the logistical cost of cleaning it up.

In this behaviour the US could be seen, for all intents and purposes, to be abiding by the Treaty and Environmental Protocol in both the operation and removal of the reactor. Of course, the avoidance of international condemnation is one of states' main objectives within the practice of international relations – and in this case the US' repositioning of foreign policy to meet emerging international norms is particularly transparent. In Spiller's words, the US achieved a paradigm shift in its cultural politics in which the vision of Antarctica as a 'godforsaken frontier rich for the taking' switched to 'a sublime and critically important wilderness'[71] – exalting the US as 'an environmental steward in Antarctica'[72] and sustaining 'the American Century through nature conservation rather than conquest.'[73]

The US also used the designation of HSM 85 as a way of controlling how the story of Nukey Poo is told from an extra-national standpoint – that is, how individuals of different nationalities regard this nuclear chapter of Antarctic history. Although the overarching narrative of HSM 85 is one of technological prowess and human ambition, the designation of PM-3A as an HSM has received a mixed reaction. Some of the officers involved in the installation and operation of the reactor are delighted by an official recognition of its significance: 'Words cannot express my appreciation for your efforts, as well as the others that assisted, in getting the approval to have the historical plaque placed on Observation Hill. This is indeed a great tribute to all of the men that participated in the successful operation of the PM-3A.'[74] While others involved, including those of other nationalities, are greatly scarred, mentally and physically, by their time spent with PM-3A – particularly the clean-up. Although the NSF journal claimed that 'Never in the operation of the reactor … was there a single injury caused by or related to the reactor'[75]

[70] After a fault in 1972, it became apparent that it would cost twice as much to carry out repairs than it would to have the reactor dismantled – it would cost approximately 1.5 million USD to repair the reactor as opposed to approximately 800,000 USD to dismantle it. Wilkes and Mann, "The story of Nukey Poo," 35.
[71] Spiller, *Frontiers for the American Century: Outer Space, Antarctica, and Cold War Nationalism*, 15.
[72] Spiller, *Frontiers for the American Century: Outer Space, Antarctica, and Cold War Nationalism*, 18.
[73] Spiller, *Frontiers for the American Century: Outer Space, Antarctica, and Cold War Nationalism*, 156.
[74] Herb Smith, NNPU Command Master Chief for two austral winters, writing to Charles Fegley.
[75] National Science Foundation, "McMurdo Station Reactor Site Released for Unrestricted Use," 2.

– and the 2010 proposal stated that 'the radiation levels at the site were similar to background radiation levels and there was minimal risk from radiation exposure'[76] – individuals from New Zealand (NZ) in particular have testified that their suboptimal health is a result of their exposure to Nukey Poo's radioactive waste.[77] In a report released by the NZ Defence Force in 2018, it was noted that it was 'possible that those stationed at either McMurdo or Scott Base may have been impacted by power plant operations.'[78] Even though a 2013 report by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency concluded that radiation doses received by personnel at McMurdo between 1962–1979 were 'similar in magnitude to those that a person residing in the United States would receive, on average, in one year from background or medical sources,'[79] this side of the story – that is, the human impact, in addition to the environmental impact, of Nukey Poo – is not acknowledged in the site's commemoration. Irrespective of the actual medical impacts, Nukey Poo has had a severe psychological impact on the lives of these individuals. A Facebook group with over 900 'likes' dedicated to 'McMurdo Radiation Issues' and the reporting mentioned above is testament to this.[80] Therefore, how these individuals interpret the historic site and associated past events likely differs greatly from the government's official interpretation. The US' treatment of the individuals who came into contact with the reactor and endured lasting effects, is again explained by what US foreign policy stood to gain or lose. Even though the US was willing to invest in a comprehensive and highly visible clean-up program on site, this admission of responsibility did not extend to the individuals who had been on site. This is despite President Eisenhower's salute to the 'sacrifices' and 'selfless dedication' of those in Antarctica at the time.[81] The US government's reluctance to acknowledge the human impact of Nukey Poo is likely due to the significance of the ramifications associated with such an admission, which also reflects a trend in US policy on nuclear waste disposal elsewhere around the globe. Take, for example, the US' handling of the nuclear waste it created

[76] WP005 (2010): 4.

[77] Michael Field, "Health fears around polar nuke leak," *Stuff*, 7 March 2011, http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/americas/4739904/Health-fears-around-polar-nukeleak; and Will Harvie, "Kiwis fear cancer after working near leaky US nuclear reactor in Antarctica," *Stuff*, 10 May 2018, https://www.stuff.co.nz/environment/103481983/kiwis-fear-cancer-after-working-near-leaky-us-nuclear-reactor-in-antarctica.

[78] New Zealand Defence Force, "Public Advisory: Potential Radiation Exposure at McMurdo Station," 23 January 2018, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/news/public-advisory-potential-historic-radiation-exposure-at-mcmurdo-station/?fbclid=IwAR3qF2asDM4OvyQpFeewV3kLjKKOlXtAW7XMrSYOYhZoEbUs2kvxxmHIjpA.

[79] McMurdo Station Radiation Dose Assessment Integrated Project Team, "Technical Report: Upper-Bound Radiation Dose Assessment for Military Personnel at McMurdo Station, Antarctica, between 1962 and 1979," *Defense Threat Reduction Agency*, June 2013, 85.

[80] McMurdo Radiation Issues, "Antarctica – McMurdo Radiation Issues," *Facebook*, accessed 15 March 2021, https://www.facebook.com/McMurdoRadiation.

[81] Spiller, *Frontiers for the American Century: Outer Space, Antarctica, and Cold War Nationalism*, 63.

and deposited in the Pacific as part of its testing regime during the mid-twentieth century. It might appear that the US has satisfactorily dealt with the disposal of the fissile material in the region, but in reality, the peoples of the Marshall Islands are still living with the consequences today.[82] This failure by the US government to sufficiently recognise and compensate individuals affected by the existence of the reactor, or more specifically its byproduct, suggests an incomplete clean-up of the site overall. Similarly, in a polar context, the US effectively cleaned-up the space it claimed authority over – and in this case remediated the site for its potential future use as it was intending to remain there – but did not exert itself beyond this to attend to those who felt they were adversely affected.

### 3.1.3 *Counter Case – Abandoned, obsolete and ruined stations?*

At the beginning of this chapter, I mentioned my initial presupposition that states could well use the ambiguous and overlapping definitions of waste and heritage to evade environmental obligations – that is, designating what could otherwise be considered historic rubbish as HSMs. This concern is shared by Barr who highlights the potential for states to manage bases and other structures no longer being used inappropriately, or not at all.[83] Although I found that in fact the record does not show states avoiding the clean-up of historic sites on an individual level,[84] the acceptance of abandoned stations on the HSM List potentially signifies a systemic approval of the commemoration of structural waste overall – and therefore counters an assumption that all waste is cleaned up in abidance with environmental expectations. This links back to the conundrum of legacy waste and how it is dealt with. Stark, Snape, and Riddle state that dealing 'with this legacy [at abandoned stations] first requires a recognition that there is a problem, then the willingness to take ownership of the issue and ultimately, rectifying it through remediation.'[85] They also observe that while 'the requirement to remediate these sites may be widely accepted socially and culturally, it is economically unpalatable and creates competition

[82] Gerrard claims that the dome the US built to dispose of their radioactive waste in this part of the world 'would not meet today's US standards for the disposal of household trash. The dome lacks any liner at the bottom, a secure cap on top, or a system to collect water, and is placed above fractured rock and next to the water and below sea level – a municipal landfill could not be built in such a way.' Michael B. Gerrard, "America's forgotten nuclear waste dump in the Pacific," *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 35, no. 1 (2015): 93.

[83] Barr, "Twenty years of protection of historic values in Antarctica under the Madrid Protocol," 247.

[84] The abandoned and ruined stations that states have been designated as HSMs, have not been abandoned administratively. Those on the HSM List have been subsumed within the maintenance of the contemporary station they sit within (HSMs 26 and 37), have been incorporated within Management Plans for overarching Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (HSM 46/47), or have been attended to by heritage trusts and foundations (HSMs 61, 62, 63, 64, and 83).

[85] Jonathan Stark, Ian Snape, and Martin Riddle, "Abandoned Antarctic waste disposal sites: monitoring remediation outcomes and limitations at Casey Station," *Ecological Management and Restoration* 7, no. 1 (2006): 22.

for resources with traditional scientific disciplines with interests in Antarctica.'[86] These material remains are therefore held in abeyance as they await classification as either waste or heritage.

Wilkes Station in the section of East Antarctica claimed by Australia is a salient example. The site has undergone a series of clean-ups since it was abandoned in 1969 by the Australian Antarctic Program that had been granted custody of the site by the Americans after the end of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) in 1959.[87] The station can be described as an informal Antarctic historic site – that is, a site 'which may hold a cultural or historical value which is not yet recognised under existing relevant legislative frameworks.'[88] Although Wilkes Station is listed within Australia's Register for National Estate, its registration is only 'indicative,'[89] and the site has not been designated as an HSM despite showing great potential. The 'stalemate' between Australian Heritage Council (AHC) and the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) at Wilkes is the result of the two coexisting requirements: to preserve potentially valuable heritage artefacts and to clean-up legacy waste, respectively.[90] This idea of an impasse also applies to the two states involved with the site: Australia, the current caretaker of the site, and the US, its historical owners. At Wilkes, the ambiguous definition of waste has led to inaction from both parties due to the ramifications positive action could have on bilateral relations. If Australia was to officially define the legacy waste at the station as heritage, then it would need to either: a) claim and protect the remains as its own, thereby asserting ownership of the site; b) recognise the material remains as the US,' in effect granting them evidence of past occupation at a site within Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT); or c) propose a joint HSM with US, effectively recognising dual ownership of the site. Each of these options has the potential to strain relations between the two countries. Therefore, it could be argued that the health of the relationship is being prioritised over the 'health' of the site's environment.

---

[86] Stark, Snape, and Riddle, "Abandoned Antarctic waste disposal sites: monitoring remediation outcomes and limitations at Casey Station," 22.

[87] Clean-up activity occurring over the austral summers of 19871988, 1990/1991, 1992/1993, and 1993/1994. Sherrie-lee Evans, "Heritage at risk: cultural heritage management in Antarctica" (paper presented at *ICOMOS Symposium*, 19-21 July 2007, James Cook University, Cairns), 8.

[88] D. Camenzuli, K. Fryirs, D. Gore, and B. Freidman, "Managing legacy waste in the presence of cultural heritage at Wilkes Station, East Antarctica," *Polar Record* 51, no. 2 (2015): 152.

[89] Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment, "State of the Environment: Heritage values and the Antarctic environment," *Government of Australia*, accessed 31 May 2020, https://soe.environment.gov.au/science/soe/2011-report/7-antarctic/2-state-and-trends/2-5-heritage-values.

[90] Camenzuli, Fryirs, Gore, and Freidman, "Managing legacy waste in the presence of cultural heritage at Wilkes Station, East Antarctica," 151.

## 4. Summary: Meeting environmental obligations while satisfying national interest

There is no universal definition of heritage, which means that the processes that determine its management are open to interpretation and even manipulation. In Antarctica, states have the opportunity to exploit the weaknesses of the regional governing regime to define what would normally be interpreted as waste as heritage, in an attempt to avoid costly and time-consuming disposal. But, perhaps unexpectedly, this has not been the case. When managing official sites of historic significance in Antarctica, states have, for the most part, met their environmental obligations under the Environmental Protocol.

The management of HSM 85 gives a geopolitical explanation as to why a state might engage in extensive clean-up efforts, and subsequent formal designation, of a historic site. Within this case example, it is apparent that the management of the nuclear reactor was largely dictated by the national agenda and what it stood to gain or lose from particular courses of action. The US remediated the site and proposed it as an HSM to meet inter-national expectations concerning the Antarctic environment, as well as intra-national expectations for progress, and extra-national expectations for moral obligation. The intra-national and extra-national motivations for the designation and prior clean-up of HSM 85 were obtaining national pride and avoiding national shame, respectively. But the inter-national motivation reveals the most about the direction and nature of US foreign policy at the time. It could be argued that the installation of such technology on the continent in the first instance demonstrated the US' lack of regard for the Antarctic environment, as it was prepared to risk the occurrence of a serious nuclear accident (noting that a minor accident did occur) for economic advantage – that is, the cost-efficient production of energy. This idea links back to Hardesty's interpretation of toxic waste as a commodity with changing value: once the nuclear waste created by the reactor was no longer a necessary byproduct of energy production, its value plummeted, and it became a liability for the US. Just as the argument for the exploitation of Antarctica's resources was dismissed, so was the US' justification for the production and presence of nuclear waste on the continent. Overall, key motivations for the clean-up within US foreign policy largely reflect a shift in discourse surrounding acceptable uses of the Antarctic environment. Although it is technically permissible for a state to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes in Antarctica, if a proposal for a reactor were made today, it would be likely met with great suspicion and even

dismay by Antarctic states and the general public alike.[91] Nukey Poo represents an earlier chapter in Antarctic history in which it was possible, if not acceptable, to produce and hold (even temporarily) such waste in the region.

Therefore, even though the caveat provided by Annex III of the Environmental Protocol pertaining to heritage management and waste disposal has not been exploited by states so far, states have used Antarctic heritage as a means to pursue national Antarctic agendas, and meet international obligations and expectations concerning the Antarctic environment. Overall, however, a reluctance to clearly define heritage and waste in Antarctica within Antarctic affairs – due to the politicisation of the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse* (PAHD) – has left decisions concerning the disposal of material remains at the discretion of individual states. This means that states have the option to simultaneously protect material remains that they consider 'heritage,' and evacuate material remains they consider 'waste.' It also represents a weakness in the region's governing system as a whole – one that will be further strained as a number of national Antarctic programs embark on Antarctic station modernisation in the coming decades.[92]

[91] A Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker, the *Arktika*, departed from Saint Petersburg on its maiden voyage in September 2020. Headlines reporting on the event included one from CBS News: 'Russia touts huge new nuclear-powered icebreaker as proof "the Arctic is ours."' Alexandra Odynova, "Russia touts huge new nuclear-powered icebreaker as proof 'the Arctic is ours,'" *Columbia Broadcasting System News*, 22 September 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-touts-huge-new-nuclear-powered-icebreaker-as-proof-the-arctic-is-ours/.
[92] According to a survey by the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP), 73 per cent of its members are planning on, or are already in the process of, modernising their stations in Antarctica. Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs, *Modernisation of Antarctic Stations: Survey results*, IP047 (2019): 3.

# Chapter Nine: Reconceptualising Heritage

*Non-state actors' engagement with Antarctic heritage*[1]

In the previous chapters, I have analysed Antarctic heritage from a purely statist perspective, but other non-state actors in Antarctica also engage with historic remains in the region. Any overarching account of the geopolitics of Antarctic heritage cannot neglect the role these political actors play within international affairs. In this chapter I therefore concentrate on three key types of non-state actors in Antarctica – the tourism industry, non-governmental organisations, and individuals – to address my third and final primary research question, 'Which non-state actors have engaged with Antarctic heritage?' These actors encounter heritage on and around the continent, and by extension, the overarching System that governs it (the Antarctic Treaty System). To date, interaction between all parties on heritage-related matters has been amicable, and the statist version of heritage in the region continues to prevail. However, an absence of dissonance does not necessarily translate to identical understandings and interpretations of heritage in Antarctica. I begin this chapter by outlining these three types of non-state actors, their varying conceptualisations of Antarctic heritage, and previous research on their political history within a global and Antarctic context. I then discuss their engagement with Antarctic heritage through a series of case examples. Finally, I consider the ramifications that their alternative perceptions have had for the statist version of Antarctic heritage embodied within the Antarctic Treaty System.

## 1. Non-State Actors and Heritage

There are several types of non-state actors operating in the Antarctic region. The three most conspicuous are the tourism industry, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and independent or private individuals. In this section I outline the history of each actor's presence in Antarctica; detail previous literature that has discussed the nature of their presence, both within and outside the polar region; and consider how each of these non-state actors interpret heritage. As Powell et al. exclaim, 'the notion that Antarctic heritage – both natural and cultural – can have multiple meanings and uses is not new. Furthermore, through these multiple meanings, the discourses about Antarctic heritage are also dynamic and may be used as vehicles

[1] This chapter has been published in modified form as: Rebecca Hingley, "Diverging Antarctic Heritage Discourses: The geopolitical ramifications of non-state actor engagement with the 'state-sanctioned' version of Antarctic heritage," *The Geographical Journal* (February 2021).

for exploring perceptions of social, political, environmental, and economic issues.'[2] What *is* new, however, is the changing political and physical climate in which these historic sites and remains are situated.

### 1.1 Commercialisation of Heritage: *the tourism industry*

The tourism industry is one of a handful of commercial endeavours that the remoteness and harshness of the Antarctic environment has attracted rather than deterred.[3] The others include the sealing and whaling industries, krill and toothfish fisheries, and bioprospecting. Tourists first arrived in the region in the 1960s,[4] and have rapidly increased in numbers since: the 1992/1993 season had 6,704 visitors, the 2018/2019 season had 44,600 visitors, and the 2019/2020 season had 73,991 visitors following the launch of nine new ice-strengthened passenger vessels.[5] The association responsible for overseeing the industry, the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO), was founded in 1991 'to advocate and promote the practice of safe and environmentally responsible private-sector travel to the Antarctic.'[6]

Although ship-based tourism accounts for the vast majority of Antarctic tourism operations, the industry has diversified as it has grown and now offers other activities such as camping, skiing, mountaineering, skydiving, and cycling – all activities IAATO classifies as 'deep field experiences.'[7] These adrenaline-inducing pursuits – as well as the advent of 'last-chance' tourism that urges people to see the continent of ice before it melts away – are common explanations for the 'modest but unrelenting human tide [that] washes up on Antarctic shores each year.'[8] People can also visit Antarctica for its history – that is, the historic remains left

---

[2] Robert B. Powell, Gregory P. Ramshaw, S. Scott Ogletree, and Kathleen E. Krafte, "Can heritage resources highlight changes to the natural environment caused by climate change? Evidence from the Antarctic tourism experience," *Journal of Heritage Tourism* 11, no. 1 (2016): 72.

[3] Elena Glasberg, *Antarctica as Cultural Critique: The Gendered Politics of Scientific Exploration and Climate Change* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 23.

[4] Lindblad Travel, an American tour operator, began small-scale tourist cruises to Antarctic in 1966. Diane Erceg, "Explorers of a different kind: A history of Antarctic tourism 1966–2016" (PhD diss., The Australian National University, 2017), 5.

[5] International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators, "IAATO Antarctic visitor figures 2019-2020," *International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators*, accessed 25 February 2021, https://iaato.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/IAATO-on-Antarctic-visitor-figures-2019-20-FINAL.pdf.

[6] International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators, "Our Mission," accessed 14 June 2020, https://iaato.org/about-iaato/our-mission/.

[7] International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators, *IAATO Overview of Antarctic Tourism: 2018-19 Season and Preliminary Estimates for 2019-20 Season*, IP140 rev.1 (2019): 6.

[8] Julia Jabour, "Strategic Management and Regulation of Antarctic Tourism," in *Antarctic Futures: Human Engagement with the Antarctic Environment*, eds. Tina Tin, Daniela Liggett, Patrick T. Maher, and Machiel Lamers (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 273.

behind by the early explorers of the Heroic Era. The industry presents these seasonal visitors with the opportunity to visit sites of historical significance during their trip, such as rock cairns (HSM 27), cemeteries (HSM 31), huts (HSM 39), monuments (HSM 40), memorial sites (HSM 53), historic bases (HSM 61), shipwrecks (HSM 74), and station ruins (HSM 76).

On a global scale, heritage tourism, often falling under the purview of cultural tourism, is one of the oldest and most widespread forms of travel.[9] A growing popularity in the 'recreated and reinterpreted past'[10] makes this sector responsible for a significant portion of the global tourism industry's total visitors per annum.[11] Heritage tourism is often denounced for the emergence of pseudo-heritage products that cut the notion of authenticity 'completely loose from its moorings.'[12] According to this view, states are directly engaging with heritage tourism and 'the new norm appears to be the outright manufacture of heritage coupled with the active consumption of tradition in the built environment.'[13] Despite this growth and popularity, Winter argues that historically, heritage scholarship has regarded tourism as a threat to heritage[14] – he claims that the word itself (tourism) has become 'a metaphor for destruction, erosion, or commodification.'[15] However, the field is starting to challenge these disparaging views and recognise the opportunities that arise as a consequence of heritage.[16] The gradual establishment of a 'heritage industry' has undoubtedly expanded the appeal and scope of heritage and led to the assemblage of new environments in which multiple possibilities of, and potentials for, heritage can coexist for multiple audiences.[17] These new approaches to mediating the past for popular audiences have culminated in a 'proliferation of alternative histories'[18] – of which polar heritage tourism is one.

[9] Dallen J. Timothy and Stephen W. Boyd, "Heritage Tourism in the 21st Century: Valued Traditions and New Perspectives," *Journal of Heritage Tourism* 1, no. 1 (2006): 1-2.
[10] Hyung yu Park, *Heritage Tourism* (Routledge: Abingdon, 2014), 3.
[11] Involving hundreds of millions of people per year. Timothy and Boyd, "Heritage Tourism in the 21st Century: Valued Traditions and New Perspectives," 1-2.
[12] Nezar Alsayyad, *Consuming Tradition, Manufacturing Heritage: Global Norms and Urban Forms in the Age of Tourism* (Routledge: London, 2013), 25.
[13] Alsayyad, *Consuming Tradition, Manufacturing Heritage: Global Norms and Urban Forms in the Age of Tourism*, 3.
[14] Tim Winter, "Heritage Tourism: The dawn of a new era?" in *Heritage and Globalisation*, eds. Sophia Labadi and Colin Long (London: Routledge, 2010), 117.
[15] Winter, "Heritage Tourism: The dawn of a new era?" 117.
[16] For two different critical approaches see: Winter, "Heritage Tourism: The dawn of a new era?"; and Laurajane Smith, *Uses of Heritage* (London: Routledge, 2006).
[17] Park, *Heritage Tourism*, 2.
[18] J. Urry, *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies* (London: Sage, 1990), 121.

Following the recognition of this new industry, critical heritage scholars have also begun to analyse the role of the tourist in heritage management. Poira, Butler, and Airey claim that 'the perception of a place as part of personal heritage is associated with the visitation patterns … [and] those who view a place as bound up with their own heritage are likely to behave significantly differently from others.'[19] González has also discussed the issue of heritage tourism management, but in relation to intangible heritage. He states that intangible heritage tourism can provide a source of identity for visitors separate from local places, becoming in effect an 'existential tourism,' which involves 'traveling in order to incorporate distant cultures within one's own personal cosmopolitan identity.'[20] Lastly, Waterton and Watson discuss in great depth the complex experience of heritage through tourism.[21] This acknowledgement of the role of the tourist is essential to understanding how polar tourism industries come into contact with polar heritage, as it is this group that either cooperate with or defy international norms on heritage management in Antarctica.

Although literature within Polar Studies has covered the advent of polar tourism extensively, there have only been a handful of contributions relating specifically to polar heritage tourism. These include Roura's doctoral thesis on 'Tourist behaviour at cultural heritage sites in Antarctica and Svalbard';[22] Senatore and Zarankin's discussion of 'invisible historic sites';[23] Powell et al.'s and Nichol's analyses of the potential for heritage resources to raise awareness of climate change;[24] and Avango's work on industrial or working polar heritage.[25] Several scholars have also discussed the tourist's experience of polar heritage, just as critical heritage scholars have done in relation to heritage tourism on a global scale: Maher, Steel, and McIntosh raise the need for further research on the experiences of tourists in Antarctica;[26] and Powell et

[19] Yaniv Poria, Richard W. Butler, and David Airey, "The core of heritage tourism," *Annals of Tourism Research* 30, no. 1 (2003): 238.
[20] Miguel V. Gonzalez, "Intangible heritage tourism and identity," *Tourism Management* 29, no. 4 (2008): 807-810.
[21] Emma Waterton and Steve Watson, *The Semiotics of Heritage Tourism* (London: Channel View Press, 2013).
[22] Ricardo Roura, *The Footprint of Polar Tourism: Tourist behaviour at cultural heritage sites in Antarctica and Svalbard* (Groningen: University of Groningen, 2011).
[23] Maria Ximena Senatore and Andrés Zarankin, "Tourism and the Invisible Historic Sites in Antarctica" (paper presented at *ICOMOS General Assembly and Scientific Symposium*, 27 November – 2 December 2011, Paris).
[24] Powell, Ramshaw, Ogletree, and Krafte, "Can heritage resources highlight changes to the natural environment caused by climate change? Evidence from the Antarctic tourism experience"; and C. Nichol, "Using heritage to engage Antarctic tourists with climate change," in the *Handbook of Climate Change Communication: Vol. 2*, eds. W. Leal Filho, E. Manolas, A.M. Azul, U.M. Azeiteiro, and H. McGhie (Cham: Springer, 2018).
[25] Dag Avango, "Working geopolitics: sealing, whaling, and industrialized Antarctica," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 485-504.
[26] Patrick T. Maher, Gary Steel, and Alison McIntosh, "Examining the experiences of tourists in Antarctica," *The International Journal of Tourism Research* 5, no. 1 (2003): 59-67.

al. investigate the immediate affective responses of visitors to Antarctica.[27] But Bauer's empirical account of cruise ship passengers' motivations for travelling to the frozen continent (one of which is to see historic sites) is the most cited contribution.[28] Bauer finds that the 'main interest while ashore' for over half of the passengers is 'wildlife,' while only one to four per cent identify 'historic sites' as a place of interest.[29] No further research has been conducted since Bauer's 2001 study to verify if this low level of interest is still the case.

The heritage industry considers heritage as a commodity or a 'socio-cultural asset.'[30] In debates surrounding the contemporary function of heritage, Smith explains how traditional and historical perspectives on heritage have regarded this commodification of heritage as a betrayal of the most acceptable and honourable uses of heritage objects and places. These perspectives conceive of mass heritage tourism as a 'Disneyfication' of heritage.[31] But Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge argue that, irrespective of the attitude toward the industry, heritage is both worth money and earns money; and by recognising it as an economic as well as a cultural phenomenon, heritage managers unlock the potential to maximise the effectiveness and survivability of heritage assets.[32] They also contend that although heritage tourism serves as only a secondary motive for the creation of heritage – as collections of artefacts and historical sites would continue to exist without it – the primary argument for the maintenance of heritage is an economic one.[33] Lastly, Park explains that even though heritage resources are typically assumed to be irreplaceable and non-renewable, from an economic perspective heritage is not in fixed supply as there are no limits, other than that of the human imagination, to its production determined by tourist demand.[34]

### 1.2 Normalisation of Heritage*: heritage NGOs*

Non-governmental organisations arrived in Antarctica at approximately the same time as the tourism industry. The global environmental movement of the late twentieth century introduced

---

[27] Robert B. Powell et al., "From awe to satisfaction: Immediate affective responses to the Antarctic tourism experience," *Polar Record* 48, no. 2 (2012): 145-156.
[28] Thomas Bauer, *Tourism in the Antarctic: Opportunities, Constraints, and Future Prospects* (New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2001).
[29] Bauer, *Tourism in the Antarctic: Opportunities, Constraints, and Future Prospects*, 157.
[30] Alan Fyall and Brian Garrod, "Heritage tourism: at what price?" *Managing Leisure* 3, no. 4 (1998): 213-228.
[31] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 28.
[32] Brian Graham, Gregory Ashworth, and John Tunbridge, *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy* (London: Arnold, 2000), 130.
[33] Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge, *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy*, 129-153.
[34] Park, *Heritage Tourism*, 3.

perhaps the most visible group of NGOs – environmental organisations – who are concerned with Antarctica's natural heritage.[35] While acknowledging the entanglement of natural and cultural heritage, here I focus only on organisations committed to protecting the region's cultural heritage. A conglomerate of committees, trusts, and foundations are devoted to the preservation of this type of heritage in the region. The three most active NGOs in this area are the International Polar Heritage Committee (IPHC), the Antarctic Heritage Trust (AHT), and the Mawson's Huts Foundation (MHF). The International Polar Heritage Committee, established in 2000, is a scientific group of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS). Its founding purpose was to bring together 'heritage specialists of all relevant professions – from field archaeologists to conservators to managers – working in either or both polar areas.'[36] The Committee is currently drafting a 'Charter for the Protection and Management of Archaeological Heritage in Antarctica' to present to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM).[37] The Antarctic Heritage Trust, established in 1993, is a coalition of the New Zealand (NZ) AHT established in 1987 and the United Kingdom (UK) AHT established in 1993. Together, these trusts aim to conserve the human history of Antarctica and promote its relevance in a contemporary context.[38] The AHT has received significant international recognition for its work.[39] Finally, the Mawson's Huts Foundation[40] was founded in 1996 as an Australian donor-funded, non-profit organisation.[41] The Foundation has carried out important conservation surveys, work, and research at the site at Cape Denison in East Antarctica since this time, and has also established a replica museum of the huts in the Gateway city of Hobart, Tasmania.

There is little research on the general category of NGOs with a heritage focus or mandate. However, of the small portion of literature that does discuss the phenomenon of heritage NGOs, Escallón's assessment of their role within the governance of intangible heritage shows the

[35] For example, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) is a leading expert on natural heritage and can attend and advise meetings of the Committee for Environmental Protection.
[36] Barr was the president of the IPHC between 2000, when the Committee was first founded, until 2012 when she moved to the position of vice president. Susan Barr, "Twenty years of protection of historic values in Antarctica under the Madrid Protocol," *The Polar Journal* 8, no. 2 (2018): 249-250.
[37] Barr, "Twenty years of protection of historic values in Antarctica under the Madrid Protocol," 263.
[38] Barr, "Twenty years of protection of historic values in Antarctica under the Madrid Protocol," 249.
[39] Including that from Getty Foundation and World Monuments Fund. Henry Redmond, "The Literature of the Antarctic Heritage Trust and the Mawson's Huts Foundation" (postgraduate certificate thesis, University of Canterbury, 2010), 8.
[40] Until 1999, the Foundation's title was the Australian Associated Press Mawson's Huts Foundation.
[41] The Foundation is classified as a medium size charity. Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, "Mawson's Huts Foundation Limited," the *Australian Government*, accessed 4 November 2020, https://www.acnc.gov.au/charity/54ea893aa70410e11e98ce366e0e94ad.

ability of these non-state actors to take part in the practice of international relations.[42] She refers to NGOs as governing bodies with a capacity to represent different communities, and talks about how they have been granted 'floor time' within the intergovernmental committee sessions of the 2003 *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage*. Although heritage NGOs do not enjoy the same amount of exposure at ATCMs, the global model raises the possibility of a similar inclusion within Antarctic governance in the future. Polar heritage experts have been commentating the need for this inclusion since the 1980s.[43] These academics and practitioners recognise the importance of heritage NGOs and the experts they employ in the conservation and preservation of Antarctic cultural heritage (and are often closely involved with one or more themselves).

NGOs that concern themselves with the conservation of cultural heritage regard heritage as an aspirational normative goal – by which I mean that they are not necessarily concerned with the exact definition of heritage (given that this is constantly changing), but rather with the conservation processes and techniques applied to the objects and sites classified as such. As discussed in *Chapter Three: Codifying Heritage*, these non-state actors can be considered norm entrepreneurs whose motivations are rooted in 'empathy, altruism, and ideological commitment.'[44] Take, for example, the mission statements of the three heritage NGOs mentioned earlier: the International Polar Heritage Committee, the Antarctic Heritage Trust, and the Mawson's Huts Foundation. The IPHC's listed objectives are to:

> (a) promote international co-operation in the protection and conservation of nonindigenous heritage in the Arctic and Antarctic;
> (b) consult and co-operate with Arctic indigenous peoples regarding heritage of cross cultural significance;
> (c) provide a forum for interchange of experience, ideas, knowledge, and the results

[42] Maria Fernanda Escallón, "Negotiating intangibles: the power, place, and prestige of NGOs in heritage governance," *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 26, no. 8 (2020): 719-736.
[43] See, for example, Warren, Pearson, Evans, and Barr. Patricia Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties" (draft of master's thesis, University of Washington, 1989); Michael Pearson, "Artefact or rubbish – a dilemma for Antarctic managers," in *Cultural Heritage in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions*, eds. Susan Barr and Paul Chaplin (Oslo: ICOMOS, 2004); Sherrie-lee Evans, "Heritage at risk: cultural heritage management in Antarctica" (paper presented at *ICOMOS Symposium*, 19-21 July 2007, James Cook University, Cairns); and Barr, "Twenty years of protection of historic values in Antarctica under the Madrid Protocol."
[44] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 898.

of research between administrators, archaeologists, conservators, historians, legislators and other professionals;

(d) promote international studies and projects;

(e) expand technical co-operation by fostering links with specialised institutions.[45]

There is clear attention here to the processes of protection and conservation, rather than just the final outcome. These actors also aspire to achieve widespread education and engagement. The four main goals listed for the NZ AHT's work program are a good example:

- Conserving Antarctica's heritage under the Trust's care for future generations
- Sharing the world's greatest exploration stories
- Encouraging youth to explore the physical world to educate and inspire them
- Sustain and grow the Trust's programmes while caring for people and the planet.[46]

The UK AHT's mission statement maintains this focus on communication and outreach:

- We exist to preserve, enhance and promote British Antarctic heritage to engage, inform and inspire a global audience.
- We care for and conserve historic buildings and artefacts in Antarctica so that they might be enjoyed and learned from by current and future generations.
- We support other organisations to preserve British Antarctic heritage, be they sites, artefacts or archives.
- We deliver and support of a range of innovative public programmes to engage and inspire people of all ages with 250 years of British human endeavour in Antarctica.[47]

Lastly, the Australian MHF publishes its mission as being to 'conserve, protect and maintain Mawson's Huts and educate the broader community about Australia's rich and unique Antarctic heritage.'[48]

[45] International Council on Monuments and Sites, "Objectives and activities," accessed 4 November 2020, http://iphc.icomos.org/index.php/home/objectives-and-activities/.
[46] New Zealand Antarctic Heritage Trust, "Our Work," accessed 4 November 2020, https://nzaht.org/about-aht/.
[47] The United Kingdom Antarctic Heritage Trust, "Our Mission," accessed 4 November 2020, https://www.ukaht.org/about-us/our-mission.
[48] Mawson's Huts Foundation, "Our Mission," accessed 4 November 2020, https://www.mawsons-huts.org.au/about/.

Within all these mission statements, objectives, and aims, there is an underlying commitment to the *methodology* of heritage protection and an emphasis on best practice. Of course, the desired final outcome for all these organisations is the successful preservation of the historic remains in question, but how they go about this task and on whose behalf they perform it is paramount to their operation. In other words, the act of heritage conservation and preservation is a moral obligation for these experts, practitioners, and technicians.

### 1.3 Personalisation of Heritage: *individuals*

In Antarctica there are independent travellers who are technically tourists (although it could be argued that anyone visiting the region is a tourist) but do not engage with the mainstream operators. Some examples include: scientists, chefs, mechanics, other support staff, and artists of national programs;[49] state figures such as the Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg and Australian Senator, Barnaby Joyce; royalty such as Britain's Prince Harry and Princess Anne; celebrities such as pop singer Lorde and actor Orlando Bloom; as well as an unknown number of undocumented persons. Even though this last group is minimal given the effectiveness of IAATO reporting, this group of people is particularly problematic for states, as the successful governance of the region relies largely upon transparency between the Treaty parties concerning who is doing what, where, and when. Although the majority of undocumented persons are likely associated with illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and are therefore unlikely to come into contact with sites of Antarctic heritage, there is still a chance that other private vessels, such as yachts, do.[50] All of these individuals, documented or undocumented, provide insight into how heritage in Antarctica can be understood beyond the lens of the state. States may govern Antarctica, but 'bottom-up improvisations of everyday Antarctic life … [help] move considerations of Antarctica from the realm of abstract space to inhabited space,'[51] and give greater meaning to the socio-cultural practices performed there, such as those by independent or private individuals.

[49] Artists and writers are in their own category as even though they can be sponsored by national programs, they are not beholden to them as an employee like the other personnel mentioned. Artists and writers can also make their way to the continent with tourist operators, or on their own accord – for example, the 2017 Antarctic biennale voyage.

[50] 'The Berserk Incident' in 2011 highlighted the problematic presence of such vessels in the region. The Norwegian yacht signalled a distress call after encountering rough weather, initiating a weeklong international search and rescue operation. New Zealand, Norway, the United States, *The Berserk Incident, Ross Sea, February 2011*, IP018 (2011).

[51] Jessica O'Reilly and Juan Francisco Salazar, "Inhabiting the Antarctic," *The Polar Journal* 7, no. 1 (2017): 9.

The key observation within literature on people-object encounters is that heritage is more than just the physical object or site being engaged with – it is an all-encompassing experience that the individual extracts meaning from and which can in turn affect the future treatment of that particular object or site.[52] The term 'heritage-making' describes this process as it can be defined as 'the ways in which people interact – routinely and creatively – with heritage.'[53] This act involves different actors at different levels, one of which is the individual,[54] and more recent literature has called for a 'better account of individual practices of heritage-making and engagement'[55] and for a reinsertion of the 'individual/transient into heritage processes.'[56] This is what I am endeavouring to do within this chapter, but in an Antarctic context.

There is very little literature pertaining to this process of heritage-making by individuals in Antarctica, as opposed to the national and international levels of engagement. What research there is tends to focus on individuals within the context of mainstream Antarctic tourism. Senatore et al. focus on individual tourist experience of Antarctic heritage, identifying '"moments" of encounter, engagement, and meaning making, that could be interpreted as constitutive of the cultural experience in Antarctica' from data collected over four Antarctic cruises and with an objective to 'enhance understanding of the wider context of this complex process [heritage-making] in Antarctica.'[57] Earlier research by Roura on tourist movements in the region, which informed Senatore et al.'s study, details prominent behavioural patterns of tourists at historic sites, their physical traces post-visitation, and several management perspectives. Perhaps the most important realisation so far has been that tourists to Antarctica are not a blank slate, and even though Antarctic tour guides can influence them,[58] each person will still develop their own unique understanding of Antarctic heritage influenced by the

[52] Piera Buonincontri, Alessandra Marasco, and Haywantee Ramkissoon, "Visitors' experience, place attachment and sustainable behaviour at cultural heritage sites: A conceptual framework," *Sustainability* 9, no. 7 (2017): 2.
[53] Emma Waterton, "A more-than-representational understanding of heritage? The 'past' and the politics of affect," *Geography Compass* 8, no. 11 (2014): 829.
[54] Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Hui Yew-Foong, and Philippe Peycam, eds. *Citizens, Civil Society and Heritage-making in Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017), 2.
[55] Hamzah Muzaini and Claudio Minca, eds. *After Heritage: Critical Perspectives on Heritage from Below* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), 3.
[56] Muzaini and Minca, *After Heritage: Critical Perspectives on Heritage from Below*, xi.
[57] Maria Ximena Senatore, Cornelia Lüdecke, María Victoria Nuviala, Sebastián Arrébola, and Gabriela Roldán, "Antarctic Heritage as Individual Experiences," *SC-HASS 2019 conference proceedings*, 73.
[58] Roura, *The Footprint of Polar Tourism: Tourist behaviour at cultural heritage sites in Antarctica and Svalbard*, 215.

personal experience they had whilst in the polar region.[59] While this research on tourists leaves other categories of individuals who interact with Antarctic heritage – such as station personnel who come into regular contact with historic artefacts on station – unaddressed, it provides approaches that could be extended to all individuals on and around the continent, not just tourists. This chapter attempts (among other things) to shift this focus from individuals engaging with Antarctic heritage from within the tourism industry, to individuals engaging with heritage outside of it.

Heritage as understood by the individual may align with national, commercial, or environmental perceptions of Antarctic heritage already explored, but can also depart from these as it is fundamentally a personal and emotional experience. Smith succinctly summarises this concept of heritage as individual experience when stating that 'individual heritage performances can occur across the dining room table, as we glance through photo albums, talk to each other about familial histories, and so on.'[60] Warren also comments on the influence of historical resources on personal identity: 'They serve as a comforting legacy and also as an inspiration to the future. They enable people to imagine their future by allowing for meaning through images and the hope of and mystery associated with those images.'[61] These individual constructions of heritage have not had a profound effect on Antarctic affairs to date, but they hold the potential to, and are therefore worth acknowledging. In the same way Salazar scales-up Antarctic 'ethnographies' to signal 'attention to the "banal geopolitics" of everyday life in Antarctica … [and to provide] fresh perspectives on larger scale (national and global) debates in polar geopolitics,'[62] so too can individual engagements with heritage be scaled-up to better understand the complexities of heritage management in Antarctica. The statist perspective on Antarctic heritage relies on the power of identity politics – or national identity more specifically – to draw together a like-minded populace within the territorial domain of states. But individuals also use heritage to legitimate their identity as, according to Douglas, it helps fulfil

[59] An article published just prior to submission of this thesis talks about how cultural heritage is 'part of an assemblage of elements which combine to create a subliminal and largely intangible Antarctic experience.' Bob Frame, Daniela Liggett, Kati Lindström, Ricardo M. Roura, and Lize-Marié van der Watt, "Tourism and heritage in Antarctica: exploring cultural, natural and subliminal experiences," *Polar Geography* (2021): 1.
[60] Laurajane Smith, "Heritage, Identity and Power," in *Citizens Civil Society and Heritage-making in Asia*, eds. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Hui Yew-Foong, and Philippe Peycam (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017), 20.
[61] Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties," 50.
[62] Juan Francisco Salazar, "Geographies of place-making in Antarctica: an ethnographic approach," *The Polar Journal* 3, no. 1 (2013): 53.

‘the basis for making choices and facilitating relationships with others while positively reinforcing these choices.’[63] The Antarctic Treaty states have harnessed this urge to validate the present with the past in the form of national Antarctic narratives, as has the tourism industry in the form of adventure tourism which enables individuals to prove to themselves that they are capable of camping on the ice or trekking across the continent, for example. But research on this relationship between heritage, the individual and the Antarctic context has only begun in the last decade or so,[64] and therefore this chapter’s aim is to make the geopolitical perspective of this relationship, along with other non-state actors’ relationships with heritage in Antarctica, explicit.

The tourism industry, conservators, and independent individuals therefore have the ability to reconceptualise the dominant (statist) understanding of heritage in this part of the world – that is, the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse* or PAHD, outlined earlier in this thesis. How they engage with the region’s heritage is a separate story, however, as I now investigate.

## 2. Case Examples: Non-state actors’ engagement with Antarctic heritage

By analysing the interaction of non-state actors with Antarctic heritage, I maintain that, even though non-state actors have their own conception of heritage in Antarctica (and elsewhere around the globe), the nature of this engagement is ultimately determined by the official and overarching approach to heritage in Antarctica – that is, the statist version of Antarctic heritage management outlined in previous chapters. This is potentially truer for heritage found in Antarctica than anywhere else in the world, given the restrictive nature of access there. Although these non-state actors hold differing understandings of Antarctic heritage, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and its mechanisms for protecting and managing historic places and objects determines the conditions under which non-state actors come into contact with material heritage. I will now outline three specific case examples to evidence this.

[63] N. Douglas, “Political Structures, Social Interaction and Identity Changes in Northern Ireland,” in *In search of Ireland: a cultural geography*, ed. Brian Graham (London: Routledge, 1997), 151-152.
[64] See for example Roura, *The Footprint of Polar Tourism: Tourist behaviour at cultural heritage sites in Antarctica and Svalbard*, 225-247; Salazar, “Geographies of place-making in Antarctica: an ethnographic approach”; and Senatore, Lüdecke, Nuviala, Arrébola, and Roldán, “Antarctic Heritage as Individual Experiences.”

2.1 *IAATO and the supervision of heritage tourists*

One of the most critical decisions made within Antarctic heritage management concerns what can and cannot be considered 'heritage.' As I have argued, Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) have developed a particular conception of heritage as represented by the official HSM List and the selection of sites it celebrates. The Antarctic tourism industry, as influential as it made be, is largely excluded from this process, but it does come into direct contact with the final product: the designated Historic Sites and Monuments (HSMs). The reception of IAATO within the ATS helps demonstrate this complex dynamic.

Figure 9.1: The 'polar plunge' at Pendulum Cove, Deception Island. (Ricardo Roura, 2002.)

On occasion IAATO has expressed its investment in heritage-related matters, such as when it asserted its 'right' to use the Pendulum Cove site at Deception Island in 2002 (Figure 9.1),[65] but ultimately it is responsive to, and respectful of, decisions made by the Consultative

[65] Roura, *The Footprint of Polar Tourism: Tourist behaviour at cultural heritage sites in Antarctica and Svalbard*, 106.

Parties.[66] The Antarctic tourism industry honours the spirit of the ATS through a commitment to its heritage-related legislation and apparatus[67] that can limit access to sites of recognised 'historic value,'[68] as well as prescribe the acceptable and correct behaviour expected at and within their vicinity.[69] For example, IAATO has attempted to control site visitors, and in 2019 published a piece on 'respecting Antarctic science and heritage,' instructing tourists that: 'Antarctica's history is a fascinating tale of courage and exploration in an extreme environment, a legacy left in structures and artifacts. Please leave them untouched for future visitors to enjoy. Be careful not to damage, leave graffiti, remove or interfere with any historic sites or monuments.'[70] The Association has also incorporated within its bylaws an obligation to 'advocate and promote operation by the Membership within the parameters of the Antarctic Treaty System, including the Antarctic Treaty and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty'[71] – which is particularly meaningful for IAATO member states that have not signed the Treaty (or the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty by extension) as they are not subject to the rules and regulations of the System.[72] Moreover, in delivering a large audience directly to the sites selected by states as possessing heritage value in Antarctica – which, as this thesis has shown, are constructed largely through national discourses – the tourism industry is playing an active role in the dissemination of the nationalistic narrative of heritage.

### 2.2 *Mawson's Huts Foundation at Commonwealth Bay*

The relationship between heritage NGOs and the managing states of HSMs is mostly harmonious. This is largely due to the intertwined fate of the two actors: the state's HSM would not be preserved without the necessary expertise that these organisations provide, and the

---

[66] Roura, *The Footprint of Polar Tourism: Tourist behaviour at cultural heritage sites in Antarctica and Svalbard*, 99-100.

[67] Including the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs), Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), and Conservation Management Plans (CMPs).

[68] Article 7, Annex V, the *Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty*, 4 October 1991, Madrid.

[69] Article 8 of the fifth annex to the Environmental Protocol is dedicated to Historic Sites and Monuments and their classification, proposition, documentation, treatment, and amendment, and states that, 'Listed Historic Sites and Monuments shall not be damaged, removed or destroyed.' Article 8, Annex V, the *Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty*, 4 October 1991, Madrid.

[70] International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators, "Respecting Antarctic Science & Heritage," *International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators*, accessed 25 February 2019, https://iaato.org/respect-science-and-heritage.

[71] International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators, "IAATO Bylaws," *International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators*, updated January 2021, https://iaato.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/IAATO-Bylaws-Updated-January-2021.pdf.

[72] Roura, *The Footprint of Polar Tourism: Tourist behaviour at cultural heritage sites in Antarctica and Svalbard*, 100.

organisation would not be able to carry out its work without the permission of the state. It is very much a reciprocal relationship in which the NGO is concurrently supported by, and supports, the state.

Figure 9.2: Mawson's Huts at Commonwealth Bay, Cape Denison. (Geoff Ashley, 1997.)

The conservation of the huts at Commonwealth Bay (Figure 9.2), HSM 77, by the Mawson's Huts Foundation is a helpful case example for the investigation of this relationship. In the decade prior to the Foundation's establishment, there was tension between individual expeditioners and heritage managers.[73] According to Mackay, 'two privately-arranged "Project Blizzard" expeditions witnessed the first clash between eager and enthusiastic expeditioners and cautious public sector heritage managers in the Australian Heritage Commission. The tension evident between good intentions to save the huts through physical work and the emerging role of the Australian Government as heritage manager meant that works themselves were regulated and the level of physical intervention was limited.'[74] But in the following decade, a curious set of circumstances saw the Foundation fill a void left by the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) when the latter did not classify conservation intervention as a 'core responsibility.'[75] The Foundation's expedition to Commonwealth Bay in 1997/1998 inspired a conservation vision for the site that accorded with advice given to the Division from the

[73] Richard Mackay, "Ice, Icon and Identity: The Meaning of Mawson's Huts," in *Object Lessons: Archaeology and Heritage in Australia*, eds. Jane Lyndon and Racy Ireland (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2005), 112.
[74] Mackay, "Ice, Icon and Identity: The Meaning of Mawson's Huts," 112.
[75] Mackay, "Ice, Icon and Identity: The Meaning of Mawson's Huts," 113.

Australian Heritage Commission.[76] This combined guidance then resulted in the drafting of policy that would eventually inform a Conservation Management Plan (CMP) for Mawson's Huts.[77]

The Foundation receives financial support from government grants, donations and bequests, income from goods and services, and investments; and receives logistical support from the Division.[78] Although its goods and services account for the largest portion of its total income, government grants are integral to not only ensuring that important conservation efforts take place in a timely manner,[79] but also granting official recognition and legitimacy to the work the Foundation does.[80] In return, the Foundation supports the Australian government's associated values, ideals, and expectations for objects and sites deemed national heritage. Most importantly, the narrative retold and celebrated by both parties is centred around *the* Australian Antarctic hero, Sir Douglas Mawson. As Griffiths observes, Mawson's name is 'almost as iconic and sacred as the words "Bradman" and "ANZAC"'[81] – a famous Australian cricketer and the Australian (and New Zealand) soldiers who fought in the First World War, respectively. The Foundation describes its vision as 'to inspire current and future generations by conserving and communicating the legacy of Sir Douglas Mawson's expeditions, other Antarctic pioneers and Australia's Antarctic heritage';[82] while the Commonwealth Heritage List entry for the huts defines their significance as associated with 'Sir Douglas Mawson and the members of the

[76] Mackay, "Ice, Icon and Identity: The Meaning of Mawson's Huts," 113.
[77] Mackay, "Ice, Icon and Identity: The Meaning of Mawson's Huts," 113.
[78] In April 2020, the Foundation was successful in its application to the Australian Heritage Grants Program, and secured 321,000 AUD to resume urgent conservation work on site in the upcoming season (2020-2021). However, this expedition did not go ahead due to the outbreak of a global pandemic that reduced national programs and decimated the tourism season. Mawson's Huts Foundation, "Federal Government Grant Ensures continued Conservation of Heritage Site," 27 April 2020, https://www.mawsons-huts.org.au/federal-government-grant-ensures-continued-conservation-of-heritage-site/.
[79] The website of the Australian Antarctic Division claims that the Foundation's past conservation expeditions have been 'largely funded by the Australian government.' The government also supports these conservation expeditions logistically, by providing necessary equipment, training, and sometimes transport arrangements via the Division. The Australian Antarctic Division, "Mawson's Huts, Cape Denison," *Australian Government*, accessed 4 November 2020, https://www.antarctica.gov.au/about-antarctica/history/cultural-heritage/mawsons-huts-cape-denison/.
[80] The Governor-General of Australia's patronage of the Foundation is another indicator of this formal recognition.
[81] Tom Griffiths, "The AAT and the Evolution of the Australian Nation" (occasional paper, *Australia's Antarctica: Proceedings of the Symposium to Mark 75 Years of the Australian Antarctic Territory*. Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies, 2012, Hobart).
[82] Mawson's Huts Foundation, "Saving Australia's Antarctic heritage," accessed 4 November 2020, https://www.mawsons-huts.org.au/.

AAE [Australasian Antarctic Expedition] for whom the site was a base and home for two years.'[83]

The conservation works performed by the Foundation on the behalf of the state also help to maintain the strategic advantage of the site – that is, demonstrating effective presence and occupation in the region prior to the signing of the Treaty.[84] Mackay, one of the consultants commissioned for the drafting of the first CMP for the site in 2001, states that 'in a political context … its [the main hut] very existence provides a physical basis for part of Australia's claim to 42% of the Antarctic territory – perhaps that is its primary physical value *in situ*.'[85] This territorial focus was reflected in comments by the chairman and CEO of the Foundation, David Jensen, in 2012 when he stated that Mawson's 'enormous' legacy marked 'the largest Antarctic claim of any nation … [making the huts the] birthplace of Australia's Antarctic heritage.'[86] The arrangement between the Foundation and the government department is therefore one of mutual assistance and recognition.

Lastly, the Foundation satisfies legislative requirements for their activities on- as well as off-site. It applies for all relevant approvals and permits with the Division, and most importantly, enacts the government's CMP for the site. In cooperating with state rules and regulations the Foundation is awarded a degree of agency. Its efforts are also appreciated by the Division, which does not have the capacity to conserve the site without assistance.[87] Therefore, like the tourism industry, this non-state actor supports rather than undermines the status quo for Antarctic heritage management, and exists in relative symbiosis with its supervising state.

---

[83] The Australian Government, "Mawson's Huts Historic Site, Dumont D'Urville Station, EXT, Australia." *Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment*, accessed 24 February 2021, https://www.environment.gov.au/cgi-bin/ahdb/search.pl?mode=place_detail;search=state%3DEXT%3Blist_code%3DCHL%3Blegal_status%3D35%3Bkeyword_PD%3D0%3Bkeyword_SS%3D0%3Bkeyword_PH%3D0;place_id=105435.

[84] Collis has commented more generally on how cultural technologies were used to make Antarctica Australian territorial possession. Christy Collis, "The Proclamation Island moment: making Antarctica Australian," *Law Text Culture* 8, no. 1 (2004): 39-56.

[85] Mackay, "Ice, Icon and Identity: The Meaning of Mawson's Huts," 119.

[86] David Jensen, "Conserving the legacy of Antarctica's heroic era," *Aurora* 100 (2012).

[87] Mackay, "Ice, Icon and Identity: The Meaning of Mawson's Huts," 113.

2.3 *Jaroslav Pavlíček and the legacy of Eco-Nelson Hut*

The construction, and eventual demolition, of Eco-Nelson Hut (Figure 9.3) is a fascinating example of an individual in Antarctica operating outside of the System, and furthermore, an individual constructing his own version of Antarctic heritage in the form of personal legacy.



Figure 9.3: Main Room, Eco-Nelson Hut. (United Kingdom and Czech Republic, *Report of the Antarctic Treaty Inspections*, 2015.)

Eco-Nelson Hut was a non-governmental facility built in 1989 on Nelson Island in the Antarctic Peninsula region by a private Czech citizen, Jaroslav Pavlíček, and intermittently occupied by him, and occasionally volunteers, for almost three decades. Pavlíček established this structure – what he called a 'Green Home' – to conduct a practical study on sustainable living in extreme conditions. In relation to the conservation of historic remains at the site, the Green Home program took the matter into its own hands and developed its own strategy: 'The most interesting findings, like floating cards, which had been sent out on purpose, we send back to their place of origin. Very interesting findings, such as old historical pieces covered with moss are left on the place for marine archaeologists. The wood, usually from broken pallets and boxes, is being dried and used as fuel.'[88] Presumably these artefacts are not

[88] Jaroslav Pavlíček, "The Green Home in Antarctica," *Eco-Nelson*, accessed 23 February 2020, http://econelson.org/?en_program=.

remnants of his own presence in the area, but rather those before him, meaning that he thought himself fit to take on the role of cultural heritage steward and conservator.

The success of the Green Home experiment overall is highly questionable, as the last inspection in 2015 by the United Kingdom and Czech Republic highlighted several issues of great concern. Environmental management – which should have been paramount given that one of the key objects of the whole exercise was to have 'minimal environmental impact'[89] – was poor. No evidence of a waste management plan was in place, medical facilities were practically non-existent, and logistics, infrastructure, and communications were rudimentary.[90] The inspectors summarised the state of the site as follows: 'Eco-Nelson appears poorly operated and maintained, and the huts are now extremely dilapidated and dangerous. The facility poses a significant risk to human health and potentially to the local environment. Whatever the earlier rationale for the facility, the Observers were not convinced that such a justification existed for it now. In the view of the Observers it should be closed down and the huts cleaned up and removed from Antarctica.'[91] The report concluded with an official recommendation which stated that 'without a complete overhaul of the purpose and state of Eco-Nelson, the facility should be removed as soon as possible and the surrounding area cleaned-up and remediated.'[92] In 2019, following the damning inspection report, the Czech Antarctic Foundation assumed responsibility of the site, renamed it 'CzechoNelson,' cleaned it up, and began dismantling it.[93] Essentially, Eco-Nelson Hut – one man's attempt to establish his own form of Antarctic heritage and legacy – did not meet state expectations of heritage and was subsequently eliminated.

The idea of a rogue actor within International Relations usually refers to a state that defies prevailing norms within the International System. However, it can also refer to non-state actors, in this case individuals like Pavlíček, defying the prevailing norms of the ATS. Partzsch defines

[89] The United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, *Report of the Antarctic Treaty Inspections undertaken jointly by the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic in accordance with Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 14 of the Environmental Protocol 2014-2015*, (2015): 86.
[90] The United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, *Report of the Antarctic Treaty Inspections undertaken jointly by the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic*, 88-89.
[91] The United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, *Report of the Antarctic Treaty Inspections undertaken jointly by the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic*, 89.
[92] The United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, *Report of the Antarctic Treaty Inspections undertaken jointly by the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic*, 89.
[93] A Background Paper submitted by the Czech Republic gave an update on this process. The Czech Republic, *Follow-up to the Recommendations of the Inspections at the Eco-Nelson Facility*, BP010 (2019).

such actors as 'social entrepreneurs,' in that they are individuals offering an alternative outlook on international politics around the globe – such as private donors or celebrities.[94] In this regard, Pavlíček is a self-defined environmental activist who deliberately disobeyed the rules of the Treaty, despite being a citizen of a signatory state. However, while he was able to evade the System for over 25 years, he and his private dwelling were eventually subject to its procedures and expectations – in short, his hut did not satisfy the same statist narrative as those from the Heroic Era, for example.

## 3. Potential Geopolitical Implications: of non-state actor interference heritage matters

The three non-state actors detailed above present several geopolitical implications for Antarctic heritage management within the ATS. Their engagement with sites of historic significance in the region pose both threats and opportunities for the System's official management of heritage. These opposing outcomes are characterised by the effect they have on the ATS as well as the sites themselves, which can be understood as the tangible product of the official discourse or the PAHD.

### 3.1 *Threats posed by the tourism industry, heritage NGOs, and individuals*

Threats to the Antarctic Treaty System's account of heritage are presented by: the tourism industry's growing presence in the region that undermines the System's grasp on non-state actors in the region in general; the expert opinions of heritage specialists that could question the current method of management; and individuals' physical visitation of the sites that has led to their damaging.

The potential threats that Antarctic tourism poses to Antarctic heritage relate to the vulnerability of the heritage governance system and what it represents – that is, the prioritisations of the PAHD outlined in *Chapter Five: Authorising Heritage*. Although the ATS has the capability to address the operation of the tourism industry – as demonstrated within Article 3 of the Environmental Protocol – as the industry continues to grow, unease surrounding its seemingly unrestricted future does also, as outlined momentarily. Article 3 specifically refers to 'Activities undertaken in the Antarctic Treaty area pursuant to scientific research

[94] Lena Partzsch, "Private Individuals in International Relations: Conceptualizing Social Entrepreneurs as a New Type of Actor" (*International Relations and the First Image Subject: International Relations, ECPR-Workshop*, 12-17 April 2011, University of St. Gallen).

programmes, tourism and all other governmental and non-governmental activities' as being subject to the environmental principles within the Environmental Protocol, and as already mentioned IAATO has incorporated this commitment into its bylaws. But several academics – including Bastmeijer, Roura, and Jabour – still call for modification of the key documentation to go further in addressing the industry's operation in the region. Over the past three decades they have: discussed the addition of an annex to the Environmental Protocol that specifically addresses the Antarctic tourism industry, its movements and impact on several occasions;[95] have called for a better application of the precautionary principle;[96] and have suggested the sponsoring of tourism operators by states.[97] Adding to these concerns, the sites themselves could be considered under-protected. Site guidelines are not currently mandatory for HSMs; CMPs that could address this are still being formulated; and Environmental Impact Assessments are inadequate[98] as historic values are seldom the subject of them.

The heritage experts and professionals that advise the System could also undermine it. Although organisations such as the IPHC and AHT can submit Information and Background Papers to ATCMs, they do not enjoy formal recognition within the System. This is most obvious in the rejection of professional assistance to the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) from the IPHC on several occasions; the absence of a scientific group covering cultural heritage matters within the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR); and an overall de-prioritisation of matters relating to the Humanities and Social Sciences (HASS) within the region's research agenda.[99] As Warren observes, despite the 'politically unifying thread'[100] that archaeological research can evoke, states prioritise 'shrines to heroic men rather than the scientific study of physical culture.'[101] In turn, this poor recognition risks offending heritage experts and creating dissent. The global environmental movement of the late twentieth century demonstrates how non-state actors familiar with the

[95] Kees Bastmeijer, "A Long-Term Strategy for Antarctic Tourism: The Key to Decision Making within the Antarctic Treaty System?" in *Polar Tourism: Human, Environmental and Governance Dimensions*, eds. Patrick Maher, Emma Stewart, and Michael Lück (New York: Cognizant Communication Corporation, 2011).
[96] Kees Bastmeijer and Ricardo Roura, "Regulating Antarctic Tourism and the Precautionary Principle," *The American Journal of International Law* 98, no. 4 (2004): 763-781.
[97] Jabour, "Strategic Management and Regulation of Antarctic Tourism."
[98] Kees Bastmeijer and Ricardo Roura, "Environmental Impact Assessment in Antarctica," in *Theory and Practice of Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment*, eds. Kees Bastmeijer and Timo Koivurova (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 202.
[99] Barr, "Twenty years of protection of historic values in Antarctica under the Madrid Protocol," 249.
[100] Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties," 60.
[101] Warren, "A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties," 65.

ATS (but ultimately considered outsiders) can disrupt the agenda for international relations in the region. While such a movement on heritage is unlikely to be imminent, any possible source of tension is a concern for the ATCPs. The recommendations from heritage experts could also affect when and if certain historic remains are officially recognised as heritage. Recent research from heritage specialists has recommended that 'each nomination for HSM status shall include a Conservation Management Plan … [and] a Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation'[102] – which, if adopted (however unlikely an occurrence), could deter states from engaging in paperwork-heavy heritage protection and management processes.

Individuals' visitation to HSMs pose the most immediate threat to the sites' physical existence, apart from the harsh Antarctic environment itself. In Antarctica, damage to official sites of Antarctic heritage has largely been caused out of negligence at best and disrespect at worst. Some examples include trampling of cemeteries,[103] as evidenced by Roura;[104] and looting of historic artefacts, as evidenced by Broadbent.[105] In a global context, the long-standing charge is that tourists destroy the very heritage they have travelled to experience by causing physical damage and behaving inappropriately.[106] Antarctica proves no exception, with the removal or souveniring of artefacts recorded at Heroic Era huts, such as those in the Ross Sea region.[107] But individuals who fall outside of the traditional Antarctic tourism industry are also responsible for heritage destruction. For example, urination on the memorial cross on Observation Hill (HSM 20) could have just as easily been committed by one of the many personnel working at McMurdo or Scott Bases as a passing tourist. The expeditioners of various national Antarctic programs are in contact with heritage items on a daily basis. For example, at Mawson Station there are cabinets displaying historical artefacts that have been curated and annotated by station personnel, as well as a taxidermied sledge dog.[108] However, one of the most memorable events of HSM tampering was in January 2010 when two

[102] Barr, "Twenty years of protection of historic values in Antarctica under the Madrid Protocol," 260.
[103] Such as *Whalers Bay Cemetery*, HSM 31/71.
[104] Roura, *The Footprint of Polar Tourism: Tourist behaviour at cultural heritage sites in Antarctica and Svalbard*.
[105] Noel D. Broadbent, "From Ballooning in the Arctic to 10,000-Foot Runways in Antarctica: Lessons from Historic Archaeology," in *Smithsonian at the Poles: Contributions to International Polar Year Science*, eds. Igor Krupnik, Michael A. Lang, and Scott E. Miller (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, 2007), 50.
[106] Gregory Ashworth, "Do Tourists Destroy the Heritage They Have Come to Experience?" *Tourism Recreation Research* 34, no. 1 (2009): 79-83.
[107] D. Harrowfield, "Archaeology on ice. A review of historical archaeology in Antarctica," *New Zealand Journal of Archaeology* 26, (2005): 5-28.
[108] The Australian Antarctic Division, *Mawson Station Heritage Management Plan 2014-2019*, the Australian Government, 58.

yachtsmen – that is, independent travellers not a part of the tourism industry – broke into a hut on Winter Island and lit a non-working stove. The hut (Wordie House or HSM 62) is jointly managed by the UK and Ukraine, who brought the damage to the attention of the ATCPs at the following ATCM. [109] What this incident, along with those mentioned above, demonstrates is that damages caused to HSMs thus far have not been committed out of malice, but rather a disregard for what the ATS and the HSM Framework seek to protect – perhaps this is more disturbing than if the destruction had been planned and calculated. The intruders had obviously held little respect for the historical significance of the hut and simply utilised it for the shelter it provided at the time of their predicament (according to the report they were 'worse for drink.')[110] Even though their condition suggests that they felt they had no other choice than to break in, if they had respected the expectations surrounding site visitation – or visitation to the continent overall – in the first instance, the situation would likely have been avoided.

3.2 *Opportunities presented by the tourism industry, heritage NGOs, and individuals*

These three non-state actors open up different opportunities for the strengthening of the statist approach to Antarctic heritage. The tourism industry supports the national narrative of heritage and its conservation program, heritage experts offer legitimacy to policy-makers, and individuals could pose as potential 'ambassadors' for the version of cultural heritage forwarded by the statist interpretation.

Antarctic tourism strengthens the official approach to Antarctic heritage in two ways: it reinforces the statist imaginary for Antarctic heritage through marketing off the continent, and it supports states' conservation agendas on the continent. As Nielsen argues, operators tailor their products to satisfy the consumer's desire to follow in the footsteps of past explorers of the Heroic Era.[111] Laing and Frost also identify the industry's enabling of such re-enactments.[112] For example, *Heritage Expeditions* sold a package for the 2019/2020 season titled 'In the Wake

[109] The United Kingdom, France, and Ukraine, *Report of an incident at Wordie House (HSM No. 62)*, WP025 (2010): 1-5.
[110] WP025 (2010): 3.
[111] Nielsen has covered this topic extensively within both her doctoral thesis and chapter for the *Handbook on the politics of Antarctica*. Hanne Nielsen, "Brand Antarctica: selling representations of the south from the 'heroic era' to the present" (PhD diss., University of Tasmania, 2018); and Hanne Nielsen, "Selling the south: commercialisation and marketing of Antarctica," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 184.
[112] Jennifer Laing and Warwick Frost, *Explorer Travellers and Adventure Tourism* (Bristol: Channel View Publications, 2014), 138-164.

of Scott and Shackleton' that sailed on the historic ship, *Spirit of Enderby*:[113] the package clearly refers to two expeditioners from the Heroic Era, while the ship's name makes reference to two Enderby brothers who were 'at the forefront of Antarctic exploration for almost 40 years in the early 1800s' (although *Samuel Enderby & Sons* was a sealing and whaling firm which suggests in this case a commemoration, even if not intentional, of industrial heritage also).[114] The tourism industry also presents a practical opportunity for states in the form of logistical support for conservation efforts. The maintenance and upkeep of HSMs in Antarctica requires a lot of time, effort, and money – resources that national Antarctic programs rarely have to spare. Moreover, if there is no Management Plan (MP) in place to ensure that the sites stay intact, the sites fall prey to the elements' unrelenting assault and deteriorate rapidly. Therefore, when supplementary support from tourism operators can be sourced, sites receive more attention. Again, Mawson's Huts at Commonwealth Bay provides a useful example. In 1996/1997 *Heritage Expeditions* supported a brief 24-hour site condition assessment;[115] in 1997/1998 *Heritage Expeditions* was again chartered and delivered a conservation team that made vital internal structural repairs;[116] in 2005/2006 *Aurora Expeditions* delivered expeditioners to Commonwealth Bay to carry out important conservation works;[117] in 2006/2007 the conservation team was brought back to Hobart aboard *Sarsen* – a tourist vessel trialling voyage for future itineraries;[118] in 2010/2011 additional members of the conservation party travelled aboard *Orion*, another tourist vessel;[119] and most recently in 2018, *Chimu Adventures* arranged an expedition in collaboration with the Foundation to visit the site,[120] although they were ultimately unable to make it ashore due to thick pack ice.[121]

Heritage experts and professionals also provide a valuable opportunity for states to legitimise their policy-making. Despite NGOs' potential to undermine the System if under-appreciated or

---

[113] Heritage Expeditions, "Antarctica," accessed 19 January 2020, https://www.heritage-expeditions.com/destinations/antarctica-travel/.
[114] Heritage Expeditions, "Spirit of Enderby," *Heritage Expeditions*, accessed 14 June 2020, https://www.heritage-expeditions.com/about/ships/spirit-enderby/#:~:text=Spirit%20of%20Enderby,is%20perfect%20for%20Expedition%20Travel.
[115] Pers. comm. with MHF expedition leader, Rob Easther, April 2021.
[116] Pers. comm. with MHF expedition leader, Rob Easther, April 2021.
[117] The Australian Antarctic Division, "Conservation team sets sail for Mawson's Huts," *Australian Government*, 8 December 2005, https://www.antarctica.gov.au/news/2005/conservation-team-sets-sail-for-mawsons-huts/.
[118] Pers. comm. with MHF expedition leader, Rob Easther, April 2021.
[119] Pers. comm. with MHF expedition leader, Rob Easther, April 2021.
[120] Chimu hosted the CEO/Chairman of the MHF, but the French Antarctic program was responsible for logistics.
[121] Frances Armitage, "Press release: History made as tourist expedition gets close to Mawson's Huts for the first time in seven years," *Chimu Adventures*, 5 January 2018, https://www.chimuadventures.com/blog/2018/01/mawsons-huts-tourist-expedition/.

excluded, for the most part, this group has been cooperative and supportive of the ATS approach to heritage overall, offering advice and insight whenever the opportunity arises. The past decade in particular has proven the worth of these experts in designing effective heritage management systems. Between 2010 and 2018 heritage experts helped to drastically modify the HSM Guidelines and Guide, two cornerstone documents of the HSM Framework, and are currently (2021) working on draft Antarctic Archaeology Guidelines with SCAR. Their motivation for this task is powered by a desire to align the governance and management of Antarctic heritage with international standards – or in other words, successfully implement procedures and processes of best practice in the region. It also goes without saying that without the professional conservators, archaeologists, specialist carpenters, and more who make up conservation teams, the historic sites would be in very poor state (and many still are). Although it is impossible to define the perfect level of intervention without the work of expert conservators, many sites would have fallen prey to the inhospitable Antarctic environment, leaving behind nothing physical to designate or commemorate. If material cultural heritage preservation is the goal – which current designation trends in Antarctica would suggest – then this group of people are essential to not only maintaining and securing sites' continued existence, but also helping communicate the value of conservation to an external audience.

It might seem that independent individuals have little to contribute to a discussion on Antarctic heritage management. However, previous literature on 'Antarctic ambassadors' has identified the potential contribution these individuals could make to ceasing processes of decay at historic sites. Discussion on the emergence of this group, its meaning, and effect has been ongoing since the early 2000s,[122] but a comprehensive working definition has only just been offered by Alexander et al.: 'An Antarctic ambassador is someone [i.e., individual or group] who has a connection to, knowledge of and passion for the Antarctic (as a space, place or idea), who represents and champions Antarctica and its values, and who supports Antarctica through communication and behaviour.'[123] Ultimately, just as national Antarctic heritages are forged, personal links with the continent are also. Tourism operators have recognised this potential connection for some time and have used it to their advantage. For example, a 1997 report by *Heritage Expeditions* suggested that they were creating '"ambassadors" by raising awareness

[122] See Maher, Steel, and McIntosh, "Examining the experiences of tourists in Antarctica"; and Robert B. Powell, Stephen R. Kellert, and Sam H. Ham, "Antarctic tourists: Ambassadors or consumers?" *Polar Record* 44, no. 3 (2008): 233-241.
[123] Karen A. Alexander, Daniel Liggett, Elizabeth Leane, Hanne E. F. Nielsen, Jennifer L. Bailey, Madeline J. Brasier, and Marcus Haward, "What and who is an Antarctic ambassador?" *Polar Record* 55, no. 6 (2020): 502.

… through sharing with them [their patrons] the unique natural history of Antarctica and the Sub-Antarctic, allowing Expedition members to visit historic sites and discussing with them the conservation issues confronting the Antarctic Continent.' [124] Although this energy is currently directed toward natural heritage, there is a very real opportunity for individuals – especially those with social capital mentioned at the beginning of this chapter (politicians, royalty, and celebrities) – to promote and spread the message of conservation and preservation at these cultural sites.

## 4. Summary: The final arbiter of Antarctic heritage

Antarctic heritage is not exclusively for states. Nor is it perceived exclusively from the statist perspective that is enshrined within the regime that governs the region, the Antarctic Treaty System. The System dictates how non-state actors should engage with heritage on and around the continent, but it does not hold a monopoly on what Antarctic heritage is, or is for. To demonstrate this, I have drawn upon examples from three non-state actors active in the region: the tourism industry, non-governmental organisations, and individuals. The tourism industry, I have argued, understands heritage as a commodity, heritage NGOs regard heritage as a normative goal or moral obligation, and individuals encounter heritage as a form of personal experience.

These varying interpretations of heritage do not yet challenge the official and dominant definitions and uses of heritage in the polar region, but they do pose some potential complications. The ATS itself becomes vulnerable as gaps in its legislation are revealed by the non-state actors, and its exclusive operation is challenged. Non-state actors also play a part in potential damage and destruction, under-conservation, and rapid decline of the physical sites. However, non-state actors also present some valuable opportunities for the current approach to heritage management in Antarctica. The statist understanding of heritage is reinforced and supported: by the tourism industry's marketing and logistical operations; by access to heritage experts, practitioners and professionals who can assist in implementing best practice; and by independent individuals that hold the potential to pose as conservation 'ambassadors.'

[124] Heritage Expeditions, *Initial environmental evaluation for the Antarctic cruise program 1997/1998 of polar research vessel Akademik Shokalskiy* (Christchurch: Heritage Expeditions, 1997), 208.

As non-state actors in Antarctica multiply and diversify, the meaning of Antarctic heritage does also. In time, this will likely lead to a revaluation of how Antarctic heritage is, and could be, engaged with. But for the time being, the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse* (PAHD) – that embodies the statist perspective within the ATS – is the final arbiter of what Antarctic heritage is, and how it should be protected and used.

# Chapter Ten: Conclusion

*The heritage of Antarctic geopolitics*

Antarctica is often presented as an exceptional place, the last wilderness, a natural environment almost untouched by humans. That picture omits not only humans but also material things from the pristine Antarctic scene and does not reflect the contemporary reality of the continent.

— Ximena Maria Senatore, "Things in Antarctica: An archaeological perspective," *The Polar Journal* 10, no. 2 (2020): 397.

This thesis has analysed the geopolitics of cultural heritage in Antarctica to expose why states participate in heritage management for reasons beyond the protection of historic places and objects. To support this analysis, I have provided detailed accounts of what Antarctic heritage is, whom it is for, and how it is consumed. It is already well known that political actors interact with formal and informal heritage in Antarctica on a regular basis, but pre-existing research has not considered extensively the nature and geopolitical ramifications of their engagement.

Overall, I have shown that, despite Antarctica's extreme climate, remote location, and unique system of governance, the understanding of material things found on and around the continent is in many ways unexceptional. As with heritage found elsewhere around the globe, the historic remains commemorated in this polar region are considered good and pristine; are mostly tangible; are engaged with passively; and are nationalised, politicised, and commodified. What is exceptional, however, is the particular way that states deploy Antarctic heritage for geopolitical means – in a place where states are restricted in their ability to assert dominance over international affairs, they seek out alternative pathways of influence. This final chapter will summarise and discuss my key findings and consider their academic and policy-relevant contributions.

## 1. Findings: The 'who,' the 'how,' and the 'which' of Antarctic heritage geopolitics

I posed three primary research questions, and two secondary research questions (as depicted in Figure 10.1) as a way of structuring my enquiry into the complex relationship between geopolitics and heritage in Antarctica. In the opening chapters I addressed the question 'What is Antarctic heritage and why is it worth studying?'; and later in this final chapter I ask 'When might heritage management in Antarctica change?' Below I explain the answers to the three primary research questions that I asked throughout the body of the thesis.




Figure 10.1: Answers to research questions (as originally posed in Figure 1.2).

The first question I asked was, 'Whose perspective on Antarctic heritage counts?' This question is the most complex of the three as it first required the proposition of a *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse* – what I termed the PAHD – and identification of the author/s of this discourse. Following this, I had to clarify how the discourse was constructed, what it entailed, and its characteristics. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 combined to answer this research question. *Chapter*

*Three: Codifying Heritage* determined what makes the prevailing discourse 'count,' how it was constructed, and what it constitutes; *Chapter Four: Claiming Heritage* identified who was predominantly responsible for the construction of the discourse; and *Chapter Five: Authorising Heritage* considered the characteristics of the discourse. The prevailing discourse on Antarctic heritage is written down and enshrined or codified within international law and is then operationalised to influence state behaviour. The key documents pertaining to heritage within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) are those concerned with Historic Sites and Monuments (HSMs) – the HSM List, the HSM Guide, and the HSM Guidelines – and constitute what I refer to as the HSM Framework. The states with territorial claims in Antarctica made the most meaningful contributions to progressing the HSM Framework. They accounted for 85 per cent of the papers submitted, were responsible for instigating 95 per cent of the discussions had on Antarctic heritage management, and had played an important role in all 13 of the intersessional periods on heritage. The United Kingdom (UK) was particularly active in the area. Moreover, the prevailing discourse on Antarctic heritage closely matches that of the Authorised Heritage Discourse (AHD) – the dominant discourse on heritage management globally – challenging an exceptionalist approach that frames the Antarctic region, and its heritage, as somehow removed from the rest of the world.[1]

The second question I asked was, 'How have states deployed Antarctic heritage for geopolitical means?' Despite states' genuine investment in the conservation and preservation of historic remains in this part of the world, they have serviced additional and ulterior motives when managing their Antarctic heritage. Geopolitical readings of several case examples within Chapters 6, 7, and 8 suggest that there are three main potential geopolitical deployments for Antarctic heritage (or HSMs more specifically): as a means to exercise de facto sovereignty (*Chapter Six: Reinforcing Heritage*), as a means to nation-build (*Chapter Seven: Constructing Heritage*), and as a means to meet environmental expectations (*Chapter Eight: Wasting Heritage*). The deployment of HSMs as a geopolitical means to exercise de facto sovereignty was by far the most common strategic application of HSMs by states. In this regard, HSMs provide states with a way to demonstrate their durable presence on the continent and to affect decision-making processes. Many of the entries on the HSM List could be considered acts of symbolic sovereignty, given that HSM proposals are in and of themselves states' textual

[1] Elizabeth Leane, "Fictionalizing Antarctica," in the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 27.

performances of their Antarctic pasts. States have therefore identified Antarctic heritage as an effective method to make known their past, present, and intended future presence in the region. The deployment of HSMs as a geopolitical means to nation-build was less commonly applied by states as it is only relevant to a select group, the New Polar Powers – also referred to as 'emerging,' 'intensifying,' or more recently, 'fast-rising' polar powers.[2] Proposing and designating HSMs helps states with more recent Antarctic pasts establish a material connection with the frozen continent, and reassures the overarching governing regime of this group of states' legitimacy in the region. Ultimately, Antarctica presents an opportunity for New Polar Powers to prove to both their peers and their constituents that they are capable of investing culturally – as well as economically and technologically – in national pursuits beyond their borders. The deployment of HSMs as a geopolitical means to meet environmental expectations was evident after the advent of the 1980s' international environmental movement. States have remediated historic sites for a complex series of reasons, but predominantly to meet international obligations concerning the Antarctic environment. This finding was unexpected, as my initial assumption was that states would exploit the ambiguous definitions of heritage and waste to designate historic rubbish as HSMs in an attempt to avoid costly and resource-draining site clean-ups.

The third and final question I asked was, 'Which non-state actors have engaged with Antarctic heritage?' Although states are the predominant actors in Antarctica and currently have a monopoly on the definition and acceptable use of heritage, other actors do engage with historic remains in the region. *Chapter Nine: Reconceptualising Heritage* addressed the engagement of three non-state actors with Antarctic heritage: the tourism industry, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and individuals. For the tourism industry in Antarctica, heritage can be regarded as a commodity, and is therefore an economic as well as cultural phenomenon. For NGOs in Antarctica with a cultural heritage focus, heritage can be reconceptualised as a normative vision or moral obligation. Lastly, for individuals in Antarctica, heritage can be a deeply personal experience. Each of these non-state actors posed both complications and opportunities for the *Prevailing Antarctic Heritage Discourse*.

[2] Jeffrey McGee and Nengye Liu, "The challenges for Antarctic governance in the early twenty-first century," *Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs* 11, no. 2 (2019): 73-77.

## 2. Discussion: The geopolitics of Antarctic heritage

The prevailing discourse on Antarctic heritage aligns with a broader global discourse on heritage, and in this sense is unremarkable. But what I have found is that the *application* of this discourse within Antarctic geopolitics sets the management of cultural heritage in this region apart from that found elsewhere around the world. My analysis of states' behaviour within Antarctic heritage management leads to several geopolitically significant discoveries which fall into three categories: those of intra-, inter-, and extra-national relevance.

### 2.1 *The intra-national significance of Antarctic heritage*

The intra-national significance of Antarctic heritage management is embedded within the conduct of individual states. As I established in the first half of the thesis, the senior architects of the framework for heritage management in Antarctica were the powerful, Western, claimant states. I anticipated this, given that these states are invested in the region and its governance. What is noteworthy, however, is the unexpected behaviour from some states. For example, despite being a claimant state and a state historically present in the region, France has been inactive on heritage related issues. On the other hand, the United States – a reserved claimant – has contributed meaningfully to the development of the HSM Framework despite having only three entries on the HSM List; while China – a non-claimant and non-Western state – spoke out about the exclusion of some opinions regarding the definition of Antarctic heritage, despite its late debut on the HSM List. Therefore, these states' involvement with the HSM Framework is related in complex and not always predictable ways to their overarching foreign policies for the region. As the HSM List receives more (and more diverse) entries, the visibility of these sites and monuments and the role that they play within the region's governance, may increase and state priorities may change accordingly.

### 2.2 *The inter-national significance of Antarctic heritage*

The inter-national significance of Antarctic heritage management does not concern the behaviour of individuals states as above, but rather the product of their collective action – the Antarctic Treaty System. The System and its Framework for the management of Historic Sites and Monuments dictates how the region, and its heritage, is governed. This research has allowed me to identify four issues unique to the Antarctic context. They relate to notions of responsibility, temporality, consistency, and intangibility.

The issue of responsibility was raised in my investigation of the relationship between heritage and waste. I expected to find states exploiting the ambiguous definitions of heritage and waste to evade environmental obligations under the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Environmental Protocol). I assumed that states would have designated what would otherwise be considered articles of waste as artefacts of heritage to avoid costly and resource-consuming remediation. Instead, they were committing to extensive clean-ups prior to HSM designation. This suggests states' strong urge to comply with regional norms in an attempt to avoid unnecessary agitation within Antarctic affairs. However, it is difficult to know if this conformance would have still occurred if these norms had not aligned with their national agendas – as the decommissioning of the nuclear reactor at McMurdo Station did with the American's shift in Antarctic policy in the 1970s/1980s. Considering the multitude of station renewals and upgrades set to take place in the near future, and the significant amount of legacy waste still on the continent, heritage managers will be watching this space closely.

The temporal ambiguity of Antarctic heritage is also potentially problematic for its managers. While the time elapsed between when a historical object was installed or when a historical event occurred is on average just over 50 years, some HSMs have been listed prior to the commemorated structure's construction. For example, HSM 44 is a plaque that was erected by India to commemorate its first research station a year before it was even built. This suggests that there is no 'cut-off date'[3] for Antarctic heritage – an omission that could crowd and slow the agenda for HSM designation as more recent, but superseded technologies and architectural achievements are proposed as having historical significance, and again, as stations undergo heritage assessments in the modernisation process. It is impossible to determine exactly how many years should pass before an object, site or event can be considered to possess heritage value, but given that HSMs are also valuable political resources, there is a potential for states to take advantage of this lack of guidance for geopolitical gain.

The classification of Antarctic heritage is inconsistent given the broad spectrum of historic resources on the HSM List. Sites vary from entire huts of the Heroic Era to contemporary technology, such as a nuclear reactor, and even replica plaques. Such an indiscriminate designation process (no HSM proposals have ever been rejected outside of the moratorium)

[3] Michael Pearson, "Artefact or rubbish – a dilemma for Antarctic managers," in *Cultural Heritage in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions*, eds. Susan Barr and Paul Chaplin (Oslo: ICOMOS, 2004), 40.

potentially risks every material object in Antarctica becoming a candidate for HSM listing. This almost non-existent rejection rate is also symptomatic of the all-encompassing HSM criteria that have not once been revised since they were first introduced in 1995. But the opacity surrounding what can and cannot be officially recognised and protected as heritage in Antarctica currently suits the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs). This is because if the definition were to be tightened, this risk of international discord would increase as tension between what some states consider to hold heritage value, and what others do not, could rise. Although there have been attempts to reinvigorate the HSM Framework from both within (the survey on the existing HSM list tabled by the UK and Norway) and without (the International Polar Heritage Committee expressing concern for use of the antiquated criteria), historically, the Antarctic Protected Areas (APAs) agenda has not prioritised the issue. But, as mentioned above, there appears to be movement in this space.

Lastly, even though temporarily intangible or hidden heritage in Antarctica has been protected under the HSM Framework since 2001 – when the Meeting adopted Resolution 5 that protects 'pre-1958 historic remains whose existence or present location is not known' – there have been significant developments in this area in more recent years. In 2019 the UK had the wreck of the *Endurance*, the current location and state of which is currently unknown, designated; Spain flagged their intention to have the unlocated wreck of the *San Telmo* designated as an HSM in the future; and in 2020, the unknown whereabouts and condition of the *Antarctic* (the ship that sunk during Nordenskjöld's Swedish Antarctic Expedition of 1901-1903) was also mentioned in relation to protection matters. The ATCPs that have or might propose these ships have cited, or could cite, Amundsen's tent (HSM 80) as precedence for HSM listing. It is possible that these protections could be extended, and a new precedent set for all material remains on the continent not yet found to be declared heritage under ATS legislation. Returning to the underwater sites in particular, heritage managers are yet to explicitly address the complexities involved in their protection. Both ATCPs and heritage experts are becoming anxious over what will happen if a shipwreck is found (both on purpose or by accident), how it should be conserved (physically handled or photographed), where it should be conserved (in situ or ex situ), and whose responsibility it is (the finder or the ship's state of origin).[4] There are numerous shipwrecks in the Drake Passage that could potentially fit the criteria for both the

[4] Recent attempts to find shipwrecks in the region – such as the *Endurance*, as recounted in the introduction (*Chapter One: Introduction*) – are catalysts for concern around the protection of underwater cultural heritage.

2001 and 2018 guidelines, but while these questions remain, heritage managers will have to assess them on a case-by-case basis.

### 2.3 *The extra-national significance of Antarctic heritage*

The extra-national significance of Antarctic heritage management concerns the potential effect non-state actors could have on the international agenda. Although the two primary non-state actors with a stake in Antarctic heritage – Antarctic tourism operators and heritage NGOs – have not yet made any serious attempts to upturn the statist agenda on cultural heritage in the region, this does not mean that harmonious relations on the topic will necessarily continue. The tourism industry delivers travellers to the region to experience natural and cultural heritage sites. Therefore, if ATCPs restrict access to these sites under area protection measures, the industry would be forced to comply and readapt its itineraries. This compliance is likely to continue as such restrictions are yet to affect the operation of the industry. The relationship with heritage NGOs could be strained by the upcoming wave of station modernisations that could result in the maltreatment of historic resources – that is, disposal of historic artefacts prior to their assessment. The mutual reliance of ACTPs and NGOs – the former being the official managers of Antarctic heritage, while the latter are often responsible for carrying out conservation mandates – means that neither can afford to perturb the other, and so the cycle continues. In addition to these non-state actors, a third category of individuals also has the potential to influence the international agenda on heritage protection. Although the phenomenon of cultural heritage ambassadors in Antarctica is currently only speculative, the hypothesis that these individuals have heritage-making abilities, is unsettling (as demonstrated in the case of Eco-Nelson Hut). Overall, non-state actors may not be the most influential political actors in Antarctica at present, but their differing approaches to Antarctic heritage challenge the statist interpretation of heritage in the region. Additionally, non-state actors constitute a large section of the audience for cultural heritage in the region, given that no permanent or Indigenous population exits there and that the majority of artefacts are located in situ.

## 3. Significance: Implications for Academia and Policymaking

The significance of this thesis' findings lies in the theoretical and practical contributions it makes. The theoretical contributions are those made in relation to the existing literature and the state of the field: I undertook a systematic analysis of HSMs, not out of concern for their

protection like previous scholars (as I am not an expert conservator or professional archaeologist), but rather out of suspicion of their geopolitical manipulation. The practical contributions are those made in relation to policymaking and diplomacy: I did not focus on the technical aspects of polar heritage conservation, but rather how states have governed Antarctic heritage at a systemic level. Here, I hypothesise how researchers and policymakers might approach the study and practice of Antarctic heritage management in the future.

### 3.1 *Implications for future research*

The discourse analysis that I conducted in the first half of the thesis offers an original interpretation of heritage and its management in Antarctica. I outlined the origins of a discourse on heritage in this part of the world, as well as detailed the underlying ontology of that heritage. I interrogated what I called the HSM Framework, its foundational documents and developments, and identified the parties involved in its construction. I specified the unexceptional conceptualisation of Antarctic heritage – an argument relevant to broader arguments of Antarctic exceptionalism. Lastly, I made explicit what was implicit – the politicisation of Antarctic heritage – which in turn offers further insight into the behaviour of states within the global region.

The longer-term contributions that I make to the field concern the future research agenda. My analysis of the origins, development, and overall application of Antarctic heritage within Antarctic geopolitics enables more nuanced studies into individual state or non-state actors' approaches to heritage. Such studies would provide further insight into the cultural diversity of Antarctic heritage as well as the objectives of individual state's Antarctic agendas. There is also room for a study of the informal, as opposed to formal, methods of discourse formation. This could include interviews with policymakers to investigate the unconventional avenues of negotiation, such as 'corridor talk' – that is, the conversations held between diplomats at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) outside of formal sessions.[5] Another promising line of future research is a comparative study of two nations' approaches to Antarctic heritage to better understand how different states perceive and use cultural phenomena. Further research within the parallel research area of Antarctic natural heritage is also possible. I have discussed the geopolitics of Antarctic cultural heritage extensively, but it was not within my

[5] Klaus Dodds and Alan D. Hemmings, "Antarctic Diplomacy in a Time of Pandemic," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 15, no. 4 (2020): 530-541.

scope to address how natural heritage has been conceptualised within this space. This type of research could consider how the natural heritage values of the Antarctic environment have changed over time and draw upon the notion of wilderness and aesthetic values found within the Environmental Protocol. A focus on natural heritage would also open up an analysis into non-state actors, such as environmental non-governmental organisations.

### 3.1 *Implications for future policy*

Historically, the approach to Antarctic heritage management has been relatively ad hoc. For over three decades after the initial recognition by the ATCPs in 1961 that historic monuments should be safeguarded, their protection was largely undefined – that is, no criteria or guidance material was available for states to use when proposing, designating, and managing HSMs. This means that there was no process to assess the initial flood of almost 50 entries to the HSM List when it first opened in 1972. It was only when the first Guidelines and criteria were introduced in 1995 that states were provided with some instructions, even if they were not mandatory to follow. Given that the pre-1995 entries have not been reconsidered since, it could be argued that the meaning of heritage in Antarctica has been watered down. By exposing the weak institutionalisation of heritage protection under the ATS in the past, I have called into question states' motivations for engaging with historic remains in the region. In light of these findings, I would support developments such as the survey of the HSM List in an attempt to better clarify heritage and what it means in the Antarctic context, or the implementation of mandatory Conservation Management Plans (CMPs) that would hold states to account once they have formally deemed a site or monument as historically significant.

Movement in this direction has already begun. This is evident in my quantitative analysis that identified a peak in HSM-related activity during and between ATCMs since the end of the twentieth century. States' preferred mode of engagement on the topic within this period was discussion during the Meetings, but also the submission of papers and formation of Intersessional Contact Groups (ICGs) and workshops during the intersessional periods. These findings show that Antarctic heritage has been discussed more frequently within governance in recent years, but they also indicate that the matter of heritage has been discussed more meaningfully. By analysing the documents integral to HSMs, I identified key progressions of the HSM Framework. Over the past five years alone, an ICG on HSMs was formed, the HSM Guidelines and Guide have been revised, a moratorium on HSM proposals was initiated to honour this process, and a redesign of the HSM List itself was suggested. It would therefore

appear that Antarctic heritage is beginning to be prioritised within official forums. In addition to these efforts, heritage experts have also been consulted, and a relationship between them and the ATCPs has begun to form. This is evident in the inclusion of the International Polar Heritage Committee (IPHC) and New Zealand Antarctic Heritage Trust (NZAHT) as co-authors of Working, Information, and Background Papers submitted to ATCMs. Experts from other scientific communities are often called upon to give advice to the Meeting or Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP), so this is a fair and natural progression in the increasing prioritisation of Antarctic heritage within the System. The CEP itself has also formally acknowledged the importance of Antarctic heritage under the APA framework by including it within its agenda as a priority at the 2019 ATCM (XLII). The future management of Antarctic heritage relies heavily on this CEP agenda, which ATCPs use to organise and operationalise efforts. The three actions listed at this ATCM on heritage-related matters were as follows:

1. Maintain the list and consider new proposals as they arise.
2. Consider strategic issues as necessary, including issues relating to designation of HSM versus clean-up provisions of the Protocol.
3. Review the presentation of the HSM list with the aim to improve information availability.[6]

I suggest several likely developments in response to these proposed items. With regard to the new proposals, I would predict that after the recent lifting of the moratorium on proposals and cancellation of the 2020 ATCM,[7] several proposals may be made in quick succession – particularly in relation to hidden heritage. This is because after the UK's designation of HSM 94, the wreck of Shackleton's ship the *Endurance*, and Spain's signposting of a proposal in relation to the *San Telmo* shipwreck, a pattern for unfound and underwater historic remains appears to be emerging. Concerning the consideration of legacy waste, I would suggest that little progress will be made in this area for some time, given its potential for contentious debate. What some states might consider worthy of HSM listing, others may consider waste in need of immediate evacuation. Lastly, with respect to a review of the HSM List's presentation and accessibility, I would assume that there are few obstacles to achieving this, given the non-

[6] Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, *ATCM XLII Final Report*, 2019, 199.
[7] The global pandemic prohibited a face-to-face meeting of delegates at the 2020 ATCM which followed a scaled-back intersessional model. In September 2020, Dodds and Hemmings published an article discussing what implications the global health crisis might have for the governance of the region in the 'post-pandemic international order.' Dodds and Hemmings, "Antarctic Diplomacy in a Time of Pandemic."

controversial nature of the task. Assuming that states cooperated within a timely manner, the Secretariat could collate and collect relevant information for each entry and design an online forum for states to collaborate on HSM-related issues. Irrespective of the completion of these three actions, I estimate that entries on the HSM List will continue to grow in number and diversify in type. I also predict a similar trend in relation to the voices contributing to the discussion of Antarctic heritage.

## 4. Dilapidated huts and piles of rocks as powerful political resources

Antarctica is often framed as an exceptional space removed from the everyday functioning of world politics. Its physical environment and overarching governing regime are indeed unique, but, this does not mean that Antarctica is unaffected by the social, cultural, and political forces that operate elsewhere around the globe. The challenge of this project has been to trace how political actors reduce sites of cultural heritage in Antarctica – such as dilapidated huts and piles of rocks – to opportunities for strategic gain within the practice of Antarctic affairs. The subsequent investigation into cultural heritage management in the region has demonstrated how states can and do manipulate managerial processes within the overarching system of governance. Cultural heritage in this part of the world simultaneously represents vulnerable historic remains and powerful political resources curated by states, for states.

# Bibliography


Adams, Rob. “Letter from the Editor: PM-3A, Pioneer in Antarctic Research.” *Atomic Insights*. 1 November 1996. https://atomicinsights.com/letter-from-editor-pma-pioneer-anarctic-research/.

Agnew, John. *Geopolitics: Re-visioning world politics*. London: Routledge, 2003.

Agnew, John. “Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics.” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95, no. 2 (2005): 437-461.

Ahmad Shabudin, Ahmad Firdaus, Rashidah Abdul Rahim, Norizan Md Nor, and Kamarulazizi Ibrahim. “Antarctic values and Malaysia’s involvement in Antarctica: perceptions among young citizens of Malaysia.” *Polar Record* 52, no. 3 (2016): 305-315.

Akademi Sains Malaysia (ASM). “MY King and emperor in Antarctica: Malaysian's journey to the ice.” 13 December 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hr-0CUmk-f0.

Alexander, Karen A., Daniel Liggett, Elizabeth Leane, Hanne E. F. Nielsen, Jennifer L. Bailey, Madeline J. Brasier, and Marcus Haward. “What and who is an Antarctic ambassador?” *Polar Record* 55, no. 6 (2020): 497-506.

Alsayyad, Nezar. *Consuming Tradition, Manufacturing Heritage: Global Norms and Urban Forms in the Age of Tourism*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. Revised. London: Verso, 1991.

Anderson, James. “Nationalist ideology and territory.” In *Nationalisms Self-determination and Political Geography*, edited by Johnston, R. J., Knight, D. B., and E. Kofman, 18-39. London: Croom Helm, 1988.

Antarctic Homestead. “The Nuclear Age in Antarctica.” Accessed 14 March 2021. http://antarctic.homestead.com/nuclear.html.

*The Antarctic Treaty*. 1 December 1959, Washington.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Antarctic Specially Managed Area No 4 (Deception Island): Revised Management Plan*. Measure 10, 2012.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Designation of ASMA 5 (Amundsen Scott South Pole Station) and 6 (Larsemann Hills)*. Measure 2, 2007.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Designation of SPA 4 (Sabrina Island, Balleny Islands)*. Recommendation 4, 1966.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Efforts to stop disposal of nuclear waste in the Antarctic Treaty Area.* Recommendation 12, 1975.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Guide to the Presentation of Working Papers Containing Proposals for Antarctic Specially Protected Areas, Antarctic Specially Managed Areas or Historic Sites and Monuments*. Resolution 1, 2008.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Guidelines for handling of pre-1958 historic remains whose existence or present location is not yet known*. Resolution 5, 2001.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Guidelines for proposing new Historic Sites and Monuments*. Resolution 8, 1995.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Guidelines for the assessment and management of Heritage in Antarctica*. Resolution 2, 2018.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Guidelines for the designation and protection of Historic Sites and Monuments*. Resolution 3, 2009.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *HSM: No.1 Building at Great Wall Station*. Measure 12, 2011.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *List of Historic Monuments*. Recommendation 9, 1972.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Monument 44 (Dakshin Gangotri) added to List of Historic Monuments*. Recommendation 7, 1983.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *National responsibilities for revising management plans of Antarctic protected areas*. Resolution 1, 1998.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Revised List of Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments*. Measure 12, 2019.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Revised List of Historic Sites and Monuments*. Measure 3, 2003.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Revised List of Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments: Incorporation of a historic wooden pole to Historic Site and Monument No 60 (Corvette Uruguay Cairn), in Seymour Island (Marambio), Antarctic Peninsula*. Measure 9, 2016.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. *Revised List of Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments: Lame Dog Hut at the Bulgarian base St. Kliment Ohridski, Livingston Island and Oversnow heavy tractor "Kharkovchanka" that was used in Antarctica from 1959 to 2010.* Measure 19, 2015.

Antarctic Treaty Secretariat. "Meeting Documents Archive." 2021. https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Meetings/DocDatabase?lang=e.

Antarctic Treaty Secretariat. "Parties." 2021. https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Parties?lang=e.

Antarctic Treaty System. *Rules of Procedure of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting and the Committee for Environmental Protection*. Updated November 2019.

Antonello, Alessandro. "Finding Place in Antarctica." In *Antarctica and the Humanities*, edited by Roberts Peder, Lize-Marié van der Watt, and Adrian Howkins, 181-203. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Apostolaki, Alexandros. "The Convergence Process in Heritage Tourism." *Annals of Tourism Research* 20, no. 4 (2003): 795-812.

Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute. "20 years of the discovery of the Pole of Inaccessibility of Antarctica." Accessed 4 October 2019. http://www.aari.aq/publication/avsyuk/avsyuk.html.

Argentina. *Additional information for the discussion of aspects related to the management of Historic Sites and Monuments*. IP022 (2010).

Argentina. *Final Report of the Informal Discussions on Historic Sites and Monuments*. WP046 (2012).

Argentina. *Proposal for the discussion of aspects related to the management of Historic Sites and Monuments*. WP047 (2010).

Argentina. *Proposal to redesign the format of the list of Historic Sites and Monuments*. WP065 (2019).

Argentina. *Report of the Informal Discussions on Historic Sites and Monuments*. WP027 (2011).

Argentina. *Use of the Guidelines for the designation of Protected Areas*. WP050 (2010).

Argentina and Chile. *Report of the Joint Inspections Program undertaken by Argentina and Chile under Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 14 of the Environmental Protocol*. IP083 (2019).

Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, the United Kingdom, and the United States. *Proposal for a joint SCAR/CEP workshop on further developing the Antarctic protected area system*. WP016 (2018).

Armitage, Frances. "Press release: History made as tourist expedition gets close to Mawson's Huts for the first time in seven years." *Chimu Adventures*. 5 January 2018. https://www.chimuadventures.com/blog/2018/01/mawsons-huts-tourist-expedition/.

Ashley, Richard. "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics." *Alternatives* 12, (1987): 403-434.

Ashley, Richard. "The Poverty of Neorealism." In *Neorealism and Its Critics*, edited by Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

Ashworth, Gregory. "Do Tourists Destroy the Heritage They Have Come to Experience?" *Tourism Recreation Research* 34, no. 1 (2009): 79-83.

Ashworth, Gregory. "From History to Heritage – From Heritage to Identity: In search of concepts and models." In *Building A New Heritage*, edited by Gregory Ashworth and P. Larkham, 13-30. London: Routledge, 1994.

Assmann, J. "Cultural memories and national narratives: With some relation to the case of Georgia." White paper report prepared for the Georgian Ministry of Education, *Caucasus Context* 3, no. 1 (2007): 40-43.

Australia. *Antarctic Protected Areas - examples of application*. WP016 (1987).

Australia, the Czech Republic, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, and the United States. *Co-conveners' report of the Joint SCAR / CEP Workshop on Further Developing the Antarctic Protected Area System. Prague, Czech Republic, 27-28 June 2019*. IP165 (2019).

Australia, the Czech Republic, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, and the United States. *Recommendations arising from the Joint SCAR / CEP Workshop on Further Developing the Antarctic Protected Area System. Prague, Czech Republic, 27-28 June 2019*. WP070 (2019).

The Australian Antarctic Division. "Conservation team sets sail for Mawson's Huts." *Australian Government*, 8 December 2005. https://www.antarctica.gov.au/news/2005/conservation-team-sets-sail-for-mawsons-huts/.

The Australian Antarctic Division. “Mawson’s Huts, Cape Denison.” *Australian Government*. Accessed 4 November 2020. https://www.antarctica.gov.au/about-antarctica/history/cultural-heritage/mawsons-huts-cape-denison/.

The Australian Antarctic Division. *Mawson Station Heritage Management Plan 2014-2019*. the Australian Government.

The Australian Antarctic Division. “Sir Douglas Mawson (1882 to 1958).” 8 March 2019. http://www.antarctica.gov.au/about-antarctica/history/people/douglas-mawson.

Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission. Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission. “Mawson’s Huts Foundation Limited.” The *Australian Government*. Accessed 4 November 2020. https://www.acnc.gov.au/charity/54ea893aa70410e11e98ce366e0e94ad.

The Australian Government. “Mawson’s Huts Historic Site, Dumont D'Urville Station, EXT, Australia.” *Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment*. Accessed 24 February 2021. https://www.environment.gov.au/cgi-bin/ahdb/search.pl?mode=place_detail;search=state%3DEXT%3Blist_code%3DCHL%3Blegal_status%3D35%3Bkeyword_PD%3D0%3Bkeyword_SS%3D0%3Bkeyword_PH%3D0;place_id=105435.

Avango, Dag. “Historical Sites and Heritage in the Polar Regions.” In *The Routledge Handbook on the Polar Regions*, edited by Mark Nuttall, Torben R. Christensen, and Martin J. Siegert. 116-133. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018.

Avango, Dag. “Working geopolitics: sealing, whaling, and industrialized Antarctica.” In the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, edited by Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts, 485-504. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017).

Barr, Susan. “Twenty years of protection of historic values in Antarctica under the Madrid Protocol.” *The Polar Journal* 8, no. 2 (2018): 241-264.

Bartelson, Jens “Sovereignty.” In *Critical Imaginations in International Relations*, edited by Aoileann Ni Mhurchu and Reiko Shindo, 182-194. Oxon: Routledge, 2016.

Bastmeijer, Kees. “A Long-Term Strategy for Antarctic Tourism: The Key to Decision Making within the Antarctic Treaty System?” In *Polar Tourism: Human, Environmental and Governance Dimensions*, edited by Patrick Maher, Emma Stewart, and Michael Lück, 167-186. New York: Cognizant Communication Corporation, 2011.

Bastmeijer, Kees and Ricardo Roura. “Environmental Impact Assessment in Antarctica.” In *Theory and Practice of Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment*, edited by Kees Bastmeijer and Timo Koivurova, 175-219. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007.

Bastmeijer, Kees and Ricardo Roura. “Regulating Antarctic Tourism and the Precautionary Principle.” *The American Journal of International Law* 98, no. 4 (2004): 763-781.

Bauer, Thomas. *Tourism in the Antarctic: Opportunities, Constraints, and Future Prospects*. New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2001.

Bazeley, Pat. *Qualitative data analysis with NVivo*. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2007.

Bell, Johnathon S. “The Politics of Preservation: Privileging One Heritage over Another.” *International Journal of Cultural Property* 20, no. 4 (2013): 431-450.

Berg, Lawrence. “Discourse Analysis.” In *The International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, edited by Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift, 215-221. Amsterdam: Elsevier Ltd, 2009.

Beyerlin, Ulrich. “Different Types of Norms in International Environmental Law Policies, Principles, and Rules.” In *The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law*, edited by Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Ellen Hey, 425-448. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Bhaskar, Roy. *The Possibility of Naturalism*. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979.

Biersteker, Thomas and Cynthia Weber, *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Billig, Michael. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1995.

Blake, Gerald H. “Globalisation and the Paradox of Enduring National Boundaries.” In *Vanishing Borders: The New International Order of the 21st Century*, edited by Lee Boon-Thong and Tengk Shamsul Bahrin, 247-256. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998.

Blanchette, Robert A., Benjamin W. Held, Joel A. Jurgens, Jackie Aislabie, Shona Duncan, and Roberta L. Farrell. "Environmental pollutants from the Scott and Shackleton expeditions during the ‘Heroic Age’ of Antarctic exploration." *Polar Record* 40, no .2 (2004): 143-151.

Boczek, Boleslaw. “The Soviet Union and the Antarctic Regime.” *The American Journal of International Law* 78, no. 4 (1984): 834-858.

Boniface, Priscilla and Peter J. Fowler. *Heritage and Tourism: in the 'global village'*. London: Routledge, 1993.

Bowden, Tim. "Amundsen Centenary Celebrations 2." 17 March 2012. https://www.timbowden.com.au/2012/03/17/amundsen-centenary-celebrations-2/.

Bowen, Glenn. "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method." *Qualitative Research Journal* 9, no. 2 (2009): 27-40.

Brady, Anne-Marie. *China as a Polar Great Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Brady, Anne-Marie. "China's Expanding Antarctic Interests: Implications for Australia." *Australian Strategic Policy Institute* Report, August 2017.

Brady, Anne-Marie. "New Zealand's Strategic Interests in Antarctica." *Polar Record* 47, no. 2 (2011): 126–134.

Brady, Anne-Marie. *The Emerging Politics of Antarctica*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Brady, Anne-Marie. "The past in the present: Antarctica in China's national narrative." In the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, edited by Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts, 284-300. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017.

Bray, Daniel. "The geopolitics of Antarctic governance: sovereignty and strategic denial in Australia's Antarctic policy." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 70, no. 3 (2016): 256-274.

Brewster, Barney. *Antarctica, wilderness at risk*. Virginia: Friends of the Earth, 1982.

British Broadcasting Corporation. "UK team makes polar trek history." Accessed 4 October 2019. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sci/tech/6281839.stm.

Broadbent, Noel D. "From Ballooning in the Arctic to 10,000-Foot Runways in Antarctica: Lessons from Historic Archaeology." In *Smithsonian at the Poles: Contributions to International Polar Year Science*, edited by Igor Krupnik, Michael A. Lang, and Scott E. Miller, 49-60. Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, 2007.

Brooks, Shaun T., Julia Jabour and Dana M. Bergstrom. "What is 'footprint' in Antarctica: Proposing a set of definitions." *Antarctic Science* 30, no. 4 (2018): 227-235.

Brummett, Barry. *Techniques of Close Reading*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2018.

Buonincontri, Piera, Alessandra Marasco, and Haywantee Ramkissoon. "Visitors' experience, place attachment and sustainable behaviour at cultural heritage sites: A conceptual framework." *Sustainability* 9, no. 7 (2017): 1-19.

Buser, Marcos. *Rubbish Theory: The Heritage of Toxic Waste*. Amsterdam: Reinwardt Academy, 2015.

Buzan, Barry, and Richard Little. "Why International Relations Has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to Do About It." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30, no. 1 (2001): 19–39.

Calcott, Dean. "Strontium powered, Antarctica's nuclear past is little known." *The Press*. 27 December 1996.

Camenzuli, D., K. Fryirs, D. Gore, and B. Freidman. "Managing legacy waste in the presence of cultural heritage at Wilkes Station, East Antarctica." *Polar Record* 51, no. 2 (2015): 151-159.

The Canterbury Museum. "Once in a lifetime chance to see famous artefacts from Antarctica's first buildings." 11 April 2019. https://www.canterburymuseum.com/about-us/media-releases/once-in-a-lifetime-chance-to-see-famous-artefacts-from-antarcticas-first-buildings/.

Chandy, Ann Marie. "Doing research work in Antarctica is this Malaysian's dream come true." *The Star*. 21 April 2017. https://www.thestar.com.my/lifestyle/people/2017/04/21/shoba-mary-thomas-research-antarctica-malaysia-scientist/.

Chaplin, Paul and Susan Barr. "Polar Heritage: Rubbish Or Relics?" *Heritage at Risk* (2002/2003): 233-235.

Chaturvedi, Sanjay. *Dawning of Antarctica: A Geopolitical Analysis*. New Delhi: Segment Books, 1990.

Chaturvedi, Sanjay. "India and Antarctica: towards post-colonial engagement?" In *The Emerging Politics of Antarctica*, edited by Anne-Marie Brady, 50-74. London: Routledge, 2013.

Chaturvedi, Sanjay. "India and the Antarctic Treaty System: Realities and Prospects." *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 42, no. 4 (1986): 351-380.

Chaturvedi, Sanjay. "Rise and decline of Antarctica in Nehru's geopolitical vision: challenges and opportunities of the 1950s." *The Polar Journal* 3, no. 2 (2013): 301-315.

Chaturvedi, Sanjay. *The Polar Regions: A Political Geography*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1996.

Child, Jack. "Stamps of the American Quadrant of Antarctica and the South Atlantic Islands." Paper presented at Blount Postal History Symposium, Smithsonian Institution - National Postal Museum, 30 September 2010.

Chile. *Antarctic Protected Area System: Revised List of Historic Sites and Monuments. Measure 3 (2003). Draft Guidelines for its Application*. IP092 (2006).

Chile. *Antarctic Protected Areas System: Revised List of Historic Sites and Monuments (Measure 3 (2003) Draft Guidelines for its Application*. WP038 (2007).

Chile. *Antarctic Protected Area System: Revised list of Historic Sites and Monuments - Measure 3 (2003). Guidelines for its application*. WP003 (2009).

Chile. *Proposal to include the ruins of BSE Pedro Aguirre Cerda on the historic sites and monuments list*. WP034 (2001).

Chile. *Protection and valuation of Historical Sites*. WP031 rev. 1 (1987).

Chile and Spain. *Historical Site.* WP039 (1991).

Chile and the United States. *Antarctic Protected Area System: Revised List of Historic Sites and Monuments Measure 3 (2003) Guidelines for its Application*. WP061 (2008).

Chile and the United States. *Draft Revised Management Plans for ASPA 149 Cape Shirreff, Livingston Island, South Shetland Islands*. WP019 rev. 1 (2004).

Chile and the United States. *Final Revised Management Plan for ASPA 149 Cape Shirreff and San Telmo Island, Livingston Island, South Shetland Islands*. WP005 (2005).

Chimu Adventures. "In Shackleton's Wake." Accessed 6 September 2019. https://www.chimuadventures.com/en-au/antarctica/shackletons-wake.

China. *A report on the environment of Great Wall Station in recent two years*. IP067 (2004).

China. *A Report on The Environment of Great Wall Station and Zhongshan Station in current years for ATCM*. IP083 (2005).

China. *Brief Introduction of the Maintenance and Conservation Project of No.1 Building at Great Wall Station*. IP014 (2012).

China. *Oil spill contingency plan for Chinese Great Wall Station in Antarctica*. IP088 (1997).

China. *Proposal for a new Antarctic Specially Managed Area at Chinese Antarctic Kunlun Station, Dome A*. WP008 (2013).

China. *Proposed addition of No.1 Building Commemorating China's Antarctic Expedition at Great Wall Station to the List of Historic Sites and Monument*. WP005 (2011).

China. *Report on clean-up and removal of the old power building at the Great Wall Station*. IP087 (2003).

China Daily. "China's 5th Antarctic research station to begin construction." 17 January 2018. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201801/17/WS5a5ee960a310e4ebf433e4ef_1.html.

China Daily. "Explorers Conquer 'Inaccessible Pole.'" 1 January 2005. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-01/18/content_410147.htm.

Clark, Linda and Elspeth Wishart. "History or Rubbish?: A Study of Wilkes Station." *Historic Environment* 8, no. 1/2 (1991): 25-27.

Collis, Christy. "Cold colonies: Antarctic spatialities at Mawson and McMurdo stations." *Cultural Geographies* 14, no. 2 (2007): 234-254.

Collis, Christy. "The Australian Antarctic Territory: A Man's World?" *Signs* 34, no .3 (2009): 514-519.

Collis, Christy. "The Proclamation Island moment: making Antarctica Australian." *Law Text Culture* 8, no. 1 (2004): 39-56.

The *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage*. 17 October 2003, Paris.

The *Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources*. 20 May 1980, Canberra.

Copeland, Sebastian. "Antarctica 2011-12 Legacy Crossing." Accessed 4 October 2019. http://sebastiancopelandadventures.com/antarcticaexpedition.

Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs. *Modernisation of Antarctic Stations: Survey results*. IP047 (2019).

The Czech Republic. *Follow-up to the Recommendations of the Inspections at the Eco-Nelson Facility*. BP010 (2019).

Dalby, Simon. "Writing Critical Geopolitics: Campbell, Ó Tuathail, Reynolds and Dissident Skepticism." *Political Geography* 15, no. 6 (1996): 655–60.

Day, David. *Antarctica: A Biography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2013.

Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment. "State of the Environment: Heritage values and the Antarctic environment." *Government of Australia*. Accessed 31 May 2020. https://soe.environment.gov.au/science/soe/2011-report/7-antarctic/2-state-and-trends/2-5-heritage-values.

Department of Ocean Development, Government of India. *Annual Report 1985-1985*. https://web.archive.org/web/20130425173818/http:/www.dod.nic.in/ann84-85.pdf.

The Diplomat. "Spain achieves Antarctic Treaty protects remains of Spanish ship 'San Telmo.'" 17 July 2019. https://thediplomatinspain.com/en/2019/07/spain-achieves-antarctic-treaty-protects-remains-of-spanish-ship-san-telmo/.

Dixon, Robert. *Prosthetic Gods: Travel, Representation, and Colonial Governance*. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2001.

Dobson, Jim. "How An Adventure In Antarctica Changed Actor Orlando Bloom Forever." *Forbes*. 30 September 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimdobson/2018/09/30/how-an-adventure-in-antarctica-changed-actor-orlando-bloom-forever/#7ad4cfe874b3.

Dodds, Klaus. *Geopolitics in Antarctica: Views from the Southern Oceanic Rim*. Cambridge: Scott Polar Research Institute, 1997.

Dodds, Klaus. "Governing Antarctica: Contemporary Challenges and the Enduring Legacy of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty." *Global Policy* 1, no. 1 (2010): 108-115.

Dodds, Klaus. "Post-colonial Antarctica: an emerging engagement." *Polar Record* 42, no. 1 (2006): 59-70.

Dodds, Klaus. "Sovereignty watch: claimant states, resources, and territory in contemporary Antarctica." *Polar Record* 47, no. 3 (2011): 231-243.

Dodds, Klaus and Alan D. Hemmings. "Antarctic Diplomacy in a Time of Pandemic." *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 15, no. 4 (2020): 530-541.

Dodds, Klaus and Alan D. Hemmings. "Frontier Vigilantism? Australia and Contemporary Representations of Australian Antarctic Territory." *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 55, no. 4 (2009): 513-529.

Dodds, Klaus, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts. Editors. *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017.

Dodds, Klaus and Christy Collis. “Post-colonial Antarctica.” In the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, edited by Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts, 50–68. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017.

Dodds, Klaus and Kathryn Yusoff. “Settlement and unsettlement in Aotearoa/New Zealand and Antarctica.” *The Polar Record* 41, no. 2 (2005): 141-155.

Dodds, Klaus and Mark Nuttall. *The Scramble for the Poles: The geopolitics of the Arctic and Antarctic*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016.

Dodds, Klaus and Richard Powell. “Polar Geopolitics: new researchers on the polar regions.” *The Polar Journal* 3, no. 1 (2013): 1-8.

Douglas, N. “Political Structures, Social Interaction and Identity Changes in Northern Ireland.” In *In search of Ireland: a cultural geography*, edited by Brian Graham, 151-173. London: Routledge, 1997.

Drewry, David J. “Conflicts of Interest in the Use of Antarctica.” In *Antarctic Science: Global Concerns*, edited by Gotthilf Hempel, 12-30. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1994.

du Gay, Paul. *Production of culture/cultures of production*. London: Sage/Open University, 1997.

Dudeney John, R. and David W.H. Walton. “Leadership in politics and science within the Antarctic Treaty.” *Polar Research* 31, no. 1 (2012): 1-9.

Easther, Rob. *Personal communication*, April 2021.

Elliot, Lorraine M. *International Environmental Politics: Protecting the Antarctic*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994.

Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Pole of Inaccessibility.” *Britannica*. Accessed 18 March 2021. https://www.britannica.com/place/Pole-of-Inaccessibility.

Erceg, Diane. “Explorers of a different kind: A history of Antarctic tourism 1966–2016.” PhD dissertation. The Australian National University, 2017.

Escallón, Maria Fernanda. "Negotiating intangibles: the power, place, and prestige of NGOs in heritage governance." *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 26, no. 8 (2020): 719-736.

Evans, Sherrie-lee. “Heritage at risk: cultural heritage management in Antarctica.” Paper presented at *ICOMOS Symposium*, 19-21 July 2007, James Cook University, Cairns.

Evans, Sherrie-lee. “Icy Heritage–managing Historic Sites in the Antarctic: Pristine Wilderness, Anthropogenic Degradation or Cultural Landscape?” *The Polar Journal* 1, no. 1 (2011): 87-100.

Explorer’s Web. “’It so, so very surreal,’ team n2i meets Lenin at the POI! Marines arrive Patriot Hills.” Accessed 4 October 2019. https://www.explorersweb.com/polar/news.php?id=15549.

Fairclough, Norman L. “Critical and descriptive goals in discourse analysis.” *Journal of Pragmatics* 9, no. 6 (1985): 739-763.

Fernando, Gavin. “As Australia looks north, China‘s presence in the Antarctic continues to grow.” *News.com Australia*. 7 September 2018. https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/as-australia-looks-north-chinas-presence-in-the-antarctic-continues-to-grow/news-story/d93aa030c6846e5bfe98f6fdc12f93c9.

Field, Michael. “Health fears around polar nuke leak.” *Stuff*. 7 March 2011. http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/americas/4739904/Health-fears-around-polar-nukeleak.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.

Frame, Bob, Daniela Liggett, Kati Lindström, Ricardo M. Roura, and Lize-Marié van der Watt. “Tourism and heritage in Antarctica: exploring cultural, natural and subliminal experiences.” *Polar Geography* (2021): 1-21.

Francioni, Francesco. "Beyond state sovereignty: the protection of cultural heritage as a shared interest of humanity.” *Michigan Journal of International Law* 25, no. 4 (2003): 1209-1228.

Fukuyama, Francis. “Nation-Building 101.” *The Atlantic*. January/February Issue 2004. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/01/nation-building-101/302862/.

Fyall, Alan and Brian Garrod. “Heritage tourism: at what price?” *Managing Leisure* 3, no. 4 (1998): 213-228.

Gan, Irina. “Red Antarctic: Soviet Interests in the South Polar Region Prior to the Antarctic Treaty, 1946-1958.” PhD dissertation. University of Tasmania, 2009.

Gan, Irina. “‘Will the Russians abandon Mirny to the penguins after 1959 . . . or will they stay?’” *Polar Record* 45, no. 2 (2009): 167-175.

Gerrad, Michael B. "America's forgotten nuclear waste dump in the Pacific." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 35, no. 1 (2015): 87-97.

Gigoux, Carlos. "'Condemned to Disappear': Indigenous Genocide in Tierra del Fuego." *Journal of Genocide Research* (2020): 1-22.

Glasberg, Elena. *Antarctica as Cultural Critique: The Gendered Politics of Scientific Exploration and Climate Change*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012.

Gonzalez, Miguel V. "Intangible heritage tourism and identity." *Tourism Management* 29, no. 4 (2008): 807-810.

Gothe-Snape, Jackson. "China unchecked Antarctica: What is China doing down there? Truth is, we don't know for sure." The *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*. 30 March 2019. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-30/china-in-antarctica-inspection-regime/10858486.

Graham, Brian, Gregory Ashworth, and John Tunbridge. *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy*. London: Arnold, 2000.

Griffiths, Tom. *Slicing the Silence: Voyaging to Antarctica*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2007.

Griffiths, Tom. "The AAT and the Evolution of the Australian Nation." Occasional paper, *Australia's Antarctica: Proceedings of the Symposium to Mark 75 Years of the Australian Antarctic Territory*. Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies, 2012, Hobart.

Haas, Peter. *Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation*. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1990.

Halbwachs, Maurice. *The collective memory* [translated by Francis J. Didder, Jr. & Vida Yazdi Ditter]. New York: Harper & Row, 1992.

Hall, Stuart. *Representation: cultural representations and signifying practices*. London: Sage/Open University, 1997.

Hamzah, B. A. "Malaysia and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty: a geopolitical interpretation." *The Polar Journal* 1, no. 2 (2011): 287-300.

Haraway, Donna. "Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective." *Feminist studies* 14, no. 3 (1988): 575-599.

Hardesty, Donald L. “Issues in Preserving Toxic Wastes as Heritage Sites.” *The Public Historian* 23, no. 2 (2001): 19–28.

Harrington, Johnathan. “China in Antarctica: A History.” *Southeast Review of Asian Studies* 37, (2015): 1-19

Harrison, Rodney. “Beyond ‘Natural’ and ‘Cultural’ Heritage: Toward an Ontological Politics of Heritage in the Age of the Anthropocene.” *Heritage & Society* 8, no. 1 (2015): 24-42.

Harrowfield, D. “Archaeology on ice. A review of historical archaeology in Antarctica.” *New Zealand Journal of Archaeology* 26, (2005): 5-28.

Harvie, Will. “Kiwis fear cancer after working near leaky US nuclear reactor in Antarctica.” *Stuff*. 10 May 2018. https://www.stuff.co.nz/environment/103481983/kiwis-fear-cancer-after-working-near-leaky-us-nuclear-reactor-in-antarctica.

Hauge, Kristin M. “Monica Kristensen is the Crime Queen of Svalbard.” *Scandinavian Traveler*. 16 May 2016. https://scandinaviantraveler.com/en/people/monica-kristensen-is-the-crime-queen-of-svalbard.

Haward, Marcus. “The originals: the role and influence of the original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty.” In *The Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, edited by Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts, 232-240. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017.

Headland, R. K. “Captain Scott's last camp, Ross Ice Shelf.” *The Polar Record* 47, no. 3 (2011): 270-270.

Hemmings, Alan D. “Problems Posed by Attempts to Apply a Claimant’s Domestic Legislation Beyond its Own Nationals in Antarctica.” *Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law* 11, no. 3 (2008): 207-220.

Hemmings, Alan D., Sanjay Chaturvedi, Elizabeth Leane, Daniela Liggett, and Juan Francisco. “The Role of Nationalism in the Contemporary Antarctic.” Paper presented at the *7th Polar Law Symposium*, 2014.

Henriques, Martha. “The bones that could shape Antarctica’s fate.” *British Broadcasting Corporation*. 22 October 2018. http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20181019-the-bones-that-could-shape-antarcticas-future.

Hepple, Leslie. “Metaphor, Geopolitical Discourse and the Military in South America.” In *Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representations of Language*, edited by Trevor Barnes and James Duncan, 136-154. London and New York: Routledge, 1992.

Heritage Expeditions. “Antarctica.” Accessed 19 January 2020. https://www.heritage-expeditions.com/destinations/antarctica-travel/.

Heritage Expeditions. *Initial environmental evaluation for the Antarctic cruise program 1997/1998 of polar research vessel Akademik Shokalskiy*. Christchurch: Heritage Expeditions, 1997.

Heritage Expeditions. “Spirit of Enderby.” *Heritage Expeditions*. Accessed 14 June 2020. https://www.heritage-expeditions.com/about/ships/spirit-enderby/#:~:text=Spirit%20of%20Enderby,is%20perfect%20for%20Expedition%20Travel.

Herr, Richard A. and H. Robert Hall. “Science as currency and the currency of science.” In *Antarctica: Policies and Policy Development*, edited by J. Handmer, 13-24. Canberra: Australian National University, 1989.

Hingley, Rebecca. “Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments: Conceptualizing heritage on and around the frozen continent.” In *Notions of Heritage*. Québec: Presses de l'Université du Québec, forthcoming 2021.

Hingley, Rebecca. “Diverging Antarctic Heritage Discourses: The geopolitical ramifications of non-state actor engagement with the ‘state-sanctioned’ version of Antarctic heritage.” *The Geographical Journal* (February 2021).

History’s Greatest Mysteries. “Endurance: The Hunt for Shackleton's Ice Ship.” *History Channel*. 28 November 2020. https://www.history.com/shows/historys-greatest-mysteries/season-1/episode-3.

Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Hodgson-Johnston, Indi, Andrew Jackson, Julia Jabour, and Anthony Press. "Cleaning up after human activity in Antarctica: legal obligations and remediation realities." *Restoration Ecology* 25, no. 1 (2017): 135-139.

Holtorf, Cornelius and Anders Högberg. “Nuclear Waste as Cultural Heritage of the Future.” Paper presented at *Waste Management Symposium*, 2-5 March, 2014, Tempe, Arizona.

Howkins, Adrian. “Defending polar empire: opposition to India's proposal to raise the ‘Antarctic Question’ at the United Nations in 1956.” *Polar Record* 44, no. 1 (2008): 35-44.

Howkins, Adrian. “Politics and environmental regulation in Antarctica: a historical perspective.” In *The Routledge Handbook on the Polar Regions*, eds. Mark Nuttall, Torben R. Christensen, and Martin J. Siegert, 337-350. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018.

Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, Hui Yew-Foong, and Philippe Peycam. Editors. *Citizens, Civil Society and Heritage-making in Asia.* Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017.

Huntford, Roland. *Scott and Amundsen*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979.

India. *Draft recommendation on Historic Sites and Monuments*. WP016 rev.1 (1983).

India. *Review of the Historic Site and Monument HSM 44 (a plaque erected at 'Dakshin Gangotri' Station).* IP040 (2004).

India Today. “Indian Antarctic Programme: India first landed on the ice continent on this day in 1982.” 9 January 2018. https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/gk-current-affairs/story/indian-antarctic-program-1130611-2018-01-09.

International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators. “2019-2020 Operational Instructions: For IAATO Office Representatives, Expedition Leaders, Field Staff, Vessel Masters and Officers.” *IAATO Field Operations Manual*, 2019-2020.

International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators. “IAATO Antarctic visitor figures 2019-2020.” *International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators*. Accessed 25 February 2021. https://iaato.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/IAATO-on-Antarctic-visitor-figures-2019-20-FINAL.pdf.

International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators. “IAATO Bylaws.” *International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators*. Updated January 2021. https://iaato.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/IAATO-Bylaws-Updated-January-2021.pdf.

International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators. *IAATO Overview of Antarctic Tourism: 2018-19 Season and Preliminary Estimates for 2019-20 Season*. IP140 rev.1 (2019).

International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators. “Our Mission.” Accessed 14 June 2020. https://iaato.org/about-iaato/our-mission/.

International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators. “Respecting Antarctic Science & Heritage.” *International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators*. Accessed 25 February 2019. https://iaato.org/respect-science-and-heritage.

International Council on Monuments and Sites. “Objectives and activities.” Accessed 4 November 2020. http://iphc.icomos.org/index.php/home/objectives-and-activities/.

Italy. *Specially Protected Areas: Sites and Monuments*. WP013 (1996).

Jabour, Julia. “Strategic Management and Regulation of Antarctic Tourism.” In *Antarctic Futures: Human Engagement with the Antarctic Environment*, edited by Tina Tin, Daniela Liggett, Patrick T. Maher, and Machiel Lamers, 273-286. Dordrecht: Springer, 2014.

Jacobsen, Trudy, Charles Sampford, and Ramesh Thakur. Editors. *Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia?* London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013.

Japan. *Amalgamated List of Historic Monuments in Antarctica*. WP009 (1970).

Jayaseelan, Sumitra. “Development of Malaysia’s position in Antarctica: 1983 to 2017.” *The Polar Journal* 9, no. 1 (2019): 214-235.

Jensen, David. “Conserving the legacy of Antarctica's heroic era.” *Aurora* 100 (2012).

Jockers, Matthew L. *Macroanalysis: Digital methods and literary history*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2013.

Jones, Max. “From “Noble Example” to “Potty Pioneer”: rethinking Scott of the Antarctic, c.1945–2011.” *The Polar Journal* 1, no. 2 (2011): 191-206.

Jones, Max. *The Last Great Quest: Captain Scott’s Antarctic Sacrifice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Joyner, Christopher. “CRAMRA: The Ugly Duckling of the Antarctic Treaty System?” In *The Antarctic Treaty System in World Politics*, edited by Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl and Willy Ostreng, 161-185. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991.

Joyner, Christopher. *Governing the Frozen Commons: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental Protection*. Columbia: South Carolina University Press, 1998.

Joyner, Christopher. “Recommended Measures Under the Antarctic Treaty: Hardening Compliance with Soft International Law.” *Michigan Journal of International Law* 19, no. 2 (1998): 401-443.

Kaufman, Alison. “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.” *Center for Naval Analysis*. 10 March 2011. https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/hearing-chinas-narratives-regarding-national-security-policy.

Kelly, Phil. “A Critique of Critical Geopolitics.” *Geopolitics* 11, no. 1 (2006): 24–53.

Kirby, Val G., Emma J. Stewart and Gary D. Steel. “Thinking about Antarctic Heritage: Kaleidoscopes and filters.” *Landscape Research* 26, no. 3 (2001): 189-202.

Kleyn, Brittney. “Gold Coast Antarctic explorer Geoff Wilson becomes the loneliest man on Earth,” *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*. 2 December 2019. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-12-02/geoff-wilson-crossing-antarctica-pole-of-inaccessibility/11755588.

Klotz, Audie and Cecelia Lynch. *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.

Krasner, Stephen. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Kratochwil, Friedrich. “Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study.” In *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*, edited by Karin Fierke and Knud Jørgensen, 13-35. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001.

Laing, Jennifer and Warwick Frost. *Explorer Travellers and Adventure Tourism*. Bristol: Channel View Publications, 2014.

Lake, David A. "The new sovereignty in international relations." *International Studies* Review 5, no. 3 (2003): 303-323.

Law, John. *After Method: Mess in Social Science Research*. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2017.

Leane, Elizabeth. *Antarctica in Fiction: Imaginative Narratives of the Far South*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Leane, Elizabeth. “Fictionalizing Antarctica.” In the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, edited by Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts, 21-36. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017.

Leane, Elizabeth. “Introduction: The Cultural Turn in Antarctic Studies.” *The Polar Journal* 1, no. 2 (2011): 149-154.

Leane, Elizabeth. *South Pole: Nature and Culture*. London: Reaktion Books, 2016.

Leane, Elizabeth and Jeffrey McGee. *Anthropocene Antarctica: Perspectives from the Humanities, Law and Social Sciences*. London: Routledge, 2019.

Leane, Elizabeth and Julia Jabour. "Performing Sovereignty over an Ice Continent." In *Performing Ice*, edited by Carolyn Philpott, Elizabeth Leane, and Matt Delridge, 171-193. Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 2020.

Lee, Wei-chin. "China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet so Near." *Asian Survey* 30, no. 6 (1990), 576-586.

Liggett, Daniela, A. McIntosh, A. Thompson, N. Gilbert, and B. Storey. "From Frozen Continent to Tourism Hotspot? Five Decades of Antarctic Tourism Development and Management, and a Glimpse into the Future." *Tourism Management* 32, no. 2 (2011): 357–366.

Lintott, Bryan. "Antarctica: Human Heritage on the Continent of Peace and Science." Paper presented at ICOMOS annual conference, 2017.

Lintott, Bryan. "Scott's and Shackleton's Huts: Antarctic Heritage and International Relations." PhD dissertation. University of Canterbury, 2015.

Liu, Nengye. "The heights of China's ambition in Antarctica." The *Lowy Institute*. 11 July 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/heights-china-s-ambition-antarctica.

Liu, Nengye. "What Are China's Intentions in Antarctica? Reviewing China's activities and commitments under the 60-year-old Antarctic Treaty." *The Diplomat*. 14 June 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/what-are-chinas-intentions-in-antarctica/.

Liu, Nengye. "What Does China's Fifth Research Station Mean for Antarctic Governance?" *The Diplomat*. 28 June 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/what-does-chinas-fifth-research-station-mean-for-antarctic-governance/.

Long, Colin and Sophia Labadi. Editors. *Heritage and globalisation*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010.

Lord, Gail D. and Ngaire Blankenberg. *Cities, Museums and Soft Power*. Washington, DC: The AAM Press, 2015.

Lowenthal, David. "Natural and cultural heritage." *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 11, no. 1 (2005): 81-92.

Macdonald, Sharon. *Memorylands: Heritage and Identity in Europe Today*. London: Routledge: 2013.

Mackay, Richard. “Ice, Icon and Identity: The Meaning of Mawson’s Huts.” In *Object Lessons: Archaeology and Heritage in Australia*, edited by Jane Lyndon and Racy Ireland, 107-126. Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2005.

Maddison, Ben. *Class and Colonialism in Antarctic Exploration, 1750-1920*. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2014.

Maher, Patrick T., Gary Steel, and Alison McIntosh. “Examining the experiences of tourists in Antarctica.” *The International Journal of Tourism Research* 5, no. 1 (2003): 59-67.

Malaysian International Seminar on Antarctica. “Polar Regions in the Global Climate System.” 18-19 June 2019, Universiti Putra Malaysia. https://www.int-conference.com/.

Mamadouh Virginie and Gertjan Dijkink. “Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse.” *Geopolitics* 11, no. 3 (2006): 349-366.

Mansvelt, Juliana and Lawrence Berg. “Writing Qualitative Geographies, Constructing Meaningful Geographical Knowledges.” In *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography*, edited by Iain Hay, 333-355. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Mason, Jennifer. *Qualitative Researching*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2018.

Massey, Doreen. “Concepts of space and power in theory and in political practice.” *Documents D'anàlisi Geogràfica* 5, (2009): 15-26.

Mawson’s Huts Foundation. “Federal Government Grant Ensures continued Conservation of Heritage Site.” 27 April 2020. https://www.mawsons-huts.org.au/federal-government-grant-ensures-continued-conservation-of-heritage-site/.

Mawson’s Huts Foundation. “Our Mission.” Accessed 4 November 2020. https://www.mawsons-huts.org.au/about/.

Mawson’s Huts Foundation. “Saving Australia’s Antarctic heritage.” Accessed 4 November 2020. https://www.mawsons-huts.org.au/.

May, John. *The Greenpeace Book of Antarctica: A new view of the seventh continent*. New York: Doubleday, 1989.

McGee, Jeffrey and Marcus Haward. “Australia-China Relations in the Frozen South.” The *Australian Institute of International Affairs*. 28 February 2019. http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/australia-china-antarctica/.

McGee, Jeffrey and Nengye Liu. “The challenges for Antarctic governance in the early twenty-first century.” *Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs* 11, no. 2 (2019): 73-77.

McIntyre, Damian. “Snow alert for Hobart as ‘Antarctic air’ sweeps towards Tasmania.” The *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*. 3 August 2020. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-03/snow-alert-for-hobart-as-cold-front-bound-for-tas/12518408.

McLean, Fiona. “Museums and the construction of national identity: A review.” *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 3, no. 4 (1998): 244-252.

McMurdo Radiation Issues. “Antarctica – McMurdo Radiation Issues.” *Facebook*. Accessed 15 March 2021. https://www.facebook.com/McMurdoRadiation.

McMurdo Station Radiation Dose Assessment Integrated Project Team. “Technical Report: Upper-Bound Radiation Dose Assessment for Military Personnel at McMurdo Station, Antarctica, between 1962 and 1979.” *Defense Threat Reduction Agency*, June 2013.

Mericq, Luis S. *Antarctica: Chile’s Claim*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1987.

Ministry of Defence. “UK military expedition marks centenary of Scott reaching South Pole.” *Government of the United Kingdom*. 17 January 2012. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-military-expedition-marks-centenary-of-scott-reaching-south-pole.

Mosley, Geoff. “Gaining World Heritage Recognition for Antarctica.” *Bob Brown Foundation*. Accessed 18 June 2020. https://www.bobbrown.org.au/gaining_world_heritage_recognition_for_antarctica.

Müller, Martin. "Doing discourse analysis in critical geopolitics." *L’Espace Politique* 12, no. 3 (2010): 1-21.

Müller, Martin. “Reconsidering the concept of discourse for the field of critical geopolitics: Towards discourse as language and practice.” *Political Geography* 27, no. 3 (2008): 322-338.

Müller, Martin. "Text, discourse, affect and things." In *The Routledge Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, edited by Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus, and Joanne Sharp, 49-68. London: Routledge, 2013.

Musto, Ryan A. “Cold Calculations: The United States and the Creation of Antarctica’s Atom-Free Zone.” *Diplomatic History* 42, no. 4 (2018): 640–668.

Muzaini, Hamzah and Claudio Minca. Editors. *After Heritage: Critical Perspectives on Heritage from Below*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018.

Mylonas, Harris. "Nation-Building." *Oxford Bibliographies: International Relations*. 22 July 2020. https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0217.xml#obo-9780199743292-0217-div2-0004.

Nash, Meredith, Hanne Nielsen, Justine Shaw, Matt King, Mary-Anne Lea, and Narissa Bax. "'Antarctica just has this hero factor…': Gendered barriers to Australian Antarctic research and remote fieldwork." *PLoS One*, 14, no. 1 (2019): 1-22.

National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research, Ministry of Earth Sciences. "Outreach Program." *Government of India*. Accessed 28 May 2020. http://www.ncaor.gov.in/antarcticas/display/373-outreach-program.

National Science Foundation. "Five Years of Nuclear Power at McMurdo Station." *Antarctic Journal of the United States* 2, no. 2 (1967): 27-56.

National Science Foundation. "McMurdo Station Reactor Site Released For Unrestricted Use." *Antarctic Journal of the United States* 14, no. 1 (1980): 1-12.

Naval History and Heritage Command. "Seabee Historical Videos." *U.S. Navy Seabee Museum.* 9 February 2018. https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/seabee/explore/online-reading-room/seabeevideos.html.

The Netherlands. *Areas, sites, monuments and Annex V*. WP005 (1996).

New Zealand. *Antarctic Historic Resources*. IP012 (1999).

New Zealand. *Development of Guidelines for the Protected Area Designation Process.* WP036 (1999).

New Zealand. *Historic Sites and Monuments*. WP013 (1987).

New Zealand. *New Historic Sites and Monuments: Suggested Guidelines for the Designation of Historic Sites*. WP009 (1995).

New Zealand. *Terms of Reference (a) - Development of Guidelines for Protected Areas Under Annex V of the Environmental Protocol*. WP011 (2000).

New Zealand. *Working paper on the protection of the Antarctic environment*. WP004 (1989).

New Zealand, Norway, the United States. *The Berserk Incident, Ross Sea, February 2011*. IP018 (2011).

New Zealand Antarctic Heritage Trust. *Conservation Plan: Scott's Hut, Cape Evans*. Christchurch: New Zealand Antarctic Heritage Trust, 2004.

New Zealand Antarctic Heritage Trust. "Our Work." Accessed 4 November 2020. https://nzaht.org/about-aht/.

New Zealand Defence Force. "Public Advisory: Potential Radiation Exposure at McMurdo Station." 23 January 2018. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/news/public-advisory-potential-historic-radiation-exposure-at-mcmurdo-station/?fbclid=IwAR3qF2asDM4OvyQpFeewV3kLjKKOlXtAW7XMrSYOYhZoEbUs2kvxxmHIjpA.

Nichol, C. "Using heritage to engage Antarctic tourists with climate change," in the *Handbook of Climate Change Communication: Vol. 2*, edited by W. Leal Filho, E. Manolas, A.M. Azul, U.M. Azeiteiro, and H. McGhie, 305–315. Cham: Springer, 2018.

Nielsen, Hanne. "Brand Antarctica: selling representations of the south from the 'heroic era' to the present." PhD dissertation. University of Tasmania, 2018.

Nielsen, Hanne. "Remembering Antarctica's nuclear past with 'Nukey Poo.'" *The Conversation.* 23 July 2018. https://theconversation.com/remembering-antarcticas-nuclear-past-with-nukey-poo-99934.

Nielsen, Hanne. "Selling the south: commercialisation and marketing of Antarctica." In the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, edited by Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts, 183-198. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017.

Nora, Pierre. "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire." *Representations* 26, (1989): 7-24

Norway. *Antarctic historic resources*. IP038 (2001).

Norway. *Automatic Protection of Pre-1957 Historic Remains*. WP020 rev. 1 (1999).

Norway. *Consideration of protection approaches for historic heritage in Antarctica*. WP030 (2016).

Norway. *Listing of the Amundsen Tent on the List of Historic Sites and Monuments*. WP039 (2005).

Norway. *Proposal: Guidelines for handling of pre-1958 historic remains in Antarctica*. WP023 (2001).

Norway and the United Kingdom. *Report of the Antarctic Protected Areas workshop*. WP026 (1998).

Norway and the United Kingdom. *Report of the intersessional contact group established to develop guidance material for conservation approaches for the management of Antarctic heritage objects*. WP020 (2018).

Norway and the United Kingdom. *Report of the intersessional contact group established to develop guidance material for conservation approaches for the management of Antarctic heritage objects*. WP047 (2017).

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Norwegian Interests and Policy in the Antarctic*. White Paper 2014-2015.

Nuttall, William J. *The Nuclear Renaissance: Technologies and Policies for the Future of Nuclear Power*. New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005.

Nye, Joseph S. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

Nye, Joseph S. *The paradox of American power: Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Ó Tuathail, Gearóid and John Agnew. "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy." *Political Geography* 11, no. 2 (1992): 190-204.

Odynova, Alexandra. "Russia touts huge new nuclear-powered icebreaker as proof 'the Arctic is ours.'" *Columbia Broadcasting System News*. 22 September 2020. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-touts-huge-new-nuclear-powered-icebreaker-as-proof-the-arctic-is-ours/.

O'Reilly, Jessica. "Tectonic History and Gondwanan Geopolitics in the Larsemann Hills, Antarctica." *Political and Legal Anthropology* 34, no. 2 (2011): 214-232.

O'Reilly, Jessica and Juan Francisco Salazar. "Inhabiting the Antarctic." *The Polar Journal* 7, no. 1 (2017): 9-25.

Orheim, Olav. "The present location of the tent that Roald Amundsen left behind at the South Pole in December 1911." *The Polar Record* 47, no. 3 (2011): 268-270.

Owen, Gregory. “Qualitative Methods in Higher Education Policy Analysis: Using Interviews and Document Analysis.” *Qualitative Report* 19, no. 26 (2014): 1-19.

Oxford Dictionaries. “Waste.” Accessed 13 November 2019. https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/waste.

The Oxford English Dictionary. “Quick search: Norm.” Accessed 24 March 2020. https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/128266?rskey=pCWQ5H&resu lt=1#eid.

Park, Hyung yu. *Heritage Tourism*. Routledge: Abingdon, 2014.

Park, Hyung yu. “Heritage Tourism: Emotional Journeys into Nationhood.” *Annals of Tourism Research* 37, no. 1 (2010): 116-135.

Partzsch, Lena. “Private Individuals in International Relations: Conceptualizing Social Entrepreneurs as a New Type of Actor.” *International Relations and the First Image Subject: International Relations, ECPR-Workshop*, 12-17 April, 2011, University of St. Gallen.

Pavlíček, Jaroslav. “The Green Home in Antarctica.” *Eco-Nelson.* Accessed 23 February 2020. http://econelson.org/?en_program=.

Pearson, Michael. “Artefact or rubbish – a dilemma for Antarctic managers.” In *Cultural Heritage in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions*, edited by Susan Barr and Paul Chaplin, 39-43. Oslo: ICOMOS, 2004.

Peru. *Report of the second workshop on Antarctic Protected Areas*. WP037 (1999).

Picard, David. “White Magic: An Anthropological Perspective on Value in Antarctic Tourism.” *Tourist Studies* 15, no. 3 (2015): 300–315.

Poria, Yaniv, Richard W. Butler, and David Airey. “The core of heritage tourism.” *Annals of Tourism Research* 30, no. 1 (2003): 238-254.

Powell, Robert B, Gregory P. Ramshaw, S. Scott Ogletree, and Kathleen E. Krafte. “Can heritage resources highlight changes to the natural environment caused by climate change? Evidence from the Antarctic tourism experience.” *Journal of Heritage Tourism* 11, no. 1 (2016): 71-87.

Powell, Robert B., Matthew Brownlee, Stephen R. Kellert, and Sam H. Ham. “From awe to satisfaction: Immediate affective responses to the Antarctic tourism experience.” *Polar Record* 48, no. 2 (2012): 145-156.

Powell, Robert B., Stephen R. Kellert, and Sam H. Ham. “Antarctic tourists: Ambassadors or consumers?” *Polar Record* 44, no. 3 (2008): 233-241.

Princen, Thomas and Matthias Finger. *Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the local and the global*. London: Routledge, 1994.

The *Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty*. 4 October 1991, Madrid.

Pyne, Stephen J. *The Ice: A Journey to Antarctica*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1986.

Redmond, Henry. "The Literature of the Antarctic Heritage Trust and the Mawson’s Huts Foundation." Postgraduate Certificate thesis. University of Canterbury, 2010.

Rejcek, Peter. “Lasting Memory.” *The Antarctic Sun*. 25 June 2010. https://antarcticsun.usap.gov/features/contentHandler.cfm?id=2177.

Reus-Smit, Christian. *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Riffenburgh, Beau. *Aurora: Douglas Mawson and the Australasian Antarctic Expedition 1911-14*. Norwich: The Erskine Press, 2011.

Riffenburgh, Beau. Editor. *Encyclopedia of the Antarctic: Volume 1*. New York: Routledge, 2007.

Riffenburgh, Beau. Editor. *Encyclopedia of the Antarctic: Volume 2*. New York: Routledge, 2007.

Roberson, Holly. “China and Russia are eyeing up Antarctica – and experts say Australia should be more concerned.” The *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*. 28 October 2018. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-28/china-and-russia-are-eyeing-up-antarctica/10433024.

Rosen, Rebecca. “A Visit to the World’s Most Remote Antarctic Outposts With Google ‘Street’ View.” *The Atlantic*. 18 July 2012. https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/07/a-visit-to-the-worlds-most-remote-antarctic-outposts-with-google-street-view/259960/.

Ross, Susan and Victoria Angel. “Heritage and waste: introduction.” *Journal of Cultural Heritage Management and Sustainable Development* 10, no. 1 (2020): 1-5.

Roura, Ricardo. “Antarctic Cultural Heritage: Geopolitics and Management.” In the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, edited by. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts, 468-484. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017.

Roura, Ricardo. *The Footprint of Polar Tourism: Tourist behaviour at cultural heritage sites in Antarctica and Svalbard*. Groningen: University of Groningen, 2011.

Ruggie, John G. “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis.” In *Neorealism and Its Critics*, edited by Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

Ruskin, John. *Seven Lamps of Architecture*. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1849.

The Russian Federation. *Orthodox temple in the Antarctic*. IP045 (2004).

The Russian Federation. *Proposal on inclusion of the oversnow heavy tractor “Kharkovchanka” that was used in Antarctica from 1959 to 2010 to the List of Historical Sites and Monuments*. WP031 rev. 1 (2015).

The Russian Federation. *Proposal on revision of Historic Sites and Monuments under management of the Russian Federation*. WP036 (2012).

Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.

Salazar, Juan Francisco. "Geographies of place-making in Antarctica: an ethnographic approach." *The Polar Journal* 3, no. 1 (2013): 53-71.

Saldaña, Johnny. *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers.* London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015.

Sampaio, Daniela P. “The Antarctic exception: how science and environmental protection provided alternative authority deployment and territoriality in Antarctica.” *Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs* 11, no. 2 (2019): 107-119.

Sánchez, Rodolfo A. and Ewan McIvor, “The Antarctic Committee for Environmental Protection: Past, present, and future.” *Polar Record* 43, no. 3 (2007): 239-246.

Schreiber, Hanna. "Intangible cultural heritage and soft power–exploring the relationship." *International Journal of Intangible Heritage* 12 (2017): 44-57.

The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research and the International Union for Conservation of Nature. *Developing the Antarctic protected area system: proceedings of the SCAR/IUCN Workshop on Antarctic Protected Areas*, Cambridge, 29 June - 2 July 1992. Gland: IUCN, 1994.

Scott, Karen N. “Institutional Developments within the Antarctic Treaty System.” *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 52, (2003): 473-487.

Scott, Shirley. “The Irrelevance of Non-Recognition to Australia’s Antarctic Territory Title.” *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 70, no. 2 (2021): 491-503.

Scott, Shirley. “Three waves of Antarctic imperialism.” In the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, edited by Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts, 37-49. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017.

Senatore, Maria Ximena. “Archaeologies in Antarctica from Nostalgia to Capitalism: A Review.” *International Journal of Historical Archaeology* 23, (2019): 755-771.

Senatore, Maria Ximena. “Things in Antarctica: An archaeological perspective.” *The Polar Journal* 10, no. 2 (2020): 397-419.

Senatore, Maria Ximena and Andrés Zarankin. “Tourism and the Invisible Historic Sites in Antarctica.” Paper presented at *ICOMOS General Assembly and Scientific Symposium*, 27 November – 2 December 2011, Paris.

Senatore, Maria Ximena and Andrés Zarankin. "Widening the scope of the Antarctic heritage archaeology and the ugly, the dirty and the evil in Antarctic history." In *Polar settlements – location, techniques and conservation*, edited by Susan Barr and Paul Chaplin, 51-59. Oslo: ICOMOS IPHC, 2011.

Senatore, Maria Ximena, Cornelia Lüdecke, María Victoria Nuviala, Sebastián Arrébola, and Gabriela Roldán. “Antarctic Heritage as Individual Experiences.” *SC-HASS 2019 conference proceedings*.

Shirlow, Peter. “Representation.” In *Key Concepts in Political Geography*, edited by Carolyn Gallaher, Carl T. Dahlman, Mary Gilmartin, Alison Mountz, and Peter Shirlow, 308-318. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009.

Shiyao, Liu. “Remembering China’s first Antarctic expedition leader Guo Wei.” *People’s Daily*. 10 April 2019. https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_3278035.

Shortis, Emma. “History repeating as Greenpeace returns to the Antarctic.” *Greenpeace Australia Pacific*. 19 April 2019. https://www.greenpeace.org.au/news/historyrepeatingasgreenpeacereturnsto-the-antarctic/.

Shortis, Emma. “Lessons from the Last Continent: Science, Emotion, and the Relevance of History.” *Communicating the Climate* 4, (2019): 53-60.

Shortis, Emma. "'Who can resist this guy?' Jacques Cousteau, Celebrity Diplomacy, and the Environmental Protection of the Antarctic." *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 61, no. 3 (2015): 366-380.

Smith, Laurajane. "Heritage, Identity and Power." In *Citizens Civil Society and Heritage-making in Asia*, edited by Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Hui Yew-Foong, and Philippe Peycam, 15-39. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017.

Smith, Laurajane. *Uses of Heritage*. London: Routledge, 2006.

South Africa. *Creating Awareness: the Role of the Antarctic Legacy of South Africa (ALSA)*. IP051 (2017).

South Pole Station. "The Pole of Inaccessibility (POI)." Accessed 4 October 2019. https://www.southpolestation.com/trivia/igy1/poi.html#ref.

Spain. *Notification of pre-1958 historic remains: The Spanish shipwreck "San Telmo"*. WP018 rev. 1 (2019).

Spectar, J.M. "Saving the Ice Princess: NGOs, Antarctica and International Law in the New Millennium." *Suffolk Transnational Law Review* 23, no. 1 (1999): 57-100.

Spiller, James. *Frontiers for the American Century: Outer Space, Antarctica, and Cold War Nationalism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Stark, Jonathan, Ian Snape, and Martin Riddle. "Abandoned Antarctic waste disposal sites: monitoring remediation outcomes and limitations at Casey Station." *Ecological Management and Restoration* 7, no. 1 (2006): 21-31.

The State Council. "Full text: China's Arctic Policy." *The People's Republic of China*. 26 January 2018. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm.

Steel, Gary. "Polar, Social, Science: A Reflection on the Characteristics and Benefits of the Polar Social Sciences." *The Polar Journal* 5, no. 1 (2015): 1-7.

Stewart, Emma J., Val G. Kirby and Gary D. Steel. "Perceptions of Antarctic tourism: A question of tolerance." *Landscape Research* 31, no. 3 (2006): 193-214.

Stonehouse, B. and J. M. Snyder. *Polar Tourism: An Environmental Perspective*. Bristol: Channel View Publications, 2010.

Suchy, Patricia A. and Vince LiCata. “Persistence of Vision: Antarctica 2017/2020.” *Antarctic Artists and Writers Collective*. Accessed 28 March, 2021. https://www.aawcollective.com/adequate-earth-exhibition#turning.

Summerson, Rupert. “The Protection of Wilderness and Aesthetic Values in Antarctica.” PhD dissertation. University of Melbourne, 2013.

Suter, K. *Antarctica: private property or public heritage?* Leichhardt: Pluto Press, 1991.

Tallentire, Jenea. “Strategies of Memory: History, Social Memory, and the Community.” *Social History* 34, no. 67 (2001): 197-212.

Thill, Brian. *Waste: Object Lessons*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2015.

Thompson, Michael. *Rubbish Theory: The creation and destruction of value*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Timothy, Dallen J. “Contested Place and the Legitimization of Sovereignty Claims through Tourism in Polar Regions.” In *Tourism and Change in Polar Regions: Climate, Environments and Experiences*, edited by C. Michael Hall and Jarkko Saarinen, 288-300. London: Routledge, 2010.

Timothy, Dallen J. and Stephen W. Boyd. “Heritage Tourism in the 21st Century: Valued Traditions and New Perspectives.” *Journal of Heritage Tourism* 1, no. 1 (2006): 1-16.

Tin, Tina, Daniela Liggett, Patrick T. Maher and Machiel Lamers. *Antarctic Futures: Human Engagement with the Antarctic Environment*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2014.

Tinjacá, Diana Marcela. “The Great Wall station, unexpected stop for female scientists in Antarctica.” *Agencia EFE*. 7 January 2019. https://www.efe.com/efe/english/technology/the-great-wall-station-unexpected-stop-for-female-scientists-in-antarctica/50000267-3860029.

Toropov, Pavel. “The Great Wall Antarctic Marathon: penguins, icebergs and the coolest race you’ll ever run.” *South China Morning Post*. 11 September 2017. https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/health-beauty/article/2110596/great-wall-antarctic-marathon-penguins-icebergs-and-coolest.

Torres, Daniel. “Observations on ca. 175-year old human remains from Antarctica (Cape Shirreff, Livingston Island, South Shetlands).” *International Journal of Circumpolar Health* 58, no. 2 (1999): 72-83.

Triggs, Gillian. “Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica.” *Melbourne University Law Review* 13, (1981): 123-158.

Triggs, Gillian. “The Antarctic Treaty System: A Model of Legal Creativity and Cooperation.” In *Science Diplomacy Antarctica, Science, and the Governance of International Spaces*, edited by Paul A. Berkman, Michael A. Lang, David Walton, and Oran R. Young, 39-49. Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, 2011.

TripAdvisor. “Mawson’s Hut Replica Museum.” Accessed 4 September 2019. https://www.tripadvisor.com.au/ShowUserReviews-g255097-d5605486-r549052937-Mawson_s_Hut_Replica_Museum-Hobart_Greater_Hobart_Tasmania.html.

Tunbridge, John and Gregory Ashworth. *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict*. New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1996.

Uminska-Woroniecka, Anna. “Cultural Diplomacy in International Relations Theory and Studies on Diplomacy.” *Actual Problems of International Relations* 2, no. 127 (2016): 4-19.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *Historic monuments*. WP034 rev. 1 (1972).

The United Kingdom. *Draft Recommendation on Historic Monuments*. WP005 rev. 1 (1970).

The United Kingdom. *Guidance for Working Papers on Area Protection and Management*. WP041 rev. 1 (2008).

The United Kingdom. *Guidance for Working Papers on Area Protection and Management*. WP043 (2007).

The United Kingdom. *Historical monuments*. WP011 (1972).

The United Kingdom. *Managing Antarctic Heritage: British Historic Bases in the Antarctic Peninsula*. WP012 (2016).

The United Kingdom. *Notification of pre-1958 historic remains: Wreck of Sir Ernest Shackleton’s vessel Endurance*. WP021 (2018).

The United Kingdom. *Proposals for improving the Protected Area System*. WP010 (1997).

The United Kingdom. *Review of the List of Historic Sites and Monuments*. WP004 (2002).

The United Kingdom. *Revision of the ‘Guide to the presentation of Working Papers containing proposals for Antarctic Specially Protected Areas, Antarctic Specially Managed Areas or Historic Sites and Monuments’*. WP005 (2016).

The United Kingdom. *The Benefits of Conservation Management Plans for Antarctic Heritage*. WP058 (2019).

The United Kingdom Antarctic Heritage Trust. “Our Mission.” Accessed 4 November 2020. https://www.ukaht.org/about-us/our-mission.

The United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. *Report of the Antarctic Treaty Inspections undertaken jointly by the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic in accordance with Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 14 of the Environmental Protocol 2014-2015*, (2015).

The United Kingdom, France, and Ukraine. *Report of an incident at Wordie House (HSM No. 62)*. WP025 (2010).

The United States. *Draft Management Plan for ASMA No. X: Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station, South Pole*. WP003 (2007).

The United States. *Proposed addition of the Plaque Commemorating the PM-3A Nuclear Power Plant at McMurdo Station to the List of Historic Sites and Monument*. WP005 (2010).

The United States. *Revised Management Plan for Antarctic Specially Protected Area No. 149 - Cape Shirreff and San Telmo Island, Livingston Island, South Shetland Islands*. WP002 (2016).

The United States and Chile. *Revised Management Plan for Antarctic Specially Protected Area No. 149 Cape Shirreff and San Telmo Island, Livingston Island, South Shetland Islands*. WP006 (2011).

University of Gothenburg. “Centre for Critical Heritage Studies (CCHS): Waste/Wasted Heritage.” Accessed 16 February 2021. https://www.gu.se/en/critical-heritage-studies/research/wastewasted-heritage.

Urry, J. *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies*. London: Sage, 1990.

van der Watt, Lize-Marié. “Contemporary environmental politics and discourse analysis in Antarctica.” In the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts, 584-593. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2017.

van der Watt, Lize-Marié. “Return to Gondwanaland: South Africa, Antarctica, minerals and apartheid.” *The Polar Journal* 3, no. 1 (2013): 72-93.

Ventura County Star. “LOOKING BACK: Seabees face hidden dangers on the ice.” 28 April 2010. http://archive.vcstar.com/news/looking-back-seabees-face-hidden-dangers-on-the-ice-ep-369094984-349712831.html/.

Vigni, Patrizia and Francesco Francioni. “Territorial claims and coastal states.” In the *Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica*, edited by Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts, 241-254. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017.

Warren, Patricia. “A Proposal for the Designation and Protection of Antarctic Historic Resources submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties.” Unpublished manuscript. Draft of Master’s thesis. University of Washington, 1989.

Waterton, Emma. "A more-than-representational understanding of heritage? The ‘past’ and the politics of affect." *Geography Compass* 8, no. 11 (2014): 823-833.

Waterton, Emma, Laurajane Smith, and Gary Campbell, “The Utility of Discourse Analysis to Heritage Studies: The Burra Charter and Social Inclusion.” *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 12, no. 4 (2006): 339-355.

Waterton, Emma and Steve Watson. *The Semiotics of Heritage Tourism*. London: Channel View Press, 2013.

Weertman, J. “Radioactive waste disposal in Antarctica.” Paper presented at Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research meeting, Cambridge, 1974.

Wendt, Alexander. **“**Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” *International Organization* 46, (1992): 391–425.

Wilkes, Owen and Robert Mann. “The story of Nukey Poo.” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 34, no. 8 (1978): 32-36.

Winter, Tim. “Clarifying the critical in critical heritage studies.” *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 19, no. 6 (2012): 532-545.

Winter, Tim. “Heritage and Nationalism: An Unbreachable Couple?” In *Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Heritage Research*, edited by Emma Waterton and Steve Watson, 331-345. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Winter, Tim. “Heritage diplomacy.” *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 21, no. 10 (2015): 997-1015.

Winter, Tim. “Heritage Studies and the Privileging of Theory.” *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 20, no. 5 (2014): 556–72.

Winter, Tim. “Heritage Tourism: The dawn of a new era?” In *Heritage and Globalisation*, edited by Sophia Labadi and Colin Long, 117-129. London: Routledge, 2010.

Wolff, Mark J. "Spirituality, culture and tradition: An introduction to the role of tribal courts and councils in reclaiming Native American heritage and sovereignty." *Thomas Law Rev.* 7, (1994): 761-768.

Wood-Donnelly, Corine. *Performing Arctic Sovereignty: Policy and Visual Narratives*. Oxon: Routledge, 2019.

The *World Heritage Convention*. 16 November 1972, Paris.

Xinhua Net. “Have a trip to China’s Antarctic station.” 18 September 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/18/c_138401503.htm.

Yayasan Penyelidikan Antartika Sultan Mizan (YPASM). “Yayasan Penyelidikan Antartika Sultan Mizan.” Accessed 8 November 2019. https://www.ypasm.my/ypasm/.

Young, Claire. “Eyes on the Prize: Australia, China and the Antarctic Treaty System.” The *Lowy Institute*. 16 February 2021. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/eyes-on-prize-australia-china-and-antarctic-treaty-system.

Zeegers, Margaret and Deirdre Barron. *Milestone Moments in Getting Your PhD in Qualitative Research*. Amsterdam: Elsevier Ltd, 2015.

Zhou, Laura. “Chinese icebreakers set sail for Antarctic rendezvous that will herald ‘new era of polar exploration.’” *South China Morning Post*. 22 October 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3034096/chinese-icebreakers-set-sail-antarctic-rendezvous-will-herald.

# Appendix

**ANTARCTIC TREATY CONSULTATIVE PARTY CONTRIBUTIONS:**
to the development of the HSM Framework

**Code**:
Yellow = HSM List
Red = HSM Guide
Pink = HSM Guidelines
Green = APAs
Blue = other

| **Country** | **Papers** Submitted | | | **Discussion** Raised | | **Intersessional** Activity | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Working (WP)* | *Information (IP)* | *Background (IP)* | *Independently* | *Collectively* | *Formal* | *Informal* | *Workshops* |
| Argentina | WP047 (2010)<br>- the concepts of 'enhancement' and 'history'<br>WP050 (2010)<br>- APA coversheet, brief mention of 'historic'<br>WP027 (2011)<br>- following on from WP047/IP022 (2010)<br>WP046 (2012)<br>- following on from WP027 (2011)<br>WP016 (2018) [+AUS/BEL/CHL/CHN/CZH/FRA/GMY/JAP/NZ/NWY/RUS/UK/US]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system<br>WP065 (2019)<br>- proposal to change HSM list format | IP022 (2010)<br>- the concepts of 'enhancement' and 'history'<br>IP083 (2019) [+ CHL]<br>- what defines an HSM? | | Paragraph 156 (2016): *individual heritage value, ex situ conservation*<br>Paragraph 60 (2017): *concepts of heritage, e.g. universality*<br>Paragraph 126 (2019): *reviewing HSM List format* | Paragraph 47-151 (2007): *changes/improvements to guidelines*<br>Paragraph 106-110 (2009): *proposing HSMs, revision of HSM Guidelines*<br>Paragraph 135-138 (2009): *permits to enter/visit historic sites*<br>Paragraph 179-184 (2010): *revision of HSM Guidelines*<br>Paragraph 200-203 (2010): *managing HSMs, concepts of 'historic' and 'enhancement'*<br>Paragraph 122-128 (2011): *descriptions/definitions of HSMs*<br>Paragraph 107 (2012): *HSM descriptions*<br>Paragraph127-132 (2012): *no one size fits all, HSM Guidelines, HSM descriptions*<br>Paragraph 134 (2013): *adoption of guidelines, designations (rubbish and recent)*<br>Paragraph 144-145 (2013): *HSM* | | 2010-2011: informal intersessional discussions on HSM definition/description (+ concepts of 'enhancement' and 'patrimony') [ARG]<br>2011-2012: continuing informal intersessional discussions on HSM definition/description (+ concepts of 'historic' & 'enhancement') [ARG]<br>2018-2019: review format of the HSM List [ARG + US] | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | *designations, large quantity*<br>Paragraph 72-73 (2016): *developing guidance materials*<br>Paragraph 203-207 (2016): *templates for ASPA/ASMA proposals* | | | |
| Australia | WP016 (1987)<br>- values, threats, zoning, APAs and historic values<br>WP016 (2018) [+ARG/BEL/CHL/CHN/CZH/FRA/GMY/JAP/NZ/NWY/RUS/UK/US]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system<br>WP070 (2019) [+ CZH, US]<br>- recommendations from 2019 APA workshop | IP165 (2019) [+ CZH, US]<br>- report on 2019 APA workshop | | Paragraph 119 (2019): *application of pre-1958 Guidelines*<br>Paragraph 173-175 (2019): *APA workshop report with, guidance material*<br>Paragraph 180 (2019): *defended fair representation of views at the APA workshop* | Paragraph 143 (1989): *reports on, visits to and conditions of, historic sites*<br>Paragraph 179-184 (2010): *revision of HSM Guidelines* | | | 1998: APA Workshop: HSMs 'generally well covered but some gaps' [UK, AUS, CHL, NWY*, SCAR & IUCN]<br>2019: APA Workshop: 'historic values' [UK, AUS, NWY, US, SPA, URU, CZH*, SCAR & CEP] |
| Belgium | WP016 (2018) [+ARG/AUS/CHL/CHN/CZH/FRA/GMY/JAP/NZ/NWY/RUS/UK/US]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system | | | | Paragraph 203-207 (2016): *templates for ASPA/ASMA proposals* | | | |
| Brazil | | | | | | | | |
| Bulgaria | | | | | | | | |
| Chile | WP031 rev.1 (1987)<br>- broad commentary, what was happening, French interpretation of 'object'<br>WP038 (2007)<br>- condensed version of IP092 (2006)<br>WP061 (2008) [+ US]<br>- WP for 2008 Guidelines, came into effect a year later<br>WP003 (2009) | IP092 (2006)<br>- Annex V and HSMs list, spatial dimensions (APAs), broad commentary, Warren thesis<br>IP083 (2019) [+ ARG] | | Paragraph 83 (2006): *draft Guidelines before intersessional reviews*<br>Paragraph 145-146 (2007): *collective commemoration* | Paragraph 47-151 (2007): *changes/improvements to guidelines*<br>Paragraph 47 (2009): *the issue of potential double designations*<br>Paragraph 106-110 (2009): *proposing HSMs, revision of HSM Guidelines* | 2007-2008: intersessional review of HSM Guidelines [CHL]<br>2008-2009: continuing intersessional review of HSM | | 1998: APA Workshop: HSMs 'generally well covered but some gaps' [UK, AUS, CHL, NWY*, SCAR & IUCN] |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | - condensed version of WP061 (2008)<br>WP050 rev.1 (2009)<br>- modifications to the list<br>WP016 (2018) [+ARG/AUS/BEL/CHN/CZH/FRA/GMY/JAP/NZ/NWY/RUS/UK/US]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system | - what defines an HSM? | | Paragraph 215 (2008): *proposed new Guidelines for comprehensive management* | Paragraph 200-203 (2010): *managing HSMs, concepts of 'historic' and 'enhancement'*<br>Paragraph 107 (2012): *HSM descriptions*<br>Paragraph 144-145 (2013): *HSM designations, large quantity* | Guidelines [CHL] | | 1999: APA Workshop: 'historic values/features' [CHL, PERU*] |
| The People's Republic of China | WP016 (2018) [+ARG/AUS/BEL/CHL/CZH/FRA/GMY/JAP/NZ/NWY/RUS/UK/US]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system | | | Paragraph 178 (2019): *culturally divergent views on heritage* | Paragraph 122-128 (2011): *descriptions/definitions of HSMs* | | | |
| The Czech Republic | WP070 (2019) [+ AUS, US]<br>- recommendations from 2019 APA workshop<br>WP016 (2018) [+ARG/AUS/BEL/CHL/CHN/FRA/GMY/JAP/NZ/NWY/RUS/UK/US]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system | IP165 (2019) [+ AUS, US]<br>- report on 2019 APA workshop | | | | | | 2019: APA Workshop: 'historic values' [UK, AUS, NWY, US, SPA, URU, CZH*, SCAR & CEP |
| Ecuador | | | | | | | | |
| Finland | | | | | | | | |
| France | WP016 (2018) [+ARG/AUS/BEL/CHL/CHN/CZH/GMY/JAP/NZ/NWY/RUS/UK/US]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system | | | | Paragraph 138-139 (2011): *updating the list* | | | |
| Germany | WP016 (2018) [+ARG/AUS/BEL/CHL/CHN/CZH/FRA//JAP/NZ/NWY/RUS/UK/US]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system | | | | Paragraph 144-145 (2013): *HSM designations, large quantity* | | | |
| India | | | | | | | | |
| Italy | WP013 (1996)<br>- protection, buffer zones, call for improvement | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | WP009 (1970)<br>- 'amalgamated list,' 40 entries<br>WP016 (2018) [+ARG/AUS/BEL/CHL/CHN/CZH/FRA/GMY/JAP/NZ/NWY/RUS/UK/US]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system | | | | | | | |
| The Netherlands | WP005 (1996)<br>- for when Annex V of the Environmental Protocol takes effect, how HSMs are classified | | | | | | | |
| New Zealand | WP013 (1987)<br>- protection, buffer zones, call for improvement<br>WP004 (1989)<br>- protection of Antarctic environment in general, some mention of HSMs<br>WP009 (1995)<br>- draft of the original Guidelines, the 7 criteria<br>WP036 (1999)<br>- guidelines for the protection of protected areas, mentions 'historic value'<br>WP011 (2000)<br>- APA guidelines, mentions 'historic values'<br>WP016 (2018) [+ARG/AUS/BEL/CHL/CHN/CZH/FRA/GMY/JAP /NWY/RUSUK/US]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system | | BP008 (2017)<br>- virtual reality to engage with and protect historic sites | Page 238 (1989): *comprehensive review of APA system*<br>Paragraph 234 (2008): *visitation to ASPAs and historic sites* | Paragraph 134 (2013): *adoption of guidelines, designations (rubbish and recent)* | 1999: open-ended intersessional contact group on developing guidelines for protected areas (drawing on 1998 & 1999 APA workshop outcomes) [NZ] | | |
| Norway | WP026 (1998) [+ UK]<br>- mentions 'historic values'<br>WP020 rev.1 (1999)<br>- automatic protection, the concept and application<br>WP023 (2001)<br>- following on from 1999 proposal, defines terms<br>WP030 (2016)<br>- approaches to heritage, ex situ conservation etc<br>WP047 (2017) [+ UK]<br>- new guidance material, ICG | IP038 (2001)<br>- introducing IPHC as a useful reference | | Paragraph 78 (2001): *pre-1958 Guidelines*<br>Paragraph 84 (2006): *professional expertise*<br>Paragraph 148-149 (2015): *guidance, historical* | Paragraph 72-73 (2001): *thorough review of list*<br>Paragraph 106-110 (2009): *proposing HSMs, revision of HSM Guidelines*<br>Paragraph 179-184 (2010): *revision of HSM Guidelines*<br>Paragraph 122-128 (2011): *descriptions/definitions of HSMs* | 2016-2017: intersessional contact group on 'guidance material for conservation approaches for the management of Antarctic | | 1998: APA Workshop: HSMs 'generally well covered but some gaps' [UK, AUS, CHL, NWY*, SCAR & IUCN]<br>2019: APA Workshop: |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | WP016 (2018) [+ARG/AUS/BEL/CHL/CHN/CZH/FRA/GMY/JAP/NZ/RUS/UK/US]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system<br>WP020 (2018) [+ UK]<br>- following on from WP047 (2017) | | | *values, in situ preservation*<br>Paragraph 174-176 (2015): *HSM designations, management philosophy*<br>Paragraph 153-155 (2016): *in situ v ex situ preservation* | Paragraph 144-145 (2013): *HSM designations, large quantity*<br>Paragraph 72-73 (2016): *developing guidance materials*<br>Paragraph 203-207 (2016): *templates for ASPA/ASMA proposals*<br>Paragraph 114 (2017): *guidance material for conservation approaches* + defining terms 'sites' and 'monuments'<br>Paragraph 108 (2018): new *Guide and Guidelines attached*<br>Paragraph 109 (2018): *HSMs as a means to educate, 200th anniversary of sighting* | heritage objects' [NWY + UK]<br>2017-2018: continuing intersessional contact group on 'guidance material for the management of Antarctic heritage objects' [NWY + UK] | | 'historic values' [UK, AUS, NWY, US, SPA, URU, CZH*, SCAR & CEP |
| Peru | WP037 (1999)<br>- report of 1999 APA workshop, mentions 'historic value' and 'cultural/historic features' | | | | | | | 1999: APA Workshop: 'historic values/features' [CHL, PERU*] |
| Poland | | | | | | | | |
| The Republic of Korea | | | | | | | | |
| The Russian Federation (U.S.S.R.) | WP034 rev.1 (1972)<br>- list, 43 entries, USSR proposal<br>WP016 (2018) [+ARG/AUS/BEL/CHL/CHN/CZH/FRA/GMY/JAP/NZ/NWY/UK/US]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system | IP045 (2004)<br>- Orthodox Temple in Antarctica, not designated though | | | Paragraph 107 (2012): *HSM descriptions* | | | |
| South Africa | | IP051 (2017)<br>- South African Antarctic heritage | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spain | | | | Paragraph 117-118 (2019): *intention to list San Telmo shipwreck as unfound/intangible HSM* | Paragraph 47-151 (2007): *changes/improvements to guidelines*<br>Paragraph 135-138 (2009): *permits to enter/visit historic sites* | | | 2019: APA Workshop: 'historic values' [UK, AUS, NWY, US, SPA, URU, CZH*, SCAR & CEP |
| Sweden | | | | | | | | |
| Ukraine | | | | | | | | |
| The United Kingdom | WP005 rev.1 (1970)<br>- list & instructions, difficult to read<br>WP011 (1972)<br>- addresses disagreement regarding descriptions, keeping the peace<br>WP025 (1987)<br>- APAs MPs<br>WP016 (1996)<br>- mentions HSMs with regard to ASPAs and ASMAs<br>WP010 (1997)<br>- following recommendations from the 1992 APA workshop for protected area proposals<br>WP026 (1998) [+ NWY]<br>- mentions 'historic values'<br>WP004 (2000)<br>- wooden sailing vessel, beginning of discussions on the Endurance<br>WP016 (2001)<br>- first proposed review of the list<br>WP004 (2002)<br>- following up review of list proposed in 2000, questionnaire distributed<br>WP043 (2007)<br>- guide to streamlining proposals, template for WPs<br>WP041 rev.1 (2008)<br>- the Guide's first revision, follows on from WP043 (2007)<br>WP005 (2016)<br>- focus on APAs, mentions HSMs, the Guide<br>WP012 (2016)<br>- 'evaluate this programme of heritage management on the | | | Paragraph 43 (1998): *APAs and Annex V*<br>Paragraph 77 (2000): *reviewing/updating the HSM List*<br>Paragraph 90-91 (2002): *questionnaire on HSM List*<br>Paragraph 169-170 (2004): *conservation and protection of HSMs*<br>Paragraph 184 (2005): *designating unoccupied stations as HSMs*<br>Paragraph 35 (2007): *HSMs falling under APAs*<br>Paragraph 99-100 (2016): *revision of guide to WPs on APA/HSM proposals*<br>Paragraph 149-152 (2016): *moratorium* | Paragraph 72-73 (2001): *thorough review of list*<br>Paragraph 47-151 (2007): *changes/improvements to guidelines*<br>Paragraph 47 (2009): *the issue of potential double designations*<br>Paragraph 135-138 (2009): *permits to enter/visit historic sites*<br>Paragraph 122-128 (2011): *descriptions/definitions of HSMs*<br>Paragraph 138-139 (2011): *updating the list*<br>Paragraph 72-73 (2016): *developing guidance materials*<br>Paragraph 203-207 (2016): *templates for ASPA/ASMA proposals*<br>Paragraph 114 (2017): *guidance material for conservation approaches + defining terms 'sites' and 'monuments'*<br>Paragraph 108 (2018): *new Guide and Guidelines attached*<br>Paragraph 109 (2018): *HSMs as a means to educate, 200th anniversary of sighting* | 2016-2017: intersessional contact group on 'guidance material for conservation approaches for the management of Antarctic heritage objects' [NWY + UK]<br>2017-2018: continuing intersessional contact group on 'guidance material for the management of Antarctic heritage objects' [NWY + UK<br>2019-2020: intersessional discussions on CMPs [UK] | | 1992: APA Workshop: Developing the APA system, better protection and assessment of HSMs [UK*, SCAR & IUCN]<br>1998: APA Workshop: HSMs 'generally well covered but some gaps' [UK, AUS, CHL, NWY*, SCAR & IUCN]<br>2019: APA Workshop: 'historic values' [UK, AUS, NWY, US, SPA, URU, CZH*, SCAR & CEP |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Antarctica Peninsula, as well as identify any areas of learning or improvement which might benefit other parties who manage HSMs'<br>WP047 (2017) [+ NWY]<br>- new guidance material, ICG<br>WP016 (2018) [+ARG/AUS/BEL/CHL/CHN/CZH/FRA/GMY/JAP/NZ/NWY/RUS/US]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system<br>WP020 (2018) [+ NWY]<br>- following on from WP047 (2017)<br>WP058 (2019)<br>- guidance material, further discussion | | | *on HSM proposals supported*<br>Paragraph 199-201 (2016): *revision of guide to WPs on APA/HSM proposals*<br>Paragraph 116 (2018): *HSM proposals in light of historic anniversaries*<br>Paragraph 112-113 (2019): *proposed addition of unfound/intangible HSM (the Endurance)*<br>Paragraph 123-125 (2019): *CMPs suggestion* | | | | |
| The United States | WP061 (2008) [+ CHL]<br>- WP for 2008 Guidelines, came into effect a year later<br>WP016 (2018) [+ARG/AUS/BEL/CHL/CHN/CZH/FRA/GMY/JAP/NZ/NWY/RUS/UK/]<br>- wide support for proposed workshop on developing the Antarctic protected area system<br>WP070 (2019) [+ CZH, AUS]<br>- recommendations from 2019 APA workshop | IP165 (2019) [+ CZH, AUS] | | Paragraph 142 (1989): *increasing protection for historic sites and monuments* | Paragraph 143 (1989): *reports on, visits to and conditions of, historic sites*<br>Paragraph 47-151 (2007): *changes/improvements to guidelines*<br>Paragraph 122-128 (2011): *descriptions/definitions of HSMs*<br>Paragraph 127-132 (2012): *no one size fits all, HSM Guidelines, HSM descriptions* | | 2018-2019: review format of the HSM List [ARG + US] | 2019: APA Workshop: 'historic values' [UK, AUS, NWY, US, SPA, URU, CZH*, SCAR & CEP |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Uruguay | | | | | | | | 2019: APA Workshop: 'historic values' [UK, AUS, NWY, US, SPA, URU, CZH*, SCAR & CEP |
| **TOTALS** | **HSM List:** 0 + 16 = **16**<br>**HSM Guide:** 3 + 2 = **5**<br>**HSM Guidelines:** 28 + 8 = **36** | | | **HSM List:** 12 + 11 = **23**<br>**HSM Guide:** 2 + 2 = **4**<br>**HSM Guidelines**: 19 + 12 = **31** | | **HSM List: 3**<br>**HSM Guide: 1**<br>**HSM Guidelines: 12** | | |