Governance and Governmentality: The Influence of the Bologna Process on Ethiopian Higher Education

by

Geberew Tulu Mekonnen, BA. M.A., M.Ed.
School of Education
College of Arts, Law, and Education

Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
University of Tasmania
March 2020

Declaration of Originality

I, Geberew Tulu Mekonnen, am the author of the thesis entitled *Governance and Governmentality: The Influence of the Bologna Process on Ethiopian Higher Education*, submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. I declare that this thesis is original and contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgment is made in the text or the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any material that infringes copyright.

Geberew Tulu Mekonnen

24/03/2020

Statement Regarding Published Work contained in Thesis

The publisher of the paper comprising some parts of Chapter 2 hold the copyright for that content, and access to the material should be sought from the respective journals. The remaining non-published content of the thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and communication in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.

Tulu, G., Corbett, M., & Kilpatrick, S. (2018). Academic Senate decision and deliberation communication in the context of the Bologna Process: The case of Ethiopian public universities. *Education and Society, 36*(2), 77-102. doi:10.7459/es/36.2.06.

Geberew Tulu Mekonnen

24/03/2020

Statement of Co-Authorship

The following people and institutions contributed to the publication of work undertaken as part of this thesis:

Candidate: Geberew Tulu Mekonnen, School of Education, University of Tasmania.

Author 1: Michael Corbett, School of Education, University of Tasmania.

Author 2: Sue Kilpatrick, School of Education, University of Tasmania.

Authors contributions:

The material from the literature component in Chapter 2:

Tulu, G., Corbett, M., & Kilpatrick, S. (2018). Academic Senate decision and deliberation communication in the context of the Bologna Process: The case of Ethiopian public universities. *Education and Society, 36*(2), 77-102. doi:10.7459/es/36.2.06.

Conceived and designed experiment: Candidate, Author 1, Author 2

Methodology: Candidate, Author 1, Author 2

Analysis and interpretation: Candidate

Wrote the manuscript: Candidate

Revised the manuscript: Candidate, Author 1, Author 2

We, the undersigned, endorse the above stated contribution of work undertaken for the published peer-reviewed manuscript contributing to this thesis

Geberew Tulu Mekonnen Candidate School of Education, University of Tasmania	Sue Kilpatrick Primary Supervisor School of Education, University of Tasmania.	Victoria Carrington Dean & Head of School School of Education University of Tasmania
24/03/2020	25/03/2020	25/03/2020

Statement of Authority of Access

I, Geberew Tulu Mekonnen, author of the thesis entitled *Governance and Governmentality: The Influence of the Bologna Process on Ethiopian Higher Education*, submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, agree that this thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and communication in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.

Geberew Tulu Mekonnen

24/03/2020

Statement of Ethical Conduct

The research associated with this thesis abides by the international and Australian codes on human and animal experimentation, as approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network-Social Science, Ethics Reference No: H0016612.

Geberew Tulu Mekonnen

24/03/2020

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to investigate the Ethiopian public universities' governance systems in the context of the Bologna Process. It specifically aimed at understanding and interpreting the perceptions and strategic responses of leaders, instructors, and students of public universities towards their governance systems. In the past few years, there has been a prevailing chorus of complaints among academic leaders, instructors, and students about university governance. The Ethiopian government acknowledged the stakeholders' dissatisfaction with governance and placed it as one of the priorities in the Growth Transformational Plan-II of 2016-2020. This dissatisfaction and the introduction of newly adopted elements of the Bologna Process brought enormous pressures to the governance of public universities. In addition, little is known about the Ethiopian higher education institutions' governance in the context of the Bologna Process. This limited information on higher education governance in the Ethiopian context and the dissatisfaction of university key actors about the university governance systems provided the impetus for this study.

Taking these gaps into consideration, this study was designed to address the following research questions:

- How do key actors in Basic Academic Units (BAUs[1]) of Ethiopian public universities perceive and practice governance in the context of the Bologna Process?
- How are students' voices reflected and perceived in the governance of Ethiopian public universities?
- What response strategies do BAUs in Ethiopian public universities use to respond to university governance systems?
- What impact has the Bologna Process had on the Ethiopian higher education system?

[1] *Key actors in BUAs are students, instructors, and leaders of colleges and departments of public universities*

- What are the challenges and opportunities pertinent to public university governance as a consequence of the Bologna Process; and
- What are the implications of this study for higher education governance and governmentality in Ethiopia and elsewhere?

The concept of governance and governmentality was utilised as a conceptual framework to understand the governance systems. The study employed mixed methods research design. A total of 42 college deans, 68 department chairs, 209 instructors, and 697 students from the three generations (established from 1950-2004, 2005-2010, and 2011-2016) sample public universities were selected using random and census sampling techniques coupled with purposive sampling. Both quantitative and qualitative data were generated from university staff and students using questionnaires and interviews. In order to address the research questions, quantitative data were analysed using descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, frequency, and percentage) and inferential statistics (ANOVA and Tukey's multiple comparison test) whilst the qualitative data were thematically analysed.

The following findings were found. First, autonomy, accountability, transparency, and participation were conceived as a critical concern of most of the research participants. As a result, discontinuity between the legal documents and the actual practice has been identified. Second, the findings on the role of student voice contrast with identified practices in the Bologna implementing countries (Bergan, 2003; Dundar, 2013). In the Ethiopian higher education context, students had more voice than instructors, and they were more empowered and listened to by the university senior management than instructors in some of the aspects of the decision-making process. Third, based on Oliver's (1991) framework of strategic responses to institutional pressure, instructors and leaders used defiance, manipulation, and avoidance as strategic responses to governance pressure, and compromise and acquiescence as a means of a confirmatory strategic response to existing governance pressures. In contrast, students' response strategies tended to be more positive as they predominantly used acquiescence and compromise strategies in responding to the university system. Fourth, the Bologna Process has had impact on both structural and governance aspects of the Ethiopian higher education. Governance challenges such as

policy decontextualisation, politicised and centralised systems, inadequate leadership skills, lack of transparency, and nepotism and paternalism emerged during Ethiopia's implementation of the Bologna Process. From the structural perspective, competency-based education, harmonisation and modularisation of academic programs, and credit transfer systems were some of the changes made to Ethiopian higher education. Consequently, flexible learning paths for students, student mobility between universities, teamwork, and continuous learning assessment emerged as positive impacts of the Bologna Process. Finally, this study suggests the need to build trust, and shared and consultative governance that accommodates the interests of the university system participants including instructors, students, lower and middle-level leaders, university senior management, and the government at a higher level.

Acknowledgments

My interest in higher education governance has been sparked by numerous conversations, experiences, and challenges that I, and others, have faced as employees within higher education. As such several individuals have informed the development of this thesis and have provided me with time, support and space for critical discussion during my time at the University of Tasmania and Addis Ababa University.

I owe a great deal to my supervisors: Professor Sue Kilpatrick, Professor David Kember, and Dr John Kenny, who provided me enormous supports and encouragement. My heartfelt gratitude also goes to Professor Michael Corbett, who encouraged me to get on with the research and provided me with meticulous feedback during the early stage of my PhD journey. All have informed the way I considered and explored the Ethiopian higher education systems from its inception up to the final stage. I am indebted to them for their unreserved efforts, constructive comments, and patience throughout the process in shaping this thesis. Had it not been for my wonderful supervisors' critical comments and invaluable suggestions, this thesis would not have the present form. My dear supervisors, you all deserve my utmost gratitude.

I am extremely grateful to leaders, instructors, and students of Addis Ababa University, Debre Berhan University, and Wachemo University, who gave their time to take part in this study. This study could not have done without their unreserved participation. I am grateful to them for their kind co-operation, patience and unreserved provision of the data. I hope this thesis does justice to their experiences and opens up opportunities for understanding those experiences in the context of others.

The Tasmania Graduate Research Scholarships and the University of Tasmania (UTAS) provided valuable financial support to complete my study, which I would otherwise have not done. My sincere gratitude also goes to Addis Ababa University for granting me a study leave. I am also grateful to fellow friends and the UTAS community for their academic and administrative supports. The discussions that I

have had as part of the network have inspired me to make more sense of how students and instructors are positioned within higher education.

My family has also provided endless support, patience, and encouragement throughout this process. My utmost thanks go to my beloved wife Tigist Tolosa Roba for her emboldened encouragement and shouldering the responsibility of taking care of our children, Yeron, Beka, and Sinan. Her sincerity, warmth, care, and love made my life and study easier. She has endured the ups and downs of research with patience and good humour. I extend my thanks to our beloved children for their tolerance and patience while I was busy with my studies. I look forward to returning my attention to you in the months ahead.

Geberew Tulu Mekonnen

March 2020

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAU	Addis Ababa University
ACS	Academic Senate
ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
AUC	African Union Commission
AVP	Academic Vice President
BAU	Basic Academic Units
BP	Bologna Process
BPR	Business Process Reengineering
C	College
CBE	Competence Based Education
CH	Chair
COAC	College Academic Commission
D	Dean
DAC	Department Academic Council
DBU	Debre Berhan University
Df	Degree of Freedom
DT	Department
ECTS	European Credit Transfer System
EFA	Education for All
EHEA	European Higher Education Area
EHEP	Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation
ESDP	Education Sector Development Program
ETP	Education and Training Policy
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GTP	Growth Transformational Plan
HE	Higher Education
HEI	Higher Education Institution
HST	Honest Significance Test
IIEP	International Institute for Educational Planning
INS	Instructor
M	Mean
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MOE	Ministry of Education
NPM	New Public Management
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORTT	Office of Research and Technology Transfer
RDT	Resource Dependence Theory
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SD	Standard deviation
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
ST	Student
UB	University Board
WCU	Wachemo University
WTA	World Trade Association

Definition of Key Terms

Academic unit: A college, faculty, school, an institute, a department or centre established as a constituent unit of an institution (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009).

Accountability is the responsibility for one's actions to someone or multiple parties as a result of legal, financial, personal, or morally based ties (Zumeta, 2011, p. 133).

Autonomy refers to the freedom of an academic institution to determine its own goals and priorities; to select its own leaders; design academic programs; employ and dismiss staff; determine enrolment size and rate of growth; and to manage its own budget, including the reallocation of funds among budget items and the right to retain for future use any savings generated (Estermann & Nokkala, 2009; Salmi, 2007).

Bologna Process: refers to the European Higher Education Area framework of harmonisation process that the Ministry of Education (MoE) of Ethiopia recently introduced to all the public universities, which constitutes curriculum harmonisation and modularisation process, competence-based education, and quality assurance, transparency, participation & accountability as the principles of governance (McMahon, 2010).

Collegial governance or self-governing approach refers to the collegial (autonomous) decision-making of the academic communities or free scholarly inquiry with strong self-regulation and collegial control by the professoriate in academic affairs, university policy, and procedures (Kivistö & Zalyevska, 2015).

Consultative governance: Consultative governance is the process by which some selected senior academics contribute to decision making on issues related to university academic issues, policy, and procedures (Schultze, 2003).

Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation: A comprehensive legal basis for the establishment and development of higher education institutions in Ethiopia (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009).

Governance: The implementation of legal forms and process of decision-making through which a university governs its affairs (Shattock, 2006). The implementation of the legal forms includes the university Senate legislation, Ethiopian higher education proclamation, and guidelines and directives from the Ministry of Education.

Governmentality: Techniques and procedures used for directing human behaviour, actions thought, and governing self (Dean, 2010; Gordon, 1991; Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006b).

Shared governance: Shared governance is the process by which university system participants (University board, university administration, and academics, students) contribute to decision making related to college or university academic issues, policy, and procedure (Flaherty, 2016).

Participation refers to key stakeholders' involvement in the affairs of their institution, including teaching, researching, leading, decision-making, and serving the community without restriction.

Public university: An institution whose budget is allocated by the Federal government and prepares qualified graduates in knowledge, skills, and attitudes; undertake research, and community service (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009).

Top-down governance is hierarchical governance that operates through top-down command control with the downward transmission of orders and upward transmission of information (Diefenbach & Sillince, 2011).

Transparency is one the governance principles in which academic decisions be made and communicated most transparently so that no doubt is left as to their legality and fairness in the minds of both those who participate in the decision-making process as well as those to whom decisions apply. It is the right to obtain, supply, and release information, both solicited and unsolicited on the particulars of decisions and how the decisions are reached (Addis Ababa University, 2011).

University Senate legislation: The rules and regulations of a university to run its internal affairs.

PART – A

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

Background of the Study

1.1 Introduction

The Ethiopian Higher Education Institution (HEI) system is comparatively young and was established in the 1950s with only one university until 1991. However, since 1991, the number of HEIs has increased to more than thirty. It is expanding significantly since the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation granted the provisions of law to establish HEIs at various levels (Akalu, 2014; Mekasha, 2005; Solomon, 2010). As a result, the Ethiopian higher education system is characterised by rapid changes. This includes the increased and diversified types of students, the increasing number of graduates every year, the growing demand for relevance and quality curricula, and the need for effective quality and relevance assurance mechanisms (Debela, 2019; Yizengaw, 2007). This expansion has escalated enrolment in undergraduate programmes with a rate of more than 1200 percent (Akalu, 2014). In the past five years, the enrolment of undergraduates grew by 55 percent, while postgraduate enrolment growth was 65 percent (Akalu, 2014; Ministry of Education, 2016a). The fundamental reason for the expansion is the country's political commitment to education, which is linked to the National Growth Transformational Plan of economic growth, poverty reduction, and health development of the country (Akalu, 2014; Kahsay, 2012; Mehari, 2010; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2016).

However, with all these large-scale attempts of HEIs expansion, there are ongoing complaints among the stakeholders (students, instructors, leaders, and researchers) about Ethiopian higher education governance systems. The Ethiopian government acknowledged the dissatisfaction of these stakeholders and set governance as one of

the priorities for the five years (2016-2020) (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2016).

1.2 What was the Study About?

This doctoral research aims to investigate the Ethiopian public universities' governance systems in the context of the Bologna Process. From this aim, there is a more generalised aim of suggesting a higher education governance system that would work for the system participants of the Ethiopian public universities.

The initial inspiration for this research emerged from my personal experience. For almost the past 17 years, I worked in different positions of higher education institutions. My experience as a teacher, Managing Director of a college, College Associate Dean, Assistant Dean of Students, and Program Coordinator allowed me to carefully look into what has been going on in the Ethiopian higher education institutions. This experience also helped me to organise different consultative workshops and conferences both at the National and University levels, where various stakeholders took part and expressed their voice. Thus, the Ministry of Education (MoE)officials, academics, in-service trainees, and high school teachers were part of the consultative meetings. During these meetings, a lot of ideas were raised by different stakeholders. Some of those ideas were partly related to university internal governance problems while some were external issues related to the MoE, and others were broad systemic problems of the country.

As an organiser of the consultative meetings, where different issues were heard, I started to sense over some of the points raised during the meetings. The frequent change of directives, policies, and guidelines were some of the challenges that I experienced in my administrative journey. The challenges I enjoyed from my previous work environments inspired me to look into higher education governance system in a broad perspective and started to embark on this research project: *Governance and governmentality: The influence of the Bologna Process on Ethiopian higher education*. Searching for scholarship in order to fully commit myself to read more literature and explain the existing Ethiopian higher education governance system was my prime target to visualise my ambition.

With this aspiration and for the sake of understanding higher education better, I began to search for a scholarship to pursue my studies overseas. Also, it was my firm conviction to undertake a doctoral course at an overseas university in order to involve myself in the overseas higher education system which would greatly help me to gain a more comprehensive understanding of higher education institutions in a global context. Taking this into account, as part of a PhD project, it was necessary for me to explore the governance of higher education institutions in the global contexts in general, and the Ethiopian public universities' governance in particular. During the scholarship search, I learned that Australia has the strongest higher education systems (ranked 4th among the top 10 countries (QS World University Rankings, 2016).

Reviewing literature was the main task at the beginning of my PhD journey. From my experience and reading, and I also learned that in the past two decades, Ethiopia expanded its higher education institutions. With this tremendous expansion, the higher education system is becoming complex, and there is a prevailing chorus of complaints among stakeholders (instructors, students, instructors, and leaders) about public university governance systems in Ethiopia (Mehari, 2010). The Ethiopian government also accepted the stakeholders' dissatisfaction with governance and has put governance as one of the agenda items of the Growth Transformational Plan-II (GTP-II) of 2016-2020 (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2016). In addition, I found that little has been done on the governance of higher education institutions both in African and Ethiopian contexts (Bano & Taylor, 2014; Kigotho, 2015; Roberts & Ajai-Ajagbe, 2013; Vandemoortele, 2012).

What is more, little has been known on the influence of the Bologna Process on the governance of higher education in Ethiopia. Being fully cognizant of what has been currently going on higher education in the Ethiopian context, exploring the issue is significant. Thus, my ambition was fuelled by my desire to better myself academically, improve on my career prospects, and contribute towards the economic and social development of my country, and link Ethiopia with Tasmania for the collaborative higher education research forum in the future. Seeking to make a contribution to those under-researched areas, this study focused on six research questions (*see section 1.4*). In addition, the study expected to suggest higher education

governance model for the university system participants to have better governance system.

1.3 Setting the Research Context

Similar to other countries, a rapidly changing global environment has had an influence on Ethiopian higher education, since the early 1990s (Mehari, 2010; Teshome, 2012). As mentioned earlier, the Ethiopian government introduced a wide variety of public reforms, including new higher education institutions, particularly after the incumbent Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) led government came to power in 1991 (Ferede, 2013; Solomon, 2010). Since 1991, Ethiopian HEIs have passed through three different legislative reforms: 1) the foundation of a legal framework for the education policy in 1994, (2) the Education Sector Development Plans in 1997, and (3) the improvement and revitalisation of the system by reforming issues related to quality and relevance in 2003 (Yizengaw, 2003b). As of 2008, Ethiopia introduced Business Process Reengineering (BPR) as a tool for improving the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and transparency of higher education institutions (Behailu, 2011). Following this, new academic reforms, including some elements of the Bologna Process were introduced across all the public universities which are accountable to the MoE as of 2011 (Moges, 2015). A similar situation is also evident across the globe with the introduction of New Public Management (NPM). The NPM introduced in HEIs as a tool for improving their efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and transparency, and to help universities become more entrepreneurial, adaptive and commercially responsive (Bleiklie, 2012; Bleiklie, Enders, & Lepori, 2013; De Boer, Enders, & Schimank, 2008; De Boer & Stensaker, 2007). However, with all these comprehensive attempts of system adjustment, there are a number of issues, including:

1. In the Bologna Process, governance is conceived as one of the principles that will turn the process framework into a reality (Communiqué Leuven, 2009; European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018; McMahon, 2010). While system change has been endemic, research shows that little has been published about HEI governance in Africa, despite the issue of governance being a priority, Post 2015-

millennium goals (Assembly, 2013; Bano & Taylor, 2014; Kigotho, 2015; MacGregor, 2009; Petlane, 2009; Roberts & Ajai-Ajagbe, 2013; Vandemoortele, 2012). Haq (2012) put it this way, "Developing countries have not yet developed effective governance and stability in political aspects…." (p. 2). In addition, other scholars stressed that "Remarkably, little is known about middle management in higher education" (De Boer & Goedegebuure, 2009, p. 226). Several studies (De Boer & Goedegebuure, 2009; Gebremeskel & Feleke, 2016; Solomon, 2010; Teferra & Altbachl, 2004) further revealed that little has been done with in-depth empirical studies on HEI governance; the previous research was mainly focusing on comparative studies using secondary data.

2. Until very recently, African leaders could not agree on governance models that could be adopted by African universities in the post-2015 era (Dampson & Edwards, 2019; Kigotho, 2015). This disagreement indicates that the issue is timely and worth investigating.

3. Regarding HEI governance systems in Ethiopia, Mehari (2010) also remarked that "surprisingly, the issue of governance in Ethiopian HE system has not been studied well" (p. 3).

4. While HEIs are increasing quickly, there is an ongoing complaint about higher education governance in Ethiopia (Ministry of Education, 2015), and it is timely and seems important to explore the causes of complaints about the system by stakeholders.

5. Public universities of Ethiopia have embarked on the implementation of some elements of the Bologna Process (BP) as of 2011 (Moges, 2015), but the influence of the Bologna on university governance has not yet been studied. As Zmas (2015) argued, "Researchers, however, are distancing themselves from the Bologna Process because they perceive 'Bolognanisation' as a soft power of Europe, which will disseminate its educational norms at a global level" (p. 732).

With these gaps in mind, this study is designed to explore the practice of governance and how the public universities perceive governance in the Ethiopian higher education context.

1.4 Research Questions

By considering these research gaps as justifications, this study is designed to answer the following research questions.

1. How do key actors in Basic Academic Units (BAUs[2]) of Ethiopian public universities perceive and practice governance in the context of the Bologna Process?

2. How are students' voices reflected and perceived in the governance of Ethiopian public universities?

3. What response strategies do BAUs in Ethiopian public universities use to respond to university governance systems?

4. What impact has the Bologna Process had on the Ethiopian higher education system?

5. What are the challenges and opportunities pertinent to public university governance and governmentality as a consequence of the Bologna Process?

6. What are the implications of this study for higher education governance in Ethiopia and elsewhere?

1.5 Expected Contributions of the Study

The study is expected to have the following significant contributions.

1. This study provides policy, academic and practical contributions. HE governance in Africa has received little attention. In particular, public university governance in light of the Bologna Process has not received much attention. In this regard, this study is expected to contribute to the existing

[2] *Key actors in BUAs are students, instructors, and leaders of colleges and departments of public universities*

scant literature on public universities system participants' response to public universities governance in Africa and elsewhere.

2. In Ethiopia, public HEIs have drastically increased in number (Akalu, 2014). Despite tremendous expansion, public universities are expected to run their internal affairs while responding to current global and local challenges. Therefore, this study is expected to provide useful recommendations for policy makers and institutional leaders, as governance is one of the most important public agenda items for the country.

3. It is also expected that the study will assist stakeholders (instructors, leaders, and students) to identify the changes in governance systems that are being practised by the public universities in order to nurture institutional governance excellence.

4. Above all, as research is an ongoing phenomenon that leads to further investigations; this study may pave the way for other research by those who are interested in the area.

1.6 Structure

This thesis is divided into four parts: Part A, B, C and D following the thesis template recommendation by Kember and Corbett (2018). Part A is an introduction section that contains three chapters, namely, the background of the study, literature review, and research methodology. Similarly, Part B includes the results and discussion chapters. This part focuses on the analysis and presentation of the data gathered through questionnaires, interviews and open-ended items of the questionnaires from the college deans, department chairs, instructors, and students of the sample public universities. Accordingly, chapters 4-7 presents the autonomy, accountability, transparency, and participation in the Ethiopian Public universities. The result of quantitative and qualitative data is integrated, compared, and explained with the relevant literature. The conception of research participants about the emergent theme of university governance, and the governance implication from the study have been discussed within each chapter.

Part C of this thesis is synthesising discussion of the study and integrates key points rather than repeating all points in the entire journey of the research. Finally, Part D treats the overall conclusion and the implication of the study. The first section of Chapter 11 presents the concluding ideas and summary of the overall findings of qualitative and quantitative results. Finally, the second section forwards the suggested model of public university governance. Table 1.1 provides the overall structure of the thesis.

Table 1.1: Structure of the thesis

Contents

Part A	**Introduction**
Chapter 1	Background of the study
Chapter 2	Literature review
Chapter 3	Research methodology
Part B	**Results and discussion**
Chapter 4	Autonomy in the Ethiopian Public Universities
Chapter 5	Accountability in the Ethiopian Public Universities
Chapter 6	Transparency in the Ethiopian Public universities
Chapter 7	Participation in the Ethiopian Public universities
Part C	**Synthesising discussion**
Chapter 8	Voice of the students in the Ethiopian Public Universities
Chapter 9	Response strategies
Chapter 10	Governance challenges and opportunities
Part D	**Conclusion**
Chapter 11	Conclusion and implications

Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Higher Education and National Development

One of the purposes of a country's development that encompasses economic, political, and social developments is to create a conducive environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives (Yizengaw, 2003b). In respect to this, various scholars have been trying to explain the notion of development from different perspectives. Several studies (Godin, 2006; Matunhu, 2011; Valenzuela & Valenzuela, 1978) witnessed that the explanation of development started from modernisation theories to the knowledge-based economy theory. In the 1950s and 60s, the modernisation theory of development, which advocates the development from the pre-modern society to modern society was profoundly embedded into capitalism (Matunhu, 2011). The assumption behind this theory is that developing countries can be developed in the same way other developed countries have been advanced (Kaur & Singh, 2016; Matunhu, 2011). This shows that developing countries need to adopt the developed countries' policies and strategies (Matunhu, 2011). However, without considering the contexts, for example, the social and cultural values of the society, top-down modernisation approaches, policies, and strategies might fail at some point (Max-Neef, 1991). This implies a country needs to consider the policies and strategies it wishes to adopt from the advanced nations in light of its indigenous knowledge, the social and cultural values of its people. This is why Sen (1999) argued that development is "a process of expanding real freedom that people enjoy" (p. 3). The author further claimed that" explaining development from its narrow point of views, specifically, identifying development with the growth of the national product, increase in individual income, technological advance, or logical advance, and social modernisation undermine the notion of development" (Sen, 1999, p. 3). But as the author clearly revealed, development as freedom expansion requires

social and economic preparations such as services for education and health, political and civil rights, the freedom to engage in public debates (Sen, 1999). Finally, as the modernisation theory failed to bring about a tangible positive growth relationship between the developing and the developed regions of the world, dissatisfaction with the theory in the late 1950s led to new more critical ways of thinking which resulted in resource dependency theory (RDT) (Peter, 1966; Valenzuela & Valenzuela, 1978).

The fundamental assumption of RDT is that external resources of organisations affect the behaviour of the organisation, that is, actions of organisations can be explained depending on the particular dependency condition (Davis & Cobb, 2010; Nienhüser, 2008). In other words, rather than "developed" societies serving as the model toward which others are progressing, RDT posits that it is precisely the uneven relationship between economically and militarily dominant global powers and subordinate states that inhibits that progress. While RDT was originally designed to explain flows of capital and economic relationships between "developed" and "underdeveloped" societies, the fundamental concepts apply to public institutions as well. For instance, in higher education institutions, RDT can also be better understood through the interactions of public institutions with external influences. For Nienhüser (2008), resources control the actions of organisations, organisational decisions, and actions which can be explained depending on the particular dependency situation. In connection to this, Fumasolia and Stensaker (2013) argued that universities and colleges are affected by their environment, and RDT is one of the theories that focus on the external control of organisations. It has been argued that organisations can act flexibly and adapt to the environment in which they operate. The importance of environmental factors is central to the RDT approach. The main argument here is in order for organisations to survive, they have to be responsive to their environment. They need to search for ways to minimise their dependence on environmental factors and maximise their resources (Fumasolia & Stensaker, 2013; Nienhüser, 2008).

Later, human capital theory (HCT) emerged to provide an alternative explanation of development focusing not on macroeconomic relations so much as the importance of societies developing human resources, largely through education (Becker, 2009). Human capital theory, the most influential economic theory of western education since

the early 1960s and still relevant today in many respects, also depends on the assumption that formal education is instrumental for increasing the productivity of society (Almendarez, 2013; Dumciuviene, 2015; Fugar, Ashiboe-Mensah, & Adinyira, 2013; Olaniyan & Okemakinde, 2008). However, Fitzsimons (1999) gave a necessary explanation for the reformulation of an HTC that education and training have paramount significance as the key to participation in the new global economy.

Additionally, many reports stress the need to invest in people, an investment in the future generation, and the nation as a whole (Debela, in press; Ozturk, 2001). The importance of educating people to achieve a country's constant competitiveness and sustainable development is, therefore, unarguable (Dervin & Zajda, 2015). Other scholars further argue that education is one of the fundamental engines of economic growth, social changes, and political stability, which gears towards the development of a country (Almendarez, 2013; Burchi, 2006; Ozturk, 2001). An increase in the quality of education is connected to a wide range of benefits, including improved productivity, reduced poverty and disparity of income, and improved health (Onsando, 2007). Without more and better education, it will be challenging to utilise available resources effectively for national development and to benefit from the comprehensive knowledge-based economy. Education, therefore, is a top priority (Banya & Zajda, 2015).

Studies have also shown that investment in education accelerates by improving human capital. For instance, the East Asia countries such as Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan achieved remarkable rates of economic growth and development as a result of making significant investments in education (Almendarez, 2013; Caruso, 2015; Fugar et al., 2013; Martin & Stella, 2007; Olaniyan & Okemakinde, 2008). However, these days, the paradigm shifted towards the enhancement of knowledge as a priority with the view of "how to learn" and "how to use" which gears toward "know what, how, and why"(Hargreaves, 2003). For example, some countries like Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil have transformed themselves into a knowledge-based economy and knowledge-based partnerships between the different actors. However, there are still some developing countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and many African countries, which are struggling with internal and external issues including security, unemployment, and political instability (Ball, 2012; Bano & Taylor, 2014;

Haq, 2012). Thus, increasing human capital is also promoted as a means of creating political stability and national security.

Consequently, universities are expected to respond to the newly emerging needs of society and the economy, in different ways, by focusing more on knowledge transfers and skills development (Antonelli & Fassio, 2015; Kaur & Singh, 2016). In fact, the knowledge economy demands an efficient governance system to be in place in any country (Bano & Taylor, 2014). In this regard, higher education is needed for its pivotal roles in bringing effective governance to have competent graduates, needs-based community service, problem-solving research outputs, innovative science, and technology, research-led development, and fostering partnerships (Bano & Taylor, 2014; Burchi, 2006; Onsando, 2007; Ozturk, 2001; Salmi, 2011).

Higher education institutions are also seen as critical for sustainable development (Okolie, 2003). Several studies (Asian Development Bank, 2007; Onsando, 2007; Pillay, 2011; Rizvi & Lingard, 2010) evidenced the contribution of higher education to economic growth and long-term benefits to society. For instance, Pillay (2011) apparently argued that "The role of tertiary education in the construction of knowledge economies is crucial (p. 5). Similarly, (Bloom, Canning, & Chan, 2006) claim that " In a knowledge economy, tertiary education can help economies catch up with more technologically advanced world"(p. iii). Hence, the increasing importance and the need for more investment in higher education in the world scenario is set out by different study reports and initiatives of the international organisations and communities (Asian Development Bank, 2007; Bloom et al., 2006). In fact, the dividing line between developed and developing countries relies on the capacity of higher education and scientific attainments, and its application for economic progress and prosperity (Bloom et al., 2006). This indicates that higher education institutions are essentially seen as generating, disseminating and utilising knowledge. However, many challenges undermine the ability of the country to meet its mission and the national goals of development in the socio-economic setting such as effective governance, poverty alleviation, and becoming competitive within the global economy which is increasingly become knowledge-based (Teshome, 2012). These fundamental problems and

weaknesses afflict higher education institutions that seek to achieve their objectives of fully skilled workforce (Burchi, 2006; Yizengaw, 2003b).

Higher education (HE) is responsible for the human resources required for different sectors which are vital for the economic and social development of a country (Banya & Zajda, 2015). The function of Higher education institutions (HEIs) also includes generating, adopting and disseminating knowledge and skills. HE expands people's productivity by giving them access to knowledge and expertise. As the world becomes progressively interconnected, more interdependent and more of a global village, HE is critical for the achievement of economic, political, development, building a democratic culture and society (Geo-JaJa & Zajda, 2015). The implementation of development strategies and policies will be successful if HEIs play their major roles such as teaching, training, and research responsibly, and services (UNESCO, 2015; Yang, Schneller, & Roche, 2015). Besides, training and preparation of competent and responsible citizens, research support for a national innovation system, which is crucial to a country's competitiveness and living standards (Geo-JaJa & Zajda, 2015). Generally speaking, higher education benefits individuals and the economy as a whole. The data from many countries also show a positive correlation between increasing higher education access and economic growth as expressed by increasing per capita income and/or human development index(UNESCO, 2015; World Bank, 2015).

Drawing on the positive correlation between increasing higher education access and economic growth (UNESCO, 2015; World Bank, 2015), nurturing governance and leadership skills in higher education can provide a country with competent individuals that will contribute toward a policy environment favourable to economic growth (Petlane, 2009; Salmi, 2011). What's more, a fundamental relationship has been reported between effective governance and economic growth (World Bank, 2015). Indeed, this debate suggests a relationship between governance in general and development, which often links the failures of development on failures in governance (Petlane, 2009). In the same way, higher education governance has taken as heightened importance to upsurge competitiveness in the global knowledge economy (Saint, 2009b). Agreeing with this idea, Petlane (2009) clearly explained the contribution of higher education to governance:

> Firstly, higher education contributes to economic growth through the production of knowledge. This largely takes place within the major universities through faculty members' and their advanced students' research and creative activities. Knowledge and understanding of governance principles, systems and processes are produced this way. Secondly, colleges and universities contribute to national growth through the diffusion of knowledge, which is the result of the community-service activities of their faculties, staff, and students (including consultancies and policy advice). These activities contribute directly to the shaping of governance policies. Thirdly, higher-education institutions contribute to the transmission of knowledge through their extensive and varied teaching activities and publications (p. 8).

Hence, the role of higher education in such a context is significant (Assembly, 2013; Petlane, 2009; Vandemoortele, 2012).

2.2 Higher Education Governance in a Global Context

The twenty-first century is recognised as a knowledge era, and HE is expected to play a paramount role in a globalised world (Gibbons, 1998; Medvedeva, 2015; Scott, 2000; Wilkins, 2016). To this end, in the past decades, HE passed through several reforms (Scott, 2000; Teferra & Altbachl, 2004). Many of the HEIs in both developed and developing world also went through similar phenomena (Bunting & Cloete, 2004). To explain the situation further, Bunting and Cloete (2004, p. 18) argue that "the global context influences national policy-makers to emphasise in national policy processes and reform issues that "fit" the globalisation discourses, such as efficiency, effectiveness, and competition." Hence, the global scenario has significant influences on the HE systems in both developed and developing nations.

In addition, the slow economic growth and the rapid drive of globalisation with increased competition have stimulated several reforms to the current higher education system (Boer & File, 2009; Dobbins, Knill, & Vogtle, 2011; Lefrere, 2007; Saint, 2009a). Boer and File (2009), for instance, argued that in the past three decades, in several states, higher education underwent substantial reforms compared to Europe. The author further depicted that the Western European countries made several changes to

the higher education system in the 1980s and much attention was given to the universities' contributions to the knowledge-based economy society with three areas of focus education, research, and innovation. What is more, a strong emphasis has been given to the implementation of modern types of governance (Boer & File, 2009). Several studies (Fielden, 2008; Salmi, 2007; Singh, Pathak, Naz, & Belwal, 2010; Tessema & Abebe, 2011) underlined that over the past decades, the global trend shows improved higher education governance of university affairs. Salmi (2007) notes, "Greater management freedom has recently been awarded to universities in Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, Denmark, and Germany" (p. 224). Fielden (2008) also sees the withdrawal of the state from restricted control and management affairs and offering the delegation of responsibility to universities to govern themselves. In addition, a gradual withdrawal of the state from decisions on the appointment of the chair of the board or president and board members has been seen as a recent practice as part of improved governance (Fielden, 2008).

However, Jreisat (2004) argued that governance varies depending on historical, economic, cultural and global contexts. For instance, variation in governance systems is greater among non-Western countries such as China, Brazil, Japan, Mexico, India, Egypt, Iran, and Indonesia due to the historical, economic, cultural and global factors (Jreisat, 2004). To support this idea, Agasisti and Catalano (2006) pointed out that in the university governance, there are some variations as structural arising out of some board of governance with some interest groups, and economic reasons such as declining of financial assistance from the government. Some are well-governed universities (Agasisti & Catalano, 2006). In the UK, for instance, higher education institutions have considerable autonomy, but, in France, the state regulates the institutions (Agasisti & Catalano, 2006; Van Vught, 1995). In Africa, the situation is quite different from Western countries for the reason that the need for improved governance has been identified (Kigotho, 2015). In most African cases, the state controls the institutions (Akalu, 2014; Petlane, 2009; Solomon, 2010; Wana, 2009; Zeleza, 2003). From the various studies, different views are observed. Some claim that it is important to increase the state's role in higher education governance. On the other hand, others were in favour of opening higher education to market forces: promoting competition, excellence, and innovativeness, and reducing political power of a government intervention

(Davidovitch & Iram, 2015; De Boer, Enders, & Schimank, 2007; Dobbins et al., 2011; Varghese, 2013a). In general, higher education governance varies across both developed and developing nations due to the historical, economic, cultural and global contexts.

2.3 History of Higher Education Policy in Africa

Current developments around the world have brought about increasingly challenging times for HEIs, particularly in developing countries (Brown, Lauder, & Ashton, 2008; Collins & Ho, 2014; Geo-JaJa & Zajda, 2015; Lefrere, 2007; Saint, 2009b). The higher education sector is challenged by several influences including globalisation, the rapid growth of technology, increased market competition, the marketisation of higher education itself, and increasing demand from local and international stakeholders for higher education (Gebremeskel, 2014; Sewonu, 2010; Taylor, Hanlon, & Yorke, 2013). Rapidly changing environments, the emergence of new technology, and the move toward a knowledge-based economy are also challenges that higher education institutions now face (Banya & Zajda, 2015; Taylor, 2013). Globalisation has induced universities to initiate reforms to meet current economic challenges (Gebremeskel, 2014; Geo-JaJa & Zajda, 2015; Sewonu, 2010). By the same token, HEIs have influenced the economies of developing countries through knowledge and technology transfer (Taylor et al., 2013) and they are assigned an important role in economic, social and institutional modernisation (Geo-JaJa & Zajda, 2015). It is common to observe higher education reforms in various countries that focus on governance, accountability initiatives, best practice, and technology to name a few (Varghese, 2013b).

These days, higher education is now expected to meet a wide range of needs in emerging knowledge societies and economies (Dervin & Zajda, 2015; Medvedeva, 2015). HEIs are expected to be "educating ever-larger numbers of the population, creating new opportunities for graduates, research and innovation, lessening the economic challenges, and acting to improve quality education and efficient service in all aspects" (Crosier & Parveva, 2013, p. 19). In order to address these demands, the African HE systems are undergoing a significant transformation process similar to other HE systems around the world (Medvedeva, 2015; Saint, 2009a; Saint, 2009b). In the

1960s and 1970s, most African countries showed interest in creating development based universities (Singh & Manuh, 2007). Mainly, after the emergence of the first generation of universities Fourah Bay College (Sierra Leone), Dakar (Senegal), and Makerere (Uganda), HEIs somewhat detached from the colonial period (Singh & Manuh, 2007; Woldegiorgis, 2013; Woldegiorgis & Doevenspeck, 2013). During the same period, HEIs' adoption of the Western model of the academic organisation was widely considered to be a fundamental instrument in promoting social and economic development in Africa (Okeke, 2010; Teferra & Altbachl, 2004; Woldegiorgis, 2013). Adoption of this model was not peculiar to African HEIs; it has occurred around the world (Teferra & Altbachl, 2004). The assumption of adopting the model was that African countries and the rest of developing countries could be developed just as other developed countries were developed (Kaur & Singh, 2016; Matunhu, 2011).

In most African countries, higher education policies were formulated to address the post-colonial socio-economic problems as a crucial part of national strategies of development (World Bank, 1991). By then, these policies were rooted in the process of decolonisation, seeking to redress colonial issues and undertaking various strategies to modernise the region and achieve socio-economic development (World Bank, 1991). HEIs were also perceived as a means of transforming the socio-economic and political development of post-colonial Africa by training experts, addressing the issue of access to higher education, expanding knowledge, and contributing to the national economy (World Bank, 1991). In the 1960s, African higher education enrolment was very small. Bloom, Canning, Chan, and Luca (2014) argued that "Sixty years ago, the gross enrolment ratio stood at just 1% in 1965" (p. 27). It was the world's lowest higher education enrollement figure. Current figures show improvement only by 6% in 2012 (UNESCO, 2012).

As discussed earlier, in the 1960s and 1970s, human capital theory received much attention in the field of education (*see section 2.1*). The theory argues that there is a direct correlation between individual productivity and their level of education (Almendarez, 2013; Dumciuviene, 2015; Fugar et al., 2013; Olaniyan & Okemakinde, 2008). Investing in formal education has a cumulative effect on individual and societal development (Olaniyan & Okemakinde, 2008). By this time, most African leaders and

elites were persuaded by human capital theory (Woldegiorgis & Doevenspeck, 2013), and started to articulate their national policy directions acknowledging roles of higher education in dealing with the existing socio-economic challenges of the region and promoting its spread (Bloom et al., 2014).

By the late 1980s, the higher education sector was accorded little attention, and financing HEIs was not a priority agenda item of African leaders and international organisations (Teferra & Altbachl, 2004; Woldegiorgis & Doevenspeck, 2013).

According to Woldegiorgis and Doevenspeck (2013),

> The international bodies mainly IMF and the WB started to interfere in [African] countries through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and stabilisation programs. A variety of SAPs were introduced in the 1980s and 1990s to address the economic and social crises of the time (Woldegiorgis & Doevenspeck, 2013, p. 41).

These international bodies influenced higher education through policy reform initiation and prescription (Behailu, 2011; Ferede, 2013; Solomon, 2010). For instance, they stipulated a set of neoliberal economic policies through SAPs, which demand that leaders of developing countries adjusted spending away from public services and publicly owned institutions, as well (Diang, 2013; Ferede, 2013; Teshome, 2012).

Later, in developing countries, much emphasis was given to primary education, and it was claimed that basic education plays a significant role in the social and economic development of a country (Scott, 2000; Singh & Manuh, 2007). The basic education sector was heavily promoted in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education for All (EFA) target (Singh & Manuh, 2007). Through this period, the leaders of developing countries, and international organisations committed to investing in primary education with the premises and expectation of its contribution to the socio-economic development of Africa countries and the rest of developing nations (Singh & Manuh, 2007). The SAP affected the HE sector, and its neglect of higher education resulted in the "deterioration of infrastructure; decline in teaching capacity and quality in the face of increasing enrolments; decline in research activities, productivity and

capacity; escalating brain drain of academics and researchers and so on" (Singh & Manuh, 2007, p. 2).

However, it is consistently argued that the pressures created by globalisation reconfirmed the importance of HEI in building a knowledge-based economy (Teferra & Altbachl, 2004). The adoption of discourse and policy positions concerning the critical contribution of HEIs to the knowledge society and the need for competent graduates as a means to advance economic competitiveness and social development have led to policy reversal that favour HE (Bloom et al., 2006; Okeke, 2010; Singh & Manuh, 2007). Currently, higher education is regarded as the main engine of development in both developed and developing countries (Bloom et al, 2005; Okeke, 2010). This, HEI is expected to address the social and economic challenges of the nations. Singh and Manuh (2007) also argued that HEIs are expected to contribute to:

> Poverty alleviation and addressing the ravages of disease; increasing participation at all education levels; the ongoing development of primary and secondary education, technical and vocational education, non-formal adult literacy and continuing education; increasing research and knowledge-based strategies for development; the achievement of MDGs and EFA targets in the face of impending deadlines (p. 3).

Singh and Manuh (2007) further argued that HEIs need to respond to three core areas: teaching, research, and community service. In connection to this, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) argued that the globalisation wave required human capital as it was "the single most important engine of growth in OECD countries in the past three decades" (OECD, 2002, p. 17).

2.4 The Expansion of the Bologna Process in African Higher Education Settings

In order to meet globalisation challenges, many countries have been reforming their higher education systems (Olsen, 2002). New regional cooperation in higher education through their Bologna Process could be cited as the best example of this kind of move (McMahon, 2010). The Bologna Process (1999), was aimed at harmonising Europe's higher education system through increased inter-compatibility, and mobility, allowing

students to study without borders and by creating unimpeded exchange of staff (Fejes, 2008). It has changed the higher education landscape in both European countries and non-European countries as well (Dehmel, 2006; European Commission, 2001; Fejes, 2008).

Similar to Europe, the African Union Commission (AUC) had embarked on harmonisation of African higher education programs for the second decade of education for Africa of 2006-2015 (Sall & Ndjaye, 2007). Many African countries have been showing interest in the view that the region could benefit from a mechanism to form partnerships with the rest of the world through the Bologna Process. For example, Sall and Ndjaye (2007) firmly claimed that "African inter-academic cooperation can be boosted if it is inspired by cooperation models existing in the European academic space" (p. 52). The African Union also claims that "…higher education in Africa would benefit from the adoption of the Bologna Process, especially in fostering regional collaboration" (African Union, 2008, p. 55).

Different regions, including the AUC, are currently using the Bologna Process as a model for higher education integration schemes (Woldegiorgis, 2013; Woldegiorgis & Doevenspeck, 2013; Woldegiorgis, Jonck, & Goujon, 2015; Woldetensai, 2009). Several African countries adopted some elements of the Bologna Process as a means to overcome the current globalisation challenges and be competitive (Alemu, 2019; Obasi & Olutayo, 2009). Obasi and Olutayo (2009) further added, "One of the driving motives of the Bologna Process is to increase the international competitiveness of the European system of higher education" (p. 169). This implies that it had an impact on the higher education system beyond Europe. For instance, Cameroon adopted the Bologna Process to its higher education system, although the implementation was characterised by a top-down approach as the government imposed it (Eta, Kallo, & Rinne, 2018; Khelfaoui, 2009). The implementation was seen to be rushed with insufficient understanding of the guiding principles of the Bologna Process (Eta et al., 2018; Steiner-Khamsi, 2013). Similarly, the Ethiopian public higher education institutions were influenced by the MoE to adopt some elements of the Bologna Process to its higher education system (Alemu, 2019; Gebremeskel, 2014; Ministry of Education, 2012).

Since 2010 East African countries such as Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda also established a Bologna-similar model to harmonise higher education systems and launched a credit transfer system that will allow the movement of students (Alemu, 2019; Clark, 2014). However, until very recently, the process has been slow due to quality and curriculum variation among these countries and hence, they were all frustrated by inadequate funding to realise the process (Alemu, 2019; Clark, 2014). The impact of the Bologna Process on the African continent is also seen in the French-speaking countries (Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria) of the Maghreb (Clark, 2014). These countries have been underway to align their systems in line with the Bologna Process, particularly following the model of the French higher education system (Alemu, 2019). This shows it has had more impact on higher education systems of North Africa compared to East Africa. However, the cultural, ideological and organisational differences between the European and African regions have created discussion among various scholars, in particular, about how feasible and efficient is a transfer of the policy among the different countries (Woldegiorgis et al., 2015).

The Bologna Process has been further criticised for being too focused on preparing students for the global market instead of giving them a broad education (Dehmel, 2006). It is also argued that the Bologna Process, as indicated in Bergen Communique of 2005, demands a lot from universities. The Communique states:

> (W)e underline the central role of higher education institutions, their staff, and students as partners in the Bologna Process. Their role in the implementation of the Process becomes all the more important now that the necessary legislative reforms are largely in place, and we encourage them to continue and intensify their efforts to establish the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) (Bergen Communique, 2005, p. 1).

Under this rubric, universities are expected to be active, and responsible for the implementation of the Bologna Process if the universities do not act and contribute toward the success of the Process, seemingly, they risk failure in achieving the aims (Bergen Communique, 2005; Fejes, 2008).

Under the Bologna Process, member countries commit to implementing academic freedom, autonomy, participation, transparency and accountability as the principles of

the European Higher Education Area (Bergan, 2015; Communiqué Leuven, 2009; Dehmel, 2006; Fejes, 2008; Gebremeskel, 2014; McMahon, 2010). The claim was that university leaders and staff were empowered to reorganise university systems to meet the needs of both their stakeholder's and a global market workforce (Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, 2012; Keeling, 2006; McMahon, 2010).

2.5 History of Higher Education Policy in Ethiopia

The Ethiopian higher education system has passed through different changes in the past sixty years. In this regard, Negash (2010), classified the education policy of the country into three regimes that had taken power over the past six decades. These are the Traditional Monarchy /Imperial Regime (1950-1974), The Socialist/ Military "Derge" Regime (1974 - 1991), and the Federal Democratic Republic Regime (1991 to present) (Ferede, 2013; Negash, 2010; Saint, 2004; Wagaw, 1990).

Several scholars stated that these three regimes have brought different impacts and shaped the educational patterns of Ethiopia (Ferede, 2013; Negash, 2010). Negash (2010) claimed that the difference of the systems evidenced "[their] ambition to expand educational opportunities to all and [their] actual limitation in delivering an education outcome that contributes to the social and economic development of the country" (p. 7). With this in mind, a review of the educational policies of the three government regimes provides a basis for understanding the development patterns of Ethiopian higher education institutions. Hence, this section attempts to review some significant developments in higher education institutions across the three periods.

2.5.1 The Traditional Monarchy /Imperial Regime (1950-1974)

The traditional monarchy regime was the first stage of the modern higher education system establishment in the history of Ethiopia in the 1950s (Ferede, 2013; Saint, 2004). This indicates that Higher Education Institution (HEI) system is relatively young compared to others, and it was introduced in the 1950s with the founding by the then University College of Addis Ababa (Behailu, 2011; Saint, 2004; Wagaw, 1990; Yizengaw, 2003a). Later, a few public colleges were established around urban areas in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Behailu, 2011; Saint, 2004; Wagaw, 1990). In the early

1960s, all colleges in the country were rearranged together under Addis Ababa University (the then Haile Selassie I University) (Tamirat, 2008; Wagaw, 1990). During this period, according to Saint (2004), the structure of the new university and colleges "were somewhat more American and less British than higher education systems in the former British colonies of East Africa" (Saint, 2004, p. 84). The educational system also suffered from a shortage of qualified personnel, funding, and facilities (Saint, 2004). This has produced an educational policy that required direction and national objectives (Saint, 2004).

Previous studies show the fundamental reason why the education policies lacked direction was that foreign advisors, administrators, and teachers played a decisive role in the establishment and expansion of country's education system. Similar to other African countries that were under the Western empire, curricula at all levels followed the Western system (Ferede, 2013; Saint, 2004). The cultural and social values of the nation were completely neglected. On top of this, higher education opportunity was not equitably distributed across regions and nations; it also favoured urban and administrative centers (Ferede, 2013).

Higher education enrolment was 4500 students in 1970 (Ferede, 2013). The "enrolment ratio was .02% which was the lowest in the world"(Saint, 2004, p. 84). In this regime, higher education was centrally governed, largely unchanged since the establishment of Addis Ababa University in 1950 which continued as the" only higher institution in the country for over half a century in the imperial regime"(Solomon, 2010, p. 96).

2.5.2 The Socialist/ Military "Derge" Regime (1974 - 1991)

The public revolt of the 1960s and 1970s brought to end the imperial regime and the military "Derge" regime took power (Saint, 2004). This period was characterised as a paradigm shift in Ethiopia political and economic setting as the political orientation moved from a feudal to a capitalist system (Negash, 2010). The military government abolished individual land ownership and properties were shifted under state control. During this period, Socialist ideology and Marxism guided the education system (Ferede, 2013; Negash, 2010). Unlike the imperial regime, when there was a strong link with the United States of America, the military regime shifted its attention to the

Eastern region, particularly, to the Soviet Union and East Germany (Negash, 2010). Strengthening the link with East Germany, new curricula were designed focusing on technical and vocational education (Yizengaw, 2003b).

In this regime, Ethiopia had only seven colleges and one university established in various parts of the country. Saint (2004) also argued that

> Ethiopia found itself with a higher education system that was regimented in its management, conservative in its intellectual orientation, limited in its autonomy, short of experienced doctorates among academic staff, concerned about declining educational quality, weak in its research output and poorly connected with the intellectual currents of the international higher education community (pp. 84-85).

The HE sector was not given proper attention, and hence, the government failed to address societal needs and access to the higher education sector. By the same token, Kahsay (2012) argued that during the military regime, HEI was fundamentally characterised by low quality, wide gender disparity, irrelevance, and inefficiency. Intellectual life was targeted on campuses, academic brain drain escalated, and the education system was largely isolated from the western world (Ferede, 2013). The World Bank claimed that during this period, the quality of education also continuously deteriorated (World Bank, 1999). Government expenditure on education and health shifted to military spending (Ferede, 2013; World Bank, 1999). In general, the government appeared to abandon investment in education intentionally (Ferede, 2013). Most analysts seem to agree that in the area of higher education in Ethiopia, progress was stagnant, and the system was centrally governed (Ferede, 2013; Teferra & Albatch, 2003).

2.5.3 The Federal Democratic Republic Regime (1991 to Present)

The third phase is represented by the FDRE from1991- present. This period is characterised by a radical change in the political, economic and social environment of Ethiopia. In 1994, the FDRE government introduced a new constitution, which makes it clear that Ethiopia is a federal state. In addition, the government declared free markets economy policies. A new Education and Training Policy (ETP) was also developed

soon after the FDRE took over political power in 1994. The ETP comprises the issues of quality and relevance in educational programs, autonomy and accountability, and particularly the linkage of higher education and the country's development (Ministry of Education, 2010). Ethiopia underwent a wide range of reforms to its education system (Ferede, 2013; Solomon, 2010). At the time of expansions, the higher education sector had to go through three different reforms. These were the foundation of a legal framework for the education and training policy, and the development of plans for the education sector to expand the facilities, improve, and revitalise the system by addressing issues related to quality and relevance (Yizengaw, 2003b).

In addition, the new Education and Training Policy has led the country to the development of twenty-five years Education Sector Development Program (ESDP) with every five-year phase. The ESDP predominantly focuses on issues such as quality, relevance, access and equity improvement across all levels of education in Ethiopia. However, the document showed that higher education was not part of the ESDP-I that was launched in 1997. The higher education sector was incorporated into the programs in ESDP-II (2000-2005). Much emphasis was given to HEIs in ESDP III (2006-2010), ESDP IV (2011 -2015). In the last phase of the ESDP V (2016 to 2020), the issue of quality and relevance, and higher education governance has got much attention. According to (Saint, 2004, p. 85) "this time higher education reform was embraced as a critical national need by the government of the day." Currently, the country is engaged in a very motivated situation to adjust its higher education system to contribute to its national strategies for economic growth and poverty reduction (Saint, 2004; Yizengaw, 2003a).

In the past twenty years, the Ethiopian HE sector underwent various transformations, which influenced both internal governance arrangement and structure of the HEIs. Several studies show that in order to address societal needs, the country has experienced an expansion of higher education institutions (Ferede, 2013; Saint, 2004; Semela, 2010; Solomon, 2010). Ethiopian HE was only established in the 1950s and with only one university for 20 years. By contrast, there are currently 31 public universities (Akalu, 2014; Ministry of Education, 2016b). The country has planned to increase the number to 47 in the coming five years as indicated in the Growth

Transformational Plan-II (GTP-II) (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2016), and many private HEIs have also emerged and expanded (Diang, 2013; Ferede, 2013). Today, the number of private HEs is 99 (Ministry of Education, 2015). In the year 2008 again, the FDRE MoE came up with a new policy whereby 70% of the overall higher education enrollment should be in science and technology, with only 30% to be allocated to social streams. Following the policy, new science and technology universities were introduced in 2013 (Semela, 2010).

In the current higher education system, Saint (2004) and Yizengaw (2003a) argued that the country has experienced more autonomy than the previous monarch and military regimes. Saint (2004, p. 104), for instance, claimed that "in pursuing higher education expansion and reform in the post-Derge (Military) period, the country promoted autonomy…". In support of Saint's idea, (Yizengaw, 2003a) attempted to compare the status of current FDRE higher education with that of pre-1994 regimes. He claimed that:

> Prior to 1994, due to the lack of any democratic rights… little but critically scrutinized academic autonomy was practised by higher education institutions. This was expressed by a top-down approach in areas such as curriculum development and adoption, staff recruitment… It was also the case that teaching staff was recruited/ appointed… by the government… [but currently under the FDRE led Government] … the academic autonomy of institutions has been respected by the government and the regulatory body (p. 3).

However, Solomon (2010) argued that the above quotation does not reflect the current context of public universities in Ethiopia. He further claimed that as the government is centrally controlling the resources, financial and administrative, and excessively intervening to public universities' governance, it is not possible to claim the existence of institutional autonomy in the public universities of the country. Similarly, in support of Solomon, several other scholars (Akalu, 2014; Assefa, 2008; Ferede, 2013; Yirdaw, 2014; Zemenu, 2016) argued for more controlled autonomy in public universities. Hence, the issue of university governance remains open for further argument with empirical evidence in the context of public universities in Ethiopia.

Following the ETP of 1994, almost after ten years after the initial implementation of the Education and Training Policy, higher education was restructured by the approval of Higher Education Proclamation No.351/2003 that drafted as a comprehensive legal framework for the establishment and development of Ethiopian higher education institutions (Yizengaw, 2003a). The Proclamation grants universities substantial autonomy, academic freedom, and accountability (Kahsay, 2012).

The first Higher Education Proclamation of 2003 has been further revised and replaced by the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation of 2009. It is currently serving as a legal document for the transformation of higher education. The Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation 650/2009 also allows all universities to be established with autonomy and accountability (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). It defines the governance structure to constitute a Board of governors, the Senate, Academic Commissions and Department Assemblies (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009).

The various reforms that higher education sector experienced have brought a rapidly changing policy environment to the Ethiopian higher education institutions (Kahsay, 2012). As demonstrated in the Higher Education Proclamation of 2009, HEIs are expected to play a leading role in national economic development and poverty alleviation (Areaya, Shibeshi, & Tefera, 2014; Ferede, 2013; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). Because of this, the Ethiopian higher education system has been exposed to various governance reforms. For example, Ethiopian public HEIs have been engaged in implementing some elements of the Bologna Process as of 2011.

The rationale behind the introduction of the Bologna Process was that the university system needs to be developed to achieve the goals of competitiveness with international standards and to lay the foundations of a knowledge economy (Addis Ababa University, 2014). The argument was that a focused and precise approach should be in place for the best results and consistency in order to respond to the changes taking place nationally and internationally. Universities were thus aligned with leading institutions around the world (Addis Ababa University, 2014; Tessema & Abebe, 2011). There is a national policy environment that encourages the universities to seek greater opportunities and align themselves more closely with the needs of

industry and the National Growth and Transformation Plan (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2016).

Consequently, various long and short-term initiatives, which aimed particularly at the improvement of the quality of education have emerged (Addis Ababa University, 2014; Hunde, 2008). For example, various Bologna elements were introduced in HEIs: European Credit Transfer System, (ECTS), Competence-Based Education (CBE) and modularisation, flexible learning paths, certificate recognition, and staff and student mobility (Gebremeskel, 2014). Some of the specific initiatives are harmonised curricula development and implementation, a new model of teaching and learning, research and work-integrated learning, pedagogical reform that will both support students from diverse backgrounds and prepare them for the market and responsible citizenship (Addis Ababa University, 2014). During the initiation of elements of the Bologna Process, there was an expectation that the universities need to provide graduates with various programs including those that promote their successful integration into the world of work and enable them to make meaningful contributions to the country's development (Addis Ababa University, 2014). The Bologna framework demands highly decentralised academic and administrative systems as stakeholder participation, and students independent learning is emphasised (Gebremeskel, 2014; Sewonu, 2010). The university and its academic staff are expected to ensure qualified and well-prepared graduates for the national growth and transformation and to actively participate in the local and international market (Addis Ababa University, 2014).

While system change has been endemic, research shows that little research has been published about higher education governance in Africa, despite the issue of governance being one of the agenda of Post 2015-millennium goals (Assembly, 2013; Bano & Taylor, 2014; Kigotho, 2015; MacGregor, 2009; Petlane, 2009; Roberts & Ajai-Ajagbe, 2013; Vandemoortele, 2012). Regarding higher education governance systems in Ethiopia, Mehari (2010, p. 3) also remarked that "surprisingly, the issue of governance in Ethiopian HE (Higher Education) system has not been studied well". Asgedom and Hagos (2015) further argued that,

> [i]t is not, however, clear how the different higher education reforms introduced by the government have affected the autonomy and accountability

> of the academic staff in its endeavor of teaching and research. It is not also clear whether the two concepts, autonomy and accountability complement or conflict [with] each other. Does more autonomy mean less accountability or does more accountability mean less autonomy (p. 5).

From the research gaps indicated above, the Ethiopian higher education system needs further studies in order to explore how HE systems operate.

2.6 Higher Education Institution Governance Shift

Hitherto, it has been mentioned that current developments around the world have brought about more and more challenging times for Higher Education Institutions (HEI), mostly in developing countries (Maassen & Stensaker, 2005; Mehari, 2016). HEIs are becoming challenged by several influences such as globalisation, the rapid growth of technology, high market competition across the globe, and high demand of local and international stakeholders from higher education (Gebremeskel, 2014; Sewonu, 2010; Taylor et al., 2013). Rapidly changing environments, for example, the emergence of new technology and the move towards the knowledge-based economy are also challenges that higher education institutions have recently faced across the continents (Taylor et al., 2013). These reforms are characterised by shifts in the relationship between universities and the state (Maassen, 2003). One study showed that "A common theme in the dramatic restructuring of higher education throughout much of the world over the past few decades has been a shift in the relationships between universities, and other higher education institutions, and the state" (Reed & Meek, 2002, p. 15). These shifts in state-university relationships resulted in new challenges predicated on new management structures in HEIs (Maassen, 2003). Consequently, "reforming the governance relationship between the state and higher education has been a constant item on the political agenda of most the countries" (Maassen, 2003, p. 31).

Several studies depict that the shifts in the relationship between the state and universities are mainly influenced by economic, ideological, and pragmatic factors (Fielden, 2008; Maassen, 2003; Maassen, 2008; Yang et al., 2015). These shifts, in turn, have brought changes in the system of HEIs' governance (Davidovitch & Iram, 2015; Lazzeretti & Tavoletti, 2006; Maassen, 2003; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004).

This new system has been reflected in the higher education literature emphasising the shift from state control to state supervision (Davidovitch & Iram, 2015; Dobbins et al., 2011; Maassen, 2008; Trakman, 2008; Van Vught, 1995).

Research findings in the field of higher education have shown increasing interest in examining HEI's development trends by producing various concepts and models of higher education governance (Clark, 1983; De Boer, Goedegebuure, & Meek, 2010; Maassen, 2003). These trends can be evidently understood from the multiple governance reforms that have been adopted by different countries over the past 20 to 30 years (Maassen, 2003; Maassen & Stensaker, 2005). A closer look at various higher education governance reforms shows that the changes have not only influenced the shape of HEIs but also their foci, which are explained by the quest for efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability (De Boer, Enders, & Schimank, 2007; Musselin, 2007). This is why the question of how to govern higher education systems and their institutions has remained a fundamental issue in higher education policy debates over the last three decades (Goedegebuure & Hayden, 2007; Maassen, 2003; Massen, Amaral, Meek, & Larsen, 2003).

2.6.1 Shift from Government to Governance

During the past decades, drastic higher education governance reforms took place (Maassen, 2003). A traditional state-centred HEI governance has been criticised and replaced by various alternative modes of governance (Davidovitch & Iram, 2015; Maassen & Stensaker, 2005; Trakman, 2008). Several studies suggest that the shift has been triggered by economic, ideological, and pragmatic factors (Agasisti & Catalano, 2006; Dobbins et al., 2011; Jreisat, 2004) shaped the mechanisms, the location, the governing abilities and mode of governance (Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004). This shift adjusted the concept from "government to governance" (Leisyte, 2007, p. 27). The change from government to governance introduced the new approach of governance, that is, new public management (NPM) with the idea of enhancing the quality of public services regarding increasing transparency, efficiency, effectiveness and accountability (Bleiklie & Kogan, 2007; Leisyte, 2007).

Recently, the new governance modes have been at the forefront of discussion among various scholars (De Boer, Enders, & Leisyte, 2007; Leisyte, 2007). According to Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004), 'Less government and more governance' has become the widely shared view by numerous inter-related developments (Pierre & Peters, 2000).

An extensive literature suggests several reasons for the shift: The first reason to evaluate the traditional governance approach was the economic recession and the growing public expenditure. So, many sectors, including higher education reform, were financially driven with the intention of improved efficiency (Leisyte, 2007). The second reason was the influence of globalisation, internationalisation, and Europeanisation, which questioned the traditional state-centre modes of governance. The international organisations such as the European Union (EU), the World Bank (WB), the World Trade Association (WTO), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) started promoting changes in the governance of public sectors ((De Boer, Enders, & Schimank, 2007; Ferede, 2013; Leisyte, 2007; Maassen, 2004; Solomon, 2010). The third reason is the ideological shift toward the marked oriented development approach, which demands self-regulation in public service provision. In the end, public institutions such as universities are encouraged to enter the market competition in order to sell their goods and services. This requires reassessing different modes of governance (Maassen, 2004). Fourth, the emergence of new public management stimulated the shift of governance arrangement. The rise of new public management stipulates public institutions should be managed in the business company mode. In this approach, public institutions need to borrow instruments and methods from the private company and run their public institutions in which managers have the right and opportunities to manage their private companies (Maassen, 2004).

Finally, these reasons for rethinking governance led both developing and developed countries to approach new institutional governance arrangements of public institutions including higher education institutions (De Boer, Enders, & Schimank, 2007; Enders, 2004; Liu, Green, & Pensiero, 2016; Maassen, 2004).

2.6.2 The shift from Government and Governmentality

Hitherto, the shift from traditional state-centred to the new alternative modes of governance adjusted the focus from the government to governance. Governance is, thus, commonly associated with the practical and policy-orientated system (Bevir, 2011). In order to understand better, the mode of governance, exploring the two terms 'government' and 'governmentality' is important. In the 1970s Michel Foucault introduced the term governmentality in the course of his investigations of political power (Bevir, 2011; Dean, 2010). The concept of governmentality identifies an approach towards thinking about the state and different mentalities of a government. The term 'govern and mentality' refers to both the processes of governing and a mindset of government, that is, it is all about thinking how the governing happens. Governmentality is, thus, both art of practice and a rationality of a technique of thinking about government (Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006a; Shore, 2011). In connection with this idea, Foucault's concept of governmentality "expands the definition of state power and shifts the focus on a much wider set of ideas and relationships and bodies of knowledge that are integral to the way political regimes are established" (Shore, 2011, p. 229). Rose et al. (2006a) argued that governmentality refers to "techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour (p. 83)." By the same token, Fimyar (2008) claimed that governmentality could be explained as the effort to create governable subjects through various techniques developed by state or institution "to control, normalise and shape people's conduct" (p. 5). The same author further summarised the concept of governmentality as "a concept ascertains the relation between the government of the state (politics) and government of the self (morality), the construction of the subject (genealogy of the subject) with the formation of the state (genealogy of the state)" (Fimyar, 2008, p. 5).

In the governmentality context, tactics and ideas of governance are more valued than laws. The particular aspects help to explore the relationship between the form and rationalities of power and the process of creating governable people. This leads to the questions Fimyar (2008, p. 2) pointed out in explaining the connection between the form and rationalities of power such as 'who can govern, 'what governing is' and 'what or who is governed 'and 'how should be governed.' As Shore (2011) also argued the

process of governing, whether it is explicit or implicit, seeks answers to the following questions: Who or what is to be governed? Why should they be governed? How should they be governed? To what ends should they be governed? In general, governing embodies questions such as Who governs what? According to what logic? With what techniques? Toward what ends? (Shore, 2011).

2.7 Formal and Informal Organisation

In an increasingly dynamic and challenging environment around the globe, almost constant organisational reforms have been observed across both developed and developing nations (Diefenbach & Sillince, 2011). The new types of organisations have extended from orthodox and bureaucratic to some sort of postmodern type, and network environment of organisations (Diefenbach & Sillince, 2011; Pierre & Peters, 2000). The orthodox bureaucratic forms of organisation are characterised by hierarchical relationships of superiors and subordinates, master and servant, manager and employee. Nevertheless, postmodern organisations are practising similar very hierarchical with top-down power and control mechanisms more comprehensive than ever before (Diefenbach & Sillince, 2011). However, a network or hybrid environment of organisations has emerged with informal hierarchical structures (Pielstick, 2000). A formal type of the hierarchy of organisation is a vertical dimension with top-down command and control.

In a formal hierarchy, the roles and responsibilities of officials are clearly defined and demarcated. The social relationship is also more hierarchical. However, people can operate their activities not only through the official vertical relationship but also through unofficial mechanisms. These mechanisms can operate in a certain established organisational norm, values and culture. It is highly social and personal social relationship. According to Diefenbach and Sillince (2011, p. 1517) " informal hierarchy can be defined (and identified) as person-dependent social relationships of dominance and subordination which emerge from social interaction and become persistent over time through repeated social processes (especially routine behaviour)."

According to Diefenbach and Sillince (2011, pp. 1517-1520), when it comes to explaining the organisational hierarchy, five different types of organisations will be considered:

A. ***Bureaucratic or Orthodox organisations***. This kind of organisations operates through top-down command control with downward transmission of orders and upward transmission of information.

B. ***Professional organisations***. Public or private sector organisations where people of the same or complementing professions jointly run large parts of the organisational affairs.

C. ***Representative Democratic organisations***. In the early 19th century, people were not happy with the top-down hierarchy of orthodox organisations. They came up with an alternative, based on the idea of empowerment and a more democratic workplace. It embraces ideas such as genuine worker participation, autonomous work groups, profit-sharing, co-partnership, and shared ownership.

D. ***Hybrid or Postmodern organisations***. In 'Postmodern' organisation, the concepts of 'business process re-engineering', 'learning organisation' and 'knowledge management' were introduced based on 'non-bureaucratic' and 'non-hierarchical' forms of governance.

E. ***Network organisations***. These emerged almost at the same time with the hybrid forms of organisation. The network organisation was identified as a new type of organization, characterised by collective responsibility of the members of an organisation.

In each type of organisations, an institution may employ different strategies to cope with multiple pressures from both the internal and external institutional environment (Mehari, 2016). According to Oliver (1991), organisations might use various response strategies in responding to environmental pressures. Oliver (1991) provided a range of five possible strategic responses by organisations to external pressures: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation. These responses are classified

from the most passive to the most active types of responses. Acquiescence refers to compliance with institutional pressures and expectations whereas compromise involves balancing and pacifying the pressures of the institutional environment or bargaining with the constituents on the nature of the pressures and demands (Mehari, 2016; Oliver, 1991). Through avoidance, organisations try to lessen some of the external pressures on their core activities, by tactics such as concealing, buffering, and escaping. A defiance strategy contests institutional pressures and requirements through tactics such as dismissing, challenging, and attacking. Oliver (1991) claimed that manipulation is the most active form of response to environmental pressures. This strategy employs co-option, influence and control as its central tactics to overcome institutional pressures (Mehari, 2016; Oliver, 1991). How these responses are used within different types of organisations will be studied along with response strategies adopted by Ethiopian public universities operate their affairs are worth studied.

2.8 Concept of governance and governmentality

Governance encapsulates broad concepts and constructs. As Keefer (2009, p. 439) argued, "there is no agreed definition of governance that would provide a convenient device for organising the literature". Keefer (2009) further claimed that whether in academic or policy contexts, governance is an elastic concept having different constructs. The definition encompasses either outcomes or causal concepts or both. The first refers to the extent to which governments are responsive to citizens and provide services including ensuring citizen's rights and the rule of law; while the second involves the degree to which the institutions are empowered to give a responsive decision to the citizens (Keefer, 2009; Ring, 2010). Governance is, thus, commonly associated with the practical and policy-orientated system (Bevir, 2011). On the other hand, the concept governmentality was coined by Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1991a; Foucault, 1991b; Foucault, 2007) to explain the notion of governments' rethinking of power. Foucault argued all aspects of power is reversible. The concept of governmentality identifies an approach towards thinking about the state and different mentalities of a government. Rose et al. (2006a) also argued that governmentality refers to "techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour (p. 83)." By the same token, Fimyar (2008) claimed that governmentality could be explained as the effort to

create governable subjects through various techniques developed by states or institutions "to control, normalise and shape people's conduct" (p. 5). Governmentality is connected to the practice of the 'art' of government (Gordon, 1991) and, in particular, how human conduct is shaped (Rose et al., 2006b). In the governmentality context, tactics and ideas of governance are more valued than laws. Governmentality is, thus, both the art of practice and a technique of thinking about government (Rose et al., 2006a; Shore, 2011).

2.9 Principles of Higher Education Governance

The issue of higher education (HE) attracted many scholars though still much is still not known about higher education governance (Assembly, 2013; Bano & Taylor, 2014; Kigotho, 2015; MacGregor, 2009; Petlane, 2009; Roberts & Ajai-Ajagbe, 2013; Vandemoortele, 2012). In most cases, the HE discourses arose from the fact that the twenty-first century as a knowledge era, the roles of higher education in addressing the socio-economic problem of the society is getting much attention (Liu et al., 2016; Teferra & Altbachl, 2004; Yates, Woelert, Millar, & O'Connor, 2017). For this reason, several reforms of HE sectors took place in both developed and developing countries (Gebremeskel, 2014; Sewonu, 2010; Taylor et al., 2013). For instance, the fundamental principle that guides many recent higher education reforms is that institutions should be free to manage their own affairs and be held accountable for their performance in doing so. However, state intervention in higher education decision-making is common in most developing countries. In some cases, the situation is a reality in the advanced nations as well (Fielden, 2008; Varghese, 2013b; Zeleza, 2004). In fact, the mode of intervention is different in both developed and developing regions. For instance, the recent evaluation of university governance system shows a need for greater autonomy for the institutions, though there are some differences. Some limits on teaching autonomy, though reduced in recent years, also exist in Italy where "courses are subject to approval from the National University Council. In Germany, the Coordination Council of the Ministries of the different regions drew up guidelines for the organisation of study courses and introduced a financial system that permits autonomy of university management (lump-sum budgets)" (Agasisti & Catalano, 2006, p. 253).

In Africa, government intervention is a norm as the government is a source of resources (budget) for public universities (Solomon, 2010; Zeleza, 2004). An overview of trends in African higher education produced in 2003 concluded, "Government involvement in university affairs is the norm" (Teferra & Altbach, 2004, p. 6). Zeleza (2004) also commented, "African universities have been characterised by authoritarianism, partly as a reflection of prevailing authoritarian nature of the State itself. In practice, many many senior university administrators are in fact state appointees. They, in turn, appoint unit heads and so forth down the administrative hierarchy. University governance has often been characterised by a discretionary and top-down organisational structure, poor communication, and strained relations between the administration and teaching faculty" (Zeleza, 2004, p. 55). As aforementioned, unlike Africa, in some Western countries such as France, Sweden, Turkey, and Russia, the mode of state involvement is a bit different. The scenario in these countries is that the state acts as a "gatekeeper" and has a direct impact on the university's internal affairs, particularly quality assurance, efficiency, and relationships with the business community (Dobbins et al., 2011).

Several scholars describe a shift in HE governance from state control to state supervision as HEIs become more complex due to the growth in the number of public and private institutions (Davidovitch & Iram, 2015; Dobbins, 2008; Dobbins et al., 2011; Fielden, 2008). Neave and Van Vught (1994) have also described a continuum at one end of which is the "state control model" where the centre seeks to control its universities, and at the other end is the "state supervising model" where it monitors and regulates. Hence, it is worth discussing the global trends in the ways that governance principles such as autonomy, accountability, transparency, and participation are implemented efficiently managing HEIs.

2.9.1 Autonomy and Accountability

In the context of higher education, the issue of autonomy and accountability is becoming controversial. Some universities claim to ensure their independence; in contrast, the state demands universities to be accountable. According to Goedegebuure and Hayden (2007), accountability and autonomy are not considered as being necessarily incompatible; as is often said, "A right is created by a responsibility" (Ndiaye & Shabani, 1998, p. 462). "Academic rights rely on a great sense of

responsibility" (Ndiaye & Shabani, 1998, p. 462). Some scholars would see university autonomy as being incompatible with some sort of accountability. However, the two concepts need some careful analysis to clarify how these issues might be reconciled. Autonomy is the power to govern an institution without outside controls (Cooperative College Staff Association, 1990). For a higher education institution, autonomy means the freedom to determine its own goals and priorities; to select its own leaders; to employ and dismiss staff; to determine enrolment size and rate of growth; and to manage its own budget, including the reallocation of funds among budget items and the right to retain for future use any savings generated (Estermann & Nokkala, 2009; Salmi, 2007). For instance, in some countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and Turkey, the president is elected by the academic staff of the institution, or the Senate, but the nomination requires the final approval of the government (Fielden, 2008; Oba, 2014).

In some African countries including Malawi, Namibia, and South Africa, the vice-chancellors are appointed by government after consulting the university council (Department of Higher Education and Training, 2012; Government Gazeti'e of the Republic of Namibia, 1992; The University of Cape Town, 2013; University of Malawi, 1998). In Kenya and Uganda, the chancellors appoint the vice-chancellor after consulting the university council or senate (National Council for Higher Education, 2001; The National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General, 2012a; The National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General, 2012b). On the other hand, in Botswana, vice-chancellors are appointed by the Ministry after consulting the University Council and the Senate (Government of Botswana, 2008).

In the same way, the concept of accountability is not straightforward (Asgedom & Hagos, 2015; Bailey, 1983). Its complex nature has resulted in different meanings; some scholars understand many different things by accountability. In fact, accountability is of many kinds, "personal, professional, managerial, political and legal" (Keay & Loughrey, 2015, p. 268). In personal accountability, the exercise of autonomy takes the form of making decisions on important issues concerning pedagogic management (Ndiaye & Shabani, 1998). As Keay and Loughrey (2015, p. 268) explain, in personal accountability "most people (parents or teachers) are accountable to

themselves, to their conscience, to set of moral values, to public opinion represented by friends, to other parents, a social circle which creates shared expectations". Professional accountability implies standards of qualification, training, practice, and conduct to which teachers subscribe. Hence, "Professionals are judged by other professionals (Keay & Loughrey, 2015, p. 268; Yin & Yeung, 2011, p. 39). Political accountability refers to judgment by political actors, or possibly by the media, against a set of societal/political norms. In contrast, legal accountability indicates accountability to legal institutions such as courts or regulators for compliance with legal rules. Accountability to organisational superiors for matters such as efficiency and cost control, and is associated with a degree of controlling over the actor is known as managerial accountability (Keay & Loughrey, 2015, p. 268).

At large, the culture and practice of institutional autonomy are essential factors for the realisation of the overall mission of higher learning institutions. Of course, universities cannot enjoy unlimited autonomy unless they have the right to manage their own finances, which in turn assures self-governance. Otherwise, there have to be checks and balances at two levels: state and university in order to lessen the tension between institutional autonomy and accountability. These days, tensions between the two concepts are common. For instance, "Where more accountability is required, often less autonomy remains due to government's emphasis on accountability" (Goedegebuure & Hayden, 2007). If the interests of the state are to be achieved and its citizens are to be protected, and universities autonomy is to be authorised, there have to be checks and balances (Asgedom & Hagos, 2015).

Bailey (1983) also contended that "accountability is inalienable from autonomy," that is, one cannot be accountable for actions for which one was not responsible, and one cannot be responsible for something which one was not free to decide to do or to do otherwise. Accountability necessarily involves autonomy, and that accounts of moral and professional action make sense only where the agent is considered to be autonomous. If the agent is merely responsible to his supervisors in the sense of working strictly with their orders, then, it is they, not he, who should provide the explanation and justification of his actions (Asgedom & Hagos, 2015; Bailey, 1983). Keay and Loughrey (2015) see accountability from the angle of compliance and

performance. They classified accountability as a compliance-based and performance-based accountability address 'for what' the actor is accountable, with the former judging the actor's conduct against externally defined rules and procedures, while the latter measures it against a set of outcomes. Therefore, the reasonable autonomy of universities in line with public accountability is essential to maintaining institutional integrity. Considering what has been explained so far, no institution can have absolute autonomy, in particular, when it comes to public HEIs, attention needs to be given to checks and balances to manage the tension between internal and external forces.

2.9.2 Transparency

In recent years, transparency has become the critical aspect of higher education governance in providing information to the public in both developed and developing nations (Freeman, 2014; Johnston, 2009; Jongbloed, Vossensteyn, van Vught, & Westerheijden, 2018; Joyner, 2014; Kosack & Fung, 2014). It is essential that academic decisions are communicated to the relevant stakeholders in a transparent manner so that those who participate in the decision-making process, as well as those to whom decisions apply, are fully informed (Addis Ababa University, 2011; Kosack & Fung, 2014). The information needs to be available both on the particulars of arrangements and how they were reached (Kosack & Fung, 2014). As Freeman (2014) claimed, in the context of publicly funded universities, the demand for proper utilisation of the public resource, that is, the relevant academic activities undertaken with the taxpayers' money is now of widespread concern in most of the countries. In the same way, the government wants to assure higher education institutions deliver quality education and research services that are needed for labour market and communities at large (Jongbloed et al., 2018). This concern for transparency for public resources is growing in parallel with the need for greater accountability of public higher education institutions (Communiqué Leuven, 2009; Dehmel, 2006; Fejes, 2008; Gebremeskel, 2014).

Based on the Bologna Process implementation reports of 2018, transparency was stressed as the critical principle of higher education governance (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018). Along the same lines, the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation, and University Senate legislation empower every higher

institution to have transparent, systematic processes for teaching and learning, and research fund management and utilisation (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; Wachemo University, 2016). Therefore, it is worth looking at how transparency is conceived by instructors, academic institution leaders, and students in the Ethiopian higher education settings.

2.9.3 Participation

Research in the field of higher education documented the important roles different stakeholders play in the process of higher education governance (Alexander, 2009; Kebede, 2015; Temmerman, 2018). The active participation of university stakeholders such as instructors, leaders, alumni, students, and community groups has become key in participating and improving higher education systems (Kebede, 2015; Temmerman, 2018). This could be understood from the influence of the Bologna Process brought on the participation of different stakeholders in higher education systems across the European and non-European countries (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018). For instance, in the Bologna Process implementation reports of 2018, the participation of students and other stakeholders in the democratic governance and management is highlighted as the significant value of higher education institutions (Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, 2012; European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018). This is reflected in the Bologna framework, which demands highly decentralised academic and administrative systems in which the stakeholders' participation and students independent learning is emphasised (Gebremeskel, 2014; Sewonu, 2010).

Similar to the Bologna Process, the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation (EHEP) also specifies that one of the major objectives of a higher education institution is to "ensure the participation of key stakeholders in the governance of institutions" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4979). However, as Gebremeskel (2014) argued, little has been studied on the impact of the Bologna Accord on the participation of key stakeholders in policy formulation and decision-making process in higher education arena. This indicates that it is worth investigating the lived experience

of key stakeholders' participation in teaching, researching, leading, and serving the community in Ethiopian higher education context.

2.10 Higher Education Institution Governance Models

Before, it has been discussed that HEIs have gone through various reforms for a number of reasons: economic recession, the driving force of globalisation, and the shift towards the market-oriented governance arrangements (De Boer, Enders, & Schimank, 2007; Dobbins et al., 2011; Leisyte, 2007; Trakman, 2008). In respect to this, scholars proposed various models for university governance arrangements. For example, Clark (1983) proposed three triangles of coordination in which higher education governance system can be organised: academic oligarchy (professional-collegial), state-centred (governmental-managerial) and the market (Davidovitch & Iram, 2015; Gebremeskel & Feleke, 2016; Trakman, 2008).

In the state-centred governance model, the state is the dominant decision-maker (Clark, 1983; Davidovitch & Iram, 2015). Here, the assumption is that HEIs are state-owned institutions with a primary mission of meeting socio-economic objectives. Whereas, in the market-centred model, HEIs are subjected to market pressure to become more service orientated towards the stakeholders: students, staff and the broader community (Agasisti & Catalano, 2006). On the other hand, the self-governance approach is similar to Wilhelm Humboldt's vision which refers to free scholarly inquiry with strong self-regulation and collegial control by the professoriate in academic affairs (Kivistö & Zalyevska, 2015). In Clark's view, the three models are the three forces that govern higher education system through interaction. Clark further elucidates that the three corners of the triangle represent, "the extreme of one form and a minimum of the other two, and locations within the triangle represent combinations of the three elements in different degrees"(Clark, 1983, p. 142).

Other scholars, however (Davidovitch & Iram, 2015; De Boer, Enders, & Schimank, 2007; Dobbins et al., 2011; Van Vught, 1989), gave much attention to understanding the phenomenon of higher education governance system and the changes within it. Clark's logic (1983) of higher education governance system classifications was the source of various options of governance arrangements for most of the scholars

(Dobbins, 2008). Drawing on Clark's work, other authors have more recently introduced other classifications of various types of Higher Education governance (see Niklasson, 1995; Van Vught, 1995), some researchers have also developed typologies for specific dimensions, for instance, Jongbloed (2003) introduced finance governance. Van Vught (1989), distinguished between "state control" models and "state supervising" models. Hence, it is worth understanding the path of governance shifts.

2.10.1 Shift from 'State-controlled' to 'State-supervised' Model

As aforementioned, scholars proposed various models of state-university governance relationships (Agasisti & Catalano, 2006; Fielden, 2008; Van Vught, 1995). Neave and Van Vught (1994) described the extreme range of one end of which is the "state-control model" where the government seeks to control its universities closely, and at the other end is the "state-supervising model" where it monitors and regulates them at a distance. Van Vught (1989), tried to simplify Clark's model and reduced it into state control model and state supervising mode.

In Van Vught's view, the state intervenes to regulate the institutions in various conditions such as the curriculum design, university entrance examination system, and the appointment, resource allocation, and remuneration of academic staff. Similarly, Davidovitch and Iram (2015) and Dobbins et al. (2011) also argued that state-centred model of HEIs governance is restrictive in its nature and regulatory in its approach. The assumption with this model is that HEIs are perceived as public institutions operated by the state to meet the national goals of a country. Several scholars agree in this model the primary activities of HEIs are teaching, research, and community service. These are perceived as products of an organisation contributing to the socio-economic development of a country (Agasisti & Catalano, 2006; Davidovitch & Iram, 2015; Trakman, 2008). It was further argued that the state strictly coordinates all aspects of HEIs, including student admission, curricula, institutional leaders appointment, resource allocation, to mention some (Davidovitch & Iram, 2015). Besides, public universities administration is strictly controlled by the state, and they are given little autonomy. In general, the state acts as 'gatekeeper' and has a direct influence on university's internal affairs in the form of quality assurance, efficiency evaluation, and

inspection of the relationship between university and business community (Dobbins et al., 2011; Trakman, 2008).

In the "state supervising" model, the role of the state is not as guardian and designer of higher education systems, instead of a "referee", "mediator", and "activator" of widely autonomous systems (Van Vught, 1995). Other authors (De Boer, Enders, & Schimank, 2007; Neave, 1998) have also reported a shift in the form of state influence on institutional output and performance indicators. By considering the complex relationship between state and university, Dobbins (2008) argued that it would be difficult to assume one model purely works in an institution without the integral part of the other models. It would be wrong to assume that the rejection of state control automatically implies the unconditional acceptance of the principles of market regulation (Niklasson, 1995). For instance, the predominance of market principles by no means indicates the complete absence of the state, as quasi-governmental accreditation or evaluation bodies generally have a stronger hand in quality evaluation in teaching and research in market-based model (Dobbins, 2008; Dobbins et al., 2011; Neave & Van Vught, 1994). Hence, the state can be regarded as a stimulator of competition and quality in market-oriented systems (Dill, 1997).

Fielden (2008) argues that several countries are shifting from the state-control model to the supervisory model in their day-to-day operations of university institutions. As the different systems are in place in the university, its governance principles are becoming so complex, and the need for institutional autonomy is growing. For instance, Fielden (2008) clearly revealed the scenario as:

> Higher education systems are getting more complex due to the growth in the number of public and private institutions, so that the task of managing and monitoring the sector is becoming more specialised and demanding. As a result, the old model of total control from a central ministry of education is proving unsustainable in the long term and is being replaced throughout the world by other models. These alter the mode of central involvement from one of detail to that of strategy and rely on more sophisticated forms of monitoring and performance review (Fielden, 2008, p. 2).

Fielden claims that the state-control governance model is not workable. The need for another mode of governance is clearly implied. Agreeing with this idea, Raza (2010) in the review of recent reforms in East Asian countries confirmed that the shift from "state control" toward the "state-supervised" model of governance where governments encourage the autonomy of higher institutions to manage their operations freely.

The move toward the decentralisation of tertiary management came in the mid and late 1990s, beginning with the Republic of Korea and followed by Indonesia and Thailand (Raza, 2010). The second wave of reforms happened in the mid-2000s when Japan and Singapore extended autonomy to their public tertiary education institutions (Raza, 2009; Raza, 2010). Kigotho (2015) also reported a similar situation in African HEIs contexts. He explained that delegates at the first African Higher Education Summit in Dakar revealed that through the past two decades, laws had been passed granting limited autonomy to public universities (Kigotho, 2015). However, delegates failed to agree on governance models that could be adopted by African universities in the post-2015 era (Kigotho, 2015). However, Petlane (2009) argues that there is a significant gap in governing HEIs in Africa compared to other Western European countries, where the government is becoming less interventionist. In Africa, usually, states intervene in higher institutions governance affairs because "African governments consistently provide more than 90 to 95 percent of the total operating budgets of higher education" (Teferra & Altbachl, 2004, p. 27). This leads a university to be more accountable to the state and, fulfills accountability requirements that encompass, transparency and access to information and service, quality teaching and learning, relevance in meeting labour market needs, nation-building, internal efficiency, and good governance (Salmi, 2007; Salmi, 2009).

In connection to this, Zeleza (2003) depicted the governance contexts of African institutions as follows:

> African universities have been characterised by authoritarianism, partly as a reflection of prevailing state authoritarianism itself and the fact that in many cases senior university administrators are state appointees, who in turn, appoint unit heads down the administrative hierarchy. University governance has often been characterized by a discretionary and top-down administrative

> structure, poor communication, and strained relations between administration and teaching faculty (Zeleza, 2003, p. 170).

In Zeleza's view, African universities are characterised by the state control model, and the right of institutional autonomy is very restricted**.** In supporting Zeleza's generalisation, Wana (2009) found the absence of institutional autonomy and individual academic freedom in the Ethiopian context. Wana (2009) further argued that teachers have little voice in policy formulation and decision-making processes even if they are core stakeholders teaching and researching in higher education institutions. The erosion of academic freedom and institutional autonomy, as exemplified by the top-down approach to policy and even curricular issues, has contributed to the downgrading of the university community in the university affairs. Salmi (2017) argued that nowadays, "reduced academic freedom is also becoming a matter of concern"(p. 27). Saint (2009b) also confirmed that historically, African higher education had been known for strong government controls on institutions of higher learning as a survey of university leaders from Commonwealth countries indicated. But the restriction is not as high as Asian countries (Saint, 2009b). Still, an overview of trends in African higher education shows, "Government involvement in university affairs is the norm" (Teferra & Altbach, 2004, p. 29). Teferra and Altbach (2004) further strengthen the idea that in most African countries, the head of the state holds the decisive power as the chancellor or president in appointing vice-chancellors and others down through their structures.

The whole argument is that in most cases, the intellectual authority that can be noticeable in advanced developed nations is missing in much of African higher education institutions. The academic community has less power in the African context than it does in the West and this has, in turn, negative impact on having effective governance of higher education institutions in Africa (Saint, 2009b; Teferra & Altbach, 2004). Hence, this scenario conveys that as opposed to several developed countries with the improved autonomy of higher learning institutions, in Africa, higher education institutions have suffered too much from unnecessary government intervention. This could affect the establishment of effective higher education governance in the continent if the aim is going to be competitive in this globalised world. However, the contemporary studies show that due to the globalisation influence, universities are now

induced to initiate reforms to meet current economic challenges, and hence, some shift of governance from state control to supervision is reported (Saint, 2009b; Sewonu, 2010).

In spite of the HEIs' governance system variation across the regions, De Boer, Enders, and Schimank (2007) introduced five governance models being state regulation, academic self-governance, competition, managerial self-governance, and stakeholder guidance. As De Boer, Enders, and Leisyte (2007) explained, state control refers to the traditional notion of the top-down authority vested in the state while academic self-governance is the collegial decision-making of the academic communities within universities. The competition, managerial self-governance, and stakeholder guidance models concerned with competition for scarce resources, activities directed through goal setting and advice, and hierarchical steering within universities and the roles of institutional leadership outside the universities respectively. In general, De Boer, Enders, and Schimank (2007) models due attention to institutional output and comparative performance indicators for each model.

Currently, scholars have proposed higher education governance models that encompass the general picture of the state, academic community, stakes, and university management. These are the state-centred model, self-regulated/governed model, and the market-oriented model (Davidovitch & Iram, 2015; De Boer, Enders, & Schimank, 2007; Dobbins et al., 2011). The main elements of each of the models have been illustrated in Table 2.1 that follows:

Table 2.1: University governance models

Elements	State-centred model	Self-regulated model	Market oriented model
Aims	Meeting national goals	Meeting its own goal	Offering student academic service
Approaches	State strict regulation (state is gatekeeper)	Relaxed (free from state intervention)	Indirect state intervention
Characteristics	Top-down (hierarchal)	Lack of coordination between state and university	Limited state interference (indirect interference, granting incentive)
Target	Teaching and learning	Learning and research	Rendering service; promoting entrepreneurship
Degree of autonomy	Very limited	High degree of autonomy	Autonomous with indirect state intervention
Advantages	Maintained public interest through strict control	Free from external influence	Encourages competition, excellence and innovation and most efficient
Disadvantages	Restricts the freedom of academia	Lack of coordination for national interest	Less profitable university may disappear; prestige university may not be affordable
Examples	France, Sweden Turkey, and Russia	Germany, Austria, UK, and Central European countries	USA and Australia

(Davidovitch & Iram, 2015; Dobbins et al., 2011)

Table 2.1 shows three types of university governance models. Based on the Bologna Process, higher education was considered as a public good and should remain as a public responsibility (Obasi & Olutayo, 2009). From the Bologna Accord, this conception of higher education as a public good in the neo-liberal ideology, it appears that a market-oriented model characterises university governance model. As Obasi and Olutayo (2009) argued, the current trend of listing higher education as a tradable commodity under "the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)" (p. 168), could be one of the indications of the move toward the market-oriented governance model.

2.11 Conceptual Framework

This conceptual framework is based on Foucault (1991a), (Dean, 2010), and Segebart (2010) ideas of governance and governmentality. According to Shattock (2006), governance is the legal forms and processes through which university governs its affairs while governmentality refers to techniques and procedures for directing human behavior, actions thought, and self-governing behavior (Dean, 2010; Foucault, 1991b; Rose et al., 2006a). Dean (2010) argued that government as "Any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests, and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes" (p. 18).

Segebart (2010) utilised the concept of governmentality in the study of education policy to identify participatory rural development projects promoted by international cooperation agencies in Brazil. He conceptualised the relationship between governance, government, and governmentality in a dualistic structure: governance and government, and government and governmentality approaches. This study builds on the work of Foucault, Dean, and Segebart to develop a conceptual framework utilising the concepts of governance, government and governmentality in quadrant form (Tulu, Corbett, & Kilpatrick, 2018). The X-axis is from, authoritarian to democratic, and the Y-axis from compliance to autonomy (*see Figure 2.1*). The framework assists in situating institutions' approaches to governance and governmentality.

The framework in Figure 2.1 illustrates the concept of governance and governmentality in the context of a state and university. The axes show compliance (B), autonomy (A), authoritarian (C) and democratic (D) approaches of university governance and governmentality. A state uses compliance (B) as a means to implement its goals. A state requires public universities to comply with the legal rules and law and to be accountable per se. This could be set in place in four ways: compliance with legal documents (BC); top-down approach to the legal documents (AC); democratic approach to legal documents (AD); and a self- governing approach with public universities' own legal documents (BD).



Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework

The notion of top-down authority (AC quadrant) is characterised as a hierarchical view of governance. The system is centralised, and it accepts the rule of law and the capacity of government to govern through law with minimum or no autonomy for ordinary system participants. The freedom to govern is not constrained. On the other hand, in the self-governing approach with little or no direct influence of state (BD quadrant), an institution promotes full autonomy and seeks to establish a framework, which enables ordinary system participants to pursue autonomous goals and to regulate internal affairs. When autonomy is followed by democratic collegial decision-making (BD quadrant), the institution is characterised by academic freedom as an organisational principle. However, the concern of collegial governance or self-ruling approach is that institution cannot fulfil the goals of the state and the demands of economic globalisation (Zmas, 2015).

Therefore, systems that reduce the tension between a state (top-down authority), and university autonomous collegial mode of governance (self-governing) have emerged. The concept of governance and governmentality (BD) vs. (AC) tend to develop and shared, and consultative governance is prompted. A substantial interaction between a state and an institution is vital. The shared (AC) and consultative governance (BD) which encompass autonomy, accountability, participation, and transparency as indicated in the Bologna Process, could be utilised to reduce the tension between the two extreme systems of university governance: authoritarian and democratic governance approaches.

In general, in this chapter, based on the theoretical and empirical insights obtained from the reviewed literature, the conceptual framework of the study is developed. This conceptual framework is developed to show the extent to which higher education governance is revealed in the Ethiopian Public Universities' legislation and the Higher Education Proclamation of 2009. This work seeks to suggest the higher education governance model in Ethiopian public universities settings. In the next chapter, the research paradigm and design of the study have been discussed at length.

.

Chapter 3

The Research Paradigm and Design of the Study

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the methodological considerations and the research design of the study, along with any underlying assumption in order to answer the research questions of the study. It then explains the research paradigm, the research design, and methodological issues such as the selection of samples, data collection tools and procedures, and the methods of data analysis. Overall, this chapter considers the research orientation and justifies the chosen paradigm and research design in conducting the study.

3.2 Research Paradigm

In the educational inquiry, a researcher needs to establish a sound research design that fits the topic under investigation. The term paradigm refers to a set or cluster of commonly held beliefs or values within the research community about a field of study (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011). The beliefs are seen as shaping or dictating how researchers should proceed in carrying out research in their field-what they should focus on, what methods to use, and how the results should be interpreted (Spratt et al., 2004). It provides "a tool to identify one's own worldview or, in research terminology, identify one's paradigm: a metaphysical construct associated with specific philosophical assumptions that describe one's worldview" (Mertens, 2007, p. 215). In order to ensure a robust research design, a researcher must choose a research paradigm that is compatible with his/her beliefs about the nature of reality" (Miller & Cameron, 2011; Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006). Mertens (2007, p. 215) identified four sets of

philosophical assumptions that are most relevant to defining a paradigm in a research context. These are:

> **The ontological assumption** is concerned with the nature of reality. As Mertens (2007) argued, ontologically speaking, how does one know that something is real? It does not mean the physical entities such as a table or a computer that one can touch. It means the realities that one knows at a conceptual level; for example, when is access real? When is an environment least restrictive? When is literacy real? In the ontological sense, one has an assumption about what is real when one decides what type of evidence one will accept that someone is indeed literate or any other conceptual characteristic (Mertens, 2007).
>
> **The epistemological assumption** is concerned with the relationship between the knower and the would-be-known. Epistemological questions include how one is to know if something is real indeed, how does he/she need to relate to the people from whom he/she is collecting data? Therefore, the knower is the researcher, and the would-be-knowns are participants in the study. Should we be close to the participants so that we can understand their experiences, or should maintain the distance between the participants and ourselves so that we can be "neutral"? This question, of course, raises the definition of *objectivity* as it is operationalised in a research context.
>
> **The methodological assumption** relates to the appropriate approach to systematic inquiry. Methodologically, the researchers have choices to make that go beyond quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods, to how they collect data about the reality of human experiences in such a way that they can feel confident that they have indeed captured that reality.
>
> **The axiological assumption** relates to the nature of ethics. Axiological, on what basis do the researchers define ethical theory and practice in research? What is considered ethical or moral behavior? How do they address issues of ethics when conducting research in culturally complex communities? How do they address ethical dilemmas that arise in the research context?

Similarly, Guba and Lincoln (1994) also argued that *ontology* is concerned with the form and nature of reality and that it attempts to determine what can be known about that reality. On the other hand, *epistemology* refers to the fundamental processes of

knowing something. In other words, it addresses the issue of how a researcher gets to know what he or she knows. Gill and Johnson (2010) perceive the subject of epistemology to be the nature of the relationship between reality and the researcher, while the term *methodology* refers to the methods adopted to investigate the reality.

Hitherto, it has been mentioned that the philosophical assumptions and research design refer to the overall approaches to the investigation process and procedures, which is, from the theoretical underpinning to data collection and analysis (Miller & Cameron, 2011). A methodological approach is determined by a researcher's philosophical assumptions about the ontological, epistemological and methodological choice for the topic under investigation (Collins, Onwuegbuzie, & Sutton, 2006).

In social science research, predominately, there are two opposing views of reality, positivism, and interpretivism (Corbetta, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell & Creswell, 2018). As Corbetta (2003, p. 12) stated, these two views of reality "have generated two coherent and highly differentiated blocks of research techniques". Most importantly, their differences can be vividly seen in their philosophical origins, or how they respond to "fundamental interrogative[s] facing social research and scientific research in general" (Corbetta, 2003, p. 12). Scholars agree that distinctions between these two paradigms are located in their *ontological base* and e*pistemological base, in* which the former focuses on the nature and existence of a phenomenon or the objective world while the latter is characterised by the constituents of knowledge and the form this knowledge would take. In addition, a *methodological base*, referring to the preferable means of generating that knowledge (Corbetta, 2003; Miller & Cameron, 2011).

However, the mixed-methods design, rooted in pragmatism, rejects choosing a single method from among the positivists and interpretivists paradigms (Corbetta, 2003; Mertens, 2007; Patton, 2015; Spratt, Walker, & Robinson, 2004). Pragmatists argue that a false distinction exists between quantitative and qualitative approaches and that the relative strengths of each should be tapped in a single study (Creswell, 2018). As Creswell (2015) argued, the main argument for a mixed-methods design is that "the combination of both forms of data [quantitative and qualitative] provides a better understanding of a research problem than either quantitative or qualitative data by itself.

Mixed methods designs are procedures for collecting, analysing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or a multiphase series of studies"(p. 22).

Therefore, the study employed mixed methods design, quantitative followed by qualitative. The basic premise of using this design is that it begins with quantitative data analyses that provide a broad explanation of the phenomenon under investigation followed by qualitative analyses. In this regard, the quantitative data produce the overall perception of key actors about university governance, while the qualitative data helps to explore the phenomenon in-depth (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). To further justify the appropriateness of this design for this study, it is worthwhile to refer to some of the advantages that Denscombe (2014, pp. 118-119) elaborated in favour of a mixed method design. The benefits include:

(1) **A more comprehensive account of the topic being researched**

A mixed method approach helps to provide a fuller description and/or a complete explanation of the phenomenon under investigation by providing more than one perspective on it.

(2) **Clearer links between different methods and data**

A mixed method approach useful for the integration of alternative methods and encourage a researcher to provide a clear account of how and why the different methods and data complement each other. An approach is useful to mix the qualitative methods relate to the quantitative methods and vice versa. Hence, it avoids any arbitrary mix-and-match approach where methods are thrown together in a random or unplanned way.

(3) **Good use of triangulation** and

Considering its emphasis on the rationale for combining different approaches, a mixed method approach involves heightened sensitivity to the nature of triangulation. In effect, the use of a Mixed Methods approach calls for a clear appreciation of triangulation and makes good use of its potential.

(4) **A practical, problem-driven approach to research**.

As an approach, a mixed method approach is problem-driven rather than theory driven. Its underlying philosophy is that of pragmatism.

Denscombe (2014) further argued, "A mixed method approach can provide a fuller description and/or a complete explanation of the phenomenon being studied by providing more than one perspective on it. By encouraging the use of qualitative and quantitative methods and by facilitating a blend of exploratory and explanatory research, the findings are likely to address a wider range of the questions relating to 'how,' 'why,' 'what,"who,'when,' and 'how many" (p. 118).

As a result, mixed method was selected as an appropriate design to explore the on-going process and trends that are useful for identifying governance issues in which the existing circumstances could be compared. In addition, the study considered multiple perspectives of actors at different levels: Departments and colleges in public universities; data from policy documents as well as lived experience of system participants in universities.

3.3 Samples and Sampling Techniques

3.3.1 Setting the Study Area

The target population of this study was public universities in Ethiopia. The first reason why only public universities were the target of the study and private universities were not part of the study is that, only public universities were embarked on some elements of the Bologna Process, but it was not introduced in the private universities (Gebremeskel, 2014). The second reason was, in the past two decades, Ethiopia expanded its higher education institutions from one public university to more than thirty public universities. With this tremendous expansion, the higher education system is becoming complex, and there is a prevailing chorus of complaints among stakeholders (instructors, students, instructors, leaders, etc.) about public university governance systems in Ethiopia (Akalu, 2014; Mehari, 2010; Yizengaw, 2003a). Thirdly, the Ethiopian government has also acknowledged the stakeholders' dissatisfaction with higher education governance (Ministry of Education, 2015), and has put governance as

one of the agenda items for the coming five years of the Growth Transformational Plan-II (GTP-II) of 2016-2020 (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2016). The last reason was that the government is financing all public universities and hence, there is apparently an expectation that the institutions are accountable for utilising the public resource (Kebede, 2015; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2016).

3.3.2 The Selection of Public Universities

Currently, there are 31 public higher education institutions in Ethiopia (Ministry of Education, 2016b); so, it was not possible to consider all of them for data collection due to time and financial constraints. Consequently, a stratified sampling technique was employed to determine the research sites and reduce the sample population to a manageable size. In order to select sample universities, all public universities, which are accountable to the MoE, and those running some elements of the Bologna Process, have been listed and clustered into three categories: 1) First generation institutions established before 2005 (9 public universities); 2) second generation institutions established in 2006 (13 public universities); 3) and third-generation institutions established since 2011 (9 public universities) as grouped in Table 3.1 below:

Table 3.1: List of public universities

Public universities		
First generation (Before 2005)	Second generation (After 2005)	Third generation (2011)
Addis Ababa University Arba Minch University Bahir Dar University Gonder University Haramaya University Hawassa University Jimma University Mekele University Dilla University	Adama Science and Technology University Ambo University Aksum University Debre Birhan University Debre Markos University Dire Dawa University Jigjiga University Meda Walabu University Mizan Tepi University Semera University Wallega University Welaita Sodo University Wollo University	Addis Ababa Science and Technology University Adegirat University Assosa University Bule Hora University Debre Tabor University Metu University Wachemo University Woldia University Wolkite University
9	13	9
	31	

(Akalu, 2014; Ministry of Education, 2016b)

Among these public universities, two universities: Adama and Addis Ababa Science Technology universities are accountable to the Ministry of Science and Technology, and they have not yet entered into the Bologna Process. The rest of 29 public universities are accountable to the MoE, and they have been implementing the Bologna Process since 2011 (Moges, 2015). The MoE's public universities classifications: first, second and third generations *(see* Table 3.1*)* were considered as the sampling frame (Ministry of Education, 2016b). Finally, the target population of this study covered the selected first, second and third-generation public universities, which were chosen by purposive sampling technique. Hence, one public university was chosen from each generational group for convenience and accessibility reasons. It was also assumed that all the universities within their a given generational group have similar infrastructures and human resource processes, and so might be representative of other universities within their group. The selected universities are shown in Figure 3.1: Sample universities below.



Figure 3.1: Sample universities

3.3.3 The Selection of Colleges and Departments from the Sample Public Universities

The selection of colleges was made based on Biglan (1973) typology and classification of disciplines (Becher & Trowler, 2001). Biglan (1973) provides a simplified classification of disciplines on the assumption that disciplinary differences can be categorised into three dimensions: hard-soft, pure-applied and life-nonlife. According to Biglan (1973), academic areas are clustered into (a) concern with a single paradigm

(hard vs. soft), (b) concern with the application (pure vs. applied), and (c) concern with life systems (life system vs. nonlife system).

Table 3.2: Biglan's classification [3] of academic disciplines

	Hard		Soft	
	Non-life system	Life system	Non-life system	Life system
Pure	Astronomy Chemistry Geology Mathematics Physics	Botany Biochemistry Zoology Physiology Microbiology Biology	Art Language & Literature History Music Philosophy	Anthropology Ethnic studies Political science Psychology Sociology
Applied	Civil engineering Chemical engineering Electrical engineering Industrial engineering Materials engineering Mechanical engineering General engineering	Medicine Dentistry Veterinarian Pharmacy Agriculture Agronomy Radiology Speech & Hearing Science Dairy science Horticulture Agricultural Economics	Accounting Business administration Finance Marketing Management Urban planning Economics Public administration	Theology or religion Business education Educational administration Music or art education Physical education Nursing Social work Secondary education Special education Vocational education

The classifications of Biglan (1973) and Becher and Trowler (2001) were considered for the selection of colleges and departments across the sample public universities with the aim to include a good representation of the views and opinions of institutional leaders, instructors, and students in their disciplines of the sample public universities. Therefore, as indicated in Table 3.2, following the Biglan (1973) typology, all the colleges within each generation of public universities were divided into four categories, namely, hard-pure, hard-applied, soft-pure, and soft-applied (*see Table 3.3*) based on their shared characteristics. It was also assumed that the implementation of the Bologna

[3] *Classification is based on (Biglan, 1973; Laird, Shoup, Kuh, & Schwarz, 2008; Malaney, 1986; Stoecker, 1993)*

Process might be different due to the nature of the population in the disciplines, and hence, the governance system across the institution and research participants might be interesting.

Table 3.3: Sample colleges and departments

	Hard	**Soft**
Pure	College A Department A	College C Department C
Applied	College B Department B	College D Department D

For each institution, after categorising the colleges, four colleges were randomly selected (one from each category, that is, one from hard-pure, hard-applied, soft-pure and soft-applied) (*see Table 3.3 and Table 3.4*). Similarly, one department was randomly selected from the respective sample colleges (*see Table 3.4*).

Table 3.4: The selection of colleges and departments

Details	Sample Public Universities			Total
	AAU	DBU	WU	
Total number of colleges	10	7	6	23
Sample colleges based on Biglan classification of disciples	4	4	4	12
Total number of departments within sample colleges	22	25	21	68
Sample departments based on Biglan classification of disciples	4	4	4	12

As indicated in Table 3.4, similar to the sample colleges selection, all the departments in each sample college have been classified into four groups; and one department has been randomly selected through lottery methods from each sample college following Biglan classification of discipline to include a good representation of the views and

opinions of department chairs, instructors, and students. As indicated in Table 3.4, in total, 12 departments were selected from the sample colleges.

3.3.4 The Selection of Research Participants

The teaching and administrative service years of the college deans, department chairs and instructors were taken into account for the selection of research participants. Only those who served in teaching and administrative positions of the current system (implementation of the Bologna Process) and the previous system (Before the implementation of the Bologna Process) were considered to understand the influence that the Bologna Process on the university governance operation. Students were also considered because, the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation and the Senate legislation specified the involvement of students in university affairs such as election of their representatives, part of the decision-making of Academic Senate of the university, Academic Commission of the college, and the Department Council, involved in evaluation of their instructors, and have the right to comment on the university system (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; Wachemo University, 2016). In addition, in both the Proclamation and the Bologna Processes, students were regarded as one of the main stakeholders of the university (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). For these reasons, it appears that the selection of the students was necessary for the findings of the study. The prospective graduating class of a sample department was purposively selected because it was believed that they had enough experience and knowledge to give genuine information about governance practices and challenges of their respective departments compared to a first-year and second-year regular undergraduate students (Patton, 2015).

3.3.4.1 Selection of College Deans and Department Chairs

As the roles of college deans and department chairs were vital for the implementation of some elements of the Bologna Process, exploring their opinions was considered significant. Accordingly, all the college deans and associate deans, and department chairs from the colleges of the three sample public universities were included in the study. A total of 42 college deans (15 from AAU, 15 from DBU, and 12 WCU) and 68

department chairs (22 from AAU, 25 from DBU, and 21 from WCU) were selected (*see Table 3.4*) through census sampling techniques as suggested by Levy and Lemeshow (2013) where all the sample college deans and department chairs were part of the study.

3.3.4.2 Selection of the Students and Instructors

The sample students and instructors were determined based on Yemane's sample determination formula (Yamane, 1973). There was a total of 11,084 prospective graduating class students (AAU =5,105; DBU =3,149, and WCU =2,831), and 273 instructors (AAU=124; DBU=84, and WCU =65) in the target colleges of the sample universities. Out of 11,084 students and 273 instructors, the sample size (n= 592) and (n=190) were respectively selected as representative participants of the study using Yemane's sample determination formula: $n = \frac{N}{1+N(e^2)}$ where, Where, n= sample size, N = population size, and e = Margin of error, e = 0.04.

1) $n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2} = \frac{11084}{1+11084(0.04)^2} = 592$ students.

2) $n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2} = \frac{273}{1+273(0.04)^2} = 190$ instructors.

In addition, 10% (59 students) and (19 instructors) non-response rates were added to the sample size (592) and (190), which yields in a total of 651 students, and 209 instructors as the study participants for a quantitative study.

After determining the sample size, the required total number of students (n=651) and (n=209) instructors were proportionally drawn from each university using Pandey, Ashraf, and Verma's (2012) formula: $n_i = \frac{N_i}{N} n$ where, n_i = the number of students and instructors required from a given university with a total number of N_i students and instructors, and the n=the total number students and instructors sampled from the sample colleges in sample universities with a total of students and instructors=N.

Finally, the required sample students and instructors were selected from each department using census sampling techniques. The detail has been indicated in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5: Sample students and instructors

Sample universities	Total number of students (Ni)	Sample students (ni)	Total number of instructors (Ni)	Sample instructors (ni)
AAU	5,105	300	124	95
DBU	3,149	185	84	64
WCU	2,831	166	65	50
Grand Total	11,084	651	273	209

As shown in Table 3.5, with the purpose of achieving an adequate sample size of this study, the initial calculation of the sample of the students was determined with a population of 11,084 students, a sample size 651 at .04 margin of error. However, in actual practice, during the quantitative data collection process, 697 valid questionnaires were collected from the students, and this sample 697 (>651) in the quantitative phase was considered statistically adequate to capture the general pattern of students' perception about the governance of the university.

In general, as can be seen from Table 3.6, the overall research participants were 453, 302, and 261 from AAU, BDU, and WCU, respectively. The total number of research participants such as instructors, students, department chairs, and college deans, was 209, 697, 68, and 42 consecutively.

Table 3.6: Research participants of three universities

Study Participants	AAU	DBU	WCU	Total	Sampling techniques
Instructors	95	64	50	209	Purposive
Students	321	198	178	697	Purposive and census
Chairs	22	25	21	68	Purposive and census
Deans	15	15	12	42	Purposive and census
Grand Total	453	302	261	1016	

3.3.5 Interview Participants Selection

As mentioned earlier, the research participants for the interview were also selected based on Biglan's classification of academic disciplines: pure vs. applied classification (*see Table 3.7*). This selection allowed flexibility to probe participants' responses more deeply and to get relevant information related to the practice of governance in public universities (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011).

Table 3.7: Selection of interviewees

Biglan's classification	Interviewees	AAU College AB	DBU College AB	WCU College AB	Total
Pure	College Dean	1	1	1	3
	Department Chair	1	1	1	3
	Instructor	2	2	2	6
	Students	1	1	1	3
Applied	College Dean	1	1	1	3
	Department Chair	1	1	1	3
	Instructor	2	2	2	6
	Student	2	2	2	6
Total		11	11	11	33
Grand Total		33			

As indicated in Table 3.7, a total of 33 research participants was selected and interviewed from the three sample public universities. The selection of college deans and department chairs was made based on simple random sampling techniques while the instructors and students were selected purposively. Those who were the member of the Academic Senate, Academic Commission and members of different committees were selected for interview.

3.4 Instrument Development and Validation

Before the actual data collection was made, intensive literature review was done to develop a questionnaire instrument for the quantitative data collection. The instruments were categorised into four major themes: autonomy, accountability, transparency, and participation of the key stakeholders in the higher education governance systems. Accordingly, variables were developed under each of the themes such as (*see Appendix 4:* Questionnaire for the College Deans*, Appendix* 5: Questionnaire for the Department Chair*, and Appendix* 6: Questionnaire for Instructors) **(A) Autonomy:** (African Society of International and Comparative Law, 1990; African Society of International and Comparative Law, 1992; Behailu, 2011; Fernando, 1989; Kohtamäki & Lyytinen, 2004; Moutsios, 2012; Ndiaye & Shabani, 1998; Ödemiş, Beytekin, & Uslu, 2016; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; Turcan & Gulieva, 2013; Wachemo University, 2016). **(B) Accountability:** (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Bailey, 1983; Bennett & Gitomer, 2009; Burgess, 1994; Burke, 2005; Dascălu & Nasta, 2015; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Estermann & Nokkala, 2009; Huisman & Currie, 2004;

Johnston, 2009; Olsen, 2013; Olssen, 2015; Rowlands, 2012; Scott, 1994; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; Wachemo University, 2016; Zumeta, 2011). **(C) Transparency:** (Addis Ababa University, 2012a; Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Johnston, 2009; Kebede, 2015; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; Wachemo University, 2016). **(D) Participation**: (African Society of International and Comparative Law, 1990; African Society of International and Comparative Law, 1992; Alexander, 2009; Fernando, 1989; Malle, Pirttimaa, & Saloviita, 2015; Planas, Soler, Fullana, Pallisera, & Vilà, 2013; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; Wachemo University, 2016).

Prior to collecting the data, a pilot test was conducted in universities not included in the study to ensure the reliability of the instruments. Analysis of the pilot data indicated no obscure data gather instruments were observed. However, a minor modification was made; some items were modified, and a few items were omitted from the instruments based on the results of the inter-item correlation analysis. Finally, the internal consistency of the instruments was found to be reliable at Cronbach alpha 0.75, 0.80, 0.75, and 0.82 for instructors, department chairs, college deans, and students, respectively.

The content and face validity of the instruments were also checked in consultation with the supervisors and language instructors to ensure the validity of the instruments. In order to check content validity, issues related to higher education governance were studied, and important variables of higher education governance were critically reviewed and identified. Items pooled and adapted from the above cited works and those framed by the researcher based on the existing literature in the area were aligned to the study. The items in the pool were assorted into four major areas. These are Autonomy, accountability, transparency, and participation. Finally, items under each theme were checked for relevance, specificity, and clarity by supervisors and English language instructors.

3.5 Data Collection Instruments and Procedures

The tools used to gather data were questionnaires, and a semi-structured interview. With respect to this, employing multiple data collection instruments helps a researcher to combine, strengthen and amend for inadequacies of the data if encountered (Creswell, 2008). Accordingly, closed and open-ended questionnaires and semi-structured interview were used as the main data gathering instruments.

3.5.1 Questionnaires

Questionnaires (*see Appendix 4, 5, 6, and 7*) were used to collect relevant and firsthand information from research participants such as college deans, department chairs, instructors, and students. The purpose of the questionnaire was to gather quantitative data on the practice of the Ethiopian higher education governance systems in the context of the Bologna Process. To this end, this questionnaire was set up to gather data regarding perceptions of the University governance during the implementation of some elements of the Bologna Process. Similar questionnaires were prepared for the first- and second-generation universities as they ran different systems before the introduction of some elements of the Bologna Process. As the third-generation universities started operating the teaching and learning activities at the same time, Ethiopia introduced some elements of the Bologna Process, the contents of the questionnaire for these participants were contextualised to the existing system only. The third-generation university was intentionally selected to see the general pattern of the perception of the key actors about the governance of higher education institutions with and without reference to the old systems.

The questionnaires were prepared for the dean, department head, instructors and students, and they are all in English. This is based on the logic that English is used as a medium of instruction and by assuming that the qualification of instructors and the educational level of students are adequate to understand the questions and respond to them. A questionnaire comprised different parts such as - demographic information such as age, gender, years of service of teaching and administration, qualification, and area of specialisation, opinion using five points Likert scale items, and expressing ideas based on open-ended questions. This information was used to gain an understanding of

the influence of the Bologna Process on university governance systems, and, to find out where the university currently stands in terms of governance, which encompass accountability, transparency, participation, and autonomy. The student researcher preferred questionnaires as the data gathering instruments because it is easier to handle a larger number of respondents and ,more straightforward for respondents to answer within a short period (Koul, 2008). Besides, the researcher believed that it allows the research participants to respond to questions anonymously and enables the researcher to reduce exposing biases.

3.5.2 Interview

An interview was conducted with college deans, department chairs, instructors, and students to further investigate the influence of the Bologna Process on Ethiopian public university governance systems in order to enrich the data obtained through questionnaires. The interview was about the participants' perception of governance practice, which encompasses transparency, participation, accountability, and autonomy. In addition, these interviews designed to explore issues around the strategies that system participants used to respond to university governance systems.

The interview was conducted with research participants in local languages (Amharic and Afan Oromo) and English language as per their preference. The interviews were held mainly to consolidate, intensify, and justify information obtained through questionnaires. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim.

3.5.3 Data Collection Procedures

Prior to data collection, initial contact was made with the MoE of Ethiopia by providing them approved ethics from the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network-Social Science No. H0016612 (*see Appendix 1: Ethics Approval*) to obtain permission to conduct the study at the sample public universities. It was a requirement for a researcher to get permission from the MoE if he/she wishes to carry out research in the Ethiopian higher education institutions. Accordingly, support letters (*see Appendix 2: Support Letter from Ministry of* Education) were issued from the Ministry of Education of Ethiopia for the sample public universities. Based on the letters from MoE, a student investigator contacted the Presidents of the three sample public

universities for their permission to collect the data. The President of each university directed request for student participants to the Office for Research and Technology Transfer (ORTT) as the ORTT was a neutral body that could to recruit, facilitate, and distribute the questionnaires to the research participants. The ORRT contacted the sample colleges and departments to facilitate and distribute the questionnaires, and later made it possible for the investigator to conduct the interviews with the research participants. Along these lines, the ORTT and the sample colleges, and departments were contacted, and meetings were held to discuss the purpose of the study, and the schedule of data collection.

After the research participants (college deans, department chairs, instructors, and students) agreed to participate in the study, participants were sent the information sheets and questionnaires (*see Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheet*) as per the set schedules.

Similarly, a brief introduction was given to the sample interviewees before each interview session was held. The participants were encouraged to talk freely and explain what they usually do and feel in real situations. It was explained that there were no right or wrong answers to all the questions. They were also told that data from the interview, including the audio recordings, would be kept confidential, and it will not be used for any other purposes outside the study. Moreover, the research participants were given enough time to read the information sheet and fill in the consent forms, if they are willing to participate in the study. For those who agreed to participate in the study and filled in and signed the consent, they were requested to place the consent forms into a box situated in each department to minimise the possibility of issues related to coercion and bias.

Before the interviews, ORRT arranged a conducive room for the interview and notified the research participants of the details. To ensure communication between the interviewer and the interviewees, the interview was conducted in Amhara, Oromo, and English languages as per the preferences and the languages they felt more at ease in expressing themselves and then it was translated into English for the analysis. Finally, all the data collected were organised for the analysis.

3.6 Data Processing and Analysis

To carry out the analysis of this study, first, the data were separately organised into quantitative and qualitative data. In analysing the quantitative data, the latest version of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software version 24 was used for its accuracy and efficiency of processing and analysing data. Then, quantifiable data were verified, encoded, and processed using SPSS software.

The interviews were recorded, transcribed, thematically organised, analysed, and interpreted following the recommendations of Kumar (2019). In one situation where one of the research participants was not comfortable with audio recording, the student researcher took detailed notes during the interview. Consequently, a complete interview transcript produced verbatim. In doing so, data were first grouped into corresponding categories, namely responses of teachers, students, chairs, and deans within each generation of the universities. In presenting the data under each category, information was organised into specific themes and then thematically analysed. In order to maintain confidentiality and anonymity, all records were coded and stored in a secure place.

3.6.1 Quantitative Data Analysis

Data from the questionnaires concerning the key variables such as autonomy, accountability, transparency, and participation are presented in chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7, which discuss the contents in detail. In order to prepare the questionnaires data for the analysis, firstly, the questionnaire papers were coded separately based on their categorical sources: the sample public universities and the key actors in each university. Secondly, quantifiable data were verified, encoded, and processed using SPSS 24 version. The analysis employed descriptive (mean, the standard deviation, frequency, and percentage) and inferential statistics (ANOVA and Tukey's multiple comparison test) to get the general pictures of the perception of research participants about the governance of universities. ANOVA was used to see whether there are statistically significant perception differences between college deans, chairs, instructors, and students across the three sample universities after checking its assumptions such as normality distribution of data, outliers, and homogeneity of variances. In addition,

Cronbach's Alpha was also calculated to see the internal consistency of the data (*see section 3.6.2*).

The open-ended data of the questionnaires was computed and managed both as quantitative and qualitative data. The qualitative component of the open-ended responses was treated under the qualitative data analysis along with the interview data analysis whereas the quantitative part was analysed using descriptive statistics such as frequency and percentage (*see Chapter 10).*

3.6.2 Instrument Reliability Test

The reliability of the questionnaire items was assessed using the Cronbach Alpha Coefficients, which were considered a central measurement of research instrument reliability. Cronbach Alpha Coefficients provides the researcher with information on which questionnaire items are related to each other and which items should be removed. Alpha Coefficient value varies from a range of 0.0 to 1.00, and the higher value is, the more reliable the generated scale is (Pallant, 2013). According to Perry, Charlotte, Isabella, and Bob (2014), Cronbach's alpha values 0.7-0.9 are considered to be of high reliability.

Table 3.8: Reliability analysis of college deans' questionnaires

	College Deans		
	AAU (n=15)	DBU (n=15)	WCU (n=12)
Principles of governance	Cronbach alpha	Cronbach alpha	Cronbach alpha
Accountability (Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5,Q6,Q7,Q8,Q9)	.842	.869	.849
Participation (Q10,Q11,Q12,Q13,Q14,)	.648	.629	.644
Transparency (Q15,Q16, Q17,Q19)	.659	.910	.832
Academic autonomy (Q20, Q21,,Q22,Q23,Q24,25,Q26,Q27, Q28)	.622	.776	.677
Financial autonomy (Q29,Q30,Q31,Q32)	.731	.816	.746
Institutional autonomy (Q33,Q34,Q35,Q36,Q37,Q38,Q39,Q40,Q41,Q42, Q43,Q44)	.792	.916	.629

As shown in Table 3.8, Cronbach's Alpha test was run to measure the internal consistency and reliability of the questionnaire. For instance, by deleting item number

18 from the *transparency theme*, the scale is improved from reliability coefficient .642 to .659 for AAU College deans' questionnaire, and from 0.679 to .0832 for that of WCU college deans. Accordingly, the alpha coefficient for the overall questionnaire items of the college deans of AAU, DBU, and WCU had the values of 0.71, 0.82, and 0.70, respectively. According to Perry et al. (2014), a reliability coefficient above 0.7 is considered as high. A good guide cut-off point for reliability is: 0.90 and above shows excellent reliability; 0.70-0.90 shows high reliability; 0.50-0.70 shows moderate reliability, and 0.50 and below shows low reliability. In this study, the assumption was met as the calculated Cronbach's alpha test is above 0.7, and the instruments were found to be reliable.

Table 3.9: Reliability analysis of department chairs' questionnaires

	Department Chairs		
	AAU chairs (n=22)	DBU chairs (n=25)	WCU chairs (n=21)
Principles of governance	Cronbach alpha	Cronbach alpha	Cronbach alpha
Accountability (Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5,Q6,Q7,Q8,Q9)	.847	.876	.779
Participation (Q11,Q12,Q13,Q14,)	.635	.855	.744
Transparency (Q15,Q16, Q17,Q18,Q19)	.849	.904	.835
Academic autonomy (Q20, Q21,,Q22,Q23,Q24,25,Q26,Q27, Q28)	.915	.881	.727
Financial autonomy (Q29,Q30,Q31,Q32)	.771	.874	.802
Institutional autonomy (Q33,Q34,Q35,Q36,Q37,Q38,Q39,Q40,Q41,Q42,Q43,Q44)	.738	.932	.727

As can be seen from the data in

Table 3.9, the reliability coefficient (Cronbach Alpha) of the department chairs' questionnaire was checked, and items with low reliability coefficient were deleted before the data analysis carried out. For instance, by deleting item number 10 from the 'participation theme', the reliability of scale of 'participation theme' improved from 0.457 to 0.635 for the AAU department chairs' questionnaire, and from 0.703 to .744

for the WCU department chairs. Therefore, the internal consistency of the research data was considered reliable for this study.

Table 3.10: Reliability analysis of instructors' questionnaires

	AAU Instructors (n=95)	DBU Instructors (n=64)	WCU Instructors (n=50)
Principles of governance	Cronbach alpha	Cronbach alpha	Cronbach alpha
Accountability (Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5,Q6,Q7,Q8,Q9)	.789	.778	.734
Participation (Q10, Q11, Q13, Q14)	.609	.689	.731
Transparency Q15, Q16, Q17, Q19)	.824	.794	.748
Academic autonomy (Q20,Q21,Q22,Q23,Q24,25,Q26,Q27)	.803	.747	.689
Institutional autonomy (Q28,Q29,Q30,Q31,Q32,Q33,Q34,Q35,Q36,Q37,Q38 ,Q39)	.767	.884	.849

Table 3.10 shows the reliability analysis of instructors' questionnaires of the three sample universities. Two items with low reliability coefficient were removed from each theme. For example, item number 12 was removed from *participation,* and the reliability of the subscale was improved from .558 to 609. Similarly, after deleting item number 18, the reliability coefficient of *transparency* improved from 0.768 to 0.826 for AAU, 0.750 to 0.794 for the DBU, and from 0.732 to 0.748 for WCU instructors' questionnaire. The coefficient reliability results are above from the recommendation of Johnson et al. (2009); Perry et al. (2014).

Table 3.10: Reliability analysis of students' questionnaires

	Students		
	AAU (n=321)	DBU (n=198)	WCU (n=178)
Principles of governance	Cronbach alpha	Cronbach alpha	Cronbach alpha
Accountability (Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5,Q6,Q7,Q8,Q9)	.852	.818	.837
Student voice (Q10,Q11,Q12,Q13,Q14, 15,16)	.770	.827	.800
Transparency (Q17,Q18,Q19,20,21)	.839	.793	.807
Autonomy (Q22,Q23,Q24,25,Q26,Q27)	.874	.816	.819

Table 3.10 presents the reliability analysis of students' questionnaires of AAU, DBU, and WCU universities. The reliability coefficient values of students' questionnaire for the three sample universities were above .81. Therefore, the measure was found to be reliable with Alpha above 0.81, which is a high reliability coefficient as recommended by Johnson et al. (2009); (Perry et al., 2014).

3.6.3 Qualitative Data Analysis

The interview data were thematically organised, analysed, interpreted and presented in this thesis. As recommended by Braun, Clarke, Hayfield, and Terry (2017), qualitative data analysis was carried out through different stages. These are: Transcribing audio records, generating codes, search for themes, naming and producing themes, and reporting themes. In this regard, data were first grouped into corresponding categories, namely responses of college deans, department chairs, instructors and students across the three sample public universities.

The analysis was done through the suggested stages (Braun et al., 2017). First, the audio recorded data were transcribed and organised according to the unit of analysis identified in the study. Second, as thematic analysis takes up the recurrence of a specific theme and looks for general statements in each category of the data, codes were generated to classify words or phrases or sentences that were related to the research questions and conceptual framework used in the study. Coding was mainly used to describe and interpret the themes that were identified from the interview data. Third, based on the generated codes, further classification and search for specific themes were done to review the important variables related to the research questions as this is essential stages of quality checking (Braun et al., 2017; Braun, Clarke, & Weate, 2016). According to Braun and Clarke (2006), in order to identify the major themes, recurrence, and the level of patterned meanings within the data that captured the core message of the research questions need to be considered. The fourth step was to name the themes in line with the purpose of the research. Finally, the refined themes were produced for analysis. These are: Autonomy, accountability, transparency, and participation of public universities governance, and strategic responses to the university governance pressures, and students' voice. Each of these themes has been thoroughly discussed in the result chapters of the thesis. Due to the interconnected nature of

autonomy, accountability, transparency, and participation, where applicable, the same interview extracts might be used more than once in different contexts to make the issues more explicit for the readers. Similar techniques might also be applied while synthesising the discussion.

3.6.3.1 Trustworthiness

The principal aim of the research is to contribute to developing knowledge that is acceptable and dependable in the field of the study (Schwandt, Lincoln, & Guba, 2007). Consequently, several studies were conducted to ensure the trustworthiness of qualitative study (Lincoln & Guba, 1988; Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017; Schwandt et al., 2007). For instance, Guba (1981) suggested four major criteria to assess the trustworthiness of qualitative research that an investigator needs to consider. These are credibility, transferability, dependability, and authenticity. These four criteria were considered to address the trustworthiness of the qualitative aspect of this study as elaborated below.

3.6.3.2 Credibility

According to Polit and Beck (2014), credibility is the confidence in the authenticity of the study, where the findings of the study are the most important criterion to ensure its trustworthiness. Credibility addresses the relationship between the findings and the data, i.e., the congruence of the findings with reality (Schwandt et al., 2007; Shenton, 2004). As Shenton (2004) argued the credibility of the study could be ensured through well-established research methods and triangulation. In this regard, the study utilised sound methodology, i.e., explanatory mixed design, where both quantitative and qualitative data were mixed in order to provide a fuller explanation of the phenomenon being studied. In addition, the study employed a thorough review of previous studies to show the significance of the study. The review of the literature and legal documents helped the researcher to formulate the research questions, and to develop an appropriate conceptual framework for the study that guides the data collection and analysis of the study. Finally, the discussion and conclusions were made, and the implications of the study were also indicated.

Triangulation was another means of ensuring the credibility of the study. Halcomb and Andrew (2005) suggested different types of triangulation. The common triangulation techniques are data, methodological, investigator, and theory triangulation (Halcomb & Andrew, 2005; Shenton, 2004). Data triangulation is the use of multiple data sources, and the collection of data from different people whereas methodological triangulation refers to the use of more than one method within a single study at either the design or data collection level (Connelly, 2016; Shenton, 2004). As Halcomb and Andrew (2005) argued investigator triangulation is a technique in which multiple experts are involved in reviewing the findings while theory triangulation stands for the use of conceptual frameworks or theories to interpret the results of the study. This triangulation provides a broader and deeper analysis of findings by looking beyond obvious explanations (Halcomb & Andrew, 2005; Thurmond, 2001).

Therefore, the credibility of this study was ensured through data, methodological, and theoretical triangulation. This was addressed by collecting different data interviewing individuals from the college and academic units of three public universities and by referring to legal documents from the sample universities, and the MoE to enhance the interpretations of the findings. In the same way, mixed methods were used at the study design level. Moreover, the conceptual framework (*see Chapter 2*) was used to interpret the result of the study.

3.6.3.3 Transferability

The notion of transferability is " the extent to which the case study facilitates the drawing of inferences by the reader that may have applicability in his or her own context or situation" (Lincoln & Guba, 1988, p. 18). Transferability depends on the readers of the study. The role of the researcher is to provide a rich, detailed description of the context, study area, and the participants by being transparent about analysis and trustworthiness of the study (Connelly, 2016). On the bases of the concept of transferability, the transferability of this study was addressed through a detailed explanation of the research context, study setting, description of study participants, research design and process, the findings so that the readers could be able to compare the results of this study with their own contexts.

3.6.3.4 Dependability

Similar to the idea of reliability in the quantitative study, dependability in qualitative research refers to the consistency of the research processes used over time (Polit & Beck, 2018). Accordingly, dependability of this study was considered by careful documentation of the data collection process, by checking the transcription of audio recorded interview data, careful analysis, and interpretation of the data. The organisation of the detail accounts of the research process followed in the study is believed to help the readers and researchers to trace the entire research processes and replicate the study. This idea is also supported by Nguyen (2013); Polit and Beck (2018); (Schwandt et al., 2007).

3.6.3.5 Authenticity

Authenticity is the extent to which researchers consider the rigour of data interpretation reasonably convey participants' lives (Polit & Beck, 2018). As Schou, Høstrup, Lyngsø, Larsen, and Poulsen (2012) pointed out, the authenticity of the study could be ensured through careful selection of appropriate people for the study sample and provision of the rich, detailed description that a researcher wishes to employ. In this study, authenticity was addressed through the notion of fair authenticity, where different views and lived experiences of all research participants were presented and accurately and fairly expressed. This was considered to increase readers' understanding of the phenomenon being investigated (Connelly, 2016).

3.7 Ethical Considerations

Before commencing the data collection, ethical approval was obtained from the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network-Social Science, Ethics Reference No. H0016612. As part of approval conditions, before administering the questionnaires for data collection in the sample universities, respondents were informed about the purposes of the research and how to fill in the questionnaires through the third party, office for the research and technology of the university. Furthermore, the participants were given pseudo names and reassured of confidentiality of their name that it would not be documented. It is only used for the purpose of the researcher's work, and the

information they provide will be kept confidential, and it will not be used for anything other purposes than the study.

Overall, this chapter has described the research paradigm and methodology employed in this study. A description of the study area and selection of research participants have been presented. The explanation of questionnaire development, reliability, and validity of the instruments were also described. In addition, an overview of data collection and analysis methods used in answering the research questions, and the ethical issues of the research have been presented. The findings of the study that have been obtained from the quantitative and qualitative data been presented in the subsequent chapters.

PART-B

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Chapter 4

Autonomy in the Ethiopian Public Universities

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the results and discussion of the empirical data pertaining to the autonomy of the Ethiopian Public Universities. Data were analysed quantitatively and qualitatively in order to show the perception of autonomy practised in public universities. The autonomy of public universities has been discussed in three dimensions: Academic, institutional and financial autonomies. The chapter begins with the results and discussion of data gathered from the college deans, followed by department chairs, instructors, and students of the three sample public universities: Addis Ababa University (AAU), Debre Berhan University (DBU), and Wechamo University (WCU).

University autonomy is described as having the capability to set university's own goals, decide on their administration policy and procedures, recruit their academic and administrative staff. A university autonomy also covers the ability to control over budget, university's capability of setting their own goals, and the ability to introduce new programs freely as discussed in Chapter two (Estermann & Nokkala, 2009). Dobbins et al. (2011) also argued that "greater autonomy also applies to academic matters, which involves universities' ability to define their own institutional strategies and academic profiles and freely regulate student admissions…. map out various facets of financial autonomy and determine a trend towards competition-orientation" (p. 668). The concept of autonomy is not straightforward as it encompasses different aspects such as institutional, academic, and financial autonomies. According to the Bologna Process implementation report of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA), "Academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and respect for the rule of law in relation

[to] public authorities, higher education institutions, and students are essential to democratic societies, and can be considered as the fundamental values of the EHEA (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018, p. 41). In line with this, the EHEP, Article 18, grants financial autonomy for the academic units of a public institution. Hence, "academic units of a public institution shall have the necessary autonomy in administration and finance as well as in academic affairs" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4986).

In the same vein, the EHEP (Article 17) grants academic freedom and autonomy to every institution in pursuit of its mission. This includes the development and implementation of academic programs and curricula, personnel and financial administration, nomination and selection of the president, vice presidents and members of the board, and selection and appointment of academic units and departments' leaders (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009).

On top of this, the public universities' Senate legislation grants executive authority over the academic and administrative matters for the college within the university (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Wachemo University, 2016). Also, Kalpazidou, Langberg, and Aagaard (2008) claimed autonomy has been regarded as a normal state of affairs, not a privilege. However, the issue of autonomy has received little attention in higher education research globally, so the subject remains debatable (Johnson, 1989; Kalpazidou et al., 2008). Considering this, the case of Ethiopian public universities has been discussed below.

4.2 Views of College Deans

According to the Addis Ababa University (2012), the document outlining the reorganisation of the structure and governance system of the university describes a college is as academic unit that coordinates and oversees the academic, research, community service and administrative activities of its departments/schools/centres. A college is a middle-level organisational unit with strategic leadership, managerial and financial responsibilities (Addis Ababa University, 2013b). The purpose of a college is to enhance integration among academic programs to provide effective administrative services. Table 4.1 shows a summary of the responses to the questionnaire sent to

College deans asking their views about the autonomy of their University. The responses are based on a 5-point Likert scale.

Table 4.1: View of college deans

Dimensions of autonomy	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	AAU Deans		DBU Deans		WCU Deans	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Academic autonomy	2.22	.52	3.01	.73	3.03	.68
Financial autonomy	2.03	.74	2.88	1.05	2.75	.84
Institutional autonomy	2.18	.58	3.06	.92	2.63	.51

Key. *The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicate the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).*

Table 4.1 shows the means scores of college deans' perception of academic, financial and institutional autonomy of the sample universities. As indicated in Table 4.1, the mean scores of AAU's college deans were relatively low compared to DBU and WCU. In AAU, the status of all forms of autonomy was perceived to be constrained as compared to the other universities, where their means scores were close to neutral. The perception of institutional autonomy scores of AAU and WCU was relatively lower compared to DBU. Overall, the perception of college deans about financial autonomy was low, and this shows that financial autonomy was the area of concern for all the college deans as the mean scores were somewhat small (less than 3).

Table 4.2: ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Academic autonomy	Between Groups	6.200	2	3.100	7.384	.002
	Within Groups	16.372	39	.420		
	Total	22.571	41			
Financial autonomy	Between Groups	6.148	2	3.074	3.871	.029
	Within Groups	30.967	39	.794		
	Total	37.115	41			
Institutional autonomy	Between Groups	5.779	2	2.890	5.858	.006
	Within Groups	19.237	39	.493		
	Total	25.016	41			

As shown in Table 4.2, a one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) found that there was a statistically significant difference among AAU, BDU, and WCU college deans about the perception of *academic, financial, and institutional autonomies* of their respective universities at (F = 7.384, P = 0.002; F=3.871, P=0.029; F=5.858, P=0.006 respectively).

The Tukey test found that the means for AAU (Mean (M)=2.22, Standard deviation (SD)=0.52) was statistically significantly different from DBU and WCU colleges deans (M=3.01, SD=0.73 and M= 3.03, SD=0.68 respectively) at P=0.005 and 0.007 respectively (*See Table 4.3*). As shown in Table 4.3, the Tukey test found that the financial autonomy mean scores for AAU (M=2.03, SD=0.74) and DBU (2.88, SD=1.05) was also statistically significantly different from each other at P=0.03.

Table 4.3: Multiple Comparisons Tukey honest significance test (HSD)

Dependent Variable	(I) University	(J) University	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
Academic Autonomy	AAU	DBU	-.79259	.23658	.005*
		WCU	-.81296	.25094	.007*
	DBU	AAU	.79259	.23658	.005*
		WCU	-.02037	.25094	.996
	WCU	AAU	.81296	.25094	.007*
		DBU	.02037	.25094	.996
Financial Autonomy	AAU	DBU	-.85000	.32538	.033*
		WCU	-.71667	.34511	.108
	DBU	AAU	.85000	.32538	.033*
		WCU	.13333	.34511	.921
	WCU	AAU	.71667	.34511	.108
		DBU	-.13333	.34511	.921
Institutional Autonomy	AAU	DBU	-.87778	.25645	.004*
		WCU	-.44722	.27201	.240
	DBU	AAU	.87778	.25645	.004*
		WCU	.43056	.27201	.265
	WCU	AAU	.44722	.27201	.240
		DBU	-.43056	.27201	.265

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

In addition, in Table 4.3 the Tukey test found that AAU college deans' perception of institutional autonomy mean score (M=2.18, SD=0.58) was statistically significantly different from DBU (M=3.06, SD=.91) at P=0.004).

Despite reaching statistical significance, the effect size, calculated using eta squared (the sum of squares between groups divided by the total sum of square from ANOVA (Table 4.2), were 0.275, 0.170, and 0.231 for academic, financial, and institutional autonomies respectively. According to Muijs (2010) recommendation, the effect size between "0–0.1 is a weak effect, 0.1–0.3 is a modest effect, 0.3–0.5 is a moderate effect and >0.5 is a strong effect" (p. 195). Therefore, as recommended by Muijs (2010), the actual difference in mean scores between the groups was modest since the overall effect size was fallen between 0.1 to 0.3. In general, AAU college deans' perception of academic, financial, and institutional autonomy stands out, and their autonomy perception was lower compared to that of DBU and WCU college deans.

Since the colleges are the academic institutions that coordinate the teaching, research, and community service activities of different academic units, they should be empowered in such a way as to support and enable the decentralisation of authority from higher to lower levels of university governance (Addis Ababa University, 2012a; Kahsay, 2012). In order to empower units in which most academic work is initiated and completed, the colleges also need to be autonomous. Granting the colleges and departments autonomy would lighten the burden on higher levels of management, freeing them from routine administrative matters so that they could concentrate on strategic and policy-related matters (Addis Ababa University, 2012b).

4.2.1 Views of AAU College Deans

The interview data supplement and confirm the finding of quantitative data that the autonomy of colleges is perceived to be restricted. In this regard, one of the college interviewees depicts his college autonomy as follows:

> The fund is allocated by the government as the university belongs to the public. The modularised curriculum is designed by the Ministry of Education (MoE), and the system is top-down. The college has no right to develop any undergraduate program curriculum at all. The organisational structure of the university is set at the top level, but there are cases where the college is asked to add their idea to already established structure. With regard to student admission to the undergraduate program, the college has no involvement. Students are assigned to different universities by the Ministry of Education at

> the national level. All these show the public universities in the nation lack autonomy (AAU-D1).

Other college deans also have similar views regarding the autonomy of their respective colleges. One of the college deans from AAU explains his concern as, "our core activities are affected by different barriers, and we are not fully mandated to do our jobs. The decision-making rate at the central level is also slow, and our college is not empowered since the system is highly centralised" (AAU-D2).

Generally, AAU college deans perceived university autonomy as having a mandate to design academic programs, decide on the overall number and quality of student intake, the authority to decide on core academic activities, the right to make decision without unnecessary interference of university top leaders, and having a bottom-up system/ decentralised system. So, for better autonomy, the university needs to be decentralised in ways that would increase the autonomy of colleges. If the colleges are granted autonomy, the system could be able to operate smoothly enough to respond quickly and efficiently to existing needs and situations.

4.2.2 Views of DBU College Deans

Unlike the quantitative results (*see Table 4.1.*), from the interview data of the DBU's college autonomy situation appears to be no different from that of AAU. The system is centralised, and the colleges are not autonomous. One of the interviewees explained his view, "My college has no autonomy. As the dean of the college, I cannot recruit academic staff, I only propose the figures (number of academic staff needs be recruited), and then, the University will recruit them on behalf of my college. Budget allocation is also controlled by the university" (DBU-D1). Another interviewee further explains his point:

> The system is centralised. Colleges do not have a mandate. There are frequent system changes because of this; there are gaps among instructors, chairs and university top officials. The instructors feel as if the top officials are there for political purposes than dealing with academic activities. This situation affected the participation of university community to take part in university affairs. We all are working just for the sake of survival than for our

> professional commitment. We run activities, which we do not believe in it, as we do not have our say (DBU-D2).

Another college dean depicts similar concerns as "my College has no mandate to decide on the number and quality of undergraduate students' admission. We do jobs based on the interest of the university top officials. It is only when we are ready to fulfil their interest that we go ahead with some issues to be resolved" (DBU-D3). Another college dean raises similar concern "my College is not autonomous because I cannot run budget and finance and process the procurement; cannot hire and fire staff; cannot promote staff and cannot generate their internal revenue. So, we only exist as a folder named by the college. Everything is centralised" (DBU-D4).

To sum up, for the DBU college deans, university autonomy encompasses, having good working communication among university community (instructors, deans, and university top leaders), having a mandate to decide on the overall number of students' intake, the right to run resources required to discharge their academic core activities (budget and finance, and procurement; hire and fire staff; generate internal revenue). The right to promote staff, having bottom-up system/ decentralised system, and the right to make a decision without unnecessary interference of university top leaders were also conceived as key areas of autonomy which their college need to be granted.

The analysis of the interviews showed that college deans understood academic autonomy as the right to run resources required to discharge their academic core activities. As the interviewees revealed, the absence or short supply of the required resources were reported as one of the barriers for the college deans to discharge their responsibilities. The issue of resources could be linked to a lack of autonomy to control over the budget. The finding of quantitative results also revealed the perception of AAU college deans about the financial autonomy was low, which confirms the issue of administering the required resource is the area of concern in AAU.

4.2.3 Views of WCU College Deans

Wechamo University's situation was also almost similar with both AAU and DBU in terms of the college autonomy. The colleges did not have the mandate to decide on students' admission, recruit and promote staff, run budget and finance, and process

procurement. In the absence of running all these activities, it would be difficult for the college deans to effectively carry out their core academic, research and community service activities. For instance, one of the college deans of WCU states:

> The admission is made at the Ministry of Education level. Our mandate is only assigning students into different academic units as per the set policy (70:30 this means 70% of the students will be assigned to Science and Engineering, and 30% to social science, humanities, and education). The recruitment is carried out at the university level, and we do not have a full mandate to recruit instructors. We only show our demand to the university, but we do not have the power to influence them. The graduate assistants are also recruited at the Ministry of Education level and send to us. We do not have a mandate (WCU-D1).

Another college dean also explained similar concern as:

> When we come to academic staff promotion, it is carried out at the central level of the university. The research and community service director run everything. It is blurred. Our role is just to submit to academic commission what has been already computed at the central university level. College is not empowered to generate its income through fundraising. The system is 100% centralised, and we do not have a mandate (WCU-D2).

The third interviewee further explained his opinion as:

> Let alone the colleges, the university itself does not have a mandate on the admission of students. The recruitment is processed at the university level. It is impossible to hire graduate assistants as the Ministry of Education directly deploys them to the university. The college only submits its plan for recruitment to the university, that is, how many instructors needed. The college does not have the mandate to generate its income. Finance is also processed at the central level of the university (WCU-D3).

As can be seen from WCU college deans' interviews, autonomy has been regarded as having a mandate to decide on the overall number of student intake, the right to run resources required to discharge academic core activities (budget and finance, procurement, recruitment, generate their internal revenue). The right to promote staff, having bottom-up system/ decentralised system, and the right to make decision without

unnecessary interference of university top leaders were also some of the themes conceived by WCU college deans.

In general, both quantitative and qualitative results of the college deans of the three universities revealed that the system has been exhibiting signs of corrosion. The interviews revealed that the corrosion happened partly due to external influence (MoE) and partly due to internal failures; university governance increasingly came to give primacy to control over the colleges' core activities. One cause for this state of affairs is the highly centralised powers of the university top management. When a system is too centralised with no distribution of powers, it limits the sense of autonomy as perceived by the Deans.

4.3 Views of Department Chairs

A department is a discipline-based academic unit that runs academic programs at undergraduate and /or graduate levels. The main functions of a department are teaching, research, and community services (Addis Ababa University, 2013b).

Table 4.4: Department chairs' view about the practice of universities' autonomy

Dimensions of autonomy	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	AAU chairs		DBU chairs		WCU chairs	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Academic autonomy	2.87	.861	3.22	.896	2.73	.696
Financial autonomy	2.10	.786	2.61	1.039	2.38	.938
Institutional autonomy	2.49	.596	3.00	1.045	2.66	.610

Key. *The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicates the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).*

Table 4.4 shows the mean scores of the department chairs' perception about the autonomy of their respective colleges. Their perception about academic, financial, and institutional autonomy were not statistically significant different from each other (*see Table 4.5*). The financial autonomy is the main concern for the department chairs of the three sample universities as their perception was lower compared to academic and institutional autonomy. The issue of financial autonomy of the department chairs matches those of the college mean scores (*see Table 4.1).* The perception mean scores

of the financial autonomy was generally lower for the college deans and department chairs across the board. So, the issue of finance is critical across the sample universities and needs serious attention.

Table 4.5: ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Academic autonomy	Between Groups	2.992	2	1.496	2.184	.121
	Within Groups	44.515	65	.685		
	Total	47.507	67			
Financial autonomy	Between Groups	3.018	2	1.509	1.738	.184
	Within Groups	56.420	65	.868		
	Total	59.438	67			
Institutional autonomy	Between Groups	3.204	2	1.602	2.531	.087
	Within Groups	41.137	65	.633		
	Total	44.341	67			

As indicated in Table 4.5, a one way ANOVA found that there were no a statistically significant difference among AAU, BDU, and WCU department chairs about the perception of academic, financial, and institutional autonomy of their colleges at (F = 2.184, P = 0.121), (F=1.738, P=0.184), and (F=2.531, P=0.087) respectively.

4.3.1 Views of AAU Chairs

The Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation stipulated the autonomy of public institutions to "develop and implement relevant curricula and research programs; create new or close existing programs…"(The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4986). According to Addis Ababa University (2013a), the Senate legislation and other rules of the university shall be made compatible with the Proclamation. Hence, the Senate legislation also demands the autonomy of academic units to run their academic affairs. However, one of the AAU interviewees explained the practice of academic autonomy as:

> I think departments need to be relatively autonomous. Through that, they can come up with different curricula, programs, and they can also generate resources. For instance, the priority of setting the curricula issued by the Ministry of Education and communicating those changes to the university

> have become common. The issue of autonomy is complicated as far as curriculum is concerned. There is a trend of exercising less autonomy at the department level. For me, the system of curriculum development should be decentralised to the level of the department. This will make the departments and university to be more responsive to the needs that emerge. With regard to curriculum design, previously, before modularisation, it was the department that initiates different programs and then gets those curricula approved by higher levels. However, in relation to modularisation, it has really different trajectories where the Ministry of Education initiates and universities implement those initiatives (AAU-CH1).

The EHEP and the University Academic Senate legislation further specify that academic units of a public institution shall have the necessary autonomy in administration and finance as well as in academic affairs (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; Wachemo University, 2016). In contrast, according to AAU-CH1 interview,

> Access to resource and fund utilisation is one of the severe problems at Addis Ababa University, and I feel that resources are centralised mainly the budget and the finance. There are claims that the top-level officials usually say, they would like to make departments and colleges cost centre, but in practice, their resources are centralised. I believe the departments are the key actors and process of teaching-learning, but they do not have resources. They have no access to even the necessary resources required for teaching and learning process in the classroom (AAU-CH1).

Another chair from AAU also revealed academic autonomy as:

> My comment is very clear. In my profession, I had experience working in other universities like the Nakagawa university of New York, and I also had experience in involving the education system of some countries France, African countries, Latin America, North America and so on. I see universities are actively involving actors, particularly departments. So, it is crucial to empower departments, college deans, and directors instead of concentrating power on the top level. Moreover, there should be a shift from one-man leadership to a team approach, servant leadership and perhaps, participatory approach or by leaders who actively involve his/her followers (AAU-CH2).

The issue of institutional autonomy has gained due attention by the department chairs of AAU. One of the chairs explained the MoE interference as the challenge of institutional autonomy. AAU-CH1 explained, "MoE should come up with broader policies, and specific issues should be left for the universities so that the difference is the potential. If this trend standardises all programs of universities, they will minimise the degree to which the universities respond to the needs of the society and that of the markets" (AAU-CH1). AAU-CH2 also revealed that 'Students' admission issues are another area that needs MoE flexibility in terms of university institutional autonomy. All undergraduate students are assigned by the MoE after the completion of grade twelve. The universities have no place even to comment on the quality of students they admit.

As can be understood from the interviews, lack of institutional autonomy impedes the contribution of the university towards the development of the society and the need of the labour markets as it would be difficult for the university to run its own plan if MoE interferes with the daily activities of the university. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2009) Higher Education Proclamation stipulates "Every public institution is hereby granted the necessary autonomy in pursuit of its mission" (p. 4985). Hence, the MoE needs to oversee the general activities of the university by leaving aside the specific routines to the university itself as it is clearly indicated in Higher Education Proclamation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

In general, for AAU department chairs, autonomy needs to involve a mandate to design academic programs, the right to run resources required to discharge their academic core activities (budget and finance, and procurement; hire and fire staff; generate internal revenue), empowerment without unnecessary interference. Having team/servant leadership, the mandate to decide on the overall number and quality of students' intake and having a bottom-up system/ decentralised system were also the key areas of autonomy they claim to grant.

4.3.2 Views of DBU Chairs

The interview of DBU chairs was also related to quantitative results (*see Table 4.4*.). One of the interviewees of DBU revealed that his department is more autonomous in

the current system compared to the previous system of the university. DBU-CH1 explained that:

> The level of autonomy is better in the current modularisation process compared to the previous, but the staff did not fully accept modularisation, and that is why it was not fully implemented. Initially, we were told to carry out the program design at the university level, but later on, we were told by Ministry of Education to stop it. The Ministry of Education then eroded our autonomy and designed the curriculum on behalf of us. As the system is top-down, by the time academic program sent from Ministry of Education to the University for implementation, no one was willing to own and implement it. Practically, currently, we are implementing the traditional mode of teaching even if the given name is modularisation (DBU-CH1).

As can be understood from the chair interview, the autonomy of the department is influenced by the MoE. The development of curriculum has to be handled by the academic program, although the situation in Ethiopian Public universities is different. The MoE should not interfere with responsibilities of academic unit. The same interview revealed his opinion about the introduction of modularisation as:

> We were not also given any training related to modularisation or harmonisation. We also faced challenges during the course delivery. Initially, we were told to implement the modularised curriculum in a block modality like one month for a unit of bulky contents. We could not do any continuous assessment as the curriculum requires the implementation of continuous assessment. It was impractical. Then, all of a sudden, we changed our teaching modality to non-block or semester based. Practically, there is no modularisation in our university. It only exists by name, and our autonomy is also constrained (DBU-CH1).

Another interviewee also revealed that

> Departments are not empowered. If they are not empowered to exercise their roles in decision-making, I think their mandate is compromised. This is why the implementation of modularisation compromised. The program was implemented overnight without consulting us. We were not ready to implement it because we were forced to implement it without owning it. Not

> all of our concerns were addressed. During the orientation of modularisation commencement, I remember, there was a student certification issue. We were told even when students dismissed academically from the university; they will be certified for the courses they previously took. However, this had never been implemented. From my understanding, I feel modularisation was wrongly interpreted and implemented in our university (DBU-CH2).

From the interview results, the DBU-CH1 acknowledged the positive change, although the issue of autonomy remains critical in DBU. DBU-CH2 also explained that the department's decision-making mandate was compromised. In order to contribute to the demand of the society and that of the labour market, university autonomy plays a crucial role in Ethiopia. This is because institutional autonomy grants the universities the right to set their strategic goals and act accordingly. The autonomy gives them more room to exercise their mandate to accomplish their tasks efficiently (Gebru, 2016). Also, the departments that are activity centres but they could not be cost centres. Departments perform the daily activities of the university. Nevertheless, they depend on colleges or universities for their daily expenditures. In other words, officials rather than executors control budgets. This implies departments are given more responsibilities, whereas more authority is at the hand of university top officials. Both departments and colleges lack autonomy in the use of resources, specially their financial and material resources. More autonomy needs to be imparted to the departments and colleges that execute more responsibilities of the university.

In summary, according to the DBU department chairs, departments need to be mandated to design academic programs, empowered to exercise the roles or department core activities, and granted the right to run resources required to discharge their academic core activities (budget and finance), and empowered in having bottom-up system/ decentralised system.

4.3.3 Views of WCU Chairs

The interviews of the WCU chairs were very much consistent with that of AAU and DBU interviews. For instance, one of the interviews mentioned that:

> My department autonomy is eroded as my decision at department level reversed anytime at the college level. Even if some decisions take place at the department, it does not mean that it will be fully implemented because the College will recheck the decision and approve or disprove it. So, it is up to the department to negotiate with college or university top leaders to implement your decision (WCU-CH2).

Another interviewee also explained that "My department is disempowered, and my decision influence is not an end in itself as it is endorsed by top-level leaders" (WCU-CH1). The third interviewee also shared similar concerns with the first and second interviewees of WCU about university autonomy. The interviewee explained about the autonomy of the department,

> My department does not have the mandate to recruit academic staff, take part in the decision, purchase the necessary materials for the teaching and learning process, etc. Even sometimes the plan I submit for an expert requirement cannot be accomplished on the basis the department needs. Since I do not have the mandate to run my department core activities, everything is highly controlled. So, my power is limited, so my influence is also limited (WCU-CH3).

As can be seen from the WCU department chairs interviews, department heads feel that to ensure the autonomy the department should be empowered to exercise the roles or department core activities, and to saving bottom-up system/ decentralised system.

4.4 Views of Instructors

In this section, an attempt is made to discuss the interview results that emerged from the instructors of the three sample universities: AAU, DBU, and WCU. Table 4.6, presents the quantitative results obtained from the instructors about the academic and institutional autonomies.

Table 4.6: Instructors' view

Dimensions of autonomy	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	AAU Instructors (n=95)		DBU Instructors (n=64)		WCU Instructors (n=50)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Academic autonomy	2.92	.73	2.76	.70	2.93	.75
Institutional autonomy	2.56	.56	2.16	.72	2.49	.73

Key. *The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicate the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).*

From Table 4.6 , we can understand that the mean scores of the instructors about the institutional autonomy of their departments were generally low across the sample universities. The mean score of perception of academic and institutional autonomy was slightly low for DBU as compared to AAU and WCU. This clearly showed that there were gaps in granting the departments' autonomy in order for instructors to perform their core activities. Along the lines of this, (Bleiklie, 2007) argued that in institutional autonomy, "institutions are free to make choices regarding their daily management of teaching and research as well as to formulate strategies for their future development (p. 397). From the result, institutional autonomy was an area of concern rather than academic autonomy for the instructors of the three sample universities.

Table 4.7: ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Academic autonomy	Between Groups	1.222	2	.611	1.161	.315
	Within Groups	108.464	206	.527		
	Total	109.686	208			
Institutional autonomy	Between Groups	6.486	2	3.243	7.551	.001
	Within Groups	88.475	206	.429		
	Total	94.961	208			

As can be seen from Table 4.7, a one way ANOVA found that there was not a statistically significant difference among AAU, BDU, and WCU instructors about the perception of academic autonomy: (F=1.161, P= 0.315). Overall, DBU instructors had

low perception of their department autonomy compared to AAU and DBU instructors. As indicated in Table, a one way ANOVA found that there was a statistically significant difference among AAU, DBU, and WCU instructors about the perception of institutional autonomy of their respective departments at (F = 7.551, P = 0.001). The Tukey test (*see Table 4.8*) found that the means for DBU (M=2.16, SD=0.72) was statistically significantly different from AAU and WCU instructors (M=2.56, SD=0.56, and M=2.49, SD=0.73 respectively) at P=0.001. However, AAU and WCU instructors (M=2.56, SD=0.56, and M=2.49, SD=0.73 respectively) were not statistically significantly different from each other (*see Table 4.6 and Table 4.7).*

Table 4.8: Multiple Comparisons Tukey HSD

Dependent Variable	(I) University	(J) University	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
Academic Autonomy Mean	AAU	DBU	.16061	.11734	.359
		WCU	-.01408	.12678	.993
	DBU	AAU	-.16061	.11734	.359
		WCU	-.17469	.13696	.411
	WCU	AAU	.01408	.12678	.993
		DBU	.17469	.13696	.411
Institutional Autonomy Mean	AAU	DBU	.40079	.10598	.001*
		WCU	.06632	.11450	.831
	DBU	AAU	-.40079	.10598	.001*
		WCU	-.33448	.12370	.020*
	WCU	AAU	-.06632	.11450	.831
		DBU	.33448	.12370	.020*

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Despite reaching statistical significance, the effect size, calculated using eta squared was 0.068, which was weak effect as per the recommendation by Muijs (2010).

4.4.1 Views of AAU instructors

Instructors from the three sample universities were interviewed about the autonomy of their respective departments. For instance, one of the instructors from AAU explained his worries about autonomy as follows:

> I have some freedom to teach, but my freedom is constrained by the relationship I have with my students. This has been disturbed by the undue interference of the university. I cannot blame a particular person, the department or the dean or the president but overall the university system empowers students and disempowers the faculty members. So, in a situation

> where you are disempowered, what is the right to teach? If any claims come definitely students will win. We are not even treated as equals. There are times when students are more favoured than I do and when they enjoy better freedom than I do. Particularly in relation to grading. The university does not value, who teaches best but who pretends to satisfy the students. Satisfy in a sense, does this guy let everybody pass the criteria. (AAU-INS1).

This interviewee revealed his idea that his freedom of teaching and assessing student learning outcomes are affected by the interference of university management. The interview further explained the mode of university management interference and put his idea as,

> If we stick to teach the traditional academic rigour and assist students all their merits, definitely we will be pained in black colour. If we want to be paid as the best teacher, we have to be lenient in grading. It does not matter whether we teach well or not. What matters is how generous we are in awarding the inflated grades for the students. In this sense, there is not direct interference but from what we see and from others, for example, in my case, I used to get unnecessary criticism from my students. The claims are that labels against me would have been a point of appreciation for me. As a person, my coping mechanism is, I do teach regularly but I am too generous in terms of awarding grades. Because this is a way I have to survive, and it is personal coping I do not think it is the right thing, but the university must have felt happy about me these days because the heart of the university is like that way. As a person, I study my environment and I cope up accordingly. But if you ask me logically, I am not doing the right thing I am supposed to do to be honest with you. Instead, I am doing certain strategies to survive this disempowerment of the faculty members at AAU. To the extent of unheard of in academia (AAU-INS1).

According to AAU-INS-1, instructors at the university should be trusted with the responsibility to produce graduates with the necessary level of requirements, but there should not be any undue interference in how to go about it. As can be observed from the AAU-INS1 interview, the students are highly empowered, and there are disputes between instructors and students when the course grade is released. The intervention of

the university internal administration in the sphere of academic competence in the university is also depicted by AAU-INS1.

Another interviewee from AAU has expounded similar concern about the opportunity of exercising academic autonomy of academic staff:

> I cannot fully say that the university is autonomous by its nature. I cannot say that the university is fully autonomous because the Ministry of Education designs courses, the instructors do not have autonomy because they are given the course they teach and these days even the course outline to be taught. As related to the courses and modularisation process, the systems are top-down approach. Overall the university is characterised by authoritarian leadership (AAU-INS2).

As evident from AAU-INS1and AAU-INS2 interviews, the university system seems not operating in line with the University Senate legislation (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Wachemo University, 2016) and Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation(The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009) as the instructors explained their ideas about the university autonomy. The need for academic autonomy for higher education institutions is clearly stated in the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation. The proclamation grants academic freedom and autonomy to every institution in pursuit of its mission. This includes the development and implementation of academic programs and curricula, personnel and financial administration, nominating the president, vice presidents and members of the board, and selecting and appointing leaders of academic units and departments (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). However, the reality in terms of autonomy on the ground appears different from what stated in the legal documents. In practice, the system is centralised; the leaders are authoritative; it would not be easy for the university itself to address the current need of the society and be competitive in the current globalised world. The AAU instructors see themselves as the core actors of the university in terms of accomplishing the core activities of the university: Teaching, researching, and serving the community at large. They believe that granting more autonomy with compliance for the university instructors will lead the university to establish shared and sustainable systems that always work regardless of who comes to or goes from the position.

4.4.2 Views of DBU Instructors

Debre Berhan University instructors' view of academic autonomy was not different from that of the AAU. DBU instructors also complained about academic freedom and centralised system of the university. For instance, one of the interviewees expressed his ideas as, "Compared to the previous system, there is some indication of autonomy, but it is impossible to claim that colleges and departments are autonomous fully. For instance, if we take a promotion, there is no clear guideline to promote academic staff to the next academic ladder" (DBU-INS1). From the same university, another instructor explained his concerns as follow:

> When our university first established everything was complicated. No autonomy, no resources, and the leaders were too autocratic. So, when I compare the current situation with the previous one, of course, I cannot deny there are some changes in terms of university governance. However, this does not mean that we are granted our autonomy. Power is accumulated at the university central level because whenever I request my department, the necessary materials for the teaching and learning process, he tells me that the university does not give him. He usually abandoned us. The funny point is that when the top officials demand him to do something, he immediately calls the department members for a meeting and gives us tasks to be accomplished. I feel that department chairs and college deans are just there to fulfill the top management interest rather than doing their core academic activities. If you ask every instructor, they will tell you the same story. Academic staff turnover is also high because the working condition is not attractive. In this university, instructors are extremely disempowered (DBU-INS2).

From DBU-INS1 and DBU-INS2 interviews, we can understand that there are some changes in university governance as the current situation is slightly better than the previous one in DBU.

The WCU instructors also shared a similar opinion with AAU and DBU instructors that their departments and colleges have limited autonomy. For instance, one of the instructors from WCU mentioned "Our academic freedom and participation in department academic council are limited because whatever we decided it will be reversed by the college and university leaders. The decision was made just in favour of

the university higher officials' need" (WCU-INS1). However, as Rowlands (2017) argued, in academic governance, decision needs to take into account the academic activities.

4.5 Views of Students

British Council (2015) specified that "there has been a significant lack of research on student perceptions of the university involvement, and student perspectives are needed to complement the views of other stakeholders, such as government, employers, university managers and lecturers" (p. 2). In view of this, students were asked to rate their autonomy. In this regard, the autonomy variables include students' perception is that the extent to which they agreed or disagreed about their right without unnecessary interference. The mean scores of the students from the three sample universities are presented in Table 4.9 below.

Table 4.9: Students' view

Dimensions of autonomy	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	AAU Students (n=321)		DBU Students (n=198)		WCU Students (n=178)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Autonomy	2.98	1.01	3.08	.933	2.99	.954

Key. *The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicates the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).*

As shown in Table 4.9, the mean scores of students are almost similar across the sample universities. The mean scores of the three groups: AAU, DBU, and WCU students almost tend to be neutral. This shows that students neither agree nor disagree with the adequacy of their level of autonomy, which constitutes the right to learn without unnecessary interference of the department or college, evaluate course instructors, be part of college decision making, and the right to comment the content of the course being offered, and instructors' teaching techniques.

Table 4.10: ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1.161	2	.580	.569	.566
Within Groups	707.918	694	1.020		
Total	709.079	696			

A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to compare the mean scores of the perception of students from three sample universities (AAU, DBU, and WCU) on the practice of autonomy. As indicated in Table 4.9, there was no statistically significant difference in autonomy mean scores among the three sample universities' students: $F (696) = 0.569$, $p = 0.566$.

Since the mean scores of the perception of students are almost close to neutral (3), the result showed students tend to form neutral opinions about the practice of autonomy in their respective universities. However, the students' interviews were mixed with both some views expressed rejecting and asserting the practice of autonomy. Students who had the chance to participate in the university affairs were also interviewed to express their idea about their respective department or college autonomy. One of the students from AAU explained his view as:

> We (student council team) have visited different universities for experience sharing. Among the universities, we were highly impressed by the Debre Markos university's student union election process. The election begins before three months. Interested candidates will campaign for the election with their vision and contributions. They have enough budget and autonomy to generate their income. They are not dependent on college/university management. They briefed us that they confidently argue in favour of students during the decision-making process, and they are more independent. They have more power in the community than the University President as they actively participate in community service. They run circa 700,000 Ethiopian birr budget. Therefore, they are autonomous compared to us. Here we are dependent on the college budget (AAU-ST3).

As can be seen from interviews, AAU student council formed a different perception about the autonomy of the university when compared with the students in other

universities. Some universities empowered their student council while others did not. It is a good opportunity for students to actively get involved in university affairs and contribute to the core activities of the university. However, attention needs to be given to the level of students' engagement in the university administrative activities as in some cases students demand instructors for academic benefits (grades), which may eventually disempower instructors. For instance, (Asgedom, 2007) clearly explained the scenario of the rough relationship between students and instructors that "examination results were the major source of poor student-teacher relationships in AAU. There were many instances in which students became very aggressive following their evaluation results" (p. 243). Another student from AAU reported, "I don't see the power of student representatives in influencing the leaders, they rather accomplish the activities of leaders rather than academic activities. Most of them are members of the ruling party. Some of them have even direct contact with the MoE. As far as I know, there is no genuine or independent student union in my university" (AAU-ST3).

Another respondent from DBU said, "I participate in different committees, but some leaders are not willing to listen to our challenges. We are dependent on the university in terms of budget and facilities; hence, we are not making a big difference in decision-making on issues related to students' affairs" (DBU-ST1). The interviewee argued that students' council needs to be independent of university management in order to be more influential.

One of the interviewees from WCU put his ideas as:

> I participated at different levels of decision-making, the Department Academic Committee, Academic Commission, and Academic Senate, and University Board. In our university trend, in each level of decision-making, delegated student council will participate. During the participation, in fact, there are some influences from university leaders. During the decision-making process, there is a term called majority passing where the entire members can vote for the agenda of the meeting when could not reach consensuses. In this kind of situation, we prefer to convince the members by logic and try to block the concept of voting. In voting, it is obvious that issues against students can easily be decided as we are only two representatives of the students in the meeting. In fact, this will happen if all the decision-making

> members are ethical and professional; if not, they can blindly decide against the students (WCU-ST1).

Another interviewee from WCU expressed a related view as follows:

> Our university election process is different and unique. I had the opportunity to visit other public universities to see how student council election was processed. Their election is based on the political affiliation where the representative will be elected based on their ethnic background. In our University, the student will elect anyone whom they think can fight for their right. One male and one female will be elected from each section. In fact, we also have the minimum requirement for the election. A male candidate should at least score above 3.00 cumulative grade point, and females should also score more than 2.75. The reason why their performance was taken into consideration is that candidates have to be competent enough. (WCU-ST3).

In general, the result of the students' questionnaire revealed that there was no perception difference of autonomy among the students of the three sample universities. However, students' interviews revealed both differences and similarities in their perception of autonomy across the universities. For instance, AAU students perceived autonomy as having a mandate to generate income and having a positive relationship with their instructors. For WCU students, autonomy was regarded as the right to elect their representatives. The interviews data also showed that students had formed a similar conception of autonomy through the sample universities. They perceived autonomy in terms of the right to voice and the right to take part in decision-making on issues related to students' affairs.

4.6 The Conception of University Autonomy

The autonomy of higher education is understood as the freedom of universities to manage their own affairs without unnecessary interference or influence from outside actors, particularly government (Akalu, 2014; Asgedom, 2007). In view of this, the Ethiopian public universities are, by law, granted autonomy to design and implement curricula, set up their organisational structure, administer personnel, manage their funds and property, finally, employ their academic and administrative staff (Addis Ababa University, 2013; Debre Berhan University, 2012; The Federal Democratic Republic of

Ethiopia, 2009; Wachemo University, 2016). Despite these legal provisions, in practice, the autonomy of the public universities was impeded by several barriers.

The finding of the college deans of three sample universities revealed that the universities' autonomy was infringed by different external pressures, mainly from the Ministry of Education. From the college deans' and department chairs' viewpoints, the three sample universities were not autonomous practically in their internal affairs due to the regular interference of the MoE. For a case in point, the universities were most commonly restricted by external authorities from making decisions on the number and quality of students, recruiting academic staff (graduate assistants), and designing undergraduate programs, selection of leaders, and financial administration. In more specific terms, for an unknown reason, academic staff recruitment (a graduate assistantship position) in public universities is filled centrally by the MoE, and design of curricula, particularly undergraduate programs is determined by the central MoE. University presidents are appointed by the government, and the budget is centrally controlled by the MoE.

The study showed the autonomy of universities was perceived as low due to the following reasons. The universities had no autonomy, mainly because they lack: (i) the mandate to design academic programs, (ii) decide on the overall number and quality of students intake, (iii) the authority to decide on core academic and administrative activities (resource and finance), and (iv) the right to make a decision without unnecessary interference. However, the necessity of academic autonomy for higher education institutions is clearly stated in the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation. The proclamation grants academic freedom and autonomy to every institution in pursuit of its mission. This includes the development and implementation of academic programs and curricula, personnel and financial administration, nominating the president, vice presidents and members of the board, and selecting and appointing leaders of academic units and departments (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009).

From the result of the study, it could be argued that the university system seems not to be operating in line with the University Senate legislation (Addis Ababa University, 2013; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Wachemo University, 2016) and Public Higher

Education Proclamation (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009) as explained by the leaders. In addition to this, Teferra and Altbachl (2004) argued, "[p]ublic higher education institutions predominate in Africa, and governmental involvement in university affairs is the norm" (p. 29). This study revealed that the Ethiopian public universities governance system also reflects similar circumstances.

The instructors across the sample universities perceived that the government intentionally constricted the academic freedom of the university; in this case, by the MoE, and university senior management itself. Due to the authoritative governance approach of the university senior management, academic freedom in public universities was limited as instructors feel marginalised from the decision-making roles in the core academic activities. Nevertheless, the need for academic freedom for higher education institutions is clearly stated in the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). For instance, as stipulated in the Proclamation and University Senate legislation, instructors should have the right to elect their president and vice presidents. However, this was not a case across the sample universities as far as instructors concerned. University senior management, particularly the president and vice presidents, in most cases, they are appointed by the government from outside the members of the faculty and are usually affiliated with members of the ruling party. This creates a perception of university staff that governments maintain control by appointing people associated with the ruling party. The autonomy of university staff is reduced, and managers take little notice of their views in decision making.

From the results of the study, managers lack university academic leadership competence and are more loyal to the government than empowering the instructors to take part in decision making roles of teaching, researching, and community service provision. Because of this, they were not able to integrate with the university community and transform the university as required. The failure to interact and create a collegial relationship with the university community made them vulnerable to the authoritarian approach of university governance.

The findings of the study were not aligned with the legal documents because the EHEP, No.650/2009, grants universities considerable autonomy to execute their core activities.

According to EHEP, university autonomy has been operationalised as the institutional freedom to exercise control over staffing, student, curriculum and teaching, academic standards, research, leader selection, administration, and finance. Universities are free to set up their organisational structures and to introduce reforms, programs, and activities that aim to achieve academic and research excellence (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009).

In contrast to the legal documents, instructors reported that the universities did not have the freedom suggested by Proclamation and Senate legislation, mainly: (i) the freedom to decide the contents of their curricula (ii) the freedom to decide on core academic activities; (iii) the right to participate in the university affairs (iv) the freedom to decide on students' performance as per the set rules and regulations; (v) the freedom to select competent leaders (vi) freedom to teach without unnecessary interference. As Kenny (2009) argued, "academics, as a professional group, must become more actively engaged as co-developers and implementers of strategy and take their place as legitimate stakeholders in their institutions (p. 639). This study further revealed that the Ethiopian public universities are characterised by hierarchal (top-down) in terms of autonomy as power is highly centralised, and the autonomy of the academic units is constrained. In such a circumstance, it could be difficult for the universities and academic units to be vigilant and contribute towards the economic and social development of the country. Hence, the universities need to be autonomous and of course, accountable, as well to run their academic, research and community service activities and this, in turn, would benefit the university to be more efficient and productive.

The study revealed that students at Ethiopian public universities are empowered, and it is evident from students' questionnaire and interview data that the Ethiopian public universities put a greater emphasis on empowering students in decision making processes through their representatives. The empirical data exhibited that students have a strong system in which they express their rights. Each class has one female and male representative, who can follow up with the academic and administrative activities of the department in the interest of their classmates. In addition, students are part of decision-making bodies in the University Board, University Senate governance, Academic

Commission of a college level, and Department Academic Council through their representatives. Student empowerment is also clearly indicated in the legal documentation, for instance, in the University Senate legislation (Addis Ababa University, 2013; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Wachemo University, 2016) and the Bologna Process (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018), students are considered as the most central stakeholder group in higher education institution. However, students' reaction to the notion of the university autonomy was mixed. Some appreciated the level of university autonomy while others did not. The results of the study revealed that student representatives were often political affiliated, and most of them were the member of the government ruling party. This creates a perception that the government uses the student union as an instrument to control academics and leaders who had a different political view from the government or the ruling party. Due to this, student representatives were increasingly being eclipsed by the MoE and university senior management, and their role was increasingly being transformed from decision-making to an advisory role.

4.7 Governance Implications

The research participants (instructors, chairs, and deans) across the sample universities had expressed their feelings regarding the extent to which university autonomy is exercised. They claimed that their freedoms of who to teach, what to teach, and their right to select their leaders had been deliberately constricted by the government, mainly through the instrument of the university senior management and its authoritative governance approaches. They reported that the government had penetrated the University fully by imposing its own curriculum and setting constraints on the authority of the college deans and department chairs to use their academic criteria for recruiting, admitting, educating and evaluating students, and managing their finance and resources. One, therefore, could conclude that during the era of a democratic government in Ethiopia, academic freedom exists "by folder and only by name". However, as Altbach (2001) claimed, academic freedom is "the freedom of the professor to teach and do research without external control in his or her area of expertise, and it also implies the freedom of the student to learn" (p. 206). The government expects the universities to comply with its national priorities and political goals, yet the instructors remain

suspicious about the government's aspirations as the system is highly centralised (AC quadrant of conceptual framework, see Figure 4.1). The findings of the study revealed that Ethiopian public universities are characterised by the top-down approach (*see section Definition of Key Terms*), AC quadrant of the conceptual framework), where the instructors have little voice in policy formulation and decision-making process even though they are considered as core stakeholders if teaching and researching in the legal documents. The university staff perceives that university senior management marginalised instructors from taking part in decision making in their core academic activities.

Both instructors and leaders express a need for more autonomy for the university, which subsequently may lead instructors having greater academic freedom. As indicated in *Figure* 4.1, when an institution is situated in the BD quadrant, it is characterised by academic freedom and instructors enjoy more freedom.



Figure 4.1: Perception of autonomy

However, the concern is that self-ruling institutions with academic freedom might not fulfil the goal of the government and demands of the nation, so it prefers a top-down mode of governance (AC quadrant) (*see section Definition of Key Terms*). The research suggests that governance that reduces the tension between Top-down authority, in this case, AC quadrant, and Self-ruling-BD quadrant is desirable, and a model could which accommodate the interest of both parties need to be in place.

In general, this research suggests there is a critical need for a flexible and responsive system of governance. The governance system should be more inclusive of instructors in the decision-making process and less hierarchical systems of governance (BC vs. AD quadrants). Negotiated and deliberative relation proposed governance model (BC vs. AD quadrants) need to be in place between academic units-university by adopting a stance of shared governance or consultant governance for mutual accommodation if the university is to contribute to national development by maintaining its academic freedom, and institutional autonomy. So, a substantial interaction between university governing bodies and their basic academic units is imperative.

Chapter 5

Accountability in the Ethiopian Public Universities

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the result and discussion of the empirical data pertaining to accountability in the Ethiopian Public Universities. The accountability of public universities has been discussed based on the data gathered from the college deans, department chairs, instructors, and students of the three sample public universities: Addis Ababa University (AAU), Debre Berhan University (DBU), and Wechamo University (WCU).

Zumeta (2011) defines "accountability as responsibility for one's actions to someone or multiple parties as a result of legal, political (in the best, constitutive sense), financial, personal, or simply morally based ties" (p. 133). The same author further argued that any institution in higher education at a given level needs to be accountable to those organised at the next higher level of university governance. In most cases, the meaning of accountability has been in the form of questions: "who is accountable," "to whom," "for what," and "how to account" (through what mechanisms) (Asgedom & Hagos, 2015). For instance, Burgess (1994) represented the question to whom to account by a model that identified in three forms: accountability to one's clients (moral accountability), responsibility to oneself and one's colleague (professional accountability); and accountability to one's employer or political master (contractual accountability) (p. 138). In general, accountability comes in many kinds, "personal, professional, contractual, and moral" (Asgedom & Hagos, 2015; Burgess, 1994; Keay & Loughrey, 2015). In line with this, perception of accountability of this study aims to shed some light on the development of higher education, in general, and Ethiopian

higher education in particular. Drawing on the quantitative and qualitative results of the perception of accountability practice of the sample universities as discussed below.

5.2 Views of College Deans

This section deals with college deans' perception of accountability across the three sample public universities.

As indicated in Table 5.1: College deans' view, the first generation university, AAU college deans' perception of accountability was low as compared to DBU, the second generation university and for WCU, the third generation university.

Table 5.1: College deans' view

Higher education governance principle	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	AAU Deans (n=15)		DBU Deans(n=15)		WCU Deans(n=12)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Accountability	2.41	.77	3.32	.74	3.30	.90

Key. *The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicate the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neural = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).*

Table 5.2: ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	7.835	2	3.918	6.177	.005
Within Groups	24.737	39	.634		
Total	32.573	41			

As indicated in Table 5.2, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to explore the perception difference of college deans of the sample universities. The deans were divided into three groups according to their university generation with 1st generation (AAU), 2nd generation (DBU), and 3rd generation (WCU). There was a statistically significant difference at the p=.005 in the perception of accountability mean scores for the college deans of three sample universities: $F(2, 39) = 6.18$, $p = 0.005$.

Table 5.3: Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: Accountability Mean

Tukey HSD

(I) University	(J) University	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
AAU	DBU	-.91111	.29081	.009*
	WCU	-.88889	.30845	.017*
DBU	AAU	.91111	.29081	.009*
	WCU	.02222	.30845	.997
WCU	AAU	.88889	.30845	.017*
	DBU	-.02222	.30845	.997

**. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.*

From Table 5.3: Multiple Comparisons, the effect size, calculated using eta squared (the sum squares of between groups divided by the total sum of squares as indicated in Table 5.2) is .241. So, despite reaching statistical significance, the actual difference in mean scores between the groups had a modest effect size since the overall effect size was fallen between 0.1 to 0.3 (Muijs, 2010). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test also indicated that the mean score for AAU (M= 2.41, SD= 0.77) was significantly different from DBU (M = 3.32, SD =0 .74), and WCU (M=3.30, SD=0.90).

5.2.1 Views of AAU College Deans

AAU college deans' perception of accountability was distinctly lower than that of DBU and WCU college deans. The interview data of AAU college deans also confirmed the quantitative results. For instance, one of the college deans from AAU depicts his view about university accountability as:

> The decision of the college made at the academic commission level, but in order to implement the decision, the college management discusses the issues in detail. Different barriers affect our core activities, and we are not fully mandated to do our jobs. The decision-making rate at the central level is also

> slow, and as a result, it is difficult for us to be fully accountable for what we need to be accountable (AAU-D2).

As can be understood from the AAU-D2 interview, AAU deans perceived accountability is linked to a lack of authority. Delays in decision making due to the university senior management affects the ability of the college deans to execute their responsibilities. The duration and modes of decision communication are clearly indicated in the Senate legislation of the university. For instance, the Senate legislation of (Addis Ababa University, 2013a) clearly stipulated, "Issues on which the Senate deliberated and decided upon shall be communicated in writing to deans, directors, centre and department heads by the office of the President. Such communication shall be made within ten days after every Senate meeting"(p. 15). In addition, as indicated in the governance document of (Addis Ababa University, 2012a), there are two forms of accountability that a healthy academic institution should ensure. One is the accountability of academic staff to their students and stakeholders (moral accountability), and the other is their accountability to each other (professional accountability). In this context, as can be seen from AAU deans' interview, the perception of accountability encompasses lack of authority to execute their core academic and administrative activities, which can also be linked to a lack of professional accountability from the university senior management.

> Another AAU interviewee revealed his assessment as,
> The responsibilities of the university are too much as the government using university board as instrument to steer us. If you see higher education proclamation, a university president's power is nominal. University president has no voice on the institution he is governing. He is non-voting member of the board. In such a situation, what kind of autonomy do I expect? Our president is just in the office to accomplish government agenda rather than the institution he is leading. He is there working as the heartbeat of government (AAU-D1).

As can be seen from interview, if the university president's decision-making roles in the university board is restricted on legal document, obviously, it will be ideal for the university to be autonomous or independent of government. As the government allocates budget for public universities, the government apparently needs universities to

be fully accountable for their spending. But, in order to maintain a healthy environment in the university, attention should be given to a circumstance in which a university is imbued with a very high sense of autonomy and accountability (Addis Ababa University, 2012a).

5.2.2 Views of DBU College Deans

The interview of the DBU college deans presented a different perspective than suggested by the quantitative result (*see Table 5.1*). The quantitative results of DBU showed the perception of college deans about university accountability was relatively higher than AAU. However, the interview showed a lack of clear guidance from university senior management. One of the interviewees explained his view as:

> We were told to implement modularisation without any proper guidance. As a dean, I tried to enforce our department chairs to read the materials and give training to instructors about modularisation. Then, we tried to search for professors in some other universities with a better understanding of modularisation concept to give training to our staff members. There is inconsistency. Some colleges are implementing modularisation while others are not. Our college is implementing the old way of teaching. Some started implementing modularisation without attending training, and they taught courses for a semester. After a semester, they also moved to the traditional mode of teaching. Our leaders think instructors are implementing modularisation, but they are not. Modularisation exists merely in name (DBU-D1).

As can be seen from the DBU-D1 interview, not all the colleges were held responsible to implement the set rules and procedures. Some colleges implemented modularisation while others did not. As a result, inconsistency in implementing modularisation was reported among the college deans. The same interviewee explained that in DBU, "the budget is handled by Academic Vice President (AVP). College deans have no mandate to utilise their budget" (DBU-D1). The DBU college deans conceived lack of accountability as lack of authority to utilise the resource and lack of supervision from senior university management. Lack of authority led the college deans to believe that academic decisions emanate from mere personal preferences of officeholders rather

than from rules and regulations that were formulated to guide responsible decision-making. This required professional accountability from the university senior management. On the other hand, the interview shows the college deans were not equally responsible for their roles, and this suggests the top-down approach might result in a power imbalance which leads to a lack of reciprocal accountability of managers to those below them. What makes these tendencies alarming is that deans were not fully committed to accomplishing their duties and responsibilities due to lack of authority from the university senior management. This decline in authority might be leading to a widespread practice of reluctance to take responsibility and mechanical paper pushing.

5.2.3 Views of WCU College Deans

One of the college deans from WCU also expressed his worries about university accountability as:

> I think we need to respect the university rules and regulations first. Here, it is common to break university rules and regulations. Sometimes, I was instructed through telephone without considering the rules. I was obliged to accomplish some activities irrespective of the University Senate Legislation. Now, the question is who will be accountable for any problem that emerged because of the breach of the law? Most of the time, this worries me too much (WCU-D1).

From the WCU college deans' interview, lack of accountability was perceived as a failure to follow the university Senate legislation by the university senior management. (Keay & Loughrey, 2015) argued an individual should be accountable for matters falling within their roles. So, the universities are expected to be accountable for their roles and maintain their professional accountability. Chan (2001) also claimed increased accountability as an element of governance would help universities to improve the quality of their teaching and research, but this would require the transfer of decision-making authority (with accountability) to the colleges.

5.3 Views of Department Chairs

This section provides the views of department chairs about the accountability in public universities as the departments that were located inside the selected colleges were part of the study. This section provides the views of department chairs about accountability in public universities. Departments that were located inside the selected colleges were part of the study, so both the quantitative and qualitative data which emerged from the department chairs were analysed and discussed as follows.

Table 5.4: Department chairs' view

Higher education governance principles	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	AAU chairs (n=22		DBU chairs (n=25)		WCU chairs (n=21)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Accountability	2.63	.72	3.28	.81	2.70	.73

Key. *The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicate the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).*

As shown in Table 5.4, the AAU department chairs' perception about the practice of accountability was also low when seen in the light of DBU and WCU department chairs.

Table 5.5: ANOVA

Accountability means

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	6.191	2	3.095	5.437	.007
Within Groups	37.007	65	.569		
Total	43.197	67			

As can be seen from Table 5.5: ANOVA, a one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to find out the department chairs' perception of accountability across the sample universities. The department chairs were grouped according to their university generation (1st generation (AAU), 2nd generation (DBU), and 3rd generation (WCU). There was a statistically significant difference at the p = .007 in the perception

of accountability mean scores for the department chairs of three sample universities: F (2, 65) = 5.44, p = .007.

Table 5.6: Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Accountability mean

Tukey HSD

(I) University	(J) University	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
AAU	DBU	-.65818*	.22057	.011
	WCU	-.07215	.23020	.947
DBU	AAU	.65818*	.22057	.011
	WCU	.58603*	.22335	.029
WCU	AAU	.07215	.23020	.947
	DBU	-.58603*	.22335	.029

As indicated in

Table 5.6, multiple comparisons of the perception difference of accountability was carried out among the department chairs of the three sample universities. Even though the difference was statistically significant, the actual difference in mean scores between the groups was modest with the effect size, calculated using eta squared, at 0.143 (Muijs, 2010). The Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for DBU (M= 3.28, SD= .81) was significantly different from AAU (M = 2.63, SD = .72), and WCU (M=2.70, SD=.73) at P=.011 and P=.029 respectively. However, AAU (M = 2.63, SD = .72) was not statistically significantly differ from WCU (M=2.70, SD=.73) (*see*

Table 5.6). Therefore, DBU department chairs had a more positive perception of accountability as opposed to AAU and WCU chairs.

5.3.1 Views of AAU Chairs

Addis Ababa University department chairs' interviews were consistent with the quantitative result. One AAU department chair revealed college and university leaders

were being unaccountable to their roles. The chair put his view about the governance change and accountability in the university as:

> Everything goes the same way. There is no change, which is observed. There is no accountability for the failure either. The change takes place in its natural course, not as a result of modularisation. There is an organisational structure where departments are related to the college, which is at the top level. However, the thing is, it has always been the same way. In general, there is no change in structure followed by the introduction of modularisation, and nobody is accountable as far as I know (AAU-Ch1).

In contrast, an interviewee from AAU tends to appreciate the second and third generations in terms of the funding system and accountability in comparison to AAU. The interviewee revealed his view as:

> The funding system of other universities even the new universities are by far better than Addis Ababa University. They are more efficient and accountable for affecting any form of payment than my university. So, Addis Ababa University, I think needs to revisit its system, particularly in terms of administration of finance, and manpower, and accountability (AAU-Ch2).

As can be understood from this interviewee, top university leaders were not efficient in executing their roles. As Dascălu and Nasta (2015) argued, higher-level management is known by efficiency and cost control, which was the case for the AAU top leaders from AAU department chairs' point of view. Another department chair also mentioned:

> In my opinion, everybody should be accountable for his/her responsibility. For instance, I appreciate our AVP because he is at least accountable for the teaching and learning process. I have never seen other university presidents offering courses for the students rather than the AVP. However, the Senate legislation stipulates President and Vice Presidents should teach. For me, this shows inconsistency. Everybody should be equally responsible. Accountability should be free from power. If our leaders are not accountable, how do they expect their subordinates to be accountable? (AAU-CH3).

Addis Ababa University department chairs' opinions were mixed with views ranging from strong disaffirming and affirming (as AAU-CH3) of implementation of

accountability. According to the interviewees, everybody has to be accountable for his/her duties in the office. AAU-CH3 implied a perceived lack of mutual accountability amongst top university leaders. The leaders should be consistent in executing their roles. They were expected to abide by the University Senate legislation and act accordingly.

5.3.2 Views of DBU Chairs

As Table 5.4 shows, the overall perception of DBU department chairs about accountability is relatively higher. However, the interviews of some of the department chairs revealed lack of accountability as some sort of lack of role model, power abuse, and breach of laws by the university leaders. For instance, similar to AAU, one of the DBU department chairs expressed his view as:

> I believe we all should be responsible for our job as per the set of the University's Senate Legislation. For instance, the legislation states that President and Academic Presidents must teach 3 credit hours per week and the dean and department chairs must teach 6 credit hours per week. To the best of my knowledge, I have never seen a president or vice president offering courses to university students. Surprisingly, these days, the college deans also followed the presidents' footsteps and insisted not to teach courses at all. Recently, even, in some departments, department chairs are showing a tendency not to teach a course. I do not know where we are heading. These are the people who are the model for their instructors, and university community. In my university breach of rules of law is not uncommon and there is no accountability for the breached law, too (DBU-CH2).

As can be understood from the DBU-CH2 interview, the expectation of department chairs about the top university leaders' involvement in teaching activity was high. Their failure to teach regarded as a breach of the University Senate legislation and guidelines. Eventually, this discouraged the accountability of other system participants of the university. The department chairs desired the top university leaders to face the challenges emerging from teaching, learning, and feel similar pain to instructors.

> Another DBU department chair expressed his concern of accountability saying: Students do not fail a course. Our president told the instructors if one

> student fails, it is not the student who fails rather it is the instructors who fail. Therefore, instructors started offering grades to students and grades are highly inflated. Students are graduated with high grade, but there is a general complaint among the stakeholders about the competence of students even after the completion of their study. I do not know who will be accountable for this, instructors? Department chairs? I believe senior university leaders undoubtedly understand what I want to say (DBU-CH1).

As can be understood from this interviewee, interference by top university leaders in instructor's role was explained with emphasis by department chairs. In this context, leaders were breaching both moral and professional accountabilities.

5.3.3 Views of WCU Chairs

The interviews of the WCU chairs were very much consistent with that of AAU and DBU interviews. For instance, the department chair of WCU revealed his view as:

> It is sad that I cannot run my duties and responsibilities as per the Senate legislation of the university. In most cases, I am performing what my dean and the top leaders want me to perform. We have a good Senate legislation policy, but we are not using it. The infringement of the Senate legislation is very common. However, I do not know who will be responsible for the different problems created so far. Everybody is complaining, students, instructors, and deans. But it is a paradox. Sometimes, I received directives through the telephone. When I asked a letter of directives instead of a telephone call, the dean and Academic Vice President were mad at me. Top leaders always want us (the department chairs) to be accountable for every incident, but they do not want to take responsibility. In general, there is no accountability of duties and responsibilities from the top officials of the university (WCU-CH1).

The interview of WCU-CH1 indicates, perceptions of breach of the law, abuse of power, and discontinuity between the Senate legislation and practice. According to the perception of WCU department chair, the top university leaders did not meet personal and professional accountabilities. In this context, the need for collegial working

atmosphere and transforming the decision-making authority with accountability to the core academic activities at department and college levels were implied.

5.4 Instructors' view

This section presents the views of instructors about the practice of accountability from AAU, DBU, and WCU. The results and discussion of quantitative and qualitative data have been presented below.

Table 5.7: Instructors' view

Higher education governance principles	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	AAU Instructors (n=95)		DBU Instructors (n=64)		WCU Instructors (n=50)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Accountability	2.65	.68	2.69	.68	2.92	.68

Key. The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicate the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree =1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).

Table 5.7 shows the overall perception of instructors from AAU, DBU, and WCU about the practice of accountability. As can be observed from Table 5.7, the perception of AAU and DBU instructors is almost equal, and their perception of accountability is inclined to be neutral (neutral=3). However, the mean score of WCU instructors was slightly higher than the AAU and DBU instructor. However, the difference was not statistically significant, as shown in Table 5.7.

Table 5.8: ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2.444	2	1.222	2.661	.072
Within Groups	94.619	206	.459		
Total	97.064	208			

A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to find out the instructors' perception of accountability across the three sample universities. There was

no statistically significant difference at the p = .07 in the perception of accountability mean scores for the instructors of three sample universities: F (2, 206) = 2.66, p = .07.

5.4.1 Views of AAU Instructors

The interview of AAU instructors affirms the perception of a lack of accountability in AAU. For example, one of the instructors said:

> Modularisation is giving a chance for those who are interested in moonlighting. Officially, the university does not encourage moonlighting. We are supposed to be here like 20 days a month. But there are complaints; some faculty members do not like to meet their students regularly. The fact that we have this modular approach, it is even contributing to those who actually miss their classes. It is a good opportunity for them; they do whatever they want to do in three weeks' time, or one month's time, nobody is worrying about whether students are benefiting or not. As I said, we pretend to teach, and they pretend to learn. For those who prefer to teach actually at the undergraduate level, the modular is perfect you can cover your course within a few weeks and fly to wherever you like (AAU-INS1).

This interview indicated that some instructors were not fully accountable for their teaching responsibilities. The interview further explained the lack of moral accountability and professional accountability (Keay & Loughrey, 2015) among the instructors themselves. This likely happens when instructors are denied the right to participate in the process of designing academic programs. As instructors reported, they were forced to implement modularisation without participating in the planning stage.

5.4.2 Views of DBU Instructors

DBU instructors have echoed similar sentiments about the practice of accountability. One of the instructors said:

> There is high staff turnover both at the Ministry of Education and university levels. We do not really find a responsible person with a good understanding of the concept of modularisation. There is no training and update related to the program. We cannot totally claim that all the academic staff members accepted the modularised curriculum as nobody cares about the

> implementation of the newly introduced teaching modality (modularisation) (DBU-INS1).

Another instructor from DBU revealed his view as,

> Theoretically, modularisation does not have a problem. The problem is whether it fits our context or not. It does not fit the context. There is also a serious awareness problem regarding the concept from both the instructor's and leader's side. Lack of awareness brought many challenges to implement the program. Everybody has to get a clear understanding of the program. For this, there must be a responsible organ in the university (DBU-INS2).

The same interviewee further expressed his view as:

> Initially, there was confusion and lack of understanding concerning the concept of modularisation process. In this context, it will be challenging to say the staff was not committed to implementing the modularisation process. There was no chain of knowledge because those who started the implementation have left the position. The high turnover of staff severely affected the modularisation process. There is no accountable body to work on the chain of knowledge. I believe the University should think over the retention of institutional memory (DBU-INS2).

DBU instructors' interviews revealed a lack of support for implementing policy, leaders' lack of competence in implementing modularisation, and lack of retention of institutional memory were the major accountability themes emerged. DBU was characterised by lack of moral accountability (lack of staff commitment) and lack of professional accountability (no accountable body to work on the chain of knowledge and provide support to policy implementers). As DBU instructors' interview showed, modularisation was poorly implemented; it was imposed on the instructors. However, DBU has an independent office for the directorate of institutional transformation (Debre Berhan University, 2012).

5.4.3 Views of WCU Instructors

Instructors of WCU also expressed their views about the practice of accountability of their university. One of the instructors expressed his view, as the university is accountable for the directives from the MoE. For instance, he revealed his view as,

> This University is good for implementing government policy without challenging the Ministry of Education. Even some universities from the first generation come to our university for experience sharing. From this, I believe that this university has something good, which I think is our leaders are a strict follower of MoE directives (WCU-INS2).

On the other hand, another instructor expressed his view, as the university leaders were not accountable for their duties and responsibilities. This designated lack of professional accountability. He explained his view as:

> Most of our university leaders are young, and they are friendly. However, they do not have enough knowledge about the concept of modularisation. They enforce us [instructors] to fully implement the modularised curriculum, which they do not even understand the concept. For example, even if the Senate legislation require the university president and vice presidents to offer courses, they have never been to the class. For this reason, they do not accommodate instructors' complaints with the modularisation concept. If they do not teach the course, how do they feel the challenges that instructors encountered during the implementation of modularisation? When we come to the implementation of modularisation, inconsistency has been exhibited across the colleges. Nobody is ready to overcome such inconsistencies. I do not know who will be blamed for failure. Our leaders are making a decision based on what they hear from others rather than supervising what is going on at different colleges. I wish, we all are either rewarded for our success or accountable for our failure, too (WCU-INS1).

As can be seen from the WCU instructors' interviews, instructors perceived the university senior management to be more in compliance with directives and regulation of the MoE than its internal legal documents. The interviewees also revealed that leaders lack leadership competence. In addition, WCU leaders should consider personal accountability and update their leadership skills in order to mobilise their academic

staff for common institutional goals. In line with this, (Kenny, 2009) clearly argued, "academics, as a professional group, must become more actively engaged as co-developers and implementers of strategy" (p. 639). Hence, there should be a governance system in the universities, where participants are held accountable for the duties and responsibilities of their office and rewarded for the successful accomplishment of their responsibilities.

5.5 View of Students

This section deals with the views of students on the practice of accountability through their respective universities. In view of this, accountability variables encompass students' perception of the duties and responsibilities of their instructors. Both quantitative and qualitative results were discussed as follow:

Table 5.9: Students' view

Higher education governance principle	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	AAU Students (n=321)		DBU Students(n=198)		WCU Students(n=178)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Accountability	3.24	.83	3.22	.75	3.19	.81

Table 5.10: ANOVA

Dependent variable: Accountability mean

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.269	2	.134	.204	.816
Within Groups	457.864	694	.660		
Total	458.133	696			

Key. The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicate the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).

Table 5.9 shows the overall perception of students on the practice of accountability across the three sample public universities. The mean scores of the three groups: AAU, DBU, and WCU students were very similar. A one-way between-groups analysis of

variance was conducted to compare the mean scores of the perception of students from three sample universities (AAU, DBU, and WCU) on the practice of university accountability.

As indicated in Table 5.10, there was no statistically significant difference in accountability mean scores among the three sample universities students: $F(697) = .204$, $p = .816$.

Since the mean scores of the perception of students are above 3 (neutral), the result shows students tend to affirm the presence of accountability in their respective universities, and this likely shows instructors were accountable for their duties.

The students' views were mixed about their instructors' accountability practice. For instance, one of the AAU students expressed her concern as:

> Frankly speaking, these days, there are many instructors in our university, who are unprofessional and fail to appear for most of the classes in the semester. They hold one or more full-time jobs elsewhere; there are also instructors who teach by abridging or unloading course material in ways that confuse us, and there are also instructors who discourage students who ask questions. Some of the instructors habitually forget to conduct scheduled exams or consider it an affront to their integrity when asked to return exam papers or provide explanations of their marking schemes. I believe the department chairs know very well those instructors, but they do not want to take action as they favour one another (AAU-ST4).

Another student from AAU expressed his view as,

> The modularisation process practice is a bit loose because the instructors are not trying to equip students with the necessary knowledge and skills. I see gaps in this aspect. This block modality is time-bounded. Instructors are not proving feedback for the block course. Some courses are offered semester-based while others are blocked. Semester based courses are taught in a good manner as instructors have enough time unlike the block courses teaching (AAU-ST5).

As modularised curriculum was offered in a block modality (within a month or one and a half month), it enabled instructors to have more time. Once they offered the course to students within a limited period, they have free time to carry out other activities. As a consequence of this, students feel that some instructors failed to be accountable for their duties and responsibilities.

On the contrary, another student expressed her view saying: "AAU gives much attention to the competency-based education, and in most cases, the instructors are also committed to grading their students" (AAU-ST3). Though the first two interviewees' perceptions disaffirmed the accountability of instructors, the last interviewee asserts that instructors were accountable for grading students. In general, from AAU students' interviews, two opposing views were expressed about the level of responsibility of instructors for their teaching positions.

According to one of the DBU students, DBU was strict in implementing the directives from the MoE rather than its Senate legislation and different guidelines. One of the students from DBU expressed his idea as:

> As a member of the student union, I have reservations about the implementation of rules and regulations of our University. Our leaders: department chairs, college deans, and university leaders were active in responding to the Ministry of Education inquiries. But, I did not see their prompt action in implementing the University Senate legislation, and guidelines. I think they should pay attention to the university's internal rules and regulations before acting on the external ones. I think they have to be accountable to themselves first (DBU-ST1).

This interview presented a view of university leaders were more compliant with MoE directives and regulation than university senate legislation. Another student also puts his idea:

> In my opinion, I classify our instructors into two categories; a very responsible and less responsible. Some instructors can be a good model when they teach, listen to students' problem, assess students, and give proper advice. There are also other instructors who teach forcefully without interest. All of their approaches and actions are discouraging. We want to see

> professionally responsible instructors. I think university leaders need to monitor how the instructors are teaching and assessing students (DBU-ST2).

DBU-ST2 believed there were accountable instructors, who fulfil their duties and responsibilities, and also instructors who did not. As clearly stipulated in DBU Senate legislation, the academic staff is expected to be accountable and to "prepare graduates who are cultivated in a democratic culture, competent in knowledge and skills and internationally competitive in their fields (Debre Berhan University, 2012, p. 38). In addition, academic staff are expected to "maintain a democratic and civil outlook by demonstrating a willingness to work with others and respecting the ideas of fellow academic staff members and students (Debre Berhan University, 2012, p. 39). DBU students' interviews indicated a call for intervention for instructors' level of commitment, which entails a need for moral and personal accountability from the instructors. Leaders are also expected to facilitate and follow-up academic advice of students and establish good relationships with students in order to establish a good teaching and learning atmosphere for their students, as per the Senate legislation of their respective universities (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Wachemo University, 2016).

Wachemo University students were interviewed about the practice of accountability in their university. As the university is a third generation and newly launched, students were complaining about the competence of their instructors. Instructors' lack of pedagogical and subject matter was reported as the perception of lack of accountability. Most of the instructors were junior, and the MoE newly deployed them, particularly the bachelor's degree holders. Not all public universities have a mandate to recruit graduate assistants (bachelor degrees) as the MoE recruit and deploy them to different public universities (Girmaw, 2014). In fact, this is one of the areas that public universities complain about the MoE interference. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2009) in its article 8.4 mandates, the recruitment responsibilities to higher education institutions as "every institution shall recruit and administer its personnel …" (p. 4981). Wachemo University students were not happy with the newly deployed graduate assistant by MoE to offer advanced courses. One of the students expressed his concerns as:

> I am working as one of a member of the student council at the university level for the past three years. I have been arguing that a bachelor's degree holder (Fresh graduate student or a new graduate assistant) should not be recruited to teach us. Our concern is that it has an implication for the quality of education. By saying this, our intention was helping both students and instructors. Students should gain the necessary knowledge and skills. The instructor should also improve his/her career before assuming senior courses. Most of the students are complaining about those newly deployed teachers. They do not have pedagogical skills on how to question students, responding to students' questions, encouraging students, etc. We usually see them feeling stressed in the classroom. Nobody was listening to us, and we could not find a responsible leader. Now, we are about to graduate without the necessary knowledge and skills. I am not proud of my result because I feel my grades do not reflect my Engineering field competence. I would like to request the university to seriously pay attention and minimise such gaps in the future (WCU-ST1).

The duties and responsibilities of a Graduate Assistant are clearly indicated in WCU's Senate legislation. One of the duties and responsibilities is "A Graduate Assistant shall normally assume tutorial responsibilities, but under exceptional circumstances, he may be given teaching responsibilities as the level of lower division courses and under the supervision of a senior college/institute member" (Wachemo University, 2016, p. 56). So, the university would have been responsible for aiding the Senate legislation and assigning a Graduate Assistant to the level he/she should assume. As can be seen from the students' interviews, an intervention for instructors' professional commitment is called.

To sum up, the overall students' perception of the quantitative results showed an indication of the presence of accountability in the three sample universities. There was no statistically significant difference among the students from the three sample universities about their perception of the practice of accountability in their respective universities. However, the interviews showed in some ways, students felt that some instructors and leaders were not accountable for their duties and responsibilities as per the set university Senate legislation. According to the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation, one of the objectives of public higher education is "to prepare

knowledgeable, skilled, and attitudinally mature graduates in numbers with demand-based proportional balance of fields and disciplines so that the country shall become internationally competitive" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4979). So, without accountability, it would be difficult for higher education to address the need of stakeholders and to be competitive in the current global influence.

5.6 The Conception of Accountability

This section summarises the concept of accountability by different university systems participants (deans, chairs, instructors, and students) and how the practice of accountabilities affects the governance of public universities.

The findings of the study from the college deans and department chairs of the sample universities revealed that the universities linked the lack the authority to execute their core academic and administrative activities to a lack of accountability. The study revealed that there was discontinuity between the University Senate legislation and its practice. The college deans and chairs across the three sample universities, therefore, perceived accountability as having the authority and capacity to implement the legal document and the compliance with legal documents. Based on their perception and understanding of accountability, the universities were not able to implement the EHEP and Senate legislation due to a lack of leadership competence, and due to the MoE requirement for the accountability of universities. The university senior management was very willing to comply with the Board and MoE requirements and dedicated their time to non- academic activities to secure their position instead of their office commitments. In line with this, Peter (2002) argued that "Accountability begins as an effort to apply democratic and public principles to higher education, but it creates a paradox: it may undermine the independence of the university vis-a-vis the public and thereby cause it to fail in its function. Independence and accountability simply are incompatible values and can only be made to appear compatible by restricting the one or the other (p. 37)."

The study further exhibited the Senate and other academic legislators were lack any real power and just endorsers of the meeting agenda rather than critical thinkers on behalf of the instructors. Their reciprocal accountability was lacking, it was top-down, in that

they felt accountable to their supervisors and not to their colleagues. To be more specific, the universities were merely accountable to the MoE, and this result reflected the higher education legal document, which states the University Board (UB) centrally governs the internal university administration.

The staff perceives that the MoE uses the Board and the Academic Senate as the means of managing the public universities. To ensure universities are in compliance with external agencies, they will administer in a way that apparently sacrifices internal reciprocal accountabilities. However, as Kenny (2009) clearly argued:

> Managers and academics both have a role to play to ensure the effectiveness of a modern university. This raises challenges for university managers to move away from corporate models of control and compliance to more open and inclusive management practices. Incentive and promotion systems should be re-structured to reward managers and academics who can promote these sorts of outcomes in their organisations. For their part, academics, as a professional group, must become more actively engaged as co-developers and implementers of strategy and take their place as legitimate stakeholders in their institutions (p. 639).

So, based on the result of the study, Kenny's (2009) argument could be taken as very important input for all the system participants of the universities to ascertain shared governance. If the university is expected to be accountable for its roles, a university governance system, where a university president and instructors are part of decision making should be supported. An institution, which is fully accountable but not autonomous could not fully empower its constituents.

The findings of the study also revealed that instructors constructed the concept of accountability in terms of leadership competencies and compliance with legal documents. According to the understanding of the instructors of the three sample universities, the universities leaders implemented top-down leadership and this, in turn, affected accountability to their office commitments. At the same time, they perceived accountability as the techniques being employed by the government to constraint the autonomy of universities and the freedom of the instructors. The result appears to be a

decline in accountability of academic officers to their colleagues and a growing culture of rule by government and university senior management fiat.

As per the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation, the University Board is the supreme governing body of a public university. The board comprises seven voting members, where the MoE appoints the board's chairperson and three additional voting members. The university president nominates three other voting members in consultation with the university council and the Senate but subjects to approval by the MoE. Surprisingly, a university president is a non-voting member and serves as a secretary of the board (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, Article 44). Another interesting aspect of the University Board in Ethiopian higher education governance is its power to revoke decisions made by the president or the Senate when the decisions compromise institutional mission or contravene government policy; or constitution (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 5010). As a result, rather than independent public universities are highly accountable to the government through its control of the Board in running their internal administration because a university president's decision-making role during the Board meeting is nominal.

Considering the authority of a university Board as stipulated in the legal document, it could be argued that Ethiopian public universities are characterised by the marginalisation of leaders and instructors from decision-making roles. This was one of the conceptions of accountability that the college deans and department chairs pointed out as the major obstacle of the university governance system. Regarding this, Bailey (1980) argued, "accountability is inalienable from autonomy, that is, one cannot be accountable for actions for which one was not responsible, and one cannot be responsible for something which one was not free to decide to do or to do otherwise" (p. 112). In the Ethiopian public universities, similar tension between the two concepts has been experienced. "Where more accountability is required, often less autonomy remains due to the government's emphasis on accountability" (Goedegebuure & Hayden, 2007, p. 9). Shore and Wright (1999) also argued that accountability is a valuable concept everywhere. However, a new form of coercive and disabling accountability emerged in recent decades that equated accountability with policing,

reducing professional relations to controllable fashion and, above all, introducing disciplinary mechanisms associated with neo-liberal governmentality.

The students across sample universities understood accountability in terms of the competence and responsibility of instructors. The study demonstrated students both affirmed and disaffirmed the concept of accountability. The findings of the questionnaire results showed that students had formed a positive perception of accountability. However, the students' interview data revealed that negative perception of accountability because some instructors were not fully committed to their duties and responsibilities as per the set university Senate legislation. As indicated in the EHEP Article 32 (1), the instructors have the responsibilities to "teach, including assisting students in need of special support, and render academic guidance or counselling, and community services, and … devote his full working time to the" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4996). As can be understood from the quotation, the instructors are expected to demonstrate full accountability to their students. In addition, according to the EHEP, one of the objectives of public higher education is "to prepare knowledgeable, skilled, and attitudinally mature graduates in numbers with demand-based proportional balance of fields and disciplines so that the country shall become internationally competitive" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4979). Since students are the key stakeholders in the higher education institutions, the instructors are expected to commit themselves fully to their duties and responsibilities. In fact, it will be one-sided to expect only instructors' accountability without ensuring them the freedom to execute their core academic activities. To nurture instructors' accountability, the universities need to implement a governance system that will accommodate their voice so that they become responsible professional community. The more the freedom of the instructors and their professional accountability, the more likely students will benefit from the system.

In conclusion, the study demonstrated a perceived lack of accountability in the Ethiopian public universities. One of the reasons was the marginalisation of middle, lower-level leaders, and instructors from decision-making roles due to lack of leadership model at the university central level. Another reason was top-down leadership in public universities. According to the findings of the study, there is a

strong perception that leaders are appointed on the basis of their political affiliation by the government and not necessarily on their leadership competence or experience. This is related to lack of mutual trust and understanding between the government and the university. In support of this idea, one of the veteran professors explained in Asgedom's (2007) study as, "The power of the President, the chief executive of the University, was nominal, as he [the President] had to take instructions from the Party Secretary, before he made academic decisions, such as appointment of deans" (p. 167). Thus, government political intervention in university affairs has damaged the criticality, collegiality, collaboration, and creativity of public universities.

Secondly, instructors revealed that once university leaders are appointed by the government, they also appoint their lower and middle-level academic units' leaders through paternalism and nepotism (geographical location, political viewpoints, ethnicity, religion, and other ties like marriage, friendship and so on). Because of this, most of the middle (college level) and lower (school and department levels) leaders are young and lack leadership skills, particularly in the second and third-generation universities. Consequently, the paternalism and nepotism have divided the academic community into the different interest of groups. These differences raise questions of conflict of interest and reduced instructors' ability to be a part of a professional learning community, accountable to him/herself, to his/her colleagues, and their profession. The absence of such a professional community constrains the possibility of academic freedom (Owusu-Ansah, 2015). As a result, there is a tendency in the university community to believe that academic decisions emanate from mere personal preferences of officeholders rather than from rules and regulations that were formulated to guide responsible decision-making (*see Chapter 10, section 10.3.4: Nepotism and Paternalism)*. From this study, it could be argued that political affiliation and paternalism have no place in university if it is expected to achieve its mission and purpose. Therefore, the study implies that there should be mutual understanding, trust, competence, partnership and professional collegiality and self-criticality between the universities and government to achieve the common goals of the social, economic and political development of the public at large.

5.7 Governance Implications

Accountability is a contested issue in higher education institution governance system as different people understand it in different ways. Some people understand it as government intervention into higher education internal affairs, that is, the government's withdrawing from closely monitoring higher education and allowing an increase in institutional autonomy (De Boer, Enders, & Leisyte, 2007; Huisman & Currie, 2004). Others see it from social responsibility as obligation and professional responsibility of academics (Solomon, 2010; Wana, 2009). However, as Bailey (1980) argued, accountability is inalienable from autonomy. This can be illustrated in Figure 5.1, AB axis of the conceptual framework. In the same vein, Zeleza (2003) claimed that African intellectuals and institutions of higher learning cannot make meaningful contributions to the social, economic and political developments without public accountability and institutional autonomy. Otherwise, the struggle between the university and government will continue without changes. The situation in Ethiopian higher education institution is not far from Zeleza's argument. Since all public universities are financed by the government (Solomon, 2010), by implication, the government requires the universities to be accountable for the public resource. However, as the Proclamation grants every public institution the necessary autonomy in pursuit of its mission (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009), the government needs to obey the legal documents and public universities need to be given autonomy and trusted to run their academic and administrative core activities. As per the legal documents, the Ethiopian public universities are characterised as accountable and autonomous institutions, which means the governance system fall in AD and BC quadrants. However, since a president of a public institution is the chief executive officer of the institution (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009), he/she has full authority to run an institution and the governance system is characterised by authoritative (C- Axis) approach rather than democratic (D-Axis).



Legend: ⊡ Deans, ◇ Chairs, ⊙ Instructors, and ✪ Students

Figure 5.1: Perception of accountability

Based on the lived experience of the research participants about the perception of accountability, university's freedom to govern is not constrained as indicated in the AC quadrant of the conceptual framework. This means more accountability is required from the middle and lower levels of the university system participants. This conveys the perception of deans, chairs, and instructors about the practice of accountability fell in AC and BD quadrants. In contrast, students formed a positive perception of accountability, and their perception fell in the AD quadrant of the conceptual framework. If less accountability is exhibited at the university higher level, it is impossible to expect more accountability of lower levels. However, the higher official requires the lower-level system participants to be more accountable. From the result of the study, both lower and middle-level leaders and instructors did not have higher officials as their role models during the practice of accountability. Therefore, there should a balance between accountability of public universities and controlling and

manipulating of the public universities by the government, and a balance between a university and its academic units. As suggested in the governance conceptual framework (*see Figure 5.1*), inclusive and shared governance (AD) and consultative governance (BC) need to be in place if all the university system participants are to be accountable for their office, duties, responsibilities, and for their stakeholders.

Chapter 6

Transparency in the Ethiopian Public Universities

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the participation of key stakeholders in the governance of higher education has been explored. This chapter presents the results and discussion of the empirical data related to the transparency in the Ethiopian public universities. Data obtained through a questionnaire and interview from three public universities are analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively in order to show the perception of transparency in public universities.

Transparency is an increasingly essential component of the governance system of public universities in both developed and developing nations (Freeman, 2014). As Freeman (2014) added, in the context of publicly funded universities, the demand for proper utilisation of public funds, that is, the relevant academic activities undertaken with the taxpayers' money is now of widespread concern in most of the countries. This tendency of concern for transparency and public accountability is growing parallel to the move toward greater autonomy (Communiqué Leuven, 2009; Dehmel, 2006; Fejes, 2008; Gebremeskel, 2014). As Freeman (2014) critically argued, "that there is a public interest in tertiary education which needs to be reconciled with the benefits that institutional autonomy can bring" (p. 19). In the Bologna Process implementation reports of 2018, transparency was also stressed as a principle of higher education institutions (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018). Along the same lines, the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation, and University Senate legislation empower every higher institution to have a transparent systematic processes for teaching and learning, and research fund management and utilisation (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,

2009; Wachemo University, 2016). The legal document also provides that every public institution "selects through a transparent system of competition, academic, and other staff to be employed by the institution and designate or determine their responsibilities based on institutional requirements and expectations concerning performance and quality of work" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4986). With this in mind, the perception of transparency by college deans, department chairs, instructors, and students in the Ethiopian public universities settings has been presented below.

6.2 Views of College Deans

This section treats college deans' perception of transparency across the three sample public universities. It is concerned with the analysis of the results of both the questionnaires and interview data of the college deans.

Table 6.1: College deans' view

Higher education governance principle	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	AAU Deans (n=15)		DBU Deans (n=15)		WCU Deans (n=12)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Transparency	2.40	.69	3.39	1.16	3.00	.85

Key. The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicate the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).

Table 6.1 shows the mean scores for perception of transparency of college deans across the sample universities. The transparency mean score of AAU college dean is lower compared to DBU and WCU.

Table 6.2: ANOVA

Transparency mean

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	7.329	2	3.664	4.288	.021
Within Groups	33.327	39	.855		
Total	40.656	41			

As indicated in Table 6.2 a one-way ANOVA was conducted to explore transparency perception differences of college deans of the sample universities. There was a statistically significant difference among the college deans in their perception of

transparency mean scores: F (2, 39) = 4.288, p = 0.021. In order to differentiate which group is different in transparency mean score, an analysis of multiple comparisons was conducted as indicated in Table 6.3 below.

Table 6.3: Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: Transparency Mean
Tukey HSD

(I) University	(J) University	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
AAU	DBU	-.98667	.33755	.016*
	WCU	-.55000	.35803	.285
DBU	AAU	.98667	.33755	.016*
	WCU	.43667	.35803	.449
WCU	AAU	.55000	.35803	.285
	DBU	-.43667	.35803	.449

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

As shown in Table 6.3, despite reaching statistical significance, the actual difference in mean scores between the groups was modest as per the recommendation of Muijs (2010). The effect size calculated using eta squared (the sum squares of between groups divided by the total sum of squares as indicated in Table 6.2), was .18.

Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test (see Table 6.3) also indicated that the mean score for AAU (M= 2.41, SD=0.69) was significantly different from DBU (M = 3.39, SD = 1.16), and WCU (M=3.30, SD=0.85). However, DBU (M = 3.32, SD = 0.74), did not differ significantly from WCU (M=3.30, SD=0.90). So, the perception of AAU college deans about the university transparency system was found to be lower than DBU and WCU college deans.

6.2.1 Views of AAU College Deans

The interview data of AAU college deans complement the result of questionnaire data that the perception of transparency system was low. One of the college deans expressed his view as,

> At the college level, the decisions are to some extent transparent particularly in accessing the decisions. However, when we see at the top level, decisions are not transparent to different stakeholders" (AAU-D1). Another interviewee also revealed that university consultancy service, where instructors are

> expected to contribute their knowledge and expertise to different organisations, including government, public sector, community and business organisations, was not transparent enough. The interviewee put his idea as, "Lack of transparency (University level consultancy service) is being practiced without the involvement of academic staff" (AAU-D2). However, the University Senate legislation clearly stipulated how the consultancy should be run. As stated in Addis Ababa University (2013a), "Consultancy services shall be deployed to establish relations with industries for mutual benefits and on the basis of principled and transparent negotiations and agreements" (p. 139).

So, the transparent system needs to be in place as it helps the institution to maintain the trust and integrity of its academic community and public at large.

6.2.2 Views of DBU College Deans

In contrast to the quantitative results, the interview data of DBU college deans depicted the perception of transparency was low due to the decisions were made at university central level, and the decisions were not openly communicated to the university system participants. For instance, one of DBU college deans expressed his idea as, "Everything is done at the committee level and the decision is more transparent for the committee members and university senior management. The majority do not have access to the information of the decision made" (DBU-D2). Another interviewee also revealed that leaders' selection system was not transparent enough. He put his ideas as,

> For the sake of selection process, there are vacancy announcements, selection requirements, and all the competition processes but it is fake because, at the end of the day, the top leaders pick someone whom they want rather than who won the selection. They need politically affiliated candidates and the one who will listen and obey them (DBU-D1).

The same interviewee further reported that "There is access to information, but it is difficult to utilise that information as the college does not have the mandate to react to the information already obtained" (DBU-D1).

Another college dean also revealed that some of the leaders' selection criteria are vague and non-measurable. The same interviewee disclosed that "candidate's attitude" was set as one of the selection criteria. This term is deliberately included to help the university senior management to pick and assign anyone whom they think to take the position. The interviewee expressed his dissatisfaction with transparency as, "The system is a bit difficult because it seems democratic when you see the set criteria for the selection of leaders. But in actual practice, it is difficult to measure the criteria. For instance, we have a criterion saying, "candidate's attitude." How one can measure the attitude of the person? Attitude towards what?" (DBU-D2).

6.2.3 Views of WCU College Deans

The perception of transparency of WCU college deans was also similar to AAU and DBU college deans. From the interview of the college deans, low perception of transparency system was reported. For instance, one of the college deans elucidated lack of transparency on the academic promotion of the staff. He put his idea as,

> When we come to promotion, it is carried out at the university central level. It is the Director for Research and Community Service Office which runs everything. It is blurred. Our role is just to submit what has been already computed at the university central level to the college level Academic Commission for approval. We cannot do anything more than this (WCU-D2).

The same interviewee also reported that recruitment is being processed at the university central level. He revealed that "The recruitment is carried out at the university level…" (WCU-D2). Therefore, from the interview, it could be possible to understand that the university is characterised by a centralised system, where promotion and recruitment were processed centrally without the involvement of the college deans in the decision-making process. In such a context, it is difficult for colleges and other basic academic units to lead instructors to be accountable for their responsibilities in the absence of transparent system from the university senior management.

6.3 Views of Department Chairs

This section presents the analysis of the questionnaire and interview data pertinent to department chairs' perception of transparency across the three sample public universities. The first part treats the questionnaire results followed by the analysis of the interview data.

Table 6.4: Department chairs' view

Higher education governance principle	1st generation AAU Department chairs (n=22)		2nd generation DBU Department chairs (n=25)		3rd generation WCU Department chairs (n=21)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Transparency	2.93	1.00	3.44	.98	2.88	1.05

Key. The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicate the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).

As can be seen from Table 6.4, the perception of transparency means scores of AAU and WCU department chairs close to neutral though DBU's mean score is a bit above neutral (3.0).

Table 6.5: ANOVA
Transparency mean

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	4.598	2	2.299	2.267	.112
Within Groups	65.922	65	1.014		
Total	70.520	67			

As shown in Table 6.5 a one-way ANOVA was conducted to explore transparency perception difference of department chairs of the sample universities. There was no statistically significant difference among the department chairs in their perception of transparency mean scores: $F(2, 65) = 2.267$, $p = 0.112$.

6.3.1 Views of AAU Department Chairs

The interview data of AAU department chairs showed that selection of leaders was an area of concern. The selection criteria were different from the set legal documentation which specifies instructors have the right to nominate their leaders. However, one of the department chairs reported that the government uses applicants' political affiliation as a

tool to appoint the leaders rather than applicants' academic competence and leadership skills. For instance, one of the department chairs revealed his assessment as:

> The selection of higher-level officials of the university and the assignment of higher-level officials are the areas where I have some concerns because selection is not open enough and it is being processed by the government. I feel unhappy, particularly when the top-level officials are assigned by using criteria which are entirely different from what is required for transformational leadership. This means the top leaders, for instance, the president, is assigned using criteria like political affiliation than academic competence, and without taking into account the leadership capacity of those individuals. And sometimes, deans, directors, are assigned based on the preference of top-level officials and at the level of satisfying their own interest than looking at the competence of individuals, particularly, their academic and leadership readiness (AAU-CH2).

For the question of whether the department chairs or deans were part of the decision making for the approval of the university senior management selection, the same interviewee put his idea as, "…the departments and colleges usually get involved in some of the decision making processes, but the selection process itself is not as such transparent…" (AAU-CH2). Another chair also explained his concern, "In my opinion, nobody knows what is going on in the college, and university. The information in the hands of a few individuals. To get updated about the university, you need to praise the top officials, even when they are doing something wrong" (AAU-CH1). As can be seen from the department chairs' interviews, access to information was limited, and the institutions were not transparent enough for the AAU system participants.

6.3.2 Views of DBU Department Chairs

The interview of DBU department chairs showed lack of transparency similar to AAU department chairs. For example, one of the department chairs explained his concern as,

> ... the Academic Vice President or the Dean will choose anyone whom they think can accomplish his or her interest. If a president agrees with the proposed candidates, no one will assume the position except a candidate whom the president believes in him/her. From the top 3 best scorers of the

> candidates, they have the right to select even the lowest scorer, so, where is the merit-based selection. Everything is just done for the ceremonial process. The position is being kept for a person, but others are just accompanying someone whom they do not know. For me, there is no transparent, participatory and merit-based election (DBU-CH2).

Two points could be understood from this interviewee: the authority of Vice President and lack of transparency in the selection of leaders. In the same vein, another department chair explained, "Everything is done at the back of the curtain. There has not been transparency, and based on my experience, I am a pessimist, and there will be no transparency" (DBU-CH1). Based on his previous experience, this interviewee has lost his hope that the university will have a transparent system in the future. The despair of the department chair who leads the academic unit, when it comes to transparency, may affect the beliefs of the instructors in his unit about the level of transparency. So, the university needs to promote a transparent system that accommodates every academic community as per the set legal documents.

6.3.3 Views of WCU Department Chairs

According to the interview of the WCU department chair, the university lacks a transparent decision-making system. One of the WCU department chairs reported the condition of transparency in his respective university as:

> Sometimes, I feel embarrassed when the university top officials ask us not to inform the decision to our academics. They sometimes say don't tell this decision to a member of your department. I do not know why some of the decisions are confidential; particularly, the decision is related to academic matters. Since the decision-making process is not transparent, the leader's usually afraid of the complaints of the instructors. But, we all knew that the decision hurts the instructors. I wish the university be transparent enough so that we shall also be transparent to our academic staff (WCU-CH1).

As can be seen from the WCH-CH1 interview, lower-level academic unit leaders perceive lack of transparent behaviour from the university senior management. If the top officials are not transparent enough, it will be difficult to expect an open and transparent system because the lower-level leaders may imitate and follow the footstep

of the higher-level leaders. This may apparently affect the instructors' right to access the information pertinent to their institution as it sets a bad example for the lower-level leaders. Another interviewee also reported that the selection process was not transparent in his institution. For instance, he put his idea as,

> I was assigned as the department chair by the Academic Vice President of my university. My department members did not get a chance to elect me. The process was hidden. I am the only one who knew the challenge I have been facing to lead my colleagues. I think they are right for putting pressure on me. I assumed the position in a very wrong way. I promised them to leave the position very soon (WCU-CH2).

As can be understood from the WCU-CH2 interview, having not a transparent system at the university level was even stressing the department chairs in due process of their activities. If a leader does not have followers, it would be difficult for him/her to mobilise the academics for the same goals. So, transparency is one of the areas the pillars of governance in Ethiopian public universities, and the university senior management needs to pay attention to promote open and transparent systems.

6.4 Views of Instructors

This section deals with the perception of instructors on transparency in the three public universities. Analysis of the findings integrates both quantitative and qualitative data drawn from the instructors of the three sample universities.

Table 6.6: Instructors' view

Higher education governance principle	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	AAU Instructors (n=95)		DBU Instructors (n=64)		WCU Instructors (n=50)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Transparency	2.88	.84	2.70	.85	2.87	.89

Key. The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicate the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).

As can be seen from Table 6.6, the perception of transparency means scores of the three sample universities are still below the neutral opinion, although the figure is close to (3.0).

Table 6.7: ANOVA
Transparency mean

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1.394	2	.697	.953	.387
Within Groups	150.666	206	.731		
Total	152.060	208			

As shown in Table 6.7, a one-way ANOVA was employed to see whether there is statistically significant difference or not on the transparency perception mean scores among the instructors of the sample universities. The result showed that there is no statistically significant difference among the instructors in their perception of transparency mean scores: $F(2, 206) = 0.953$, $p = 0.387$. The instructors tend to have a low perception of transparency.

6.4.1 Views of AAU Instructors

Even if the quantitative result of AAU instructors indicated a neutral opinion about their perception of transparency, the interview data showed their dissatisfaction with the transparency of the system. As one interviewee said:

> So far higher leadership are government appointees. I hear that at a distance, at least there is a rumour they are going to make it an open competition. But still, from what I have seen in the choice of deans and directors, I do not think, there will be competition. It is rather the best pretention ever. Some faculties even had a reservation to the extent of even not applying for open positions. It is customary to see at Addis Ababa University calls for competitions are appearing now and then. The funny thing, the university has never felt of the situation, simply they act mechanically; they post one call when that call expiry date approaches, they prepare another copy because it was easy to copy and paste. A sensible reaction would have been why academics shy away from the said competition or from the said selection. There must be some confusion, so, we as faculty members think that it is simply betrayed. If that has been the case for deans and department heads, senior leadership management cannot be any difference. Even it can get more politicised; more pretender than the lower levels. That is the view I have (AAU-INS1).

This interviewee claimed that the selection process of the leaders was not transparent enough. The process seems more ritualistic or the selection of leaders was only ceremonial. Talking about a similar issue, another interviewee mentioned:

> There is something, that is, the deceiving mechanism is still implemented. There are nominal ways of doing things as it is merit-based and individuals are asked to fill in form and apply for the position, but the positions are most of the time pre-determined for individuals. Sometimes individuals are told that the positions are reserved for them but just to fulfil the requirement or to follow the procedures others are simply there to fill that procedure*" (*AAU-INS3).

Another interviewee also revealed that access to information was a serious problem. For example, he put his idea as "There is also a serious problem with information flow. Unfortunately, we have a serious problem with access to information. For instance, any information, from the main campus reaches us after the deadline…" (AAU-INS4). Overall, AAU instructors call for a more open and transparent system.

6.4.2 Views of DBU Instructors

The interview of DBU instructors also revealed that the university lacks a transparent system. Concerning this issue, one of the interviewees said: "If everything is carried out at the university central level (for example promotion, recruitment, appointment, curriculum design, student admission, unit assessment schemes, etc) how do we expect transparency? Believe me; there is no transparency in this university" (DBU-INS1). Another interviewee mentioned similar concerns. For instance, he said: "Our University Senate Legislation requires our leader to be transparent in different aspects like an election, curriculum design, fund utilisation, and so forth but so far, I have never seen all these happen in my department and colleges unless I am yet to see it (DBU-INS2). DBU instructors perceived transparency in terms of lack of access to information and not following due process.

6.4.3 Views of WCU Instructors

Like AAU and DBU instructors, the interview of WCU instructors indicated a lack of transparency. As one instructor said:

> Whether you believe it or no, there is no transparency in this university. Everything is secret. As an instructor, I just teach my subject and go home because there is nothing I expect from university. Many announcements are posted after they expired just for the consumption of bureaucracy. Leaders are in the office to conceal such activities. My fellow friends and I are desperate for the lack of openness in the university (WCU-INS1).

In a similar vein, another interviewee revealed his view as, "There is no access to information, specially, information related to scholarship. Ministry of Education scholarship opportunity has been posted after the deadline. We cannot even ask the reasons behind the delay" (WCU-INS2).

In summary, the interviews of the instructors across the sample universities indicated transparency is one of the concerns of university governance. Even if the Proclamation and Senate legislation stipulates the university should put in place transparent and open systems, the lived experience of instructors showed a lack of transparency in the system.

6.5 Views of Students

This section discusses the analysis of the questionnaire and interview data about the students' perception of transparency across the three sample public universities.

Table 6.8: Students' view

Higher education governance principle	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	AAU Students (n=321)		DBU Students (n=198)		WCU Students (n=178)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Transparency	3.24	.83	3.22	.75	3.20	.85

Key. The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicate the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).

As indicated in Table 6.8, the students' perception of transparency means scores across the three sample universities were almost similar, and the mean scores are a little bit higher than the neutral opinion (3.0). This shows students' view of transparency tended to a positive opinion compared to the deans, chairs, and instructors, whose

questionnaire results lean towards the neutral or negative positive perception of transparency like DBU college deans.

Table 6.9: ANOVA
Transparency mean

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.269	2	.134	.204	.816
Within Groups	457.864	694	.660		
Total	470.382	696			

As can be seen from Table 6.9, a one-way ANOVA was employed to see the transparency mean score difference among the students of the sample universities. The result showed that there was no statistically significant difference among the students in their perception of transparency mean scores: $F(2, 694) = 0.204$, $p = 0.816$. In general, students formed a positive perception of the transparency of their university system.

6.5.1 Views of AAU Students

Addis Ababa University students' interviews showed their dissatisfaction with university transparency. One of the students said: "We are not clearly informed about the election process ahead of time. The committee just comes to the class and ask the whole class to elect class representatives. The process is not transparent" (AAU-ST1). Another student also expressed similar concerns as: "The election process is not transparent. Students do not have the means to follow up on the executive committee election process at the university level. It is only at the department level that the election looks transparent" (AAU-ST4). AAU students perceived transparency in terms of the election, and this implies their level of awareness to take part in the university governance system.

6.5.2 Views of DBU Students

Debre Berhan University Students perceived transparency in terms of access to university rules, regulations and learning assessment. As stipulated in the University Senate legislation, every university is expected to help the students to be familiar with its rules and regulation. This could be done either through oral or written orientation. This means students have the right to have access information pertinent to their institution's rules and regulations. However, one of the students mentioned the

university lack transparency in making sure relevant information reaches students. He said: "lack of enough orientation for the newcomers" (DBU-ST2). For instance, one of the interviewees reported the incidents his friend encountered while studying in the library due to lack of clear instruction.

> Due to lack of clear instruction, a friend of mine encountered an unforgettable incident. One day, when he was reading in the library, he unplugged a socket from the library wall and plugged in a charger of his laptop. He did not know that the socket he plugged off was library camera for security surveillance. The security people caught and sent him to prison. They black labelled him as if he intentionally plugged off a socket to disturb the university community. It was difficult to describe all that had happened. The security people were running here and there. You can imagine how all those who were studying in the library felt and stressed running in different directions. Many things happened, but the question is, whose fault was this? There was not any warning notice or orientation that shows no need to unplug the socket. Then, after a long negotiation, the student was released from prison. Imagine we are studying in such a disturbing environment of the university (DBU-ST3).

As can be seen from the interview, if the student were given the necessary information, he would not have faced all those sufferings. A clear orientation would have minimised those sufferings. Another interviewee mentioned that instructors were not transparent in providing students learning assessments. He put his ideas as, "lack of feedback on students learning is one of the major challenges we encounter from instructors' side. Our instructors should be open and transparent when proving feedback on the course" DBU-ST1).

6.5.3 Views of WCU Students

The interviews of WCU students are more similar to that of DBU students. They formed a similar perception of transparency. Students from both universities revealed transparency in terms of lack of access to general information about the university and feedback on learning assessment. For instance, one of the students revealed his perception of transparency as, "There is no access to general information about university affairs. Only the students' representatives have access to any information.

The problem is, they are not ready to share the information they got. Sometimes, they share information with their close friends.

Another problem is, they are more transparent for the leaders than for us. They take our information (what we discussed or said) to the university higher official and never come back to us with what they heard from the university higher official. I feel like they are working as a secret service agent for the university higher officials" (WCU-ST1). Another student, on the other hand, explained his perception of transparency in terms of lack of learning feedback from instructors. He said: "Our instructors are not transparent when they give us feedback on the course. When we ask them for further clarification, they are not polite. They, sometimes, disrespect and offend us. We cannot easily push them to be open for us" (WCU-ST2).

In general, students demonstrated mixed feelings regarding the extent to which their university was transparent. For instance, the students from the first-generation university (AAU) showed their dissatisfaction with transparency from student representative election process perspectives. On the other hand, students of second and third-generation universities, in this, DBU and WCU had both shown perceived lack transparency because of lack of access to information about their institution and lack of access to learning feedback from their instructors.

6.6 The Conception of Transparency

Higher education institutions need to ensure transparent systems through which academic activities such as staff promotion, resource and finance administration, staff recruitments, consultancy, leaders election and so on could be conducted (Kebede, 2015). In a similar vein, the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation, Article 25 clearly specified, "Every institution shall have a transparent system…" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4991). However, the results of this study have shown a low perception of transparency in Ethiopian public universities. The conception of transparency from the perspective of the university system participants such as college deans, department chairs, instructors and students are discussed along with the implications of the findings of the study.

From the college deans to students, differences have been exhibited in their statements about what needs to be transparent. Deans and chairs are concerned about a lack of transparency of university senior management in terms of the financial administration, staff promotion, leader selection, consultancy service, and decision communication. This is despite Senate legislation for each of the sample universities specifying that "compete for academic offices and leadership positions on the bases of the applicable University criteria and be treated in the selection process on the basis of merit and without any discrimination, transparent, …" (Addis Ababa University, 2013a, p. 139; Debre Berhan University, 2012, p. 40; Wachemo University, 2016, p. 64). Additionally, the Proclamation stipulates, "Every institution shall have a transparent system of research fund management and Utilisation" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4991), and "every institution shall have the responsibility to forge relations with industries for mutual benefits and on the basis of principled and transparent negotiations and agreements" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4992). Therefore, while in both the Proclamation and Academic Senate legislation, universities are required to be transparent in running their activities, from the results of this study, gaps have been found between the legal documentation and its implementation on the ground. Hence, the universities need to review their systems so that the academic communities and the public at large can get the benefits from open and transparent systems.

The instructors of the three sample universities revealed their dissatisfaction with the level of transparency when the universities carry out their core activities such as staff promotion, recruitment, appointment, curriculum design, student admission, and the design of unit assessment schemes. From the instructors' interviews, more particularly perception of transparency is related to the degree of centralisation of the system. Top-down bureaucracies tend to be perceived as less transparent than more developed governance system. However, the Proclamation clearly indicates that university instructors "enjoy transparent, fair, and equitable administration and system of remuneration and benefits that shall be instituted by Government…" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4995). The Senate legislation of the three sample universities also stipulate that the universities be expected to "Ensure that all teaching-learning and research activities are institutionalised and transparent (Addis

Ababa University, 2013a, p. 129; Debre Berhan University, 2012, p. 18; Wachemo University, 2016, p. 1). Despite the legal provisions, the instructors of the public universities did not think these systems are open and transparent.

From the students' interview data, universities were not transparent in the areas such as student representatives' election, access to general information about the university affairs (rules and regulation of the university) and getting learning feedback from the instructors. Students are concerned about election of students' leaders and learning assessment policy. However, the university legislation specifies students have a right to access information; they have even the right to "participate in a transparent system of performance evaluation of academic staff and academic programmes" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 5001). As can be seen from the quotation, students are backed by the legal documentation even though the implementation of these policies was not transparent in their view.

6.7 Governance Implications

The findings of the study showed that many of the stakeholder groups in the sample public universities did not think open and transparent systems had been established. Specifically, college deans, department chairs, instructors, and partly students did not feel they had access to important information. On the contrary, based on the legal documents, the Ethiopian public universities are meant to be accountable and transparent institutions, which means the governance system should fall into BC and AD quadrants in Figure 6.1 below. The lived experience of the research participants indicated that staff in these public universities perceived a centralised system, where decision-making systems were not seen transparent enough for the academic community. Legally, the participants, as stakeholders, have the right to access to information related to academic staff promotion, their leader selection, rules and regulation, resource and finance, design and implementation of academic programs, academic staff appraisal, incentives, and so on. Unfortunately, the governance practice was characterised by an authoritative (C- Axis) approach rather than democratic (D-Axis). However, students demonstrated mixed feelings regarding the extent to which their university was transparent. In view of the students, the university transparency

system fell into both AC and AD quadrants. The former is characterised by a top-down approach, whereas the latter is considered as shared governance in which students had access to information relevant to them.



Legend: ⊡ *Deans,* ◇ *Chairs,* ⊙ *Instructors, and* ✪ *Students*

Figure 6.1: Perception of transparency

The results of the study further revealed that the two-way nature of transparency: the university requires the middle and lower levels academic units to comply with some aspects of the legal documents (A- Axis of the conceptual framework), whereas the lower and middle levels expect transparent systems from the university as shown in B-Axis. This conveys a perception of transparency, which fell into AC and BD quadrants. When there is a lack of transparency exhibited at the university higher level, it is hypocritical to expect transparency at lower levels. In reality, what seems to happen is the higher officials demand transparency from the lower level system participants when dealing with them but less so than when dealing with their colleagues, students, and their stakeholders. This suggests a shift to shared and consultative governance, where a university and its academic units are expected to promote an open and transparent

system, might better promote transparency. As suggested in the governance conceptual framework *(see Figure* 6.1*),* inclusive and shared governance, which fall into AD quadrant and consultative governance, BC quadrant needs to be in place if all the university system participants are to be transparent for their superior, colleagues, and students.

In general, open and transparent systems, which accommodate the right of instructors, students and public at large as per the legal requirements (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009) need to be in place.

Chapter 7

Participation in the Ethiopian Public Universities

7.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the results and discussion of the empirical data obtained from the research participants of the three sample universities. The chapter treats the participation of internal stakeholders such as instructors, department chairs, college deans, and students in the governance of Ethiopian public universities: Addis Ababa University (AAU), Debre Berhan University (DBU), and Wechamo University (WCU).

In the Bologna Process implementation reports of 2018, the participation of students and other stakeholders in the democratic governance and management is highlighted as the significant value of higher education institutions (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018). Sewonu (2010) also argued that the Bologna framework demands highly decentralised academic and administrative systems because stakeholders' participation and students independent learning is emphasised. In a similar vein, as specified in the EHEP, one of the major objectives of higher education institution is to "ensure the participation of key stakeholders in the governance of institutions" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4979). Taking this into account, the perception of stakeholders' participation across the three sample universities has been discussed below.

7.2 Views of College Deans

This section deals with the results and discussion about participation perception of college deans of the three sample universities. It is concerned with the analysis of the results of both the questionnaire and interview data of the college deans.

Table 7.1: College deans' view

Higher education governance principle	1st generation AAU Deans (n=15)		2nd generation DBU Deans(n=15)		3rd generation WCU Deans (n=12)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Participation	2.23	.58	3.34	.73	2.98	.80

Key. The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicate the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).

Table 7.1 shows the mean scores for the perception of participation of the college deans across the sample universities. The participation mean score of AAU college dean is lower compared to DBU and WCU. To be specific, in AAU, college deans' perception of participation in decision making stood out and perceived lower compared to DBU and WCU college deans. This shows deans' participation in AAU was relatively limited compared to the deans from the other two universities.

Table 7.2: ANOVA
Participation mean

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	7.559	2	3.779	7.666	.002
Within Groups	19.229	39	.493		
Total	26.785	41			

As shown in Table 7.2, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to explore participation differences of college deans of the sample universities. There was a statistically significant difference in their perception of participation mean scores: $F(2, 39) = 7.666$, $p = 0.002$. In order to differentiate which group is different in participation mean score, an analysis of multiple comparisons was conducted as indicated in Table 7.3 below.

Table 7.3: Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Participation Mean
Tukey HSD

(I) University	(J) University	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
AAU	DBU	-.97333*	.25638	.001
	WCU	-.71667*	.27193	.031
DBU	AAU	-.97333*	.25638	.001
	WCU	.25667	.27193	.616
WCU	AAU	.71667*	.27193	.031
	DBU	-.25667	.27193	.616

The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level

As indicated in Table 7.3, despite reaching statistical significance, the actual difference in participation mean scores between the groups was modest as per the recommendation of Muijs (2010). The effect size calculated using eta squared, that is the sum squares of between groups divided by the total sum of squares, as indicated in Table 7.2, was 0.282.

Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test *(see* Table 7.3*)* also indicated that the mean score for AAU (M= 2.23, SD= 0.58) was significantly different from DBU (M = 3.34, SD = 0.73), and WCU (M=2.98, SD=.80). However, DBU (M = 3.34, SD = 0.73), did not differ significantly from WCU (M=2.98, SD=0.80). So, AAU college deans' perception of participation was found to be lower than DBU and WCU college deans.

7.2.1 Views of AAU College Deans

As indicated in Table 7.31, the quantitative results of AAU college deans' perception of participation were distinct and found to be lower compared to that of DBU and WCU college deans. Similarly, the interview of AAU college deans confirmed the quantitative results. For instance, one of the college deans from AAU revealed his view about instructors' participation in the university affairs as:

> The participation of instructors in electing their leaders is totally absent. I think the Senate legislation requires staff to participate in selection process of their senior leaders, but the culture in the university indicates that senior leaders are totally assigned by government and political decision. For the purpose to be seen as democratic, the university board invites vacancy for the competent staff, but the assignment is not merit-based, and it is based on certain criteria apart from what has been already set in the Senate legislation. Also, academic staff members are not asked to elect their representatives. The representatives are assigned by the top leaders of the university (AAU-D1).

Although the Proclamation specifies that every institution will, "ensure the participation of key stakeholders in the governance of institutions"(The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4979), the lived experience of research participants showed limited stakeholders' participation in the affairs of the university. For instance, one of the college deans claimed that newly established universities (first and second-generation universities) have better stakeholder participation compared to AAU. He

said: "There are cases where some newly emerged universities are considered as more democratic and more collegial compared to that of ours" (AAU-D2). On the similar matter, another interviewee reported that:

> As far as I know, there is no full participation in my university. I can give you some examples, the curriculum was designed by Ministry of Education (it is untouchable), there is no fair election of leaders, a very few individuals with invisible hands decide on our fate. In the absence of all these, can I surely say there is participation in the university staff? I don't think so (AAU-D3).

As can be understood from the interviews, in AAU, the participation of stakeholders seems limited. However, the Proclamation and Senate legislation requires the university academic community to participate in the governance of their institutions through their representatives. This study revealed the gaps between the Proclamation and Senate legislation, and the actual practice of stakeholders' participation in the university affairs. So, as stated in the Bologna Process, Proclamation and the University Senate legislation, AAU might need to pay attention in raising the participation of its system participants in the affairs of the university.

7.2.2 Views of DBU College Deans

Similar to AAU college deans, the interview data of DBU college deans showed low perception of participation. For instance, one of the college deans expressed his idea as,

> As far as I know, there is no teamwork spirit, interpersonal communication, collaboration among academic staff and leaders, and lack of delegation. In my University, I don't see any collegiality of leadership skills. For me, the leadership is characterised by more of dictatorship (DBU-D1).

Another interviewee further claimed that, "…I don't see any fair participation of staff to select their leaders. The other point is, you have to be politically affiliated in order to assume any position" (DBU-D2). In addition to this, the participation of gender and physically challenged academic community was neglected in the governance of the university. On this matter, the same interviewee went on and said, "Gender and physically challenging staff participation in the decision making and other affairs of the university was totally forgotten by the university. However, the participation of these

groups has been clearly indicated in the Senate legislation, but their participation is very poor" (DBU-D2). In summary of the above interviews regarding the participation, it appears that the university restricted the participation of DBU system participants in various aspects of university governance, which was not in accordance with the Proclamation and Senate legislation.

7.2.3 Views of WCU College Deans

Regarding the participation of stakeholders in different aspects of the university governance, similar concerns of AAU and DBU college deans were reported by the WCU college deans. For example, one of the college deans reported that "There is no open staff representative selection and I don't see much participation" (WCU-D1). Another interviewee added, "Our leaders pretend to be democratic, and they mask things as if there is stakeholder participation in the affairs of university. In actual practice, you don't see fullhearted participation of the university staff in the university affairs" (WCU-D2). However, the Senate legislation demands academic community to participate in the university affairs actively. Participation in university affairs has been already set as one of the criteria for academic promotion. Also, the participation of instructors in university affairs is allotted a mark. If the instructors refuse to take part in the university affairs, they will be affected as they will lose the points allotted for the participation. For instance, WCU Senate legislation specified "Academic staffs who, for no justifiable reasons, refuse to accept positions of academic administration or committee assignments shall forgo the points for participation in University" (Wachemo University, 2016, p. 54). However, nothing has been stated when the instructors are denied taking part in university affairs. So, the legal document also needs improvement on how to accommodate the interests of both parties; the academics and institution as well.

7.3 Views of Department Chairs

This section provides analysis of the questionnaire and interview data pertinent to the department chairs' perception of participation across the three sample public universities. The first part treats the questionnaire results followed by the analysis of the interview data.

Table 7.4: Department chairs' view

Higher education governance principle	1st generation Department chairs (n=22)		2nd generation Department chairs (n=25)		3rd generation Department chairs (n=21)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Participation	2.61	.63	3.06	.90	2.85	.90

Key. The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicates the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).

As can be seen from Table 7.4, the perception of participation means scores of DBU and WCU department chairs close to neutral though AAU's mean score is somehow below a neutral opinion scale (3.0).

Table 7.5: ANOVA

Participation mean

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2.422	2	1.211	1.802	.173
Within Groups	43.688	65	.672		
Total	46.110	67			

As indicated in Table 7.5, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to see participation perception mean difference across department chairs of the sample universities. The result showed there was no a statistically significant difference among the department chairs in their perception of participation mean scores: $F (2, 65) = 1.802$, $p = 0.173$.

7.3.1 Views of AAU Department Chairs

The interview data of AAU department chairs showed that participation in university affairs was an area of concern. For example, one of the department chairs expressed his idea about the level of participation in university leaders' selection by saying,

In relation to having voice or selecting university official, our participation was not also visible. There is no direct participation in selecting them. But I think there are criteria where different individuals are invited and competed for different positions. This means, as my experience goes, I have never seen voting for position holders at any level above the department" (AAU-CH1).

On a similar issue, another interviewee reported that:

> With regards to the selection of higher-level officials of the university, this is an area where I have some concerns because selection of senior management is a kind of appointment by the government. I feel that particularly the top-level officials are assigned by using criteria which are entirely different from what is required for transformational leadership. This means the top leaders, for instance, the president, is assigned using criteria like political affiliation than academic competence, and without taking into the leadership capacity of those individuals. And sometimes, deans, directors, are assigned based on the preference of top-level officials and at the level of satisfying their own interest than looking at the competence of individuals, particularly, professional competency, academic competency, and so on (AAU-CH2).

As can be understood from the AAU-CH1 and CH2 interviews, the participation of university academics in selecting their leaders was restricted although the Proclamation clearly specified the academics have the right to select their leaders. For instance, in Article 17 of the Proclamation stipulates that "every public institution is granted the necessary autonomy in pursuit of its mission …and shall nominate the president, vice presidents and members of the Board, and select and appoint leaders of academic units and departments as provided for by this Proclamation" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, pp. 4985-4986). However, as the lived experience of department chairs disclosed, in actual practice, university top leaders were politically appointed by the government and the participation of the chairs and university community in selecting those leaders has not yet happened.

7.3.2 Views of DBU Department Chairs

The interview of the DBU department chairs revealed that the participation of the department in designing curriculum was limited even though one of the roles of the department is developing the curriculum and ensuring its implementation. Regarding this issue, one of the department chairs expressed his view as, "The department role is ensuring the proper implementation of modularisation. My department couldn't make it. The instructors in the department didn't participate in modularisation process and hence they were challenging us in every activity when they are asked to implement" (DBU-CH2). The same interviewee further revealed his dissatisfaction with being marginalised from having participation in designing the department's program and

being forced from owning and implementing it. He put his dissatisfaction and went on saying, "We are not satisfied with the implementation of modularisation. The program was implemented overnight without consulting us. We were not ready to implement it because we were forced to implement it without owing it" (DBU-CH2).

Another interviewee reported that:

> In my university, our participation is limited because most of the time we are prearranged to take part in the university affairs. Participation is a matter of our approach during the meetings. If I am not challenging the dean or top leaders, I will have more chances to participate otherwise I will be kicked out of the game. So, I have to say 'yes' in the agreement with my leaders if I ought to participate. In my university, this is what participation is (DBU-CH1).

As DBU-CH1 expressed his idea, in order to get more participation in the university affairs, he was using a tactic of pleasing the university top officials and avoiding confronting them during the discussion forum. From his claim, if the chairs are in support of the idea of the university top officials, they will have more chances to take part in different discussion opportunities. However, if the different views are not accommodated through more participation, it might be difficult for the university to get the divergent ideas that would help the university to move forward. So, the chairs and the university community need to be encouraged to participate in the affairs of their institution as clearly stated in the Proclamation and the University Senate legislation (Debre Berhan University, 2012; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009).

7.3.3 Views of WCU Department Chairs

The department chairs of WCU raised almost similar concerns with that of AAU and DBU chairs regarding their level of participation in the governance of university. WCU department chairs claimed that the centralised system of the university restricted the department to take part in different aspects of the university governance system. As one of the department chairs mentioned, "Every decision depends on the top leaders' goodwill. My role in planning was minimum because everything is planned and done at university and MoE levels" (WCU-CH2).

On a similar issue, anther interviewee reported that "My department didn't take part in the planning stage of modularisation. I was given the directives to implement the modularisation and I tried to hold discussion with staff and tried to implement it" (WCU-CH3).

With regard to the department roles in taking part in the selection of the university higher official, one of the interviewees explained that, "University top leaders pick and assign someone whom they think can run their views. So, it is not fair and participatory at all. We don't have also instructors' representatives in the college" (WCU-CH2). As can be seen from the interviews, the department chairs' participation in planning of the academic program and selecting the leaders was affected by the university centralised system. However, this contradicts with the Proclamation, where it specifies, "Every institution shall formulate rules and procedures on all matters of rights of its academic staff and adopt and implement the same after having them duly debated through participatory processes" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4996). So, the results of this study revealed that the participation of department chairs in decision making was not as required by the legal documents. Limited participation as result of the discontinuity between legal documents and practice was an area of concern for WCU department chairs.

7.4 Views of Instructors

This section presents detailed analysis and discussion of quantitative and qualitative data collected from the instructors of the three sample universities. Analysis of the findings integrates both quantitative and qualitative data drawn from the instructors of the three sample universities.

Table 7.6: Instructors' view

Higher education governance principle	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	Instructors (n=95)		Instructors (n=64)		Instructors (n=50)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Participation	2.57	.65	2.75	.72	2.70	.87

Key. The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicates the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).

Table 7.6 shows the perception of participation mean scores of instructors across the sample universities. The mean scores were below a neutral opinion scale (3.0) and the participation perception of instructors was somehow inclined toward the negative opinion.

Table 7.7: ANOVA
Participation mean

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1.418	2	.709	1.340	.264
Within Groups	109.028	206	.529		
Total	110.446	208			

As indicated in Table 7.7, a one-way ANOVA was employed to see whether there is statistically significant difference or not on the participation perception mean scores among the instructors of the sample universities. The result of ANOVA showed there was no statistically significant difference among the instructors in their perception of participation mean scores: $F(2, 206) = 1.340$, $p = 0.264$.

7.4.1 Views of AAU Instructors

The interviews of AAU instructors revealed that their representatives were restricted to take part in some of the decision-making roles as required in the legal documents. Regarding the instructors' level of participation in decision-making, one of the AAU instructors reported his dissatisfaction of the university's decision-making process as:

> I would say it is not a decision; it is kind of getting some information. The decision has been already made by the university. I don't even think that it is made by the university. It must have been made by somebody, probably by the Ministry of Education or other bodies. Leave me alone as an individual, even the senior academics and the university management had little say on it. I was introduced and informed of the decisions made by somebody else. As a faculty member, I would have my say because I have taken my teaching job but somebody who probably could have little stake in teaching in this university has made a decision and I had to accept like any other policy in this country. This is quite common in this country" (AAU-INS1).

AAU-INS1 argued that the university academic community involvement in the decision-making process is highly centralised, and the decisions are made at the central

level. The same instructor claimed that the contributions of academics during academic program and policy designs were restricted. He further expressed his view by saying:

> Most policies in this country are much borrowed because people don't want to put in it more effort. We are looking for the readymade one, like we buy our shirt and jacket in the market. In a similar way, modular approach is not even the idea initiated by the university. I don't think so. It has been brought from probably, supposedly from European member countries to promote what we call Bologna Process, but it is putting in place in the wrong way probably. So, I had a little say on it (AAU-INS1).

Another interviewee alluded to the notion of instructors' involvement presence in the affairs of the university although it was said simply to comply with the idea of participation.

> There were some participations, I would say, but it has been already disturbing. I participated in some activities, but, for example, I didn't have the chance to critic why we need to have modular approach. My role was actually managerial role; it is not about professional role. I was left with a donkey work. The decision was already taken by somebody else unknown to me to date. We were having some nominal discussion and participation whereby we simply put up courses so as to resemble the proper modular. I would not even call what we have in place the modular approach. Seemingly, a cluster in course and rebranding of courses. So, I would not say it was open, I would not say it was hit debate that went on. We simply were given instructions and we were paid a small amount of honorarium and we put things together, to resemble something like modular approach (AAU-INS2).

According to AAU-INS2 interview, the participation of instructors in planning and designing the current modularised curriculum was nominal. Thorough discussion and deliberation were not carried out. He further revealed that:

> Every change that was introduced is less participatory and again, it is top-down. So as a colleague, the staff didn't participate in this action and not actively participate in the planning stage of all these changes and these are the major problems. We lack participation, and as a result of this, implementation is poor (AAU-INS2).

Another aspect of participation in decision making is selection of the leaders. The Proclamation and Senate legislation demand instructors to participate in their leaders' election (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). However, according to AAU-INS2 interview, the academic involvement in the selection process was insignificant. For instance, an interviewee put his assessment as:

> If I take the appointment of top leaders in the university, it is fully political appointment. But there are some positions, deanship, directorship, and department chair positions, especially these days advertised, and staff applies and compete for the position although the final outcome is ceremonial and not genuine. When we come to top positions like president and vice-president positions, these are political assignments. When I look into University's Academic Senate legislation, we do have staff representatives to participate in different positions like department academic commission including Academic Senate. And the Senate legislation provides at least a certain portion or a certain number of staff to participate in representing the staff, representing the college and the like. In this case, in the legal documents, we can say there is staff participation but in actual practice, it is nominal (AAU-INS2).

Gender participation in university governance was another area of concern that the instructors pointed out. Both Proclamation and University Senate legislation specify participation of academic staff in different affairs (leadership, committee work, academic councils, and so on) of the university with appropriate gender mix. However, let alone considering the participation of gender in different aspects of university governance, the concept of the gender itself has not yet properly internalised as stated by AAU-INS2. Concerning this issue, another interviewee put his assessment as follows:

> I myself is interested in gender issues, but the way gender issue is managed on this campus is quite pretentious. We have a gender office. The gender issue is not a generic part of the system. For instance, if a female student for some reason failed the examination, it comes a gender issue. The gender issue would have been an integral part of my class. It should not be an issue when a student fails the exam. It should have come with me as early as possible so that I could make the support as an integral part of my teaching. It is a kind of

> crisis management and not something organic and something part of teaching-learning activities. It is rather kind advocacy. Defining the feature of the gender issue in this campus is merely advocacy, it doesn't go beyond that. Advocacy like the celebration of girls' day, the girls' club, etc. If we have to bring seriously about justices from the perspective of gender, it should have been an integral part of every activity, otherwise, it merely means at an advocacy level. You may talk to a gender office; I don't think they have good plans. They have policies; I have seen it, but in practice, it doesn't go down and it is not something part of our day to day activity. The support would have been part of our day to day activities. In that sense, we have gender office, but we are remaining as advocator of female rights (AAU-INS1).

From AAU-INS1 interview, gender participation needs to be beyond the advocacy, and it should not be just ritual. So, based on the findings of the study, it could be argued that there should be a legitimate participation of academics in the affairs of university and representation of gender in the decision-making process of the university governance system as per the set legal documents (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009).

7.4.2 Views of DBU Instructors

Debre Berhan University instructors' view of participation was similar to that of the AAU. DBU instructors also expressed their dissatisfaction with participation in university affairs. For instance, one of the instructors expressed his dissatisfaction as follows;

> The process of participation is dubious because, at some point, there is some sort of academic staff participation in the selection of lower (department) and middle (college) level leaders but not the university senior management. Some staff members also compete for vacant positions though there are still some politics in the process. At the end of the day, an individual with low score is picked up and assigned to lead the academic units. Due to such vague nature of selection process, it is difficult to say there is free participation even though instructors still get involved in the process. So, even if there is no genuine participation, I think, the processes can be indicative of participation (DBU-INS1).

Another instructor also revealed his concern by saying:

> Every form of participation in the university is ceremonial. The university higher official demands the department chairs or instructors to participate in some aspects of the university affairs when the Ministry of Education or University Board demands them. This kind of participation is seasonal, but it must be system based. For me, this is not participation, but it is just to respond to what the Ministry or the Board requires them to do so. Sometimes, we observe some sort of participation, for instance, some attempts to involve gender and students from disadvantaged areas to participate in university affairs just for one day or two days. That's all. Individuals just go, celebrate, and get back to their regular work. In my opinion, this is not participation; it is a ritual. There are so many challenges that limit our participation (DBU-INS2).

As can be understood from the above interviews, instructors' participation in different aspects of the university governance system was restricted for one major reason. That is, the university was following the legal documents in name only, but in reality, the instructors did not feel they genuinely participate in some aspects of the university governance. Instructors disclosed their dissatisfaction because participation in university affairs was not system based. So, a university needs to put into practice the participation of its academic community as specified in the legal documents (Debre Berhan University, 2012; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009).

7.4.3 Views of WCU Instructors

The instructors of WCU also pointed out a similar concern with that of AAU and DBU. Their participation was limited due to the university centralised system. For instance, one of the interviewees said:

> Our participation in the department academic council is limited because whatever we decided will be reversed by the college and university leaders. The decision was made just in favour of the university's higher official need. The selecti0n is not merit-based because election carried out based on university higher official goodwill. We had appointment through friendship, and it was not fair at all (WCU-INS1).

Another interviewee went on saying, "As per the senate legislation, academic staff is part of decision making but in actual practice, this did not happen" (WCU-INS2). On the same matter, one of the interviewees also revealed his opinion as, "Our staff members don't have any role in electing their leaders. Leaders are appointed by the university president. Even we don't have instructor representatives at our university" (WCU-INS3).

In general, as it can be understood from the instructors' interviews of the three sample universities, the participation of the instructors was restricted for improper implementation of the legal documents, lack of awareness (the concept of gender participation), and due to highly centralised system of the university. So, from the finding of the study, it could be argued that the university is expected to decentralise its system so that every system participant of the universities will have the opportunity to take part in the activities of their respective universities and maximise their participation.

7.5 Views of Students

This section treats the analysis of the questionnaire and interview data about the students' perception of participation across the three sample public universities: AAU, DBU and WCU.

Table 7.8: Students' view

Higher education governance principle	1st generation		2nd generation		3rd generation	
	Students (n=321)		Students (n=198)		Students (n=178)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Participation	2.93	.75	2.89	.86	2.94	.86

Key. The Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5 indicate the extent to which the participants agree or disagree about the perception of accountability: (Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5).

As can be seen from Table 7.8, the students across the sample university tend to form a neutral participation perception in the affairs of their respective universities.

Table 7.9: ANOVA
Participation mean

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.347	2	.173	.256	.774
Within Groups	470.036	694	.677		
Total	470.382	696			

As shown in Table 7.9, a one-way ANOVA revealed that there was not a statistically significant difference in the perception of participation mean scores among the students of three sample universities: $F(2, 694) = 0.256$, $p = 0.774$.

This study used interview data from the three sample universities to explore students' participation perception in the university governance. Opinions differed as to whether there is participation of students in the affairs of university or not. For instance, AAU and WCU students are in favour of participation, while students from DBU had formed a relatively low participation perception. For example, one of the students from AAU revealed her opinion and went on saying, "I participated in Veterinarian Social network club. I am working as a vice president of the club. I have contributed to community awareness raising of activities. I have also improved my confidence and knowledge about the field of study" (AAU-ST5). Another student also appreciated the value of taking part in the affairs of university as,

> I have participated in focused group discussion at the department level. We evaluated different issues about the college and university. I got different skills like how to ask questions and how to respond to the questions, and how to communicate with people. I also participated in student representative election (AAU-ST2).

In a similar vein, one of the students from DBU mentioned, "I participate in different committees, but some leaders are not willing to listen to our challenges. We are dependent on university in terms of budget and facilities; hence we are not making a big difference in decision-making on issues related to students' affairs" (DBU-ST1). Even if students at DBU took part in the decision, dissatisfaction on a delay of responses from the leaders was also reported. Another DBU student expressed her concern on less participation of female students in the affairs of the university, "I believe female

students will participate if they are given chance. But I don't think female students have enough participation" (DBU-ST2).

The interview of WCU students also showed some indication of student participation in the university affairs. For instance, one of the students expressed his view as follows:

> I am participating at different levels of decision-making, department academic committee, academic commission, and academic senate, university board. In our university trend in each level of decision students will participate. During the participation, in fact there are some influences from university leaders. But, leadership needs confidence and competences. This means, for someone who is working as student's union leader, he/she must have leadership skills and confidence. If a student leader does not have confidence, he/she may not argue with university leaders; he/she may accept any form of decision against students without critically looking at it… (WCU-ST1)

Another student kept on expressing his view and said:

> During the commencement of first-year students, we full-heartedly worked with university leaders so that students should not feel bad as they come from different backgrounds, culturally, geographically, ethnically, religiously etc. It is because of our effort that instructors also teach those students in the classroom otherwise, they will not have an opportunity to teach them. This is why we say students are the main customer of the university (WCU-ST2).

It is interesting that the interviews of most of the students emerged with positive participation perception in the university affairs, which is different from college deans, department chairs and instructors *(see section 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3),* although the statistical analysis did not reflect this. The legal documents stipulate the participation of both students and instructors in the affairs of the university, although the implementation differed as to whether students or instructors are more empowered to participate (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). So, the participation of other system participants (deans, chairs, and instructors) needs also be given impartial attention and encouraged to increase their participation in the governance system of their respective universities as specified in the legal documents.

7.6 The Perception of Stakeholders' Participation

In the current trend of higher education governance and the Bologna Process, several studies revealed increased involvement of the stakeholders in planning and decision making of the higher education governance (Alexander, 2009; European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018; Gebremeskel, 2014; Kebede, 2015; Wana, 2009). In the same way, in the recent Ethiopian public universities' competence-based education document, a move towards the market orientation and increased participation of stakeholders is emphasised (Gebremeskel, 2014; Office of the Academic Vice President Addis Ababa University, 2015). The EHEP also clearly specified one of the objectives of higher education institutions is to "ensure the participation of key stakeholders in the governance of institutions" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4979). Despite the provision of legal documents, the result of this study revealed two divergent discourses: some sort of indication of participation from students' perspective and low participation perception from the college deans, department chairs, and instructors' points of view as explained in more detail below.

The results of the data obtained from the college dean, department chairs, and instructors showed a limited involvement of stakeholders in the university governance. This was partly due to external influence by the MoE and University Board, and partly due to internal failures, university governance increasingly came to give primacy to control over institutional work and participatory decision-making. One consequence of this state of affairs has been the over-centralisation of governance system. From the university central level to all the way down to department and college assemblies, the system through which instructors and leaders participate and influence academic decision-making was constrained. To be more specific, instructors' involvement in the selection of leaders, academic programs design, policy planning, committee works, institutional assembles, community service was minimal. The result of the study also revealed the decline in participation has in some departments of sample universities reached a level of total dissatisfaction and withdrawal, and reluctance to take responsibility*(see section4.6 and 5.6*).

On the other hand, the findings of the study disclosed an increased involvement of students in the university governance system through their representatives. Student

representatives are the member of the University Board, Academic Senate, and member to all the way to department academic council. The findings of the study also showed students acknowledged their level of participation in the university governance and valued their influence in decision making. From the result of this study, students were more empowered and listened to by the university higher official than the instructors. It could be argued that this is an area of concern, which needs serious attention from university senior management. Similar to students, instructors need to be addressed and they should be encouraged to get involved in their institution's planning and decision-making process. So, the universities are expected to ensure the participatory and good relationship between their instructors and students, and give impartial attention and encourage both parties to increase their participation in their university governance system as stipulated in the legal documents (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; Wachemo University, 2016).

7.7 Governance Implications

In general, the findings of this study showed that from the point of view of research participants, the sample public universities have not established a participatory system. The university system participants, for example, the college deans, department chairs, and instructors, feel that they could have a bigger in the governance of public universities as required by the legal documents. From the finding of the study, it could be argued that decision making at higher level (university level) should be decentralised to the middle level (college), and lower level (department) in a way that would increase the participation of the instructors and lessen the chances for authoritarian control by the executive. In this respect, the legal documents such as Proclamation (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009), University Senate legislation (Addis Ababa University, 2013; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Wachemo University, 2016), and the Bologna framework (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018; Sewonu, 2010) recommend decentralised academic and administrative systems to ensure stakeholders participation in the university governance. Despite the intention of this documentation to promote shared and inclusive participatory governance, the lived experience of participants showed low perception of university participation in decision making. As

per the legal documents, the participatory governance system falls in BC and AD quadrants as indicated in Figure 7.1. To be more specific, as per the legal documents, the universities system participants have the right to participate in different affairs of their institutions such as the right to participate in the selection of leaders, design and implement academic programs, work in the committee, and so on. However, unfavourably, the governance practice was characterised by an authoritative (C- Axis) approach with less participation of stakeholders rather than democratic approach (D-Axis) *(see Figure 7.1)*.



Figure 7.1: Perception of participation

The results of the study further revealed that the universities demanded the middle and lower levels of academic units to comply with some aspects of the legal documents with limited participation as indicated in B- Axis of the conceptual framework. On the other hand, the lower and middle-level academic units anticipated participatory systems from their university as shown in A-Axis *(see Figure 7.1)*. This conveys the tension

between the university, and the lower and middle-level academic units, where the participation perception fell in AC quadrant, which is top-down governance. The higher officials did not fully permit the participation of the lower level of academic units to take part in the affairs of their institution as the system is more centralised and characterised as AC quadrant. On the other side, as indicated in Figure 7.1, the lower level academic units demanded the university senior management for more participation (BD quadrant). However, as indicated in AD quadrant, students perceived that the system is being characterised by shared governance where they are part of the decision-making on issues relevant to them.

Therefore, this study suggests more inclusive and shared, and consultative governance (*see Definition of Key Terms*), where a university and its academic units are expected to promote and contribute to participatory system. As suggested in the governance conceptual framework *(see Figure 7.1),* inclusive and shared governance (AD quadrant) and consultative governance (BC quadrant) need to be promoted in a way that participatory system could be established if all the university system participants are to be active participants in the affairs of their institutions. Overall, participatory systems, which accommodate the leaders, instructors, and students as per the legal requirements (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009) need to be in place.

PART- C

SYNTHESISING DISCUSSION

Chapter 8

Response Strategies to University Governance

8.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the strategies used by the research participants in responding to governance pressures. It focuses on response strategies of college deans, department chairs, and instructors toward the governance of their respective public universities. In this context, the response strategies are related to the demands and pressures of university governance as a consequence of the implementation of some elements of the Bologna Process. The interview data obtained from the research participants of the three sample universities were analysed based on the idea of Oliver'(1991) five typologies of strategic organisational responses to the changing environments ranging from active resistance to passive conformity to institutional pressures. These are manipulation, defiance, avoidance, compromise, and acquiescence. Accordingly, the responses of research participants were interpreted in light of the policies, practices, and norms of the sample public universities.

Since the early 1990s, public universities have gone through several reforms to respond to the environmental pressure that affects them (Bisaso, 2010). As in other countries, the Ethiopian government also embarked on the new reform, that is, the introduction of some elements of the Bologna Process into its higher education institutions as of 2011 (Addis Ababa University, 2010; Areaya et al., 2014; Chaka, 2016; Mehari, 2016; Moges, 2015). However, several studies showed that little is known about the strategic responses of organisations to the institutional pressures pertinent to the implementation of the Bologna Process (Bisaso, 2010; Mehari, 2010; Oliver, 1991; Shehada, 2010). In a similar vein, little attention has been given to the individual members of the Ethiopian public universities and their possible responses toward the university governance

system in the context of the Bologna Process (Mehari, 2010). As Oliver (1991) claimed, the institutions that challenge organisational pressures may use strategic responses that range from the most active to passive response strategies. The chapter explores the different response strategies that the sample universities' research participants use towards the governance system of their public universities.

8.2 Instructors and Leaders' Response Strategies

This section deals with the response strategies that college deans, department chairs, and instructors used to respond to the university governance pressure. Accordingly, different response strategies, which emerged from the interview data have been discussed below under the headings of 8.2.1, 8.2.2, 8.2.3, 8.2.4, and 8.2.5.

8.2.1 Defiance

Defiance is largely considered as a more active form of resistance to institutional pressures, requirements, and demands. In this response strategy, the institutions use dismissing, challenging, and attacking tactics to overcome institutional pressures and requirements (Mehari, 2016; Oliver, 1991). Based on the interview data of department chairs, and instructors across the sample public universities, defiance was observed as the most active response strategy used to lessen the university governance pressures. For example, from the interviews, the university system participants challenged the implementation of modularisation. This is evidenced by the fact that the modularisation process (block mode teaching), which was expected to be implemented at the department level faced challenges due to some academic units retaining the traditional teaching approach (semester-based mode of teaching) instead of the new modularisation method of teaching. For instance, one of the department chairs from AAU, revealed his concern as, "As the department chair, I tried to hold a meeting with my colleagues on how to implement the modularised curriculum. All the members anonymously rejected the agenda of the day. They were not even ready to talk about it let alone implementing it. We had serious challenges to implement modularisation" (AAU-CH3). Talking about a similar issue, another chair from the same university added that:

> In my opinion, nobody hates reform in higher education, particularly, in the current globalised world. The problem is how the reform is initiated and planned for implementation. When the reform is centrally initiated and sent to the implementers, in this case, the departments, it will obviously face challenges. We faced a similar situation at this university. We were told to implement the modularisation without taking part in it. At least, we would have been considered to take part in selecting or commenting on the content we are going to teach. But the system was not flexible enough to do so (AAU-CH1).

The same chair expressed his idea saying as "Still, we feel that at the department, the leadership is collegial. But this is not again the outcome of modularisation. It has been there for years because of the nature of the leadership that exists in higher education" (AAU-CH1). According to this interviewee, the introduction of modularisation has not brought change in the institutional leadership even though the Bologna Process demands collegial working environments (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018).

A similar concern was reported by another department chair from the same university. Concerning this issue, this interviewee went on to say:

> The introduction of modularisation thought to bring about many changes, but there is little change that this modularisation process has brought to our college. Of course, modularisation process is based on competence-based education; it gives more loads to students work; it is based on European Credit Transfer System, and teaching modality was thought to be students centred in which more students will be engaged in the learning process. But, I do not think all these points brought into practice due to poor implementation of modularisation. Lack of commitment from students and instructors could be some of the reasons why little change has been observed in modularisation (AAU-CH3).

This interview shows poor implementation of modularisation process, which includes professional development was one of the issues behind the lack of success with implementation. This was despite the MoE paying significant attention to teacher professional development, by introducing a Higher Diploma Programme (HDP) for

teacher educators in 2011, and later expanding the program to all higher education instructors to support the implementation of modularisation (Addis Ababa University, 2014). The program was aimed at strengthening teaching-learning, research, and development capacities (Addis Ababa University, 2014). However, the program was implemented after the modularisation process had already been put into practice. Addis Ababa University started implementing the HDP in 2014 (Addis Ababa University, 2014) and the introduction of HDP seems the idiomatic expression 'The cart before the horse'. Logically, the HDP would have come before the introduction of modularisation to equip teachers with basic pedagogical skills needed to implement the modularisation process. This view is supported by another chair from AAU who claimed that no change had been observed in AAU as a result of the introduction of modularisation, and things are moving as usual. He said "Everything goes the same way. There is no change which is observed…" (AAU-CH1). On a similar point, another interviewee further added, "I do not see any improvement. I feel we have even got more challenges than before. There is serious tension between different stakeholders, students, academic staff, university leaders, society, and [Ministry of Education] MoE as it has got quality implication" (DBU-CH2). The situation at DBU was almost similar to AAU. A department chair from DBU also reported that:

> We were not given any training related to modularisation or harmonisation. We also faced challenges during the course delivery. Initially, we were told to implement the modularised curriculum in a block modality like one month for a unit of bulky contents. We could not do any continuous assessment even if the curriculum requires the implementation of continuous assessment. It was impractical. Then, all of a sudden, we changed our teaching modality to non-block or semester-based. Practically, there is no modularisation in our university. It only exists by name … (DBU-CH1).

Another department chair from the same university added, "The department role is ensuring the proper implementation of modularisation. My department could not make it. The instructors in the department did not participate in modularisation process, and hence they were challenging us in every aspect when they were asked to implement" (DBU-CH2). Due to the fact that the modularisation process was new to the university,

and its implementation was enforced by the university, the resistance from academics was high as DBU-CH2 reported. For instance, an interviewee further put his idea as:

> We are not satisfied with the implementation of modularisation. The program was implemented overnight without consulting us. We were not ready to implement it because we were forced to implement it without owning it. All of our questions were not addressed. During the orientation, I remember, there was a student certification issue. We were told even when students academically dismissed from the university; they will be certified for the course they previously took. However, this had never been implemented. From my reading, I feel modularisation was wrongly interpreted and applied in our university (DBU-CH2).

This interview shows that the initiation of the program was external to the university as it was introduced and pushed by the MoE as an obligatory program. Consequently, the implementation faced challenges from the academic units. Even though strong resistance was reported from academic units, the instructors were forced to accept the program and start to implement it as a move to satisfy the interest of higher officials.

What is more, the implementation of modularisation was rushed by the university senior management with little consultation with local staff. This imposition and lack of consultation were noted as a means of defiance strategy of university governance. For instance, one of the instructors from AAU put his concern as, "Generally, speaking modularisation process in this university, I see it as an imposed process. It has been imposed by senior university management with of course unclear purpose. So, it was all in a rush, imposed by senior authorities with few consultations with academic staff including myself" (AAU-INS1). Adding to this, another interviewee reported that the instructors did not accept the program as it did not fit their teaching context. As a result, they resisted the implementation of the program by changing the intended curriculum design:

> When I look at the graduate program courses, which I am highly engaged in, I cannot say that they are modular approach rather, each course took one month to finish for regular programs, and only six weeks for the extension program [in-service program]. So, we cannot say that it is an appropriate modular form

> and it is simply courses that are provided a monthly basis, and so we cannot say this is a modular approach in a real sense (AAU-INS2).

The same interviewee further added, "When I came to the undergraduate program, the courses in my department, which I know very well, was designed by the MoE at the federal level. Then, they were given to us to teach it within three years" (AAU-INS2). From this interviewee's report, although the curriculum was designed before the implementation of modularisation, the instructors were not part of the process. The curriculum design was highly centralised at the MoE level, and this depicts how much MoE influenced the implementation of modularisation. Another instructor from the same university reported a similar assessment by saying:

> Modularisation concept looks good if it is properly implemented. But there is a shortage of resources as our courses are more practical [need more time]. The problem is during the design of the curriculum; the process was not participatory. It was developed by the Ministry of Education and sent to us to implement it. Some of the contents of the units are not relevant, but we are not allowed to make any form of change at the department level (AAU-INS4).

The inflexible nature of modularisation triggered instructors to resist the implementation of the program. Another instructor from DBU alluded the notion of defiance by saying "…we cannot totally claim that all the academic staff members accept the program…" (DBU-INS1). Similarly, an interviewee from WCU claimed that the introduction of modularisation did not consider the cultural context of students' learning. This was taken as evidence to resist that modularisation was not seriously considered. The interviewee commented that:

> …modularisation process did not consider the context of the country because it promotes students' self-study whereas our students did not have such culture at the high school level. It was so difficult for them to carry out any form of assignment by themselves. Hence, they began to depend on one another even during the final examination. The content of the unit is also too bulky and difficult to cover the content within the time frame (WCU-INS1).

The resistance of the participants was not only heightened by the issue that modularisation process was introduced from the MoE, but also there was a widespread perception among university system participants that the values, norms, and practices of public universities were not compatible with the existing local contexts of the public universities. For example, the interviewees revealed modularisation requires students to be autonomous learners, but the students had not yet developed independent learning (Chaka, 2016). However, the modularisation process was introduced to the public universities and their Basic Academic Units as an obligatory program that had to be adopted at any cost regardless of any conceived challenges of the university system participants. In other words, modularisation was pushed by MoE without reaching consensus with the university academic community and this negatively affected the instructors' sense of ownership, which is very crucial for the effective implementation of the program.

8.2.2 Manipulation

Oliver (1991) puts manipulation at the 'top' of her strategies ahead of defiance. Oliver labelled manipulation as the most active resistance strategy in responding to institutional pressures, which takes co-option, influence, and control as its central tactics. These tactics range from importing influential constituents to enhance their negotiation power, to shape the values and criteria of the institutional pressures and dominate institutional constituents and processes (Mehari, 2016; Oliver, 1991). Oliver did not consider different issues pertinent to an organisation such as the form, culture, context, and capacity of the organisation in influencing the external pressure through the manipulation strategy. If we take the Ethiopian higher education as a case in point, all public universities are financed by the government (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2016). In this circumstance, it is unlikely that public universities would resist the demand, requirement, and expectation of the government. This is evident from the interview data of the college deans, department chairs, and instructors of the sample universities shows that they did not use the manipulation strategy in responding to the external pressure. In support of this idea, Clemens and Douglas (2005) argued that further study needs to be conducted to evaluate the position of manipulation strategy in Oliver's (1991) model of response strategies to institutional

pressures. Consistent with the argument of Clemens & Douglas (2005), the results of this study exhibited that defiance was a more likely resistance response than manipulation. However, the manipulation response strategy was used by student representatives as a means to overcome the organisational pressure in the Ethiopian sample public universities.

The strategy was found to be bottom-up. The manipulation strategy was evident as the students' representatives tried to approach the university administration to achieve its objectives. Students' interviews showed how student representatives approached the university administration to influence the activities of the instructors and the leaders. For instance, one of the students put his points about an instructor's wrong action in grading the course as:

> We [student representatives] approached the instructor to look into himself and correct his mistake. He resisted us. The department chair also advised him, he couldn't accept. We tried to follow all the university administrative steps from the department through Academic Vice President, but he kept on resisting. Then, we have written a beautiful report about the instructor's wrong action and presented it to the Academic Senate. The Senate members reached a consensus that the instructor should receive a warning letter. Finally, he received a warning letter from the university president and got a good lesson. So, instructors should listen to their students. They should accept their fault, too. They should not undermine us [students] because it is this student who will be an instructor, leader and responsible citizen for tomorrow. Not everybody is beyond the rules of law. We need to respect rules and laws. We do not want to hurt anyone, but we want to give them a lesson (WCU-ST1).

Thinking along the same lines, another interviewee from AAU made the following points:

> It is not easy to work as student representatives. Every week, we received a lot of complaints from students about instructors' teaching and grading, department chairs' handling students' cases, and issues related to students' services such as the cafeteria, dormitory, library and so on. It takes much of our time to verify their complaints. Some of the issues are baseless and

> emotional whereas some are found to be genuine. We try to solve the problem through negotiation with leaders and following the legal procedures. Unfortunately, in most cases, we were not fruitful with the mentioned methods of complaint resolution. We were productive when we present the claims to the university president or vice presidents. They listen to us and solve our problems immediately. The problem with this mechanism is instructors, and department heads treat us as if we are the agent of the university higher officials. Our role is tough (AAU-ST4).

From the above interview scripts, it can be seen that students' representatives approached the university senior management to revoke decisions made by instructors and leaders. The interesting aspect of the Ethiopian higher education system is that students have more voice than instructors in influencing the decisions made by the academic units through the university administration. This shows that students are more autonomous than academics. Historically, the concept of academic autonomy of the students had its roots in the Bologna School in the 12th century, where students were organised to learn by hiring their own faculties and administrators (Clark, 1983; Neave, 1988). By that time, students had the right to hire and fire faculty members who tried to gain favours from them. As Clark (1983) pointed out, "Students in some medieval Italian universities, through students guilds could hire and fire professors and hence obtain favours from them"(p. 265). This accords with the current Bologna Process, and the Ethiopia higher education legal documents show students have more voice than instructors and are perceived as the main stakeholders of higher education institutions (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; Wachemo University, 2016). However, there is a view that academic freedom needs to be the collaborative efforts of students and teachers (Pavela, 2008). A student cannot enjoy academic freedom unless the professors are also entitled to the freedom to teach without unnecessary interference (Asgedom, 2007; Pavela, 2008).

From the results of the study, students employed a manipulation strategy in responding to pressure from academic units. This shows that students' response strategy is characterised by bottom-up manipulation because student representatives used

university senior management as a means to influence the work of instructors and unit leaders.

8.2.3 Avoidance

Avoidance is one of the response strategies, in which an institution attempts to protect some of their core activities from external pressures and regulations while admitting the necessity of conforming to these pressures (Oliver, 1991). The same author further argued that escaping from institutional rules or expectations is one of the avoidance tactics of minimising the governance pressures.

From the interview data of instructors, avoidance was regarded as a means to overcome the existing governance pressure. For instance, one of the interviewees used the escaping mechanism to avoid the influence of the university senior management. A situation, where instructors offer inflated grades to students as a means to get acceptance from their students has been identified. This person was accused by their colleagues for being prompted by cheap popularity to give inflated grades to students. Regarding this point, the same interviewee added that:

> In fact, it is difficult to blame only the university management in interfering with the grading system; there are also some faculty members who offer grades for cheap popularity- to be perceived as committed professors in front of their students. If you see the profile of those individuals, you will eventually find them less competent in their area of specialisations than those who offer grades for the survival of the fittest. So, in this university, we have two types of instructors. Instructors who offer grades for the survival of the fittest and instructors who reward grades for being considered a nice person (AAU-INS1).

Another interviewee further claimed that "these days, most of the instructors are shifting to use the objective form of students' learning assessments such as multiple-choice, matching and true/false rather than essay or stories or short answer types. The objective type of assessment is safe for us to convince both students and the management" (AAU-INS3). From the interview data, this new strategy was designed mainly to justify that their assessment was fair and to argue clearly for all kinds of assessment claims. The university senior management is on the side of students in this

conflict as much attention is given to students in the higher education institutions' education development change implementation document which was set by MoE (Ministry of Education, 2013).

As the interviewee explained, instructors' arguments of offering inflated grades could be attributed to forming an attachment with students. The more they attached to the students, the less they receive blame or pressure from the university management. A similar circumstance, where the instructors avoid the system through escaping, was reported by one of the instructors from DBU. He went on saying: "…I just come to the university, teach and go back to my home and spend more time with my family. Why do I stay here and affect my mind?" (DBU-INS3). This exhibits that the university administration interventions in instructors core activities compromise the quality of teaching and encroach on to the autonomy of the instructors even though the legal documents specify the autonomy of academics (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; Wachemo University, 2016).

Cushman (2003) pointed out another possibility of why grades could be inflated. When instructors fail to assess their students rigorously, and they may result in grade inflation (Cushman, 2003). The author further pointed out some other possible reasons for grade inflation as:

> Perhaps the most obvious factor leading to grade inflation is, quite simply, professorial complacency and downright laziness. The simple fact is that giving students lower grades means more work for professors. Every professor knows that he or she has to spend much more time writing comments to justify lower grades and, in most cases, professors who give students lower grades have to spend more time with students defending their choice of grade (p. 50).

The introduction to modularisation was perceived as good as it gives the instructors more time to do part-time jobs in other institutions. One of the instructors from AAU revealed that:

> ... we are supposed to be here [in the university] like 20 days of the month. But there are complaints that some faculty members do not like to meet their

> students regularly. The fact that we have this modular approach, it is even contributing to those who actually miss the classes. It is a good opportunity for them; they do whatever they want to do in three weeks, or one-month time, nobody is worrying whether students are benefiting or not. As I said, we pretend to teach, and they pretend to learn. For those who prefer to teach at the undergraduate level, the modular approach is perfect; you can cover your course within a few weeks and fly to wherever you like (AAU-INS1).

From interviewees' arguments, it seems a norm for the instructor to cover the required lessons and do their own personal activities. Even if this is practiced as a norm, the legal documents require the instructors to teach, research and render community service (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Wachemo University, 2016). From the interviews, it looks like instructors perceive teaching was the only core academic activity for which they were recruited. The university legislation stipulates that "The workload of the academic staff shall respectively be 75 percent and 25 percent teaching and research" (Addis Ababa University, 2013a, p. 71; Debre Berhan University, 2012, p. 42; Wachemo University, 2016, p. 65). However, research and community services are perceived as optional activities of the institutions. This is evidenced by the avoidance response strategy they employed to respond to the university governance system. They abandoned other activities (research and community service) except teaching role. Regarding this idea, Oliver (1991) argued that "institutional compliance is partial and organisations are more active in promoting their own interests" (p. 154). Similarly, from the finding of the study, it seems some instructors were more inclined to their personal interest rather than adhering to institutional benefits, rules, and regulations.

Another interviewee further strengthened this idea by saying:

> During the implementation of modularisation, instructors have got enough time. We teach only one month, finish our module, and we will be free for three months. And then, we can carry out if we have research projects which are very limited by their nature in our university, and then we can work on the other assignments either in the university or outside the university (AAU-INS2).

The instructors knew the unsuitability of the program in their context even though they were forced to accept and implement it. As a result, they did not full-heartedly implement the program.

From the interview data, the present grading system is becoming a serious threat to the freedom of academics to carry out their core activities: teaching, undertaking research, and assessing their students professionally. One of the department chairs from DBU employed denial as a tactic of avoidance strategy to overcome governance pressures. He put his assessment as,

> …sometimes, I have been asked to execute a lot of activities by the university higher officials. Mostly, I spend my time writing reports or explanation letters to the dean and university. These days, I stopped responding to their requests to the extent of denying what they asked me to perform. To tell you the truth, being a leader is tough (DBU-CH2).

Another interviewee from WCU used escaping as a tactic of avoidance strategy to overcome governance pressures.

> Our most time-consuming activities are students' complaints about grades. Everybody wants to get "A" grade, which is impossible. Nowadays, students don't accept "C" grades. Instructors are also in difficult situations. When the grade released, you don't find instructors in this university. They ran away, and they don't want to confront students. It is the department chairs and Student Affairs Committee who sit on the fire. We try to compromise with the management to handle grading cases. I am very keen to see when the management stops dealing with routines and start working on the strategic issues of the university (WCU-CH1).

From this interview, both instructors and leaders believe that the current student tendencies to favour grades instead of knowledge is backed by the university management which also pressurised instructors not to adhere to the rules and regulation and evaluate students professionally. In line with this, Cushman (2003) argued that "professors give higher grades and students accept them and don't make waves. The professor satisfies the student consumer's demand for an acceptable product and, in

return, avoids the taxing and unpleasant duties of assigning and defending lower grades "(p. 51). The finding of the study also confirmed a similar state of affairs.

On a similar issue, one of the WCU instructors further disclosed that:

> As the academic staff of the university, we [instructors] would have committed ourselves to the planning stages of policy formulation, curriculum design, guideline preparation, or whatsoever activities that benefit the academic community, but, in practice, we did take part in those undertakings. Even by the time we get a chance on the general staff assembly, no one wants to raise the critical question because it will fire back to us. We prefer to be in a silent mode (WCU-INS3).

As can be seen from the interview data, the department chairs and instructors from the sample public universities used avoidance as the response strategy to overcome the university governance pressures. The results also indicated the instructors would be unlikely to have the capacity to develop dissenting views regarding the grading system and university governance system. In general, the instructors and department chairs employed escaping, copying, denial, and silence as the tactics of avoidance strategies of university governance. From this, it could be argued that avoidance response strategies perhaps put at risk the academic integrity of the university if this trend is to continue in this way.

8.2.4 Compromise

According to Oliver (1991) compromise is a response strategy that attempts to balance, pacify, or bargain with external pressures of the institutional environment with the constituents on the nature of the pressures and demands. In this study, based on the empirical data, we argue that compromise also involves negotiation and consideration of alternatives in addition to what Oliver suggested. The compromise tactics such as balancing, pacifying, or bargaining, and negotiating to represent the initial stage of something undesirable in organisational resistance to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). Thus, when institutions are confronted with a lot of conflicting pressures and demands, they tend to use a compromise or negotiation strategy. From the interview data of the three sample universities, some sort of compromise to institutional internal

governance pressure was reflected. On this idea, one of the college deans reflected on institutional improvement as a means to compromise with the system and went on saying:

> Merit-based leadership selection needs to be in place. Competence, knowledge, experience need to be considered in assigning the leaders for the post. People with leadership knowledge and management are better at leading the institutions. We need friendly and democratic leaders. We also wish to nominate top officials of the university from among our own staff members than bringing in from other institutions, which are external to our university. It is better to focus on academic activities than political activities. Leaders must be competent and academician. All the challenges we faced in our university are recursive in other universities, too. So, the government needs to think over these challenges as the issue of quality education being affected by those challenges (DBU-D1).

Another college dean also commented on getting assistance from administrative staff as a means to improve the internal governance system of the university. He expressed his view by saying:

> The relationship between the administrative and academic staff was the major challenge we faced during the implementation of modularisation. The administrative staff is totally isolated from the academic staff, and they think that the implementation of modularisation is only the job of instructors. They feel that academic issues are none of their businesses (DBU-D2).

As DBU-D2 mentioned, the implementation of modularisation needs to be inclusive. It should not be left only for academics; the administrative staff should also be part of the implementation. This alerts the university management to establish a good relationship between the two parties.

8.2.5 Acquiescence

Acquiescence refers to compliance with institutional pressures and expectations (Oliver, 1991). From the interview data of the research participants, acquiescence through compliance was used as a strategy in responding to the governance pressure.

As it could be understood from some of the interviewees, the MoE was using the University Board as a means to influence the activities of the public universities. To fulfil the interest of the MoE, the universities on their part influenced their system participants to accommodate the interest of their regulators. This was notable from the interviews of college deans of the three sample universities. The following extract from the interview responses is a good indication of university acquiescence as one of the deans from AAU reported:

> The responsibilities of the university are too much as the government using University Board as an instrument to steer us. If you see Higher Education Proclamation, a university president's power is nominal. University president has no voice on the institution he/she is governing. He is a non-voting member of the board. With regard to student admission for the undergraduate program, the college has no involvement at all. Because students are assigned to different universities at the national level by the Ministry of Education… (AAU-D1).

Another dean confirmed a similar situation at DBU. Commenting on the influence of MoE, he said:

> My college has no mandate to decide on the number and quality of undergraduate students' admission. We do jobs based on the interest of university top officials. It is only when we are ready to fulfil their interest that we go ahead with some issues to be resolved (DBU-D2).

Talking about the same issue, a dean from WCU added his concern as:

> The admission was done at the Ministry of Education level. Our mandate is only assigning students into different academic units as per the set policy (70:30 this means70% of the students will be assigned to science and engineering and 30% to social science, humanities, and education). The recruitment is carried out at the university level, and we do not have a full mandate to recruit instructors. We only show our demand to the university, but we do not have the power to influence them. The graduate assistants are also recruited at the MoE level and sent to us. Totally, we do not have a mandate (WCU-D1).

An acquiescence response strategy theme in the interviews was observed across the college deans of the three sample universities. In order to address the interest and demand of MoE, it appears the universities enforced their system participants to accept the MoE requirements and adhere to the system through compliance tactics of acquiescence strategy.

In addition, one of the deans reported that compliance with the idea of the introduction of modularisation as, "I personally try to test something new. But it does not mean that there are no challenges. Something new by itself is also a challenge. Many of my colleagues were challenging the system which I personally do not agree with. We need to test the new idea first before resisting it" (DBU-D2). This shows that some sort of evaluation and adjustment that the institution needs to consider. The interview also indicated that individual acts differently to their institution.

Moreover, a college dean from WCU put his compliance with a system as,

> I think we need to respect university rules and regulation first. Here, it is common to breach the university rules and regulations. Sometimes, I am instructed through telephone without taking into the rules. I am obliged to accomplish some activities irrespective of the University Senate legislation... (WCU-D1).

Based on the interview reports of the college deans, all the sample universities utilised acquiescence to respond to the institutional pressure. From the interview data, it seems normal to run academic core activities as required by higher officials without adhering to the legal documents.

From the interviews, the acquiescence of the university senior management to the notion of modularisation and their power was used to impose change on the instructors. This led the response from the academic staff to be varied from acquiescence (not failing students) to some forms of defiance. Regarding this issue, one of the department chairs said:

> The instructors are not empowered to run a teaching and learning process. They can't assess students seriously. Students cannot fail a course. Our president says if one student fails, it is not the students who fail it is the

> instructors who fail. So, instructors started offering grades to students and grades are highly inflated. Students are graduated with the high grade, but there is a complaint among the stakeholders about the competence of students even after the completion of their studies. I don't know who will be accountable for this, instructors? Chairs? I believe the university top leaders understand what I want to say (DBU-CH1).

The DBU department chair interview disclosed that the university unnecessarily interfered in the work of instructors and started favouring only students, particularly, in the process of grading. Thus, instructors began to comply with the system, kept on negotiating with the students, and finally, they agreed to award inflated grades as a means to comply with the system.

The department chair from WCU also confirmed how the instructors adhere to the existing system. The interviewee reported that:

> The good thing about this university is that we are all new. Since our university is very young, we do not have room to resist some of the unnecessary interferences from the university central administration. Even if, we do not feel happy with some of the directives, we still try to agree with the deans or university management in all aspects (WCU-CH2).

In addition, one of the interviewees used the compliance mechanism to overcome the influence of the university senior management. In pursuit of this, the interviewee began to change his behaviour to comply with the existing organisational culture. He acquiesced in his decision and offered inflated grades to the students although he was very much aware that his action was not right. He mentioned the escaping mechanism as:

> The university does not value, who teaches best but who pretends to satisfy the students. Satisfy in a sense, does this guy let everybody pass is the criteria…if we want to be paid as the best teacher, we have to be lenient in grading. It does not matter whether we teach well or not. What matters is how generous we are in awarding the inflated grades for the students. So, in this sense, there is no direct interference, but from what we see and from others, for example, in my case, I used to get this unnecessary criticism from my students. The claims that labeled against me would have been the point of

> appreciation for me. As a person, my coping mechanism is, I do teach regularly, but I am too generous in terms of awarding grades. Because this is a way I have to survive, and it is personal coping? I do not think it is the right thing, but the university must have felt happy about me these days because the heart of the university is like that way. As a person, I study my environment, and I cope up accordingly. But if you ask me logically, I am not doing the right thing I am supposed to do. Instead, I am doing certain strategies to survive this disempowerment of the faculty members at AAU (AAU-INS1).

From the interview, it could be possible to see how the university pressurised instructors. Due to unwarranted pressure from the university side, the interviewee decided acquiescing and offering grades to deal with the environment as a means to overcome the existing pressure. So, the results of the study revealed that instructors were not performing their core activities freely as required by legal documents (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Wachemo University, 2016).

Overall, from the interviews, the modularised curriculum was initiated by the MoE and put into practice by public universities with little involvement of academic units. It seems the top-down approach created problems to implement the curriculum as the academic units were denied participation at the initial planning and designing stage of the modularised curriculum. Eventually, it looks like the academic units faced challenges from their colleagues to own the program as they were externally influenced by MoE, and internally by the university senior management. Finally, the public universities acquiescence in MoE's demand and expectation and they used their power to influence the academic units to accept the reform. The next section discusses the strategies used by the university participants to respond to pressures such as modularisation.

8.3 Comparison of Response Strategies

The response strategies of the system participants to the university governance pressures varied across the sample universities. As Oliver (1991) argued, response strategies generally can be classified into confirmatory and resistance. Acquiescence

and compromise are part of confirmatory responses, while avoidance, manipulation, and defiance are considered as resistance response strategies. Acquiescence is a passive conformity strategy while compromise is an active strategy when members of the institution agree to institutional pressures (Clemens & Douglas, 2005; Oliver, 1991). The other three strategies: Avoidance, defiance, and manipulation represent passive to active resistance responses to the institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). However, the response strategies of institutional pressure might differ both across the countries and organisation depending on the form, culture, and condition of the organisation and the level of interconnectedness between organisation and the external environment, say for example a state (Wijethilake, Munir, & Appuhami, 2017). Oliver's model included the presence of the factors driving the strategic responses. These factors encapsulated the following questions: "why these pressures are being exerted, who is exerting them, what these pressures are, how or by what means they are exerted, and where they occur" (Oliver, 1991, p. 159).



Figure 8.1: Response strategies to governance

Unlike, most of the higher education institutions in developed countries, government interference in higher education institutions in Africa is a norm (Solomon, 2010;

Zeleza, 2004). As Solomon (2010) argued, this is mainly because the government is financing most of the public universities, and consequently, the universities' authority to govern their affairs is minimum. The government demands higher education to be accountable for its core activities (Varghese, 2013a; Wana, 2009; Woldegiorgis et al., 2015; Zeleza, 2004). Similar to previous studies, the findings of this study demonstrated that the influence of public universities in responding to the external pressure was minimal as they were fully dependent on the government budget. For instance, the result of the study revealed that the college deans and department chairs tend to use confirmatory strategy in responding to the governance pressure (*see Figure 8.1*). Based on the result of the study, it seems the use of acquiescence served the university officials to prove their obedience to the MoE from whom they get budget and approval. In light of this, Oliver (1991) also argued that an organisation might use this strategy as means of institutional ties to establish its trustfulness and acceptance to other external constituents from whom it obtains resources and approval.

On the other hand, the findings of the study indicated that defiance was the most active strategy that the department chairs and instructors of the sample universities used in responding to governance pressures instead of manipulation, which Oliver (1991) proposed as the most active resistance strategy *(see Figure 8.1).* Oliver's (1991) argument for resistance as the most active strategy might work in the context, where higher education could influence the state in achieving its internal demands and expectation. However, in Ethiopian higher education settings, manipulation was not as active as a defiance strategy in responding to the governance pressure.

The results of the study also showed that manipulation strategy was mainly used by students' representatives. Students employed a bottom-up manipulation strategy, where they approached the university senior management to influence the activities of instructors and leaders. In connection to this, Clemens and Douglas (2005) argued that "further conceptual and empirical work is necessary to evaluate the position of the manipulation strategy in Oliver's (1991) framework and the importance of the observer's perspective, that is, whose lens is using" (p. 7). Drawing on Clemens's & Douglas's (2005) argument, the results of the study exhibited that Ethiopian public universities response strategies are characterised by resistance responses from the lower

level academic units and confirmatory responses by the middle-level management. This shows a tension between the lower academic units and the higher level of the university administration. It demonstrates the implementation of policy or reform which was more challenged at the lower level by the members of the academic units than those at the middle and higher levels, in this case, the college and university.

From the response strategies of the university system participants across the sample universities, the Bologna Process is not seriously taking being incorporated into practice. This is also evident from the reports of department chairs and instructors about the implementation of modularisation process, which is one of the elements of the Bologna Process that all the public universities were embarked on.

So, from the results of the study, it could be argued that the Bologna Process needs to be contextualised in such a way that it accommodates the existing circumstance of the higher education institutions and the open participation of the relevant stakeholders.

8.4 Governance Implications

The findings of the study revealed that strong government influence of the public universities limited the capabilities of the deans' responses to passive conformity but used power to influence the lower level academic units in the form of simple acquiescence and compromise. This acquiescence was put into place mainly through the directives and requirements set by the MoE.

Based on the strategic responses that the participants used, a system is identified by a circumstance, where the university senior management is censured in undermining the autonomy of the lower academic units. At the same time, those in lower-level positions: instructors and department chairs, in their part also criticised university senior management for failing to engage them to take part in the introduction of some elements of the Bologna Process. As a result, a very confusing scenario emerged where the past patterns still contained the implementation of some elements of the Bologna Process. This could further explain some sort of failure to implement the modularisation process as required by legal documents. The defiance and avoidance response strategies of the lower academic units also confirmed this situation. This means the instructors

and department chairs strongly resisted the pressures as it was largely accompanied by a strong force from the university administration.

Overall, modularisation process was imposed on the university without reaching consensus with the key stakeholders, in this case, the public universities about its pros and cons in the Ethiopian higher education settings. As the analysis of the participants' response strategies indicated, the public universities were forced to adopt some elements of the Bologna Process, of which the implementation of modularisation can be cited as an example. The adoption took place regardless of the public universities' needs and context. As a result, this study showed that the system was characterised by resistance mainly defiance and avoidance, and bottom-up manipulation. As Ashcroft and Rayner (2010) argued, the increasing pressures on the university and its system participants to adopt government objectives without reaching consensus resulted in tensions such as, "control versus autonomy, modernisation versus government knows best, democracy versus the need to control dissident voices" (p. 1). The finding of this study suggests the importance of reaching consensus among different actors such as the MoE, public universities and their basic academic units in policy or program adoption before the implementation occurs. So, the need for shared governance is implied from the findings of the study to lessen the existing governance pressures among the university system participants as required by the Bologna Process and public universities legal documents.

Chapter 9

Voice of the Students in the Ethiopian Public Universities

9.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the data analysis and discussion pertaining to the student voice in the Ethiopian public universities' settings. Data obtained through open-ended questionnaire questions and interviews from the students of three public universities are analysed qualitatively in order to explore the broader picture of student voice in their respective universities.

In the current trend of higher education governance, much emphasis has been given to students' voice (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018); Freeman (2014); (Gebremeskel, 2014; Kebede, 2015). For example, in the Bologna Process, students are conceived as the main stakeholders in the democratic participation of higher education (Bergan, 2003; Boland, 2005; Sewonu, 2010). Klemenčič (2006) also argued that in the Bologna Process, "student involvement in higher education policy and decision-making most often ends up making demands: on higher education institutions regarding what they should deliver; on governments to fund their education; on industry to come up with jobs and recognise their qualifications" (p. 8). However, students voice is far from the actual practice in Bologna implementing countries such as Norway, Ireland, UK, and Turkey (Bergan, 2003; Boland, 2005; Dundar, 2013; Kuruuzum, Asilkan, & Cizel, 2005). Drawing on this, Bergan (2003) further argued that in the Bologna implementing countries " even if the formal right to representation [of students] has been secured, students' actual use of that right is far from satisfactory"(p. 3).

Over the past two decades, Ethiopia also embarked on some elements of the Bologna Process and introduced some elements of the Bologna Process into its higher Education

institutions (Gebremeskel, 2014; Ministry of Education, 2012). One of the elements of the Bologna Process was the right of higher education institutions' students to participate in the university affairs. For instance, the voice of students in the Ethiopian public universities is specified in the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation Article 37 (1 & 2) (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009) as shown below. Hence, student shall have the right to:

> join the institution's student union, which shall be founded on the principle of universality of membership in accordance with the pertinent laws so as to promote and protect lawfully their common interests; participate, through their union or representatives, in the sessions of the institution's governing bodies in accordance with this Proclamation and directives issued by the Board; use, under the leadership and guidance of the student union and with the attendant responsibilities, communications media on campus to provide a forum for the free exchange of ideas and to present news, opinion and editorial comments(pp. 5001-5002).

As can be seen from the legal documents, Ethiopian public universities have a legal requirement to make provision for students to exercise their rights. Also, in previous chapters, we have seen how strongly the student voice comes through. As can be seen from Table 9.1, students seem to construct a positive perception of university governance as compared to college deans, department chairs, and instructors.

Table 9.1: Mean scores on questionnaires for 3 universities combined

Principles of governance	Deans		Chairs		Instructors		Students	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Autonomy	2.63	.70	2.70	.72	2.65	.65	3.10	1.01
Accountability	2.99	.89	2.89	.80	2.72	.68	3.22	.81
Transparency	2.91	1.00	3.1	1.02	2.83	.86	2.90	.94
Participation	2.81	.81	2.85	.83	2.66	.73	2.92	.82
Overall	2.83	.74	2.88	.71	2.71	.56	3.05	.72

As indicated in Table 9.1, students' mean scores about autonomy, accountability, and participation are slightly higher as compared to the college deans, department chairs,

and instructors. The interview data also confirmed quantitative results as discussed in the next sections. This shows that the Bologna accord principles and the legal documents do not seem to be taken much note of by deans, chairs and instructors but has had impact on students' voice.

9.2 Students Representation in the Governance of University

As specified in the University Senate legislation, students have a formal structure to participate in the decision- making process across the sample universities. Students have the representatives in the Academic Senate (ACS), College Academic Commission (CoAC), and Department Academic Council (DAC). However, the numbers and types of representatives differ from university to university as indicated in Table 9.2.

Table 9.2: Documented legal provision of student representation by university

Students' representation	AAU	DBU	WCU
Academic Senate and university council	Two representatives of the University's Students' Union (male and female).	Two Student Union representatives. Student representative is the member of the University Council, but the number of representatives is not indicated	The female representative of WCU Students' union, and the President of WCU Students' Union 4 and two undergraduate and two postgraduate student representatives with gender mix5. In total six members.
College Academic Commission	Two student representatives (one graduate and one undergraduate).	One representative of the students from the respective college	Two Student Representatives (male and female)
Department Academic Council	Two shall be student representatives from regular and continuing education programs	One representative as deemed necessary	No representatives

(Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Wachemo University, 2016)

[4] *Members of the Academic Senate*
[5] *Members of the University Council. The University souncil is advisory body to the President.*

As indicated in Table 9.2, the legal documentation shows the number of students' representatives in decision-making decreases from Academic Senate through their respective departments in DBU and WCU. Department is the level of decision-making process closest to the students and where their involvement in the decision-making would most likely to be appreciated and encouraged.

9.2.1 AAU Students' Voice

As Table 9.2 shows, in AAU's Senate legislation, gender representation is only considered at the Academic Senate level. At the College and Department levels, student representation was comprised the representatives of graduate and undergraduate programs and regular and continuing education programs respectively. Despite there being student representation on program-related governance structures, the interviews of the students disclosed that their involvement in academic program planning and development was limited in their respective college and department. For instance, one of the students expressed her dissatisfaction of the program as follows:

> Modularisation approach doesn't improve students' competence. We just work in a group. Let me tell you frankly the secret, when we are given five different assignments in our group (1 to 5), I take the responsibility of one group and other will also do their share individually. We are doing 5 assignments all together but we share the 5 assignments and so I will do only one assignment from my side. Finally, we all write our names in each assignment and submit it to the concerned instructors. That's all. Instructors don't have time to check our assignments because they only rush to cover the content of the units within one and half a month. I don't know how they assessed our assignment and graded it with limited time they were given. So, I don't see any competence-based education in this program. I don't know where the problem is (AAU-ST1).

As can be seen from the above interview, the student was not happy with the design of the program. The program delivery arguably influenced the instructors not to effectively teach and assess the students due to a mismatch between the content of the units and the time allocated to cover the unit. Consequently, it appears academic integrity was compromised. However, the Academic Senate legislation of the three

sample universities stipulate that the department is responsible to ensure academic integrity through a formal students' evaluation of instructors' teaching effectiveness, assessment, and the relevance of the content of the unit at the end of the semester (Addis Ababa University, 2013a, p. 130; Debre Berhan University, 2012, p. 188; Wachemo University, 2016, p. 170). The evaluation process enables the students to evaluate the performance of instructors and comment on the contents of the unit.

With regards to assessment, it would be inappropriate for students to have a voice because students' voice in assessment might result in conflict of interest like complaining because of grade dissatisfaction. Under normal circumstances, say for example, before the release of grades, if students are given chance, they are more likely to participate. In connection to this, Planas et al. (2013) argued that students are likely to participate in the university affairs both formally and informally when they have a voice. They do not only make complaints but also ask questions and express their concerns. In harmony with this, the Academic legislation further specified that students have the right to "[g]ive suggestions in the preparation of bylaws, regulations and directives pertaining to administrative matters as well as in the review and development of curricula" (Addis Ababa University, 2013a, p. 183). But from the interview, it seems the actual practice is missing.

From the findings of the study, the department level meetings tend to be concerned with teaching, assessment, and curriculum. Even if the legal documents specify students, involvement in academic program design, undergraduate students are not normally considered to have the expertise to participate in such discussions. This suggests, it would be reasonable to involve postgraduate students to take part in curriculum design rather than undergraduate students as in most cases postgraduate students have experience and expertise prior to commencing their postgraduate study. They might have more inputs than undergraduate students. In this regard, the legal documents need to be specific enough and consider postgraduate students to take part in curriculum design. This would help both the students and the university to maintain academic integrity.

The Addis Ababa University Senate legislation reveals that one student representative from the student union is the member of the Academic Standards and Program Review

Committee (ASPRC) (Addis Ababa University, 2013a). However, students interview revealed that,

> We participate in some activities of the university like selection of students' union, attending meetings, participation in different clubs and so on. But we were not invited to comment on the curriculum we are currently learning. As students, we have some ideas to comment on the content of the courses but, never happened at our department or college (AAU-ST3).

Another student acknowledged the benefits she has got from working as student representative. She said, "I have participated in focused group discussion at the department level. We evaluated different issues about the college and university. I got different skills like how to ask questions and how to respond to the questions, and how to communicate with people. I also participated in student representative election" (AAU-ST2). Therefore, this student's involvement in different affairs of the university helped her to get new skills in addition to her academic engagements.

Regarding the election of their representatives, as one of the students revealed, the election process was conducted democratically through the following steps;

> Student representative election process begins from the department. Each section within the department elects their representatives. Then, all the representatives come together and elect their president, vice president, and secretariat. The remaining members will take part in different committees. There are no set criteria to elect the representatives. But, usually, students will go for individuals who are vocal having interpersonal communication skills. Any seconded students will be accepted as a candidate. If she/he gets large votes, he/she will be nominated. Gender has also been considered (AAU-ST3).

So, the election process looks democratic as the students from different sections and gender mix were well-thought-out. Student representatives were happy with their level of involvement in the decision-making process. One of the student representatives expressed her satisfaction in leadership participation by saying:

> I was elected as the president of student union of my college. Participation in every activity has benefits. My current position helped me to experience

> leadership skills. I know that various challenges are ahead of me and hence leadership practice and experience are one way of overcoming those challenges. From this position, I have got problem-solving skills, negotiation skills, establishing good relationships among students, academic staff and college leaders. I and other committee members have been working as a bridge between students, and academic staff, administrative staff, and college leaders (AAU-ST3).

On a similar issue, another student also revealed benefits of his involvement in leadership as,

> I have been elected as the chairperson representing my class students. I am also a member of student union council. Participation in every activity has benefits. My current position helped me to experience responsibility. My position helped to acquire interpersonal communication skills with students and instructors, and college managements. I have also got confidence to accomplish my responsibilities (AAU-ST4).

In addition to this, another student put her view as, "I participated in Veterinarian Social network club. I am working as a vice president of the club. I have contributed to community awareness raising activities. I have also improved my confidence and knowledge about the field of study" (AAU-ST5).

In general, from the interviews of AAU students, it looks students had a strong participation in university affairs. AAU students have more voice in the governance of university compared to instructors and chairs *(see Table 9.1)*.

9.2.2 DBU Students' Voice

As shown in Table 9.1, two representatives are the member of Academic Senate Assembly as stated in the Senate legislation of DBU (Debre Berhan University, 2012). However, according to the interview of DBU student, only one representative was participating in the Academic Senate Assembly of the university. The student revealed his idea by saying:

> Only one member participated in decision making although the legislation states two students in the Academic Senate meeting. Only male student

> participated in AC [Academic Commission] and different committees. We are trying to convince the university management to get more voice. It is a good opportunity to practice leadership at the university. This skill is waiting for us in real world and being a member of student union is good opportunity for all (DBU-ST3).

Another student also mentioned that "The participation of female students in the decision-making process is minimal as only one student (in most cases a male student) takes part in decision making at college and university levels" (DBU-ST1). On the similar issue, another student said, "I believe female students will participate if they are given chance. But I don't think female students have enough participation" (DBU-ST2). This contrasts with the legal documentation which stipulates female participation in decision making process through the Gender Office. From the interviews, lack of female students' participation was exhibited even though the legislation specified their participation in different assemblies including the Academic Commission of the college.

9.2.3 WCU Students' Voice

Wachemo University students were in a better position in their level of participation in the decision-making process compared to AAU and DBU, where only two students' representatives participate in decision-making process from each university. In WCU, students had more voice in the Academic Senate Assembly as six students' representatives participate in Senate Assembly *(see Table 9.2)* even though their participation at the department level was not specified in the university Senate legislation. It is only in WCU that female students have their representative in Students' union at the university level in addition to two students' representative in the Academic Senate assembly. Students voice was also heard better in WCU as one of the interviewees revealed. For instance, one of the interviewees expressed that:

Another interviewee further expressed that:

> During the commencement of first year students, we full-heartedly worked with university leaders so that students should not feel bad as they come from different background, culturally, geographically, ethnically, religiously, etc. It is because of our effort that instructors also teach those students in the

> classroom otherwise, they will not have an opportunity to teach us. This is why we say students are the main customer of the university (WCU-ST2).

As can be understood from the interviews, WCU students had more voice at the University Board, Academic Senate, and College assembly levels. Student representatives were relatively empowered by the university to the extent of influencing the decision to reprimand the instructors. For instance, WCU's Senate legislation does not state the student representatives as the members of decision-making bodies in their respective departments. However, their voice was more heard at the university central level than at the department level. For instance, one of the representatives of the students narrated how one of the instructors was warned:

> One of the students complained about an instructor wrong action in grading the course. We [student representatives] approached the instructor to look into himself and correct his mistake. He resisted us. The department chair also advised him; he couldn't accept. We tried to follow all the university administrative steps from the department through Academic Vice President, but he kept on resisting. Then, we have written a beautiful report about the instructor's wrong action and presented it to the Academic Senate. The Senate members reached consensus that the instructor should receive a warning letter. Finally, he received a warning letter from the university president and got a good lesson… (WCU-ST1).

The same student further disclosed that instructors formed negative attitudes toward the Students' Union and student representatives. He revealed that "instructors perceive as if we are their number one enemy. This kind of attitude needs to be improved" (WCU-ST1).

In general, the interviews of students across the sample universities unveiled personal growth as the key theme constructed by students. On top of this, students are highly empowered as they received strong backing from the university. On the other hand, the interviews revealed a malfunction in the system of decision-making, mainly, the poor relationship between students and instructors. It was evident from the interviews of the students that they did not exhibit as much confidence in the professional and ethical rectitude of their instructors. This shows there is a need for public universities to ensure

the healthy relationship between students and instructors through different forums in which both parties meet and discuss their common issues.

9.3 Students Response Strategies

Based on the interview data of students from the three sample public universities, acquiescence and compromise response strategies were mostly used to respond to the university internal governance pressures. This section treats the discussion of acquiescence followed by compromise.

9.3.1 Acquiescence

Hitherto, it has been mentioned that acquiescence refers to compliance with institutional pressures and expectations. According to Oliver (1991), acquiescence happens in three forms: Following invisible, taken-for-granted norms, imitating institutional models, and obeying rules and accepting norms. Based on the interview data, students used compliance as a means to respond to the university system. For instance, one of the students accepted the university rules and regulations, and he was happy with the leadership position. He revealed his compliance by saying:

> I was elected as the president of the student union of my college. Participation in every activity has benefits. My current position helped me to experience leadership skills. I know that various challenges are ahead of me, and hence leadership practice and experience are one way of overcoming those challenges. From this position, I have got problem-solving skills, negotiation skills, establishing a good relationship among students, academic staff and college leaders. Other committee members and I have been working as a bridge between students, and academic staff, administrative staff, and college leaders (AAU-ST3).

Another student from the same university also added:

> I have been elected as the chairperson representing my class students. I am also a member of the student union council. Participation in every activity has benefits. My current position helped me to experience responsibility. My position helped to acquire interpersonal communication skills with students

> and instructors, and college managements. I have also got the confidence to accomplish my responsibilities (AAU-ST4).

In the same way, a student from DBU used compliance as the strategy to respond to the university system, and he put his view as,

> For me, I am happy with the way university treats and listens to students. But, from my observation, I want to comment on two points. My first point is that the university needs to work on community awareness particularly for the activities that affect students teaching-learning (night club, bars, chewing chat, drugs) near the university compound. Second, there is no counselling and follow up after female students academically dismissed from the university. They feel ashamed to go back to their parent, and they prefer to engage in unpleasant activities like working in the bar (DBU-ST3).

Like AAU and DBU students, WCU students also used acquiescence by obeying institutional expectations as a means to respond to the system. As can be seen from the WCU-ST1 quotation, even if an interviewee engaged in leadership activities, he also tried to meet his parent and university expectations that academic success is his primary goal. He revealed his idea as,

> … basically, my parent primarily sent me here to study and hence, I have to be successful in my study. I do not want them to feel ashamed of me. Practicing responsibility and studying simultaneously is difficult. That is why I said time management is crucial if we want to put in place responsibility and studying together. We are responsible for everything from top to bottom university administration system. We have passed through many challenges. We are also happy to overcome many challenges. In fact, overcoming those challenges need different techniques such as patience, tolerance, and thinking (WCU-ST1).

Therefore, the interview data revealed that students from the three sample public universities used compliance as a method to meet the internal expectation or pressure of their respective institutions.

9.3.2 Compromise

As discussed before, Oliver (1991) explained compromise as one of the strategies to respond to institutional pressure. In a similar vein, from the interview data of the students, compromise strategy was used to respond to the institutional environment. As Oliver (1991) argued compromise tactic represents the initial stage of something undesirable in organisational resistance to institutional pressures. For instance, WCU-ST1 tried to negotiate the tension between the university senior management and students' demand as mentioned below:

> I am working as one of the members of the student council at the university level for the past three years. I have been arguing that Bachelor degree holder (Fresh graduate student or a new graduate assistant) should not be recruited to teach us. Our concern is that it has an implication for the quality of education. By saying this, our intention was helping both students and instructors. Students should gain the necessary knowledge and skills. The instructor should also improve his/her career before assuming senior courses. Most of the students are complaining about those newly deployed teachers. They do not have pedagogical skills on how to question students, responding to students' questions, encouraging students, etc. We usually see them feeling stressed in the classroom. I would like to request the university to seriously pay attention and minimise such gaps for the future (WCU-ST1).

The same student further added how negotiation took place between the student union and the MoE,

> We believe student's union should not be a parasite to university management. One of our discussion points with Ministry of Education was, after completion of our undergraduate studies, we, member of students' union should be given postgraduate study Scholarship opportunity for the service we rendered to university students. The Ministry of Education said, "for some who feeds well, do you report any bad of him/her? No, you cannot". Therefore, the Ministry of Education insisted on offering us such an opportunity. We were also convinced because if we get such an opportunity; we will definitely be dependent and cannot accomplish students' related issues independent of the university top management. In our university, we have an independent office, the office of the students' union. It is accountable

> to the university president. Our office has its own budget. We are autonomous; if we are not autonomous; we cannot accomplish students' rights (WCU-ST1).

One of the students from DBU used negotiation or compromise as a method of remarking on university governance practice. He said, "Only one member can participate in decision making even though the legislation states two students. In most cases, the only male student participates in AC and different committees. We are trying to convince the university management to get more voice" (DBU-ST3). Another student from AAU also used a similar tactic as a means to respond to the university system and put his idea as, "In my opinion, respect for students must be the priority. Students are the primary stakeholders of the students. We request our institution to have a practical oriented curriculum and to fulfil the necessary teaching and learning materials" (AAU-ST3).

Overall, the university system participants used different response strategies such as acquiescence/compliance, manipulation, defiance/resistance compromise, and avoidance to respond to university internal and external pressures. However, students' response strategies tended to be more positive as they predominantly used acquiescence and compromise strategies to respond to the university system and lessen the tension between students and university senior management.

9.4 Students' Conception of their Voice in Higher Education Settings

From the findings of the study, students understood their rights in terms of influencing various decisions on issues related to students' affairs that is, in terms of contributing to policy and procedures governing the activities of instructors. The Ethiopian higher education institutions' education development change agent operational manual specifies that "Students' change army should work hard and follow up instructors not to miss the class for unjustified reasons, and report to the results to the concerned bodies. The armies also perform other duties as assigned by their respective department chairs" (Ministry of Education, 2013, p. 45). The document further specifies that students need to get involved in decision making about issues related to academic and administrative

activities at different levels of the universities, Academic Senate, College Academic Commission, and Department Academic Council (Ministry of Education, 2013).

The legislation of the three sample universities also required the representation of students in different aspects of university governance, including the Senate, its various committees, college/institute AC, DACs, other academic decision-making bodies including administrative bodies, which engaged in students' service delivery (Addis Ababa University, 2013a, p. 188; Debre Berhan University, 2012, p. 100; Wachemo University, 2016, p. 179). Despite the legal requirements, the lived experience of students showed students' representatives were more empowered at the higher-level decision-making (university level) than the lower level (departmental level). The level of their participation decreases as it goes down to the department, where issues related to students are expected to be discussed at greater length (Addis Ababa University, 2012b; Ministry of Education, 2013). This imbalance students' participation at different levels created conflict between students and instructors because instructors sometimes perceived students' representatives as their opponents. The roles of students' representatives were perceived as an advisory role to the university senior management. It could be arguable that this kind of students' involvement in a decision-making process might apparently weaken the relationship between students and instructors. In addition, the empowerment of students at the department level might cause a conflict of interest between students and instructors as students might be put in a position where they can directly influence the assessment of their own work, especially if instructors feel threatened by students. As a consequence, instructors might easily be influenced to change students' learning assessment standards, which could obviously affect the academic integrity of the department and university as well. In this regard, caution needs to be made on the issues that students' representatives should be involved in at the department level. Students need to be represented in the departments especially on issues such as rights, responsibilities and experiences that can affect them directly so that decisions reached could be accepted by all the parties involved. This will enable the students to feel being part of the decision reached and minimise the tension between students and instructors.

The universities need to work on how students and instructors collaborate to ensure both academic and professional integrity. For instance, Millett (1974) argued that one of the reasons why students are made to participate in a council or senate is to legitimatise their power that has been limited by administrative power, and proper representation of students in these decision-making bodies would ensure appropriate action. Nevertheless, in the Ethiopian public universities' context, students have more voice and their interviews confirmed their level of participation, particularly at the university level was high and they also acknowledged that their voice is being heard by university senior management.

Fabrice Hénard and Alexander Mitterle (2010) have noted that "it is imperative to involve students in academic or administrative decision-making processes as what faculty and students do is what the institution becomes. It does not happen because a committee or president asserts a new idea" (p. 58). Students participation in different aspects of university affairs such as involvement in decision making process, providing feedback on university teaching and leadership, and participation in academics-students liaison forums can contribute to peaceful and responsive academic environment and to better quality of decisions (Luescher-Mamashela, 2013)

Therefore, the roles of students and academics are paramount in ensuring the growth and development of the higher education institution, but caution needs to be made on students' level of participation in decision making processes.

9.5 Governance Implications

The Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009), University Senate legislation (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Wachemo University, 2016), and the Bologna Process have made clear that student participation in the university as one of the focus points higher education governance (Planas et al., 2013). Based on the findings of the studies, the university needs strategies of understanding and connecting both instructors and students to have formal spaces for participation in different affairs of a university. The participatory governance system, where the university system participants (students, instructors, and leaders) can actively take part needs to be promoted and the university

dedication in this aspect should be encouraged as an important strategy of maintaining the relationship between students and instructors. In connection with this, Planas et al. (2013) argued:

> The teaching staff are really the ones who promote – or inhibit – student participation through their attitudes and the resources they use to facilitate the information and participation processes. It would seem obvious that, if professors do not show themselves to be clearly predisposed towards and involved in the university, it is unlikely they will be able to work in this direction with the students (p. 581).

Therefore, in order to maintain a healthy and peaceful academic institution, instructors and institution leaders need to work as the frontiers to create a forum through which all the system participants (institutional leaders, instructors, and students) collaborate and freely exchange their opinion. As Luescher-Mamashela (2013) argued, a more peaceful academic institution generates trust, and improve the quality of university leadership and teaching, and university-community partnership.

Chapter 10

Governance Challenges and Opportunities in the Ethiopian Public Universities

10.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, the perception of the university system participants and the strategies they used in responding to the university governance have been discussed. This chapter presents the challenges and opportunities pertinent to the universities' governance as a consequence of the Bologna Process. Accordingly, the chapter presents the data obtained from the open-ended questionnaires and interviews of the college deans, department chairs, instructors, and students.

Several studies have revealed that HEI is regarded as the main engine of development across different countries (Banya & Zajda, 2015; Bloom et al., 2014; Dervin & Zajda, 2015; Okeke, 2010). Singh and Manuh (2007) argued that HEIs need to respond to three core areas: teaching, research, and community service. In order to overcome the globalisation challenges, various countries have been reforming their higher education systems (Hahn & Teferra, 2014; Olsen, 2002; Varghese, 2013a; Woldegiorgis et al., 2015). New regional cooperation in higher education through the Bologna Process could be cited as an example of this kind of move (McMahon, 2010). The Bologna Process (1999) was aimed at harmonising Europe's higher education system through increased inter-compatibility, and mobility, allowing students to study without borders and by creating an unimpeded exchange of staff (Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, 2012; European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018; Fejes, 2008). It has changed the higher education landscape in both European and non-European countries (Dehmel, 2006; European Commission, 2001; Fejes, 2008).

Similar to Europe, the African Union Commission (AUC) had embarked on the harmonisation of African higher education programs for the second decades of education for Africa of 2006-2015 (Sall & Ndjaye, 2007). Many African countries showed interest in the notion of the Bologna Process with the view that the region could benefit from the Process by forming partnerships with the rest of the world. For example, Sall and Ndjaye (2007) firmly claimed that "African inter-academic cooperation can be boosted if it is inspired by cooperation models existing in the European academic space" (p. 52). The African Union also claimed that "…higher education in Africa would benefit from the adoption of the Bologna Process, especially in fostering regional collaboration" (p. 55). Different regions, including the AUC, are currently using the Bologna Process as a model for higher education integration schemes (Woldegiorgis, 2013; Woldegiorgis & Doevenspeck, 2013; Woldegiorgis et al., 2015). However, the cultural, ideological and organisational differences between the European and African regions have created discussion among various scholars, in particular, about how feasible and efficient is a transfer of the policy among the different countries (Woldegiorgis et al., 2015). Taking this into consideration, this chapter presents the challenges and opportunities reported by the various university system participants of the sample public universities.

10.2 Governance Challenges Reported by Instructors and Leaders

Instructors and academic unit leaders reported the challenges they encountered as a consequence of the governance of public universities. The data were obtained from the open-ended questionnaire items and interviews of the college deans, department chairs, instructors, and students. The open-ended responses were tallied, organised, and categorised as described in (the methodology Chapter 3) and analysed quantitatively using frequency and percentage, as indicated in Table 10.1: Governance challenges reported by instructors and leaders.

Table 10.1: Governance challenges reported by instructors and leaders

		AAU		DBU		WCU	
Major themes	Sub-themes	Freq[6]	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Lack of autonomy		111	38.4	38	38.8	40	28.2
	Centralised system	26		14		13	
	Centralised resources	24		10		10	
	Disempowerment	32		8		9	
	Interference	3		6		8	
Inefficiency and ineffectiveness		73	25.3	18	18.4	31	21.8
	Poor program design	37		10		19	
	Poor planning	22		5		6	
	Delay in decision & information flow	14		5		5	
Lack of accountability		31	10.7	6	6.1	25	17.6
Lack of training and communication		25	8.7	10	10.2	15	10.6
	Awareness	11		9		11	
	Delay of decision & information flow	6		3		9	
	Open discussion	7		7		6	
	Training	1		4		7	
Paternalism and nepotism		26	9.0	20	20.4	24	16.9
	Incompetency	13		8		9	
	Breach laws	5		7		7	
	Demit	8		5		7	
Lack of transparency		11	3.8	6	6.1	8	5.6
Unstable system		12	4.2	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total		289	100	98	100	139	100

As can be seen from, seven major themes emerged from the open-ended responses of the college deans, department chairs, and instructors of the three sample universities. Lack of autonomy due to the centralised system, centralised resources,

[6] *The numbers of themes mentioned in the dataset by instructors and leaders.*

disempowerment, and unnecessary interference were the major themes that emerged from the open-ended responses. Inefficiency and ineffectiveness in terms of program design, planning, and delay in decision and information flow were other themes cited by the instructors and leaders. Paternalism and nepotism were also added as other challenges. As a consequence of these challenges, recruiting and selecting less qualified individuals, breach of law in favouring individuals, and unfair selection, and unfair promotion of individuals were stated frequently by instructors and leaders. Due to the frequent reforms taking place in public universities, an unstable system was reported by AAU instructors and leaders. Other themes such as the low perception of accountability, inadequate training [professional development], and transparency were also reported as the governance challenges across the three sample public universities.

10.3 Governance Challenges Emerged from Interview Data

The interview data of the instructors and leaders also confirmed the results of open-ended responses across the three sample universities. The interview data revealed some challenges related to the public universities governance such as policy decontextualisation, limited participation, inadequate leadership skills, low transparency, and the centralised system as discussed below.

10.3.1 Policy Decontextualisation

Policy decontextualisation was one of the areas of concern for the research participants of the three sample public universities. For instance, one of the department chairs from AAU put his assessment about the implementation of modularisation:

> During the implementation of [modularisation], I think the preparation was not made adequately. Through modularisation, I believe that students should get teacher inbuilt kind of materials where they can read and understand in the absence of the instructors. Then, they ask questions, reflect on that and come up with issues for discussion of new initiatives, new ideas, but the material is not well prepared. So, we claim that we are using the modularisation approach, but the modules are not there. I did get training by the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), where modularisation is the crucial strategy or approach for teaching students. If you

> complete one part of a module, you will be certified for that, and even that goes to the level of looking at the market situation where there must be fit with what we provide and the labour market or what you have. I see that from the external efficiency of our training programs. The idea is, we do not have that kind of arrangements. I am not sure whether this kind of approach is actually related to what is happening in the labour market or the actual demand of the society. It is good, but still, we need to look at some of the aspects, may be learning from the experience of other countries. But I feel that the modularisation approach in Addis Ababa University is not complete (AAU-CH2).

From the interviewee's response, it was clear that modularisation was not implemented as required by the legal documents. The interviewee further claimed that modularisation was not complete in terms of promoting students' independent learning, mode of delivery of modularisation, labour markets, and benchmarking the experiences of other countries. These issues were specified in the Bologna Process even though the implementation was not as required in the legal documents (Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, 2012; European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018; Gebremeskel, 2014).

From the responses given by one of the department chairs from DBU claimed, "Modularisation approach should not be implemented without proper consideration of local context. Failing to contextualise has brought a lot of changes during the implementation process. Even if there is a claim that university is implementing modularisation, in practice, universities are still implementing the traditional modality, i.e., semester-based teaching" (DBU-CH2). The same interviewee further claimed that,

> Initially, there was an understanding that modularisation may help to facilitate students' mobility from one public university to another but, currently, the opposite is true because every university has changed the nature of modularisation in its context. The credit hours of one unit is different from another unit in other universities. This creates challenges to facilitate students transfer from one university to another. So, where is the benefit of modularisation? For me, it has failed (DBU-CH2).

Overall, from the interviewees' responses, it appears the modularisation process was not properly designed as it did not consider the real context of the country. Consequently, the implementation of modularisation process was not effective as required by the legal documents and the Bologna accords (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018; Office of the Academic Vice President Addis Ababa University, 2015; Wachemo University, 2016). As suggested by interviewees' claims, a policy needs to be adapted and implemented rather than adopted because the culture and contexts of higher education institution vary across regions and countries (Gebremeskel, 2014).

10.3.2 Leadership Styles

Leaders' skills need to be aligned with the needs of the organisation and its system participants, and it needs to be inclusive (Bolden & Gosling, 2006; Wise & Carrazco Montalvo, 2018). This could be achieved through competent individuals with the necessary leadership skills (Spendlove, 2007). In connection to this, the interview data revealed that a lack of leadership skills was cited as one of the challenges of higher education governance. The department chair from AAU expressed his view by saying:

> It is important to understand that universities are public institutions and it is important to understand the unique characteristics of educational institutions where its leadership by itself is collegial or friendly. The leadership should really focus on key level actors. Leadership and good governance are about leading or getting followers in a given situation and having a charismatic disposition of leaders. It is important to think about the role of actors, instructors, department heads, deans and those academic staff, and of all, I believe that the top-level officials should think about transformation, particularly, institutional transformation, cultural transformation, changing the attitude of people where, attention should be given to competency, capacity, and experience of the leadership of the university (AAU-CH2).

As can be understood from the response of this interviewee, universities as public institutions should be led by an individual with appropriate leadership skills. This idea is supported by Fabrice Hénard and Alexander Mitterle (2010), who argued, the

academic institution "should provide appropriate structures to facilitate competent management" (p. 107).

Another department chair also argued that the purpose of proposing modularisation was to bring about competence-based education. However, poor implementation of the program did not prepare students in this regard. He further explained his view as:

> As the main aim of modularisation is to certify students based on their competence, in our department and college nothing has been implemented in this regard. In my department, we only did clustering different courses into a unit. So, there is no difference between the traditional mode of teaching and the current modularisation system. The only difference is clustering the contents into a unit. In the first place, I don't agree with the concept of modularisation which states that students will be certified for a unit he/she attended. Let alone certifying students in a unit and linking them to the labour market, those who certified and completed their program have not been offered a job. They are unemployed. Because of this, the idea of competence-based certification is impractical and wastage of time. Nothing is new in modularisation; we only reorganised the courses and contents we used to offer (DBU-CH1).

As DBU-CH1 revealed, modularisation was not properly implemented due to the fact that instructors were not equipped with basic pedagogical knowledge and skills of modularised curriculum. The university administration and the academic units would have been expected to address on how the instructors develop their profession and be able to implement the desired reforms. However, it looks like the reality on the ground did not reflect modularisation process as required by the Bologna accords (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018).

10.3.3 Lack of Transparency

According to Jongbloed et al. (2018), transparency is an essential ingredient in higher education governance as it contributes to the quality of decision making and accountability, which increases trust among the system participants of an academic institution. Concerning the transparency, one of the instructors from AAU mentioned his view on the process of academic staff nomination for the scholarship as,

> There are many complaints among the academic staff. Most of the junior staff had a grievance that only who are favoured by the college or university management get scholarship opportunities to pursue their further education in Western countries, while others are made to study locally or in Indian universities (AAU-INS1).

Another instructor from DBU also put his assessment as,

> Most of my friends got a local scholarship because they did not clap their hands for the leaders. If I fulfil leaders' interest, without considering my professional ethics, I can be easily promoted because the system favours those kinds of people. But it is very hard for me to put myself in such conditions (DBU-INS2).

Another department chair from DBU further revealed that "Everything is done at the back of the curtain. There has not been transparency, and based on my experience, I am a pessimist, and there will be no transparency" (DBU-CH1). Transparency is very crucial in higher education for maintaining positive relationships among the faculty members and leaders (Shattock, 2006). If an institution is not transparent enough for its system participants, it will have a negative impact on them and also an undesirable consequence on the functioning of an institution (Harman & Treadgold, 2007; Joyner, 2014). So, institutional transparency builds trust among the university system participants, which is essential to promote effective, shared governance in order to foster an improved governance system of the public universities.

10.3.4 Nepotism and Paternalism

Nepotism and paternalism were also reported by both instructors and leaders of the three sample universities as the governance challenges. For instance, one of the instructors from AAU put his dissatisfaction as:

> The governance system is characterised by paternalistic and nepotism. By paternalistic and nepotism, I mean, if you know someone, if you have friends, if you have social networks, you will enjoy the maximum freedom, the maximum benefits, and you will be appreciated for even the wrong thing you did. It doesn't matter whatever wrongdoings you did, whatever incompetence you show, so as long as you have friends, you are fine… in our case, it

> [governance] is not democratic, it is not laizefaire, not autocratic but it is paternalistic and nepotism (AAU-INS1).

The same interviewee further claimed that:

> … if you take a bigger picture of education in Ethiopia, it is highly politicised. In politics, it is the network that works, a network of ideology, and a network of whatever. So, the old kind of academic collegiality in this spirt is going way in everywhere, and everything is being politicised, so, I don't see any difference. This begins with the assignment of leaders. When leaders are assigned on the basis of their political reality, they try to throw that kind of attitudes on campus. They don't give places to academia, the traditional respect, and collegiality will go away. So, in Amharic, we say "asa gimatu ke chinkilatu" which means "the foul smell of fish comes from its head". When the head gets spoiled, you can't expect the body to survive. I don't see any betterment, even in the universities of the regions, it gets even worse, you know why? Resources are quite limited in regional universities, so resource is scarce, there is competition, when the competition is not based on merit definitely the issues of good governance will suffer. At Addis Ababa University being in a capital city, we have some diversion, some outlets, we don't as such compete over the resource on this campus. The paternalistic is even worse in other universities outside the capital. So, I don't think it is free. The remedy would have been to make education ap-political. That would be the solution (AAU-INS1).

From the interview responses of AAU-INS1, paternalism and nepotism go beyond the public universities because it seems these challenges are mirroring how the system operates at the country level. This could be evident from the interviewee's idiomatic expression i.e. "asa gimatu ke chinkilatu" which means 'the foul smell of fish comes from its head. When the higher-level system is not merited based, fair and not considering open opportunities to its system participants, the institution may lose trust by its employees and customers (F. Hénard & A. Mitterle, 2010; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2011). This conveys that leaders need to be role models to their employees by being responsible for their actions and decision in order to build trust among system participants of their institutions.

Another interviewee also explained the paternalistic nature of governance in terms of the selection of leaders. He said,

> There is something that is the deceiving mechanism is still implemented. There are nominal ways of doing things as it is merit-based and individuals are asked to fill the form, to apply for the position, but the positions are most of the time pre-determined for individuals. Sometimes individuals are told that the positions are reserved for them but just to fulfil the requirement or to follow the procedures others are simply there to fill that procedure (AAU-INS3).

Another interviewee from DBU also echoed this view. He reported the paternalistic nature of governance in his respective university by saying,

> In this university, the system doesn't favour all fairly. In order to be promoted or elected or given any form of benefits, I have to be a sub-member of higher official, either regionally, or religiously. Here, my academic preparation did not help me because there is no merit. Trust me, being seeded ignorance; we even failed to update ourselves. Everybody looks engaged in gossiping our leaders' doings. I just come to university, teach and go back to my home and spend more time with my family. Why do I stay here, and bleed affect your mind? (DBU-INS3).

In Wachemo University, a similar concern was reported by one of the instructors. He went on saying,

> If you ask every instructor, he/she will tell you that most of our leaders are from the same area because one of the influential leaders of the university is from that area. I don't blame the top officials for performing such wrongdoings because this is what they acquired from their own boss at a higher level. I personally link this problem with lack of competence, which leads to lack of confidence. Since they are not confident enough, they must be surrounded by their locality as a safeguard for their position. Unless fair, merit and inclusive election happen, I believe this favouring will continue. Urgent action is needed to make things go smoothly on time (WCU-INS3).

Overall, the interview data revealed that paternalism and nepotism manifested in different forms. Some of these are: unfair and non-merit-based selection and

appointment of leaders, instructors' disempowerment, high staff turnover, and breach of rules of law on instructors' remuneration, recruitment, and promotion. So, public universities need to overcome paternalism and nepotism by establishing trust (Vidovich & Currie, 2011) among its system participants. Trust in public institutions could be enhanced through proper implementation of their legal documents in relation to the decision and provision of services and information to their employees and customers trust (Fabrice Hénard & Alexander Mitterle, 2010; Welch, Hinnant, & Moon, 2004; Woelert & Yates, 2015).

10.4 Governance Challenges Reported by Students

Similar to instructors and leaders, students were also able to express their views on the challenges they encountered as a consequence of university governance. The data obtained from through questionnaire open-ended items and interviews were analysed quantitatively and qualitatively respectively as indicated below.

Table 10.2: Governance challenges reported by students

	AAU		DBU		WCU	
Major themes Sub-themes	Freq[1[7]]	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Lack of accountability	37	16	31	17.3	8	5.4
Lack of autonomy	26	11.3	38	21.2	15	10.1
Centralised system	23		11		0	
Interference	2		2		15	
Lack of academic freedom	1		25		0	
Inefficiency and ineffectiveness	85	36.8	25	14	65	43.9
Bureaucracy	26		0		7	
Delay in service delivery	21		2		32	
poor planning	15		9		2	
Shortage of resource	12		5		20	
Poor program coordination	5		3		0	
Content irrelevance	6		6		4	
Lack of learning support & communication	31	13.4	32	17.9	13	8.8
Lack of support	7		6		3	
Lack of open discussion	5		3		6	

[7] *The numbers of themes mentioned in the dataset by students.*

Delay of decision & Information flow	16		19		2	
Lack of awareness	3		3		2	
Paternalism and nepotism	22	9.5	29	16.2	28	18.9
Unfairness	22		11		3	
Breach of law	8		5		2	
Demerit	14		1		7	
Corruption	5		4		12	
Incompetency	3		8		4	
Lack of transparency	22	9.5	1	0.6	2	1.4
Limited participation	4	1.7	11	6.2	3	2
Lack of supervision	4	1.7	12	6.7	14	9.5
Total	231	100	179	100	148	100

As shown in Table 10.2, eight major themes emerged from the open-ended responses of students' questionnaires of the three sample universities*3.6.1)*. The lack of accountability and inefficiency and ineffectiveness were the major themes cited by students. For instance, inefficiency and ineffectiveness were ascribed to bureaucracy, delay in service delivery, poor planning, shortage of resources, and poor program coordination, and the content of the course was not following the existing local context. Low perception of autonomy was attributed to a centralised system, unnecessary interference, and lack of academic freedom. Universities need to be a place, where the free exchange of ideas and knowledge is valued (Rowlands, 2013). Other challenge themes such as lack of learning support and communication, paternalism and nepotism, and transparency were also reported. Students further reported limited participation and lack of supervision as other challenges of university governance.

10.5 Governance Challenges Emerging from Interview Data

The students of the three sample universities also reported that they received unfair treatment from instructors in terms of grading and assessment strategies of the courses. Some students perceived that instructors tend to disparage them rather than encourage and help them. Students claimed that grades are determined by the adversarial or affective considerations of instructors rather than by professional judgment of their work. On the contrary, instructors were complaining about students' poor academic readiness and their antisocial behaviours towards them (*see section 5.4 and 5.5)*. As the

finding of the study showed, clear evidence of criticism and blaming between students and instructors was the growing complaint about grades at the end of each semester and the increasingly negative tone that students received from their instructors. In contrast, instructors bitterly complain about students' behaviour and reaction after the release of the grades. Instructors started negotiating the grading system of the students as a means to avoid conflict with their students because the students have leadership backing from their academic units and university senior management (*see section 10.2.3*). In line with this, one of the students claimed that:

> Most of the time students are complaining about instructors grading systems. In my department, instructors have the authority to decide on our fate. Some instructors grade students based on different affiliations, gender (being a female student), religion, ethnicity, and political affiliation. Most of the time, instructors want to be friendly with the student representatives and award them a good mark so that the student representatives should not talk about any negative aspect of the instructors. They favour each other. We all (all the class members) know this situation because the student representatives are busy dealing with different issues related to students, and they don't have time to study. In the end, our student representatives are the good scorers of the subjects. It is a painful system (AAU-ST4).

Another student from DBU also revealed that instructors' grading system was not fair. The student further claimed that "In my opinion, assessment strategies and grading system are not fair, biasness is common due to region, religion, language, ethnicity and political viewpoint. All these affect our grades due to instructors' predisposition to these factors" (DBU-ST2). In a similar vein, WCU student expressed issues related to instructors' attitudes toward the student representatives and the grading system as follows:

> Generally, there is a negative attitude towards the students' union. They [instructors] usually think as if we are always reporting bad aspects of them. We have incidents where our members were given "D" and "F" grades for being the members of the students' union. They are not even aware that our office is supporting their activities: teaching and learning activities. They see us as if we are their enemies. I believe this kind of negative attitude will be gradually improved over time (WCU-ST2).

Another student reported a similar concern with WCU-ST2, i.e., instructors grading system was not fair enough. An interview reported that:

> Most of our instructors are young, and they are not fair in the grading system. Students of the same class taking the same course we know each other. All of a sudden, I see some students, who even could not express themselves score "A" and "B" grades in some subjects. When I further researched the case, that student has a tied with the instructor of a subject, either ethnically, religiously, geographically and the like. Ask students about this issue; they will tell you a lot of stories (WCU-ST3).

Overall, the findings of the study showed the tension between students and instructors in terms of assessment strategies. Grades have been the major sources of friction for student-instructor relationships. Healthy and positive relationships between students and teachers could be beneficial for improving their interpersonal communication skills and reducing the tension between them in order to establish positive working environments. In accordance with the finding of this study, previous studies have demonstrated that students' good relationships with instructors help students to improve both academically and socially (Hamre & Pianta, 2006; McCormick, O'Connor, Cappella, & McClowry, 2013). This informs the academics units and university senior management for future interventions of the poor relationship between academics and students in the Ethiopian higher education landscape.

10.6 Governance Opportunities Reported by Deans, Chairs, and Instructors

Hitherto, the governance challenges reported by instructors, leaders, and students have been discussed. This section discusses the governance opportunities that emerged from open-ended questionnaires and interview data. In this context, governance opportunities refer to the opportunities for good governance resulting from the implementation of the Bologna Process. The themes emerged from open-ended questionnaires and interview data. The results and discussion of the responses of instructors, leaders, and students have been discussed below.

Table 10.3: Governance opportunities reported by leaders and instructors

	AAU		DBU		WCU	
Major opportunity themes	Freq[8]	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Student learning engagement	18	27.7	6	15	15	36.6
Program uniformity	12	18.5	14	35	10	24.4
Student mobility	20	30.8	13	32.5	6	14.6
Labour market	5	7.7	4	10	5	12.2
Teaching efficiency	10	15.4	3	7.5	5	12.2
Total	65	100	40	100	41	100

As can be seen from Table 10.3, governance opportunities emerged from open-ended item of the questionnaire (*see Chapter 3, section3.6.1: Quantitative Data Analysis*) including student learning engagement, having a uniform program, students' mobility across public universities, labour market, and teaching efficiency were the major themes reported by instructors and leaders as the consequence of the Bologna Process.

Several studies revealed that in the Bologna Process (Bergan, 2015; Communiqué Leuven, 2009; Dehmel, 2006; Fejes, 2008; Gebremeskel, 2014; McMahon, 2010), the member countries agreed to commit themselves to implement academic freedom, autonomy, participation, transparency, and accountability as the principles of European Higher Education Area. The claim was that university leaders and staff need to be empowered to reorganise university system to meet both stakeholder's needs and a global market workforce (Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, 2012; Keeling, 2006; McMahon, 2010). Following this, Ethiopia also introduced some elements of the Bologna process in its higher education institutions. Some of the Bologna elements were European Credit Transfer System, (ECTS), Competence-Based Education (CBE) and modularisation (harmonised curriculum), labour market, flexible learning paths, certificate recognition, and staff and student mobility (Gebremeskel, 2014). This study also confirmed some benefits of the Bologna process that the country introduced to its higher education institutions. These are student learning engagement, having a uniform program (harmonised curriculum), students' mobility across public

[8] *The numbers of themes mentioned in the dataset by college deans, department chairs and instructors.*

universities, academic program design in accordance with the labour market, and teaching efficiency *(see Table 10.3).*

10.7 Governance Opportunities Emerging from Interview Data

Some governance opportunities emerged as a consequence of the Bologna Process also from the interviews of college deans and department chairs. One of the college deans from AAU reported that "there are some new concepts like the change in timetable or scheduling, and new ideas in competence-based education, criterion-referenced grading system, continuous assessment, ECTS, and so on" (AAU-D1). Another dean from DBU also put his idea, " I personally try to test something new. But it doesn't mean that there are no challenges. Something new by itself is also a challenge. Many of my colleagues were challenging the system which I personally don't agree with. We need to test the new idea first before resisting" (DBU-D2). In a similar vein, the college dean from WCU acknowledged the opportunities as the consequence of the Bologna Process as, "There is strong teamwork sprit among instructors …" (WCU-D1).

Similar to the college deans, some of the department chairs also expressed views pertinent to the governance opportunities which resulted from the influence of the Bologna Process. For instance, one of the AAU chairs expressed his view as:

> After the introduction of modularisation, there have been some improvements, for instance, in terms of students' responsibilities. Students started to actively get involved in, for instance, teamwork, group assignment, individual assignment. They are required to present their work, and instructors are there to guide, facilitate, and to lead the students. I think that is a good quality of modularisation approach. But the problem is, we did not fully shift to modularisation approach, in practice because, modules were not prepared adequately, university instructors tend to lecture than using active teaching-learning or learning teaching approach. I don't see basic change in terms of the teaching approach itself except the involvement of students seems increasing from time to time (AAU-CH2).

The same chair further acknowledged the opportunities that modularisation brought to the university by saying;

> The importance of adopting modularisation process is a kind of shift particularly in a country like Ethiopia and Addis Ababa University because we have been using lecture approach, and we all have gone through those kinds of systems, where teachers simply teach, and students simply listen, sometimes or frequently remain passive. I think it is important to give attention and put students at the center of the teaching-learning process. The modularisation approach, if we implement it well gives an opportunity for the students to prepare and playground to learn, particularly we can promote independent learning, and the role of instructors should be guiding, and supporting students. So, I believe that it is a very good approach and indeed a paradigm shift, but its implementation should be taking care of (AAU-CH2)

Agreeing with AAU-CH2, another AAU chair put his assessment as:

> Overall the modularisation process in Addis Ababa University is the recent phenomenon, and we have been using the traditional approach of teaching, that is, basically lecturing whereby teachers are placing difficult while students remain as passive. After the introduction of the modular approach, there have been changes, and the idea is moving from the traditional way of teaching to that of involving students actively, and both the roles of students and teachers have been changed. Because in modularisation approach, students are expected to engage more with more activities like individual assessment, group assignment, read modules, and they tend to depend on their activities than depending on teachers or instructors in the university in total (AAU-CH3).

DBU and WCU department chairs perceived similar ideas. For instance, one of the DBU chairs reported that "one of the benefits of modularisation is that it reduced challenges of students' transfer inter public universities due to having harmonised curriculum across the public universities" DBU-CH2. WCU chair also revealed his view as, "The introduction of modularisation is good because it avoids the inconsistency of courses among different universities which affects students' inter-university transfer" (WCU-CH1). Another chair went on saying, "The good thing is that we have got a good teamwork spirit at the department level, but we do not see the collaboration of top leaders" WCU-CH3. Another department chair further revealed that:

> Modularisation brought some changes in my department. For instance, we started to promote teamwork spirit with the members of the department. It looks good as it deals with competence-based education, but its implementation is hard because the curriculum was not developed well. The time allocated to teach one unit is very short. This created a problem in assessing student learning (WCU-CH2).

Overall, the interview data of the deans and chairs confirmed the results obtained from open-ended responses. The governance opportunities as the consequence of the Bologna process were perceived positively in terms of flexible student learning paths, student mobility, and teamwork spirit. However, as the results of the study revealed, its implementation seems to be taking care of because it is a new phenomenon and paradigm shift in the higher education institutions of the country.

10.8 Governance Opportunities Reported by Students

This section deals with the governance opportunities revealed in the open-ended responses and interview data of the three sample universities. The open-ended responses are analysed quantitively followed by interview data.

Table 10.4: Governance opportunities

	AAU		DBU		WCU	
Major opportunity themes	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Increase students' learning	8	34.8	9	40.9	3	23.1
Increased students' participation in the affairs of the university	15	65.2	13	59.1	10	76.9
Total	23	100	22	100	13	100

As indicated in Table 10.4, from students' open-ended responses, increased students' learning and participation in the affairs of the university emerged as governance opportunities resulting from the introduction of modularisation. Students perceived the introduction of modularisation positively. Modularisation is one of the elements of the

Bologna Process which increased their participation in both learnings and the affairs of their institution.

10.8.1 Governance Opportunities Emerging from Students' Interviews

From the interview data, students acknowledged the governance opportunities they gained due to the introduction of some elements of the Bologna Processes in the Ethiopian public universities. One of the students from AAU reported that:

Participation in different committees helped me to get experience. I have gained confidence in leadership and speaking in front of many people. I have also got experience in how to approach and communicate with managers when dealing with students' problems. Always it is good opportunity to take part in different committees and learn from different people with a diverse cultural and religious background (AAU-ST2).It is interesting that students are active in the affairs of their universities, as their level of involvement helps them to get leadership experience in addition to their academic career. For instance, one of the students from DBU said "…it is a good opportunity to practice leading people. This skill is waiting for us in the real world and being a member of the student union is a good opportunity for all" (DBU-ST3).

A similar benefit was reported by WCU student:

> …it is not easy to lead people and study at the same time. The good thing is that most of us were academically high performers and award winners. I usually sleep late; sometimes at 2:00 am. It is not easy. When other students use their time to study and reading properly, we sleep late after we checked everything is going well with our students. We work for their peace. We don't even have a chance to visit our parents during semester break. In fact, these challenges are an opportunity for us at this early stage. Because we value one minute. We do not have time to think about evil. Our mind is always framed for work (WCU-ST1).

In general, in both the Bologna Process and Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation, students are considered as the main stakeholders of higher education rather than simply members of the academic community (Communiqué Leuven, 2009; European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018; Sewonu, 2010; The Federal Democratic

Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). The legal documents specify students' involvement in different aspects of the university governance such as member of Student Union, Academic Senate, College, and Department Assembles, committees, and overall in the affairs of their institutions (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; Wachemo University, 2016). This engagement helped higher education students to experience leadership and increase their participation in learning and the affairs of their respective universities.

10.9 Governance Implications

The findings of the study indicated that the introduction of some elements of the Bologna Process had brought both challenges and opportunities regarding the governance of the public universities. From the results of the study, the governance of public universities was characterised by some challenges such as centralised system, lack of autonomy, accountability and transparency, inefficiency, policy decontextualisation, leadership competence, and nepotism. Because of these challenges, the operation of governance remains an issue for the system participants of the sample public universities. These factors led to tension and frustration among the system participants, and they revealed that the system negatively affected them in carrying out their core academic activities.

On the other side, the findings of the study demonstrated some governance opportunities as a result of the implementation of some elements of the Bologna Process. These are increased students' participation in learning and the affairs of the university, the introduction of the notion competence-based education, harmonised curriculum, students' mobility from one public university to another, criterion-referenced grading system, and continuous assessment scheme. Some of these opportunities are in accordance with the Bologna accords and the Academic Senate legislation of the public universities.

The findings of the study imply building trust among the university system participants and the higher officials, and higher education needs to be politics free. In order to achieve this, good leadership needs to be in place. As Kezar (2004) argued: "if leadership is missing and relationships and trust damaged, the governance system will

likely fail for lack of direction, motivation, meaning, integrity, a sense of common purpose, ways to integrate multiple perspectives, open communication, people willing to listen, and legitimacy" (p. 45). In addition, the finding of the study has implications for shared governance arrangements to lessen the governance challenges and retain the opportunities for public universities to move forward. Along the same line, (Côté, Jones, & Shapiro, 2011) argued that in promoting effective university governance "Colleagues and groups of colleagues must be able and willing to work together; under such leadership in the context of both a shared vision and mutual respect" (p. 28). Therefore, this study suggests that university senior management needs to promote trust and shared governance that recognises the contribution of the university system participants and builds on transparency, autonomy, efficiency and effectiveness, fair and open participation in the affairs of the public universities. This could further build trust and collegial working atmospheres among the university community and sustain their commitment to the university vision and mission, which aid the public universities to move forward.

PART- D

CONCLUSION

Chapter 11

Conclusions and Implications

11.1 Introduction

This study was carried out in the Ethiopian higher education context. The purpose of this study was to explore the practice and perceptions of leaders, instructors, and students of public universities towards their governance systems using a mixed methods research design. Even though the main purpose of the study was to explore the influence of the Bologna Process on the governance aspects of the Ethiopian public universities, the structural aspects of the Bologna Process were also taken into account. This study was designed to answer six research questions. The first research question was how the key actors in Basic Academic Units (BAU) of Ethiopian public universities perceive and practice governance. The second research question addressed how students' voices are reflected and perceived. The question regarding the types of response strategies used by the university system participants in responding to university governance systems was answered through the third research question, while the fourth addressed the challenges and opportunities pertinent to public university governance as a consequence of the Bologna Process. The fifth research question analysed the impact of the Bologna Process on the Ethiopian higher education system. Finally, the implications of the study for higher education governance and governmentality in Ethiopia and elsewhere with similar contexts were explored.

In order to answer the research questions, the study involved the analysis and collection of quantitative data through questionnaires, and qualitative data from opened ended items of the questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with college deans, department chairs, instructors, and students of three sample public universities: Addis Ababa University (AAU), Debre Berhan University (DBU), and Wachemo University

(WCU). This chapter provides the conclusions and implications, limitations, and further research of the study in line with the main findings.

11.2 The Perception of Governance Practice

This section addresses research question 1: How do key actors in BAUs of Ethiopian public universities perceive and practice governance?

The findings of the quantitative study revealed that the AAU perception of autonomy, accountability, and transparency is lower compared to DBU and WCU universities. Indeed these results need to be interpreted with caution due to the fact that AAU participants have long years of exposure to different regimes (Asgedom & Hagos, 2015), which may have enabled them to build confidence in reporting the existing problems as opposed to participants from second and third-generation universities, who may have reported their views conservatively. Evidence also showed that AAU stood out in their perception of the governance system due to its historical development and government control over institutional autonomy (Solomon, 2010; Wana, 2009; Zeleza, 2004).

11.2.1 Autonomy

The findings of the study revealed that autonomy was considered to be a critical concern by most of the university system participants. The EHEP Article 18, grants autonomy for the academic units of a public institution. For instance, "academic units of a public institution shall have the necessary autonomy in administration and finance as well as in academic affairs" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4986). In addition, the EHEP (Article 17) grants academic freedom and autonomy to every institution in pursuit of its mission. This includes the development and implementation of academic programs and curricula, personnel and financial administration, nomination and selection of the president, vice presidents and members of the board, and selection and appointment of academic units and departments' leaders (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009).

Based on the findings of the study and the existing literature on higher education governance, the institutional autonomy in the Ethiopian public universities has a degree of difference in some respects compared to the autonomy of universities in other countries. Using the selection of university president/vice-chancellor as a case in point, globally, university governance systems reveal significant differences in institutional autonomy as identified in their respective University Act or national proclamation (*see section 2.9.1*). The academic community elects their university president/vice-chancellor, although, in other countries, this rarely happens (Fielden, 2008; Oba, 2014). Also, in most East European countries, the university president or vice-chancellor is elected by the Senate without state or central approval. However, in Austria, Denmark, and Norway, the rectors are elected by academic staff and appointment is made by the university board by considering the leadership skills and experience of the candidates (Fielden, 2008). In some African countries, for example, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, and South Africa, the vice-chancellors are appointed by government after consulting the university council (Department of Higher Education and Training, 2012; Government Gazeti'e of the Republic of Namibia, 1992; Government of Botswana, 2008; The University of Cape Town, 2013; University of Malawi, 1998). On the other hand, in Kenya and Uganda, the chancellors appoint the vice-chancellor after consulting the university council or senate (National Council for Higher Education, 2001; The National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General, 2012a; The National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General, 2012b).

However, the Ethiopian case is different from the countries mentioned earlier (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). The legal document specifies that a university board nominates the presidents, but an appointment has to be approved by the Ministry or the state body (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). EHEP also stipulates that the academic staff has the right to select their president and vice president, but this has not yet happened, as the findings of the study revealed. Despite legal documentation that requires academic staff to have control over critical decisions such as academic program design, the admission, and enrolment of students, resource utilisation, and leaders' selection, the system is still centrally controlled by the MoE. As a result, the vested political interests of the government dominate in the higher

education arena, and the autonomy of the public universities is constrained. This appears to restrict the ability of public universities to make far-reaching changes in their academic institutions in the way higher education needs to act in this globally competitive environment and guaranteed to change in the immediate future.

In general, the findings of the study revealed that Ethiopian public universities system participants had formed a low perception of autonomy. This affect was manifested in different forms: (i) restricted mandate of academic institution in designing their academic programs, (ii) restricted mandate in deciding on the overall number and quality of students intake, (iii) restricted authority in deciding on core academic and administrative activities (resource and finance), and (iv) reduced right in making a decision without unnecessary interference, (v) loss of freedom in deciding on students' performance as per the set rules and regulations, and (vi) loss of the freedom in selecting competent leaders.

These findings point to the importance of accommodating the interests of both the government and university by suggesting a more participatory and inclusive system of governance, where diverse opinions could be entertained freely at all levels of academic institutions. This has been found to build trust and mutual understanding among the key actors in contributing toward the development of higher education institutions (Asgedom & Hagos, 2015; Kezar, 2004; Vidovich & Currie, 2011; Wise, Dickinson, Katan, & Gallegos, 2018; Woelert & Yates, 2015).

11.2.2 Accountability

In Ethiopia, all public universities are financed by the government (Solomon, 2010); by implication, the government requires public universities to be accountable for public resources. In contrast, the university system participants demand autonomy from the government to execute their core academic activities such as teaching, research, and community service. This leads to an inevitable tension between accountability and autonomy. The Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation also stipulated institutional autonomy with accountability as one of the objectives that all public universities are expected to ensure in pursuit of their mission (The Federal Democratic Republic of

Ethiopia, 2009). Despite this provision, the findings of the study revealed that the university system participants had formed a low perception of accountability.

Based on the lived experience of the research participants and the perception of accountability, this tension is evident between the university system participants and university senior management. While the universities' freedom to govern is not constrained; strong accountability requirements are placed on the middle and lower levels of the university systems. The issue of how to balance the autonomy demand by the system participants of the public universities and the accountability required by the government remains a critical question in governing public universities. If the government retains direct control over the public universities, to improve outcomes, it must promote shared or inclusive, consultant governance, and build trust. To be effective, results strongly suggest that the government control of public universities needs to be relaxed. There needs to be a shift from control of public universities tofacilitation and supervision so that the university system participants can contribute to the advancement of knowledge and the effectiveness of their respective institutions with accountability (*see section 2.9.1 and 2.10.1*).

11.2.3 Transparency

Transparency is considered as one of the crucial principles of higher education institutions. Transparency has received attention in the governance system of higher education institutions in both developed and developing nations (Freeman, 2014). Currently, there is a concern about lack of transparency in higher education for the proper utilisation of public resources for the relevant academic activities being undertaken (Communiqué Leuven, 2009; Dehmel, 2006; Fejes, 2008; Gebremeskel, 2014). In the Bologna Process implementation reports of 2018, transparency was also stressed as an important principle for higher education institutions (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018). Along the same lines, the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation, and University Senate legislation empower every higher institution to have a transparent system for teaching and learning, and research fund management and utilisation (Addis Ababa University, 2013a; Debre Berhan University, 2012; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; Wachemo University, 2016).

However, the findings of this study revealed that Ethiopian public universities are characterised by low transparency because they were perceived as having a centralised system of governance. As per the legal documents, public universities are required to be transparent enough for the system participants to access the information related to academic staff promotion, their leaders' selection, rules and regulation, resource and finance, design and implementation of academic programs, academic staff appraisal, and incentives. But these legal provisions were not put in place as required. The study suggests that public universities need to establish a transparent system in order to establish mutual understanding and trust among their system participants.

11.2.4 Participation

As specified in the EHEP, one of the primary objectives of a higher education institution is to "ensure the participation of key stakeholders in the governance of institutions" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 4979). In the Bologna Process implementation reports of 2018, the participation of students and other stakeholders in the democratic governance and management is also highlighted as the significant principle of higher education institutions (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018). Despite these legal provisions, the findings of the study demonstrated a limited involvement of instructors and institutional leaders in the governance and affairs of public universities. This was partly due to external influence by the MoE and University Board, and partly due to internal failures, as university governance increasingly came to give primacy to control over institutional work, thus reducing participatory decision-making. One consequence of this state of affairs has been the over-centralisation of the governance system. From the university central level to all the way down to department and college assemblies, the system through which instructors and leaders participate and influence academic decision-making is constrained. The involvement of the university academic community in the selection of leaders', design of academic programs, policy planning, committee work, institutional assembles, community service is almost minimal. The findings of the study also revealed the decline in participation of instructors led to dissatisfaction and withdrawal, and reluctance to take responsibility (*see section 1.1 and 7.6*).

Interestingly, the findings of the study revealed an increased involvement of students in the university governance system through their representatives. Students are represented as members of the University Board, Academic Senate, and in the Department Academic Councils. As opposed to the instructors, students formed a positive perception of their influence in decision-making processes.

Based on the findings of the study, students were more empowered and listened to by the university senior management than the instructors. The findings revealed this caused some tension between the instructors and students. This is an area of concern for both government and public universities, so the study suggests ensuring both parties are enabled to participate in their university governance system, as stipulated in the legal documents (Addis Ababa University, 2013; Debre Berhan University, 2012; The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009; Wachemo University, 2016).

11.3 Students' Voices in the Ethiopian Public Universities

With regard to the second research question, the findings of the study showed that the voice of the students in Ethiopian higher education has got considerable attention. From the findings of the study, the strength of the student's voice contrasts with other Bologna implementing countries including, Norway, Ireland, UK, and Turkey (Bergan, 2003; Boland, 2005; Dundar, 2013). In these countries, despite the legal representation of students in the Bologna Process, previous studies revealed that in actual practice, students' participation in higher education governance is limited (Bergan, 2003; Dundar, 2013). In contrast, in the Ethiopian higher education context, students had more voice than the instructors, and they were more empowered and listened to by the university senior management than instructors in the decision-making process. This empowerment of students by university senior management and inappropriate participation of students at different levels of decision-making processes created conflict between students and instructors because instructors perceived students' representatives as their opponents. Due to student representatives' role increasingly being understood as advisory role to the university senior management, there was a perceived imbalance in the level of students' participation in decision making, which led some instructors to perceive students' representatives as hidden agents of university

senior management. It could be argued that this kind of student involvement in a decision-making process might weaken the integrity of the relationship between students and instructors. Therefore, reasonable students' involvement needs to be practiced both at the Senate and department levels.

The findings of the study also showed that students understood their rights in terms of influencing various decisions on issues related to students' affairs, that is, in terms of contributing to policy and procedures governing the activities of instructors. The findings of the study are in line with the universities' legal document and Proclamation where students voice is explicitly mentioned. The legislation of the three sample universities required the representation of students in different aspects of university governance, including the Senate, its various committees, college/institute AC, DACs, other academic decision-making bodies including administrative bodies, which engaged in students' service delivery (Addis Ababa University, 2013a, p. 188; Debre Berhan University, 2012, p. 100; Wachemo University, 2016, p. 179).

From the findings of this study, public universities appear to lack strategies to formally enable appropriate participation of both instructors and students in affairs of the university, which might better connect these groups and enable them to better understand each other's needs.

11.4 Response Strategies

The findings of the study that addressed the third research question indicated that university system participants identified different response strategies in responding to the university governance pressures. The existing literature showed different academic institutions employ various mechanisms in responding to the internal and external pressures that affect them to execute their academic core activities (Bisaso, 2010; Oliver, 1991). As Oliver (1991) argued, institutions use strategic responses that range from passive conformity to proactive manipulation to minimise the pressures. The results of this study also revealed that Ethiopian public universities were forced to adopt some elements of the Bologna Process, of which the implementation of modularisation can be cited as an example. The adoption took place with little regard to the needs and context of public universities (Gebremeskel, 2014; Mehari, 2016). As a result, the

implementation of modularisation encountered resistance from system participants in the form of defiance and avoidance strategies of resistance. Oliver (1991), in her study on the institutional response, found 'manipulation' was the most active resistance strategy. However, the findings of the current study did not support this and indicated that 'defiance' was the most active resistance strategy adopted in responding to governance pressures in the Ethiopian public universities.

On the other hand, the study revealed that students' response strategies tended to be more positive as they predominantly used acquiescence and compromise strategies, and bottom-up manipulation as the strategies to achieve their goals from the university senior management. These divergent responses of students and instructors show the importance of reaching a consensus between universities and their basic academic units in the process of policy formation and the planning and adoption of academic programs as required by the University Academic Senate legislation and the Bologna Accord.

Overall, from the responses of the research participants, it appears the implementation of the Bologna Process was not as prescribed in the declaration and at the same time not as required for good governance by the university system. Despite these findings, the Bologna Process has some benefits to the Ethiopian higher education institutions, but there seems much work ahead for government and public universities in contextualising some elements of the Bologna Process in light of the local context, institution needs, participation of stakeholders, and the capacity of leaders among others issues.

11.5 Governance Challenges and Opportunities

The fourth research question of the study is concerned with the challenges and opportunities pertinent to public university governance as a consequence of the Bologna Process. Although Ethiopia embarked on some elements of the Bologna Process for its higher education system, the cultural, ideological and organisational differences between the European and African regions has created discussion among various scholars, particularly, about how feasible and efficient is the transfer of the policy among the different countries (Woldegiorgis et al., 2015). In the same way, the findings of the study revealed that the prescribed nature of the Bologna Process has affected the Ethiopian higher education systems. The governance of public universities has been

impaired by numerous pitfalls such as policy decontextualisation, inadequate leadership skills, low academic autonomy, transparency, and accountability, and nepotism and paternalism. It has been also impacted by challenges, such as inefficiency and ineffectiveness in terms of poor program planning and design, and delay in decision and information flow, due to national centralised systems, and academic disempowerment. Both instructors and leaders reported paternalism and nepotism as additional barriers. As a consequence of this, recruiting and selecting less competent individuals, and breaching rules of law to favour individuals were frequently reported. Due to frequent reforms taking place, the instability of the system was identified as another challenge.

On the other hand, consistent with the literature (Chaka, 2016; Gebremeskel, 2014), this study revealed some governance opportunities arose as a consequence of the Bologna Process. The governance opportunities are opportunities for good governance resulting from the implementation of the Bologna Process. These opportunities are flexible student learning paths, student mobility across public universities, and teamwork spirit, student learning engagement, having a uniform program, having curriculum aligned with the labour market, and teaching efficiency.

In general, based on the findings of this study, in the process of policy or academic program planning or adoption, and their implementation, the university senior management should accommodate more diverse views of their academic communities, and establish trust among the system participants in order for them all to contribute toward development of their institutions. Also, since modularisation is a new phenomenon and a paradigm shift for the Ethiopian higher education institutions, caution needs to be taken during the implementation processes in terms of listening to the instructors and academic leaders as they are key actors in implementing programs and policy, and importantly, how they carry out their roles will affect the quality of education and research in higher education institutions.

11.6 The Impact of the Bologna Process on Higher Education Systems

In the fifth research question, the impact of the Bologna Process on the Ethiopian higher education systems is addressed. The influence of the Bologna Process beyond Europe was made explicit from the intention of the participating government that "[t]he European Higher Education Area must be open and should be attractive to other parts of the world"(Bergen Communique, 2005, pp. 4-5). Accordingly, different non-European countries from Latin America, Asia, and Africa were invited to attend the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) Ministerial Conference (Communiqué Leuven, 2009). The interest in the adoption of the Bologna Process emanated from its objectives of mobility, competence-based education, regional cooperation and mutual recognition (curriculum harmonisation, comparability of academic programs and mutual recognition of degrees, and credit transfer system) as a feasible instrument to overcome common regional challenges (Crosier & Parveva, 2013; Obasi & Olutayo, 2009). The Bologna Process has been pushed by Europe in collaboration with some international and regional organisations such as the EU, OECD, UNESCO, and World Bank as a 'turnkey' product (Khelfaoui, 2009; Obasi & Olutayo, 2009) to reform higher education beyond Europe. Obasi and Olutayo (2009) argued that "One of the driving motives of the Bologna Process is to increase the international competitiveness of the European system of higher education" (p. 169). This implies that it had an impact on the higher education system beyond Europe.

Consistent with the literature (*see section 2.4*) from the findings of this study, the Bologna Process had some impact on Ethiopian higher education systems as some new elements such as harmonisation, modularisation, competence-based education, credit transfer system, and students' voice have been introduced to the higher education system. However, the implementation was characterised by a top-down approach without the active participation of the key implementers (instructors, lower and middle-level leaders). As a result, the implementation appears to be not as required by the legal documents.

Overall, based on the findings of this study, the implementation of the Bologna Process seems to be less successful in Ethiopia and in some other African countries' higher education contexts (Alemu, 2019; Eta et al., 2018; Gebremeskel, 2014). This could be attributed to the differences in cultural, social, economic, and political environments between Europe and Africa, and the decontextualisation and low participatory nature of policy without considering the existing realities of cultural, political, and economic circumstances of the countries in the region (Alemu, 2019; Babaci-Wilhite & Geo-JaJa, 2018; Eta et al., 2018; Khelfaoui, 2009; Obasi & Olutayo, 2009). Thus, this study suggests that careful adoption of policy needs to be in place in such a way that policy implementers (MoE, higher education officials, instructors, and students) openly and actively take part in the process and own it.

11.7 The Mismatch between Practice and the Universities' Legal Documents

The findings of the study revealed the mismatch between the practice and legal documents (EHEP) and Universities' Academic Senate legislation). These legal documents specify that public universities have been granted the necessary autonomy to pursue their missions. The granted autonomy covers the nomination of leaders, designing and implementing academic curricula and research programs, managing funds, and properties, and exercising academic freedom (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). Existing research (Akalu, 2014; Altbach, 2001; Altbach, Reisberg, & Rumbley, 2009; Teferra & Altbachl, 2004) also recognises that university autonomy has long been viewed as a crucial issue and requirement to manage its core academic activities, but not privilege.

However, from the findings of the study, it appears that the autonomy of the Ethiopian public universities was restricted due to the national and university centralised systems. Although institutional autonomy is considered as the foundation for the democratic governance of higher education both in the legal documents (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009) and the Bologna Process (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018), it was not practised as required by the universities' legal documents. As Teferra and Altbachl (2004) argued, autonomous

universities are crucial in knowledge creation, nurturing democratic governance, and advocating academic freedom and institutional autonomy. This suggests the EHEP and other rules and regulations could be practised more in an autonomous institution than the Ethiopian highly controlled environment, where its system participants are not actively engaged in the planning and implantation of the core academic activities of their academic institutions.

Hence, as required by both Bologna Process and universities' legal documents, the Ethiopian public universities need to be given autonomy and encouraged to manage their internal affairs such as designing programs and promoting the participation of academic staff in the selection their leaders should come to the fore. This could foster the development of universities to respond to the knowledge-based economy in this competitive edge.

11.8 Implications of the Study

The last research question addressed the implications of the study for higher education governance and governmentality in Ethiopia and elsewhere. From the findings of the study, the tension among instructors, lower and middle leaders, and university management, Academic Board, and the MoE is evident. The principles of higher education governance such as autonomy, accountability, transparency, and participation are clearly stipulated in the university legislation and national proclamation, and the Bologna Process. However, a discontinuity between the legal documents and the actual practice has been identified.

The model in Figure 11.1 demonstrates the concept of governance and governmentality in the context of university in quadrant form. Figure 11.1 shows the notion of university autonomy mapped against different forms of governance on a vertical scale. It has been derived from Tulu, Corbett, and Kilpatrick (2018). In this model, the vertical scale shows (bottom to top) decreasing demands for compliance characterised by more consultative and collegial forms of governance. Similarly, the horizontal scale shows decreasing levels of top-down authority (left to right). The findings of the study revealed that Ethiopian public universities are characterized by the top-down approach, placing them in the AC quadrant of the model. This is based on government

expectations that the universities comply with its national priorities and political goals, yet the instructors, and lower and middle-level leaders remain suspicious about the government's aspirations as the system is highly centralized. The instructors and department chairs have little voice in policy formulation, and decision-making process and university staff perceive that university higher officials marginalised instructors from taking part in decision making in their core academic activities. In their view, the actual practice was characterised by an authoritative (C- Axis) approach with less autonomy, transparency, and participation for the system participants. However, students had formed different perceptions from staff. From students' perspective, the system is autonomous, transparent, and participatory, and hence, their perception of governance fell into the AD quadrant of the model. This describes a clear mismatch between the intentions of the Bologna Process and Ethiopian policy on higher education.



Figure 11.1: University governance model

The research, however, suggests that the need to reduce tension caused by top-down governance by shifting to a form of governance that is more inclusive of staff. In the model, the AD quadrant represents what is desirable, and a model could which accommodates the interest of both parties needs to be in place. It is recommended that the governance of the Ethiopian Education system would be more consistent with these policies if it was changed to be more in line with the characteristics associated with the BD quadrant, characterised by more autonomy for the University, which subsequently should lead to instructors having greater academic freedom.

The research also suggests there is a critical need for a flexible and responsive system of governance. The governance system should be more inclusive of academics in the decision-making process and adopt less hierarchical systems of governance (BC vs AD quadrants). The proposed governance model (BC vs AD quadrants) need to be in place between academic units and the university in which they operate. This might be achieved by adopting a stance of shared governance or consultant governance for mutual accommodation. If the universities are to contribute to national development by maintaining their academic freedom, institutional autonomy, transparency, and accountability, the suggested model (BC vs AD quadrants) needs to be considered.

As Bejou and Bejou (2016) argued, “Shared governance does not take authority away from anyone; on the contrary, it adds to the competence and authority of all units and components" (p. 56). Flaherty (2016) further claimed shared governance does not necessarily mean shared power; it is a means to build bonds of mutual understanding, cooperation, trust, and respect among the basic academic units of a university. It is also the heart of any successful university as it reflects the dedication of leaders, instructors, and students to collaborate in enhancing and strengthening their institution (Bejou & Bejou, 2016; Curnalia & Mermer, 2018). This implies the university senior management and the MoE should be flexible in promoting autonomous, transparent, and participatory systems. Several studies (Bejou & Bejou, 2016; Curnalia & Mermer, 2018; Flaherty, 2016; Leach, 2008) revealed that in such a context, all the system participants would commit themselves for the common goals of their institution.

Significantly, the study found that students had more voice than instructors in the Ethiopian public universities' governance. Also, instructors are the key to governance in

higher education; their inputs should not be undermined. As Curnalia and Mermer (2018) argued, when academics are denied their voice, they likely to leave their profession.. High academic staff turnover has also been reported in the second and third generation universities. Evidence shows that staff turnover affects the academic activities of the universities (Minda, 2015; Yimer, Nega, & Ganfure, 2017). So, executing the academic core activities such as teaching, research, and community service might not be smooth when the academic voice is not heard, and shared governance is not seriously put in practice (Leach, 2008).

11.8.1 Implications of the study for governmentality

This study suggests the need for effective governance system of Ethiopian public universities. The government should shift from substantial control of universities' internal affairs to overseeing and guiding their general activities as it is clearly indicated in the Higher Education Proclamation of the country. Universities should be empowered, and the decision-making authority should be decentralised from higher to lower levels of university government to enable academic units (where most academic work is initiated and completed) to execute their academic core activities freely. In view of the notion of governmentality, power should be dispersed to lower levels of the university rather than being highly centralised. If universities are to contribute to the political, economic and social development of the country, they should be empowered and given institutional autonomy. Also, policymakers should consult and engage universities for policy dialogue and contextualisation before introducing multiple reforms to universities. Finally, a substantial interaction between university governing bodies and their basic academic units is imperative.

11.9 Reflections on the Research

11.9.1 Knowledge Contributions and Dissemination

This study has contributed to the field of higher education, particularly the influence of the Bologna Process on the Ethiopian higher education system. Very few studies have been done in the area both in Ethiopia and African settings (Bano & Taylor, 2014; Gebremeskel, 2014; Kigotho, 2015; Mehari, 2016). The use of the concept of

governance and governmentality as the conceptual framework of the study was a contribution of the study to knowledge. Given the current move of the Bologna Process in non-European countries, including Ethiopia, this study has made a timely contribution to guiding principles for the Ethiopian higher education governance practice. Overall, it is the contribution of new knowledge to this under-researched area that the significance of this study resides. The paper entitled: *Academic Senate decision and deliberation communication in the context of the Bologna Process: The case of Ethiopian public universities* (Tulu et al., 2018) has been published by the author and supervisors from the literature portion of the study and made available for the readers. In addition, a manuscript on *the students' voice receives more attention than the academics voice: A paradox in Ethiopian public universities is under review.* Another paper on *Constrained autonomy: Academics and institutional leaders empowerment in Ethiopia in the context of the Bologna Process entitled* has been submitted to the journal for publication.

11.9.2 Strengths

The present study had several strengths, including explaining the perception of governance practice of Ethiopian public universities in the context of the Bologna Process using the concept of governance and governmentality as a conceptual framework of the study, which was developed from this research (Tulu et al., 2018). In addition, the study employed a mixed-methods research design based on the premise that higher education governance is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, which requires the perspectives of various actors. To this end, data from different sources and academic disciplines (college deans, department chairs, instructors and students), and different data collection instruments (document analysis, semi-structured interview, and questionnaire) were employed to get diverse views of the system participants. Both descriptive and inferential statistical tools were also used to analyse the quantitative data.

11.9.3 Limitations

Although the present study has strengths, it also has some limitations. Therefore, in interpreting and using the results of the current study, the following limitations should be considered.

First, this study was limited to public universities and their basic academic units. Thus, the study would have been more comprehensive if it had considered participants from the MoE. Second, the first- and second-generation universities experienced governance practice in two systems. The new system, the introduction of some features (block mode of the learning-teaching process), and the old system, before the introduction of some elements of the Bologna Process (semester-based teaching mode). The third-generation universities commenced their activities right when the new system (some component of the Bologna Process) was introduced to the Ethiopian Higher Education institutions. Due to this fact, and the intention to collect information about perceived differences between two systems, the questionnaire instrument for the third-generation universities was necessarily slightly different from that used for the first two generations. The third-generation questionnaire aimed only to find out the views of participants in the context of the new system as the old system did not apply to the third generation. Comparability of third-generation questionnaire findings with first and second-generation questionnaire findings is therefore impaired. Third, as the area of higher education governance in the Ethiopian context is politically sensitive, the research participants might report their views conservatively. Thus, in the above aspects, the limitations of the applicability of the study need to be considered.

11.9.4 Suggestions for Future Research

Future studies involving institutional leaders, policy-makers, and experts considering how they perceive the implementation of legal documents by public universities in Ethiopian higher education settings would be warranted. Involving other stakeholders such as the Ethiopian Ministry of Education, Ministry of Science and Higher Education, and the Higher Education Relevance and Quality Agency in future research on the impact of university governance will make a significant contribution to improving the university governance system. In addition, further studies of this kind including private

universities would be beneficial to obtain a broader picture of how the Ethiopian private universities operate in implementing the legal documents. Similar studies could also be carried out in African contexts and in other developing and developed countries in order to build up a more coherent picture of the influence of the Bologna Process in the governance higher education institutions and enabling useful comparative studies between different countries.

References

Addis Ababa University. (2010). *Procedures of modularization and block teaching: Masters program of the Addis Ababa University*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Addis Ababa University.

Addis Ababa University. (2011). *Framework document for reforming academic governance* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Addis Ababa University.

Addis Ababa University. (2012a). *Addis Ababa University reorganization of structural set-up and governance system of the university*. Retrieved from http://www.aau.edu.et.

Addis Ababa University. (2012b). *Reorganization of structural set-up and governance system of the university*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Addis Ababa University.

Addis Ababa University. (2013a). *Addis Ababa University senate legislation*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Addis Ababa University.

Addis Ababa University. (2013b). *Addis Ababa University: General information*. Addis Ababa: Eclipse Printing Press.

Addis Ababa University. (2014). *Handbook for higher diploma program (HDP)*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: AAU Business Enterprise PLC.

African Society of International and Comparative Law. (1990). Dar es Salaam declaration on academic freedom and social responsibility of academics. *African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 4*(2), 552-564.

African Society of International and Comparative Law. (1992). Kampala declaration on intellectual freedom and social responsibility. *The African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 4*(2), 545-551.

African Union. (2008). *Provisional agenda and programme of work.* Paper presented at the Validation Meeting for African Quality Rating Mechanism and Harmonization Strategy for Higher Education held 25th to 27th March, Accra, Ghana. Retrieved from http://www.africa-union.org.

Agasisti, T., & Catalano, G. (2006). Governance models of university systems towards quasi-markets? Tendencies and perspectives: A European comparison. *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 28*(3), 245-262.

Akalu, G. A. (2014). Higher education in Ethiopia: Expansion, quality assurance and institutional autonomy. *Higher Education Quarterly, 68*(4), 394-415. doi:10.1111/hequ.12036.

Alemu, S. K. (2019). African higher education and the Bologna Process. *European Journal of Higher Education, 9*(1), 118-132.

Alexander, L. T. (2009). Stakeholder participation in new governance: Lessons from Chicago's public housing reform experiment. *Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law Policy, 16*(1), 117-185.

Almendarez, L. (2013). Human Capital Theory: Implications for educational development in Belize and the Caribbean. *Caribbean Quarterly, 59*(3-4), 21-33. doi:10.1080/00086495.2013.11672495.

Altbach, P. G. (2001). Academic freedom: International realities and challenges. *Journal of Higher Education, 41*(1-2), 205-219.

Altbach, P. G., Reisberg, L., & Rumbley, L. (2009). *Trends in global higher education: Tracking an academic revolution*. Paris, France: UNESCO.

Antonelli, C., & Fassio, C. (2015). Globalization and the knowledge-driven economy. *Economic Development Quarterly, 30*(1), 3-14. doi:10.1177/0891242415617239.

Areaya, S., Shibeshi, A., & Tefera, D. (2014). *Reengineering [Postgraduate curricula and its mode of delivery: Graduate students' views of modular course delivery at Addis Ababa University*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Addis Ababa University.

Asgedom, A. (2007). *Academic freedom and the development of higher education in Ethiopia: The case of Addis Ababa University 1950-2005.* (Doctoral thesis), University of East Anglia, Norwich.

Asgedom, A., & Hagos, T. (2015). Governance reforms in higher education of Ethiopia: The case of Addis Ababa University. *Ethiopian Journal of Development Research 37*(1), 1-40.

Ashcroft, K., & Rayner, P. (2010, August 22). *Ethiopia: Expanding and improving higher education*. *University World News: African Edition*. Retrieved from https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20100820150903137.

Asian Development Bank. (2007). *Moving toward knowledge-based economies: Asian experiences*. Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank.

Assefa, T. (2008). *Academic freedom in Ethiopia: Perspectives of teaching personnel*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Forum for Social Science.

Assembly, U. G. (2013). *A life of dignity for All: Accelerating progress towards the millennium development goals and advancing the United Nations Development agenda beyond 2015. A Report of the secretary-general*. New York, NY: United Nations.

Babaci-Wilhite, Z., & Geo-JaJa, M. A. (2018). *A critique and rethink of modern education in Africa's development in the 21st century*. (0856-4027).Retrieved from http://journals.udsm.ac.tz/index.php/ped/article/view/1459.

Bailey, C. (1980). *The autonomous teacher*. London, UK: Hodder and Stonghton.

Bailey, C. (1983). Education, accountability and the preparation of teachers. *Cambridge Journal of Education, 13*(2), 10-19.

Ball, S. (2012). *Global Education: New policy networks and the neoliberal imaginary*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Bano, S., & Taylor, J. (2014). Universities and the knowledge-based economy: perceptions from a developing country. *Higher Education Research & Development, 34*(2), 242-255. doi:10.1080/07294360.2014.956696.

Banya, K., & Zajda, J. (2015). Globalisation, the brain drain and poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa. In J. Zajda (Ed.), *Second International Handbook of Globalisation, Education and Policy Research* (pp. 263-285). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.

Becher, T., & Trowler, P. (2001). *Academic tribes and territories: Intellectual enquiry and the culture of disciplines*. London, UK: McGraw-Hill Education.

Becker, G. S. (2009). *Human capital: A Theoretical and empirical analysis, with special reference to education*. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.

Behailu, A. (2011). *The path of governance transformation in Ethiopian higher education - institutional perspective: A tale of three universities experience with respect to BPR reform.* (Master's thesis), University of Oslo, Oslo. Retrieved from http://www.duo.uio.no/.

Bejou, D., & Bejou, A. (2016). Shared governance: The key to higher education equilibrium. *Journal of Relationship Marketing, 15*(1-2), 54-61. doi:10.1080/15332667.2015.1091630.

Bennett, R. E., & Gitomer, D. H. (2009). Transforming K–12 assessment: Integrating accountability testing, formative assessment and professional support. In C. Wyatt-Smith & J. J. Cumming (Eds.), *Educational assessment in the 21st century* (pp. 43-61). Princeton, NJ: Springer.

Bergan, S. (2003). *Student participation in higher education governance*. Retrieved from https://www.coe.int/T/dg4/HigherEducation/Governance/SB_student_participation_EN.pdf.

Bergan, S. (2015). The EHEA at the cross-roads. The Bologna Process and the future of higher education [Overview paper]. In A. Curaj, L. Matei, R. Pricopie, J. Salmi, & P. Scott (Eds.), *The European Higher Education Area: Between critical reflections and future policies* (pp. 727-742). Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Bergen Communique. (2005). *The European Higher Education Area-achieving the goals, communique of the conference of European ministers responsible for higher education, Bergen, 19-20 May 2005*. Retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/2010/et_en.html.

Bevir, M. (2011). Governance and governmentality after neoliberalism. *Policy & Politics, 39*(4), 457-471. doi:10.1332/030557310X550141.

Biglan, A. (1973). Relationships between subject matter characteristics and the structure and output of university departments. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 57*(3), 204-213. doi:10.1037/h0034699.

Bisaso, R. (2010). Organisational responses to public sector reforms in higher education in Uganda: A case study of Makerere University. *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 32*(4), 343-351. doi:10.1080/1360080X.2010.491108.

Bleiklie, I. (2007). Systemic integration and macro steering. *Higher Education Policy, 20*(4), 391-412. doi:10.1057/palgrave.hep.8300166.

Bleiklie, I. (2012). Collegiality and hierarchy: Coordinating principles in higher education. In A. R. Nelson & I. P. Wei (Eds.), *The global university: Past,*

present, and future perspectives (pp. 85-104). NY, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bleiklie, I., Enders, J., & Lepori, B. (2013). Introduction: Transformation of universities in Europe. *Higher education, 65*(1), 1-4. doi:10.1007/s10734-012-9577-5.

Bleiklie, I., & Kogan, M. (2007). Organization and governance of universities. *Higher Education Policy, 20*(4), 477-493. doi:10.1057/palgrave.hep.8300167.

Bloom, E., Canning, D., & Chan, K. (2006). *Higher education and economic development in Africa*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Bloom, E., Canning, D., Chan, K., & Luca, D. (2014). Higher education and economic growth in Africa. *International Journal of African Higher Education, 1*(1), 22-57.

Bloom et al. (2005). *Higher Education and Economic Development in Africa*. Washington D.C: World Bank.

Boer, H., & File, J. (2009). *Higher education governance reforms accross Europe*. Enschede, Netherlands: University of Twente.

Boland, J. A. (2005). Student participation in shared governance: A means of advancing democratic values? *Tertiary Education and Management, 11*(3), 199-217. doi:10.1007/s11233-005-5099-3.

Bolden, R., & Gosling, J. (2006). Leadership competencies: Time to change the tune? *Leadership, 2*(2), 147-163. doi:10.1177/1742715006062932.

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative research in psychology, 3*(2), 77-101. doi:10.1191/1478088706qp063oa.

Braun, V., Clarke, V., Hayfield, N., & Terry, G. (2017). Thematic analysis. In C. Willig & W. & Rogers (Eds.), *The sage handbook of qualitative research in psychology* (pp. 843-860). London, UK: Sage.

Braun, V., Clarke, V., & Weate, P. (2016). Using thematic analysis in sport and exercise research. In Brett S. & A. C. Sparkes (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of qualitative research in sport and exercise*. London, UK: Routledge.

British Council. (2015). *Students in the driving seat: Young people's voices on higher education in Africa*. Retrieved from https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/2.5_students-in-the-driving-seat_report_overview.pdf.

Brown, P., Lauder, H., & Ashton, D. (2008). Education, globalisation and the future of the knowledge economy. *European Educational Research Journal, 7*(2), 131-156. doi:0.2304/eerj.2008.7.2.131.

Bunting, I., & Cloete, N. (2004). *Developing performance indicators for higher education: A South African case study*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University.

Burchi, F. (2006). *Identifying the role of education in socio-economic development.* Paper presented at the International Conference on Human and Economic Resources, Rome, Italy. Retrieved from https://ideas.repec.org/h/izm/prcdng/200617.html.

Burgess, R. G. (1994). Accountability to whom? Researchers and researched in education. In D. Scott (Ed.), *Accountability and control in educational settings*. London, UK: Cassell.

Burke, J. C. (2005). The many faces of accountability. In J. C. Burke (Ed.), *Achieving accountability in higher education: Balancing public, academic, and market demands* (1st ed., pp. 1-24). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Caruso, L. (2015). The knowledge-based economy and the relationship between the economy and society in contemporary capitalism. *European Journal of Social Theory, 19*(3), 409-430. doi:10.1177/1368431015611297.

Chaka, D. (2016). *Practices of EFL modular instruction: The case of undergraduate programme of English language and literature in three public universities in Ethiopia.* (Doctoral thesis), Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Retrieved from http://etd.aau.edu.et/handle/123456789/180.

Chan, K. (2001). The difficulties and dilemma of constructing a model for teacher evaluation in higher education. *Higher Education Management, 13*(1), 93-111.

Clark, B. R. (1983). *The higher education system: Academic organization in cross-national perspective*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Clark, N. (2014). *The Bologna Process as a model for regional integration*. Retrieved from https://wenr.wes.org/2014/06/the-bologna-process-as-a-model-for-regional-integration.

Clemens, B. W., & Douglas, T. J. (2005). Understanding strategic responses to institutional pressures. *Journal of Business Research, 58*(9), 1205-1213. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2004.04.002.

Cohen, L., Manion, L., & Morrison, K. (2011). *Research methods in education* (7th ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Collins, F. L., & Ho, K. C. (2014). Globalising higher education and cities in Asia and the Pacific. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 55*(2), 127-131. doi:10.1111/apv.12050.

Collins, K. M., Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Sutton, I. L. (2006). A model incorporating the rationale and purpose for conducting mixed methods research in special education and beyond. *Learning Disabilities: A Contemporary Journal, 4*(1), 67-100.

Communiqué Leuven. (2009, 28-29 April 2009). *The Bologna Process 2020-The European Higher Education Area in the new decade.* Paper presented at the Communiqué of the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, Leuven and Louvain-la-Neuve. Retrieved from http://www.lefis.org/images/documents/jornada_sobre_derecho/leuven_louvain_la_neuve.pdf.

Connelly, L. M. (2016). Trustworthiness in qualitative research. *Medsurg Nursing, 25*(6), 435-437.

Cooperative College Staff Association. (1990). *Dar es Salaam Declaration on academic freedom and social responsibility of academics*. Retrieved from http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/africa/DARDOK.htm.

Corbetta, P. (2003). *Social research: Theory, methods and techniques*. London, UK: Sage.

Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (2008). *Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Côté, A., Jones, G., & Shapiro, B. (2011). *Strengthening governance at Concordia: A collective challenge. Report of the external governance review committee*. Retrieved from https://www.oise.utoronto.ca/hec/UserFiles/File/Research/Papers/ENGLISH.EGRC_REPORT.pdf.

Creswell, J. (2008). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed approaches* (3rd ed.). London, UK: Sage.

Creswell, J. (2015). Basic and advanced mixed methods designs. In V. Knight & K. Guarino (Eds.), *A concise introduction to mixed methods research* (pp. 34-50). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Creswell, J. (2018). *Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating quantitative and qualitative research* (4th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc.

Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2018). *Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. London, UK: Sage.

Crosier, D., & Parveva, T. (2013). *The Bologna Process: Its impact on higher education development in Europe and beyond*. Paris, France: UNESCO.

Curnalia, R. M., & Mermer, D. (2018). Renewing our commitment to tenure, academic freedom, and shared governance to navigate challenges in higher education. *Review of Communication, 18*(2), 129-139. doi:10.1080/15358593.2018.1438645.

Cushman, T. (2003). Who best to tame grade inflation? *Academic Questions, 16*(4), 48-56.

Dampson, D. G., & Edwards, A. K. (2019). Strategic thinking, leadership and governance for African universities: Lessons from successful universities. In *Strategic Management-a Dynamic View*. London, UK: IntechOpen.

Dascălu, E. D., & Nasta, L. (2015). Managerial accountability-a key factor in the implementation of internal control systems. *Ovidius University Annals, Series Economic Sciences, 15*(2), 229-235.

Davidovitch, N., & Iram, Y. (2015). Models of higher education governance: A comparison of Israel and other countries. *Global Journal of Educational Studies, 1*(1), 16. doi:10.5296/gjes.v1i1.7556.

Davis, G. F., & Cobb, J. A. (2010). Resource dependence theory: Past and future. *Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 28*(1), 21-42. doi:10.1108/S0733-558X(2010)0000028006.

De Boer, H., Enders, J., & Leisyte, L. (2007). Public sector reform in Dutch higher education: The organizational transformation of the university. *Public Administration, 85*(1), 27-46. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00632.

De Boer, H., Enders, J., & Schimank, L. (2007). On the way towards new public management? The governance of university systems in England, the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany. In D. Jansen (Ed.), *New forms of governance in research organizations* (pp. 137-152). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.

De Boer, H., Enders, J., & Schimank, U. (2008). Comparing higher education governance systems in four European countries. In N. C. Soguel & P. Jaccard (Eds.), *Governance and performance of education systems* (pp. 35-54). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.

De Boer, H., & Goedegebuure, L. (2009). The changing nature of the academic deanship. *Leadership, 5*(3), 347-364. doi:10.1177/1742715009337765.

De Boer, H., Goedegebuure, L., & Meek, V. L. (2010). The changing nature of academic middle management: A framework for analysis. In V. L. Meek, Goedegebuure, L. , Santiago, R. & Carvalho,T. (Ed.), *The changing dynamics of higher education middle management, higher education dynamics* (Vol. 33, pp. 229-241). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.

De Boer, H., & Stensaker, B. (2007). An internal representative system: The democratic vision. In P. Maassen & J. P. Olsen (Eds.), *University dynamics and European integration, higher education dynamics* (Vol. 19, pp. 99-118). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.

Dean, M. (2010). *Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society*. London, UK: Sage.

Debela, N. (2019). *Education and training policy in Ethiopia: The missing link*. Marshall University, Graduate College, Huntington, WV.

Debela, N. (in press). *Nation building*. Tsehai Publisher: Los Angeles, CA.

Debre Berhan University. (2012). *Debre Berhan University Senate legislation*. Debre Berhan, Ethiopia: Debre Berhan University.

Dehmel, A. (2006). Making a European area of lifelong learning a reality? Some critical reflections on the European Union's lifelong learning policies. *Comparative Education, 42*(1), 49-62. doi:10.1080/03050060500515744.

Department of Higher Education and Training. (2012). *Higher education Act: Amendments to the institutional statute*. Johannesburg, South Africa: University of Johannesburg.

Dervin, F., & Zajda, J. (2015). *Governance in education: Diversity and effectiveness*. Paris, France: UNESCO.

Diang, M. C. (2013). *Colonialism, neoliberalism, education and culture in Cameroon.* (Master's thesis), DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois. Retrieved from http://via.library.depaul.edu/soe_etd/52.

Diefenbach, T., & Sillince, J. A. (2011). Formal and informal hierarchy in different types of organization. *Organization Studies, 32*(11), 1515-1537. doi:10.1177/0170840611421254.

Dill, D. D. (1997). Higher education markets and public policy. *Higher Education Policy, 10*(3-1), 167-185. doi:10.1016/S0952-8733(97)00011-1.

Dobbins, M. (2008). *Comparing higher education policies in central and Eastern Europe: To converge or not to converge?* (Doctoral thesis), University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany. Retrieved from http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/handle/123456789/3887/DISS_fuer_KOPS.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

Dobbins, M., Knill, C., & Vogtle, E. M. (2011). An analytical framework for the cross-country comparison of higher education governance. *Journal of Higher Education, 62*(5), 665-683. doi:10.1007/s10734-011-9412-4.

Dumciuviene, D. (2015). The impact of education policy to country economic development. *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 191*, 2427-2436. doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.04.302.

Dundar, S. (2013). Students' participation to the decision-making process as a tool for democratic school. *Educational Sciences: Theory and Practice, 13*(2), 867-875.

Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency. (2012). *The European higher education area in 2012: Bologna Process implementation report*. Brussels, Belgium: Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency.

Enders, J. (2004). Higher education, internationalisation, and the nation-state: Recent developments and challenges to governance theory. *Journal of Higher Education, 47*, 361–382. doi:10.1023/B:HIGH.0000016461.98676.30.

Estermann, T., & Nokkala, T. (2009). *University autonomy in Europe: Exploratory study*. Brussels, Belgium: European University Association.

Eta, E. A., Kallo, J., & Rinne, R. (2018). Process of transfer and reception of Bologna Process ideas in the Cameroon higher education system. *European Educational Research Journal, 17*(5), 656-675. doi:10.1177/1474904117733376.

European Commission. (2001). *Making a European area of lifelong learning a reality*. Brussels, Belgium: Commission of the European Communities.

European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice. (2018). *The European higher education area in 2018:Bologna Process implementation report*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

Fejes, A. (2008). European citizens under construction: The Bologna Process analysed from a governmentality perspective. *Educational Philosophy and Theory, 40*(4), 515-530. doi:10.1111/j.1469-5812.2007.00362.

Ferede, W. (2013). Historical evolution and the dynamics of modern education in Ethiopia. *Journal of Educational Research and Studies, 1*(5), 40-49.

Fernando, L. (1989). The Lima declaration on academic freedom and autonomy of institutions of higher education. *Higher Education Policy, 2*(1), 49-51. doi:10.1057/hep.1989.14.

Fielden, J. (2008). *Global trends in university governance*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Fimyar, O. (2008). Using governmentality as a conceptual tool in education policy research. *The Journal of Doctoral Research in Education, 1*(1), 3-18.

Fitzsimons, P. (1999). Human capital theory and education. In M. A. Peters (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Education* (pp. 1050-1053). Singapore: Springer.

Flaherty, C. (2016). *Shared governance, not shared power*. Retrieved from https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/09/29/survey-presidents-and-board-memberssuggests-shared-governance-matters-them-could-be.

Foucault, M. (1991a). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality* (pp. 87-104). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Foucault, M. (1991b). Politics and the study of discourse. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality* (pp. 53-73). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Foucault, M. (2007). *Security, territory, population: lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Freeman, R. M. (2014). *Student voice: new forms of power and governance in higher education in England (2003-2013).* (Doctoral thesis), University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK. Retrieved from https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/5379/1/Freeman14PhD.pdf.

Fugar, F. D. K., Ashiboe-Mensah, N. A., & Adinyira, E. (2013). Human capital theory: Implications for the Ghanaian construction industry development. *Journal of Construction Project Management and Innovation, 3*(3), 464-479.

Fumasolia, T., & Stensaker, B. (2013). Organizational studies in higher education: A reflection on historical themes and prospective trends. *Higher Education Policy, 26*(4), 479-496. doi:10.1057/hep.2013.25.

Gebremeskel, H. H. (2014). Influence of the Bologna Process on African higher education: Ethiopian higher education in focus. *International Journal of Research Studies in Education, 3*(4), 85-98. doi:10.5861/ijrse.2014.785.

Gebremeskel, H. H., & Feleke, K. M. (2016). Exploring the context of Ethiopian higher education system using Clark's triangle of coordination. *Journal of Tertiary Education and Management, 22*(2), 99-120. doi:10.1080/13583883.2016.1149739.

Gebru, D. A. (2016). Effectiveness of higher diploma program for early career academics in Ethiopia. *Studies in Higher Education, 41*(10), 1741-1753. doi:10.1080/03075079.2016.1221652.

Geo-JaJa, M., & Zajda, J. (2015). Globalisation and the future of education in Africa. In J. Zajda (Ed.), *Second International Handbook of Globalisation,Education and Policy Research* (pp. 287-307). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.

Gibbons, M. (1998). *Higher education relevance in the 21st Century*. Washington, DC.: World Bank.

Gill, J., & Johnson, P. (2010). *Research methods for managers* (4th ed.). London, UK: Sage.

Girmaw, A. (2014). Higher education in Ethiopia: Expansion, quality assurance and instititional autonomy. *Higher Education Quarterly, 68*(4), 394-415. doi:10.1111/hequ.12036.

Godin, B. (2006). The knowledge-based economy: conceptual framework or buzzword? *The Journal of Technology Transfer, 31*(1), 17-30. doi:10.1007/s10961-005-5010-x.

Goedegebuure, L., & Hayden, M. (2007). Overview: Governance in higher education-concepts and issues. *Higher Education Research & Development, 26*(1), 1-11. doi:10.1080/07294360601166778.

Gordon, C. (1991). Governmental rationality: An introduction. *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality, 1*(3).

Government Gazeti'e of the Republic of Namibia. (1992). *University of Namibia ACT*. Windhoek, Namibia: University of Namibia.

Government of Botswana. (2008). *University of Botswana Act*. Gaborone, Botswana: Government of Botswana.

Guba, E. G. (1981). ERIC/ECTJ Annual Review Paper: Criteria for Assessing the Trustworthiness of Naturalistic Inquiries. *Educational Communication and Technology: A Journal of Theory, Research, and Development, 29*(2), 75-91.

Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. *Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2*(163-194), 105-117.

Hahn, K., & Teferra, D. (2014). Tuning as instrument of systematic Higher Education reform and quality enhancement: the African experience. *Tuning Journal for Higher Education, 1*(1), 127-163.

Halcomb, E. J., & Andrew, S. (2005). Triangulation as a method for contemporary nursing research. *Journal of Nurse Researcher, 13*(2), 71-81. doi:10.7748/nr.13.2.71.s8.

Hamre, B. K., & Pianta, R. C. (2006). Student-Teacher Relationships. In G. G. Bear & K. M. Minke (Eds.), *Children's needs III: Development, prevention, and intervention* (pp. 59-71). Washington, DC: National Association of School Psychologists.

Haq, S. M. A. (2012). Knowledge-based development and its relation to economic prosperity in developing countries *Asian Social Science, 8*(12), 36-47. doi:10.5539/ass.v8n12p36.

Hargreaves, A. (2003). *Teaching in the knowledge society: Education in the age of insecurity*. New York, NY: Teachers College Press.

Harman, K., & Treadgold, E. (2007). Changing patterns of governance for Australian universities. *Higher Education Research & Development, 26*(1), 13-29. doi:10.1080/07294360601166786.

Hénard, F., & Mitterle, A. (2010). Governance and quality guidelines in higher education. *A review of governance arrangements and quality assurance. Berlim: OECD*.

Hénard, F., & Mitterle, A. (2010). *Governance and quality guidelines in higher education: A review of governance arrangements and quality assurance guidelines*. Retrieved from https://books.google.com.au/books?id=lWEyMwEACAAJ.

Huisman, J., & Currie, J. (2004). Accountability in higher education: Bridge over troubled water? *Journal of Higher Education, 48*(4), 529-551. doi:10.1023/B:HIGH.0000046725.16936.4c.

Hunde, A. B. (2008). Application of higher diploma program training skills in classroom instruction: The case of education faculty, Jimma University (Ethiopia). *Ethiopian Journal of Education and Sciences, 4*(1), 51-72.

Johnson, R. K. (1989). *The second language curriculum*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, W., Cameron, N., Dickson, P., Emsley, S., Raynor, P., Seymour, C., & Wright, J. (2009). The reliability of routine anthropometric data collected by health workers: a cross-sectional study. *International Journal of Nursing Studies, 46*(3), 310-316. doi:10.1016/j.ijnurstu.2008.10.003.

Johnston, M. (2009). *Good governance: Rule of law, transparency,and accountability*. Network, NY: United Nations Public Administration.

Jongbloed, B. (2003). Marketisation in higher education, Clark's triangle and the essential ingredients of markets. *Higher Education Quarterly, 57*(2), 110. doi:10.1111/1468-2273.00238.

Jongbloed, B., Vossensteyn, H., van Vught, F., & Westerheijden, D. F. (2018). Transparency in higher education: The emergence of a new perspective on higher education governance. In A. Curaj, L. Deca, & R. Pricopie (Eds.), *European higher education area: The impact of past and future policies* (pp. 441-454). Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Joyner, L. (2014) *Diverse conversations: The importance of transparency in governance/Interviewer: M. Lynch*. Diverse issues in higher education, CMA publication, Fairfax, Verginia.

Jreisat, J. (2004). Governance in a globalizing world. *International Journal of Public Administration, 27*(13-14), 1003-1029. doi:10.1081/pad-200039883.

Kahsay, M. (2012). *Quality and quality assurance in Ethiopian higher education: Critical issues and practical implications.* (PhD), Universiteit Twente, Twente, the Netherlands. Retrieved from https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/6064589/thesis_M_Nega_Kahsay.pdf.

Kalpazidou, E., Langberg, K., & Aagaard, K. (2008). *Funding systems and their effects on higher education systems: Country study-Denmark.* Aarhus, Denmark: University of Aarhus.

Kaur, M., & Singh, L. (2016). Knowledge in the economic growth of developing economies. *African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development, 8*(2), 205-212. doi:10.1080/20421338.2016.1147207.

Keay, A., & Loughrey, J. (2015). The framework for board accountability in corporate governance. *Legal Studies, 35* (2), 252–279. doi:10.1111/lest.12058.

Kebede, K. (2015). *Academic governance in public and private universities in Ethiopia: A comparative case study.* (Doctoral thesis), Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Retrieved from http://etd.aau.edu.et/handle/123456789/13.

Keefer, P. (2009). Governance. In T. Landaman & N. Robimson (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of comparative politics*. London, UK: Sage.

Keeling, R. (2006). The Bologna Process and the Lisbon research agenda: The European Commission's expanding role in higher education discourse. *European Journal of Education, 41*(2), 203-223. doi:10.1111/j.1465-3435.2006.00256.x.

Kember, D., & Corbett, M. (2018). *Structuring the thesis: Matching method, paradigm, theories and findings*. Singapore: Springer.

Kenny, J. D. (2009). Managing a modern university: Is it time for a rethink? *Higher Education Research & Development, 28*(6), 629-642. doi:10.1080/07294360903206934.

Kezar, A. (2004). What is more important to effective governance: Relationships, trust, and leadership, or structures and formal processes? *New Directions for Higher Education, 2004*(127), 35-46. doi:10.1002/he.154.

Khelfaoui, H. (2009). The Bologna Process in Africa: Globalization or return to colonial situation. *Journal of Higher Education in Africa, 7*(1-2), 21-38.

Kigotho, W. (2015, March 20). Africa: No agreed university governance model for post-2015 era. *University World News: The Global Window on Higher Education*. Retrieved from https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20150320084615210.

Kivistö, J., & Zalyevska, I. (2015). Agency theory as a framework for higher education governance. In J. Huisman, H. d. Boer, D. D. Dill, & M. Souto-Otero (Eds.), *The Palgrave International Handbook of Higher Education Policy and Governance* (pp. 132-151). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Klemenčič, M. (2006). *The Bologna process and student expectations: Bologna handbook*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kohtamäki, V., & Lyytinen, A. (2004). Financial autonomy and challenges to being a regionally responsive higher education institution. *Tertiary Education & Management, 10*(4), 319-338. doi:10.1080/13583883.2004.9967135.

Kosack, S., & Fung, A. (2014). Does transparency improve governance? *Annual Review of Political Science, 17*, 65-87. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-032210-144356.

Koul, L. (2008). *Methodology of Educational Research.* (3rd ed.). New Delhi, India: Vikas Publishing Agency.

Kumar, R. (2019). *Research Methodology-a step-by-step guide for beginners*. London, UK: Sage.

Kuruuzum, A., Asilkan, O., & Cizel, R. B. (2005). Student participation in higher education institutions in Turkey. *Higher Education in Europe, 30*(3-4), 345-355. doi:10.1080/03797720600625077.

Laird, T. F. N., Shoup, R., Kuh, G. D., & Schwarz, M. J. (2008). The effects of discipline on deep approaches to student learning and college outcomes. *Research in Higher Education, 49*(6), 469-494. doi:10.1007/s11162-008-9088-5.

Lazzeretti, L., & Tavoletti, E. (2006). Governance shifts in higher education: A cross-national comparison. *European Educational Research Journal, 5*(1), 18-37. doi:10.2304/eerj.2006.5.1.18.

Leach, W. D. (2008). *Shared governance in higher education: Structural and cultural responses to a changing national climate*. Sacramento, CA: California State University.

Lefrere, P. (2007). Competing higher education futures in a globalising world. *European Journal of Education, 42*(2), 201-212. doi:10.1111/j.1465-3435.2007.00301.x.

Leisyte, L. (2007). *University governance and academic research: Case studies of research units in Dutch and English universities.* (Doctoral thesis), University of Twente, Twente, the Netherlands. Retrieved from https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/university-governance-and-academic-research-case-studies-of-research.

Levy, P. S., & Lemeshow, S. (2013). *Sampling of populations: Methods and applications* (4th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.

Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1988). *Criteria for assessing naturalistic inquiries as reports*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans. Retrieved from https://login.ezproxy.utas.edu.au/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eric&AN=ED297007&site=eds-live.

Lincoln, Y. S., Lynham, S. A., & Guba, E. G. (2011). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluences, revisited. *The Sage handbook of qualitative research, 4*, 97-128.

Liu, Y., Green, A., & Pensiero, N. (2016). Expansion of higher education and inequality of opportunities: a cross-national analysis. *Journal of Higher Education Policy & Management, 38*(3), 242-263. doi:10.1080/1360080X.2016.1174407.

Luescher-Mamashela, T. (2013). Student involvement in university decision-making: Good reasons, a new lens. *Studies in Higher Education, 38*(10), 1442-1456. doi:10.1080/03075079.2011.625496.

Maassen, P. (2003). Shifts in governance arrangements. In A. Amaral, V. L. Meek, & I. M. Larsen (Eds.), *The Higher Education Managerial Revolution?* (Vol. 3, pp. 31-53). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.

Maassen, P. (2008). The modernisation of European higher education. In A. Amara, I. Bleiklie, & C. Musselin (Eds.), *From governance to identity* (Vol. 24, pp. 95-112). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.

Maassen, P., & Stensaker, B. (2005). The black box revisited: The relevance of theory-driven research in the field of higher education studies. In I. B. Henkel (Ed.), *Governing knowledge* (pp. 213-226). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.

Maassen, P. G. a. P. (2004). Challenge and change: The academic profession in uncertain times. In P. Maassen, A. Amaral, A. Arimoto, D. Dill, J. Enders, P. Gumport, M. Henkel, & G. Jones (Eds.), *Higher Education Dynamics*. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.

MacGregor, C. (2009, 11 October 2009). Africa: Higher education and development. *The Global Window on Higher Education*. Retrieved from http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20091011105738 12.

Malaney, G. D. (1986). Differentiation in graduate education. *Research in Higher Education, 25*(1), 82-96. doi:10.1007/BF00991880.

Malle, A. Y., Pirttimaa, R., & Saloviita, T. (2015). Policy-practice gap in participation of students with disabilities in the education and training programme of Ethiopia: policy content analysis. *Support for Learning, 30*(2), 121-133. doi:10.1111/1467-9604.12084.

Martin, M., & Stella, A. (2007). *External quality assurance in higher education: Making choices, fundamentals of educational planning* Paris, France: UNESCO.

Massen, P., Amaral, A., Meek, V., & Larsen, I. (2003). Shifts in governance arrangements: An interpretation of the introduction of new management structures. *The Higher Education Managerial Revolution, 3*, 31-53. doi:10.1007/978-94-010-0072-7_2.

Matunhu, J. (2011). A critique of modernization and dependency theories in Africa: Critical assessment. *African Journal of History and Culture, 3*(5), 65-72.

Max-Neef, M. (1991). *Human scale development: Conception, application and further reflections*. London, UK: Apex Press.

McCormick, M. P., O'Connor, E. E., Cappella, E., & McClowry, S. G. (2013). Teacher–child relationships and academic achievement: A multilevel propensity score model approach. *Journal of School Psychology, 51*(5), 611-624. doi:10.1016/j.jsp.2013.05.001.

McMahon, F. (2010). *European higher education and the Bologna Process*. Retrieved from http://www.ehea.info/.

Medvedeva, T. A. (2015). University education: The challenges of 21st century. *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 166*, 422-426. doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.12.547.

Mehari, Y. (2010). *Governance in Ethiopian higher education system: State-higher education insitutions relationship: The case of Mekelle University.* (Unpublished master's thesis), University of Tampere, Finland.

Mehari, Y. (2016). *Governance reform in the Ethiopian higher education system: Organisational responses to business management tools in the case of Mekelle university.* (Doctoral thesis), Tampere University Tampere, Finland. Retrieved from https://trepo.tuni.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/99738/978-952-03-0208-5.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

Mekasha, K. (2005). Ensuring the quality of Ethiopian higher education in the face of the challenges of the 21st Century. *The Ethiopian Journal of Higher Education, 2*(2), 103-131.

Mertens, D. M. (2007). Transformative paradigm mixed methods and social justice. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1*(3), 212-225. doi:10.1177/1558689807302811.

Miller, P. J., & Cameron, R. (2011). Mixed method research designs: a case study of their adoption in a doctor of business administration program. *International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches, 5*(3), 387-402. doi:10.5172/mra.2011.5.3.387.

Millett, J. D. (1974). Governance and leadership in higher education. *Management Forum, 3*(8), 7.

Mills, J., Bonner, A., & Francis, K. (2006). The development of constructivist grounded theory. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 5*(1), 25-35. doi:10.1177/160940690600500103.

Minda, M. H. (2015). A study on the magnitude and causes of turnover among academic staffs of Ethiopian Higher Institutions: Evidence from Ambo University. *Science, Technology and Arts Research Journal, 4*(3), 285-293.

Ministry of Education. (2010). *Education sector development program IV (2010/2011-2014/2015)*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Ministry of Education.

Ministry of Education. (2012). *A guideline of modularization for Ethiopian higher education institutions*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Ministry of Education.

Ministry of Education. (2012). *A Guideline for modularization to Ethiopian higher education institutions*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Higher Education Strategy Center.

Ministry of Education. (2013). *Higher education institutions' education development change army operational manual*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Ministry of Education.

Ministry of Education. (2015). *Education sector development programme V (ESDP V) 2016 - 2020*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Ministry of Education.

Ministry of Education. (2016a). *Education statistics annual abstract*. Retrieved from www.moe.gov.et.

Ministry of Education. (2016b). *Public university plan implementation evaluation and report of 2016*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Ministry of Education.

Moges, L. (2015). *Modularization and the practices of module development in selected Ethiopian universities.* (Doctoral thesis), Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Retrieved from http://etd.aau.edu.et/handle/123456789/13.

Moutsios, S. (2012). *Academic autonomy and the Bologna Process*. Aarhus, Denmark: Epoke.

Muijs, D. (2010). *Doing quantitative research in education with SPSS*. London, UK: Sage.

Musselin, C. (2007). Are universities specific organisations? In G. Krücken, A. Kosmützky, & M. Torka (Eds.), *Towards a multiversity? Universities between global trends and national traditions* (pp. 63-84). Bielefeld, Germany: Transcript Verlag.

National Council for Higher Education. (2001). *Universities and other tertiary institutions ACT, 2001*. Mekerere, Uganda: National Council for Higher Education.

Ndiaye, L., & Shabani, J. (1998). *Academic freedom and university autonomy*. Dakar, Senegal: UNESCO Regional Office for Africa.

Neave, G. (1988). On being economical with university autonomy: Being an account of the retrospective joys of a written constitution. *Academic freedom and responsibility*, 31-48.

Neave, G. (1998). The evaluative state reconsidered. *European Journal of Education, 33*(3), 265-284.

Neave, G., & Van Vught, F. A. (1994). *Government and higher education relationships across three continents: The winds of change* (1st ed.). Oxford, UK: Pergamon.

Negash, T. (2010). Education and development in Ethiopia: The history of dubious. *Ethiopian E-Journal for Research and Innovation Foresight, 2*(2), 6-55.

Nguyen, T. (2013). *English learning strategies of Vietnamese tertiary students.* (Doctoral thesis), University of Tasmania, Launceston, Tasmania. Retrieved from https://eprints.utas.edu.au/17105/1/Front-Nguyen-Thesis-_2013.pdf.

Nienhüser, W. (2008). Resource dependence theory: How well does it explain behavior of organizations? *Management Revue, 19*(1), 9-32.

Niklasson, L. (1995). State, market and oligarchy in higher education: A typology and an outline of the debate. *Higher Education Management, 7*(3), 345-353.

Nowell, L. S., Norris, J. M., White, D. E., & Moules, N. J. (2017). Thematic analysis: Striving to meet the trustworthiness criteria. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 16*(1), 1-13. doi:10.1177/1609406917733847.

Oba, J. (2014). Reforming national universities in Japan: Implications for governance. In M. Shattock (Ed.), *International trends in university governance: Autonomy, self-government and the distribution of authorit* (pp. 121-138). London, UK: Routledge.

Obasi, I. N., & Olutayo, A. O. (2009). Globalization, the Bologna Process and African universities: Limits and contradictions of market-oriented higher education reforms. *Higher Education in Africa, 7*(2), 159–187.

Ödemiş, İ. S., Beytekin, O. F., & Uslu, M. E. (2016). An exploratory study on university autonomy: A comparison of Turkey and some European Union

countries. *Journal of Educational & Instructional Studies in the World, 6*(3), 79-90.

OECD. (2002). *Financing education: Investments and returns analysis of the world education indicators*. Paris, France: OECD.

Office of the Academic Vice President Addis Ababa University. (2015). *Addis Ababa University graduate programs review report*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Addis Ababa University.

Okeke, C. I. (2010). A neglected impediment to true Africanisation of African higher education curricula: Same agenda, differential fee regimes. *Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 8*(2), 39-52.

Okolie, A. C. (2003). Producing knowledge for sustainable development in Africa: Implications for higher education. *Higher Education, 46*, 235–260. doi:10.1023/A:102471772.

Olaniyan, D. A., & Okemakinde, T. (2008). Human capital theory: Implications for educational development. *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences, 5*(5), 479-483.

Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. *Academy of Management Review, 16*(1), 145-179.

Olsen, J. P. (2002). Reforming European institutions of governance. *Journal of Common Market Studies, 40*(4), 581-602. doi:10.1111/1468-5965.00389.

Olsen, J. P. (2013). The Institutional basis of democratic accountability. *West European Politics, 36*(3), 447-473. doi:10.1080/01402382.2012.753704.

Olssen, M. (2015). Neoliberal competition in higher education today: Research, accountability and impact. *British Journal of Sociology of Education, 37*(1), 129-148. doi:10.1080/01425692.2015.1100530.

Onsando, P. L. (2007). *Sustaining economic growth through proper linkages in national educational systems: A case of Kenya* UNESCO Forum Second Regional Research Seminar for Africa. Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya. Retrieved from http://portal.unesco.org/education/es/files/52558/11725004885Onsando.pdf/Onsando.pdf.

Owusu-Ansah, C. (2015). Academic freedom: Its relevance and challenges for public universities in Ghana today. *Journal of Education and Practice, 6*(5), 173-179.

Ozturk, I. (2001). The role of education in economic development: A theoretical perspective. *Journal of Rural Development and Administration, 33*(1), 39-47. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1137541.

Pallant, J. (2013). *SPSS survival manual: A step by step guide to data analysis using the SPSS program*. London, UK: McGraw-Hill Education.

Park, H., & Blenkinsopp, J. (2011). The roles of transparency and trust in the relationship between corruption and citizen satisfaction. *International Review of Administrative Sciences, 77*(2), 254-274. doi:10.1177/0020852311399230.

Patton, M. Q. (2015). *Qualitative research & evaluation methods: Integrating theory and practice* (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Pavela, G. (2008). Academic freedom for students has ancient roots. *Florida Philosophical Review, 8*(1), 13-16.

Perry, R., Charlotte, B., Isabella, M., & Bob, C. (2014). *SPSS explained* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Peter, A. G. (1966). *The development of underdevelopment* Boston, Massachusetts: New England Free Press.

Peter, K. (2002). Weberian collegiality and academic freedom in the western university. In D. S. Preston (Ed.), *The University of crisis* (pp. 21-42). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Rodopi.

Petlane, T. (2009). Integrating governance education into university education in Africa: Perspectives, challenges and lessons. *African Perspectives: Global Insights,* (43), 35. Retrieved from www.saiia.org.za.

Pielstick, C. D. (2000). Formal vs. informal leading: A comparative analysis. *Journal of Leadership Studies, 7*(3), 99-114. doi:10.1177/107179190000700307.

Pierre, J., & Peters, G. B. (2000). *Governance, politics and the state*. Basingstoke, UK: Red Globe Press.

Pillay, P. (2011). *Higher education and economic development: Literature review*. Wynberg, South Africa: The Centre for Higher Education Transformation

Planas, A., Soler, P., Fullana, J., Pallisera, M., & Vilà, M. (2013). Student participation in university governance: The opinions of professors and students. *Studies in Higher Education, 38*(4), 571-583. doi:10.1080/03075079.2011.586996.

Polit, D. F., & Beck, C. T. (2014). *Essentials of nursing research: Appraising evidence for nursing practice*. Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.

Polit, D. F., & Beck, C. T. (2018). *Essentials of nursing research: Appraising evidence for nursing practice* (9th ed.). Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.

QS World University Rankings. (2016). *QS higher education system strength rankings-2016*. Retrieved from https://www.topuniversities.com/system-strength-rankings/2016.

Raza, R. (2009). *Examining autonomy and accountability in public and private tertiary institutions*. Retrieved from http://documents.vsemirnyjbank.org/curated/ru/267671468158063464/pdf/526540WP0Auton145574B01PUBLIC110pdf.pdf.

Raza, R. R. (2010). *Higher education governance in East Asia*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Reed, M., & Meek, L. (2002). Governing higher education: National perspectives on institutional governance. In A. Amaral, G. A. Jones, & B. Karseth (Eds.), *Higher Education Dynamics*. New Delhi, India: Springer.

Ring, P. J. (2010). Governance and governmentality: a discussion in the context of UK private pension provision. *Economy and Society, 39*(4), 534-550. doi:10.1080/03085147.2010.510683.

Rizvi, F., & Lingard, B. (2010). *Globalizing education policy*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Roberts, L., & Ajai-Ajagbe, P. (2013). *Higher education and the millennium development goals from, and where are going?* London, UK: The Association of Commonwealth Universities.

Rose, N., O'Malley, P., & Valverde, M. (2006a). Governmentality. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 2*, 83-104. doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.2.081805.105900.

Rose, N., O'Malley, P., & Valverde, M. (2006b). Governmentality. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 2*(1), 83-104. doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.2.081805.105900.

Rowlands, J. (2012). Accountability, quality assurance and performativity: The changing role of the academic board. *Quality in Higher Education, 18*(1), 97-110. doi:10.1080/13538322.2012.663551.

Rowlands, J. (2013). Academic boards: Less intellectual and more academic capital in higher education governance? *Studies in Higher Education, 38*(9), 1274-1289. doi:10.1080/03075079.2011.619655.

Rowlands, J. (2017). *Academic governance in the contemporary university: Perspectives from Anglophone nations*. Singapore: Springer.

Saint, W. (2004). Higher education in Ethiopia: The vision and its challenges. *Journal of Higher Education in Africa, 2*(3), 83–113.

Saint, W. (2009a). Guiding universities: Governance and management arrangements around the globe. *Human Development Network. Washington, DC: World Bank*.

Saint, W. (2009b). Legal frameworks for higher education governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Higher Education Policy, 22*, 523–550. Retrieved from www.palgrave-journals.com/hep/.

Sall, H. N., & Ndjaye, B. D. (2007). Higher education in Africa: between perspectives opened by the Bologna Process and the commodification of education. *European Education, 39*(4), 43-57. doi:10.2753/EUE1056-4934390403.

Salmi, J. (2007). Autonomy from the state vs responsiveness to markets. *Higher Education Policy, 20*(3), 223-242. doi:10.1057/palgrave.hep.8300154.

Salmi, J. (2009). *The growing accountability agenda in tertiary education: Progress or mixed blessing?* . Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Salmi, J. (2011). The road to academic excellence: The making of world-class research universities. In P. G. Altbach & J. Salmi (Eds.), *The road to academic excellence: Lessons of experience* (pp. 323-347). Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Salmi, J. (2017). *The tertiary education imperative: Knowledge, skills and values for development*. Rotterdam, the Netherlands: Springer.

Schou, L., Høstrup, H., Lyngsø, E. E., Larsen, S., & Poulsen, I. (2012). Validation of a new assessment tool for qualitative research articles. *Advanced Nursing, 68*(9), 2086-2094. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2648.2011.05898.x.

Schultze, C. J. (2003). Cities and EU governance: Policy-takers or policy-makers? *Regional and Federal Studies, 13*(1), 121-147. doi:10.1080/714004785.

Schwandt, T. A., Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (2007). Judging interpretations: But is it rigorous? Trustworthiness and authenticity in naturalistic evaluation. *New Directions for Evaluation, 2007*(114), 11-25. doi:10.1002/ev.223.

Scott, D. (1994). *Accountability and control in educational settings*. London, UK: Continuum International Publishing Group.

Scott, P. (2000). Globalisation and higher education: Challenges for the 21st century. *Journal of Studies in International Education, 4*(1), 3-10. doi:10.1177/102831530000400102.

Segebart, D. (2010). Government, governance and governmentality in Pará, Northern Brazil. In P. Lindert & O. Verkoren (Eds.), *Decentralized Development in Latin America* (pp. 129-138). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.

Semela, T. (2010). Who is joining physics and why? Factors influencing the choice of physics among Ethiopian university students. *International Journal of Environmental and Science Education, 5*(3), 319-340.

Sen, A. (1999). *Development as freedom*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Sewonu, R. (2010, October 4-8). *Bologna Process and its impact on African higher education.* Paper presented at the Triennial African Conference.

Shattock, M. (2006). *Managing good governance in higher education. Maidenhead*. Berkshire, London: Open University Press.

Shehada, F. (2010). *Strategic organizational responses to environmental pressures: the case of three Palestinian non-governmental organizations.* (Doctoral thesis), The State University of New Jersey, Rutgers, NJ. Retrieved from https://doi.org/doi:10.7282/T3Z60P5C.

Shenton, A. K. (2004). Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects. *Education for Information, 22*(2), 63-75. doi:10.3233/EFI-2004-22201.

Shore, C. (2011). European governance or governmentality? The European Commission and the future of democratic government. *European Law Journal, 17*(3), 287-303. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0386.2011.00551.x.

Shore, C., & Wright, S. (1999). Audit culture and anthropology: Neo-liberalism in British higher education. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 5*(4), 557-575.

Singh, G., Pathak, R. D., Naz, R., & Belwal, R. (2010). E-governance for improved public sector service delivery in India, Ethiopia and Fiji. *International Journal of Public Sector Management, 23*(3), 254-275. doi:10.1108/09513551011032473.

Singh, M., & Manuh, T. (2007). *The contribution of higher education to national education system: Current challenges in Africa.* Paper presented at the Final Report of the African Regional Research Seminar, Accra, Ghana. UNESCO Forum on Higher Education, Research and Knowledge.

Solomon, A. (2010). Tension between massification and intensification: Reforms and implications for teaching and learning in Ethiopian public universities. *Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 8*(2), 93-115.

Spendlove, M. (2007). Competencies for effective leadership in higher education. *International Journal of Educational Management, 21*(5), 407-417. doi:doi:10.1108/09513540710760183.

Spratt, C., Walker, R., & Robinson, B. (2004). *Mixed research methods: Practitioner research and evaluation skills training in open and distance learning*. London, UK: Commonwealth of Learning.

Steiner-Khamsi, G. (2013). What is wrong with the 'what-went-right'approach in educational policy? *European Educational Research Journal, 12*(1), 20-33. doi:10.2304/eerj.2013.12.1.20.

Stoecker, J. L. (1993). The Biglan classification revisited. *Research in Higher Education, 34*(4), 451-464.

Tamirat, W. (2008). *The anatomy of private higher education in Ethiopia: Current landscape, challenges, and prospectus*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: St. Mary University College.

Taylor, J., Hanlon, M., & Yorke, M. (2013). The evolution and practice of institutional research. *New Directions for Institutional Research, 2013*(157), 59-75. doi:10.1002/ir.20039.

Taylor, M. (2013). Shared governance in the modern university. *Higher Education Quarterly, 67*(1), 80-94. doi:10.1111/hequ.12003.

Teferra, D., & Albatch, P. G. (2003). *African higher education: An international reference handbook*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University.

Teferra, D., & Altbach, P. G. (2004). African higher education: Challenges for the 21st century. *Higher Education, 47*, 21-50.

Teferra, D., & Altbachl, P. G. (2004). African higher education: Challenges for the 21st century. *Journal of Higher Education, 47*(1), 21-50. doi:10.1023/B:HIGH.0000009822.49980.30.

Temmerman, N. (2018, 13 April 2018). The importance of listening to university stakeholders. *University World News: The global window on higher education* Retrieved from https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20180410151237739.

Teshome, A. (2012). *Meles's development paradigm and its impacts on economic transformation in Ethiopia*. Ethiopian Civil Service University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Tessema, A., & Abebe, M. (2011). Higher education in Ethiopia: Challenges and the way forward. *International Journal of Education Economics and Development, 2*(3), 225-244.

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. (2009). Higher education proclamation No. 650/2009. *Federal Negaret Gazeta, 64,* 4976-5044.

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. (2016). *Growth and transformation plan II (GTP II) (2015/16-2019/20)*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: National Planning Commission.

The National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General. (2012a). *Kenyatta University ACT*. Nairobi, Kenya: The National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General.

The National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General. (2012b). *University of Nairobi ACT*. Nairobi, Kemya: The National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General.

The University of Cape Town. (2013). *Institutional statute institutional rules related legislation & code of conduct*. Cape Town, South Africa: The University of Cape Town.

Thurmond, V. A. (2001). The point of triangulation. *Nursing Scholarship, 33*(3), 253-258. doi:10.1111/j.1547-5069.2001.00253.x.

Trakman, L. (2008). Modelling university governance. *Higher Education Quarterly, 62*(1-2), 63-83. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2273.2008.00384.x.

Tulu, G., Corbett, M., & Kilpatrick, S. (2018). Academic Senate decision and deliberation communication in the context of the Bologna Process: The case of Ethiopian public universities. *Education and Society, 36*(2), 77-102. doi:10.7459/es/36.2.06.

Turcan, R. V., & Gulieva, V. (2013). *Exploring the relationship between university internationalization and university autonomy: Toward a theoretical understanding.* Paper presented at the 39th EIBA Conference, Bremen, Germany. Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9814/3a28a8930804a7b8169783b5a28b6b6ebd77.pdf?_ga=2.19994620.579439595.1569827663-1514034654.1569629545.

UNESCO. (2012). *UNESCO data tables.* Retrieved from http://data.uis.unesco.org/?ReportId=167.

UNESCO. (2015). Recent developments and future prospects in higher education. Follow up to the world conference on higher education. Retrieved from http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/strengthening-education-systems/higher-education.

University of Malawi. (1998). *University of Malawi ACT, (1974) incorporating the amended ACT of 1998*. Zomba, Malawi: University of Malawi.

Valenzuela, J. S., & Valenzuela, A. (1978). Modernization and dependency: Alternative perspectives in the study of Latin American underdevelopment. *Comparative Politics, 10*(4), 535-557. doi:10.2307/421571.

Van Kersbergen, K., & Van Waarden, F. (2004). Governance'as a bridge between disciplines: Cross-disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts in governance and problems of governability, accountability and legitimacy. *European Journal of Political Research, 43*(2), 143-171. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00149.x.

Van Vught, F. A. (1989). *Governmental strategies and innovation in higher education*. Bristol, UK: Taylor and Francis.

Van Vught, F. A. (1995). *Policy models and policy instruments in higher education: The effects of governmental policy-making on the innovative behaviour of higher education institutions*. Retrieved from https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/864/1/pw_26.pdf.

Vandemoortele, J. (2012). *Advancing the global development agenda post-2015: Some thoughts, ideas and practical suggestions*. Retrieved from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.362.7057&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

Varghese, N. (2013a). *Governance reforms in African higher education: The missing link*. Retrieved from http://www.inhea.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Governance-Reforms-African-Higher-Education-FINAL-FOR-POSTING-1.pdf.

Varghese, N. (2013b). *Governance reforms in higher education: A study of selected countries in Africa*. Paris, France: IIEP.

Vidovich, L., & Currie, J. (2011). Governance and trust in higher education. *Studies in Higher Education, 36*(1), 43-56. doi:10.1080/03075070903469580.

Wachemo University. (2016). *Senate Legislation of Wachemo University*. Hosanna, Ethiopia: Wachemo University.

Wagaw, T. G. (1990). *The development of higher education and social change: An Ethiopian experience*. Michigan: Michigan State University Press.

Wana, L. (2009). *Higher education expansion and intake capacity*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Forum for Social Studies.

Welch, E. W., Hinnant, C. C., & Moon, M. J. (2004). Linking citizen satisfaction with e-government and trust in government. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 15*(3), 371-391. doi:10.1093/jopart/mui021.

Wijethilake, C., Munir, R., & Appuhami, R. (2017). Strategic responses to institutional pressures for sustainability: The role of management control systems. *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 30*(8), 1677-1710. doi:10.1108/AAAJ-07-2015-2144.

Wilkins, S. (2016). Transnational Higher Education in the 21st Century. *Journal of Studies in International Education, 20*(1), 3-7. doi:10.1177/1028315315625148.

Wise, G., & Carrazco Montalvo, I. (2018). How to build a regional university: A case study that addresses policy settings, academic excellence, innovation system impact and regional relevance. *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 40*(4), 342-358. doi:10.1080/1360080X.2018.1482104.

Wise, G., Dickinson, C., Katan, T., & Gallegos, M. C. (2018). Inclusive higher education governance: managing stakeholders, strategy, structure and function. *Studies in Higher Education*, 1-14. doi:10.1080/03075079.2018.1525698.

Woelert, P., & Yates, L. (2015). Too little and too much trust: Performance measurement in Australian higher education. *Critical Studies in Education, 56*(2), 175-189. doi:10.1080/17508487.2014.943776.

Woldegiorgis, E. T. (2013). Conceptualizing harmonization of higher education systems: The application of regional integration theories on higher education studies. *Higher Education Studies, 3*(2), 12-23. doi:10.5539/hes.v3n2p12.

Woldegiorgis, E. T., & Doevenspeck, M. (2013). The changing role of higher education in Africa: A historical reflection. *Higher Education Studies, 3*(6), 35.

Woldegiorgis, E. T., Jonck, P., & Goujon, A. (2015). Regional higher education reform initiatives in Africa: A comparative analysis with the Bologna Process. *International Journal of Higher Education, 4*(1), 241-253. doi:10.5430/ijhe.v4n1p241.

Woldetensai, Y. (2009). Regional harmonization of higher education for Africa: Background document. *Accra, Ghana: Association of African Universities*.

World Bank. (1991). *The African capacity building initiative: Toward improved policy analysis and development management in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

World Bank. (1999). *Ethiopia: Poverty and policies for the new millennium*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank. (2015). *Human development index*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Yamane, T. (1973). *Statistics: An introductory analysis* (2nd ed.). London, UK: Harper & Row.

Yang, J., Schneller, C., & Roche, S. (2015). *The role of higher education in promoting lifelong learning.* . Hamburg, Germany: UNESCO.

Yates, L., Woelert, P., Millar, V., & O'Connor, K. (2017). New Public management and the changing governance of universities. In L. Yates, P. Woelert, V. Millar, & K. O'Connor (Eds.), *Knowledge at the crossroads? Physics and history in the changing world of schools and universities* (pp. 59-75). Singapore: Springer.

Yimer, I., Nega, R., & Ganfure, G. (2017). Academic staff turnover intention in Madda Walabu University, Bale Zone, South-East Ethiopia. *International Journal of Higher Education, 6*(3), 21-28.

Yin, S., & Yeung, S. (2011). A school evaluation policy with a dual character: Evaluating the school evaluation policy in Hong Kong from the perspective of curriculum leaders. *Educational Management Administration & Leadership, 40*(1), 37-68. doi:10.1177/1741143211420616.

Yirdaw, A. (2014). *The role of governance in quality of education in private higher education institutions: Ethiopia as a case study.* (Doctoral thesis), Fielding Graduate University, Santa Barbara, CA. Retrieved from http://ezproxy.utas.edu.au.

Yizengaw, T. (2003a). The status and challenges of Ethiopian higher education system and its contribution to development *The Ethiopian Journal of Higher Education, 1*(1), 1-19.

Yizengaw, T. (2003b, September 23-25). *Transformations in higher education: Experiences with reform and expansion in the Ethiopian higher education*

system. Paper presented at the Improving Tertiary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Things that Work Accra, Ghana.

Yizengaw, T. (2007). *The Ethiopian higher education: Creating space for reform*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: St. Mary Printing Press.

Zeleza, P. (2003). Academic freedom in the neo-liberal order: Government, globalization, governance and gender. *Higher Education in Africa, 1*(1), 149-194.

Zeleza, P. (2004). Neo-liberalism and academic freedom. In P. Zeleza & O. Adebayo (Eds.), *African universities in the twenty-first century* (pp. 42-68). UNISA, South Africa: Liberalisation and Internationalization, CODESRIA.

Zemenu, Y. (2016). Subnational fiscal autonomy in a developmental state: The case of Ethiopia. *Beijing Law Review, 7*, 42-50. doi:10.4236/blr.2016.71005.

Zmas, A. (2015). Global impacts of the Bologna Process: International perspectives, local particularities. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 45*(5), 727-747. doi:10.1080/03057925.2014.899725.

Zumeta, W. M. (2011). What does it mean to be accountable?: Dimensions and implications of higher education's public accountability. *The Review of Higher Education, 35*(1), 131-148. doi:10.1353/rhe.2011.0037.

Appendix 1: Ethics Approval

This research was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network-Social Science, Ethics Reference No. H0016612

Social Science Ethics Officer
Private Bag 01 Hobart
Tasmania 7001 Australia
Tel: (03) 6226 2763
Fax: (03) 6226 7148
Katherine.Shaw@utas.edu.au

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (TASMANIA) NETWORK

UTAS

06 June 2017

Professor Michael Corbett
Faculty of Education
University of Tasmania

Student Researcher: Geberew Mekonnen

Sent via email

Dear Professor Corbett

Re: MINIMAL RISK ETHICS APPLICATION APPROVAL
Ethics Ref: **H0016612 - Governance and Governmentality: The Expansion of Ethiopian Higher Education Systems**

We are pleased to advise that acting on a mandate from the Tasmania Social Sciences HREC, the Deputy Chair of the committee considered and approved the above project on 06 June 2017.

This approval constitutes ethical clearance by the Tasmania Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee. The decision and authority to commence the associated research may be dependent on factors beyond the remit of the ethics review process. For example, your research may need ethics clearance from other organisations or review by your research governance coordinator or Head of Department. It is your responsibility to find out if the approval of other bodies or authorities is required. It is recommended that the proposed research should not commence until you have satisfied these requirements.

Please note that this approval is for four years and is conditional upon receipt of an annual Progress Report. Ethics approval for this project will lapse if a Progress Report is not submitted.

The following conditions apply to this approval. Failure to abide by these conditions may result in suspension or discontinuation of approval.

1. It is the responsibility of the Chief Investigator to ensure that all investigators are aware of the terms of approval, to ensure the project is conducted as approved by the Ethics Committee, and to notify the Committee if any investigators are added to, or cease involvement with, the project.

A PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

2. Complaints: If any complaints are received or ethical issues arise during the course of the project, investigators should advise the Executive Officer of the Ethics Committee on 03 6226 7479 or human.ethics@utas.edu.au.

3. Incidents or adverse effects: Investigators should notify the Ethics Committee immediately of any serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants or unforeseen events affecting the ethical acceptability of the project.

4. Amendments to Project: Modifications to the project must not proceed until approval is obtained from the Ethics Committee. Please submit an Amendment Form (available on our website) to notify the Ethics Committee of the proposed modifications.

5. Annual Report: Continued approval for this project is dependent on the submission of a Progress Report by the anniversary date of your approval. You will be sent a courtesy reminder closer to this date. **Failure to submit a Progress Report will mean that ethics approval for this project will lapse.**

6. Final Report: A Final Report and a copy of any published material arising from the project, either in full or abstract, must be provided at the end of the project.

Yours sincerely

Katherine Shaw
Executive Officer
Tasmania Social Sciences HREC

Appendix 2: Support Letter from Ministry of Education

በኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ
የትምህርት ሚኒስቴር
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
Ministry of Education

☎ 0111565538
✉1367
ቁጥር /8/m259/7273/17
No.
ቀን 10/05/2017
Date
አዲስ አበባ
Addis Ababa

To Addis Ababa University

To Debre Berhan University

To Wachemo University

Addis Ababa

Subject: Request for Support

Mr Geberew Tulu who is a staff member of Addis Ababa University is pursuing his PhD at Tasmania University Australia. He is carrying out his research entitled: Governace and Governmentality: The Expansion of of Ethiopian Higher Education System. He is planning to collect data from college deans, department chairs, instructors and students of three sample Universities: Addis Ababa, Debre Berhan, and Wachemo Universities.

This is therefore, to request your good office to offer him access to administer the questionnaire, and conduct interview with the research participants for his PhD research study.

Regards!

Zerihun Mekede Wudie (PhD)
Director General, for Higher Education
Research and Academic Affairs

CC

- Tasmania University
  Australia
- HE Research and Academic Affairs General Directorate
  Ministry of Education

መልስ ሲፅፉልን ስለከሞን የስኛን ቁጥር ይጥቀሱ
In replying, please Quote our Ref.No

E-mail- moe.heducation@gmail.com

Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheet

Governance and Governmentality: The Influence of Bologna Process on Ethiopian Higher Education

Invitation

You are invited to participate in a research study that will investigate the Ethiopian public universities' governance systems. This study is being conducted by Geberew Tulu from the University of Tasmania, Faculty of Education. This PhD project is supervised by Professor Michael Corbett (Professor, Rural and Regional Education, University of Tasmania), and Professor Sue Kilpatrick (Professor of Education, University of Tasmania).

What is the purpose of this study?

Purpose of this questionnaire is to investigate Ethiopian higher education institution (HEI) governance systems in the context of the Bologna Process. To this end, this questionnaire is set up to gather data regarding your perception on the empirical practices of the University governance systems. The questionnaire will comprise different parts including demographic information and opinion questions using a five point Likert scale. You will also have the opportunity to comment or express ideas through responses to open-ended questions.

Why have I been invited to participate in this study?

You have been invited to participate in this study because you have experience in university governance systems through leading an institution, working as a member of Academic Senate, chairing a College Academic Commission, and/or as a member of the University Council.

What will I be asked to do?

You are asked to fill out the questionnaire provided. The questionnaire should take about 15-20 minutes to complete. The questionnaire is anonymous; you are not asked to provide your name or contact information on the questionnaire. The data from this questionnaire will be kept confidential and used only for the purpose of this study. The reliability and validity of this study is entirely dependent on the quality of your response. You are, therefore, kindly requested to give your frank responses.

Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study?

This questionnaire is part of a social research PhD study and it has been designed to investigate Ethiopian public university governance systems in the context of the Bologna Process. By participating in this study your experience and knowledge will help ensure quality of the results of this study which will make recommendations about governance in higher education institutions.

Are there any possible risks from participation in this study?

While the information you provide does not pose any known risk to you, it is important for potential participants to know that all information will be treated in a confidential manner, and your name will not be collected and you will not be identifiable in any publication arising out of the research.

What if I change my mind during or after the study?
While we would be pleased to have you participate, this is a voluntary study and we respect your right to decline. There will be no consequences if you decide not to participate. If you decide to discontinue participation at any point in the process, you may do so, without providing an explanation. Please note that your response could not be withdrawn after submitting the questionnaire, as it is anonymous.

What will happen to the information when this study is over?
All hardcopy research documentation will be kept in a locked cabinet and all electronic research documentation will be stored in a password protected confidential folder on the UTAS server for a duration of 5 years, after which time the data will be destroyed.

What if I have questions about this study?
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study, please contact Geberew Tulu, by phone (+61 3 6324 3241or email (Geberew.Mekonnen@utas.edu.au) at any time.

This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Science Human Research Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study you should contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on +613 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au and approval number H0016612.

Thank you for taking the time to consider this study. If you wish to take part in it, please complete and return the questionnaire to a person who distributed it to you.

This information sheet is for you to keep.

Appendix 4: Questionnaire for the College Deans

Part one: Background Information

Please make a tick mark "√" against the questions and write short answers on the space provided

1) Name of the University:
AAU: ☐ DBU: ☐ WCU : ☐
2) Name of the School/College_____
3) Name of the Department_____
4) Years of service of teaching_____
5) Years of service of administration:_____
6) Area of specialization:_____
7) Qualification:
BA/BSc ☐ PhD ☐
MA/MSc ☐ Other, please specify_____

8)Age
25-35 ☐ 56-65 ☐
36-45 ☐ 66> ☐
46-55 ☐

9) Gender:
Male ☐
Female ☐

Part two: Governance practice

Please make a tick mark "√" against the items indicating the extent to which you agree or disagree with following statements. Each item in the table applies for your response using the rating scales (ranging from 1 to 5): ***Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neural = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5***

Accountability						
SN	Items	SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
1	The AVP facilitates a higher level of professional development for University instructors in the current modularization system [9]compared to the previous system[10].					
2	The AVP is ensuring higher quality teaching and learning by the colleges in the current system than in the previous system.					
3	The AVP is ensuring the implementation of modularization modalities by the colleges.					
4	The AVP is ensuring stronger academic evaluation of the college in the current system compared to the previous system.					
5	The AVP is facilitating remuneration that is more appropriate and benefits of the University academic staff in the current system compared to the previous system.					
6	The AVP is more clearly communicating the decisions of top-level management to the college dean in the current system compared to the previous system.					
7	The AVP is more clearly communicating the decisions of the Senate to the college in the current system than in the previous system.					
8	The AVP is ensuring better facilities and equipment necessary for teaching and learning processes in the current system than in the previous system.					
9	The AVP has established a more collegial working environment for college staff members under the current system than under the previous system.					

[9] Modularization process (block mode of learning-teaching process).
[10] Traditional teaching-learning process (semester based mode of teaching-learning process).

	Participation	SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
10	My College has a more appropriate level of academic staff representation in the Senate Assembly of the University in the current system compared to the previous system.					
11	There is a more appropriate level of academic staff academic with disabilities (physically challenged) representation in the Senate Assembly of the University in the current system compared to in the previous system.					
12	There is a more appropriate level of student representation in the Senate Assembly of the University in the current system than there was in the previous system.					
13	My College has a more appropriate level of gender representation in the Senate Assembly of the University in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
14	There is a more appropriate level of active academic staff participation in the affairs of the University in the current system compared to the previous system.					
	Transparency	SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
15	My University has more transparent academic staff selection criteria for the Colleges in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
16	My University has more transparent academic staff selection process and procedures for every college in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
17	My College has more access to the University information in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
18	My College has more access to efficient financial services (budget allocation) in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
19	My College has more access to the University Senate Assembly's decisions and deliberations in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
	Academic autonomy	SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
20	My College is more empowered to teach without unnecessary interference in the current system than it was in the previous system.					
21	Instructors in my College are better able to carry out their own research agenda in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
22	Instructors in my College have a greater right to disseminate research findings without fear of unnecessary interference in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
23	My College has a stronger mandate to decide on the overall number of students' intake in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
24	My College has a stronger mandate to decide on the overall student intake in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
25	My College has a stronger mandate to design Bachelor degree programs in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
26	My College has a stronger mandate to design Master's degree programs in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
27	My College has a stronger mandate to design Doctoral degree programs in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
28	My College has a stronger mandate to decide on the Termination of degree programmes in the current system than in the previous system.					
	Financial autonomy	SD	D	N	A	SA
29	My College has a stronger mandate to raise funds in the current system than	1	2	3	4	5
	it did in the previous system.					
30	My College has more of a right to decide how to use its own funds according to its own internal rules in the current system than it did in the previous system.					

31	My College can make more autonomous decision in regards to resource allocation (office & teaching facilities) in the current system than it could in the previous system.					
32	My College is more autonomous in terms of financial systems (processing its own procurement and staff salaries) in the current system than it was in the previous system.					
Institutional autonomy		SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
33	My College has a stronger mandate to select department heads in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
34	My College has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new graduate assistants in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
35	My College has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new lecturers in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
36	My College has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new assistant professors in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
37	My College has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new associate professors in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
38	My College has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new full professors in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
39	My College has more autonomy to promote academic staff to the rank of assistant professor in the current system compared to the previous system.					
40	My College has more autonomy to promote academic staff to the rank of associate professor in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
41	My College has more autonomy to promote academic staff to the rank of full professor in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
42	My College has more authority to allocate funds to the departments in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
43	My College has more authority to set standards of teaching in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
44	My College has more authority to set standards for academic staff teaching performance evaluation in the current system than it did in the previous system.					

45. What are the major governance challenges you have faced as a consequence of the Bologna process/modularization?

46. What are the major University governance opportunities you have as a consequence of the Bologna process/modularization?

47. Any other comments?

Appendix 5: Questionnaire for the Department Chair

Part one: Background Information

Please make a tick mark "√" against the questions and write short answers on the space provided

1) Name of the University:
AAU: ☐ DBU: ☐ WU : ☐
2) Name of the School/College_____
3) Years of service of teaching_____
4) Years of service of administration:_____
5) Area of specialization:_____
6) Qualification:
BA/BSc ☐ PhD ☐
MA/MSc ☐ Other, please specify_____

7)Age
25-35 ☐ 56-65 ☐
36-45 ☐ 66≥ ☐
46-55 ☐

8) Gender:
Male ☐
Female ☐

Part two: Governance Practice

Please make a tick mark "√" against the items indicating the extent to which you agree or disagree with following statements. Each item in the table applies to your response using the rating scales (ranging from 1 to 5):

Strongly disagree(SD) = 1; Disagree (D) = 2; Neutral (N) = 3; Agree(A) = 4; Strongly agree(SA) = 5

Accountability						
SN	Items	SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
1	My College facilitates a higher level of professional development for College instructors in the current modularization system [11]compared to the previous system[12].					
2	My College is ensuring higher quality teaching and learning by the departments in the current modularization system than in the previous system.					
3	My College is ensuring the implementation of modularization modalities by the department.					
4	My College is ensuring stronger academic evaluation of the departments in the current system compared to the previous system					
5	My College is facilitating remuneration that is more appropriate and benefits of the College teaching staff in the current system compared to the previous system.					
6	My College is more clearly communicating the decisions of top-level management to the department chair in the current system compared to the previous system.					
7	My College is more clearly communicating the decisions of the Senate to the department in the current system than in the previous system.					
8	My College is ensuring better facilities and equipment necessary for teaching and learning processes in the current system than in the previous system.					
9	My College has established a more collegial working environment for college staff members under the current system than under the previous system.					

[11] Modularization process (block mode of learning-teaching process).

[12] Traditional teaching-learning process (semester based mode of teaching-learning process).

Participation		SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
10	My College has a more appropriate level of academic staff representation in the Academic Commission Assembly of the College in the current system compared to the previous system.					
11	There is a more appropriate level of academic staff with disabilities (physically challenged) representation in the Academic Commission Assembly of the College in the current system compared to the previous system.					
12	There is a more appropriate level of student representation in the Academic Commission Assembly in the current system than there was in the previous system.					
13	My College has a more appropriate level of gender representation the Academic Commission Assembly in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
14	There is a more appropriate level of active academic staff participation in the affairs of the College in the current system compared to the previous system.					
Transparency		SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
15	My College has more transparent academic staff selection criteria for the departments in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
16	My College has more transparent academic staff selection process and procedures for every department in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
17	My Department has more access to the College information in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
18	My Department has more access to efficient financial services (budget allocation) in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
19	My Department has more access to the College Level Management's decisions and deliberations in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
Academic autonomy		SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
20	My Department is more empowered to teach without unnecessary interference in the current system than it was in the previous system.					
21	Instructors in my Department are better able to carry out their own research agenda in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
22	Instructors in my Department have a greater right to disseminate research findings without fear of unnecessary interference in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
23	My Department has a stronger mandate to decide on the overall student intake in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
24	My Department has a stronger mandate to control over the quality of students admitted in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
25	My Department has a stronger mandate to design Bachelor degree programs in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
26	My Department has a stronger mandate to design Master's degree programs in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
27	My Department has a stronger mandate to design Doctoral degree programs in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
28	My Department has a stronger mandate to decide on the termination of degree programmes in the current system than in the previous system.					

Financial autonomy		SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
29	My Department has a stronger mandate to raise funds in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
30	My Department has more of a right to decide how to use its own funds in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
31	My Department can make more autonomous decisions in regards to resource allocation (office & teaching facilities) in the current system than it could in the previous system.					
32	My Department is more autonomous in terms of financial systems (processing its own procurement and staff salaries) in the current system than it was in the previous system.					

Institutional autonomy		SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
33	My Department has a stronger mandate to select program coordinator in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
34	My Department has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new graduate assistants in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
35	My Department has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new lecturers in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
36	My Department has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new assistant professors in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
37	My Department has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new associate professors in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
38	My Department has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new full professors in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
39	My Department has more autonomy to promote academic staff to the rank of assistant professor in the current system compared to the previous system.					
40	My Department has more autonomy to promote academic staff to the rank of associate professor in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
41	My Department has more autonomy to promote academic staff to the rank of full professor in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
42	My Department has more authority to allocate funds to the departments in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
43	My Department has more authority to set standards of teaching in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
44	My Department has more authority to set standards for academic staff teaching performance evaluation in the current system than it did in the previous system.					

45. What are the major governance challenges you have faced as a consequence of the Bologna process/modularization?

46. What are the major governance opportunities you have as a consequence of the Bologna process/modularization?

47. Any other comments

Appendix 6: Questionnaire for Instructors

Part one: Background Information

Please make a tick mark "√" against the questions and write short answers on the space provided

1) Name of the University:
AAU: ☐ DBU: ☐ WU : ☐
2) Name of the School/College_____
3) Name of the Department_____
4) Years of service of teaching_____
5) Area of specialization:_____
6) Qualification:
BA/BSc ☐ PhD ☐
MA/MSc ☐ Other, please specify_____

7)Age
25-35 ☐ 56-65 ☐
36-45 ☐ 66≥ ☐
46-55 ☐

8) Gender:
Male ☐
Female ☐

Part two: Governance practice

Please make a tick mark "√" against the items as to what extent you agree or disagree with following statements. Each point in the Table applies for your response using the rating scales (ranging from 1 to 5):

Strongly disagree=1; Disagree=2; = Neutral 3; Agree =4; Strongly agree = 5

Accountability						
SN	Items	SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
1	My Department facilitates a better professional development for the Department instructors in the current modularization system [13]compared to the previous system[14].					
2	My Department is ensuring higher quality teaching and learning in the current system than in the previous system.					
3	My Department is ensuring the implementation of modularization modalities.					
4	My Department is ensuring stronger academic evaluation of the departments in the current system compared to the previous system					
5	My Department is facilitating remuneration that is more appropriate and benefits of the Department academic staff in the current system compared to the previous system.					
6	My Department is more clearly communicating the decisions of College-level management to the Department academic staff in the current system compared to the previous system.					
7	My Department is more clearly communicating the decisions of the College's Academic Commission to the academic staff in the current system than in the previous system.					
8	My Department is ensuring better facilities and equipment necessary for teaching and learning processes in the current system than in the previous system.					
9	My Department has established a more collegial working environment for staff members under the current system than under the previous system.					

[13] *Modularization process (block mode of learning-teaching process)*
[14] *Traditional teaching-learning process (semester based mode of teaching-learning process).*

Participation		SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
10	There is a more appropriate academic staff representation in the Department Academic Council in the current system compared to the previous system.					
11	There is a more appropriate level of academic staff with disabilities (physically challenged) representation in the Department Academic Council in the current system compared to the previous system.					
12	There is a more appropriate level of student representation in the Department Academic Council in the current system than there was in the previous system.					
13	My Department has a more appropriate level of gender representation the Department Academic Council in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
14	There is a more appropriate level of active academic staff participation in the affairs of the Department in the current system compared to the previous system.					
Transparency		SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
15	My Department has more transparent academic staff selection criteria for the academic staff in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
16	My Department has more transparent academic staff selection process and procedures for academic staff in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
17	I am kept more informed about what is going on at my department in the current system compared to the experience in the previous system.					
18	I have more access to efficient financial services (budget allocation) in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
19	I have more access to the Department level decisions and deliberations in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
Academic autonomy		SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
20	I am more empowered to teach without unnecessary interference in the current system than it was in the previous system.					
21	I have a greater right to carry out research without unnecessary interference in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
22	I have a greater right to disseminate research findings without unnecessary fear of interference in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
23	I have a stronger mandate to decide on the overall student assessment techniques in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
24	I have a stronger mandate to decide on the content of the course I teach in the current system than I did in the previous system.					
25	I have a stronger mandate to use innovative teaching methods in the current system than I did in the previous system.					
26	I am more empowered to address individual student learning need in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
27	I have a stronger mandate to decide on student's grade in the current system than in the previous system.					

	Institutional autonomy	SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
28	My Department has a stronger mandate to select program coordinator in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
29	My Department has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new graduate assistants in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
30	My Department has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new lecturers in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
31	My Department has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new assistant professors in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
32	My Department has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint new associate professors in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
33	My Department has a stronger mandate to recruit and appoint and assign new full professors in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
34	My Department has more autonomy to promote academic staff to the rank of assistant professor in the current system compared to the previous system.					
35	My Department has more autonomy to promote academic staff to the rank of associate professor in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
36	My Department has more autonomy to promote academic staff to the rank of full professor in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
37	My Department has more authority to allocate funds to the departments in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
38	My Department has more authority to set standards of teaching in the current system than it did in the previous system.					
39	My Department has more authority to set standards for academic staff teaching performance evaluation in the current system than it did in the previous system.					

44. What are the major governance challenges you have faced as a consequence of the Bologna process/modularization?

45. What are the major governance opportunities you have as a consequence of the Bologna process/modularization?

46. Any other comments?

Appendix 7: Questionnaire for Students

Part one: Background Information

Please make a tick mark "√" against the questions and write short answers on the space provided

1) Name of the University:

AAU[15]: ☐ DBU[16] : ☐ WU[17] : ☐

2) Name of the School/College_____

3) Name of the Department_____

4)Age

21-25 ☐ 36-40 ☐

26-30 ☐ 40≥ ☐

31-35 ☐

5) Gender:

Male ☐

Female ☐

Part two: Governance practice

Please make a tick mark "√" against the items indicating the extent to which you agree or disagree with following statements. Each item in the table applies to your response using the rating scales (ranging from 1 to 5):

Strongly disagree (SD) = 1; Disagree (D) = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree(A) = 4; Strongly agree(SA) = 5

Accountability						
SN	Items	SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
1	My instructor encourages students to get involved in governance in the course of the study.					
2	My instructor gives us feedback on time for the course he/she teaches.					
3	My instructor encourages students to express their thought freely.					
4	My instructor addresses multicultural and other differences of students (gender, religion, ethnicity, special needs) in the course of study.					
5	My instructor advises the students about their studies.					
6	My instructor covers the content of the as per the set schedule.					
7	My instructor assesses the students in line with the set course assessment techniques.					
8	My instructor teaches in line with the established course outline.					
9	My instructor arranges make up for the class he/she missed due to some justifiable reasons.					

[15] *Addis Ababa University*

[16] *Debre Berhan University*

[17] *Wachemo University*

	Items	SD 1	D 2	N 3	A 4	SA 5
	Participation					
10	There is sufficient student representation in the Senate Assembly of the University.					
11	There is sufficient female student representation in the Senate Assembly of the University.					
12	There is student with special needs representation in the Academic Commission of my College.					
13	There is sufficient student representation in my Department Academic Council.					
14	There is sufficient female student representation in my Department Academic Council.					
15	There is active female student participation in the affairs of my College.					
16	My College instructors take part in the activities organized by students.					
	Transparency					
17	My College has transparent students' representative selection criteria.					
18	There is a transparent students' representative selection process and procedures in my College.					
19	There is access to information about the university rules and regulation, for example, student handbook & the university Senate legislation in my College.					
20	There is access to College's decisions pertinent to students' academic matters.					
21	There is access to Department Academic Council decision related to students' academic matters.					
	Autonomy					
22	I feel that I have the right to learn without any interference of my College.					
23	I feel that I have the right to comment on university's system.					
24	I feel that I have the right to evaluate my course instructor.					
25	I feel that I have the right to be part of college decision making.					
26	I feel that I have the right to comment on the content of the course being offered.					
27	I feel that I have the right to comment course instructor teaching techniques.					
28	What are the major governance challenges you have faced in your university?					
29	What are the opportunities you have to take part in university governance?					
30	Any other comments?					

Appendix 8: Interview Participant Information Sheet

Governance and Governmentality: The Influence of Bologna Process on Ethiopian Higher Education

Invitation

You are invited to participate in a research study that will investigate the Ethiopian public universities' governance systems. This study is being conducted by Geberew Tulu from the University of Tasmania, Faculty of Education. This PhD project is supervised by Professor Michael Corbett (Professor, Rural and Regional Education, University of Tasmania), and Professor Sue Kilpatrick (Professor of Education, University of Tasmania).

What is the purpose of this study?

Purpose of this interview is to study Ethiopian higher education institution (HEI) governance systems in the context of the Bologna Process. To this end, this interview is designed to gather data regarding your view on the empirical practices of the University governance systems. The interviews will help to understand the influence of the Bologna Process, and provide insights into the challenges and opportunities pertinent to public university governance systems.

Why have I been invited to participate in this study?

You have been invited to participate in this study because you have experience in university governance systems such as leading an institution, working as a member of Academic Senate, chairing a College Academic Commission, or as a member of the University Council.

What will I be asked to do?

Participating in this phase of the study will involve you being interviewed about your experience about the implementation of the Bologna Process (BP) and how the implementation of BP influences the governance of your department/colleges, what challenges and opportunities you gained from the introduction of the Bologna Process. In addition, the interview will cover what involvement you have had in your department or college activities and why you have or haven't participated. The interview will take around 30 minutes, and will be conducted one-on-one with the researcher at your convenience either at your department, or in a café or other location conveniently located for you, depending on your preference. The interview will be audio recorded for transcription and accuracy purposes.

Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study?

This interview is part of a social research PhD study and it has been designed to investigate Ethiopian public university governance systems in the context of the Bologna Process. By participating in this study your experience and knowledge will help ensure quality of the results of this study which will make recommendations about governance in higher education institutions.

Are there any possible risks from participation in this study?

All interview participants will be given pseudonyms and reassured of confidentiality and anonymity in any publications resulting from this work without their explicit consent.

What if I change my mind during or after the study?
While we would be pleased to have you participate, this is a voluntary study and we respect your right to decline. There will be no consequences if you decide not to participate. If you decide to discontinue participation, you may do so, without providing an explanation and you may choose to have the data you have provided withdrawn 2 weeks after interview.

What will happen to the information when this study is over?
All information will be treated in a confidential manner, and your name will not be used in any publication arising out of the research. All hardcopy research documentation will be kept in a locked cabinet and all electronic research documentation will be stored in a password protected confidential folder on the UTAS server for a duration of 5 years, after which the data will be destroyed.

What if I have questions about this study?
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study, please contact Geberew Tulu, by phone (+61 3 6324 3241or email (Geberew.mekonnen@utas.edu.au) at any time.

This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Science Human Research Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study you should contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on +613 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au and approval number H0016612.

Thank you for taking the time to consider this study. If you wish to take part in it, please sign the attached consent form.
This information sheet is for you to keep.

Appendix 9: Consent form for Interview Participants

Governance and Governmentality: The Influence of Bologna Process on Ethiopian Higher Education

1. I have read and understand the 'Information Sheet' for this project and agree to take part in the research study named above.
2. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me.
3. I understand that if I participate in this study, it will involve 20-30 minute meeting with a researcher to talk about my experience of university governance systems.
4. I understand that the interview will be audio recorded for transcription purposes and to ensure accuracy.
5. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of Tasmania premises for a duration of 5 years, after which the data will be destroyed.
6. I agree that any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction.
7. I understand that the results of the study will be published without naming participants.
8. I understand that the risk of participation is therefore minimal. While it is possible that the information provided will make me identifiable (despite privacy and confidentiality measures being taken by the investigators), the nature of the information being provided should not pose any foreseeable risk to me.
9. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time. I also understand that data I have supplied may be withdrawn from the research 2 weeks after interview.

Name of Participant: _____

Signature: _____ Date: _____

Statement by Investigator

☐ I have explained the project & the implications for participants to this volunteer. I believe that the consent given is informed and that he/she understands the implications of participation

If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to their participation, the following must be ticked.

☐ The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been provided so participants have the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting to participate in this project.

Appendix 10: Interview Questions

A. Interview questions for the College Deans

1. Tell me about the status of Modularization Process (MP) of your college, please? Has this new structure of MP brought something new to your College?
2. Tell me about the governance system of your university in comparison to the situation before MP? (collegial, autonomous, authoritarian)
3. What do you think about other university system in Ethiopia? Do you think their governance system is different from yours?
4. In your opinion, what aspects of governance do you think your college is involving? *Student admission, staff recruitments, senior management leaders (president & vice president election), Senate members' selections, raising and using funds, modularized curriculum development, setting up an organizational structure, etc.*
5. Tell me how you describe the participation of academic staff in the implementation MP? Do the College staff members (academic and administrative) participate in selecting their executive leadership (president, vice president, deans, etc.?) Are they happy and cooperative to implement MP?
6. Do academic staff seem happy to implement MP?
7. Do you feel your office has power in decision-making? Has this increased or decreased after MP? Why?
8. Are the rules and decision making at the college sufficiently transparent and participatory to the stakeholders?
9. Tell me how you describe your relationship with university administration before and after MP?
10. How do you finance your College? Internal revenue, university, funding from stakeholder?
11. Compared to the previous system, what has been changed after the adoption of MP?
12. Compared to the previous system do you believe that MP has provided you the opportunity to exercise competent leadership?
13. In your opinion, what major challenges you face in governing your college?
14. What would you recommend to the university to the university leaders for the advancement of the university governance system? What about the department chairs?
15. Do you have any additional comments?

B. Interview questions for Department Chairs

1. Tell me about the modularisation process (MP) in your department? Was teaching, research and community service changed in your department after the implementation of MP?
2. Tell me what main changes occurred in your department after implementing MP? Tell me about your department's organisational structure before MP and does it have any difference with the current structure you have now?
3. Do you think the governance system in other universities is different from yours?
4. What is the decision-making process before and after implementing MP?
5. In comparison to the situation before MP, how would you describe the governance system of your university? (collegial, autonomous, authoritarian)
6. How would you characterise the autonomy of your department before and after MP?
   In your opinion, what changed in your department after the implementation of MP? *Student admission, staff recruitment, senior management leaders (president & vice president election), Senate members' selection, raising and using funds, modularized curriculum development, setting up the organizational structure, determining on the resource and finance, etc.*
7. What is the status of your department to influence decisions?
8. What was your department's role during the planning and implementation stage of MP?
9. Would you explain to me the reaction of your department towards MP?
10. What would you say about the relationship you have with your college after and before MP?
11. What is your view about using MP in university? Do you really think it is essential to advance your university? And relevant enough to bring effective organisational change in your university?
12. Are you satisfied with the changes that have brought by MP in your departments?
13. What were the main challenges in implementing MP in your departments? In your opinion, what major challenges did you face in governing your Department?
14. In your opinion, what do you recommend the university leaders for the advancement of the university the governance system?
15. Do you have any additional comments?

C. Interview questions for instructors

1. Would you tell me your feelings towards MP reforms in your university?
2. Have you participated in decision-making? Can you describe the level of your participation in the process of implementing MP?
3. In your opinion, is the university to some degree autonomous after the implementation of modularization? *Selection of senior management leaders (president & vice president election), the right to select staff representative in recruitment committee, academic commission, Senate, Board), participation in modularized curriculum development, contributing*

to the organizational structure of the university, access to resource and fund utilization, the right to teach and research without any interference, access to information,

4. In comparison to the situation before MP, tell me about the governance system of your university? (collegial, autonomous, authoritarian)
5. Compared to the situation before MP, how would you characterise the role of the academic staff in the decision-making process of the following issues? *Selection of senior management leaders (president & vice president election), selection of dean, department head, staff representative, etc.*
6. What do you think about other colleagues in other universities? Do you think their governance system is better than yours?
7. How do you describe the impact of MP on the core activities (teaching, research, community service) of the university compared with the previous system?
8. As compared to the past, what has been changed in your university in general and in your department in particular? What are the opportunities of adopting MP?
9. Would you tell me the major challenges that you have faced in during and after the implementation of MP?
10. In your opinion, what would you recommend the university leaders for the advancement of the university governance system?
11. Do you have any additional comments?

D. Interview questions for students

1. Have you participated in department or university decision-making? What is your experience of participating in it? What opportunities do you have in participating in decision making?
2. Do you participate in electing student representatives? Tell me how the election has been conducted? Transparent?
3. Do you think you are informed about student representative elections? Do you know about any other university governance systems? What do you think of the governance system of your university in comparison to other universities? Transparent, accountable, authoritarian? Do you think other universities system is different from your? In what aspect do they differ?
4. In your opinion, what challenges did you face?
5. In your opinion, what do you recommend the university leaders for the advancement of the university the governance system?
6. Do you have any additional comments?

Appendix 11: Thematic Analysis: Worked Example

A. College deans			
Themes	**College deans' interview extracts**		
	AAU	**DBU**	**WCU**
Autonomy	The college has no right to develop any undergraduate program curriculum at all. The organizational structure of the university is set at the top level, but there are cases where the college is asked to add their idea to already established structure. With regard to student admission to the undergraduate program, the college has no involvement. Students are assigned to different universities by Ministry of Education at the national level. All these show the public universities in the nation lack autonomy (AAU-D1).	My College has no autonomy. As a dean of the college I cannot recruit academic staff, I only propose the figures (number of academic staff need be recruited) and then, the University will recruit them on the behalf of my college. Budget allocation is also controlled by the university (DBU-D1).	The admission was done at Ministry of Education (MoE) level. Our mandate is only assigning students into different academic units as per the set policy (70:30 this means70% of the students will be assigned to science and engineering and 30% to social science, humanities, and education). The recruitment is carried out at the university level and we do not have full mandate to recruit instructors. We only show our demand to the university, but we do not have power to influence them. The graduate assistants are also recruited at Ministry of Education level and send to us. Totally, we do not have mandate (WCU-D1).
	Since modularized curriculum is not participatory and it is top down the instructors are not happy to implement it(AAU-D1).	The system is centralised. Colleges do not have mandate (DBU-D2).	When we come to promotion, it is also carried out at the centre level. It is the research and community service director who runs everything. It is blurred (WCU-D2).
Empowerment	These days the system favours students. We cannot easily make any decision which is not in favour of students because higher officials can suddenly revoke a decision without our knowledge (AAU-D1)	Instructors are highly disempowered… Instructors are islander here (DBU-D1).	Instructors are not happy because they are not empowered in their core activities. I feel that I am not empowered in my role as the college dean WCU-D1).
Participation	As far as I know, there is no full participation in my university…	Gender and physically challenging staff participation are the area that totally forgotten by the university. The participation of these groups has been	There is no open staff representative selection and I don't see much participation (WCU-D1).

		clearly indicated in the senate legislation but their participation is very poor (DBU-D2).	
B. Department chairs			
Themes	**Department chairs interview extracts**		
	AAU	**DBU**	**WCU**
Autonomy	With regard to curriculum design, previously, before modularization, it was the department that initiates different programs and then get those curricula approved by higher levels. But in relation to modularization, it has really persuade different trajectory where the ministry of education initiates and universities implement those initiatives (AAU-Ch1).	The level of autonomy is better than the previous but the staff didn't fully accept modularization and that is why it was not implemented….(DBU-CH1).	My department autonomy is eroded as my decision at department level reversed anytime at the college level. Even if some decisions take place at the department, it doesn't mean that it will be fully implemented because the College will recheck the decision and approve or disprove it. So, it is up to the department to negotiate with college or university top leaders to implement your decision (WCU-CH2).
Transparency	The selection of higher level official of the university and the assignment of higher level officials are the areas where I have some concerns because selection is not open enough and it being processed by the government.	Everything is done at the back of curtain. There has not been transparency, and based on my experience, I am pessimist and there will no transparency (DBU-CH1).	I was assigned as the department chair by the Academic Vice President of my university. My department members did not get a chance to nominate me. The process was covert. It is only me who knew the challenge I have been facing to lead my colleagues. I think they are right for putting pressure on me. I assumed the position in a very wrong way. I will leave the position very soon (WCU-CH2)
Accountability	I believe everybody should be accountable for his/her responsibility. For instance, I appreciate our AVP because he is at least accountable for teaching and learning process. I have never seen other presidents offering courses for the students except the AVP though the legislation stipulates President and Vice Presidents should teach. For me, this shows inconsistence. Everybody should be accountable. Accountability should be free from power. If our leaders are not accountable how do they expect their subordinates to be accountable (DBU-CH3).	In other universities, I have heard at least Academic Vice president teaches courses to their students as per the set legislation but in our university the senate legislation is not properly implemented (DBU-CH2)	Infringement of the Senate legislation is very common. However, I do not know who will be responsible for the different problems created so far…(WCU-Ch1).
Participation	At academic commission level, there are less academic staff representatives. For instance, in my college, there were two individuals selected by	In my university, our participation is limited because most of the time we are prearranged to take part in the university affairs.	The good thing is that we have got a good team work sprit at the department level but we don't see collaboration of top leaders WCU-CH3.

	academic staff and there are also students' representatives, and yes, the practice is there but their role and what is expected from them is not as such practiced. Particularly students' representatives are not there in most cases during academic commission meetings, and even staff representatives are not as such active and key decision makers (AAU-CH2).	Participation is a matter of our approach during the meetings. If I am not challenging the dean or top leaders, I will have more chance to participate otherwise I will be out of the game. So, I have to say 'yes' in agreement of my leaders if I ought to participate. In my opinion, this is what participation is (DBU-CH1)	
C. Instructors			
Themes	**Instructors interview extracts**		
	AAU	**DBU**	**WCU**
Autonomy	It is challenging to give full autonomy for the university as the university budget is financed by government, but it is still better to let the university to do their activities by themselves. If we do so the university will be the centre of knowledge otherwise it can lose its academic excellence (AAU-INS3).	Compared to the previous system, there is some indicative of autonomy, but it is impossible to fully claim that colleges and departments are autonomous. For instance, if we take promotion, there is no clear guideline to promote academic staff to the next academic ladder. We didn't experience promotion of academic staff so far DBU-INS1).	Let alone the colleges, the university itself does not have mandate on the admission of students. The recruitment is processed at the university level. It is impossible to hire graduate assistants as they are directly deployed by Ministry of Education to the university. The college only submits its plan for recruitment to the university, that is, how many instructors needed. The college does not have mandate to generate its income. Finance is also processed at the university central level (WCU-D3).
Empowerment	I was introduced and informed the decisions made by somebody else. As the faculty member, I would have my say because I have taken my teaching job but somebody who probably could have little stake in teaching in this university has made a decision and I had to accept like any other policy in this country (AAU-INS1).	If everything is carried out at the university central level (for example promotion, recruitment, appointment, curriculum design, student admission, unit assessment schemes etc) how do we expect transparency? Believe me, there is no transparency in this university (DBU-INS1).	Empowering staff Improving the remuneration package of the university (WCU-INS1).
Transparency	There is something that is the deceiving mechanism are still implemented. There are nominal ways of doing things as it is merit based and individuals are asked to fill form, to apply for the position but the positions are most of the time pre-determined for individuals…(AAU-INS3).	Our University Senate Legislation requires our leader to be transparent in different aspects like election, curriculum design, fund utilisation, and son on but so far, I have never seen all these happened in my department and colleges unless I am yet to see it (DBU-INS2).	Whether you believe it or no, there is no transparency in this university. Everything is secret. As an instructor, I just teach my subject and go home because there is nothing I expect from university. Many announcements are posted after they expired just for the consumption of bureaucracy. Leader are in the office to conceal such activities. Me and my

			fellow friends are desperate for the lack of openness in the university (WCU-INS1).
Participation	If I take the selection process of my department head, I and my colleagues didn't participate in selection process. He was assigned by the dean so for me the election was not participatory and transparent. I feel the same for top leaders as well(AAU-INS4).	The process of participation is dubious because at some point, there some sort of academic staff participation in the selection of lower (department) and middle (college) level leaders but not the university higher officials…(DBU-INS1).	Our staff members don't have any role in electing their leaders. Leaders are appointed by the university president. Even we don't have instructor representatives at our university(WCU-INS3).
Nepotism	…the university governance is particularly described as paternalistic whereby you operate it on the basis of friendship. Social networks are stronger than the rule of laws in this campus…	In this university, the system doesn't favour all fairly. In order to be promoted or elected or given any form of benefits, I have to be a sub member of higher official, either regionally, ethnically or religiously (DBU-INS3).	Prompting fairness and avoiding impartiality Supervising core activities of the departments or colleges(WCU-INS2). If you ask every instructor, he/she will tell you that most of our leaders are from the same area because one of the influential leader of the university is from that area.
D. Students			
Themes	**Students interview extracts**		
	AAU	**DBU**	**WCU**
Participation	I participated in different clubs like veterinarian social network club which was organized by the office gender. The aim is to encourage student in the field of studies. I am working as the stage facilitator and program coordinator. This experience helped to develop my confidence. I have a chance to express by idea confidently (AAU-ST1)	The participation of female students in decision-making is minimal as only one student (in most case a male student) takes part in decision making at college and university level(DBU-ST1).	I am participating at different levels of decision-making, department academic committee, academic commission, and academic senate, university board. In our university trend in each of level of decision students will participate. During the participation, in fact there are some influences from university leaders. But, leadership needs confidence and competences…(WCU-ST1).
Transparency	We are not clearly informed about the election process ahead of time. The committee just come to the class and ask the whole class to elect their representative. It is not transparent(AAU-ST1).	There is no transparency in student election process in my college (DBU-ST2).	

Accountability	Frankly speaking, these days, there are many instructors in our university, who are unprofessional and fail to appear for most of the classes in the semester. They hold one or more full-time jobs elsewhere(AAU-ST4)	As a member of student union, I have reservation about the implantation of rules and regulation of our University. Our leaders, chairs, dean and university leaders are active in responding to the Ministry of Education inquiries. But, I do not see their prompt action in implementing the senate legislation, and guidelines. I think they should due attention to the university internal rules and regulation before actin on the external one. I think they have to be accountable to themselves first DBU-ST1).	Instructor should also improve his/her career before assuming senior courses…(WCU-ST1).

Appendix 12: Copyright Permission

Copyright permission Inbox ×

Josy Hogan Sep 20, 2019, 2:48 PM (4 days ago)

to me

Dear Mr Tulu,

We hereby give you permission to include your co-authored article "Academic Senate decision and deliberation communication in the context of the Bologna Process: The case of Ethiopian public universities' published in *Education and Society*, 36(2), 77-102. doi:10.7459/es/36.2.06 in your thesis.

Kind regards,

Josy Hogan

Josy Hogan
Journal Review Manager
James Nicholas Publishers Pty. Ltd.
PO BOX 244, Albert Park, VIC, Australia 3206
Tel: +61 3 96965545 | Fax: +61 3 96992040
www.jnponline.com
Find us on facebook: www.facebook.com/JNPonline

Appendix 12: Published Article

Education and Society Vol. 36, No. 2, 2018

pp. 77-102

Academic Senate Decision and Deliberation Communication in the Context of the Bologna Process: The Case of Ethiopian Public Universities

Geberew Tulu
University of Tasmania Addis Ababa University
Michael Corbett
Sue Kilpatrick
University of Tasmania

Abstract

This paper reports results of a review of Ethiopian universities' Senate governance documents: Senate legislation of public universities and the Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation of 2009, in light of the Bologna Process. The result revealed that Ethiopian public universities were categorised as hierarchal (top-down) in terms of Senate legislation provision as legal documents vested power in University Presidents. In contrast, they were categorised as having collegial decision-making approaches because the participation of representatives of academic staff and students have been mandated as members of Academic Senate decision-making. This review finds there is a tension in the Senate legal documents between the decision-making power of university top management and the mandated representatives in Senates. Understanding the concept of governance and governmentality could assist to revise the Senate documents by exploring the techniques that universities employ to govern their affairs, which is the next emphasis of this paper.

Keywords: Academic Senate, Senate legislation, Ethiopian Higher Education Proclamation, Bologna Process, public universities

Background of the Study

Current developments around the world have brought about increasingly challenging times for Higher Education Institutions (HEI), par-

ISSN 0726-2655 (print) / 2201-0610 (online)
https://doi.org/10.7459/es/36.2.06

colonial issues and undertaking various strategies to modernize the region and achieve socio-economic development (World Bank, 1991). HEIs were also perceived as a means of transforming of the socio-economic and political development of post-colonial Africa by training experts, addressing the issue of access to higher education, expanding knowledge, and contributing to the national economy (World Bank, 1991). In the 1960s, African higher education enrolment was very small. Bloom, Canning, Chan, and Luca (2014) argued that, 'Sixty years ago, the gross enrolment ratio stood at just 1% in 1965' (Bloom et al., 2014, p. 27). It was world's lowest higher education enrollment figure. Current figures show improvement though are yet only 6% by 2012 (UNESCO, 2012).

In the 1960s and 1970s, human capital theory (Becker, 2009) received much attention and became popular in the field of education. The theory argues that there is a direct correlation between an individual's productivity and their level of education (Almendarez, 2013; Dumciuviene, 2015; Fugar, Ashiboe-Mensah, & Adinyira, 2013; Olaniyan & Okemakinde, 2008). Investing in formal education has a cumulative effect on individual and societal development (Olaniyan & Okemakinde, 2008). By this time, most African leaders and elites were persuaded by human capital theory (Woldegiorgis & Doevenspeck, 2013), and started to articulate their national policy directions acknowledging roles of higher education in dealing with the existing socio-economic challenges of the region and promoting its spread (Bloom et al., 2014).

By the late 1980s, the higher education sector was being accorded little attention, and financing HEIs was not a priority agenda item of African leaders and international organizations (Teferra & Altbachl, 2004). According to Woldegiorgis and Doevenspeck (2013).

> The international bodies mainly IMF and the WB started to interfere in [African] countries through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and stabilization programs. A variety of SAPs were introduced in the 1980s and 1990s to address the economic and social crises of the time (Woldegiorgis & Doevenspeck, 2013, p. 41).

These international bodies, influenced higher education through policy reform initiation and prescription (Behailu, 2011; Ferede, 2013; Areaya, 2010). For instance, they stipulated a set of neo-liberal economic policies through SAPs, which demand that leaders of developing countries adjusted spending away from public services and publicly owned institutions, as well (Diang, 2013; Ferede, 2013; Teshome, 2012).

Later, in developing countries, much emphasis was given to primary education, as it was proven through research, that basic education plays a significant role in social and economic development of a country (Singh & Manuh, 2007). The basic education sector was heavily promoted for instance in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education for All (EFA) target (Singh & Manuh, 2007). Through this period, the leaders of developing countries and international organisations committed to investing in primary education with the premises and expectation of its contribution to the socio-economic development of Africa counties and the rest of developing nations (Singh & Manuh, 2007). The SAP affected the higher education sector, and its neglect of higher education resulted in the 'deterioration of infrastructure; decline in teaching capacity and quality in the face of increasing enrolments; decline in research activities, productivity and capacity; escalating brain drain of academics and researchers and so on' (Singh & Manuh, 2007, p. 2).

However, it is consistently argued that pressures created by globalization reconfirmed the importance of higher education institution in building a knowledge-based economy (Teferra & Altbachl, 2004). The adoption of discourse and policy positions concerning the critical contribution of HEIs to the knowledge society and the need for competent graduates as a means to advance economic competitiveness and social development have led to policy reverse that favors higher education institutions (Bloom, Canning, & Chan, 2006; Okeke, 2010; Singh & Manuh, 2007). Currently, higher education is regarded as the main engine of development in both developed and developing countries (Bloom et al., 2005; Okeke, 2010). The HEI is expected to address social and economic challenges of the nations. Singh and Manuh (2007) also argued that HEIs are expected to contribute to:

> Poverty alleviation and addressing the ravages of disease; increasing participation at all education levels ;the ongoing development of primary and secondary education, technical and vocational education, non-formal adult literacy and continuing education; increasing research and knowledge-based strategies for development ;the achievement of MDGs and EFA targets in the face of impending deadlines (Singh & Manuh, 2007, p. 3)

Singh and Manuh (2007) further argued that HEIs need to respond in three core areas: Teaching, research, and community service.

In connection to this, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) argued that the globalization wave required human capital as it was 'the single most important engine of growth in OECD countries in the past three decades' (OECD, 2002, p. 17). In

order to meet globalization challenges, many countries have been reforming their higher education systems (Olsen, 2002). New regional cooperation in higher education through the Bologna Process could be cited as the best example of this move (McMahon, 2010). The Bologna Process, established in 1999, was aimed at harmonizing Europe's higher education system through increased inter-compatibility, and mobility, allowing students to study without borders and by creating unimpeded exchange of staff (Fejes, 2008). It refers the European Higher Education Area framework of harmonization process that the Ministry of Education of Ethiopia recently introduced to all the public universities and it constitutes curriculum harmonization, modular mode of teaching, Competence Based Education, ECTS, Criterion-referenced grading system, and Quality Assurance, stakeholder participation in decision making and so on to mention some). It has changed the higher education landscape in both European countries and non-European countries as well (Dehmel, 2006; European Commission, 2001; Fejes, 2008).

Similar to Europe, the African Union Commission (AUC) had embarked on harmonization of African higher education programs for the second decade of education for Africa of 2006-2015 (Sall & Ndjaye, 2007). Many African countries have been showing interest in the view that the region could benefit from a mechanism to form partnerships with the rest of world through the Bologna Process. For example, Sall and Ndjaye (2007) firmly claimed that 'African inter-academic cooperation can be boosted if it is inspired by cooperation models existing in the European academic space' (Sall & Ndjaye, 2007, p. 52). The African Union also claims that ' . . . higher education in Africa would benefit from the adoption of the Bologna Process, especially in fostering regional collaboration' (African Union, 2008, p. 55). Different regions, including the AUC are currently using the Bologna Process as a model for higher education integration schemes (Woldegiorgis, 2013; Woldegiorgis & Doevenspeck, 2013; Woldegiorgis, Jonck, & Goujon, 2015; Woldetensai, 2009). However, the cultural, ideological and organisational differences between the European and African regions have created discussion among various scholars, in particular, about how feasible and efficient is a transfer of the policy among the different countries (Woldegiorgis et al., 2015).

The Bologna Process has been further criticized for being too focused on preparing students for the global market instead of giving them a broad education (Dehmel, 2006). It is also argued that the Bologna Process as indicated in Bergen Communique of 2005 demands a lot from universities. The Communique states:

> (W)e underline the central role of higher education institutions, their staff and students as partners in the Bologna Process. Their role in the implementation of the Process becomes all the more important now that the necessary legislative reforms are largely in place, and we encourage them to continue and intensify their efforts to establish the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) (Bergen Communique, 2005, p. 1).

Under this rubric, universities are expected to be active, and responsible for the implementation of the Bologna Process. However, if the universities do not act and contribute toward the success of the Process, seemingly, they risk of failure in achieving the aims (Bergen Communique, 2005; Fejes, 2008).

The Bologna Process member countries committed to implementing academic freedom, autonomy, participation, transparency and accountability as the principles of European Higher Education Area (Communiqué, 2009; Dehmel, 2006; Fejes, 2008; Gebremeskel, 2014; McMahon, 2010). The claim was that university leaders and staff were empowered to reorganise university systems to meet both stakeholders needs and a global market workforce (Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, 2012; Keeling, 2006; McMahon, 2010). The Academic Senate is the centeral governing body of a university in the Ethiopian context (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). Hence, the role of university's Senate is paramount in decision-making, as its procedure for communication to its immediate system participants in order for its decisions to be implemented. Tremendous HE expansion has been seen in Ethiopia in the past two decades (Gebremeskel & Feleke, 2016; Areaya, 2010). Public HEIs have drastically increased in number and enrolment have risen sharply (*see Table 1; Figure 1*) (Akalu, 2014; Ministry of Education, 2016a).

Table 1. Number of public universities

Before 2005 (First generation)	Since 2005 (Second generation)	Since 2011 (Third generation)	Total
9	13	9	31

(Ministry of Education, 2016b)

Ethiopia introduced the Bologna Process to its public higher education institutions as of 2011 (Areaya, Shibeshi, & Tefera, 2013; Gebremeskel, 2014; Moges, 2015). The rationale behind the introduction of Bologna Process was that the University system needs to be developed significantly to achieve the goals of competitiveness with international standards and to lay the foundations of a knowledge economy (Addis Ababa University, 2014). The argument was that a focused and precise approach should be in place for the best results and for consistency needed to respond to the changes taking place nationally, and

internationally. Universities were thus aligned with leading institutions around the world (Addis Ababa University, 2014; Tessema & Abebe, 2011). There are considerable interest and a national policy environment that encourages the universities to seek greater opportunities and align themselves more closely with the needs of industry and the National Growth and Transformation Plan (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2016). These developments also indicate an increasing articulation of higher education institutions and integrated and globalized economic systems (Held, 1999; Rizvi & Lingard, 2010).



Figure 1. Students enrolment (Ministry of Education, 2016a)

In the Bologna Process, governance is conceived as one of the principles that will turn the process framework into a reality (Communiqué, 2009; McMahon, 2010). While system change has been endemic, research shows that little has been published about higher education governance in Africa, despite the issue of governance being one of the agenda of Post 2015-millennium goals (Assembly, 2013; Bano & Taylor, 2014; Kigotho, 2015; MacGregor, 2009; Petlane, 2009; Roberts & Ajai-Ajagbe, 2013; Vandemoortele, 2012). Regarding higher education governance systems in Ethiopia, Mehari (2010) also remarked that "surprisingly, the issue of governance in Ethiopian HE (Higher Education) system has not been studied well" (2010, p. 3).

In order to address this gap, this study reviewed Senate governance documents, that is, Senate legislation of public universities and the Higher Education Proclamation of 2009 of Ethiopia. Senate legislation is "a legal act of public university issued by the Senate of University pursuant to the powers vested in it by Article 49 of the Higher Education ProclamationNo.650/2009" whereas the Higher Education Proclamation of 2009 is a comprehensive legal basis for the establishment and development of higher education institutions in Ethiopia (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). It was expected that similarities and differences revealed by the document review would assist

in explaining the implementation of the Bologna Process, as the Academic Senate is the highest governing body of all the public universities of the country.

From what has been elaborated above, examination of academic governance arrangements, in particular, Senate membership and decision communication time and means in public universities in Ethiopia is warranted. Thus, this study encompassed a review of Senate composition, the tenure of the membership, meeting frequency, appointment procedures, accountability, and decision communication procedures of selected public universities.

Conceptual framework

This conceptual framework is based on Foucault (1991), (Dean, 2010), and Segebart (2010) ideas of governance and governmentality. According to Shattock (2006), governance is the legal forms and processes through which university govern its affairs while governmentality refers to techniques and procedures for directing human behavior, actions thought, and governing self (Dean, 2010; Foucault & Lewis, 1991; Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006). Dean (2010) argued that government as 'Any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes (p. 18).'

Segebart (2010) utilised the concept of governmentality in the study of education policy to identify participatory rural development projects promoted by international cooperation agencies in Brazil. He conceptualised the relationship between governance, government, and governmentality in a dualistic structure: governance and government, and government and governmentality approaches. This study builds on the work of Foucault, Dean, and Segebart to develop a conceptual framework utilising the concepts of government, governance, and governmentality in quadrant form. The X-axis is from, authoritarian to democratic, and the Y-axis from compliance to autonomy. The framework assists in situating institutions' approaches to governance and governmentality.

The framework in Figure 2 illustrates the concept of governance and governmentality in a context of a state and university. The axes show compliance (A), autonomy (B), authoritarian (C) and democratic (D) approaches of university governance and governmentality. A state uses compliance (A) as a means to implement its goals. A state requires public universities to comply with the legal rules and law and to be ac-

countable per se. This could be set in place in four ways: compliance with legal documents (A); the top-down approach of a legal document (C); democratic approach to legal documents (D); and a self- governing approach with public universities' legal documents (B).



Figure 2. Conceptual framework
Developed based on the ideas of Michel *Foucault (1991)*, (*Dean, 2010*) and *Segebart (2010)*

The notion of top-down authority (AC quadrant) is characterised by a hierarchical view of governance. The system is centeralised, and it accepts the rule of law and the capacity of government to govern through law with minimum or no autonomy for ordinary system participants. The freedom to govern is not constrained. On the other hand, in the self-governing approach with little or no direct influence of state (BD quadrant), an institution promotes full autonomy and seeks to establish a framework, which enables ordinary system participants to pursue autonomous goals and to regulate internal affairs. When autonomy is followed by democratic collegial decision-making (BD quadrant), the institution is characterized by academic freedom as an organisational principle. However, the critique of self-ruling approach is that institution cannot fulfil the goals of the state and the demands of economic globalisation (Zmas, 2015).

Therefore, systems that reduce the tension between a state (top-down authority), and university autonomous collegial mode of governance (autonomy) has emerged. The concept of governance and governmentality (AD) vs. (CB) tend to develop, and shared governance is prompted. A substantial interaction between a state and an institution is vital. The principles of governance and governmentality (AD) vs. (CB) which encompass autonomy, participation, transparency, and compliance as indicated in the Bologna Process could be utilised to reduce the tension between the two extreme systems of university governance: authoritarian and democratic governance approaches.

This conceptual framework is developed to show the extent to which Academic Senate hierarchical and democratic collegial decision making is revealed in the Ethiopian Public Universities' legislation and the Higher Education Proclamation of 2009. This work seeks to analyse Senate composition, the tenure of the membership, meeting frequency, appointment procedures, accountability, and decision communication procedures of eight selected public universities.

Significance of the study

The significance of the study is in stimulating discussion and showing how the Senates of public universities operate following reforms inspired by the Bologna Process implementation. This study both fills a research gap in the analysis of university governance and provides a framework for future studies in Ethiopia and in other contexts. In addition, as Bologna's range of influence is growing, this study has relevance to a comparative analysis with respect to the similarities and differences between the changes in the legal acts of Ethiopian public universities and higher education institutional convergence movements across the globe. This is one instance of the broader phenomenon of the globalization of education policy(Ball, 2012; Rizvi & Lingard, 2010; Sellar & Lingard, 2014)

Methods and materials

This study used document analysis as a research method. "Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material" (Bowen, 2009, p. 1). In qualitative research, like other analytical methods, document analysis needs data to be studied and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Martin and Stella (2007) note that the policy document, papers, and records give the researchers access to the necessary background information and insights into the topic under investigation. In line with this idea, a thorough review of Academic Senate legislation, and the Ethiopian Higher Education

Proclamation of 2009 was made. The contents of legal documents were analysed thematically, with themes drawn from literature describing and critiquing the Bologna Process, as presented above. Finally, the interpretation of the thematic analysis of public university Senate composition, the tenure of the membership, meeting frequency, appointment procedures, and decision communication procedures was made.

Currently, there are more than thirty public higher education institutions in Ethiopia (Ministry of Education, 2016a). Among these public universities, two universities: Adama and Addis Ababa Science Technology universities are accountable to the Ministry of Science and Technology. The rest of public universities are accountable to the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education of Ethiopia has classified public universities into three generations *(see Figure 3).* This study selected first, second and third generation public universities based on the performance of public universities as evaluated by the Ministry of Education of Ethiopia (Ministry of Education, 2016a, 2016b). The Ministry of Education of Ethiopia set 12 main criteria with 104 sub-criteria to evaluation all the public universities within each generation. The 12 main criteria are indicated in Table 2.

Table 2. University evaluation criteria and weight

SN	Evaluation criteria	Weight
1	Change agent arrangement and management	10
2	Ensuring the development and good governance of the institution	7
3	Ensuring peaceful teaching –learning process	6
4	Strengthening the academic and administrative staffs career development	7
5	Ensuring and implementing the quality of academic programs and curriculum	20
6	Implementing the 70:30 education policy as per the need of the Nation	3
7	Ensuring equity in higher education institutions	6
8	Fostering the capacity of institutions toward the development of industries	6
9	Promoting need based education and research	13
10	Need based community service progress	10
11	Ensuring efficient information system	6
12	Efficient resource utilization	7
Total Weight		**101**

(Ministry of Education, 2016a)

The best and lowest performing universities were purposively selected because the selected universities are almost similar in their year of establishment, facilities, and human resources within their generation though they were different in their performance as evaluated by the Ministry of Education of Ethiopia (Ministry of Education, 2016a, 2016b). The performance of public universities triggered the investigators to review the Senate legislation of these universities. The respective Senate legislation documents of best and lowest performing public universities were analysed from each generation as indicated in Figure 3.



Figure 3. Sample public universities

In addition, Addis Ababa University and Adama Science and Technology University were purposively chosen to add to sample population for the reasons articulated below. Addis Ababa University is the largest and oldest higher institution of learning in Ethiopia (Ferede, 2013) established in the 1950s. The University has made a significant contribution to the country in the training of a skilled workforce and professionals in various key areas of development (Akalu, 2014). Until recently, it has been the only source of qualified professionals in the country (Areaya, 2010). Its contributions to the country's progress in various spheres of development are considered far-reaching, and its impact on the rest of the public universities is significant (Areaya, 2010). For this reason, Addis Ababa University was purposively selected.

Along with this, Ethiopia recently launched two science and technology universities under the Ministry of Science and Technology in 2013, which is independent of Ministry of Education. From the two public universities, Adama Science and Technology University was purposively chosen as it is relatively old (launched as Adama University in 2006 and later renamed as Adama Science and Technology University in 2011) and well-established compared to Addis Ababa Science and Technology University (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Negaret Gazeta, 2011). In total, Senate legislation of eight universities were analysed, along with the Higher Education Proclamation of 2009.

In general, the review encompassed: How Academic Senate decisions are communicated to other academic units in the university; that is, the timing of dissemination of information and the means of decision

and communication, and Senate members representation of best and lowest performing public universities.

Results and discussion

The "Senate" is the central academic decision-making body of a university with various academic responsibilities such as determining the academic calendar and accrediting, supervising and ensuring the academic programmes relevance and quality of education and research (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). According to the Higher Education Proclamation of 2009, a university president shall chair the Senate and ensure that the institution's academic community is appropriately represented in its membership. The Proclamation vested power in the president and hence, "at lowest the majority of the members of the Senate shall be meritorious and senior members of the academic staff appointed [selected] by the president" (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 5014). Table 3 illustrates the total members, tenure, meeting session of the Senate of the sample universities.

Table 3. Senate composition, tenure, and meeting frequency

Details	Sample Public Universities							
	1st Generation		2nd Generation		3rd generation		Additional Uni.	
	BP HU	LP DU	BP DBU	LP AU	BP WCU	LP BHU	MoE AAU	MoST ASTU
Total members of the Senate	43	25*	30	24*	26+	22*	23-37	23-33
The tenure years of membership of the Senate	2	n.i	n.i	2	2	2	3	2
Minimum meeting Sessions per year	3	4	3	4	3	3	4	4

(Adama Science and Technology University, 2016; Addis Ababa University, 2013; Ambo University, 2013; Bule Hora University, 2015; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Dilla University 2012; Hawassa University, 2015; Wachemo University, 2016).

Best Performing (BP), Lowest Performing (LP), * Small *numbers of Academic Senate members, not indicated (n.i) Additional members will be added by the President (+).*

As can be understood from Table 3, best performing universities (BP) had larger Senate memberships in comparison with the lowest performing (LP) ones. The eight universities vary in the number of Senate members except for the two universities: Addis Ababa University (AAU) and Adama Science and Technology University (ASTU), which are similar in their minimum number of the members, that is, 23. Looking into the office tenure of the Senate, in Addis Ababa University the Senate serves for 3 years. The remaining five universities, Senators leave their office in 2 years. However, Dilla University and Debre Berhan University did not mention the Senate term of office in their documents. The Senate

meets 3-4 times every academic year in all universities. Some universities split the four meeting sessions into semesters, meeting twice per semester. This suggests that power is less concentrated in high ranking universities. It can be argued here that for universities to have good governance, power needs to be distributed and more members need to be included (Mushemeza, 2016; Zeleza, 2003).

As the legal governance documents of all the universities and the Higher Education Proclamation show, power is more centralised and which falls under the top-down approach of governance of the conceptual framework. The Senate consists of vice presidents, central directors, deans/academic unit heads, registrar head, academic staff representative, and students representative. This composition confirms the collegial democratic approach to governance because teaching staff from different academic units are participating in Academic Senate decision making.

In Ethiopia, the current Higher Education Proclamation of 2009 recognizes the power and duty of individual public universities and awards the mandate and autonomy of the institution to "nominate the president, vice presidents, and the Board members, and select and appoint leaders of academic units and departments as provided for by this Proclamation." However, the Senate legislations are inconsistent with the provision (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). Article 50 (2) also states, 'at lowest the majority of the Senate members shall be meritorious and senior members of the academic staff appointed by the president' (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009, p. 5021). The Proclamation vests power in President of the University and if the majority of the members are to be selected by the President, by default the president is the one who influences the decisions of the Senate. A similar, statement is made in the Senate legislation of most of the public universities (*see Table 4*), yet, Wochamo, Bule Hora, and Ambo Universities did not indicate how and by whom the members of the Senate are appointed (Ambo University, 2013; Bule Hora University, 2015; Wachemo University, 2016). The top down governance is regarded as authoritarian governance approach, Quadrant (AC) as indicated in the conceptual framework (see Figure 2). In top down model of governance system, if the concept of governance and governmentality, quadrants CB and AD (see Figure 2) was to be in place, shared governance would be prompted in the legal document of institutions. For instance, M. Taylor (2013) argued that shared governance is necessary for the success of university. The success of university could be realized when shared governance is coordinated by the executive through joint Council-Senate system (Bano & Taylor, 2014; Bejou & Bejou, 2016; M. Taylor, 2013). The concept of governance and

governmentality opens a better autonomous environment for ordinary system participants of the institutions, which in turn, helps an institution to achieve its mission and becomes competitive nationally, regionally, and globally as well (Zmas, 2015).

Table 4. Appointment and accountability of the Senate

Universities	Senate members appointment	Accountability of the Senate
AAU	12-25 leaders of academic units and/or academic staff appointed by the President.	Board
ASTU	5-10 leaders of academic units and/or academic staffs selected on the basis of their individual merit and academic seniority Two representatives of the University's Students' appointed by President.	President
HU	The heads of academic units and meritorious and senior staff members shall be nominated by the President of the University.	Not indicated
DU	At lowest the majority of the members of the Senate shall be meritorious and senior members of the academic staff appointed by the president.	President
WCU	Not stated	President
BHU	Not stated but set membership criteria only for the representatives' election.	President
DBU	By Article 53 (1) (j) of the Proclamation the President shall appoint the voting members of the University's Senate	Board
AU	Not stated	Board

Regarding the accountability of the Senate, differences were seen among the sample universities. In the legislation of three universities, the Senate is accountable to the Board (Addis Ababa University, 2013; Ambo University, 2013; Debre Berhan University, 2012) whereas in the documents of the other four Universities the Senate is accountable to the president of the University (Adama Science and Technology University, 2016; Bule Hora University, 2015; Dilla University 2012; Wachemo University, 2016). The Proclamation also fails to indicate clearly the accountability of the Senate only requiring that the president chairs the Senate (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). In fact, chairing does not necessarily ensure accountability, as demonstrated by the Senate accountability among the universities. In the Senate Legislation of Hawassa University, the accountability of the Senate was not indicated at all. Hence, there are compliance differences of Academic Senate exhibited among the universities as revealed in legal documents. Therefore, as accountability, in this case, compliance (see Figure 2. axis A), and autonomy, (axis B) is at the centre of Bologna Process which Ethiopian public universities are expected to reflect in their legal documents to implement the elements of the Bologna Process, legal documents need to consider the ideas in quadrants (BD) and (AD) for the implementing institutions (Communiqué, 2009; Gebremeskel, 2014).

In an institution, from both an individual and organisational perspective, decision making, and communicating deliberations to the ordinary system participant is the main and integral form of governance (Diefenbach & Sillince, 2011). If the decision-making procedures, deliberation, and communication are not clearly indicated in the legal document of the institution, it will be difficult to hold leaders to account for failing to communicate decisions to staff members. Since a college/faculty is responsible for communicating Academic Senate deliberations, its responsibility is an integral part of effective academic governance (Tierney & Minor, 2004). Communication of a Senate decision and academic staff engagement with the decision is one part of effective governance. As indicated in Budapest-Vienna Declaration of 2010, the participation of institutional leaders, teachers, administrative staff, and students in making a decision is crucial to implementing the Bologna Process into reality (Communiqué, 2009). This participation promotes the idea of shared academic governance (Tierney & Minor, 2004).

Among the eight public universities in Ethiopia, only AAU and ASTU have legislation that clearly indicates the means and timing of the Academic Senate decision communication by a president from top level to the middle level (colleges/schools) and subsequently to the lower level (departments/units). The Academic Senate legislation of the two additional sample universities, Addis Ababa University and Adama Science and Technology University Article 7 (1& 2) and Article 14 (1 & 2), elucidate similar statements on the procedures of an Academic Senate decision and communication,(see Table 5).

Table 5. Public universities communication of Academic Senate deliberation and decisions

Additional sample public universities				
Universities	**Communication of Senate Deliberations and Decisions**	**Time and means of Communication**		**Article**
		Time	**Means**	
AAU	Communication of Senate Deliberations and Decisions by University President to colleges/centers/institutes	within ten days	written form	Article 7
	Communication of Senate Deliberations and Decisions by College Dean to department chairs	within seven days	written form	
	Communication of Senate Deliberations and Decisions by Department Chairs to staff	within seven days	written form	
ASTU	Communication of Senate Deliberations and Decisions by President to schools/institutes	within ten days	written form	Article 14

Communication of Senate Deliberations and Decisions by School Head to units	within seven days	written form
Communication of Senate Deliberations and Decisions by Unit heads to staff	within seven days	written form

(Adama Science and Technology University, 2016; Addis Ababa University, 2013)

As can be seen from Table 6, as opposed to Addis Ababa University and Adama Science and Technology University Senate legislation (see Table 6), leaders responsible for decision communication are not indicated. Communication of Academic Senate deliberations and decisions was imprecise as legislation designates all the members of Academic Senate to inform staff of decisions without considering the communication time or channel and power chain of command. In fact, Academic Senate members could not be easily blamed for failing to communicate the decision to the academic staff and students because no proper chain of communication is explicit in Senate legislation, that is, who communicates to whom.

Table 6. Best and lowest performing universities communication of Academic Senate deliberation and decisions

	Communication of Senate Deliberations and Decisions	Time and means of Communication		Article
Best performing Universities		**Time**	**Means**	
DBU	By the direction given by the Chairperson of the Senate, College/Faculty/School Deans, Institute Directors, and other members of the Senate are expected to communicate pertinent Senate decisions to their respective constituents as soon as possible	As soon as	Not indicated	Article 19
HU	Vice Presidents, Heads of Academic Units in the Senate, Directors, Staff and Student Representatives in the Senate are expected to communicate pertinent Senate decisions to their respective constituents	Not indicated	Not indicated	Article 14
WCU	The Dean of every College/Institute is communicating issues on which the Senate deliberated and decided upon to their respective academic staff within reasonable time after every Senate meeting through writing, meeting or any other modalities.	Within reasonable time	Written form/ meeting/ other modalities	Article 28
Lowest Performing Public universities				
BHU	Vice presidents, Faculty/College/School/Institute Heads, Directors, Staff and Student Representatives are expected to communicate pertinent Senate decisions to their respective constituents	Not indicated	Not indicated	Article 11

DU	Members of the Senate shall communicate the decisions of the Senate to their respective and pertinent academic or administrative staffs. Such communication shall be conducted within reasonable time after every Senate meeting based on the approved minute through writing, meeting or any other modalities	Within reasonable time	Written form and any modalities	Article 14
AU	Not stated in the Senate Legislation	Not stated at all	Not stated at all	Not stated at all

(Bule Hora University, 2015; Debre Berhan University, 2012; Dilla University 2012; Hawassa University, 2015)

In the legal documents for these three universities, vague time phrases such as 'as soon as' (Debre Berhan University, 2012) and 'within reasonable time' (Dilla University 2012; Wachemo University, 2016) are used to indicate the required time of decision communication to the academic community of the Universities. Other universities do not indicate a required period. For instance, in two universities, documents simply state that 'Vice presidents, heads of academic units in the Academic Senate, directors, staff and student representatives in the Academic Senate are expected to communicate pertinent Academic Senate decisions to their respective constituents' (Bule Hora University, 2015; Hawassa University, 2015). The question of when leaders communicate the decision to the member of academic units remains open. Notably, Ambo University does not state the time and means of Academic Senate decision communication within its Senate legislation (see Table 6).

The implementation of the Bologna Process specifies key roles for each of institutional leaders, teachers, administrative staff, and students (McMahon, 2010). Unless there is full engagement and participation of the community of an institution in decision-making, the implementation of the Bologna Process will not happen (McMahon, 2010). In the Bologna Process, where the participation of stakeholders and independent learning of students is highly emphasised and valued, the communication of decisions and deliberation of the Academic Senate, which is the highest governing constituent of the university is paramount. Since the academic staff members are the implementers of the teaching programs, they need to receive communications regarding the decisions of the Academic Senate. In the conceptual framework, information that could place the universities in quadrant (AD) is missing, where the participation of system participants needs to be clearly indicated in the legal documents.

In order for clear compliance with the Proclamation, revision of Senate legislation in the light of the current academic reform is required.

Public universities of Ethiopia could also arrange inter-university benchmarking to remove the top down governance gaps of quadrant CB in their Senate legislation (Leisyte, 2007; Mok, 2007). For instance, the means and timing of decision communication of Addis Ababa University and Adama Science University are clearly specified, and their legislation could be a model for other universities to adopt.

In general, in examining the conceptual framework, differences have been observed among universities in their Academic Senate composition, the tenure of the membership, appointment procedures, and decision communication procedures. Looking at the Academic Senate composition, four universities: AAU, ASTU, DBU, and HU have more system participants in Academic Senate decision making, indicating they are in quadrant (AD) of the conceptual framework. However, the other four universities AU, DU, BHU, and WCU are categorised as less democratic as the number in the Academic Senate is less compared to other universities. Appointment of the Academic Senate members can be viewed as a top-down government approach, quadrant AC, where the President of the university appoints the majority of the Academic Senate members. The ordinary system participants of a university (academic staff and students) are not part of the system of electing Academic Senate members. In relation to communicating the decisions of Academic Senate to the rest of the system participants, only the legal documents of two universities, AAU and ASTU specify precise time and means of decision communication. However, in the legal documents of six universities, quadrant AD of the conceptual framework is missing, and legal documents are characterised by top-down government as indicated in quadrant AC. In general, the legal documents of the sample universities are characterised by two major approaches, authoritarian (top-down) quadrant AC, and democratic approach quadrant AD. Implementation of the Bologna Process requires that the authoritarian approach be replaced by the more collegial approach of governance quadrant CB. This change is needed to make the principles of governance and governmentality explicit in the legal documents of the Ethiopian public universities.

Conclusion

This paper reported a review and document analysis of the content of Academic Senate legislation of Ethiopian public universities in light of the implementation of the Bologna Process in that country. The analysis focused particularly on the means and timing of communication of Academic Senate decisions in the light of the concept of governance and governmentality. The results of the review indicate that public universities vary in the composition of Academic Senate. The lowest performing universities have fewer Academic Senate members

compared to the best-ranked universities. Whether the number of Academic Senate members relates to performance is left open for further research.

The review also revealed that all the sample universities' governance is characterized by hierarchal or top-down approach because in their legal documents, power is ultimately vested in the University President because the President appoints the majority of Academic Senate members. Since the Academic Senate is a central academic governing body of a university, implementation of the Bologna Process requires that Academic Senate need to be granted a power that is independent of the President. This tension of power can be addressed through the concept of governance and governmentality, and shared governance (shared power) should be in place. The Bologna Process was introduced as a means of overcoming current globalization challenges and integrating workforces into transnational geographies by promoting university competitiveness. The Bologna Process requires that legal document works promote institutional autonomy, and stakeholders' (academic staff and student) participation in decision making is needed (Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, 2012; Estermann & Nokkala, 2009; McMahon, 2010). This review has found that Academic Senate composition fosters a collegial approach because the Senate decision-making approach is participatory, with the participation of different College Deans, academic staff, and students explicitly representing both men and women, and physically challenged staff and students specified in the legal documents. When it comes to accountability of Academic Senates, inconsistencies have been observed in the legal documents. In some universities, Academic Senate is accountable to President while in others, Academic Senate is accountable to the Board. Therefore, it is not clear to whom the Academic Senate complies with and hence, clarity is needed in Higher Education Proclamation as it is a comprehensive legal basis for the establishment and development of higher education institutions in Ethiopia.

From the review of the legal documents, Ethiopian public universities would benefit from undertaking inter-university benchmarking with a view to improving legislation. Vague terms such as 'as soon as' and 'within reasonable time' have been used to indicate the required timeframe in decision communication and these should be reviewed. Finally, although public universities have already undergone academic reforms, this study suggests that carefully considered Senate legislation revision follows. The autonomous working environment for system participants in electing their leaders or representatives is required. For example, clear Academic Senate accountability, shared power, precise time and means of Academic Senate decision communication are

required as they are fundamental to the operation of the university system and the implementation the Bologna Process.

Following this review of the content of the Senate legislation of public universities and Higher Education Proclamation in Ethiopia, the next step is to consider the way the recent reforms have been experienced by participants in various institutional positions.

References

Adama Science and Technology University. (2016). *Adama Science and Technology University Senate Legislation*. Adama: Adama Science and Technology University.

Addis Ababa University. (2013). *Addis Ababa University Senate Legislation*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Printing Press.

Addis Ababa University. (2014). *Handbook for Higher Diploma Program (HDP)*. Addis Ababa: AAU Business Enterprise PLC Printing Press.

African Union. (2008). *Provisional agenda and programme of work*. Paper presented at the Validation Meeting for African Quality Rating Mechanism and Harmonization Strategy for Higher Education held 25th to 27th March.

Akalu, G. A. (2014). Higher Education in Ethiopia: Expansion, Quality Assurance and Institutional Autonomy. *Higher Education Quarterly*. *68*(4), 394-415. https://doi.org/10.1111/hequ.12036

Almendarez, L. (2013). Human capital theory: Implications for educational development in Belize and the Caribbean. *Caribbean Quarterly*. *59*(3-4), 21-33. https://doi.org/10.1080/00086495.2013.11672495

Ambo University. (2013). *Ambo University Senate Legislation*. Ambo: Ambo University.

Areaya, S. (2010). Tension Between Massification and Intensification Reforms and Implications for Teaching and Learning in Ethiopian Public Universities. *Journal of Higher Education in Africa*. *8*(2), 93-115.

Areaya, S., Shibeshi, A. & Tefera, D. (2013). Reengineering postgraduate curricula and its mode of delivery: graduate students' views of modular course delivery at Addis Ababa University. *Journal of Higher Education in Africa*. *11*(1-2), 71-100.

Assembly, U. G. (2013). A Life of Dignity For All: Accelerating Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals and Advancing the United Nations Development Agenda Beyond 2015. A Report of the Secretary-General. *A Report of the Secretary-General. New York, NY: United Nations*.

Ball, S. (2012). *Global Education Inc.: New policy networks and the neoliberal imaginary*. New York: Routledge.

Bano, S. & Taylor, J. (2014). Universities and the knowledge-based economy: Perceptions from a developing country. *Higher Education Research & Development*. *34*(2), 242-255. https://doi.org/10.1080/07294360.2014.956696

Banya, K. & Zajda, J. (2015). Globalization, the brain drain, and poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa. In *Second International Handbook on Globalisation, Education and Policy Research* (pp. 263-285): Springer.

Becker, G. S. (2009). *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Behailu, A. (2011). The Path of Governance Transformation in Ethiopian Higher Education – Institutional Perspective, A Tale of Three Universities Experience with Respect to BPR Reform.

Bejou, D. & Bejou, A. (2016). Shared Governance: The Key to Higher Education Equilibrium. *Journal of Relationship Marketing. 15*(1-2), 54-61. https://doi.org/10.1080/15332667.2015.1091630

Bergen Communique. (2005). The European Higher Education Area-achieving the goals, Communique of the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, Bergen, 19-20 May 2005. In: Žiūrėta 2006-03-20. Prieiga per internetą: http://europa.eu. int/comm/education/policies/2010/et_en. html.

Bloom, E., Canning, D. & Chan, K. (2006). *Higher education and economic development in Africa* (Vol. 102): World Bank Washington, DC.

Bloom, E., Canning, D., Chan, K. & Luca, D. (2014). Higher education and economic growth in Africa. *International Journal of African Higher Education. 1*(1), 22-57. https://doi.org/10.6017/ijahe.v1i1.5643

Bloom, et al. (2005). *Higher Education and Economic Development in Africa.* Washington D.C: World Bank.

Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative Research Journal. 9*(2), 27-40. https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027

Bule Hora University. (2015). *Bule Hora University Senate Legislation.* Bule Hora: Bule Hora University

Communiqué, L. (2009). The Bologna Process 2020-The European higher education area in the new decade. *Leuven and Louvain-La-Neuve.*

Corbin, J. & Strauss, A. (2008). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory. *Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.*

Crosier, D. & Parveva, T. (2013). *The Bologna Process: Its impact on higher education development in Europe and beyond.* Paris: UNESCO: International Institute for Educational Planning.

Dean, M. (2010). *Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society.* London: Sage Publications.

Debre Berhan University. (2012). *Debre Berhan University Senate Legislation.* Debre Berhan: Debre Berhan University.

Dehmel, A. (2006). Making a European area of lifelong learning a reality? Some critical reflections on the European Union's lifelong learning policies. *Comparative Education. 42*(1), 49-62. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050060500515744

Dervin, F. & Zajda, J. (2015). Governance in education: Diversity and effectiveness. In: Paris: UNESCO. Google Scholar.

Diang, M. C. (2013). *Colonialism, Neoliberalism, Education and Culture in Cameroon.* College of Education Theses and Dissertations. 52. Retrieved from https://via.library.depaul.edu/soe_etd/52

Diefenbach, T. & Sillince, J. A. (2011). Formal and informal hierarchy in different types of organization. *Organization Studies. 32*(11), 1515-1537. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840611421254

Dilla University. (2012). *Dilla University Senate Legislation.* Dilla: Dilla University.

Dumciuviene, D. (2015). The Impact of Education Policy to Country Economic Development. *Procedia: Social and Behavioral Sciences. 191*, 2427-2436. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.04.302

Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency. (2012). *The European Higher Education Area in 2012: Bologna Process Implementation Report.* Brussels: Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency.

Estermann, T. & Nokkala, T. (2009). *University autonomy in Europe: exploratory study*: European University Association Brussels.

European Commission. (2001). *Making a European area of lifelong learning a reality.* Brussels: European Commission, Directorate-General for Education and Culture and Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs.

Fejes, A. (2008). European citizens under construction: The Bologna process analysed from a governmentality perspective. *Educational Philosophy and Theory. 40*(4), 515-530. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-5812.2007.00362.x

Ferede, W. (2013). Historical evolution and the dynamics of modern education in Ethiopia. *Journal of Educational Research and Studies. 1*(5), 40-49.

Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality": 87-104. *G., Burchell, C., Gordon., & P., Miller (Eds.). The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.*

Foucault, M., & Lewis, A. (1991). *Politics and the study of discourse.*

Fugar, F. D. K., Ashiboe-Mensah, N. A. & Adinyira, E. (2013). Human Capital Theory: Implications for the Ghanaian Construction Industry Development. *Journal of Construction Project Management and Innovation. 3*(3), 464-479.

Gebremeskel, H. H. (2014). Influence of the Bologna Process on African higher education: Ethiopian higher education in focus. *International Journal of Research Studies in Education. 3*(4). https://doi.org/10.5861/ijrse.2014.785

Gebremeskel, H. H. & Feleke, K. M. (2016). Exploring the context of Ethiopian higher education system using Clark's triangle of coordination. *Tertiary Education and Management. 22*(2), 99-120. https://doi.org/10.1080/13583883.2016.1149739

Geo-JaJa, M. A. & Zajda, J. (2015). Globalisation and the future of education in Africa. In *Second International Handbook on Globalisation, Education and Policy Research* (pp. 287-307): Springer.

Hawassa University. (2015). *Hawassa University Senate Legislation.* Hawassa: Hawassa University.

Held, D. (1999). *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Keeling, R. (2006). The Bologna Process and the Lisbon Research Agenda: The European Commission's expanding role in higher education discourse. *European Journal of Education. 41*(2), 203-223. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-3435.2006.00256.x

Kigotho, W. (2015, 20 March 2015). Africa: No agreed university governance model for post-2015 era. *University World News: The Global Window on Higher Education.*

Leisyte, L. (2007). *University governance and academic research: Case studies of research units in Dutch and English universities*: University of Twente.

MacGregor, C. (2009, 11 October 2009). Africa: Higher education and development. *The Global Window on Higher Education.*

Martin, M. & Stella, A. (2007). *External quality assurance in higher education: making choices (85).* Paris: UNESCO: International Institute for Educational Planning.

McMahon, F. (2010). *European Higher Education and the Bologna Process.* Dublin Institute of Technology.

Medvedeva, T. A. (2015). University Education: The Challenges of 21st Century. *Procedia: Social and Behavioral Sciences. 166*, 422-426. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.12.547

Mehari, Y. (2010). *Governance in Ethiopian Higher Education System:State-Higher Education Insitutions Relationship, The Case of Mekelle University.* (MA), University of Tampere, Finland.

Ministry of Education. (2016a). Education Statistics Annual Abstract. from Ministry of Education http://www.moe.gov.et

Ministry of Education. (2016b). *'Public University Plan Implementation Evaluation and Report of 2016'.* Retrieved from Addis Ababa: Ministry of Education. (2016c). *'Public University Plan Implementation Evaluation and Report of 2016'.* Addis Ababa: Ministry of Education.

Moges, L. (2015). *Modularization and the Practices of Module Development in Selected Ethiopian Universities.* (Doctoral dissertation, Addis Ababa University)

Mok, K. H. (2007). Questing for internationalization of universities in Asia: Critical reflections. *Journal of Studies in International Education. 11*(3-4), 433-454. https://doi.org/10.1177/1028315306291945

Mushemeza, E. D. (2016). Opportunities and Challenges of Academic Staff in Higher Education in Africa. *International Journal of Higher Education. 5*(3), 236-246. https://doi.org/10.5430/ijhe.v5n3p236

OECD. (2002). *Financing education: Investments and returns analysis of the world education indicators.* Paris: OECD publishing.

Okeke, C. I. (2010). A neglected impediment to true Africanisation of African higher education curricula: Same agenda, differential fee regimes. *Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. 8*(2), 39-52.

Olaniyan, D. A. & Okemakinde, T. (2008). Human Capital Theory: Implications for Educational Development. *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences. 5*(5), 479-483.

Olsen, J. P. (2002). Reforming European institutions of governance. *Journal of Common Market Studies. 40*(4), 581-602. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00389

Petlane, T. (2009). Integrating governance education into university education in Africa: perspectives, challenges and lessons. *African perspectives. Global insights,* (43), 35. Retrieved from www.saiia.org.za

Rizvi, F. & Lingard, B. (2010). *Globalizing Education Policy.* New York: Routledge Printing Press.

Roberts, L. & Ajai-Ajagbe, P. (2013). *Higher Education and the Millennium Development Goals from, and where are going?* United Kingdom: The Association of Commonwealth Universities.

Rose, N., O'Malley, P. & Valverde, M. (2006). Governmentality. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science. 2*(1), 83-104. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.2.081805.105900

Saint, W. (2009a). Guiding Universities: Governance and Management Arrangements around the Globe. *Human Development Network. Washington, DC: World Bank.*

Saint, W. (2009b). Legal frameworks for higher education governance in sub-Saharan Africa. *Higher Education Policy. 22*(4), 523-550. https://doi.org/10.1057/hep.2009.17

Sall, H. N. & Ndjaye, B. D. (2007). Higher education in Africa: Between perspectives opened by the Bologna Process and the commodification of education. *European Education. 39*(4), 43-57. https://doi.org/10.2753/EUE1056-4934390403

Segebart, D. (2010). Government, Governance and Governmentality in Pará, Northern Brazil. In *Decentralized Development in Latin America* (pp. 129-138): Springer.

Sellar, S. & Lingard, B. (2014). The OECD and the expansion of PISA: New global modes of governance in education. *British Educational Research Journal. 40*(6), 917-936. https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3120

Sewonu, R. (2010). *Bologna Process and its impact on African higher education.* Paper presented at the Triennial Africa Conference.

Shattock, M. (2006). *Managing good governance in higher education. Maidenhead.* Berkshire: Open University Press.

Singh, M. & Manuh, T. (2007). *The Contribution of Higher Education to National Education System: Current Challenges in Africa.* Paper presented at the Final Report of the African Regional Research Seminar, Accra, Ghana. UNESCO Forum on Higher Education, Research and Knowledge.

Taylor, J., Hanlon, M. & Yorke, M. (2013). The evolution and practice of institutional research. *New Directions for Institutional Research. 2013*(157), 59-75. https://doi.org/10.1002/ir.20039

Taylor, M. (2013). Shared governance in the modern university. *Higher Education Quarterly. 67*(1), 80-94. https://doi.org/10.1111/hequ.12003

Teferra, D. & Altbachl, P. G. (2004). African higher education: Challenges for the 21st century. *Higher Education. 47*(1), 21-50. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:HIGH.0000009822.49980.30

Teshome, A. (2012). *Meles's Development Paradigm and Its Impacts on Economic Transformation in Ethiopia.* Ethiopia Civil Service University. Addis Ababa.

Tessema, A. & Abebe, M. (2011). Higher Education in Ethiopia: Challenges and the Way Forward. *International Journal of Education Economics and Development. 2*(3), 225-244. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJEED.2011.042403

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. (2009). Higher Education Proclamation No. 650/2009. *Federal Negaret Gazeta. 64*, 4976-5044.

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. (2016). *Growth and transformation plan II (GTP II) (2015/16-2019/20).* Addis Ababa: National Planning Commission.

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Negaret Gazeta. (2011). Adama Science and Technology University Establishment Council of Ministers Regulation. *237/2011*

Tierney, W. G. & Minor, J. T. (2004). A cultural perspective on communication and governance. *New Directions for Higher Education.* (127), 85-94. https://doi.org/10.1002/he.158

UNESCO. (2012). UNESCO data tables. Retrieved 03/03/2017, from UNESCO stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=167

Vandemoortele, J. (2012). Advancing the global development agenda post-2015: some thoughts, ideas and practical suggestions. *New York: UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda.*

Varghese, N. (2013). *Governance reforms in higher education: A study of selected countries in Africa.* Paper presented at the Policy Forum on governance reforms in higher education in Africa, Nairobi Kenya. Paris: UNESCO.

Wachemo University. (2016). Senate Legislation of Wachemo University. In. Hosanna: Wachemo University.

Woldegiorgis, E. T. (2013). Conceptualizing harmonization of higher education systems: The application of regional integration theories on higher education studies. *Higher Education Studies. 3*(2), 12. https://doi.org/10.5539/hes.v3n2p12

Woldegiorgis, E. T. & Doevenspeck, M. (2013). The changing role of higher education in Africa: A Historical Reflection. *Higher Education Studies. 3*(6), 35. https://doi.org/10.5539/hes.v3n6p35

Woldegiorgis, E. T., Jonck, P. & Goujon, A. (2015). Regional Higher Education Reform Initiatives in Africa: A Comparative Analysis with the Bologna Process. *International Journal of Higher Education. 4*(1), 241-253. https://doi.org/10.5430/ijhe.v4n1p241

Woldetensai, Y. (2009). Regional harmonization of higher education for Africa: Background document. *Accra, Ghana: Association of African Universities.*

World Bank. (1991). *The African Capacity Building Initiative: Toward Improved Policy Analysis and Development Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*: ERIC Clearinghouse.

Zeleza, P. (2003). Academic Freedom in the Neo-Liberal Order: Government, Globalization, Governance and Gender. *Journal of Higher Education in Africa. 1*(1), 149-194.

Zmas, A. (2015). Global impacts of the Bologna Process: International perspectives, local particularities. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative Education. 45*(5), 727-747. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057925.2014.899725